



2015 OSCE Asian Conference
**“The Changing Global Security Environment and Visions of
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Asia”**
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**Session 3: “Visions for Security Co-operation in Asia: Experience
Sharing and New Co-operation Areas” 2 June, 9–11.30 a.m.**

**Remarks by the Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific
of the German Federal Foreign Office
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- This Conference on the changing global security environment and this session on visions for security cooperation in Asia are very timely indeed.
- The world seems to be in disorder and conflict in many places and the order that we knew and may have taken for granted to an unwarranted degree seems to be less stable than we thought.
- In Europe, of course, the conflict in Ukraine, a conflict on European soil itself, takes much of our attention these days. The turmoil in the region of the Middle East is very much on the agenda as well.
- However, and this is an initial point I want to make at the very beginning, security in Asia is of highest interest and relevance to Europe as well.
- We share close economic relations, important investment and trade interests, there are more goods and services traveling between Europe and Asia than across the Atlantic; it is therefore stating the obvious that regional stability in Asia, freedom of navigation and peaceful conflict resolution in this region are of utmost importance for us as well.
- Asia and Europe do not only face new common challenges and global security threats. We are interlinked to a degree that makes conflict in one region tangible and immediately relevant to the other. That’s why we feel we need to also work much closer together on stability and security in our respective areas.
- So what could this closer cooperation look like? And here I am coming to the guiding questions of this session: The potential relevance of the OSCE experience for Asia and visions for our enhanced cooperation on security in Asia.

- Let me try to approach these questions in four steps:
 - revisit the guiding principles of the concept of comprehensive security laid down in the Helsinki Final Act,
 - elaborate on the relevance of these principles and experiences for Asia (from our point of view),
 - share with you some thoughts on the security situation in Asia as we perceive it in Europe,
 - give some suggestions on where/ how we feel the institutional cooperation between Europe and Asia should be strengthened.

I. The Helsinki Final Act – the concept of comprehensive security

- Maybe the most important achievement of the Helsinki Final Act and following CSCE/OSCE documents is the acknowledgement that security has to be looked at in a comprehensive way.
- The Helsinki Final Act does not make provisions for “hard” security alone but lays out that security can only be guaranteed if basic principles of human security are observed as well.
- The three “baskets” of commitments the Final Act consists of form one indivisible set of principles, all equally important.
- The Helsinki Decalogue holds key principles of “hard” security, such as sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes.
- But the Final Act also includes the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- And it stresses the importance of co-operation in the field of economics, science and technology and environment.
- We firmly believe, that while the principles in the so-called 1st basket were necessary to prevent military escalation, the inclusion of 2nd and 3rd basket obligations in the Final Act played a key role in overcoming the “Cold War” by setting common standards, softening political divisions and building confidence through cooperation.
- And as our American colleague reminded us yesterday: When the Final Act was signed in 1975, it was not at all seen as a major breakthrough and was not accompanied by great expectations. It were to a large extent the 2nd and 3rd basket obligations that paved its way through expectations created in the part of Europe where they were least implemented.
- After German unification and the fall of the iron curtain, these principles were further strengthened in the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” (‘90), putting even more emphasis on human rights, democracy, rule of law, economic liberty and responsibility.
- There is one further aspect I would like to stress: Throughout its existence the CSCE and (from 1995 onward) the OSCE, were and still are of great importance as a forum for dialogue and confidence building, besides the principles of their acquis.

- Throughout its existence, the OSCE has always been work in progress, and not an easy. There have been setbacks and difficult times, but it has all along its way also brought about numbers of other important achievements and agreements like the Open Sky Treaty.
- Of course, you may say the OSCE has not been able to prevent the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine in which the fundamental principles of Helsinki were so blatantly violated by Russia.
- That is true but I do believe that the crisis has also shown the value of the OSCE as a crisis management tool and a body that can quickly muster capacities for political dialogue.

II. Relevance of CSCE/OSCE principles and experiences for Asia

- Coming to the potential relevance of the OSCE principles for Asia I want to make one point clear from the very beginning: CSCE or OSCE are no blueprint for Asia that can be directly “exported” and applied.
- But some CSCE/OSCE experiences may nonetheless be insightful for Asia, given the challenges and corresponding risks, e.g. territorial disputes, threats from transnational crime, terrorism and violent extremism, migratory issues, to name just a few.
- I would highlight the following experiences as relevant for Asia:
 - 1) It is important to have structures for dialogue and crisis management in place to fall back on in times of crises. Having to build them once a crisis is already there will not work.
 - 2) Building enduring and institutionalized structures for cooperation and confidence building takes time, a long-term perspective and strategic patience.
 - 3) Involving all relevant regional actors is essential.
 - 4) Starting with content, not structures is the recipe of choice.
 - 5) Identifying topics that are of interest to all actors involved and that can serve as a basis for confidence building is important, even if that means starting small.
 - 6) Confidence building measures are key to build trust and can be initiated by one side even unilaterally.
 - 7) A comprehensive concept of security can offer a broad range of such confidence building issues while avoiding an exclusive focus on “hard security”.
 - 8) Developing an inclusive institutionalized format to address issues of regional security does not have to mean substituting existing multilateral structures but supplementing them.

III. Security in Asia – from a European perspective

- Let me finally offer you some thoughts on the security situation in Asia as we perceive it in Europe.
- With the exception of ASEAN with its Charter, the ASEAN+ processes and a number of treaties, rules-based systems that could provide a reliable framework for dialogue on regional security in Asia do not seem to be growing at the same pace as Asia's economies and economic integration.
- On the contrary, the risk of serious conflict in the Asia-Pacific has grown rather high with a number of factors contributing, e.g.:
 - unresolved historical conflicts;
 - widespread misperceptions and misunderstandings;
 - conflicts with the possibility of a nuclear dimension;
 - territorial conflicts in particular in the East and South China Sea.
- Adding to the complexity is the “China-factor”, the emergence of China as a global power and the question of alignment or cooperation with the two major actors in the Pacific, China and the U.S.: Asian nations that have been welcoming the role of the U.S. as provider of security in the Asia-Pacific and at the same time rely on economic cooperation with China understandably do not want to have to choose between the U.S. and China.
- Given this complexity and the risk for conflict, we feel that more confidence building in Asia is darenly needed. The question is: how to do it?
- Building on the point I made about starting small and building on a comprehensive security concept I would argue for linking existing institutions and structures and for starting with “soft issues” and small projects to build trust.
- It is in that sense that I understand the North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). We encourage this initiative very much and hope that Korea and its neighbors can further develop NAPCI despite all difficulties. The EU is prepared to be partner/observer to this initiative.

IV. Cooperation between Europe and Asia

- And here I am already at my final remarks on institutional security cooperation between Asia and Europe.
- The EU is eager and willing to play a more active role in order to further strengthen cooperation in coping with global and regional challenges and sharing best practices as we are doing today.
- As regards regional cooperation and more concretely the objective of promoting regional security architecture in Asia-Pacific the strengthening of ASEAN and the ASEAN+ processes is a major strategic aim of German and European foreign policy as ASEAN is the main and most active motor of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Germany very much supports the EU's deeper engagement with ASEAN and welcomes the steps taken in the last years: EU-accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, scaling up the political and security cooperation through the Brunei Plan of Action, active EU-participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

- And there are indeed lots of very concrete cooperation initiatives the EU is engaged in (and in a broad range of issues) with ASEAN and within ARF – not well known to the public.
- In July 2014, the EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers mandated the SOMs to develop a roadmap towards a strategic partnership between the EU and ASEAN (with security – global and regional - at the centre of the strengthening of the political pillar of EU-ASEAN-cooperation).
- In this regard, Foreign Minister Steinmeier proposed some very concrete joint initiatives in November 2014 (speaking at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta), placing ASEAN’s role as an anchor of stability at the very heart of his approach.
- Through specific initiatives, especially in the field of non-traditional security risks, we want to share experiences: trafficking (in human beings, drugs, and wildlife), cyber security, non-proliferation and disarmament, de-radicalisation, protection of vulnerable minorities/refugees, mediation and election observation as core areas for deeper cooperation come to mind.
- The EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue in Malaysia last month was another opportunity to exchange lessons and experiences esp. on piracy, maritime surveillance and port security. At the same time we are enhancing dialogue on disaster relief including greater capacity-building.
- Finally we believe that a stronger EU-ASEAN relationship also with and within other multilateral security platforms and initiatives, with a particular focus on maritime security, combating piracy, disarmament and confidence-building, could and would be a significant contribution to stability in Asia-Pacific – as we are increasing our engagement in the ARF. Last year for example we organised the first-ever ARF training on preventive diplomacy and mediation.
- However: While we are putting strong emphasis on closer cooperation with ASEAN and the ASEAN driven and ASEAN-centred fora, this does not mean that we are not prepared to engage in other initiatives like the NAPCI, as this initiative is inspired by the OSCE approach.
- On the contrary: NAPCI can be and become a very meaningful North-East-Asian complement to the South-East-Asian ASEAN processes.
- It is in our view a good idea to involve existing institutions like ASEAN and to link NAPCI to other initiatives such as the Seoul Defence Dialogue (SDS), and involving European structures as the EU as well as the OSCE as observers is very much welcome and in our European interest.
- NAPCI could – at some point – even serve to establish a security dialogue on “soft” issues which could allow participation of North Korea and encourage more direct communication between the two Koreas.
- Therefore, I would like to say that we hope NAPCI can be a promising adaptation, not a copy, of the OSCE example with all respect to regional and historical specificities.
- And a last remark to conclude: While enhancing our engagement and adding further substance to the EU’s role as a security actor in Asia, I confirm and reiterate our strong commitment and wish to participate also in the East Asia Summit.