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**ENGLISH** only



# **Permanent Mission of Ukraine** to the International Organizations in Vienna

## Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 980th FSC Plenary Meeting

(23 June 2021, via video teleconferencing)

(Agenda item 1, General Statements, on the subject of "Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea")

Mr. Chairperson,

On behalf of the Delegation of Ukraine let me deliver a statement on the subject of "Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea".

Over the past two weeks of 7-20 June, the armed formations of the Russian Federation operating in the temporarily occupied areas of Donbas kept shelling positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and civilian infrastructure.

The Russian occupation forces breached the ceasefire regime 78 times with the use of Minsk-proscribed 120mm artillery systems, 82- and 120mm mortars near 8 residential areas (Shumy, Vodiane, Novhorodske, Starohnativka, Luhanske, Pisky, Novoselivka, Novozvanivka) as well as with the use of diverse grenade launchers, small arms and heavy machine guns.

As a result of these act of armed aggression, 2 Ukrainian serviceman were severely wounded.

On 19 June, the Russian armed formations unleashed fire from machine guns against the peaceful settlement of Avdiivka. The fire was conducted from the temporarily occupied Kashtanove. One civilian was wounded as a result.

Such provocative shelling of residential areas poses direct threat to the lives and health of civilians and point to Russia's intent of further escalating the situation along the entire line of contact. These actions violate the norms of the international humanitarian law and the Minsk agreements and must be stopped immediately.

The Russian armed formations kept violating other provisions of the Minsk agreements.

The Ukrainian side observed prohibited UAVs, mostly Orlan-10 and Orlan-ZM types, crossing the line of contact multiple times (9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20 June) near Raivka, Zhovte, Zaitseve and other areas of the Luhansk region. Between 13 and 15 June, the Russian armed formation intensified the use of UAVs to carry out reconnaissance activities of the Ukrainian positions. The operation of these aircraft were disrupted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

These flights are carried out in a demonstrative and provocative manner with numerous instances of crossing the line of contact, disregarding the coordination mechanisms for notification of ceasefire violations. Such actions infringe the provision of the TCG agreement on measures to consolidate ceasefire of July 2020 regarding the ban on offensive, subversive actions and the use of any type of aircraft.

The Ukrainian side considers that the increase in the use of prohibited UAVs is intertwined with the increase in the number of cases of SMM UAVs jamming. Based on the Mission data, over 140 occasions of the use of means of radio electronic interference were recorded for the period between 16 May and 6 June.

Such actions clearly have a deliberate character and are supported by the Russian radio electronic warfare systems. The recent fact of detection by the SMM of another Russian system RB-636 "Svet-KU" is just another prove of this.

During the past two weeks, the occupants continued to obstruct the implementation of the SMM mandate by impeding the freedom of movement of the Mission and the work of its aerial assets, including during take-off and landing of the UAVs in the government-controlled areas.

According to the SMM, on 15 June, the Mission mini-UAVs were jammed while flying over areas near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk), Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk), Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk), Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk), Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk), Pivdenne (40km north-east of Donetsk) and temporarily occupied Donetsk city's Petrovskyi district and Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk). Another case occurred on 13 June when the SMM mid-range UAV experienced jamming, while flying over areas near temporarily occupied Shevchenko (69km south of Donetsk).

The SMM was unable to launch two SMM mid-range UAVs due to jamming in areas near temporarily occupied Donetsk city's Petrovskyi district and Staromykhailivka. On 16 June, an SMM long-range UAV flight was cancelled due to jamming near its base in Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk).

Small-arms fire was directed at SMM mini-UAVs near temporarily occupied Obozne and Horlivka. The SMM had to land the UAVs and leave the area. Near Vesele (9km northwest of Donetsk) the Mission was unable to retrieve its UAV after it was shot at by the Russian armed formations.

According to the SMM, the occupants kept flouting their obligations on the deployment of weapons. On different occasions, the Mission observed two howitzers (7 June), 5 tanks (17 June) in violations of withdrawal lines and 39 tanks (7 June) outside the designated storage sites in the training area near temporarily occupied Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and near the temporarily occupied residential area of Boikivske (67km south-east of Donetsk).

The occupants continued to contaminate Ukrainian soil with mines and explosive objects. On 11 June, the Mission observed 272 anti-tank mines near temporarily occupied Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk).

Mr. Chairperson,

Russia remains reluctant to heed to the recommendations expressed at the 14 April joint PC-FSC meeting and numerous appeals of the participating States to provide adequate measures of transparency to deescalate tensions and dispel concerns over its military activity this past spring near Ukraine and in the temporarily occupied Crimea.

Despite the statements of Russian officials, we do not see any real withdrawal of forces of the Russian Federation. The escalatory potential remains high, and the military threat is real.

12 battalion tactical groups and 10 tactical groups, reaching 4.7 thousand servicemen, remain a part of the land group of forces, which were additionally concentrated around Ukraine and in the temporarily occupied Crimea (during snap military checks of the Russian Armed Forces this past spring).

Currently, the total number of Russian forces along the State Border of Ukraine and in the temporarily occupied Crimea amounts to 40 battalion tactical groups (among them 28 were deployed on a permanent basis from the formations and units of the 8<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Armies and 22<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps of coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet; 12 were additionally redeployed to the temporarily occupied Crimea and the border with Ukraine). It is around 94 thousand servicemen.

Given that most of the weapons and military equipment remain on the training grounds, and that the redeployment of personnel can be carried out in a covert manner at any time, the threat of escalation of armed aggression against Ukraine is not subsiding.

According to the recently obtained information, the Russian Federation concentrated significant air power in the temporarily occupied Crimea. Today, we would like to make a presentation on the militarization of the Ukrainian peninsula by Russia, in particular on its air component that is capable of conducting various types of military operations.

#### **PRESENTATION**

On the slides, you may see satellite imagery from this spring of the Russian air bases, located on the occupied Ukrainian soil.

- (**Slide 1, 2**) BELBEK Air Base the 38<sup>th</sup> fighter aviation regiment of 27<sup>th</sup> mixed aviation division. Since 2014, with the beginning of the armed aggression against Ukraine, Russia redeployed 87 air vessels (including fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, UAVs etc.), to BELBEK Air Base. 35 of them were redeployed under the cover of snap military checks this past spring.
- (**Slide 3, 4**) GVARDEISKOYE Air Base the 37<sup>th</sup> mixed aviation regiment of 27<sup>th</sup> mixed aviation division. In total, 29 air vessels were redeployed to GVARDEISKOYE Air Base. 5 of them were redeployed during this past spring.
- (**Slide 5, 6**) DJANKOI Air Base the 39<sup>th</sup> helicopter regiment of 27<sup>th</sup> mixed aviation division. In total, 30 air vessels were redeployed to DJANKOI Air Base.
- (**Slide 7, 8**) KACHA Air Base the 318<sup>th</sup> navy aviation regiment. In total, 36 air vessels were redeployed to KACHA Air Base. 1 of them was redeployed during this past spring.

(**Slide 9, 10**) KIROVSKOE Air Base – the 929<sup>th</sup> Air Force training Centre. In total, 37 air vessels were redeployed to KIROVSKOE Air Base, of which 19 were redeployed during this past spring.

(**Slide 11, 12**) SAKI – the 43<sup>rd</sup> navy aviation regiment. In total, 48 air vessels were redeployed to SAKI, of which 11 were redeployed during this past spring.

In total, the Russian Federation concentrated around 260 units of various types of air vessels, of which 69 were relocated under the cover of snap military checks of the Russia armed forces this past spring in the temporarily occupied Crimea.

More detailed information on the weapons and military equipment systems concentrated by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied Crimea will be appended to our statement.

#### Esteemed colleagues,

While the Russian Federation remains reluctant to revoke its unlawful decision to close part of the Black Sea until the end of October 2021, we witness ongoing restrictions of the freedom of navigation through the Kerch Strait. In May 2021, the average duration of artificial delays caused by Russia's actions of vessels going from the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, was more than 16 hours. Such unlawful restrictions to the freedom of navigation inflict economic losses to Ukraine, in particular to the population living in the coastal areas of the Sea of Azov.

In conclusion, we urge the Russian Federation to stop its aggression against Ukraine, reverse its illegal occupation of Crimea, de-occupy parts of Donbas, and restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, through the Kerch Strait and in the Sea of Azov. Russia must fully implement its commitments under the Minsk agreements, including the withdrawal of its armed forces, mercenaries, armed formations, and weapons from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

# Militarization of the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea (Ukraine) by Russian Federation

All the weapons have been delivered to the territory of Ukraine since February 2014.

### Air Force and Air Defense units within the territory of Ukraine

BELBEK Air Base – 38 fighter aviation regiment of 27 mixed aviation division. GVARDEISKOYE Air Base – 37 mixed aviation regiment of 27 mixed aviation division.

DJANKOI Air Base – 39 helicopter regiment of 27 mixed aviation division.

KACHA Air Base – 318 navy aviation regiment.

KIROVSKOE Air Base – 929 Air Force training Centre.

SAKI – 43 navy aviation regiment.

No.	Name/Type	BELBEK Air Base – 38 fighter aviation regiment		GVARDEISK OYE Air Base - 37 mixed aviation regiment		DJANKOI Air Base – 39 helicopter regiment		KACHA Air Base – 318 navy aviation regiment		KIROVSKOE Air Base – 929 Air Force training Centre		SAKI – 43 navy aviation regiment	
		2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
1.	A-50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
2.	Su-27/30	37	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3.	Su-34	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.	Su-24		-	13	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	14
5.	Su-25	-	-	11	14	-	•	-	•	-	-	-	1
6.	Su-30SM	-	-	1	1	-	•	-	•	-	-	12	25
7.	MiG-29	9	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8.	L-39	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
9.	Mi-8	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	5	2	16	-	-
10.	Mi-26	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11.	Mi-28	-	-	-	-	19	11	-	-	0	9	-	-
12.	Mi-24/35	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	8	1	-	-
13.	Ka-27	-	-	-	-			17	16	1	1	-	-
14.	Ka-52	-	-	-	-	12	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
15.	Ка-226	-	4	ı	ı	-	•	-	•	2	2	-	-
16.	IL-76	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17.	IL-20/22	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18.	IL-22ΠΠ	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19.	An-12	-	1	ı	1	-	ı	-	ı	-	-	4	4
20.	An-26	-	1	ı	ı	1	1	7	7	1	1	1	1
21.	An-72	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	-	-
22.	An-148	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23.	Be-12	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	8	-	-	3	3

24.	Tu-134	1	2	-	_	-	-	_	-	-	-	1	1
25.	Tu-154	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26.	Tu-334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27.	Tu-204	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28.	UAV ORION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	2	-	-
29.	Radar 55Zh6U "NEBO-U" (three range)	1	1	2	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
30.	Radar 59N6 "Protivnik-Ge"	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31.	Radar 5N87M Back Net (three range)	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32.	Radar PRV- 13 Odd Pair (altemeter)	1	1	ı	ı	-	ı	-	-	1	1	ı	-
33.	Radar PRV- 16 (altemeter)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	2	2
34.	Radar 96L6 (three range)	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
35.	Radar 91N6 (three range)	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
36.	Radar 19Zh6	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
37.	(two range)	2	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	1
38.	Radar P-37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1
39.	Radar 64L6 Gamma-S1 (three range)	ı	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
40.	MLRS BM-27 URAGAN	-	-	-	-	0	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
41.	9K33 OSA- AKM SA- 8GECKO	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	7	-	-	-	-
42.	2A65 MSTA- B 152 mm howitzer	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	2	-	-	-	-