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**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF FRANCE AT THE MEETING OF THE  
OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

Vienna, 21 January 2009

Mr. Chairman,  
Mr. Secretary General,  
Distinguished permanent representatives,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure and an honour for me to mark today the beginning of the French Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC).

In what will be no easy task, France is assuming this position following Finland, a country to which I wish to extend my warm thanks and congratulations for the work it accomplished with such perseverance and effectiveness during these last months, under circumstances troubled by the conflict that erupted in the Caucasus last summer.

Our work will be guided, as it should be, by the FSC decisions adopted under the Finnish Chairmanship, and particularly the two ministerial decisions adopted at Helsinki, the one on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition, and the other on the other areas involved in the work of the Forum (intensification of the security dialogue, implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, arms control, and confidence-and security-building measures), which together constitute our road map for 2009.

I wish also to pay tribute to Estonia, which is leaving the FSC Troika today, and to welcome Georgia as a new member of the Troika, which France is pleased to involve in the work of the Forum.

The principal areas of action for the Forum for Security Co-operation during the year 2009 are mentioned in the common indicative programme of the three chairmanships, which has been prepared in co-operation with Georgia and the United Kingdom and which has recently been published. In line with that common programme, the French Chairmanship will be active in the following four areas:

1. We intend to maintain the Forum's security dialogue at a high level of expertise by involving distinguished persons with responsibility in some of the OSCE's major problem areas. Specifically, the FSC will issue invitations to Mr. Peter Croll, Director of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, General Bentégeat, Chairman of the Military Committee

of the European Union, and Ambassador Haber, Head of the European Union Mission to Georgia.

2. We shall above all concern ourselves with the full application of the principal documents underpinning the work of the OSCE in the politico-military area, seeking, where necessary, to improve them:

- With regard to the Vienna Document, the next annual meeting to assess security- and confidence-building measures to be held on 3 and 4 March of this year in Vienna will offer an opportunity to sum up the results achieved.
- With regard to the updating of the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, France will follow up the work of the Finnish Chairmanship with the aim of achieving the adoption of a decision.
- Lastly, with regard to the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, we shall begin preliminary planning for the convening in 2009 of a meeting to examine this document, as the Forum has been called on to do in Decision No. 11/08 adopted at the Helsinki Ministerial Council meeting.

3. Cyber security will also be on the agenda of the French Chairmanship of the FSC, as reflected in the seminar to be held on 17 and 18 March of this year in Vienna.

4. Lastly, working together with the two other chairs of the FSC in 2009, France intends to make United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 on combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction one of the principal subjects to be dealt with by the Forum this year. Several decisions, including one adopted by the ministers in Brussels in 2006, have in fact conferred on the Forum a responsibility for providing fresh impulses in this area and for supporting the 1540 Committee. Along these lines, a 1540 co-ordinator could be appointed, following the example of the SALW, the conventional ammunition stockpiles, and the Code of Conduct co-ordinators, who are performing much and well-recognized work within the FSC. Fresh impetus might also be given to the process of preparing best practice guides for the implementation of resolution 1540, a process referred to incidentally in Ministerial Decision No. 13/08 adopted at Helsinki.

In order to enable us to make progress in these areas, the French Chairmanship, in agreement with the other members of the FSC Troika and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), has decided to confirm the mandates of the three co-ordinators in the Forum's three major areas of competence:

- Colonel Petersen, of the delegation of Denmark, as FSC co-ordinator for projects involving stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA);
- Colonel Eicher, of the delegation of Austria, as FSC co-ordinator for projects involving the Code of Conduct;
- Colonel Hartnell, of the delegation of the United Kingdom, as FSC co-ordinator for projects involving small arms and light weapons.

We are also pleased to confirm the mandate of Colonel Schweizer, of the delegation of Germany, as chairman of the informal group of friends on small arms and light weapons.

These four persons unhesitatingly accepted their assignments, which are indispensable and essential if the chairmanship of the Forum is to successfully do its work. For this I thank them most sincerely.

With regard to the participation of the Partners for Co-operation in the discussions, France will follow the practice begun by its predecessors and will invite the partners to take part as observers in the Forum's discussions, not only at the plenary meetings of the FSC but also in the working groups.

Ladies and gentlemen,

A number of the topics that concern the FSC and that I have just mentioned are clearly concerns felt by my country. This has led, during the year 2008, to a fundamental focus, looking ahead to the next 15 years, on matters of defence and national security in the form of the preparation of a White Paper, which, for the first time, establishes a close link between defence and national security. Among many options, this White Paper singles out Europe's desire to play a key role as one of the priorities of French strategic ambitions.

In the immediate wake of the French Presidency of the European Union (EU), which has just ended and which made it possible to relaunch the European security and defence policy, I should like to take the opportunity afforded me by this meeting to share with you some insights into this ambitious intention to position the European Union as a major player in crisis management and international security.

France elevated the European security and defence policy to the status of one of the four priorities (along with the common agricultural policy, immigration and the environment) of its Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The balance sheet of that Presidency has been a positive one, envisaging as it does concrete measures to strengthen European defence. Following the tenth anniversary of "Saint-Malo", it ushers in a new cycle for European defence, that of consolidation.

This balance sheet is positive also in political terms since it has led to the coming together of all the member States without antagonism, a new element in European defence.

In terms of what it contains, Europe's balance sheet for the French Presidency highlights the following points:

1. The European security strategy adopted in 2003 embraces the notion of a community of security interests on the part of the Europeans. This strategy was updated, re-examined and supplemented to take account of the changes that have occurred in Europe and the emergence of new global threats (weapons proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, cyber attacks, space, etc.). In this way, Europeans are jointly evaluating and assuming their shared responsibilities in the area of security.
2. Europeans have adopted more ambitious objectives for the period up to 2010, calling for the planning and simultaneous conduct of the following: two operations of stabilization

and reconstruction involving a civilian component supported by 10,000 men for a period of two years; two rapid-response operations specifically employing the tactical groups of the EU (1,500 men); an urgent evacuation exercise for European citizens over a period of ten days; a maritime surveillance and interdiction mission; a combined civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation; and a dozen or so civilian missions, one of them of major scale (up to 3,000 men).

3. For the first time in ten years, 15 or so member States have agreed on some ten “robust, flexible and interoperable” capacity-building projects, which have also been proposed to the other member countries. These projects are designed to permit the projection of force (aerial, air-naval and helicopter transport), the protection of forces (demining, drones, and an evacuation concept), space-based information and intelligence-gathering (Hélios II, Cosmo Skymed, Sar Luppe and the Multinational Space-Based Imaging System (MUSIS) ground segment).

4. In order to create these capabilities, the Europeans are planning to set up world-level groups based on a network of small and medium-sized enterprises and European centres of excellence. To that end, they have committed themselves to a common objective of two per cent of defence spending and to the establishment of a voluntary multinational fund. It is their wish in this way to reduce their dependence and to keep a close eye on non-European investments that could have an impact on their security.

5. An ERASMUS-type officer exchange programme and the strengthening of the European Security and Defence College will promote interoperability and a common culture in these matters.

6. A unique strategic planning capability for EU operations has been developed by the General Secretariat of the Council. This capability will permit more effective mobilization and better co-ordination of the means employed. Temporary deployments are planned to ensure continuity between the strategic planning and the operational planning of EU missions and operations.

7. There has been a strengthening of the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU and support for the United Nations and the EU has been reinforced through the introduction of new co-operative measures.

8. Lastly, in its declaration on security, the European Union has adopted specific measures, such as a code of conduct on space activities to promote global security or, especially, a European nuclear disarmament plan inspired in large measure by the address given by President Sarkozy in Cherbourg on 21 March 2008 on the subject of deterrence and nuclear disarmament.

**The balance sheet is also positive in political terms.**

When France assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, three major concepts could be identified with regard to European defence:

- Autonomy at any price;
- Non-duplication;

— Neutrality.

Each of these concepts or trends had a logic of its own. Given the desire of Europeans to work together to formulate policy in this area, it is these three concepts in combination that have led to European defence as we know it today: a crisis management instrument at the service of the international community and recognized as such in the light of no less than 22 civilian and military operations.

The concern to avoid duplication led some Europeans to welcome the development of the European security and defence policy only in co-ordination with NATO in the areas of capabilities and of command and control.

Limited as they are by their neutrality, some Europeans were in favour of pursuing only civilian crisis management.

But in the face of reality, the proliferation of crises, their growing intensity and their ever more complex nature have led Europeans to combine these concepts and in so doing to adopt a policy capable of ensuring their own security in Europe and of managing crises outside the continent.

In announcing its intention to strengthen complementarity between the EU and NATO, France's goal, in this difficult context of global security and budgetary constraints, was to enable Europeans to be able to rely on at least two organizations to protect their security and to respond to the need expressed by the international community for dialogue with a strong Europe.

In so doing, it gave its backing to the start of a new political dynamic in European defence.

To be sure, a number of preliminary signs had been evident:

- The problems experienced by some member States with the coalition's operations in Iraq;
- The gradual and significant increase in their contribution to operations conducted by the European Union;
- The call by certain member States to place a focus on common European security and solidarity (given concrete expression in the Treaty of Lisbon under the clause on solidarity and under the clause on aid and assistance).

During the French Presidency, the Europeans were able to capitalize on this dynamic and in this way launch a second cycle for European defence. This new enthusiasm was not dampened by Ireland's rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon. Nor did it yield to the crisis in Georgia, the financial crisis or the dangers posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia. Quite the contrary, this enthusiasm was behind the European solution proposed on each occasion by the Presidency.

This Presidency thus came to an end with all the member States committing themselves to:

- The use of European defence for crisis management outside the European Union, but also, where necessary, for internal security within the EU;
- The coming together of 12 member States of different size in ten structural capacity-building projects, thereby initiating an approach based on reciprocity and specialization for defence-related production in Europe;
- The assumption by the United Kingdom of the command over a European naval operation;
- The initial consideration by all concerned of how best to strengthen the credibility of Europe's capabilities in planning and crisis management.

All of this provides us with a specific and pragmatic basis for our European defence project, a basis to which the Treaty of Lisbon, should it come into force, will lend legal and institutional legitimacy.

With the declaration on the strengthening of international security, adopted in December 2008, Europeans have also shown their concern for measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have reaffirmed their determination to deal with the crisis in Iran and have announced their intention to contribute to the establishment of a fuel bank at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to a stepping up of their operational co-operation in this area.

An action plan will make it possible to strengthen the effectiveness of the 2003 European strategy for combating proliferation. This action plan will enable us to:

- Evaluate together the risks and threats in this area;
- Strengthen our efforts to block proliferation flows and suppress acts of proliferation;
- Put into place measures to combat intangible or non-material transfers of knowledge;
- Intensify our efforts to combat the financing of proliferation;
- Assist the relevant international and regional organizations in improving their policies on combating proliferation and controlling exports.

Europeans have also adopted a disarmament action plan and have called on the international community to co-operate in several specific and realistic initiatives, among them those proposed by the President of the Republic in March 2008:

- The universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- The dismantling of all nuclear testing sites in a manner that is both transparent and open to the international community;

- The start without delay at the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- The declaration of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material;
- The development among the five nuclear powers recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of transparency measures;
- The start of negotiations on a treaty banning short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles;
- The accession to and implementation by all member States of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
- Increased efforts in all other disarmament-related areas, specifically as regards conventional weapons. Alarmed at the humanitarian drama resulting from the use of cluster munitions against civilians, France, which signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December in Oslo, urges countries in possession of these weapons to do the same and is also seeking to promote the rapid adoption of a protocol on cluster munitions within the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Furthermore, France welcomes the adoption by a very large majority of votes of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the arms trade treaty (ATT). It further welcomes the efforts undertaken by the European Union to promote this treaty, particularly through the regional seminars to be held in 2009 for the purpose of raising awareness in this area.

As regards small arms and light weapons, the European Union has recently achieved genuine progress in the area of arms trafficking by air (the promotion of best practice guides on the basis of a French initiative) and the future inclusion of a clause dealing with SALW in the major agreements concluded between the Union and its main commercial partners (along the lines of the clause on weapons of mass destructive that already exists).

Lastly, the EU's Code of Conduct on the Control of Arms Exports has become a restrictive legal instrument after ten years in force, proving its effectiveness.

As underscored by the President of the Republic in his address presenting the White Paper, "everyone can clearly see that the current challenges call for collective and co-ordinated responses, first of all because we are forging a common destiny with our European partners and our allies, and secondly because we are facing the same threats and because we must come to one another's aid and assistance in the case of aggression".

I am convinced that the work that we shall carry out within this Forum will help to develop the kind of collective responses that will enable us, working together, to prevent conflicts and manage crises.

Thank you.