


Engaging the Ukrainian Diaspora in Reconstruction and Development

Report from expert discussions organized by ODIHR in the
period of 9 February – 3 July 2023*



Warsaw

9 January 2024

* This report summarizes discussions and recommendations during an expert workshop held at ODIHR on 9-10 February 2023 and a follow-up consultation held on 3 July 2023 coupled with additional desk research. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of ODIHR.

Contents

Introduction 4

Executive summary 6

Part I. The bigger picture: Diasporas in times of emergency, military conflict and in post-conflict reconstruction and development..... 8

 1. What is a diaspora?..... 8

 2. Why are diasporas important?..... 9

 2.1 Economic remittances 10

 2.2 Philanthropy and humanitarian response..... 11

 2.3 Human capital..... 12

 2.4 Policy influence 13

 3. Policies of countries of origin towards their diasporas..... 14

 4. How to empower diasporas? Lessons learned 15

Part II. Zooming in on the Ukrainian diaspora: Roles, contributions and future potential 18

 5. The Ukrainian diaspora is dispersed globally, diverse and constantly evolving 18

 6. The Ukrainian diaspora’s mobilization after 24 February 2022..... 20

 6.1 Remittances sent by Ukrainians abroad are expected to increase 21

 6.2 Humanitarian assistance and philanthropy were the first responses of the Ukrainian diaspora 21

 6.3 Human capital contributions of the Ukrainian diaspora are multi-faceted..... 24

 6.4 The Ukrainian diaspora is trying to exert political influence to harness international solidarity..... 25

 7. Ukraine’s policy on diaspora and emigration..... 27

 8. Envisaging the role of the Ukrainian diaspora in Ukraine’s reconstruction and future development 28

 8.1 Governmental policy 28

 8.2 Civil society and the international community..... 29

 8.3 Diaspora organizations 30

 9. How to create a conducive environment for the Ukrainian diaspora’s contribution? 31

 9.1 Recognition and mapping of contributions by the Ukrainian diaspora 31

 9.2 Dedicated institutions for diaspora matters and policy environment 33

Conclusions 36

Bibliography 38

Annex 1: List of participants in the ODIHR expert workshop on Engaging the Ukrainian diaspora in reconstruction and development..... 44

Annex 2: List of participants in the expert workshop on engaging the Ukrainian diaspora in reconstruction and development hosted by ODIHR in collaboration with the University of Warwick, UK 46

List of boxes

Box 1: Decline in remittances in Greece after the 2009 financial crisis	11
Box 2: Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination (DEMAC).....	12
Box 3: The gender dimension of diaspora contributions.....	13
Box 4: International frameworks endorsing diaspora engagement	15
Box 5: Typology of diaspora actors: Broker, Local, Distant, Reserved.....	17
Box 6: Ukrainian World Congress: The Ukrainian diaspora umbrella organization	23
Box 7: Ukrainian House in Warsaw: Assistance to newly arriving refugees.....	24
Box 8: Global Ukraine	24
Box 9: Promote Ukraine.....	25
Box 10: World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations (representation in Switzerland)	26
Box 11: Transitional justice projects in Poland involving the Ukrainian diaspora	26
Box 12: Examples of diaspora mapping.....	33

Introduction

The OSCE participating States recognized the role of civil society in the promotion of human rights generally and of the human rights of migrants and their families in particular and recommended that host countries and countries of origin should cooperate to facilitate the reintegration of migrants (Vienna 1989, Istanbul 1999, Athens 2009, Astana 2010).¹ The role of the Ukrainian diaspora, being integral to civil society in Ukraine and other countries, has proven crucial in response to the Russian Federation's military attack in Ukraine in February 2022. It has included mobilizing humanitarian assistance following the attack, organizing support for refugees, and liaising with other civil society, national and international organizations that looked for partners when providing assistance in Ukraine and to refugees. It can be expected that the role of the diaspora will also be crucial in the post-conflict phase of reconstruction and development.

This meeting report² reflects on a two-day expert workshop organized on 9-10 February 2023 by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It compiles preliminary information on Ukrainian diaspora engagement and contributions so far and outlines areas for potential future development. It also puts the case of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization into a wider context of diaspora engagement globally. The report presents existing research, expert opinions, and recommendations on the overall role of diaspora in development, with particular emphasis on countries that have experienced military conflict and post-conflict situations.

The workshop gathered prominent experts working on the topic of diasporas, representatives of Ukrainian authorities, members of the Ukrainian diaspora, as well as representatives of NGOs based in Ukraine and abroad engaged in working with diaspora (see Annex 1 for the list of participants). The participants discussed good practices of diaspora engagement (particularly in the cases of Jewish, Irish, Greek, East African and South Asian diaspora mobilization) and their relevance for the case of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization after 24 February 2022. The activities of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic, Poland, Switzerland, Germany, and the United States, in addition to cooperation between diasporas and international humanitarian organizations, were discussed during the meeting. The workshop also covered the perspectives of Ukrainian authorities and the destination countries on the existing diaspora activities. Additional consultation with representatives of Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Germany and the UK was hosted by ODIHR in collaboration with Professor Maria Koinova from the University of Warwick on 3 July 2023 to get feedback on the first draft of this report (see Annex 2 for the list of participants). The present report includes insights from both discussions supplemented by additional desk research.

¹ OSCE Third Follow-up Meeting, "Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference", Vienna, 19 January 1989, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/7/40881.pdf>>; OSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government PCOEW389, "Istanbul Document 1999", Istanbul, 19 November 1999, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/5/39569.pdf>>; OSCE Ministerial Council MC17EW71, "Final Document of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 1 and 2 December 2009", Athens, 2 December 2009, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/5/67621.pdf>>; OSCE Summit Meeting SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1*, "Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community", Astana, 3 December 2010, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/6/74985.pdf>>.

² The first draft of this report was prepared by Marta Jaroszewicz, external consultant, under the guidance of ODIHR Migration and Freedom of Movement Adviser and based on notes from the expert workshop organized by ODIHR on 9-10 February 2023, background material prepared by ODIHR and additional desk research. Professor Maria Koinova from the University of Warwick helped identify key experts for the first expert workshop and initiated the consultation with Ukrainian diaspora organizations based in the United Kingdom and Germany which she co-organized with ODIHR on 3 July 2023 in Warsaw and which generated additional insights included in this report.

The report should be of interest to a range of stakeholders, including national authorities and civil society in Ukraine, international organizations and civil society and authorities in countries that host refugees from diaspora communities and the Ukrainian diaspora in particular. It includes recommendations stemming from the above-mentioned workshop and consultation on facilitating the diaspora's contributions and involvement in line with democratic principles and human rights.

The report consists of two main parts followed by the conclusions. The first part presents the bigger picture of diasporas' multiple contributions, particularly in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Based on the empirical evidence, it analyses the most significant contributions diasporas may bring including economic remittances, philanthropy/humanitarian assistance, human capital, policy/attitudinal influence. The first part also includes good practices of empowering diasporas in different contexts. The second part analyses the unique case of the Ukrainian diaspora contributions in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. It suggests how the lessons learned from other contexts can be relevant for Ukraine and what could be done to create conducive environment for Ukrainian diaspora's contributions in the context of future reconstruction efforts.

Executive summary

The meeting report summarizes main findings, expert opinions and recommendations developed by the workshop participants:

- Being part of a “diaspora” is linked with shared feelings of belonging and self-identity. A sense of collective obligation towards a country of origin is an important element here that, however, needs to be mobilized and its strength will depend on conditions and contexts within which diaspora organizations operate.
- There is ample evidence about the numerous contributions of diasporas to both countries of origin and destination. Diasporas constitute a “human link” between the destination states and the countries of origin. They often contribute to maintaining homelands’ national and cultural identity abroad, including through education and promotion of culture. Diasporas can also facilitate democratic cooperation between states and societies and help promoting a human approach to migration management in the international context.
- The role of diasporas as providers of financial remittances has been widely documented. Diasporas can bring an entrepreneurial spirit and skills back to the homeland and are an important source of investments and philanthropy. They may also play a prominent role in the promotion of democracy and gender equality. Diasporas may also act as brokers between the homeland and international actors, and support the political claims of their homeland abroad.
- The role of diasporas grows significantly in times of crisis or in post-conflict situations. A diaspora tends to provide timely and flexible forms of humanitarian assistance due to their understanding of the local realities. Their contribution can serve as an important financial instrument in post-conflict reconstruction in sectors such as education, public health or other public infrastructure. Diasporas actively participate in public diplomacy by organizing demonstrations, speaking to the media, meeting with politicians and other stakeholders, and lobbying on the international stage. An important area of diaspora engagement is their role in promoting and achieving transitional justice.
- Nevertheless, diasporas’ assistance to their homeland in times of crisis also poses certain challenges. A diaspora is usually a heterogeneous community that provides support on a voluntary basis and may encounter problems with coordination of activities and recognition on the part of governments and humanitarian organizations. The contribution of a diaspora may not always be welcomed by the homeland society. Some individuals or segments of the diaspora can also take more radical stances than the homeland society.
- The positive impacts of this assistance will depend upon an enabling environment for the diaspora contributions in both the origin and the destination country, as well as in the international context. The crucial aspect of empowering diasporas is providing them with status and respect, e.g., acknowledging their role in the humanitarian response, sending remittances and playing an active role in the reconstruction.
- The Ukrainian diaspora is diverse and consists of different generations of migrants who left their homeland for a variety of reasons: security, political, economic, family, border changes and forced deportations.
- Ukrainian diaspora organizations, some of which are led by second or third generation members of the Ukrainian community abroad, have been actively contributing to maintaining and promoting Ukrainian national and cultural identity through educational and cultural activities in their countries of residence.
- These efforts have contributed to shared feelings of belonging and facilitated diaspora mobilization based on a sense of collective obligation towards Ukraine in critical moments of its recent history.
- The role of the Ukrainian diaspora has proven crucial in the context of the war in Ukraine. Members of the diaspora mobilized humanitarian assistance, organized support for refugees and

liaised with civil society, national and international organizations that sought partners when providing assistance in Ukraine and to refugees.

- The main areas of humanitarian response of the Ukrainian diaspora organizations have been in health, food security, emergency shelter and education. In the countries neighboring Ukraine, assistance for the incoming forced migrants was an important aspect of their interventions. Yet, no comprehensive assessment of the scale of humanitarian support and types of assistance provided by the Ukrainian diaspora is presently available.
- Despite the growing interest of Ukrainian authorities in increasing cooperation with the diaspora, the diaspora policy remains underdeveloped. More attention could be paid to acknowledging the diaspora's contributions and creating a plan for its active role in the recovery activities.
- To provide long-term and impactful contributions, the Ukrainian diaspora needs support, both from the Ukrainian government and society, and from destination countries and international organizations. The recognition of the roles played by the Ukrainian diaspora is crucial. A more dynamic and systematic mapping of diaspora activities and contributions would be beneficial, both for purposes of recognition and for better coordination. Ukraine could also consider creating a diaspora ministry or a dedicated diaspora agency, which would oversee contacts with diaspora communities and be responsible for coordinating diaspora policy and liaising with other relevant ministries. An important aspect of such activities should be building trust between Ukrainian authorities and society and the diaspora and mitigating potential tensions between those who remained in the country during the war and those who left or acted from abroad. Another important matter could be strengthening the country's dialogue with its diaspora through the Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad.
- Further approaches to creating a conducive environment for the Ukrainian diaspora's engagement mentioned by the experts included consideration of dual citizenship, recognition and transferability of social rights and the avoidance of double taxation of Ukrainians living abroad.

Part I. The bigger picture: Diasporas in times of emergency, military conflict and in post-conflict reconstruction and development

1. What is a diaspora?

Diaspora is a widely used term with many definitions. Yet all modern notions underline a certain subjectivity of the term and link it with feelings of belonging and self-identity. One of the classical definitions describes diasporas as expatriate communities whose members show a range of common characteristics, such as being from a specific territorially dispersed community and retaining a “collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland” and feeling a collective obligation to support the homeland.³ There is a question of whether this “specific community” needs to be of an ethnic character, since this may also include religious or post-colonial diasporas. Another question is how, in a globalized world of multi-faceted identities, diasporas can strive to keep their identity within the new and changing political and social contexts in which they operate. To maintain its diasporic consciousness, a diaspora should fulfil three conditions: 1) be characterized by dispersion; 2) have a homeland orientation; and 3) try to maintain a separate identity even if its members possess other identities.⁴ Recent approaches underline the fact that the diaspora does not have to be characterized by a stable feeling of collective obligation towards the country of origin, and that those commitments to the safety and prosperity of the homeland and populations originating from that homeland can vary over time and context. In other words, diasporic consciousness needs to be mobilized, as it is not so much about any intrinsic features of a particular diaspora, but rather about the conditions and developments that make this diaspora active.⁵

The formation of a diaspora is not an automatic consequence of migration processes. Diasporas need time to form and, depending on the security, political or economic contexts, diasporic communities may go through different phases and changing levels of diasporic engagement. This also depends on the time and context in which the diasporic community was initially formed. Moreover, members of a diaspora usually represent different generations of emigrants with different needs towards the “homeland” and visions of its development. Different generations may differ in the way they think about the past and any historic traumas experienced, and how they think those issues should be tackled at present.⁶ Moreover, a diaspora’s interest in the homeland does not necessarily decrease with the passage of time.⁷

While academic literature distinguishes different typologies of diasporas,⁸ for the purposes of this report, the aspect of self-identification of members of a diaspora is key. Hence, non-traditional members of diaspora, such as circular migrants or people who moved abroad only for a short period of time and have not developed strong attachments in the host country, can also self-identify as members of a diaspora.⁹ The Ukrainian diaspora abroad consists of different generations of migrants who left their homeland for a variety of reasons: security, political, economic, family, border changes and forced deportations. While some groups of Ukrainians living abroad prefer to speak of themselves as labor migrants or political émigrés, this does not mean that those living abroad cannot switch from being more or less active at

³ William Safran, ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’, *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 83–99, <https://doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.1.1.83>.

⁴ Rogers Brubaker, ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>.

⁵ Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003256526>.

⁶ Othon Anastasakis, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

⁷ Camilla Orjuela, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

⁸ Robin Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (July 1996): 507–20, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2625554>.

⁹ Orjuela, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

different times.¹⁰ Therefore, the borderlines of diaspora are conceived as flexible, inclusive and based on the sense of belonging.

2. Why are diasporas important?

There is ample evidence that diasporas bring multiple contributions to their place of origin. They are traditionally seen as guardians of homelands' national and cultural identity abroad, maintained through educational and cultural activities. Their role usually grows during a crisis or a military conflict. At these moments, the diaspora often provides timely and flexible humanitarian assistance, including in places where professional humanitarian organizations do not dare to venture.¹¹ It is due to the diaspora engagement that some countries are more resilient to crises and receive first-hand support that mitigates shocks generated by crises.¹² Diasporas' role as providers of remittances (financial, but also social, cultural and political) has been widely researched.¹³ Diasporas often bring an entrepreneurial spirit and skills back to the homeland. They may also play a prominent role in the promotion of democracy in their countries of origin, such as by strengthening civil society, supporting democratic political campaigns, or criticizing undemocratic behaviors. When lobbying for the right to participate in elections in the country of origin, diasporas can contribute to more inclusive and democratic electoral reforms.¹⁴ Diasporas may also act as brokers between the homeland and international actors and support the political claims of their homeland abroad.¹⁵ Diasporas build bridges between origin and receiving societies, constructing mutual trust and bringing mutual benefits for both societies. Finally, a very important, yet under researched role, of diasporas concerns their engagement in the so-called transitional justice, memorialization, and reconciliation after large-scale violence.¹⁶

This report follows Brinkerhoff's¹⁷ four categories of diaspora engagement, which are especially relevant during crisis and post-conflict situations:

- Economic remittances,
- Philanthropy and humanitarian assistance,
- Human capital,
- Policy influence.

¹⁰ Iryna Lapshyna, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹¹ Anders Knudsen, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹² Rabat Process: Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 'Collection of Diaspora Engagement Practices"', November 2020, <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/activities/publications/publication-collection-diaspora-engagement-practices>.

¹³ Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 'Diasporas, Skills Transfer, and Remittances: Evolving Perceptions and Potential"', *Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2006).

¹⁴ Maria Koinova, 'Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 41–64, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.02.001>.

¹⁵ Maria Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

¹⁶ Camilla Orjuela, 'Mobilising Diasporas for Justice. Opportunity Structures and the Presencing of a Violent Past', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 8 (11 June 2018): 1357–73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354163>. & Maria Koinova and Dženeta Karabegović, 'Causal Mechanisms in Diaspora Mobilizations for Transitional Justice', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42, no. 11 (18 August 2019): 1809–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1624802>.

¹⁷ Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 'Diasporas and Conflict Societies: Conflict Entrepreneurs, Competing Interests or Contributors to Stability and Development?', *Conflict, Security & Development* 11, no. 02 (May 2011): 115–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2011.572453>.

2.1 Economic remittances

Diasporas are an important source of remittances (inter-personal financial transfers) and investments that help to alleviate poverty, economic disparities, or unemployment.¹⁸ These remittances often enhance a diaspora's credibility in the eyes of governments and empower them vis-à-vis state structures. However, if economic remittances are the sole focus of states and other stakeholders' engagement with a diaspora, its representatives may gradually feel that the homeland countries perceive them only as "money senders" or "cash cows".¹⁹

In 2000, global remittance inflows to receiving countries were estimated at 125 billion USD. In 2019, this figure had risen by 470 per cent to 719 billion USD.²⁰ In many low- and middle-income countries, remittance inflows are larger than both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).²¹ Furthermore, the scale of all international remittances is likely to be significantly larger in practice, as many remittances go beyond the official money transfer channels. According to some estimates, the total amount of global remittances may be "at least 50 percent larger than recorded flows".²² Some policy makers do not appreciate remittances as much as investment, as they tend to perceive them as being spent on consumption rather than development. Yet remittances are often used to obtain education or are spent in "household enterprises", particularly in rural areas. They also raise the national income and can influence the overall macroeconomic stability of the receiving country.²³ There is a smaller risk of misuse or corruption than in the case of humanitarian aid.²⁴ While skilled migrants may be able to send more money than unskilled ones, much also depends on cultural factors, as well as migrants' generation or gender.²⁵ For example, data at the global level indicates that migrant women send approximately the same amount of remittances as men. Because they generally earn less than migrant men do, this means that they send a higher proportion of their income. Migrant women also usually send money more regularly and for longer periods.²⁶

Remittances are relatively resilient to economic crises or military conflicts. In 2020, during the strict COVID-19 related mobility restrictions, the global level of remittances dropped by only about 2.4 per cent to an estimated 702 billion USD, notwithstanding the associated economic crisis.²⁷ During and after military conflicts, remittances from the diaspora can help individuals and families to survive and to rebuild.²⁸ Their role is particularly significant when it comes to poverty reduction. In the long-term, they serve as an important financial instrument in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly at the local level and in sectors such as education, public health or other public infrastructure that are crucial for local communities. Remittances can be an important resource to prevent further displacement, since they can

¹⁸ Stephen Gelb et al., 'Diaspora Finance for Development: From Remittances to Investment', JRC technical report, 15 June 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2760/034446>.

¹⁹ International Organization for Migration, 'Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and States' (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2013), https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/DMC_Final_Conference_Report.pdf.

²⁰ European Commission. Joint Research Centre., *Diaspora Finance for Development: From Remittances to Investment*. (LU: Publications Office, 2021), <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/034446>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ratha Dillip, 'What Are Remittances? Finance and Development' (International Monetary Fund, 2017), <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/pdf/ratha-remittances.pdf>.

²³ European Commission. Joint Research Centre., *Diaspora Finance for Development*.

²⁴ Maria Koinova, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

²⁵ Anastasakis, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

²⁶ International Organization for Migration, 'Gender, Migration and Remittances', factsheet, 23 June 2015, <https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/about-iom/Gender-migration-remittances-infosheet.pdf>.

²⁷ Ratha Dillip, 'What Are Remittances? Finance and Development'.

²⁸ van Hear Nicolas, 'Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development and Conflict', Migration Information Source (Migration Policy Institute, 1 June 2003), <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-diasporas-remittances-development-and-conflict>.

help internally displaced people sustain themselves in their temporary places of stay.²⁹ Yet, particularly in conflict-affected areas, governments and humanitarian actors may face problems in directing remittances towards systemic development as remittances often create an informal financial infrastructure.³⁰

Box 1: Decline in remittances in Greece after the 2009 financial crisis

Although remittances in general are resilient to economic crises or conflicts, the willingness of the diaspora to send money home may wane, particularly in a moment of protracted crisis or where the homeland institutions are not perceived as credible. The results of a survey on the Greek diaspora in the United Kingdom carried out by South East European Studies at the European Studies Centre at Oxford University in 2020 demonstrated that there is a differentiation between strong emotional attachment to the motherland and the comparatively weaker moral responsibility towards it. Although emigration flows from Greece increased threefold between 2009 and 2012, from about 40,000 to more than 120,000 people, remittances shrank. Faure (2017) argues that one of the main factors that influenced this decline was the perceived lack of credibility of the institutional and political system of the country of origin and lower trust in the institutions.³¹

2.2 Philanthropy and humanitarian response

Diasporas provide philanthropy to their homelands, either via sending funds to the diasporic organizations or in more informal ways.³² With the growing number of migrants worldwide and the wealth they accumulate, diasporas' philanthropic activities are rising on a global level, often using online charity transfer.³³ Philanthropy may also take a form of volunteering and in-kind donations. Volunteering can make diaspora commitments to the homeland more long-term and sustainable.³⁴

Diaspora philanthropy usually forms part of a more complex humanitarian response in times of armed conflicts or during other emergencies. Diasporas have many advantages when it comes to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Firstly, they act quickly and flexibly; often being the first actors to raise the international alarm in the event of a crisis.³⁵ Secondly, while engaging in crisis management, diasporas are characterized by strong local attachment and recognition of the critical role that local actors play. Thirdly, the support from diasporas is usually long-term. They provide support in different phases of

²⁹ The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, 'Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development' (Boston University, 2013), https://www.bu.edu/africa/files/2018/11/Pardee_CenterRemittanceFlows_Pr4-1.pdf.

³⁰ Maria Koinova and Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'How Do Countries of Origin Engage Migrants and Diasporas? Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives', *International Political Science Review* 39, no. 3 (June 2018): 311–21, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118755843>.

³¹ Aymeric Faure, 'New Greek Migrants Remitting Behaviour: Exploring the Factors in the Rapid Decline of Remittances Inflows in Greece', The Greek Diaspora Project, SEESOX Diaspora Briefs, September 2017, <http://seesoxdiaspora.org/publications/briefs/new-greek-migrants-remitting-behaviour-exploring-the-factors-in-the-rapid-decline-of-remittances-inflows-in-greece>.

³² Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 'Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas' Participation in Homeland Development: Enabling Diaspora Contributions', *International Migration* 50, no. 1 (February 2012): 75–95, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00542.x>.

³³ Johnson Paula Doherty, 'Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues', The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc. and The Global Equity Initiative (Harvard University, 1 May 2007), <https://www.cbd.int/financial/charity/usa-diasporaphilanthropy.pdf>.

³⁴ Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

³⁵ 'Diaspora Emergency Response to the Ukraine Crisis', Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination, 23 December 2022, <https://www.demac.org/response/ukraine>.

crises and can change modes of engagement smoothly. Nevertheless, the role of diasporas as non-traditional actors in humanitarian assistance also poses some challenges related to the heterogeneity of diaspora motivations, modes of operations and political goals. In general, diaspora organizations often act on a voluntary basis and do not necessarily follow clear coordination rules. This can become a challenge when cooperating with professional humanitarian organizations. In particular, they typically do not follow the principle of specialization of humanitarian actors in different fields of crisis response, and often mix humanitarian assistance with other forms of public activism, for instance, political lobbying or fundraising for the needs of the military.³⁶

Box 2: Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination (DEMAC)

Highlighting and supporting the role that diaspora communities can play as civil society actors is central to the approach of the Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination (DEMAC).³⁷ Hosted by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC),³⁸ this global initiative aims to bring together diaspora organizations, local NGOs and institutionalized humanitarian structures in periods of crisis. DEMAC seeks to increase engagement and visibility for diaspora organizations in the humanitarian system. It also aims at better understanding of the role of diasporas as humanitarian actors.

According to DEMAC, Afghan diaspora organizations heavily supported their community and continued to do so after the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Diaspora organizations have extended their reach to all provinces, which includes minority groups, ethnic groups, internally displaced people and other vulnerable groups even in physically remote rural communities. Apart from humanitarian assistance focusing on food provision, they have also supported women-specific services, public health, resettlement and integration of refugees, informal literacy training and formal education and psychosocial assistance.

2.3 Human capital

Contribution through human capital denotes what is also referred to as social remittances or contributions to the homeland's development in the form of ideas, skills, knowledge and expertise. Knowledge or skills transfers can also be combined with investments. It often materializes when migrants return to their homeland with new skills and invest in certain sectors, where there may be a lack of homegrown expertise.³⁹ The human capital may also be mobilized virtually, such as by organizing remote mentoring or training programs for local specialists. This type of support was particularly popular during the COVID-19 pandemic. Diaspora members often team up in professional networks or in youth organizations. This kind of mobilization may also facilitate establishing international business contacts.

Equally important, yet more difficult to capture, are more abstract forms of human capital contributions. For instance, the raising of cultural and civic awareness. Diaspora members may also promote certain kinds of behavior, for instance encourage the return to the homeland or promote particular gender norms.

³⁶ European Union Diaspora Facility (EUDiF), 'Diaspora Engagement Mapping Ukraine' (International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), March 2020), https://diasporaforddevelopment.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CF_Ukraine-v.7.pdf.

³⁷ 'About Us', Danish Refugee Council, 6 January 2023, <https://pro.drc.ngo/about-us/>.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Brinkerhoff, 'Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas' Participation in Homeland Development'.

However, these new skills, ways of working and social attitudes are not always welcomed by the host society, who may regard them as alien, imported, and generally not suitable for the local context.⁴⁰

Box 3: The gender dimension of diaspora contributions

The types of contributions provided by a diaspora may depend on the gender of diaspora members. The relationship between gender, diaspora engagement and development is complex and requires further studies. A case study of Armenian women in The Netherlands demonstrated that women looked for alternative, collective methods of sending remittances home, and were more open towards cooperation with local NGOs. Furthermore, even if women are not the active representatives of the diaspora in normal times, they are more likely to mobilize themselves and try to support their homeland when in crisis.⁴¹ Another study on diaspora investments in the United Kingdom documented that migrant women often perform the roles of active investors as informal “social agents” or “social lenders” and their role is crucial in the development of local communities.⁴²

2.4 Policy influence

Diaspora contributions linked to political mobilization, state-building activities, or the search for international justice, are usually considered the most important spheres of their activities, yet they tend to be highly diversified and often contested by other actors. Their scope, dynamics and methods heavily depend on the political conditions in both the country of destination and the country of origin. In general, however, diasporas’ political activities are likely to flourish in democratic contexts and tend to be suppressed in authoritarian ones.⁴³ Many diasporas actively participate in public diplomacy in the destination country by organizing protests, speaking in the media, meeting with politicians and other stakeholders, and lobbying at international fora.⁴⁴

The goals of diasporas vis-à-vis the homeland may vary, depending on whether they oppose a political authority there or not.⁴⁵ If they support the national government, they may try to serve as facilitators or brokers between the destination and sending country. For instance, the Irish Diaspora in the United States proved to be a critical partner in reaching the negotiated agreement over the autonomy of Northern Ireland.⁴⁶

An important yet understudied area of diaspora engagement is their role in promoting and achieving transitional justice. Diasporas often participate in truth commissions (e.g., in Liberia, Haiti, Sierra Leone

⁴⁰ Orjuela, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

⁴¹ Nare Galstyan and Maurizio Ambrosini, ‘Diasporas and Collective Remittances: From State-Driven to Unofficial Forms of Diaspora Engagement’, *International Migration Review*, 15 June 2022, 019791832211035, <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221103572>.

⁴² Roda Madziva, Juliana Siwale, and Juliet Thondhlana, ‘Exploring Gender and Diaspora Investment Among Diaspora Women in the UK’, in *African Diaspora Direct Investment*, ed. Dieu Hack-Polay and Juliana Siwale (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 211–37, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72047-0_10.

⁴³ Brinkerhoff, ‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas’ Participation in Homeland Development’.

⁴⁴ Elaine L. E. Ho and Fiona McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”: Territory and Populations Betwixt the Domestic and Foreign’, *Progress in Human Geography* 43, no. 2 (April 2019): 235–55, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132517740217>.

⁴⁵ Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Long-Distance Nationalism’, in *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, ed. Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian Skoggard (Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005), 570–80, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-29904-4_59.

⁴⁶ Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, ‘Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 8 (13 August 2009): 681–704, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903040716>.

or Cambodia),⁴⁷ contribute to acts of memorialization and promote genocide recognition (e.g., in the Armenian, Bosnian or Jewish case).⁴⁸

3. Policies of countries of origin towards their diasporas

Countries of origin have started paying more attention to establishing and institutionalizing contacts with their diasporas in recent times, although some were also doing this in the past. For example, the development of consular service and trade missions was, among other things, driven by the desire to maintain contacts with diasporas. In general, two types of state-level motivations to maintain and develop policies on diasporas can be distinguished: 1) a utilitarian motivation that focuses on the material gains that states may receive from engagement with the diaspora and 2) an identity-based motivation where states try to keep relations with diaspora for the purposes of promotion of language, culture and national ideas abroad.⁴⁹ Countries usually mix those types of motivations or employ them differently towards different categories of emigrants. For example, a study on the policies on the diaspora and emigrants of Egypt demonstrated that while the country developed institutionalized links with migrants residing in Europe, North America and Australia, it set aside a state policy on Egyptians living in the Arab world for geopolitical reasons.⁵⁰

When it comes to measures aimed at stimulating remittances and investments, states may facilitate transfers of remittances by creating special banking channels to eliminate high transaction costs or by incentivizing migrants to participate in investment or co-investment schemes. Homeland states may also develop active return policies that include privileges for returning migrants, such as by exempting their belongings from import taxes, by the easier recognition of qualifications obtained abroad or through job placement programs.⁵¹

The identity-based dimension of diaspora policies includes support in organizing cultural events and commemorating important historic dates, organizing homecoming trips for members of the diaspora or financing language courses.

The so-called policy towards co-ethnics represents a specific form of diaspora policies typical for the Central and Eastern Europe region that experienced significant changes of international borders and forced mass expulsions. The idea behind special programs for that category of diaspora lies in the conviction of the sending states that they bear moral responsibility to make amends for the historic injustice the displaced populations encountered.⁵²

Finally, at the international level, there is growing understanding that diaspora engagement and empowerment may bring positive results in the democratic and economic transition of countries of origin.

⁴⁷ L. A. Young and R. Park, 'Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project', *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3, no. 3 (1 November 2009): 341–61, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp021>.

⁴⁸ Maria Koinova and Dženeta Karabegović, 'Diasporas and Transitional Justice: Transnational Activism from Local to Global Levels of Engagement', *Global Networks* 17, no. 2 (April 2017): 212–33, <https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12128>.

⁴⁹ Koinova and Tsourapas, 'How Do Countries of Origin Engage Migrants and Diasporas?'

⁵⁰ Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Why Do States Develop Multi-Tier Emigrant Policies? Evidence from Egypt', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 13 (10 November 2015): 2192–2214, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1049940>.

⁵¹ Luicy Pedroza and Pau Palop-García, '¿Retorno o Remesas? Políticas Económicas de Los Estados de Latinoamérica y El Caribe Hacia Su Diáspora', *Apuntes: Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 46, no. 84 (2019): 159–84, <https://doi.org/10.21678/apuntes.84.1017>.

⁵² Andreea Udrea, David Smith, and Karl Cordell, 'Karta Polaka', Poland and Its Co-Ethnics Abroad', *Ethnopolitics* 20, no. 1 (1 January 2021): 1–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1808311>.

4. How to empower diasporas? Lessons learned

In times of crisis, diasporas can mobilize quickly and efficiently as they are usually guided by strong motivations in contributing to the homeland, sustaining their country's independence, fighting for a democratic regime, and preserving their cultural and linguistic heritage. The positive impacts of this assistance will depend upon an enabling environment for the diaspora contributions in both the origin and the destination country, as well as in the wider international context. Does the regulatory environment support economic opportunities for the diaspora? Do diaspora members have access to positions of authority and influence? Do they have access to decision makers and are able to influence them?⁵³ Do they have access to relevant information? Is their cause perceived to be legitimate?⁵⁴ In summary, to be effective, diasporas need a friendly and conducive structural environment. This could not only be supported by special governmental agencies in charge of contacts with the diaspora, but also through special economic incentives. Diaspora organizations should be treated as partners with access to information and the ability to influence the way their assistance is being used. In the destination countries, access to resources and information will also increase the likelihood that the diaspora will generate meaningful contributions. Finally, at the international level, there is growing understanding that diaspora engagement and empowerment may bring positive results in the democratic and economic transition of countries of origin.

Box 4: International frameworks endorsing diaspora engagement

United Nations

The *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*⁵⁵ (2018) promotes diaspora policies as a tool of migration governance. The instrument that was designed under the United Nations identifies diasporas as important stakeholders within its *whole-of-society* approach to migration, highlighting their relevance for data collection, the provision of information during all stages of migration, migrant inclusion and integration efforts, and the elimination of discrimination. The Global Compact dedicates one of its twenty-three objectives to diaspora engagement, namely to “Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries”. To achieve this objective, it is suggested to map and facilitate diasporas' varied contributions, including the non-financial ones such as skills and expertise in countries of origin and destination (e.g. through dedicated government structures, targeted support programs or decreased administrative burdens in terms of residency status).⁵⁶

In *Sustainable Development Goals* (2015), the target 10.c expresses the commitment of the international community to lowering the transaction costs of remittances to less than 3 per cent by 2030. The average cost of sending money to low- and middle-income countries decreased from 9.7 per cent in 2009 to just below 7 per cent in the beginning of 2020. However, it remains more than double the Sustainable Development Goal target.⁵⁷

⁵³ Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*.

⁵⁴ Brinkerhoff, ‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas’ Participation in Homeland Development’.

⁵⁵ UN General Assembly, ‘Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. A/RES/73/195.’, 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/451/99/PDF/N1845199.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵⁶ The iDIASPORA platform at www.idiaspora.org was set up as a forum and a resource hub that allows member of diasporas from around the globe access latest diaspora success stories, share best practices and discuss relevant policies.

⁵⁷ World Bank, ‘The Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals 2020’, Text/HTML, The Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals 2020, accessed 19 April 2023, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgoalatlas/>.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE participating States recognize the role of civil society in the promotion of human rights and of the human rights of migrants and their families and recommend that host countries and countries of origin should cooperate to facilitate the reintegration of migrants, and acknowledge the benefits stemming from effective migration management (Vienna 1989, Istanbul 1999, Athens 2009, Astana 2010).⁵⁸

European Union

The EU Integration Action Plan 2021 – 2027⁵⁹ recognizes that diaspora communities can be a driving force in supporting migrants' inclusion in the host country, while simultaneously helping them maintain a link with their country of origin. In addition, the European Commission sees diasporas as potential investors and actors of innovation and development. Moving forward, the Commission suggests that diaspora organizations should be involved in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the 2021-2027 EU funds programs. In 2019, the EU launched the first ever EU-funded project that takes a global approach to consolidate efforts on diaspora engagement for development. The EU Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF) supports governments of countries of origin and diaspora organizations towards diaspora engagement in developing policies and strengthening the capacities of diaspora organizations.

A crucial aspect of empowering diasporas is providing them with status and respect, e.g. acknowledging their role in the humanitarian response, sending remittances and playing an active role in the reconstruction. One way of demonstrating this respect is allowing diaspora to have a say in how their support is used.⁶⁰ The enabling environment enhances a diaspora's motivations and confidence in bringing about a positive change.⁶¹ Diasporas also need to trust the institutions of the homeland, in particular with regard to transparency in disbursement of financial contributions provided by the diaspora.⁶² The approach of homeland institutions should be diversified according to the migrants' generations and take into account potential frictions within the diaspora.⁶³ The process of empowering diasporas requires time; sometimes it takes generations before the diaspora mobilizes the resources that will make an impact.⁶⁴ Empowering diasporas can take different forms depending on whether they are considered as groups or individuals who can be differently connected to their countries of origin and settlement.⁶⁵ Some may be more empowered by their homeland, others by their host-land. This is why cooperation of countries across borders is necessary to fully mobilize the potential of diasporas.

⁵⁸ OSCE Third Follow-up Meeting, "Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference", Vienna, 19 January 1989, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/7/40881.pdf>>. OSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government PCOEW389, "Istanbul Document 1999", Istanbul, 19 November 1999, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/5/39569.pdf>>. OSCE Ministerial Council MC17EW71, "Final Document of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 1 and 2 December 2009", Athens, 2 December 2009, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/5/67621.pdf>>. OSCE Summit Meeting SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1*, "Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community", Astana, 3 December 2010, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/6/74985.pdf>>.

⁵⁹ European Commission, 'Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021 - 2027. COM (2020) 758', 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0758&from=EN>.

⁶⁰ Brinkerhoff, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

⁶¹ Orjuela, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Anastasakis, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

⁶⁴ Feargal Cochrane, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

⁶⁵ Koinova, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'; Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*.

Box 5: Typology of diaspora actors: Broker, Local, Distant, Reserved

A study by a European Research Council Project “Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty” conducted at the University of Warwick mapped four types of diaspora entrepreneurs depending on their connections to different global contexts. The “Broker” has strong access to both institutions and people in the country of origin and country of settlement, allowing this person to be “multi-vocal” about various issues in these contexts, and to collaborate with many groups and institutions, including with international organizations. This type of diaspora entrepreneurs is most often engaged by policy makers, because of their visibility. Yet other, quieter, types have different potential for collaboration. The “Local” is a diaspora entrepreneur more strongly connected to social, economic, and political processes in the country of settlement, and could be an excellent link to the host-country’s civil society and local government. The “Distant” is a diaspora entrepreneur mostly operational transnationally. It is a type likely to return or mobilize returnees. The “Reserved” is an activist with less connections to the institutions of both countries of origin and of settlement, having strong preference for communal and humanitarian activism. Acknowledging different types and strengths of diaspora entrepreneurs can strengthen diaspora policy making in host and origin countries.⁶⁶

Governments in homeland countries (as well as civil society actors) could try to convince society that the diaspora is a “strategic asset”.⁶⁷ Yet one should also remember that an active role of the diaspora in the homeland, and in particular their access to power, may be met with mistrust within society, whose members may feel side-lined despite remaining in the country during the military conflict. Moreover, in post-conflict countries, the societies may have high and sometimes unrealistic expectations towards the returnees. They may be blamed for a delayed or unsatisfactory transformation.⁶⁸ Furthermore, authorities in the home country should acknowledge that the diaspora might not have sufficient information about what is happening back home and thus will not always be able to make proposals that fit into the local context.⁶⁹

Even when diasporas do not have access to stable resources to run their activities as formalized organizations, they can still sustain less formal networks based on horizontal relations that are more agile and resilient and should not be undervalued for lack of institutionalization.⁷⁰ On many occasions, less institutionalized diaspora networks are facilitated by diaspora actors who may be working in the business sector, as social activists, self-employed, as shop or restaurant owners, hairdressers or have another profession where they have easy access to other diaspora members.⁷¹

Finally, diasporas maintain multi-faceted relations with different actors in the host countries, also being in alliances with other civil society organizations, such as local NGOs assisting migrants or human rights organizations in both destination and sending countries. This can enhance their impact.⁷² The diaspora organizations often try to establish relationships with political parties in the destination countries to help them achieve their goals in the homeland. However, there is a risk of their instrumentalization in political campaigns and for certain political interests that may be unrelated to the aims of the diaspora.⁷³

⁶⁶ Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*.

⁶⁷ Yehonatan Abramson, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

⁶⁸ Abramson.

⁶⁹ Orjuela, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

⁷⁰ Anastasakis, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

⁷¹ Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*.

⁷² Natalia Dziadyk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

⁷³ Nadejda K. Marinova, *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country: How Host States Use Diasporas* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

Part II. Zooming in on the Ukrainian diaspora: Roles, contributions and future potential

5. The Ukrainian diaspora is dispersed globally, diverse and constantly evolving

Taking into consideration the wider historic context of its formation, the contemporary Ukrainian diaspora is a diverse and segmented community.⁷⁴ The most pronounced differences and sources of potential tensions are those around different political affiliations, class identity, religion (Catholic vs. Orthodox), regional origins (eastern vs. western Ukraine), and periods of migration (new-wave immigrants after 1991 vs. those who settled abroad following WWII or earlier).⁷⁵

Furthermore, the context of the destination country and consequently the extent to which members of the Ukrainian diaspora maintained regular contacts with their homeland has impacted the nature of the diaspora's engagement and attitudes towards the Ukrainian state. Whereas the North American-based diaspora communities traditionally focused on cooperation with the existing Ukrainian political leadership, the European-based diaspora groups tended to focus on supporting civil society organizations instead.⁷⁶ Another diversifying trait of the Ukrainian diaspora are the differences between Ukrainians who left the country voluntarily or forcefully; ethnic Ukrainians who did not move anywhere but are living as a minority in their places of birth due to different historical reasons and migrants who moved to the neighboring states, mostly for economic reasons after 1991. The distinction between economic and political migrants, made by some diaspora organizations and the Ukrainian state, have, to a certain degree, undermined the political agency of labor migrants because they have been perceived as separate from the political migrants who were more likely to be treated as counterparts by the authorities.⁷⁷

Finally, there is an important gender dimension to the diaspora evolution, which is likely to get more pronounced in the context of current displacement. Since the 1990s, Ukrainian emigration has had a growing proportion of women. This has gradually become reflected in the leadership of diaspora organizations, particularly in European countries, with more Ukrainian women taking prominent leadership positions.⁷⁸

Following the 2022 Russian Federation's military attack in Ukraine, the number of Ukrainians living abroad has grown significantly and this growth is likely to persist.⁷⁹ After the initial mass forced migration, many Ukrainian nationals returned home or are circulating between Ukraine and the neighboring countries. By 3 October 2023, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded 6.2 million refugees from Ukraine globally.⁸⁰ Yet the number of border crossings to and from the

⁷⁴ Olena Fedyuk and Marta Kindler, 'Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues', in *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union*, ed. Olena Fedyuk and Marta Kindler, IMISCOE Research Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9_1.

⁷⁵ There were several waves of emigration from Ukraine. The first started in the last decades of the nineteenth century and lasted until WWI. The second wave refers to the war-related emigration of Ukrainians engaged in struggle for independence for Ukraine in the 1920s, while the third wave relates to post-war movement of the 1940s-1950s. The labor migration that started during the times of independent Ukraine is usually described as the fourth wave. See more in Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, Global Diasporas (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

⁷⁶ Alexander Clarkson, 'Coming to Terms with Odessa Ukraine: The Impact of the Maidan Uprising on the Ukrainian Diaspora', in *Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties That Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine*, vol. 159, Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (Ibidem Verlag, 2017), 115–36.

⁷⁷ Olena Fedyuk, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

⁷⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'Engaging the Ukrainian Diaspora in Reconstruction and Development. Warsaw Human Dimension Conference Side Event. OSCE/ODIHR Meeting Report' (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, October 2022), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/528936>.

⁷⁹ Monika Sie Dhian Ho, Bob Deen, and Drost Niels, 'Long-Term Protection in Europe Needed for Millions of Ukrainian Refugees', Clingendael Alert, September 2022, <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/long-term-protection-in-europe-needed-for-millions-of-ukrainian-refugees-.pdf>.

⁸⁰ UNHCR, 'Ukraine Refugee Situation', accessed 3 October 2023, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

neighboring countries was much higher – according to the UNHCR data in the period from 24 February 2022 to 3 October 2023, 25.1 million border crossings from Ukraine and 18 million border crossings to Ukraine were recorded.⁸¹ Germany hosts the largest share of displaced Ukrainians, with approximately 1.1 million persons currently recorded as present according to the UNHCR data.⁸² Neighboring Poland and the Czech Republic accommodate additional 960 thousand and 372 thousand respectively as the other two major receiving countries.⁸³

Additionally, according to the UNHCR, 1.2 million Ukrainian refugees were recorded in the Russian Federation at the end of 2022.⁸⁴ This data must be treated with caution, as it is unknown how many Ukrainian civilians have entered Russia for the purpose of transit (because the residents of eastern Ukraine faced difficulties in reaching unoccupied Ukrainian territory) and how many were forcibly deported to Russia.⁸⁵

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine declared in 2019 that at least 9 million ethnic Ukrainians resided abroad. Moreover, some Ukrainian communities remain living in the border areas of Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary or Moldova, usually described by themselves and the countries they live in as an ethnic minority. In 2020, 5.9 million ethnic Ukrainians were reported to be residing outside their home country according to the EU Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF), of which 20 per cent resided in the EU.⁸⁶ At the end of 2021, 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens were in the possession of a valid residence permit in the EU, mainly issued for labor purposes.⁸⁷

While the EU is hosting more recent Ukrainian emigrants, Canada has one of the largest and oldest populations of Ukrainians outside Ukraine. According to the 2016 population census of Canada, Canadian Ukrainians amounted to 1.3 million persons, which made the Ukrainian ethnic group the eleventh largest ethnic population in Canada.⁸⁸ However, in reality the number of people with Ukrainian origin may be larger, since the majority of them arrived in the 19th century or during WWI and WWII.⁸⁹ The cohesion of the Ukrainian community in Canada was facilitated by its specific geographical dispersion. Back in the time, most ethnic Ukrainians settled in the Prairie Provinces in Western Canada. Today, large part of the community also lives in the Greater Toronto Area. Between January 2022 and May 2023, 190,000 Ukrainian citizens and returning Canadian permanent residents of Ukrainian origin entered Canada by air.⁹⁰

Although similar numbers of ethnic Ukrainians can be found in the United States, the Ukrainian community there comprises of much more diversified groups of migrants, including those arriving after

⁸¹ Ibid. the number of border crossings to and from Belarus are not included.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the Human Rights Council’ (United Nations Human Rights Council, 16 March 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/A_HRC_52_62_AUV_EN.pdf.

⁸⁶ European Union Diaspora Facility (EUDiF), “Diaspora Engagement Mapping Ukraine” (International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), March 2020), 1. https://diasporafordevelopment.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CF_Ukraine-v.7.pdf. According to this fact sheet, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) maintains that this number stands at 6.8 million.

⁸⁷ Eurostat, ‘Ukrainian Citizens in the EU’, November 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ukrainian_citizens_in_the_EU#Ukrainian_citizens_authorized_to_stay_in_the_EU.

⁸⁸ Statistics Canada, ‘A Sociodemographic Profile of Ukrainian-Canadians’, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.25318/36280001202200400003-ENG>.

⁸⁹ Statistics Canada.

⁹⁰ Refugees and Citizenship Canada Immigration, ‘Ukraine Immigration Measures: Key Figures’, 24 May 2023, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>.

1991 and is more dispersed geographically. According to the most recent estimates of the United States Census Bureau (2016-2020 ACS), the total Ukrainian population was 1.015 million.⁹¹ Moreover, the U.S. has admitted around 270,000 Ukrainian refugees since February 2022.⁹²

Determining the number of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation is a controversial matter. According to official Russian sources, the number amounted to 1.9 million in 2019, while according to Ukrainian sources it could be as many as 10 million.⁹³ The Ukrainians in Russia outnumber those in the EU, US or Canada but information about their presence is scattered.

Diaspora engagement is traditionally spurred by specific events in the country of origin.⁹⁴ For example, the Chernobyl catastrophe was one of the first occasions during which the Ukrainian diaspora demonstrated its resourcefulness and commitment to support homeland. Between the late 1980s and early 2000s, humanitarian aid worth 40 million USD was provided by the US-based Ukrainian diaspora, for the benefit of children harmed by the disaster.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the Ukrainian diaspora from the US and Canada was actively engaged in supporting Ukraine during its years of independence in the 1990s, such as by lobbying in their countries of residence to recognize the act of Ukraine's independence or in preparation of the first Ukrainian constitution.⁹⁶ Many of them were active in providing electoral monitoring from abroad, organization of policy forums, and grassroots activism, including during the 2004 Orange Revolution.⁹⁷ More recently, after 2014, there was a shift in Ukrainian diaspora activities due to events such as the Euromaidan protests and the Russian Federation's illegal annexation of Crimea. Diaspora organizations in different countries organized mini Euromaidans, tried to ensure that Ukraine remained high on their host countries' foreign policy agenda and many returned to Ukraine to support a reform process.⁹⁸ Diaspora communities in Poland and the United Kingdom reported that these developments had united their communities among themselves as well as with civil society groups active in Ukraine.⁹⁹ The 2022 military attack by the Russian Federation has provided another impetus for diaspora communities' engagement.

6. The Ukrainian diaspora's mobilization after 24 February 2022

The engagement of the Ukrainian diaspora with the homeland increased dramatically after 24 February 2022. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further united the diaspora's 'old' and 'new' organizations and diverse diaspora initiatives started to cooperate more closely. Due to the limitations concerning the border crossing of men aged 18 to 60, new organizations are usually led by women, which adds diversity to the diaspora activities and modes of operation.¹⁰⁰ A major line of engagement has been the support provided to the Ukrainian refugees. Research carried out in Poland and the Czech Republic demonstrates

⁹¹ 'More Than One Million Americans Report Ukrainian Ancestry' (United States Census Bureau, 7 July 2022), <https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/07/more-than-one-million-americans-report-ukrainian-ancestry.html>.

⁹² Julia Ainsley, 'U.S. Has Admitted 271,000 Ukrainian Refugees since Russian Invasion, Far above Biden's Goal of 100,000', *NBC News*, 23 February 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/us-admits-271000-ukrainian-refugees-russia-invasion-biden-rcna72177>.

⁹³ 'Ukrainians Worldwide', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 18 December 2019, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/ukrainians-worldwide>.

⁹⁴ Iryna Lapshyna, 'Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Development of the Homeland in Times of War' 8, no. 1 (2019): 51–73, <https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2019.04>.

⁹⁵ Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Maria Koinova, 'Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 41–64, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.02.001>.

⁹⁸ Ulana Suprun, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023); Kateryna Bondar, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

⁹⁹ Lapshyna, 'Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Development of the Homeland in Times of War'.

¹⁰⁰ Lapshyna, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

that most Ukrainian migrants in these countries were hosting Ukrainian refugees.¹⁰¹ The Ukrainian diaspora also launched numerous online and offline communication activities to counter Russian Federation's propaganda and disinformation.¹⁰²

Below, various types of activities are mapped out according to the earlier outlined categories of diaspora engagement relevant to conflict and post-conflict situations: remittances, philanthropy, human capital, and policy influence. It is worth noting that these capacities could be mobilized also thanks to the long-term efforts of Ukrainian diaspora organizations to maintain and promote Ukrainian national and cultural identity through educational and cultural activities in their countries of residence.¹⁰³

6.1 Remittances sent by Ukrainians abroad are expected to increase

One of the ways in which Ukrainians abroad continue to be connected to the country of origin is through sending part of their earnings to those who stayed in Ukraine – in other words, through remittances. In 2022, Ukraine received 17.1 billion USD in personal remittances,¹⁰⁴ representing 10.4 per cent of its GDP. It remains Europe and Central Asia's largest recipient of remittances despite a decline of 5.4 per cent compared to 2021.¹⁰⁵ In the first four months of 2023, the volume of remittances decreased by 11.5 per cent, pointing to continued decline in remittance flows to the country.¹⁰⁶ According to the Deputy Head of the Secretariat of the Council at the National Bank of Ukraine, Yevhen Stepaniuk, a possible explanation for this development could be that Ukrainians abroad started taking in their relatives fleeing Ukraine, therefore directly spending the money that would otherwise be sent as remittances.¹⁰⁷ Yet other research suggests that due to the devastating impact of the war on the earning capabilities of Ukraine's inhabitants, the diaspora will probably display additional efforts to remit money to the homeland in the future.¹⁰⁸

6.2 Humanitarian assistance and philanthropy were the first responses of the Ukrainian diaspora

Since many diaspora organizations started boosting their capabilities even before February 2022 and could use the experience from their post-2014 activities, they were often the first ones offering the crisis response in the affected localities and in places where humanitarian organizations did not have access.¹⁰⁹ Yet there is no reliable information on the amount of assistance sent via Ukrainian organizations or directly paid to the accounts of the numerous charity and other initiatives based in Ukraine. Ukrainian diaspora members may also have been donating via the charity organizations and international bodies active in their countries of residence. The dynamically changing situation in the aftermath of the 2022 military attack did not allow for proper coordination or tracking of the material aid that was gathered and sent to Ukraine. As underlined by one of the speakers at the workshop: "We don't count how many trucks we've sent to Ukraine and many other organizations don't do it either".¹¹⁰ According to the

¹⁰¹ Fedjuk, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹⁰² Iryna Sushko, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁰³ Iryna Terlecky, 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁰⁴ World Bank, 'Remittances Remain Resilient but Likely to Slow', Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed 13 October 2023, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/13/remittances-remain-resilient-likely-to-slow>.

¹⁰⁵ World Bank, 'Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) - Ukraine', World Bank Open Data, accessed 13 October 2023, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

¹⁰⁶ World Bank, 'Remittances Remain Resilient but Likely to Slow'.

¹⁰⁷ 'Remittances in War: How Money from Abroad Is Helping Ukraine', International Organization for Migration, 18 January 2023, <https://ukraine.iom.int/stories/remittances-war-how-money-abroad-helping-ukraine>.

¹⁰⁸ Joop Adema et al., 'The Role of the Diaspora for the Recovery of Ukraine', *EconPol Forum*, CESifo, 24, no. 2 (2023): 41–45.

¹⁰⁹ Knudsen, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹¹⁰ Myroslava Keryk, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February' (Warsaw, 2023).

mapping exercise by the Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination (DEMAC) initiative, founded by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) which was conducted between 24 February 2022 and 1 April 2022, selected Ukrainian diaspora organizations declared that they “raised more than 60 million USD over the span of a few weeks following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian forces”.¹¹¹ For example, the Canadian-Ukrainian Foundation gathered as much as 30 million USD of financial assistance between February and March 2022.¹¹²

Diaspora organizations are also well-placed to address the needs of specific groups. For instance, “\$1K Project Ukraine”, a global diaspora network initially founded to support those impacted by the COVID-19 crisis, matches donors with Ukrainians suffering from the effects of the war.¹¹³ Furthermore, donations to purchase protective clothing and smaller protection equipment for the Ukrainian soldiers were organized by the diaspora organizations when this equipment was in short supply. According to the DEMAC report, the main areas of humanitarian response of the diaspora organizations have been health, food security, emergency shelter and education. In the countries neighboring Ukraine, assistance for the incoming refugees has been an important area of intervention.¹¹⁴ These are just a few examples of a dynamic and constantly evolving landscape of diaspora assistance. There is currently no comprehensive assessment of the amount of humanitarian support and types of assistance that are being provided by the Ukrainian diaspora.

The diaspora humanitarian assistance initiatives have not been without challenges. Many new organizations were created after 24 February 2022 with no previous experience¹¹⁵ and most diaspora activists worked as volunteers.¹¹⁶ It took time to professionalize the provision of assistance and the coordination of the volunteer-based work was often chaotic and time-consuming. Even for established global diaspora organizations like the Ukrainian World Congress, which serves as a main umbrella organization for national diasporic groups, vertical coordination is challenging with such a big and diversified diaspora consisting of different waves of migrants, including Ukrainian civil society organizations that relocated temporarily from Ukraine after 24 February 2022. Besides, in many countries, Ukrainian diaspora organizations are embedded in the wider context of local civil society.¹¹⁷ Finally, cooperation with professional humanitarian and international organizations created new challenges. On the one hand, professional organizations may find it difficult to support diaspora organizations that often perform diverse and overlapping activities.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, local NGOs including diaspora organizations struggled with the lack of flexibility and strict administrative and reporting requirements attached to some international funds¹¹⁹ and the lack of awareness about the local context.¹²⁰

¹¹¹ ‘Diaspora Emergency Response to the Ukraine Crisis’.

¹¹² Юрій Банахевич, ‘Павло Грод, президент Світового конгресу українців’, accessed 12 July 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-diaspora/3450932-pavlo-grod-prezident-svitovogo-kongresu-ukrainciv.html>.

¹¹³ ‘SEND \$1K TO DIRECTLY SPONSOR A FAMILY FROM UKRAINE’, accessed 30 April 2023, <https://www.1kproject.org/>.

¹¹⁴ ‘Diaspora Emergency Response to the Ukraine Crisis’.

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Lapshyna, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹¹⁷ Dziadyk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹¹⁸ ‘Diaspora Emergency Response to the Ukraine Crisis’.

¹¹⁹ Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹²⁰ ‘In Poland Local NGOs Issued an Open Letter to International Donors and Organizations That Want to Help Ukrainian Refugees in Poland Calling for Respect, Partnership and Attention to the Time and Working Culture of Local NGOs’, accessed 30 April 2023, <https://zagranica.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Open-letter-to-international-donors.pdf>.

Box 6: Ukrainian World Congress: The Ukrainian diaspora umbrella organization

Founded in 1967, this international NGO upholds a network of foreign-based member organizations and communities in over 60 countries. It advocates for the rights and interests of the Ukrainian diaspora and promotes their connection to the homeland, including through collaboration with government and civil society actors.¹²¹ The UWC is recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as a non-governmental organization with special consultative status and has a participatory status as an international non-governmental organization with the Council of Europe.¹²² The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers concluded a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) in 2020.¹²³ Other MoCs between the UWC and Ukrainian authorities include two MoCs with the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, in 2016¹²⁴ and 2021,¹²⁵ and a MoC with the Ukrainian Investment Promotion Office UkraineInvest in 2020.¹²⁶ In January 2023, the NGO concluded a MoC with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.¹²⁷ Among the main areas of partnership are strategic communication, countering disinformation and fundraising efforts. On 5 January 2023, the UWC received an honorary award from the Ukrainian President, thanking the organization for its support for Ukraine.¹²⁸ These are examples of the Ukrainian authorities increasingly perceiving the UWC (and thus diaspora communities) as useful partners.

¹²¹ Ukrainian World Congress, 'About the UWC', 23 January 2023, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/about/>.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ 'Ukrainian World Congress Signs Memorandum with Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine', Ukrainian World Congress, 10 December 2020, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/ukrainian-world-congress-signs-memorandum-with-cabinet-of-ministers-of-ukraine/>.

¹²⁴ 'MIP: The Ukrainian World Congress Will Contribute to Spread the Truth about Ukraine in the World', Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, 25 August 2016, <https://mkip.gov.ua/en/news/1429.html>.

¹²⁵ 'Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, Ukrainian World Congress, Holodomor Museum and Foundation of the Holodomor Museum Development', Holodomor Museum, 22 April 2021, <https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/news-museji/memorandum-of-cooperation-between-the-ministry-of-culture-of-ukraine-ukrainian-world-congress-holodomor-museum-and-foundation-of-the-holodomor-museum-development/>.

¹²⁶ 'UkraineInvest and Ukrainian World Congress Signed Memorandum of Cooperation', UkraineInvest, 23 January 2023, <https://ukraineinvest.gov.ua/news/ukraineinvest-and-ukrainian-world-congress-signed-memorandum-of-cooperation/>.

¹²⁷ 'UWC Enhances Collaboration with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense', Ukrainian World Congress, 10 January 2023, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/uwc-enhances-collaboration-with-ukraines-ministry-of-defense/>.

¹²⁸ 'UWC Receives an Honorary Award from President Zelensky', Ukrainian World Congress, 5 January 2023, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/uwc-receives-an-honorary-award-from-president-zelensky/>.

Box 7: Ukrainian House in Warsaw: Assistance to newly arriving refugees

Before 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian House in Warsaw run by “Our Choice Foundation” supported the integration of migrants into Polish society and worked to prevent exclusion and discrimination of foreigners in Poland. However, during the last couple of years, like many other Ukrainian-led organizations, it has turned into a crisis response and assistance center, with its staff growing rapidly over a short period of time. It is now providing a complex package of services ranging from daily info line about changing conditions and procedures at the Polish border, finding accommodation for Ukrainians arriving in Poland (according to the organization’s estimates as many as 10,000 refugees have been supported with accommodation matching), coordinating volunteers wishing to help, collecting and distributing of aid and support to Ukraine or providing psychological support for Ukrainians in Poland.¹²⁹ Already in April 2022, the Ukrainian House, together with the Polish Intelligentsia Club, opened the Ukrainian Warsaw School for refugee children enabling them to continue their education according to the Ukrainian national curriculum. The children obtained official school certificates provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education.

6.3 Human capital contributions of the Ukrainian diaspora are multi-faceted

Human capital refers to experiences and skills that people possess and bring to their homeland upon returning, when visiting for short-term stays or even remotely. The Defense Ministry of Ukraine reported¹³⁰ that in the first two weeks after the 24 February 2022, 66,000 Ukrainian men returned from abroad to join the military. Another form of human capital contribution is organizing virtual training for specialists in areas that are in great demand in Ukraine. For example, the Ukrainian diaspora organizes virtual or in-person (when in the neighboring countries) training courses for Ukrainian medical staff. The Canadian-Ukrainian foundation supports the work of plastic surgery specialist teams who conducted several hundred surveys of people with serious facial injuries.¹³¹ They also provide virtual psychological assistance on a voluntary basis. Ukrainian diaspora professional associations are also active in supporting refugees from Ukraine. For example, the Ukrainian Medical Association of the United Kingdom quickly put together a guide for refugee medical doctors and students helping them to continue their profession and studies while abroad.¹³² These are just a few illustrative examples of many different areas in which the diaspora mobilizes its skills and experiences in support of Ukraine and Ukrainians abroad.

Box 8: Global Ukraine

This is a network of over 400 young, highly educated Ukrainian migrants living in over 70 countries. It focuses on diaspora involvement through their education portal, business hub and network of ambassadors, mentors and communities. Their declared goal is to “combine the creative, intellectual, financial resources of Ukrainians worldwide with the aim of facilitating their efforts to create an extraterritorial Ukrainian space where leading Ukrainian organizations, independent leaders and experts promote Ukraine’s interests at the global level.”¹³³ The organization has ties with governmental partners, such as the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ukrainian Business

¹²⁹ Ukraiński Dom, ‘Nasze Działania’, accessed 30 April 2023, <https://ukrainskidom.pl/nasze-dzialania/>.

¹³⁰ Reuters, ‘Over 66,200 Ukrainian Men Have Returned from Abroad to Fight, Says Defence Minister’, 5 March 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-66200-ukrainian-men-have-returned-abroad-fight-says-defence-minister-2022-03-05/>.

¹³¹ Анастасія Рінгіс, ‘Потрібно Готуватися До Перемоги, а Опісля – До Важкої Праці’. Голова Канадсько-Української Фундації Про Допомогу Від Діаспори’, *Ukrainska Pravda*, 10 January 2023, <https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/01/10/252227/>.

¹³² Ukrainian Medical Association of the United Kingdom, ‘Work in the UK’, Umauk, 2022, <https://www.umauk.org/workintheuk>.

¹³³ “About Us,” Global Ukraine, accessed January 6, 2023, https://www.global-ukraine.org/en/about_us/details.

Council, but also others such as the Ukrainian Leadership Academy, Tech Ukraine and the Israeli Ukrainian Alliance.

6.4 The Ukrainian diaspora is trying to exert political influence to harness international solidarity

The diaspora's efforts to shape policy and exert political influence can take on the form of civic activism, as well as online and offline political activities. The 2013 and 2014 Euromaidan protests were a strong impetus for diaspora engagement, which "...connected Ukrainians abroad on unprecedented levels, creating a new and vibrant digital society of individuals with a shared cause".¹³⁴ The social mobilization after Euromaidan was extraordinary because all segments of the Ukrainian diaspora were involved in political actions.¹³⁵ This resulted in increased connections both among the diaspora communities and between the diaspora and people in Ukraine.

Therefore, it was no surprise that after February 2022, the Ukrainian diaspora showed an extraordinary degree of mobilization, organizing major demonstrations and protests against Russia's invasion of Ukraine in major European cities. According to the estimates of the Ukrainian World Congress, on the first anniversary of the start of the war, Ukrainian communities around the world organized mass demonstrations in 46 countries.¹³⁶ In Germany, Ukrainian activists coordinate with one another to be able to secure their presence at the regular demonstrations outside the embassy and consulates of the Russian Federation.¹³⁷ Even in countries that did not have a sizeable Ukrainian community before February 2022, such as Switzerland, the Ukrainian diaspora managed to organize large-scale protests.¹³⁸ The Ukrainian diaspora there got involved in awareness raising and advocacy at the United Nations (see Box 10: World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations, representation in Switzerland).

Box 9: Promote Ukraine

Based in Brussels and coordinated by the Ukrainian diaspora in Belgium, this organization focuses on the EU and aims to "... voice the interests of Ukrainian civil society in Brussels by sharing news, connecting experts, informing public, coordinating events, cooperating with activists, and advocating for the Ukrainian cause to the EU policymakers."¹³⁹ It was founded in 2014, the year of the Euromaidan protests. The website hosts a "Promote Ukraine Hub", with projects such as a podcast series, journal, and the "Ukraine needs you!" campaign.

¹³⁴ Svitlana Krasynska, 'Digital Civil Society: Euromaidan, the Ukrainian Diaspora, and Social Media', in *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution* (ibidem Press, 2015), 177–98, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280080500_Digital_Civil_Society_Euromaidan_the_Ukrainian_Diaspora_and_Social_Media.

¹³⁵ Lapshyna, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹³⁶ UWC News, 'UWC Unites Ukrainians in More than 45 Countries and 300 Cities for Rallies', 23 February 2023, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/365-days-in-a-war-that-lasts-9-years-how-to-join-the-rallies/>.

¹³⁷ Українське Радіо, '100 Днів Незламності: Як Дипломати Та Діаспора Воюють За Україну На Дипломатичному Фронті — Частина 1', *Ukrainian Radio*, 3 June 2023, <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=98855>.

¹³⁸ Bondar, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹³⁹ "About Us," Promote Ukraine, accessed January 6, 2023, <https://www.promoteukraine.org/about-promoteukraine/>.

Box 10: World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations (representation in Switzerland)

An umbrella and coordination organization founded in 1948 which brings together 35 Ukrainian women's organizations from many countries and regularly contributes to the UN Human Rights Council on issues such as alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine; effects of the attacks on the lives of women and children; violence against women and children; conditions of Ukrainian prisoners of war; forcible transfers and unlawful deportation of population including abduction of children; call for accountability for the crime of aggression and war crimes.

Other areas of advocacy include lobbying for Ukraine's accession to the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. Ukraine signed the Convention in 2011 but ratified it only in mid-2022. The organization has been active in the Ukrainian candidate campaign for the CEDAW Committee for 2023-2026 (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women). It has also raised awareness to counter Russian Federation's disinformation and issued public statements, petitions and letters to international organizations and organized panel discussions on the impact of on the ongoing war in Ukraine on the rights of women, children and refugees.¹⁴⁰

Box 11: Transitional justice projects in Poland involving the Ukrainian diaspora

Project Sunflower

The project is designed to complement the activities of state authorities and international courts established to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression, or other serious human rights violations in the context of the war in Ukraine. The project identifies potential witnesses of alleged war crimes who left Ukraine and collects their testimonies.¹⁴¹

Centre for Assistance of War Crimes Documentation

The Centre for War Crimes Documentation, opened by the Civil Network OPORA (a Ukrainian NGO) in Warsaw with the support of the United Kingdom Government, is a place where any person from Ukraine who witnessed or fell victim to crimes can share their story. Professional lawyers collect testimonies and forward them to prosecutors to be considered in international courts. Refugees may also receive psychological care there. The collection, processing, and transfer of data to international courts are administered in a safe mode – from protected web services on international servers to physical storage and anonymization of written files.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Bondar, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹⁴¹ 'Project Sunflower. About Us', accessed 30 April 2023, <https://www.projectsunflowerukraine.com/about>.

¹⁴² Centre for Assistance of War Crimes Documentation, 'Про Центр Документування Воєнних Злочинів', accessed 30 April 2023, <https://warcrimescenter.org/>.

7. Ukraine's policy on diaspora and emigration

The Ukrainian state's growing interest in its diaspora is illustrated by repeated statements about the importance of the Ukrainian diaspora by President Zelenskyy, both prior to and after February 2022.¹⁴³ In his inaugural speech on 20 May 2019, President Zelenskyy appealed to the Ukrainian diaspora:

We really need you. To all who are ready to build a new, strong and successful Ukraine, I will gladly grant Ukrainian citizenship. You must come to Ukraine not to visit, but to return home. We are waiting for you. There is no need to bring souvenirs from abroad, but please, bring your knowledge, experience and values.¹⁴⁴

Since February 2022, President Zelenskyy has regularly addressed the Ukrainian diaspora when visiting foreign states, such as Canada and the United States. In Canada, the Ukrainian President reached out to the Ukrainian Canadian community to ask for their help and for them to “prove with [their] actions that [they] are a part of Ukrainian history, the living history.”¹⁴⁵ When speaking before the US Congress in Washington DC in December 2022, Zelenskyy addressed not only the members of the Congress, senators, and journalists, but also the “representatives of diaspora present in this chamber, and spread across the country”.¹⁴⁶ These statements seem to designate a new and special role for the Ukrainian diaspora in supporting the Ukrainian state.

The Ukrainian authorities started developing a diaspora policy in the wake of the Orange revolution of 2004. The 2004 Law on the Legal Status of Ukrainians abroad¹⁴⁷ defines a “Ukrainian abroad” (also referred to as a “foreign Ukrainian”) to be a citizen of another state or a stateless person, who is from Ukraine or whose ancestors are Ukrainian or recognize Ukraine as their home country. The document emphasizes that the Ukrainian state has an obligation to meet the national, cultural, and linguistic needs of the Ukrainians abroad, and calls for mutual spiritual and cultural enrichment. Under this law, the National Commission for Matters concerning Ukrainians Worldwide was established and tasked with governing the – mostly legal – affairs related to Ukrainians abroad.¹⁴⁸ In addition to this commission, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a Department for Ukrainians Worldwide and Humanitarian Cooperation.¹⁴⁹ In 2006, the National Concept of Ukrainians Abroad was approved”.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴³ Andrej Lushnycky, ‘Diaspora Deputies: Should Ukraine’s Global Community Have a Voice in Parliament?’, Atlantic Council, *Ukraine Alert* (blog), 3 December 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/diaspora-deputies-should-ukraines-global-community-have-a-voice-in-parliament/>.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Inaugural Address’, Official website of the President of Ukraine, accessed 12 July 2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/inavguracijna-promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelensk-55489>.

¹⁴⁵ Aliona Mazurenko, “Zelensky to Canadians and the Diaspora: We Want to Live,” *Ukrainian Pravda*, March 15, 2022, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/15/7331660/>.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Full Transcript of Zelensky’s Speech Before Congress’, *The New York Times*, 21 December 2022, sec. Russia-Ukraine War, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/21/us/politics/zelensky-speech-transcript.html>.

¹⁴⁷ ‘Про закордонних українців [Law on the Legal Status of Ukrainians Abroad]’, Pub. L. No. No 25, ст.343 (2004), <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1582-15>.

¹⁴⁸ This commission consists of representatives from various state departments and ministries, the State Committee for television and radio broadcasting of Ukraine, the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, the Ukrainian World Coordinating Council, the Ukraine-World Society and Ukrainian MPs.

¹⁴⁹ “Ukrainians Worldwide,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, December 18, 2019, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/ukrainians-worldwide>.

¹⁵⁰ “Про Національну концепцію співпраці із закордонними українцями [About the National concept of cooperation with Ukrainians abroad],” Pub. L. No. No. 875/2006, accessed January 4, 2022, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/8752006-4948>.

In 2021, the Ukrainian government prepared an Action Plan for Development of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad, although the documents have not yet been approved.¹⁵¹

The State Migration Policy Strategy of Ukraine for the period up to 2025¹⁵² published in 2017 also addresses diaspora issues. The document acknowledges that the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the armed conflict in the Donbas region and the economic malaise in the country have led to an increase in emigration and the transformation of temporary labor migration into permanent emigration. The Policy Strategy points out the importance of state support to better use the economic and intellectual potential of the Ukrainian diaspora and to advance Ukraine's interests abroad. One of its objectives focuses on the conditions for the return and reintegration of Ukrainian migrants into Ukrainian society. It proposes a state credit system for returnees who plan to set up businesses and tax benefits for those who invest money earned abroad. The importance of encouraging the return of Ukrainians abroad, their descendants and other migrants is mentioned under the document's other objective, referring to the usefulness of ties with the Ukrainian diaspora in doing so. Also published in 2017, the Action Plan on Ensuring the Reintegration into Society of Labor Migrants and Members of their Families¹⁵³ followed the 2015 law on External Labor Migration and signaled to Ukrainians abroad that Ukraine is interested in their return to the homeland and takes special measures to provide social services for reintegration support upon their return.

8. Envisaging the role of the Ukrainian diaspora in Ukraine's reconstruction and future development

8.1 Governmental policy

The diaspora's engagement in reconstruction is mentioned in the recovery plan put forward by the Ukrainian government's National Council for the Restoration of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War.¹⁵⁴ The documents prepared by the Council working groups were publicly presented in July 2022, during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, under "Ukraine's Recovery Plan Blueprint".¹⁵⁵ The Ukrainian diaspora is mentioned mainly in the context of facilitations of returns. Particular attention is being paid to the building of new houses and renewal of the damaged ones, improvements in the system of social service provisions, and the creation of special incentives for the entrepreneurs who will employ the returnees. The plan also foresees improved cooperation with the EU Member States related to the protection of rights of citizens of Ukraine. When it comes to investment, and the financial role of the diaspora in reconstruction, this is mentioned directly in the parts of the recovery program that relate to the renewal of public infrastructure and the cultural and educational potential at the level of regions and municipalities. The documents pay special attention to establishing channels of communication and collaboration with the academic diaspora, i.e. Ukrainian scholars and researchers living abroad,¹⁵⁶ and

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Проект Концепції Державної Цільової Програми Співпраці Із Закордонними Українцями На Період До 2023 Року', 16 February 2020, <https://ireland.mfa.gov.ua/news/proyekt-konserciji-derzhavnoyi-cilovoyi-programi-spivpraci-iz-zakordonnimi-ukrayincyami-na-period-do-2023-roku>.

¹⁵² 'Про схвалення Стратегії державної міграційної політики України на період до 2025 року [State Migration Policy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025]', Pub. L. No. 482–2017, accessed 28 August 2022, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/482-2017-%D1%80>.

¹⁵³ 'Про затвердження плану заходів щодо забезпечення реінтеграції в суспільство трудових мігрантів і членів їх сімей [Decree on the Approval of the Action Plan on Ensuring the Reintegration into Society of Labour Migrants and Members of their Families]', Pub. L. No. 257–2017 (2017), <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/257-2017-p#Text>.

¹⁵⁴ "Питання Національної ради з відновлення України від наслідків війни [Issues of the National Council for the Restoration of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War]," Pub. L. No. No. 266/2022 (2022), <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2662022-42225>.

¹⁵⁵ "Recovery Plan," Ukraine Recovery Conference, accessed February 1, 2023, <https://www.urc2022.com/urc2022-recovery-plan>.

¹⁵⁶ "Draft Ukraine Recovery Plan. Materials of the 'Education and Science' Working Group"

the provision of online education to students and teachers, no matter where they are located.¹⁵⁷ The recovery plans also touch upon digital resources as a tool for engagement with the Ukrainian diaspora youth on providing humanitarian aid, refugee support and engagement with the authorities of destination countries.¹⁵⁸ While these documents envision a positive role for diaspora communities in the recovery of Ukraine, it remains to be seen whether there is sufficient political will to develop a two-way, reciprocal partnership with the diaspora being given the voice to influence the reconstruction efforts and to provide inputs on which roles they can and wish to assume in the process.

Governments in countries hosting the Ukrainian diaspora are also in the process of implementing and developing various programs to support their contributions to homeland. For example, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) provides support that includes the topping up of salaries of returning and diaspora experts moving back to partner countries, Ukraine being one of them, to enable them to use their skills and knowledge to support the development and growth of their countries.¹⁵⁹

Alongside with national recovery strategy, more could be done to involve the diaspora in local recovery plans for specific towns and cities. Such efforts could harness their local expertise and build on local patriotism. Governments of countries where the Ukrainian diaspora reside could use their knowledge and contacts to support Ukraine's recovery at the local level through sister city and town projects.¹⁶⁰ Diaspora can also help connect private sector actors such as small and medium-sized enterprises in their countries of residence and homeland and facilitate partnerships in support of reconstruction projects.¹⁶¹

8.2 Civil society and the international community

Recovery plans published by civil society and international organizations consider diaspora engagement only sparingly.¹⁶² In preparation for the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, the Centre of Economic Recovery (CER) prepared several thematic policy briefs on Ukraine's recovery. Diaspora engagement is alluded to and framed as a potential resource to stimulate Ukraine's economic growth.¹⁶³ In addition to proposals that focus on the representation of Ukrainian business abroad and the skills and knowledge of the Ukrainian diaspora, one of the recommendations issued by the think tank is to allow dual citizenship for all Ukrainian citizens. Furthermore, contributing to this international conference, over 100 Ukrainian civil society organizations jointly declared the criteria they deem necessary for the successful reconstruction of Ukraine and presented them in the Civil Society Manifesto 2022.¹⁶⁴ Diaspora engagement was not included among them.

In general, the trend to consider diaspora involvement mostly in the economic context persists. This is natural as most of the recovery plans focus first and foremost on the economic recovery of Ukraine. An example is the plan issued by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), which identifies private aid collected by the Ukrainian diaspora as a potential source of assistance, with the expectation that it

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ "Draft Ukraine Recovery Plan. Materials of the 'Youth and Sports' Working Group"

¹⁵⁹ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 'Programme Migration & Diaspora', accessed 19 July 2023, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/78803.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Kateryna Pavlova, 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁶¹ Yevhenii Surniaiev, 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July' (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁶² For example, a 2022 report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States titled *Designing Ukraine's Recovery in the Spirit of the Marshall Plan* does not explicitly refer to a role for Ukrainian diaspora organizations, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Designing%20Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20Recovery%20in%20the%20Spirit%20of%20the%20Marshall%20Plan_0.pdf.

¹⁶³ "Policy Briefs on Ukrainian Recovery" (London: Centre of Economic Recovery, July 2022), https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/621f88db25bf24758792dd8/62bea1badf4e93871d7c8ec5_eng%20-%20URC%20brief%20final.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ "Civil Society Manifesto 2022," accessed February 1, 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1a-HuoED_iHaMuZFLBrcWmfk4NtVsVR5t/view.

will remain substantial in the future.¹⁶⁵ Building on this publication, CEPR published a more extensive report “Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and policies”.¹⁶⁶ In addition to strictly financial matters such as remittances, this report also emphasizes the importance of involving the Ukrainian academic diaspora in an internationalization strategy aimed at the research and development sector, which the authors see as imperative for sustainable recovery. An interesting vision of the future role of diaspora has been presented by a Ukrainian think-tank, the “Ukrainian Institute for the Future”, that underlines the significant role of the diaspora in the context of political advocacy in the destination countries and recommends that the Ukrainian state should create a new system of cooperation with the diaspora, including cultural, informational, and educational dimensions. According to the Institute, the diaspora could also help facilitate export of Ukrainian goods.¹⁶⁷

Some members of Ukrainian civil society see potential influence of the diaspora in promoting reconstruction driven by concerns for more just and equal society.¹⁶⁸ Since most members of the Ukrainian diaspora live in countries with long-term and established traditions of trade unions and systems of protection of workers’ rights and social benefits, they could introduce a different culture of employment relations by disseminating good practices in Ukraine.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, they could lobby at the international arena to write off foreign debt that could improve Ukraine’s potential to cover health care and educational needs. Awareness raising and lobbying is also needed to influence the Ukrainian government’s decisions on curtailing employees’ rights, as exemplified by a newly adopted Labor Code that reduces the rights of workers employed in small and medium-sized enterprises.¹⁷⁰

8.3 Diaspora organizations

Diaspora organizations can be overwhelmed with everyday humanitarian and social assistance tasks and are not always able to contribute to high-level proposals for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Nevertheless, diaspora members have expectations as to the recognition of their contributions by Ukrainian authorities. They see themselves as active players in future cooperation with Ukraine on reconstruction and future development of the country.¹⁷¹ Even though they do not necessarily agree on how they should be called (e.g. diaspora, émigrés, Ukrainians living abroad, migrants),¹⁷² many would like to have a stronger and more united and coordinated voice when contributing to Ukraine’s reconstruction.¹⁷³ They see the need to raise awareness about both their capabilities (e.g. strong motivation and mobilization potential, growing professionalism, flexibility and adaptability) and vulnerabilities (e.g. reliance on volunteers, lack of personnel and financial capacity, unstable organizational structure).¹⁷⁴ The diaspora would like to bring to Ukraine its skills, knowledge and experience; contributions that go beyond financial

¹⁶⁵ Torbjörn Becker et al., “A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine,” Rapid Response Economics (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 6, 2022), <https://cepr.org/system/files/2022-06/BlueprintReconstructionUkraine.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ “Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and Policies,” Paris Reports (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, December 2022), https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/178114-paris_report_1_rebuilding_ukraine_principles_and_policies.pdf.

¹⁶⁷ UIFuture, ‘Україна 2022. Як Не Втратити Свій Шанс Стати Сильною Державою’, 22 April 2022, <https://uifuture.org/publications/ukrayina-2022-yak-ne-vtratyty-svij-shans-staty-sylnoyu-derzhavoyu/>.

¹⁶⁸ Vitalii Dudin, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Petro Rewko, ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’ (Warsaw, 2023); Nataliya Pryhornytska, ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’ (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁷² Suprun, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’; Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’; Lapshyna, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁷³ Pryhornytska, ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’; Pavlova, ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’.

¹⁷⁴ Pryhornytska, ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’; Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

remittances.¹⁷⁵ The diaspora could also contribute to a peace and reconciliation agenda and work towards strengthening of the rights of minorities in Ukraine.¹⁷⁶ Those residing in the EU countries could assist Ukraine in the process of EU accession. A wide range of spheres of reconstruction could capitalize on the expertise present in the diaspora such as rebuilding of the healthcare system including psychological assistance to address mental health problems and environmental damage caused by the war, organization of volunteering schemes and visits of the diaspora, virtual tutoring or the promotion of gender equality.¹⁷⁷ Diaspora can also facilitate contacts with relevant institutions in their host countries and organize country visits to enable exchange of good practices in reconstruction efforts.¹⁷⁸

9. How to create a conducive environment for the Ukrainian diaspora's contribution?

The diaspora roles in the provision of local humanitarian support, meeting the needs of incoming refugees, coordinating support and sustaining political mobilization, and ensuring both political and material support for the homeland are key for supporting countries in a conflict and post-conflict situation. Diaspora engagement can make countries more resilient to crises. Diasporas act as brokers between the homeland and international actors and support the political objectives of their homeland abroad. Diasporas can also help build bridges between homeland and societies hosting them. Empowering diasporas is in the interest of destination countries, who may team up with diaspora organizations in implementing their trade and development agendas and engage them as partners when providing assistance to incoming refugees.

The positive impacts of diaspora engagement heavily depend upon an enabling environment for the diaspora contributions¹⁷⁹ in both the origin and the destination country, as well as in the international context. Diasporas whose efforts are not supported by institutional or legal frameworks may not only feel overlooked but might be unable to make concrete contributions. The first, most crucial, aspect of empowering diasporas is providing them with status and respect, for example by acknowledging their role in supporting the humanitarian response, their practice of sending remittances and their potential role in future reconstruction. Secondly, diasporas need to trust the institutions of the homeland regarding transparency in spending financial resources.¹⁸⁰ Thirdly, homeland institutions should recognize the diversity within its diaspora and consider their different characteristics and diverse socio-political and geographical contexts in which they operate. Considering how individual diaspora actors are connected to people and institutions in these different contexts could facilitate tailored policy interventions.¹⁸¹ While the Ukrainian state's diaspora policy is being redesigned and will likely be boosted soon, additional issues for consideration include the question of dual citizenship, social rights recognition, and the avoidance of double taxation.

9.1 Recognition and mapping of contributions by the Ukrainian diaspora

As highlighted in this report, the Ukrainian diaspora has demonstrated enormous efforts to support Ukraine. Yet both diaspora representatives and experts working in the field admit that the recognition of the diaspora's multi-faceted contribution is insufficient.

While there may be several reasons for this, it is worth noting that for many years, Ukrainian labor migrants were not considered as belonging to the diaspora by both the government and established diaspora organizations. It was only the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity that have

¹⁷⁵ Suprun, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹⁷⁶ Suprun; Abramson, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹⁷⁷ Koinova, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'.

¹⁷⁸ Surniaiev, 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July'; Pavlova, 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July'.

¹⁷⁹ Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, "Creating an Enabling Environment....", op. cit.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Koinova, 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'; Koinova, *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*.

started to slowly change that perception.¹⁸² Inside Ukraine, many used to perceive diaspora communities as detached from the daily reality in the country¹⁸³ and their voices and experiences were therefore not always considered relevant for contemporary discussions in Ukraine.¹⁸⁴ For example, unlike other countries with substantial diasporas, Ukrainian politicians have not yet established a practice of regularly meeting with diaspora representatives during official visits abroad.¹⁸⁵

Taking stock of the diverse contributions made by the diaspora and creating general awareness about its possible future roles in the reconstruction and development of the country is a complex endeavor that needs support of multiple actors, including the diaspora itself. Firstly, civil society, the media, state institutions (including Ukrainian consulates and embassies), international organizations, and professional humanitarian organizations should acknowledge their collaboration with Ukrainians living abroad and promote the work done by the diaspora to audiences in Ukraine. Despite the obvious importance of the return of Ukrainians from abroad to rebuild the country when the security situation allows for it, recognizing the role of the Ukrainian diaspora in supporting the country from abroad could create an empowering and motivating environment and make their activities more appreciated in Ukraine. Contributions from diverse groups of Ukrainians abroad, including members of ethnic minorities, should be recognized alongside more established diaspora organizations. In practical terms, the recognition of diaspora activities could take various forms, such as granting distinguished diaspora members with honorary citizenships, naming streets after them, installing commemorative plaques to acknowledge their financial and other contributions or promoting their existence and activities in popular culture.¹⁸⁶ Popular culture and information campaigns could also be used as means of addressing potential tensions related to returns of people from abroad. The returns could, at least in the short term, result in increased rental and real estate prices and heightened competition for jobs which could be viewed negatively by those who did not leave the country.

Beyond recognition, a more systematic mapping of diaspora activities and contributions would be beneficial for better coordination. While exact mapping of financial and in-kind contributions might not be feasible in the current context, a mapping initiative could take the form of self-assessment, where diaspora organizations decide to take part in the mapping and continuously update their information on digital platforms. Such mapping could also help identify gaps where greater diaspora engagement would be beneficial.¹⁸⁷ It could make invitations to events and dissemination of information relevant for the diaspora organizations by the Ukrainian authorities more transparent. The Ukrainian World Congress website offers a basic overview of selected Ukrainian communities worldwide presented on a map. It includes assessments of numbers of Ukrainians per country, main cities of residence, key Ukrainian organizations, media, churches, and education facilities.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² Lapshyna, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁸³ Abramson, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁸⁴ Suprun, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁸⁵ Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁸⁶ Kateryna Krakhmalova, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁸⁷ Suprun, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁸⁸ Ukrainian World Congress, ‘Our Communities Worldwide’, accessed 12 July 2023, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/our-communities-worldwide/>.

Box 12: Examples of diaspora mapping

Greek diaspora organizations mapping by Oxford University

The Digital Map of the Greek Diaspora Project serves as a record of Greek diaspora worldwide and provides a networking tool for Hellenic organizations. A dynamic map tracks and depicts the presence and thematic focus of Greek diasporic organizations worldwide. Greek organizations can be filtered through criteria such as country, activity, and origin.¹⁸⁹

Atlas of the Polish presence abroad (Atlas polskiej obecności za granicą)

This publication is part of the effort undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland to gather comprehensive information on Polish communities abroad. It describes in detail diaspora groups in 33 countries with significant presence of Poles and people of Polish descent.¹⁹⁰

9.2 Dedicated institutions for diaspora matters and policy environment

A dedicated diaspora agency needs to be well connected with other state institutions, especially ministries dealing with different areas relevant for diaspora contributions (e.g. economy, education, health care, reconstruction and others).¹⁹¹ Such an agency could be an easily accessible first point of contact for all the diaspora organizations approaching central authorities, which is currently a challenge for the Ukrainian diaspora.¹⁹² It could also help the diaspora to better place itself in the local context, for example by training diaspora members wanting to be active in the country in how to effectively communicate in order not to be perceived as patronizing or out of touch with the local reality.¹⁹³ The agency could also contribute to preventing tensions and mitigating the resentments held by those who remained towards those who had left. Some level of diaspora's involvement in managing the agency, or at least in setting its priorities, could be considered together with a structured consultation process with the diaspora about future diaspora-related policies. Rather than defining all parameters of diaspora engagement, the government should regard themselves more as a channel facilitating diaspora contributions.¹⁹⁴ Bringing a high degree of political legitimacy to any dialogue with the diaspora will be crucial.¹⁹⁵

Embassies and consulates could be more proactive in reaching out towards the diaspora, as they are in a unique position to gauge diaspora needs and are able to collaborate with other actors in the private and public realm.¹⁹⁶ For example, establishing the post of a diaspora officer could help with mapping and coordination of activities. Other institutional solutions might include establishing a “Diaspora House” or appointing a “Diaspora Adviser” to the Prime Minister.¹⁹⁷

An important aspect of the above-suggested activities should be trust-building between Ukraine and the diaspora. Diasporas could, for example, be provided with information on how the money they have provided is being spent, alongside greater transparency about and improvement of regulatory frameworks for investment.

¹⁸⁹ ‘Greek Diaspora Organizations Mapping by Oxford University’, accessed 30 April 2023, <http://seesoxdiaspora.org/the-greek-diaspora-map>.

¹⁹⁰ ‘Atlas Polskiej Obecności Za Granicą (Atlas of Polish Presence Abroad)’, accessed 30 April 2023, https://issuu.com/msz.gov.pl/docs/atlas_polskiej_obecnosci_za_granica.

¹⁹¹ Orjuela, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁹² Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁹³ Abramson, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

¹⁹⁴ Abramson.

¹⁹⁵ Marta Jaroszewicz, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’ (Warsaw, 2023).

¹⁹⁶ International Organization for Migration, ‘Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and States’.

¹⁹⁷ Krakhmalova, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

Efforts towards the institutionalization of contact with the diaspora are already underway. “Ukraine’s Recovery Plan Blueprint” envisages the creation of the National Agency for the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens of Ukraine Who Have Received Temporary Shelter in the Territory of the EU Member States and Other States, including the establishment of the “Situation and Consulting Centre”, which would be based in the countries hosting Ukrainian refugees.¹⁹⁸ Details about the mandate and functions of this institution are yet to be made public. Given the name envisaged for the institution, it is likely that its mandate will be narrower and only targeting those Ukrainian nationals who received temporary protection abroad. While better communication and provision of services to this group is of utmost significance, communication with more settled diaspora members should also be on the agenda.¹⁹⁹

When discussing parameters of a conducive environment for the Ukrainian diaspora’s engagement, some experts mentioned that introducing dual citizenship could represent an important mobilizing and trust-building factor and could stimulate long-term interest of the diaspora in the politics of the homeland.²⁰⁰ Dual citizenship, also referred to as multiple citizenship, is the legal status held by an individual simultaneously in two or more states. It is generally recognized that access to dual citizenship allows members of a diaspora to maintain stronger contacts with their homeland while exercising full rights in their country of residence. Most democratic countries admit dual or multiple citizenship in their legislation. It is a practical reaction on the part of states to the circumstances of increasing migration, multi-national marriages and children born to multi-national parents.²⁰¹

The policy of dual citizenship requires a country to accept that citizenship is not an exclusive contract it has with a citizen.²⁰² Therefore, many EU countries, while permitting dual citizenship on a general level, prefer that migrants renounce their previous citizenship when they are naturalized.²⁰³ For instance, Germany allowed for acquiring second citizenship only in a very limited number of cases, such as for children born to parents of dual nationality.²⁰⁴ However, this approach is now being reconsidered and the newly proposed German citizenship law could allow for acquiring German citizenship without the need to relinquish the original one.²⁰⁵ In Poland and in the Czech Republic, dual citizenship is allowed and applicants can retain their current citizenship while obtaining Polish or Czech citizenship.

Other policy areas mentioned by the experts included social rights recognition and double taxation²⁰⁶ As a rule, a bilateral agreement on social security protection is based on four pillars: equal treatment, application of a single legislation, aggregation of insurance periods, and maintenance of acquired rights

¹⁹⁸ “Recovery Plan,” Ukraine Recovery Conference, accessed February 1, 2023, <https://www.urc2022.com/urc2022-recovery-plan>.

¹⁹⁹ Sushko, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

²⁰⁰ Keryk, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’; Suprun, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

²⁰¹ Rainer Bauböck et al., ‘Acquisition and Loss of Nationality|Volume 2: Country Analyses: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries’ (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n00f>.

²⁰² Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, ‘Dual Citizenship : Policy Trends and Political Participation in EU Member States CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS’, 1 January 2008, https://www.academia.edu/67193971/Dual_citizenship_Policy_trends_and_political_participation_in_EU_member_states_CONSTITUTIONAL_AFFAIRS.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, ‘Dual Citizenship - Multiple Nationality’, accessed 30 April 2023, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/migration/staatsang/Doppelte_Staatsangehoerigkeit_Mehrstaatigkeit_en.html.

²⁰⁵ ‘Germany Models New Citizenship Law on France to Tackle Labour Shortage - EURACTIV.Com’, accessed 13 October 2023, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/germany-models-new-citizenship-law-on-france-to-tackle-labour-shortage/>.

²⁰⁶ Krakhmalova, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’; Jaroszewicz, ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’.

(export of benefits).²⁰⁷ Before 2022, Ukraine concluded social security agreements with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Portugal and Poland.²⁰⁸ In the case of Poland, the Polish-Ukrainian agreement on social protection in force from 2014 stipulates dual recognition of insurance periods required to obtain pension rights and other social benefits related to maternity leave and sick leave.²⁰⁹

Ukrainians displaced by the war are also faced with the problem of double taxation and proper documentation of their tax residency periods.²¹⁰ In a letter from the Polish Ministry of Finance, dated 6 July 2022, to the Better Regulation Delivery Office of Ukraine, Poland declared that in wartime, Ukrainian taxpayers residing in Poland may still declare themselves as having tax residence in Ukraine and pay their taxes there despite residing and working in Poland.²¹¹ Similar procedure was introduced by Germany. Ireland and Lithuania allowed Ukrainian citizens not to pay taxes in their respective countries of residence in 2022, even if they remained there more than 183 days within a year.²¹² These measures can potentially increase the inflow of tax revenues from abroad to Ukraine.

²⁰⁷ Beata Samoraj-Charitonow, ‘Citizens of Ukraine in the Polish Social Insurance System’, *Ubezpieczenia Społeczne. Teoria i Praktyka* 1, no. 144 (2020): 3–24, https://doi.org/10.32088/0000_21.

²⁰⁸ Commission Staff Working Document, “Analytical Report following the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union”, 01.02.2023

²⁰⁹ Sejm RP, ‘Umowa Między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o Zabezpieczeniu Społecznym, Sporządzona w Kijowie Dnia 18 Maja 2012 r.’ (Dziennik Ustaw 2013 poz. 1373, 2013), <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20130001373>.

²¹⁰ Roman Vlasenko, ‘Solving the Double Taxation of Ukrainian Refugees as a Part of Support Measures’, GLOBSEC, accessed 12 July 2023, <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/publications/solving-double-taxation-ukrainian-refugees-part-support-measures>.

²¹¹ Republic of Poland, Ministry of Finance, and Income Tax Department, ‘Letter Ref # 679 Dated June 14, 2022 to Mr Oleksii DOROHAN Better Regulation Delivery Office Ukraine’, 6 July 2022, <https://brdo.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/MF-odpowiedz-49.pdf>.

²¹² Vlasenko, ‘Solving the Double Taxation of Ukrainian Refugees as a Part of Support Measures’.

Conclusions

Diasporas are the “human link” between the destination states and the countries of origin. They not only facilitate decentralized, democratic cooperation between states and societies, but also help to promote a human approach to migration management in the international context. Existing research confirms the positive role of diasporas in the process of developing their homeland. Their role as providers of remittances (financial, but also social, cultural and political) has been widely explored, showing how diaspora contributions help to alleviate poverty, economic disparities, and unemployment in the countries of origin. Moreover, diasporas often bring an entrepreneurial spirit and skills back to the homeland either upon eventual return or remotely from their host country. Diasporas may play a prominent role in the promotion of democracy in their countries of origin, by strengthening civil society, gender equality, and by challenging undemocratic behaviors. Diasporas may also act as brokers between the homeland and international actors and promote the political claims of their homeland abroad.

The role of diasporas becomes even more critical during military conflicts or economic crises. Remittances tend to be resilient to economic crises or conflicts. They are often the main source of income for internally displaced persons and can therefore decrease secondary migration movements. Diasporas tend to provide the most timely, flexible, and durable humanitarian assistance, due to their understanding of local realities. When properly facilitated, their contributions can serve as an important financial instrument in post-conflict reconstruction in sectors such as education, public health, and other areas of public infrastructure. Diasporas actively participate in public diplomacy by organizing protests, speaking to the media, meeting with politicians and other stakeholders, and lobbying in the international arena. A key area of diaspora engagement lies in their role in promoting and achieving transitional justice. Diasporas can also help in strengthening statehood and actively participate in conflict resolution.

For several reasons, the multiple contributions that diasporas bring may go overlooked. Firstly, it is because of the dynamic and diverse character of their engagement. A diaspora does not have to be characterized by a stable feeling of collective obligation towards the country of origin and any associated commitments may vary according to time and context. Secondly, diasporas are social movements oriented towards the homeland that commonly draw their motivation to act from a sense of moral obligation and often provide support on a voluntary rather than professional basis. Low level of institutionalization can contribute to the lack of recognition by the government or international organizations. Therefore, providing them with status and respect is a crucial aspect of empowering diasporas. Importantly, diasporas need to trust the institutions of the homeland, in particular with regard to transparency in spending financial resources.

The Ukrainian diaspora abroad consists of different generations of migrants who left their homeland for a range of reasons: security, political, economic, family, border changes, and forced deportations. While some groups of Ukrainians living abroad prefer to speak of themselves as labor migrants or political émigrés, this does not mean that they cannot switch between being more or less active towards the homeland. Therefore, the borderlines of who belongs to a diaspora should be conceived as flexible, inclusive, and based on the sense of belonging.

The role of the Ukrainian diaspora, being integral to civil society in Ukraine and other countries, has proven crucial, overall and in particular, after February 2022.²¹³ It has included mobilizing humanitarian assistance, organizing support for refugees, and liaising with social, national and international organizations that have sought partners when providing assistance in Ukraine and to refugees. Philanthropy and humanitarian assistance were the most popular types of response provided by the Ukrainian diaspora, both to Ukraine and to the newly arriving refugees. The main areas of humanitarian response have been in health, food security, emergency shelter, and education. In spite of this, no

²¹³ The examples listed in this report are only illustrations of the different types of engagement and should not be seen as an attempt to comprehensively map the diaspora landscape.

comprehensive assessment of the amount of humanitarian support and the types of assistance provided by the Ukrainian diaspora is presently available.

Despite the growing interest of the Ukrainian authorities in increasing cooperation with the diaspora, the post-2022 state diaspora policy will need to be revamped in light of the surge of forced migration from Ukraine triggered by the Russian Federation's military attack. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine will develop a two-way, reciprocal partnership with the diaspora in which the latter is given a voice to influence the reconstruction efforts and to actively define its role in the process. To sustain its contributions in the longer-term, the Ukrainian diaspora needs to operate in a conducive environment created by the Ukrainian government and the acceptance from the Ukrainian society as a whole. Government and civil society in their host countries as well as international organizations can also play an important role in supporting their engagement. The most crucial issue, which cuts across all other sectors of diaspora involvement, is that of recognition of the role played by the Ukrainian diaspora. It appears that more attention could be paid to both past contributions by the diaspora and its future role in the country's reconstruction and development. While the role for the diaspora is mainly envisaged in the economic realm, more could be done to facilitate flows of human capital and diaspora's political and cultural contributions. A systematic mapping of Ukrainian diaspora activities and contributions would be beneficial both for purposes of recognizing them and for improved coordination. Ukraine could consider creating a diaspora ministry or a dedicated diaspora agency in charge of contacts with the diaspora communities and responsible for coordinating diaspora policy across different sectors of government. Strengthening of the consular capacities of the Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad and investing in a long-term dialogue with the diaspora in their host countries should also contribute to a conducive environment for their mobilization and engagement. A key aspect of the activities of institutions dealing with diaspora matters should be effort to maintain and enhance relations of trust between Ukraine and its diaspora and the promotion of legitimacy of the diaspora involvement towards Ukrainian society.

Bibliography

- Abramson, Yehonatan. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Adema, Joop, Yvonne Giesing, Tetyana Panchenko, and Panu Poutvaara. 'The Role of the Diaspora for the Recovery of Ukraine'. *EconPol Forum*, CESifo, 24, no. 2 (2023): 41–45.
- Ainsley, Julia. 'U.S. Has Admitted 271,000 Ukrainian Refugees since Russian Invasion, Far above Biden's Goal of 100,000'. *NBC News*, 23 February 2023. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/us-admits-271000-ukrainian-refugees-russia-invasion-biden-rcna72177>.
- Anastasakis, Othon. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- 'Atlas Polskiej Obecności Za Granicą (Atlas of Polish Presence Abroad)'. Accessed 30 April 2023. https://issuu.com/msz.gov.pl/docs/atlas_polskiej_obecnosci_za_granica.
- Bauböck, Rainer, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, and Harald Waldrauch. 'Acquisition and Loss of Nationality|Volume 2: Country Analyses: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries'. Amsterdam University Press, 2006. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n00f>.
- Bondar, Kateryna. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 'Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas' Participation in Homeland Development: Enabling Diaspora Contributions'. *International Migration* 50, no. 1 (February 2012): 75–95. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00542.x>.
- . 'Diasporas and Conflict Societies: Conflict Entrepreneurs, Competing Interests or Contributors to Stability and Development?' *Conflict, Security & Development* 11, no. 02 (May 2011): 115–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2011.572453>.
- . 'Diasporas, Skills Transfer, and Remittances: Evolving Perceptions and Potential'. *Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals*. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2006.
- . 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>.
- Centre for Assistance of War Crimes Documentation. 'Про Центр Документування Воєнних Злочинів'. Accessed 30 April 2023. <https://warcrimescenter.org/>.
- Clarkson, Alexander. 'Coming to Terms with Odessa Ukraine: The Impact of the Maidan Uprising on the Ukrainian Diaspora'. In *Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties That Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine*, 159:115–36. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. Ibidem Verlag, 2017.
- Cochrane, Feargal. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Cochrane, Feargal, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain. 'Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 8 (13 August 2009): 681–704. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903040716>.
- Cohen, Robin. 'Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers'. *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (July 1996): 507–20. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2625554>.
- . *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003256526>.
- Danish Refugee Council. 'About Us', 6 January 2023. <https://pro.drc.ngo/about-us/>.
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. 'Programme Migration & Diaspora'. Accessed 19 July 2023. <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/78803.html>.
- Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination. 'Diaspora Emergency Response to the Ukraine Crisis', 23 December 2022. <https://www.demac.org/response/ukraine>.
- Dudin, Vitalii. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Dziadyk, Natalia. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- European Commission. 'Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021 - 2027. COM (2020) 758', 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0758&from=EN>.
- European Commission. Joint Research Centre. *Diaspora Finance for Development: From Remittances to Investment*. LU: Publications Office, 2021. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/034446>.

- European Union Diaspora Facility (EUDiF). ‘Diaspora Engagement Mapping Ukraine’. International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), March 2020. https://diasporafordevelopment.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CF_Ukraine-v.7.pdf.
- Eurostat. ‘Ukrainian Citizens in the EU’, November 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ukrainian_citizens_in_the_EU#Ukrainian_citizens_authorized_to_stay_in_the_EU.
- Faure, Aymeric. ‘New Greek Migrants Remitting Behaviour: Exploring the Factors in the Rapid Decline of Remittances Inflows in Greece’. The Greek Diaspora Project. SEESOX Diaspora Briefs, September 2017. <http://seesoxdiaspora.org/publications/briefs/new-greek-migrants-remitting-behaviour-exploring-the-factors-in-the-rapid-decline-of-remittances-inflows-in-greece>.
- Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community. ‘Dual Citizenship - Multiple Nationality’. Accessed 30 April 2023. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/migration/staatsang/Doppelte_Staatsang_ehoerigkeit_Mehrstaatigkeit_en.html.
- Fedyuk, Olena. ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’. Warsaw, 2023.
- Fedyuk, Olena, and Marta Kindler. ‘Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues’. In *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union*, edited by Olena Fedyuk and Marta Kindler, 1–14. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9_1.
- Galstyan, Nare, and Maurizio Ambrosini. ‘Diasporas and Collective Remittances: From State-Driven to Unofficial Forms of Diaspora Engagement’. *International Migration Review*, 15 June 2022, 019791832211035. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221103572>.
- Gelb, Stephen, Sona Kalantaryan, Simon McMahon, and Perez-Fernandez, Marta. ‘Diaspora Finance for Development: From Remittances to Investment’. JRC technical report, 15 June 2021. <https://doi.org/10.2760/034446>.
- ‘Germany Models New Citizenship Law on France to Tackle Labour Shortage - EURACTIV.Com’. Accessed 13 October 2023. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/germany-models-new-citizenship-law-on-france-to-tackle-labour-shortage/>.
- ‘Greek Diaspora Organizations Mapping by Oxford University’. Accessed 30 April 2023. <http://seesoxdiaspora.org/the-greek-diaspora-map>.
- Ho, Elaine L. E., and Fiona McConnell. ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”: Territory and Populations Betwixt the Domestic and Foreign’. *Progress in Human Geography* 43, no. 2 (April 2019): 235–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132517740217>.
- Holodomor Museum. ‘Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, Ukrainian World Congress, Holodomor Museum and Foundation of the Holodomor Museum Development’, 22 April 2021. <https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/news-museji/memorandum-of-cooperation-between-the-ministry-of-culture-of-ukraine-ukrainian-world-congress-holodomor-museum-and-foundation-of-the-holodomor-museum-development/>.
- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. ‘Ukraine Immigration Measures: Key Figures’, 24 May 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>.
- ‘In Poland Local NGOs Issued an Open Letter to International Donors and Organizations That Want to Help Ukrainian Refugees in Poland Calling for Respect, Partnership and Attention to the Time and Working Culture of Local NGOs’. Accessed 30 April 2023. <https://zaganica.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Open-letter-to-international-donors.pdf>.
- International Organization for Migration. ‘Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and States’. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2013. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/DMC_Final_Conference_Report.pdf.
- . ‘Gender, Migration and Remittances’. Factsheet, 23 June 2015. <https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/about-iom/Gender-migration-remittances-infosheet.pdf>.

- International Organization for Migration. 'Remittances in War: How Money from Abroad Is Helping Ukraine', 18 January 2023. <https://ukraine.iom.int/stories/remittances-war-how-money-abroad-helping-ukraine>.
- Jaroszewicz, Marta. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Johnson Paula Doherty. 'Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues'. The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc. and The Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University, 1 May 2007. <https://www.cbd.int/financial/charity/usa-diasporaphilanthropy.pdf>.
- Keryk, Myroslava. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Knudsen, Anders. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Koinova, Maria. *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- . 'Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World'. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 41–64. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.02.001>.
- . 'Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World'. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 41–64. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.02.001>.
- . 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Koinova, Maria, and Dženeta Karabegović. 'Causal Mechanisms in Diaspora Mobilizations for Transitional Justice'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42, no. 11 (18 August 2019): 1809–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1624802>.
- . 'Diasporas and Transitional Justice: Transnational Activism from Local to Global Levels of Engagement'. *Global Networks* 17, no. 2 (April 2017): 212–33. <https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12128>.
- Koinova, Maria, and Gerasimos Tsourapas. 'How Do Countries of Origin Engage Migrants and Diasporas? Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives'. *International Political Science Review* 39, no. 3 (June 2018): 311–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118755843>.
- Krakhmalova, Kateryna. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Krasynska, Svitlana. 'Digital Civil Society: Euromaidan, the Ukrainian Diaspora, and Social Media'. In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, 177–98. ibidem Press, 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280080500_Digital_Civil_Society_Euromaidan_the_Ukrainian_Diaspora_and_Social_Media.
- Lapshyna, Iryna. 'Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Development of the Homeland in Times of War' 8, no. 1 (2019): 51–73. <https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2019.04>.
- . 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Lushnycky, Andrej. 'Diaspora Deputies: Should Ukraine's Global Community Have a Voice in Parliament?' Atlantic Council. *Ukraine Alert* (blog), 3 December 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/diaspora-deputies-should-ukraines-global-community-have-a-voice-in-parliament/>.
- Madziva, Roda, Juliana Siwale, and Juliet Thondhlana. 'Exploring Gender and Diaspora Investment Among Diaspora Women in the UK'. In *African Diaspora Direct Investment*, edited by Dieu Hack-Polay and Juliana Siwale, 211–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72047-0_10.
- Marinova, Nadejda K. *Ask What You Can Do For Your (New) Country: How Host States Use Diasporas*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. 'MIP: The Ukrainian World Congress Will Contribute to Spread the Truth about Ukraine in the World', 25 August 2016. <https://mkip.gov.ua/en/news/1429.html>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Проект Концепції Державної Цільової Програми Співпраці Із Закордонними Українцями На Період До 2023 Року', 16 February 2020. <https://ireland.mfa.gov.ua/news/proyekt-konceptsiyi-derzhavnoyi-cilovoyi-programi-spivpraci-iz-zakordonnimi-ukrayincyami-na-period-do-2023-roku>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 'Ukrainians Worldwide', 18 December 2019. <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/ukrainians-worldwide>.

- ‘More Than One Million Americans Report Ukrainian Ancestry’. United States Census Bureau, 7 July 2022. <https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/07/more-than-one-million-americans-report-ukrainian-ancestry.html>.
- Official website of the President of Ukraine. ‘Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Inaugural Address’. Accessed 12 July 2023. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/inavguracijna-promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelensk-55489>.
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. ‘Engaging the Ukrainian Diaspora in Reconstruction and Development. Warsaw Human Dimension Conference Side Event. OSCE/ODIHR Meeting Report’. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, October 2022. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/528936>.
- Orjuela, Camilla. ‘Mobilising Diasporas for Justice. Opportunity Structures and the Presenting of a Violent Past’. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 8 (11 June 2018): 1357–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354163>.
- . ‘ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February’. Warsaw, 2023.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. ‘Dual Citizenship : Policy Trends and Political Participation in EU Member States CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS’, 1 January 2008. https://www.academia.edu/67193971/Dual_citizenship_Policy_trends_and_political_participation_in_EU_member_states_CONSTITUTIONAL_AFFAIRS.
- Pavlova, Kateryna. ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’. Warsaw, 2023.
- Pedroza, Luicy, and Pau Palop-García. ‘¿Retorno o Remesas? Políticas Económicas de Los Estados de Latinoamérica y El Caribe Hacia Su Diáspora’. *Apuntes: Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 46, no. 84 (2019): 159–84. <https://doi.org/10.21678/apuntes.84.1017>.
- ‘Project Sunflower. About Us’. Accessed 30 April 2023. <https://www.projectsunflowerukraine.com/about>.
- Pryhornytska, Nataliya. ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’. Warsaw, 2023.
- Rabat Process: Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development. ‘Collection of Diaspora Engagement Practices’’, November 2020. <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/activities/publications/publication-collection-diaspora-engagement-practices>.
- Ratha Dillip. ‘What Are Remittances? Finance and Development’. International Monetary Fund, 2017. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/pdf/ratha-remittances.pdf>.
- Republic of Poland, Ministry of Finance, and Income Tax Department. ‘Letter Ref # 679 Dated June 14, 2022 to Mr Oleksii DOROHAN Better Regulation Delivery Office Ukraine’, 6 July 2022. <https://brdo.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/MF-odpowiedz-49.pdf>.
- Reuters. ‘Over 66,200 Ukrainian Men Have Returned from Abroad to Fight, Says Defence Minister’, 5 March 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-66200-ukrainian-men-have-returned-abroad-fight-says-defence-minister-2022-03-05/>.
- Rewko, Petro. ‘ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July’. Warsaw, 2023.
- Safran, William. ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 83–99. <https://doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.1.1.83>.
- Samoraj-Charitonow, Beata. ‘Citizens of Ukraine in the Polish Social Insurance System’. *Ubezpieczenia Społeczne. Teoria i Praktyka* 1, no. 144 (2020): 3–24. https://doi.org/10.32088/0000_21.
- Satzewich, Vic. *The Ukrainian Diaspora*. Global Diasporas. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Schiller, Nina Glick. ‘Long-Distance Nationalism’. In *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, edited by Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian Skoggard, 570–80. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-29904-4_59.
- Sejm RP. ‘Umowa Między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o Zabezpieczeniu Społecznym, Sporządzona w Kijowie Dnia 18 Maja 2012 r.’ *Dziennik Ustaw* 2013 poz. 1373, 2013. <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20130001373>.
- ‘SEND \$1K TO DIRECTLY SPONSOR A FAMILY FROM UKRAINE’. Accessed 30 April 2023. <https://www.1kproject.org/>.
- Sie Dhian Ho, Monika, Bob Deen, and Drost Niels. ‘Long-Term Protection in Europe Needed for Millions of Ukrainian Refugees’. *Clingendael Alert*, September 2022. <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/long-term-protection-in-europe-needed-for-millions-of-ukrainian-refugees-.pdf>.

- Statistics Canada. 'A Sociodemographic Profile of Ukrainian-Canadians', 2022. <https://doi.org/10.25318/36280001202200400003-ENG>.
- Suprun, Ulana. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Surniaiev, Yevhenii. 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Sushko, Iryna. 'ODIHR Expert Workshop, 9-10 February'. Warsaw, 2023.
- Terlecky, Iryna. 'ODIHR and University of Warwick Expert Workshop, 3 July'. Warsaw, 2023.
- The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. 'Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development'. Boston University, 2013. https://www.bu.edu/africa/files/2018/11/Pardee_CenterRemittanceFlows_Pr4-1.pdf.
- The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. 'Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the Human Rights Council'. United Nations Human Rights Council, 16 March 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/A_HRC_52_62_AUV_EN.pdf.
- The New York Times*. 'Full Transcript of Zelensky's Speech Before Congress'. 21 December 2022, sec. Russia-Ukraine War. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/21/us/politics/zelensky-speech-transcript.html>.
- Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 'Why Do States Develop Multi-Tier Emigrant Policies? Evidence from Egypt'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 13 (10 November 2015): 2192–2214. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1049940>.
- Udrea, Andreea, David Smith, and Karl Cordell. 'Karta Polaka , Poland and Its Co-Ethnics Abroad'. *Ethnopolitics* 20, no. 1 (1 January 2021): 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2020.1808311>.
- UIFuture. 'Україна 2022. Як Не Втратити Свій Шанс Стати Сильною Державою', 22 April 2022. <https://uifuture.org/publications/ukrayina-2022-yak-ne-vtratyty-svij-shans-staty-sylnoyu-derzhavoyu/>.
- UkraineInvest. 'UkraineInvest and Ukrainian World Congress Signed Memorandum of Cooperation', 23 January 2023. <https://ukraineinvest.gov.ua/news/ukraineinvest-and-ukrainian-world-congress-signed-memorandum-of-cooperation/>.
- Ukrainian Medical Association of the United Kingdom. 'Work in the UK'. Umauk, 2022. <https://www.umauk.org/workintheuk>.
- Ukrainian World Congress. 'About the UWC', 23 January 2023. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/about/>.
- . 'Our Communities Worldwide'. Accessed 12 July 2023. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/our-communities-worldwide/>.
- Ukrainian World Congress. 'Ukrainian World Congress Signs Memorandum with Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine', 10 December 2020. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/ukrainian-world-congress-signs-memorandum-with-cabinet-of-ministers-of-ukraine/>.
- Ukrainian World Congress. 'UWC Enhances Collaboration with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense', 10 January 2023. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/uwc-enhances-collaboration-with-ukraines-ministry-of-defense/>.
- Ukrainian World Congress. 'UWC Receives an Honorary Award from President Zelensky', 5 January 2023. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/uwc-receives-an-honorary-award-from-president-zelensky/>.
- Ukraiński Dom. 'Nasze Działania'. Accessed 30 April 2023. <https://ukrainskidom.pl/nasze-dzialania/>.
- UN General Assembly. 'Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. A/RES/73/195.', 2018. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/451/99/PDF/N1845199.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UNHCR. 'Ukraine Refugee Situation'. Accessed 12 July 2023. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.
- UWC News. 'UWC Unites Ukrainians in More than 45 Countries and 300 Cities for Rallies', 23 February 2023. <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/365-days-in-a-war-that-lasts-9-years-how-to-join-the-rallies/>.
- van Hear Nicolas. 'Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development and Conflict'. Migration Information Source. Migration Policy Institute, 1 June 2003.

- <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-diasporas-remittances-development-and-conflict>.
- Vlasenko, Roman. 'Solving the Double Taxation of Ukrainian Refugees as a Part of Support Measures'. GLOBSEC. Accessed 12 July 2023. <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/publications/solving-double-taxation-ukrainian-refugees-part-support-measures>.
- World Bank. 'Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) - Ukraine'. World Bank Open Data. Accessed 13 October 2023. <https://data.worldbank.org>.
- . 'Remittances Remain Resilient but Likely to Slow'. Text/HTML. World Bank. Accessed 13 October 2023. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/13/remittances-remain-resilient-likely-to-slow>.
- . 'The Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals 2020'. Text/HTML. The Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals 2020. Accessed 19 April 2023. <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgoalatlas/>.
- Young, L. A., and R. Park. 'Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project'. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3, no. 3 (1 November 2009): 341–61. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp021>.
- Анастасія Рінгіс. 'Потрібно Готуватися До Перемоги, а Опісля – До Важкої Праці'. Голова Канадсько-Української Фундації Про Допомогу Від Діаспори'. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 10 January 2023. <https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/01/10/252227/>.
- Банахевич, Юрій. 'Павло Грод, президент Світового конгресу українців'. Accessed 12 July 2023. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-diaspora/3450932-pavlo-grod-prezident-svitovogo-kongresu-ukrainciv.html>.
- Про закордонних українців [Law on the Legal Status of Ukrainians Abroad], Pub. L. No. No 25, ст.343 (2004). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1582-15>.
- Про затвердження плану заходів щодо забезпечення реінтеграції в суспільство трудових мігрантів і членів їх сімей [Decree on the Approval of the Action Plan on Ensuring the Reintegration into Society of Labour Migrants and Members of their Families], Pub. L. No. 257–2017 (2017). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/257-2017-p#Text>.
- Про схвалення Стратегії державної міграційної політики України на період до 2025 року [State Migration Policy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025], Pub. L. No. 482–2017. Accessed 28 August 2022. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/482-2017-%D1%80>.
- Українське Радіо. '100 Днів Незламності: Як Дипломати Та Діаспора Воюють За Україну На Дипломатичному Фронті — Частина 1'. *Ukrainian Radio*, 3 June 2023. <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=98855>.

Annex 1: List of participants in the ODIHR expert workshop on Engaging the Ukrainian diaspora in reconstruction and development

Warsaw, 9-10 February 2023

Surname, Name	Affiliation
Abramson, Yehonatan	Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Anastasakis, Othon	Oxford University
Bondar, Kateryna	World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations & Association of Ukrainian Women in Switzerland
Brinkerhoff, Jennifer	George Washington University
Cochrane, Feargal	University of Kent
Dudin, Vitalii	NGO 'Sotsialnyi Rukh' (Social Movement)
Dziadyk, Natalia	Central European University
Fedyuk, Olena	University of Padova
Gebhard, Julia	ODIHR, Democratization Department
Keryk, Myroslava	Fundacja „Nasz Wybór” (Our Choice Foundation)
Knudsen, Anders Helge	Danish Refugee Council / Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination (DEMAC)
Koinova, Maria	University of Warwick
Krakhmalova, Kateryna	University of Warsaw
Lapshyna, Iryna	Osnabrück University & Ukrainian Catholic University
Leskiw, Maryna	Association of Ukrainians in Poland, Przemyśl
Marta Jaroszewicz	University of Warsaw
Orjuela, Camilla	University of Gothenburg
Ryabiko, Kateryna	ODIHR, Direction and Policy
Suprun, Ulana	Ministry of Health of Ukraine (8/2016-8/2019) & ARC.ua - NGO and publishing house
Sushko, Iryna	Europe without Barriers / Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine
Szczepanikova, Alice	ODIHR, Migration and Freedom of Movement Unit

Tsybukh, Olena	Embassy of Ukraine in Poland
Van Berlo, Robin	ODIHR, Migration and Freedom of Movement Unit

Annex 2: List of participants in the expert workshop on engaging the Ukrainian diaspora in reconstruction and development hosted by ODIHR in collaboration with the University of Warwick, UK

Warsaw, 3 July 2023

Surname, Name	Affiliation
Lalak, Joanna	Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Koinova, Maria	University of Warwick
Pavlova, Kateryna	CRISP Berlin
Pryhornytska, Nataliya	Alliance of Ukrainian Organizations in Germany
Rewko, Petro	Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain
Rzewuska, Agata	ODIHR, Coordination of the Ukraine Project
Sukhinina, Iryna	ODIHR, Coordination of the Ukraine Project
Surniaiev, Yevhenii	IWEK, Germany
Szczepanikova, Alice	ODIHR, Migration and Freedom of Movement Unit
Terlecky, Iryna	Association of Ukrainian Women in Great Britain