

Chairmanship: Estonia

554th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 23 July 2008

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 12.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. T. Parts

3. Subjects discussed — Statements — Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

None

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

(a) *Presentation on the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted in Dublin, by Lt. Col. J. Burke of the Irish Defence Forces*: Chairperson, Lt. Col. J. Burke (FSC.DEL/134/08 OSCE+), France, Germany, United States of America, United Kingdom, Spain (FSC.DEL/135/08 OSCE+)

(b) *Presentation on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Naval Area: Pro and Contra, by Mr. M. Uliyanov, Head of the Delegation on Military Security and Arms Control of the Russian Federation*: Chairperson, Russian Federation (Annex 1), Finland, Ukraine, United States of America, Greece (Annex 2), France, Italy, Switzerland, Latvia, United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Turkey, Germany

Agenda item 3: REPORT ON THE 2008 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW
CONFERENCE BY THE CHEF DE FILE FOR THE FSC
CONTRIBUTION TO THE 2008 ASRC

Chairperson, Chef de file for the FSC contribution to the 2008 ASRC
(Finland) (FSC.DEL/139/08 OSCE+)

Agenda item 4: REPORT ON THE THIRD BIENNIAL MEETING OF STATES ON THE 2001 UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO PREVENT, COMBAT AND ERADICATE THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SALW IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON SALW

Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Belarus), Chairperson

Agenda item 5: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Publication of the brochure “Private Military Companies — The Business with War”*: Austria
- (b) *Seminar on conventional arms control, held in Zagreb on 10 and 11 July 2008*: Germany
- (c) *Matters of protocol*: United States of America, Chairperson, Netherlands
- (d) *Global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism*: Ireland

Agenda item 6: CLOSING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION

Chairperson (FSC.DEL/140/08), Spain (FSC.DEL/136/08 OSCE+), Finland (FSC.DEL/138/08 OSCE+), Turkey, Russian Federation

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 10 September 2008, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/560

23 July 2008

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

554th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 560, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,
Distinguished colleagues,

On 2 July of this year during the Annual Security Review Conference, the Russian delegation circulated a food-for-thought paper on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the naval area.

Today, we are looking forward to hearing the initial reactions of our colleagues to the Russian proposals — the arguments “for” and “against”.

What lies behind the Russian initiatives? Above all, a desire to enhance transparency as regards armed forces, whose activities are now taking on an increasingly marked inter-branch character. Naval forces constitute a most important component of today’s armed forces. It can hardly be regarded as normal that at a time when we exchange information on nearly every tank or artillery system, we leave the huge potential of naval forces outside the pan-European CSBM regime.

When Russia proposes that we agree on some kind of new confidence-building measure, the question that usually follows is whether that step is in response to a perceived threat to Russian security. We believe that posing the question in this way smacks of a Cold War mentality. May not every OSCE participating State put forward initiatives designed to address the interests not only of national but also of pan-European security? For that reason, we propose that the question be phrased differently: Would transparency, confidence and security in Europe win or lose if the Russian proposals were to be approved? To us the answer seems obvious — they would clearly win.

This view, incidentally, is also supported by the successful implementation of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Black Sea Area, which was prepared at the initiative of Ukraine and other Black Sea countries. And although this unique experience of applying naval CSBMs, which is unreplicated anywhere in the world, is by no means ideal, it would be difficult today to imagine international co-operation in the Black Sea region without it.

At a pan-European level, only one very modest step has so far been taken in that direction. In accordance with the Document on the Global Exchange of Military Information, OSCE participating States annually submit summarized data on their naval capabilities. However, this concerns only the overall number of surface warships with more than 400 tons displacement and submarines with more than 50 tons displacement. What we are proposing, however, would take things further. For Europe, surrounded as it is on three sides by water, it would seem natural to continue on the path towards improving regional security by extending confidence-building measures to the adjacent seas.

Anyone who has taken time to carefully study the Russian food-for-thought paper will know that we are not proposing anything extraordinary here. None of the Russian proposals are ambitious or difficult to understand. They are based entirely on the experience of applying ground CSBMs and are designed by analogy with them. What is involved are prior notifications, invitations to observe major exercises, military contacts and visits to naval bases.

The measures we are proposing in no way encroach upon the existing norms of maritime law, including the freedom of navigation, to the degree that they apply to planned naval activities, which we are proposing to make more transparent. We should like to point out in particular that the introduction of constraining provisions on naval activities is not at issue here.

Let me say a few words about the area of application. We propose that it cover the waters adjacent to the European continent, as has already been set out in the Madrid mandate. This does not include the Middle East, the Far East, the Western Atlantic or any other sea or ocean regions.

Such are the basic arguments “for”. However, in accordance with the announced subject for discussion we should like straight away, by way of anticipation as it were, to touch also on a few arguments “against” that we have become aware of in the course of bilateral contacts with a number of delegations.

Some colleagues have drawn our attention to the fact that the Russian proposals are not fully consistent with the principle of mutuality. They argue that among the countries of the OSCE area many do not have an outlet to the sea and, accordingly, have no naval forces. As a result, in the event that naval CSBMs were to be agreed on, some countries would find themselves in an unequal situation. This argument cannot be dismissed out of hand since it rests on genuine objections. In all likelihood, it would be possible to overcome these difficulties by reaching an agreement, perhaps under Chapter X of the Vienna Document, only between countries that actually possess naval forces. The Russian side, however, believes it undesirable to divide partners into two different categories. We have to deal very carefully with the principle of mutuality to which certain of our colleagues have referred. In principle, absolute mutuality in the area of CSBMs is impossible for a large number of objective reasons. For example, some participating States have neither territory nor armed forces in Europe, but at the same time they have rights equal to those of other participating States to the application of verification measures and they exercise those rights fairly actively. Also in an unequal situation for that matter are those participating States that have

armed forces in the CSBM area of application and that provide information to participating States that do not have armed forces. But, this is not a problem for anyone. Hence the question as to whether it is worthwhile applying other criteria to possible naval confidence-building measures.

A number of our partners take the view that CSBM agreements must without exception be verifiable. In the opinion of the Russian side, on the other hand, it is altogether sufficient in this case to use national technical means of verification. But, if anyone wishes to insist on verification, we are prepared to study proposals along these lines.

Among the arguments “against” we have also had occasion to hear references to possible additional expenses. What can we say in answer to this? Only that confidence has its price, all the more when the amounts in question are not that substantial. From among the proposals we have submitted, additional financial resources may be required only for visits to naval bases and the inviting of observers to naval exercises. If our partners nevertheless believe that what is involved would represent a financial burden beyond their means, non-standard solutions might be examined. Not as an official proposal but simply “thinking out loud”, one might suggest that thought be given to having the expenses for visits to bases and the presence of observers at exercises borne not by the receiving State but by the sending State. We might recall that even now the Vienna Document provides for various options for covering such financial expenses (paragraphs 106, 134.1 and 134.3).

In conclusion, I should like to note that efforts to devise naval CSBMs have in fact been undertaken earlier, both during the period of bloc-to-bloc confrontation and at the end of the 1990s. At that time it was not possible to reach an agreement. The resubmission of proposals along these lines can, if you will, be regarded as an effort to see whether anything has changed in this regard over the last 10 to 20 years or whether we are continuing to think in the same categories as before.

And lastly. We do not regard the Russian proposals as the ultimate truth. Rather, they should be seen as an invitation to engaged and creative dialogue to which every State has an opportunity to make its own contribution.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/560

23 July 2008

Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

554th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 560, Agenda item 2(b)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GREECE

Thank you Madam Chairperson,

We would like to express our appreciation to the delegation of the Russian Federation for requesting today's discussion on its proposal for an examination of the pros and cons of naval confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

Greece, as one of the major naval states in Europe, is understandably very interested in the Russian proposal, which is currently being considered by the competent departments in Athens.

We believe that a thorough examination of the topic is necessary, since it has many aspects. For this reason, it should be assessed in a comprehensive way, with consideration being taken of the military, political and legal parameters. This process may be time-consuming, but it is the safest way for the OSCE community to reach a common understanding on the pros and cons of naval CSBMs.

We believe that our further discussions on the issue should be guided by the basic principles of our Organization, i.e., mutual respect, good faith, commitment to openness and transparency, and adherence to international law. I would like to assure you that my authorities are examining the proposal in this spirit.

Madam Chairperson, I would kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.