

## Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Forum for Security Co-operation

FSC.AIAM/40/01 7 March 2001

**ENGLISH** only

**Conference Services** 

Please find attached the Chairman's Report and reports of the Working Group Rapporteurs of the 2001 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.



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# 2001 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

**Vienna**, 26-28 February 2001

## **SUMMARY**

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# CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION ON THE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

## **Vienna**, 26-28 **February 2001**

Mr. Chairman,

As Chairman of the closing plenary of the 11th Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), held in Vienna, it is an honour for me to report to the Forum for Security Co-operation on the proceedings, discussions and results of that meeting.

The objective of the meeting was, in accordance with Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999, to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). In open discussions, the participating States exchanged their views, with the common objective of contributing to the enhancement of confidence and security in the OSCE area.

The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, as well as Japan, the Republic of Korea and, for the first time, Thailand, were invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings.

The AIAM comprised two plenary sessions, the opening one chaired by Slovenia and the closing one by Sweden, and four working groups, skilfully facilitated by designated co-ordinators. In the margins of the meeting, Sweden organized a workshop on defence planning, which also included a briefing by a Canadian expert.

At the closing plenary session, the four rapporteurs presented their reports on the deliberations in each working group. Their reports will be attached to this statement, and my comments on the working groups are based on their comprehensive reports.

In the **opening plenary**, delegations warmly welcomed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the AIAM. There was a strong consensus regarding the paramount importance of satisfactory implementation. Many delegations stressed that the Vienna Document (VD) should not, for the foreseeable future, be reopened, but that existing tools could well be developed and fine-tuned.

Working Group I addressed the questions of annual exchange of military information (AEMI), global exchange of military information, and defence planning. It was emphasized that the provisions of the VD concerning AEMI were of particular importance. The standard of implementation was considered high, and it was noted that the number of States meeting their obligations had increased in the year 2000. However, some States still did not fully comply. Several delegations stressed their readiness to help and assist other participating States with implementation in this field.

Many delegations emphasized that implementation of the defence planning commitments led to better military predictability in the OSCE area, and facilitated democratic control over the armed forces.

A reminder was given that the information provided should follow the structure of chapter II. It was suggested that the defence planning information could be provided voluntarily in two OSCE languages, and/or published on the Internet. These three proposals were all aimed at making comparisons easier and thus enhancing real transparency.

One delegation explained that it had not been able to comply with its obligations in 2000 due to lack of qualified personnel and technical problems, but gave an assurance that it would do its best to comply as soon as possible. This was viewed as a constructive contribution, and several delegations offered assistance.

Working Group II focused on the "bad weather" capability of the VD in general and specifically on risk reduction mechanisms. Several delegations agreed that chapter III had the potential to play a crucial role in crisis management. It was suggested that the implementation of chapter III could be improved as part of the Security Dialogue in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Several States found merit in the idea of developing guidelines for the application of existing measures in times of crises. Other delegations, however, raised the issue of whether the VD had reached the limits of its applicability in this respect, and speculated that it might be worth considering the creation of tailor-made crisis management instruments.

The new chapter X on regional measures was generally deemed a very valuable tool for confidence and security building. There were numerous reports on bilateral and subregional agreements, inspired by this chapter. Such agreements were considered to contribute to security not only in the region in question, but in the entire OSCE area.

An impressive number of military contacts within the OSCE context were reported. Six visits to air bases, five "military co-operation" visits, and three presentations of new types of equipment had been notified for 2001. Since the current five-year time-frame for air base visits expires at the end of 2001, the handful of participating States that had neither hosted nor announced their intention to host a visit were urged to do so. One delegation suggested that "sports associations" be used more extensively within the framework of military contacts.

**Working Group III** developed into an open and frank exchange of views in the best tradition of previous AIAMs. The discussions were concrete and constructive. The applicability of the VD 99 in crises was a theme in this working group as well, and the VD 99 was widely regarded as an all weather document. The Russian invitation for observation and the notification measures relating to the military situation in Northern Caucasus did not, according to some delegations, satisfy the VD 99 provisions. Nevertheless, the Russian measures were widely welcomed as important steps toward more transparency.

Practical problems of applying notification and observation measures in crisis situations were pointed out. Issues discussed were, *inter alia*, how to strike a correct balance between transparency and operational security, and how often information on troops and equipment should be updated. The delegations shared the view that provided there was the political will, the VD 99 could also be effectively applied in crisis situations.

All delegations expressed concern about the recurring "race quota" in January, and supported the idea of a more even distribution of visits over the year. The need for adherence to the specified time-frames for inspection and evaluation requests was stressed, and the majority of delegations supported the view that requests that did not comply with those time frames should be considered invalid. In this context, it was proposed that the notification formats should be modified to include date and time.

Several delegations were concerned about the increased routine use of inspections. This threatened to undermine the original purpose of inspections, due to the early exhaustion of passive quotas. The delegations agreed that inspection quotas ideally should remain available all year in order to enhance the "all weather" capability of the VD 99.

Several specific points needing further clarification were identified with the hope that they could be pursued by FSC Working Group A: size of the specified area (paragraph 80); special measures concerning the over-flight of border areas; access to military and defence installations (paragraph 81); auxiliary personnel (paragraphs 92 and 125); *force majeure* and denial without adequate grounds (paragraph 120); and transit of verification teams and point of entry/exit (POE) procedures.

In **Working Group IV**, all delegations expressed gratitude to the Netherlands for hosting the communications network so far. They emphasized the urgency of decisions on a new location for the central mail server and on phase II of the network upgrade. Many delegations showed willingness to compromise.

Concerning principles of non-proliferation, one delegation conveyed information on export control for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from a recent meeting at the highest national level.

It was noted that ten States had not submitted their questionnaires for the last year on principles governing conventional arms transfers.

Many delegations stressed the importance of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) working paper was generally welcomed as a good basis for its implementation. One State provided a comprehensive account on its national efforts to collect over half a million small arms adrift in the country. It was emphasized that the Document would provide important input to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects later this year. New information was provided on the SALW seminar in Baku in June. Many delegations expressed their interest in this event, and some announced new contributions to it.

Delegations were reminded of the great importance of the Code of Conduct as it reflected fundamental common values. Some delegations deeply regretted that not all participating States fully complied with its commitments. These delegations also stated that all elements of armed forces, intelligence services and the police were to remain under effective constitutional review and control, and conform to the rule of law and international law. Assistance for the implementation of the Code was offered, and one delegation said that it would organize a workshop on the Code in April. Delegations noted with concern that not all answers to the questionnaires on implementation had been provided.

In the **closing session**, one delegation declared its interest in a broader variety of CSBMs, including sea and air based weapons. There was a fruitful discussion on the future organization of THE AIAM. Some delegations expressed interest in a more flexible, yet comprehensive, agenda next year which could focus more on areas of particular interest. It was suggested that stock should be taken before next year's AIAM of the status of proposals made during this year's AIAM. The idea of starting preparations for the AIAM earlier was supported by some delegations.

One delegation raised the question of the duration of the AIAM. Some delegations responded that three days were necessary to allow for informal contacts between experts as well as formal meetings.

#### Mr Chairman,

It is my conviction that FSC Working Group A will carefully study and address the suggestions and assessments made during this year's AIAM, especially on the applicability and operability of existing measures in bad weather situations, which was the central theme in our discussions.

Before concluding, let me remind you that the AIAM agreed that next year's meeting will be held the first week of March 2002, the modalities and agenda to be decided in this forum.

Finally, let me once again express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to all participants of the AIAM, and in particular the co-ordinators and rapporteurs, the CPC, the previous FSC Chair, Norway, and the Chair of the opening session, Slovenia.

## WORKING GROUP I

Monday, 26 February 2001

## Report of the Working Group Rapporteur

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- Annual Exchange of Military Information
- Defence Planning

Agenda item 3: Operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- Global Exchange of Military Information

#### Introduction

Under the co-ordination of Brigadier General Joze Konda from Slovenia, and based on a questionnaire, Working Group I addressed the issues of the Annual Exchange of Military Information, Defence Planning and the Global Exchange of Military Information. The Co-ordinator first mentioned the good work which had been done with respect to the implementation of these provisions. Nevertheless, there were still some cases of non-compliance. The purpose of the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting was not to lay blame on participating States, but to help and give assistance where necessary.

## 1. Annual Exchange of Military Information (VD 99, Chapter I)

## 1.1 Information on military forces

Concerning this topic, it was the general understanding that this provision of the Vienna Document was of particular importance (especially for evaluations and inspections) and was actually the basis of all confidence- and security-building measures. It was noted that the standard of implementation achieved was high and that the number of participating States conforming to the relevant provisions had increased since the previous year. This was looked upon as encouraging and as demonstrating a real will to achieve transparency. Conversely, it was noted that some participating States still did not completely fulfil their obligations (incomplete exchange of information, e.g., missing quotas), and that was worrying, since collecting and submitting such data was not a very complicated or costly process. Furthermore, some delegations stressed that there was assistance available, either from the CPC or from other participating States. Some of them renewed their offer in this respect.

## 1.2 Data relating to major weapon and equipment systems

Concerning the data exchanged, the question was raised by some delegations as to whether an up-date or even a completely new exchange of photographs and technical data should not be decided upon, since most of the data had not been up-dated since 1992, or, if

so, only in an incomplete and unsystematic manner. Quite a number of delegations supported the idea of a new exchange, possibly providing the photographs on a CD-ROM.

Another question was raised about the obligation to produce a NIL report, as provided for in other paragraphs of VD 99. It was the understanding of two delegations that a NIL report was also required in this case.

## 2. Defence Planning (VD 99, Chapter II, Para. 15)

It was stated that full compliance with the respective provisions was a very important issue. Some delegations stressed that defence planning made it possible to predict future developments and facilitated democratic control over the armed forces. In particular, one delegation underlined the importance of closely following the different sub-paragraphs (15.1 to 15.4) with regard to the overall information provided. That would facilitate comparison of the information exchanged by the different participating States. One delegation supported the earlier proposal made by the CPC for a certain type of formatting.

Two delegations stated that the three-month deadline for submitting the information could result in incomplete information due to various national decision-making procedures.

Another delegation announced that it already provided the information required on the Internet. However, information on defence planning was regarded as meriting separate discussion, either in the FSC, for instance under the agenda item "Security Dialogue", or in annual discussion meetings or *ad hoc* meetings or seminars, such as the next Seminar on Military Doctrines. The linguistic problem was also raised, and it was proposed that defence planning should be submitted in a second OSCE language. Finally, one delegation announced that it would host a parallel workshop on this specific topic on the following day, an initiative that was very much appreciated by other delegations.

## 3. Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI)

In this respect, also, compliance slightly improved during the past year. However, there are still some countries which have never exchanged any information. One delegation stressed the added value of this exchange. The question of how to further improve the situation was addressed, but no specific answer was found. Up-dates or possibly even completely new information exchanges (including photographs) and NIL reports were also considered by some delegations.

#### 4. General remark

With regard to non-compliance, one delegation explained its technical difficulties and its lack of qualified personnel to fulfil its obligations. However, this participating State gave assurances that it would do its best to comply as soon as possible. In this case too, assistance was offered.

## **Conclusion**

The debates in Working Group I were frank, although only one clarification for non-compliance was provided. Compliance with the different provisions has indeed

improved, but there are still the same few participating States facing difficulties. Further improvements will hopefully be reported next year.

### WORKING GROUP II

Monday, 26 February 2001

## Report of the Working Group Rapporteur

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- Risk reduction
- Contacts
- Regional measures

## **Risk reduction**

The Co-ordinator opened the session by summarizing the process that had led to the current Vienna Document language. He then asked a series of thought-provoking questions designed to generate discussion on the application and effectiveness of Chapter III.

A number of delegations underlined in particular the "all weather" nature of Chapter III and of the Vienna Document as a whole. Although Chapter III had limited application, several delegations agreed that it had the potential to play a crucial role in crisis management in Europe. It was therefore suggested that there would be merit in considering how the implementation of Chapter III could be improved as part of the Security Dialogue. The objective would be to reach a common understanding on the application of the existing measures through the development of a list of guidelines.

Three delegations questioned whether the Vienna Document had reached the limits of its applicability. As a consequence, they speculated that it might be time to consider the creation of a crisis-management instrument specifically tailored to deal with crises in the OSCE region, complementing the existing instruments. In response, some delegations said that it was better to improve the implementation of the current text rather than to create a new instrument.

No specific suggestions were made concerning "hazardous incidents of a military nature". With regard to "the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns", the Co-ordinator noted that cost implications might represent a significant obstacle to implementation.

The Co-ordinator concluded that, although the common feeling was that it was not the right time to attempt to alter the text of the Vienna Document, it was certainly worthwhile trying to enrich its application.

## Stabilizing measures for localized crisis management

There was no objection to the Co-ordinator's opening statement, which underlined this rarely applied but extremely important part of the Vienna Document. The Co-ordinator noted that much of what had been said on "risk reduction" was also relevant to this topic.

## **Regional measures**

The Co-ordinator emphasized the important role that Chapter X of the new Vienna Document played in the building of confidence and security at the regional level.

Delegates from Belarus, Finland, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine all reported either the implementation of, plans to implement, or the readiness to embark on regional bilateral and multilateral agreements with neighbouring OSCE and non-OSCE participating States. All delegations underlined the importance of regional agreements as a confidence-building tool. One delegation said that the increasing number of regional agreements being announced at recent AIAMs was a positive trend, although more could be done in certain regions, notably the South Caucasus, the Western Balkans and Central Asia. In this context, one delegation raised the issue of the creation of a regional security and stability pact covering the Baltic Sea region, which would build on existing agreements between regional participating States.

#### **Contacts**

The Co-ordinator suggested that discussions should focus on developments that had taken place under "Contacts" over the past year, any current shortcomings and possible ways to improve implementation.

The Co-ordinator welcomed the FSC Chairman's statement of November 2000, which had reiterated the harmonization of the five-year schedules for air base visits. He noted that the new schedule would begin in 2002.

Using the CPC's most recent survey, the Co-ordinator calculated that six participating States had hosted visits to air bases in the past year. In 2001, a further six were scheduled.

One delegation noted that the current five-year time frame for air base visits would expire at the end of the current year, and a handful of participating States had neither hosted nor announced their intention to host a visit. It was not the AIAM's role to "name and shame", but the Co-ordinator urged those participating States that were planning to host visits in the current year to notify the CPC.

Delegates from the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Portugal and the Russian Federation announced either the hosting or the intention to host air base visits in 2000 or 2001. The majority of the visits scheduled for 2001 would include the demonstration of new military equipment.

A number of delegations gave details of military contacts, verification training and language courses provided in 2000. One delegation suggested that "sports associations" should be used more extensively within the framework of military contacts.

On the basis of the CPC's survey, the Co-ordinator announced that six participating States had hosted "Military Co-operation" visits in 2000. In 2001, the CPC had received notifications for a further five. One delegation noted that it was difficult to distinguish from the notification whether it was a voluntary or a mandatory activity.

The Co-ordinator reminded delegations that the CPC had been informed of only one presentation of new types of equipment that had taken place in 2000. Encouragingly, three were scheduled for 2001.

## WORKING GROUP III

Tuesday, 27 February 2001

## **Report of the Working Group Rapporteur**

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment, and conclusions:

- Military activities:
  - Prior notification of certain military activities;
  - Observation of certain military activities;
  - Annual calendars:
  - Constraining provisions;
- Compliance and verification;

## 1. Military activities

In terms of military activities, the main topic was the assessment of the "all-weather" capabilities of the VD 99, as in the AIAM 2000, the VD 99 was widely regarded as an all-weather document. The Russian invitation for observation and the notification measures in relation to the military situation in the Northern Caucasus, in the opinion of some delegations, did not satisfy the VD 99 obligations. Nevertheless, the Russian measures were widely welcomed as important steps towards better transparency.

The practical problems connected with the applicability of notification and observation measures in crisis situations were pointed out. The problems discussed included, *inter alia*, the questions as to how often the information on troops and equipment should be updated, and what could be the right balance between transparency and operational security in the framework of military activities in a crisis situation. The delegations shared the view that, given political will, the VD 99 could be effectively applied also in crisis situations. There were also proposals to develop a "crisis framework" or set of guidelines on the VD's application in crisis situations in order to further enhance its all-weather capabilities.

Delegations also raised the question of the notification thresholds for certain military activities and some delegations supported their review in the light of recent developments. Other delegations underlined the importance, in this respect, of voluntary bilateral and regional measures, based on Chapter X (Regional Measures).

## 2. Compliance and verification

The lively debate on compliance and verification issues covered a multitude of topics, ranging from practical problems encountered during evaluation visits and inspections to more general subjects.

All delegations expressed their concern about the "quota race" in January, and supported the idea of a more even distribution of verification measures over a calendar year. Regional measures were identified to alleviate this problem and their increased application

was encouraged. The importance of adherence to the specified time frames for inspection and evaluation requests was emphasized and the majority of delegations supported the view that requests that did not comply with the time frames should be considered invalid. Several delegations expressed their uneasiness at the increased routine use of inspections, whereby these were less and less motivated by suspicions of notifiable military activity and had become routine verification measures. Even if that indicated increased confidence among participating States, it threatened to undermine the original purpose of inspections due to early exhaustion of passive quotas. The delegations shared the view that inspection quotas should remain available all year in order to enhance the all-weather capabilities of the VD 99. The link to Chapter III (Risk Reduction) was also pointed out.

During the discussion, the participating States were reminded of their obligation to distribute full and timely reports of every evaluation visit and inspection and answer evaluation and inspection requests promptly. It was proposed that the notification formats should be modified to include date and time of the request and indicate whether the request was based on a voluntary regional arrangement.

Several specific points needing further clarification were raised in the hope that they could be pursued by Working Group A:

- Size of the specified area (paragraph 80);
- Special measures concerning the overflight over border areas;
- Access to military and defence installations (paragraph 81);
- Auxiliary personnel (paragraphs 92 and 125);
- Force majeure and denial without adequate grounds (paragraph 120);
- Transit of verification teams and POE procedures.

In conclusion, delegations felt that the general level of implementation of these provisions was adequate and some improvements during the year 2000 were reported. However, the need for FSC Working Group A to take a more active role in tackling the remaining issues was underscored.

#### WORKING GROUP IV

Tuesday, 27 February 2001

## **Report of the Working Group Rapporteur**

Agenda item 3: Operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- Communications;
- Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
- Principles Governing Non-Proliferation;
- Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
- Questionnaire on the Process of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
- Small arms and light weapons.

## Communication and compliance and verification

The Co-ordinator asked the delegations to comment on the current functioning of the network and to make proposals for its improvement. All delegations expressed their gratitude to the Netherlands for hosting the network so far. They stressed the need to find an early solution for the future location of the network, based on the principles of security, efficiency and cost effectiveness. This decision should be taken before the end of March 2001, so as to allow about three months to upgrade the network. Some delegations referred to Vienna as its future location or expressed support for a compromise proposal suggested in December 2000.

Although delegations stressed the importance of upgrading the network, it was also mentioned that not all the participating States were currently able to participate at all. If submission of information in a second language was permitted, that would help to bring about wider participation.

## **Working Group IV**

The Working Group's discussions were structured in line with the Co-ordinator's proposal that some of the topics could be clustered.

#### **Principles Governing Non-Proliferation**

One delegation referred to a very recent meeting at the highest national level during which legal and non-legal national export control measures relating to weapons of mass destruction and missile components had been discussed.

#### **Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers**

One delegation mentioned that, in 2000, ten participating States had not submitted their questionnaires. As it had been agreed last year that information on military holdings was voluntary, only figures on exports should be provided.

#### Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

The Co-ordinator pointed to the CPC paper as a good basis for determining how to approach future implementation of the SALW document. All countries stressed the document's importance. It was also stressed that the OSCE addressed SALW as part of an overall security assessment in any country, and that full implementation of its Section V was needed. One delegation described progress in the collection of about half a million arms some years ago. It furthermore stressed the link between economic development, foreign investment, overall security and solving the SALW issue. Delegations were supportive of CPC participation in preparations for the United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2001. Mention was also made of the need to avoid duplication of United Nations and OSCE efforts, in particular also in light of the development of United Nations instruments which would imply legal obligations. Delegations also expressed support for the seminar to be held in Baku in June 2001, which would have a broad approach, focus on regional and national implementation and provide results for the United Nations Conference. Some delegations expressed interest in assisting in the preparations, or committed experts or keynote speakers. Delegations agreed that they would take the 30 June deadline for information-sharing seriously, and gratitude was expressed towards the United Kingdom Delegation for having provided co-ordinators for the negotiations of the SALW document.

#### **Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines**

It was noted that the Ottawa Convention had been signed by 139 States and ratified by 110 of them, while 38 had given notification that they had ceased to produce landmines altogether. One delegation of a State not party to the Convention also described legal and non-legal efforts that had been made. Delegations voiced the necessity of living up to commitments to transparency and information sharing, or described national programmes or bilateral treaties concluded with other countries on demining efforts.

#### **Code of Conduct**

Delegations were reminded of the importance of the document as a comprehensive and living document and an innovative instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Some delegations deeply regretted that not all participating States were fully complying with the commitments contained in it. Earlier experience with events should therefore be used for future implementation efforts. The delegations also stated that all elements of armed forces, including military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services and the police, were to remain under effective constitutional review and control and to conform to the rule of law and international law. Assistance in implementation of the Code of Conduct should be offered to countries in political, societal and military transition. Delegations were also reminded of the FSC decision to hold the next Code of Conduct seminar not later than in 2002. The

delegations noted with concern that, although the Code also provided for exchange of experiences among participating States, not all questionnaires on national implementation had been provided. Referring to the document as a consensus-based document, one delegation stressed that it looked at the Code in its entirety, seeing all aspects of the document as of equal value. Delegations were finally informed by one delegation about an upcoming workshop on the Code of Conduct to be organized by his State in September 2001.



## Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Forum for Security Co-operation

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#### 314th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 320, Agenda item 2

## DECISION No. 1/01 AGENDA OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

## 26-28 February 2001

#### I. AGENDA

- 1. Opening of the Meeting by the Chairperson
  - Report of the Chairperson of the FSC on CSBM issues discussed in the FSC during 2000;
  - Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC);
  - General statements.
- 2. Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
  - Annual exchange of military information;
  - Defence planning;
  - Military activities:
  - Prior notification of certain military activities;
  - Observation of certain military activities;
  - Annual calendars;
  - Constraining provisions;
  - Compliance and verification;
  - Risk reduction;
  - Contacts:
  - Regional measures.
- 3. Operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
  - Communications:
  - Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
  - Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
  - Principles Governing Non-Proliferation;
  - Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations;
  - Global Exchange of Military Information;

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- Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
- Questionnaire on the Process of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
- Small arms and light weapons.
- 4. Closure of the Meeting
  - Working group summaries and concluding remarks;
  - Date of the 2002 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

#### II. TIMETABLE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES

1. The AIAM will be organized into an opening and a closing plenary meeting as well as working group meetings to address all topics contained in the agenda. The indicative timetable (II.9) provides more detail.

The working hours of the Meeting will be 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.

Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided.

- 2. The Meeting will be chaired by participating States, in rotation in accordance with the French alphabetical order, following the chairmanship of the closing plenary of the 2000 AIAM (Slovakia). The chair of the opening plenary and working groups will be held by Slovenia, while the chair of the closing plenary will be held by Sweden.
- 3. There will be no formal statements in the working groups.

All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide experts to participate in the working groups. They are designed to be very informal sessions of national experts with the dual objective of answering questions and exchanging information between participating States.

4. Each working group will have one or more designated co-ordinators and one rapporteur. The duties of the co-ordinators will be to facilitate the discussion, while the duties of the rapporteurs will be to present an oral report to the closing plenary.

If possible, the co-ordinator will circulate a list of questions or topics for discussion, making use of the CPC survey of suggestions of the last AIAM, prior to his or her session to help guide the discussion and ensure that all relevant areas are addressed.

During the first part of the closing plenary, the rapporteur of each working group will provide an oral report to the delegates on the issues that the working group has addressed, including problem areas, improvements in implementation accomplished by OSCE participating States, suggestions for further improvement and any other pertinent information. After each oral report, the rapporteur will answer questions. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the reports presented by the rapporteurs.

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The rapporteur will also provide a written report for inclusion in the survey of suggestions drawn up by the CPC.

Delegations that have volunteers for the role of working group co-ordinator or rapporteur should provide the name of the individual and working group/preferred topic to the Chairperson of the FSC as soon as possible, but not later than 14 February 2001. The co-ordinator(s) and rapporteur for each working group/topic will be made known to all delegations not later than 21 February 2001.

5. Pertinent additional areas relating to CSBMs can be considered for discussion. Delegations that wish to suggest additional areas for discussion in the working groups should contact the Chairperson of the FSC not later than 14 February 2001.

Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations and concrete examples of their own implementation procedures as appropriate.

- 6. Within one month of the conclusion of the AIAM, the CPC will provide a written survey of suggestions made during the Meeting aiming at improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.
- 7. During the first FSC plenary meeting after the conclusion of the AIAM, the chairperson of the closing plenary will submit a report on the Meeting to the FSC.
- 8. The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Partners for Co-operation (Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) are invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings of the 2001 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.
- 9. Indicative timetable

#### Monday, 26 February

9.30 a.m. Organizational meeting (chairpersons, co-ordinators, rapporteurs, CPC)

10 a.m.-1 p.m. Opening plenary

- Report of the Chairperson of the FSC on CSBM issues discussed in the FSC during 2000
- Situation report by the Director of the CPC
- General statements

3 p.m.-6 p.m. Working Group I

- Global Exchange of Military Information
- Defence planning
- Annual Exchange of Military Information

- 4 - Annex

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## Tuesday, 27 February

10 a.m.-1 p.m.

## Working Group II

- Risk reduction
- Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations
- Regional measures
- Contacts

3 p.m.-6 p.m.

## Working Group III

- Communications
- Military activities (prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, annual calendars, constraining provisions)
- Compliance and verification

## Wednesday, 28 February

10 a.m.-1 p.m.

## Working Group IV

- Principles Governing Non-Proliferation
- Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines
- Questionnaire on the Process of Ratification of the
  - Chemical Weapons Convention
- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers
- Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of
  - Security
- OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

3 p.m.

## Closing plenary

- Rapporteurs' reports
- Discussion
- Concluding remarks
- Date of the 2002 AIAM
- Closure