



Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the International Organizations in Vienna

FSC.DEL/112/16
8 June 2016

ENGLISH only

Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine
at the 822nd FSC Plenary Meeting
(8 June 2016 at 10.00, Hofburg)
(Agenda item 2)

Mr. Chairman,

In the past month the combined Russian-separatist forces in Donbas provoked hostilities at the level not seen this year. The disregard by Russia and its proxies for undertaken international commitments bears deadly and bloody consequences. Last month registered the highest toll of casualties among Ukrainian servicemen since August 2015. **28 soldiers were killed and 98 wounded.** Apart from shellings and provocations, the illegal armed formations intensified their subversive activities, attacking Ukrainian units or mining the roads in the government controlled areas.

Ukraine condemns the use by the militants of cynical practice of shellings from the residential areas, which was witnessed many times in the past and is recently again reported by the SMM. On 30 May the SMM informed about number of the residents of Kuibyshevskyi district of the Donetsk city where militants fired from nearby areas before withdrawing their weapons soon after. Image of a battle tank placed between residential houses, made by the SMM UAV over the militant-controlled areas near Zaitseve, is a conspicuous evidence of disregard for the Minsk agreements and for the security of the local population. In the report of 3 June the SMM registered accounts of residents in the town of Debaltseve pointing out that the Russia-backed militants shell from residential areas to provoke response of the Ukrainian forces. On 4 June the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in a residential area of government-controlled Marinka. The SMM observed a punctured gas pipeline, fractured walls, and destroyed roofs. In government-controlled Pervomaiske the kindergarten director told the SMM that due to the damage they would not be able to receive pupils in September. At an industrial compound in the village after the shelling during the previous night the dead man was found. The shelling of these locations was carried out by mortars and artillery which should have been withdrawn under Minsk agreements.

The SMM consistently reported of heavy jamming of its UAVs over the occupied territories. We strongly condemn the deliberate downing of one SMM UAV over the outskirts of the occupied Horlivka on 27 May, after it had spotted a surface-to-air missile system Strela-10 and another UAV on 2 June

while it was flying in the area between “DPR”-controlled Korsun and Shevchenko, Donetsk oblast. On 3 June the SMM followed up on the loss of an SMM long-range UAV over Korsun and visited the area near the presumed crash site to recover possible debris and collect other relevant information. When the SMM intended to launch a small-size UAV to fly over the area, the “DPR” member said that it would be shot down. This obstruction to the SMM and the use of its technical devices breaches the Minsk agreements and is utterly unacceptable.

In daily report of 2 June the SMM registered the presence of 12 battle tanks in Budyonivskiyi, 8 tanks in Leninskyi and 4 tanks in Kalininskyi districts of the Donetsk city. In the same report the SMM registered 5 MLRS “Grad” and one self-propelled howitzer “Gvozdika” in Budyonivskiyi district of Donetsk. The Mission also observed the presence in the security zone in so-called “LPR”-controlled areas 2 armoured reconnaissance vehicles BRDM-2, six BTR, 19 command vehicles with multiple antennas, 18 military trucks with portable command space with additional 8 portable command space offices on trailers. These observations of concentration of weaponry by the combined Russian-separatist forces were made by the SMM with the use of its UAVs. The shooting-down of these UAVs proves the extent to which the combined Russian-separatist forces can go to hide their persistent violations of the Minsk agreements.

On the same day that the UAV was shot down, an incident happened near Yasynuvata, where the SMM patrol came under fire. Thorough investigation should be conducted to establish the details of this incident given the visible signs of a deliberate provocation. Many other incidents of intimidation towards the monitors in the occupied areas have been reported by the SMM. This behaviour towards the monitors is totally unacceptable.

The ability of the SMM to duly monitor the situation is further limited by impediments to monitors’ contacts with the local residents, imposed by the Russia-backed militants. Lifting of all those restrictions depends on the Russian Federation and we urge it to undertake the necessary measures. This includes re-connection of the SMM cameras near the Donetsk airport, which have been intentionally disabled since 20 May immediately prior to intensive shelling of the areas under Government control. Specific measures from the Russian side will be indicative of its real interest in increasing effectiveness of the part of Russian officers in the JCCC.

Distinguished colleagues,

Deterioration of the security situation was in the primary focus of the Trilateral Contact group meeting, held on 1 June in Minsk. The Ukrainian side drew particular attention to the high numbers of ceasefire violations, including the use of heavy weapons, and reiterated the urgency of implementing de-escalation proposals put forward by Ukraine. Establishment of a sustainable ceasefire remains a basic requirement for progress on other aspects of the Minsk agreements. There is the urgent need to fully and

verifiably implement three initial security provisions of the Minsk Package of Measures. The Russian Federation deprives the people of Donbas of opportunities for peace as it continues to selectively interpret the Minsk agreements, setting out conditions for stopping the shelling.

Despite persistent Russian denials, regular Russian troops remain in Donbas and Moscow continues to provide weapons, military equipment and training to the combined Russian-separatists forces in eastern Ukraine.

At the previous FSC meeting of 25 May, Head of the Russian delegation with full responsibility stated that there are neither any Russian regular troops in Donbas, nor their weapons and military equipment. In this context, in addition to the SMM reports and earlier presentations by the Ukrainian delegation, today we would like to demonstrate the Forum some new evidence of the presence of Russian sophisticated military equipment and modern weapons in the occupied Donbas, many of which can be operated only by highly trained military personnel from the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Attachment: photo presentation, on 28 slides.

Mr. Chairman,

In the interests of peaceful resolution in Donbas we once again urge the Russian Federation and its proxies to stop military provocations, to withdraw their heavy weapons in a verifiable manner, to stop provision of Russia's weapons, ammunition and logistical support to the illegal armed formations.


We emphasise the imperative of full freedom of movement for the SMM, establishment of permanent and unhindered monitoring and creation of security zones in border areas of both Ukraine and Russia as envisaged by the Minsk agreements. Re-establishing control on the Ukrainian-Russian state border remains critical for progress of de-escalation efforts and political resolution of the conflict.

We again urge Russia to return to the tenets of the international law, to cease its aggression against Ukraine and reverse the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VERIFIED CASES OF RUSSIAN ARMAMENTS AND AMMUNITION TRANSFERRING TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE

LOCALITIES WHERE RUSSIAN MATERIEL WAS OBSERVED OR CAPTURED IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS OF DONBAS



Russian T-72BM main battle tank (model of 1989)

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 1989
(not in the inventory of the Ukrainian military)



On March 26, 2016 a T-72BM main battle tank (model of 1989) was observed during the military training of 100th SepMRBde, 1st Army Corps near the town of Torez (Donetsk region)




T-72BM main battle tank (model of 1989) at a parade

Nº	Specific features of the T-72BM main battle tank
1	"Luna" spotlight mounted to the right of the gun
2	"Kontakt-5" turret-mounted dynamic protection system
3	Body mounted protection
4	Distinctive shape of the track chain

3

Russian "Pantsir-S1" AD system on 8x8 truck (SA-22 "Greyhound")

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2012 only



On April 13, 2016 the "Pantsir-S1" AD system (SA-22 Greyhound) was observed in Krasnodonska str., city of Luhansk



"Pantsir-S1" AD system (SA-22 "Greyhound")

Nº	Specific features of the "Pantsir-S1" AD system
1	Launch missile containers and twin-barrel flak guns
2	Distinctive shape of the "1RL123" tracking radar system
3	Stern ladder
4	Onboard equipment
5	Chassis of four-axle KamAZ 6560 heavy utility truck

4

Russian 9S482M7 Army Air Defence command post vehicle

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2012



On April 8, 2016 a 9S482M7 AAD command post vehicle was observed near the town of Makiivka (Donetsk region)



9S482M7 AAD command post vehicle

Nº	Specific features of the 9S482M7 AAD command post vehicle
1	Specific shape of the bigger hull
2	Unarmed turret

5

On May 10-12, 2016 a Russian "Torn" SIGINT system was identified deployed in the North of Yasynuvata (Donetsk region),



6

Russian "Torn" SIGINT system

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2012



Nº Specific features of the "Torn" SIGINT system

- 1 Distinctive shape of the antenna system
- 2 KamAZ 4310 chassis


Performance characteristics

Frequency band, MHz	1,5-30/30-3000
Number of monitored (recorded) channels	8
Number of controlled users	1024


7

Russian RB-531B "Infauna" Electronic Warfare system

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2011



On April 8, 2016 a RB-531B "Infauna" EW system was spotted in Makiivka (Donetsk region)




RB-531B "Infauna" EW system

Nº Specific features of the RB-531B "Infauna" EW system

- 1 Antenna system cover
- 2 Toolbox
- 3 Specific shape of the bigger hull
- 4 Unarmed turret

8

On April 7, 2016 a Russian R-330ZH "Zhytel" automated radio interference system was observed at the position ready for the use in the Northern part of the town of Makiivka (Donetsk region)



Russian R-330ZH "Zhytel" automated radio interference system

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2008



On April 12, 2016 the R-330ZH "Zhytel" automated radio interference system was identified in the town of Makiivka




The R-330ZH "Zhytel" automated radio interference system in deployed mode

Specific features of the R-330ZH "Zhytel" automated radio interference system	
1	Distinctive shape of the GSM antenna system located on the trailer power generator
2	Distinctive shape of the direction finder
3	Automobile chassis of Russia-manufactured "Ural-43203" or "KamAZ-43114" military truck with trailer

Performance characteristics	
Frequency band, MHz in monitoring mode in jamming mode	100-2000 1227, 1575, 1500-1900
Jamming range, km	20-30
Direction finding accuracy, degree.	3

Russian "Leer-3" Electronic Warfare system

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2008



Donetsk, Pavshyh Komunariv ave.,
"Zolotoye koltso" shopping centre



On April 5, 2016 a "Leer-3" Electronic Warfare system was observed in Pavshyh Komunariv ave., the city of Donetsk



"Leer-3" Electronic Warfare system

№ Specific features of the "Leer-3" Electronic Warfare system

- 1 UAV RC module antenna tower in transport position is hung at the top right of the shelter
- 2 The distinctive wooden flooring over the roof, facilitates the antenna system deployment
- 3 Shape and technologic features of "Leer-3" EW system specialized universal cargo shelter
- 4 Russai-manufactured Kamaz 5350 three-axle vehicle chassis

Performance characteristics

Frequency band, MHz	935-960, 1805-1880
User terminals jamming range, km	3,5-6
Number of communication providers blocked at a time	3
UAV range, km	120

11

Russian RB-636 "Svet-KU" EW system

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2012

On March 9, 2016 a "Svet-KU" EW system" was observed in Artema str., the city of Donetsk



"Svet-KU" EW system"



№ Specific features of the "Svet-KU" Electronic Warfare system

- 1 Cover for special equipment and specific wooden flooring over the roof, which facilitates the antenna system deployment
- 2 Distinctive transmitter module antenna tower mounted at the rear board of the shelter
- 3 Shape and technologic features of "Svet-KU" EW system shelter
- 4 Two-axle chassis of Russian KamAZ 5320


Performance characteristics

Frequency band, MHz	30-18000
Direction finding accuracy, degree	1-5
Range, km	30-40

12

On March 9, 2016 a Russian automated R-934BMV jamming station was observed in Artema str., the city of Donetsk

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2014



№	Specific features of R-934BMV station
1	Transmitter module antenna tower mounted at the right side of the front board of the shelter
2	Transmitter module antenna tower mounted at the right side of the rear board of the shelter
3	Shape and technologic features of the shelter
4	Three-axle chassis of Russia-manufactured KamAZ 5350
5	Power unit

Performance characteristics	
Frequency band, MHz	100-1000
Direction finding accuracy, degree	2
Operation range, km:	
air targets	250-400
land targets	75

13

Russian ZALA 421-08M tactical UAV

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2008





On April 12, 2016 a "ZALA 421-08M" UAV was downed near the village of Novoselivka (Donetsk region)

14

Russian Granat-1 tactical UAV

In service in Russian Armed Forces since 2014



"Granat-1" UAV, was downed near Luhanske locality (Donetsk region) on March, 28, 2016

15

Samples of Russian armaments collected in the ATO area



- 1 – RGO hand grenade
- 2 – MON-50 directional anti-personnel mine
- 3 – RPO-A "Shmel" thermobaric rocket launcher
- 4 – RPG-26 "Aglen" anti-tank rocket


- 5 – PG-7VR "Resume" rocket for RPG-7V1
- 6 – TBG-7V thermobaric rocket for RPG-7V1
- 7 – PG-7VL "Luch" rocket for RPG-7V1 rocket launcher
- 8 – Gunpowder charge for PG-7VL "Luch" projectile

16

MPO-A "Borodach" Thermo-baric rocket launcher

Markings:

MO.1.10.00 – rocket launcher index;
08 – year of manufacture (2008).



In January 2016, after the clash with the "DNR" militants who infiltrated deep into the territory of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian military, the troopers of Ukrainian Armed Forces picked up the used tubes of MPO-A "Borodach" thermo-baric rocket launcher. The distinctive markings on the tubes (year of manufacture and RL indexes "MO.1.1001 KL5731 34 08" and "MO.1.1001 KL3180 33 08") revealed the Russian identity of that weaponry. It is in service in the Russian Armed Forces only. 17

RPO-A "Shmel" thermo-baric rocket launcher



Markings:

MO.1.02.00 – rocket launcher index;
1 – serial number;
11 – year of manufacture (2011);
 – factory logo;
638 – item number;

In late February, 2016 the Ukrainian troopers picked up two used tubes of "Shmel" man-portable thermo-baric rocket launchers (manufactured in 2011) during the patrolling mission near the village of Shyrokyne (Donetsk region).

RPO-A "Shmel" thermo-baric rocket launcher



Markings:

MO.1.02.00	– rocket launcher index
13	– batch number
90	– year of manufacture (1990)
	– factory logo
209	– item number

Another used tube of the same RPO-A "Shmel" man-portable thermo-baric rocket launcher was picked up in February 2016 by the Ukrainian Armed Forces troops after the exchange of fire with the militants near Zaitseve (Donetsk region). According to the markings (MO 1.02.00 2.09Δ 696) it was produced in 2011 in Russia.

19

RPO-A "Shmel" thermo-baric rocket launcher



Markings:

<u>MO.1.0200</u>	– rocket launcher index
<u>12</u>	– batch number
<u>91</u>	– year of manufacture (1991)
	– factory logo
<u>579</u>	– item index
<u>9800</u>	– serial No




20

Command-fire mine made of RPO-A "Shmel" tube



On March 25, 2016 the Ukrainian Armed Forces troopers came into an improvised explosive device reworked out of RPO-A "Shmel" thermo-baric rocket launcher, directed at "Bakhmutka" roadway near the village of Zolote (Luhansk region). Markings on the tube confirm that it was manufactured in Russia. 21

OG-7V fragmentation projectile for RPG-7V rocket launcher



Markings:

OG-7B	– RPG-7V projectile index
56	– index of production facility ("Planta" FSUE), Nizhniy Tagil, Russia;
10	– batch number;
07	– year of manufacture (2007) ;
A-IX-1	– type of explosive

On March 29, 2016 the Ukrainian Armed Forces troopers picked up the OG-7V fragmentation projectile for RPG-7V rocket launcher manufactured in Russia at the position left by the 'DNR' militants between Zaitseve and Mykytivka localities (Donetsk region) 22

TBG-7V thermo-baric rocket for RPG-7V rocket launcher




Markings:

<u>ТБГ-7В</u>	– thermobaric rocket index
<u>56</u>	– index of production facility (“Planta” FSUE), Nizhniy Tagil, Russia;
<u>5</u>	– batch number;
<u>08</u>	– year of manufacture (2008);
<u>А-IX-1</u>	– type of explosive;
<u>У-505</u>	– item number;

On March 29, 2016 Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen found the TBG-7V thermobaric rocket for RPG-7V rocket launcher manufactured in Russia at the position left by the “DNR” militants between Zaitseve and Mykytivka localities (Donetsk region)

23

TBG-7V thermo-baric rocket for RPG-7V1 rocket launcher



Markings:

<u>ТБГ-7В</u>	– thermobaric rocket
<u>56</u>	– index of production facility (FSUE “Planta”, Nizhniy Tagil, Russia)
<u>5</u>	– batch number
<u>08</u>	– year of manufacture (2008)
<u>ЛП-30Т</u>	
<u>А-IX-1</u>	– type of explosive
<u>У-505</u>	
<u>533-1-08</u>	

24

PG-7VR "Resume" projectile with two cumulative charges for RPG-7V1 rocket launcher




Markings:

ПГ-7ВР – rocket launcher projectile;
56 – index of production facility ("Planta" FSUE ,
 Nizhniy Tagil, Russia);
88 – year of manufacture (1988);
ОКФОЛ – type of explosive.

25

RPG-26 disposable anti-tank rocket





Markings:

РПГ-26 – anti-tank rocket;
251 – index of production facility
5 – batch number
91 – year of manufacture (1991)
ОКФОЛ – type of explosive

26

RShG-2 assault rocket



Markings:


- РШГ-2 – assault rocket
- 56 – index of production facility ("Planta" FSUE, Nizhniy Tagil, Russia)
- 3 – batch number
- 08 – year of manufacture (2008)
- ОКФОЛ – type of explosive
- 6Г31 – Russian MoD Main Rocket and Artillery Department (MRAD) index
- КП 13566 – Serial No.

Additional paper markings
(with plastic cover):

- MRAD index 6Г18 (from RPG-22)
- 013988 – Serial No
- 2008 – year of manufacture

27

MON-50 directional anti-personnel mine



Index of the production facility
("Promsintez" JSC , Chapayevsk, Samara region,
Russia)



Year of manufacture (2003)

On March 21, 2016 near the 177,2 elevation (7km to the S-E from Popasna, Luhansk region) Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen came into the MON-50 directional anti-personnel mine with MD-5M detonator manufactured in 2003 in Russia. Although it is widely used all over the world, the markings on it make it unique. At present the mine is neither in the inventory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine nor manufactured in Ukraine.

28