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Netherlands Chairmanship

FIRST ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 25 and 26 June 2003

CHAIR'S REPORT

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AGENDA OF THE FIRST ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

First day: 25 June 2003

10 a.m.-1 p.m. Session 1: Opening plenary session

The opening plenary session should set the stage for the ASRC by looking back over the past few years and looking forward to the challenges that the OSCE will face in the future, under the theme, "The role of the OSCE in the European security landscape".

- Opening speech by the Chairperson
- Keynote speech
- Speech by the Chairperson of the FSC, Ambassador D. Boden, Permanent Representative of Germany to the OSCE
- General statements and debate

Chairperson: Ambassador D. Everts, Head of the OSCE Task Force, the Netherlands Rapporteur: Mr. R. in den Bosch, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands

3-6 p.m. Session 2, with parallel sessions of Working Groups A and B

The detailed work of the ASRC will be conducted in four working groups, each of which will concentrate on one broad topic, introduced by one or two keynote speakers, which may be followed by a discussion of any number of relevant sub-topics that delegates may wish to raise. Each of the proposed groups below has been assigned a number of such subjects for illustrative purposes. These lists are not exhaustive. It is expected that the interface between the politico-military dimension and the other dimensions of security will be addressed in each of the groups, as will the question of co-operation with other international organizations.

Working Group A: Preventing and combating terrorism

This working group will review the implementation of OSCE commitments related to preventing and combating terrorism, such as those contained in the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, the Bishkek Programme of Action, the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism and the Porto decision, and should evolve possible improvements through dialogue. The review might include border controls, institutional road maps, intra-OSCE co-ordination, the implementation of the recommendations by the OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, and improvement of the implementation of FSC documents such as the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

Co-ordinator: Ambassador K. Bringéus, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the

OSCE

Rapporteur: Colonel P. Ryan, Military Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Ireland

to the OSCE

Keynote speakers: (to be followed)

Working Group B: Comprehensive security

This working group will review the contribution of various OSCE instruments to security and stability in the OSCE area, in particular politico-military instruments. The review might include particular contributions of the FSC, as well as that of existing arms control agreements/treaties, including regional agreements, to security.

Co-ordinator: Ambassador Z. Mazi, Permanent Representative of Albania to the

OSCE

Rapporteur: Ms. D. Phelan, Mission of the United States of America to the OSCE

Keynote speakers: (to be followed)

Second day: 26 June 2003

10 a.m.-1 p.m. Session 3, with parallel sessions of Working Groups C and D

The detailed work of the ASRC will be conducted in four Working Groups, each of which will concentrate on one broad topic, introduced by one or two keynote speakers, which may be followed by a discussion of any number of relevant sub-topics that delegates may wish to raise. Each of the proposed groups below has been assigned a number of such subjects for illustrative purposes. These lists are not exhaustive. It is expected that the interface between the politico-military dimension and the other dimensions of security will be addressed in each of the groups, as will the question of co-operation with other international organizations.

Working Group C: Security risks and challenges across the OSCE region

This working group will review the security situation in the OSCE area. This review may include the nature of threats emerging in the twenty-first century, regional issues and police-related activities of the OSCE.

Co-ordinator: Ambassador Ö. Orhun, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the

OSCE

Rapporteur: Colonel N. Jovanović, Military Adviser of the Permanent Mission of

Serbia and Montenegro to the OSCE

Keynote speakers: (to be followed)

Working Group D: Conflict prevention and crisis management

This working group will review the contributions of the core activities of the OSCE to conflict prevention and crisis management. The review might include the Organization's instruments and mechanisms, as well as security issues related to field operations and institutions.

Co-ordinator: Ambassador H. Reimann, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to

the OSCE

Rapporteur: Mrs. H. Zvonková, Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the

OSCE

Keynote speakers: (to be followed)

3-6 p.m. Session 4: Closing plenary session

In the last plenary session, delegations, including representatives sent by governments, will hold a general debate on the results of the working groups. Therefore, the programme should include:

- Reports of the working groups;
- General debate:
- Chairperson's perception of recommendations made at the conference;
- Closing remarks.

Chairperson: Ambassador J. de Visser, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the

OSCE, Chairperson of the Permanent Council

Rapporteur: Colonel P. Gorissen, Senior Military Adviser of the Permanent Representation

of the Netherlands to the OSCE

CO-ORDINATION

Present Co-ordinators and Rapporteurs

Working Group A: Preventing and combating terrorism

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Krister Bringéus, Sweden

Rapporteur: Col. Peter Ryan, Ireland

Working Group B: Comprehensive security

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Zef Mazi, Albania

Rapporteur: Ms. Donna Phelan, United States of America

Working Group C: Security risks and challenges across the OSCE region

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Ömür Orhun, Turkey

Rapporteur: Col. Negovan Jovanović, Serbia and Montenegro

Working Group D: Conflict prevention and crisis management

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Branislav Milinković, Serbia and

Montenegro

Rapporteur: Ms. Hana Zvonková, Czech Republic

Closing Plenary

Chair: H.E. Ambassador Justus J. de Visser, the Netherlands

Rapporteur: Col. Peter Gorissen, the Netherlands

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

Opening

- H.E. Ambassador Daan Everts, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office
- Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poland

Working Group A: Preventing and combating terrorism

- H.E. Ambassador Cofer Black, Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, United States Department of State
- H.E. Ambassador Rakhat Aliyev, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the OSCE

Working Group B: Comprehensive security

- Mr. Alexander Grushko, Director Department European Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
- Brigadier General Heinz Vetschera, LL.D, Ph.D

Working Group C: Security risks and challenges across the OSCE region

- H.E. Ambassador Kirsten Malling Biering, Chair of the Informal Open-ended Group of Friends of the Chair for the Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century
- Mr. Gilles Andréani, Director Policy Planning Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Working Group D: Conflict prevention and crisis management

- H.E. Ambassador Professor Luigi Vittorio Ferraris
- Brigadier General Ulf Henricsson, Head Department for Leadership and Management, National Defence College, Sweden

CHAIRPERSON'S PERCEPTION

Halfway from Porto to Maastricht we have held the first Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC). The first dimension has now been brought into line with the other two dimensions, which have already their review mechanism, thus implementing our shared policy objective to balance the three dimensions better. The enhanced interaction between the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Council (PC) is a good example of this more integrated approach.

The OSCE started in Helsinki, was redefined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and has to show flexibility in adapting to new risks and challenges. By redefining its role in ever more rapidly changing international surroundings, the OSCE can continue to fulfil its unique role based on the notion of comprehensive security.

The discussions in the various working groups have clearly underlined the multidimensional character of the new security threats as these latter interact with already existing conflict situations, some of which are potential generators of zones of lawlessness. The full OSCE toolkit should be mobilised to prevent conditions from deteriorating further. Hence the importance of our work to counter intolerance, extremism, corruption and organized crime.

In all four working groups, suggestions and proposals were made to improve the security situation in the OSCE area and beyond. Some groups even mentioned new fields for the OSCE to work on, such as bio-terrorism. The work of the several Informal groups of friends of the chair received strong support. More than once it was expressed that synergy in our work and co-operation with other international organizations is of utmost importance.

Delegations were of the opinion that the fundamental basis for arms control is still valid and that its nature should not be changed. Ample attention should be paid to the full implementation of current obligations. With reference to the Best Practice Handbook for Small Arms and Light Weapons, consideration should be given to developing similar documents for other instruments. As a contribution to security beyond the OSCE area it would be useful to exchange views on our experiences of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures with other organizations and (groups of) countries outside the OSCE area.

Our strategy paper on addressing the risks and challenges of the twenty-first century will be a political sign to the outside world that this Organization has something to offer. Hermetically closed borders do not exist any more. There is a need to look outward in our threat assessment. One of the strengths of the OSCE lies in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The debate showed that some of the OSCE mechanisms are not sufficiently well-known, both inside and outside the OSCE. We should consider how to improve this.

Our revised general policy paper on OSCE peacekeeping is a case in point. We have to balance our ambitions to the means at our disposal. The documents we have, such as the 1992 Helsinki document, form a strong basis to work on. This basis should not be destroyed. Given the OSCE does have an important role to play, the Informal Group of Friends will certainly have a successful outcome. Similarly, the field missions play an important role in

the work of the OSCE in all three dimensions. There is a common understanding that constant attention has to be paid to the so-called frozen conflicts.

The suggestions and proposals made during the conference have to be worked out. This will require initiative on the part of national delegations and institutions. There are also items that can be worked out in the IGFs, for which a change in tasking could be needed. The Chair will take action to consider the suggestions and proposals made at this first ASRC.

OPENING PLENARY

In his opening statement, the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office, Ambassador Daan Everts, drew attention to the fact that with this first ASRC the politico-military (first) dimension had now been brought into line with the economic and environmental (second) and the human (third) dimensions of the OSCE comprehensive security concept. The establishment of an ASRC is also a reflection of the stated policy objective of striking a better balance between the three dimensions, both in terms of policy making and in operational activities. This three-dimensional approach to security - the OSCE's trademark - was to be followed throughout the organization and in all its activities. The kind of intensive interaction between the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation, that took place in the run-up to the ASRC, was therefore a welcome development.

The ASRC was to examine the following:

- 1. How the OSCE was performing its tasks in addressing problems affecting stability and human security. (To discuss the effectiveness of the OSCE's contribution to reducing insecurity within and between nations and whether it has in comparison with other international organizations with similar or related mandates a noticeable added value. Is it filling an important niche in the overall security architecture and would a reduced presence or the absence of current activities be any great loss?).
- 2. Is the organization equipped and prepared to take on new challenges and threats?

The latter question was, according to Ambassador Everts, particularly pertinent a world marked by globalization, cross-border developments, interaction and spillover effects. The conference was to examine how safe the OSCE area was, and if there were threats to security, to discuss what the OSCE could do about it. At the same time it was to review the remedies that have been suggested or initiated and possibly come up with new strategic answers. The answers given to new threats and challenges also had to be subject to scrutiny because of their possible negative effect on human security. The tightening of security as a result of the fight against terrorism was mentioned as an example. This should, however, not lead to infringements of basic human and democratic rights.

In short, the ASRC was to clarify what most affected human security at all different levels, what should be done about it and what role the OSCE could play, given its mandate, experience and expertise.

The Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation, Ambassador Dr. Dieter Boden, referred to the contribution made by the FSC in the preparation phase of the ASRC and to the fact that one of the working groups would focus on politico-military affairs.

Ambassador Boden underlined the continuing relevance of the first dimension and the undiminished role the Forum played in this regard. Before looking ahead at the threats of the twenty-first century, he reminded his audience of the network of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and arms control commitments, which the FSC had established in past years (Vienna Document 1999, Code of Conduct, OSCE Document on

SALW and the ongoing work to address risks associated with stockpiles of ammunition and explosives). He also recalled the arms control treaties, which are, implemented under the OSCE auspices, namely the CFE Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Dayton Agreements. Referring to von Clausewitz's expression "das Unvorhersehbare ist das Wahrscheinliche" the Chair of the FSC stated that with regard to security, things should be made as predictable and manageable as possible.

In Porto, ministers tasked the OSCE as a whole with responding to the emerging threats of the twenty-first century, among which terrorism stands out most prominently. In response to this, the FSC had embarked upon a review of all existing commitments and instruments of the first dimension in order to identify their specific quality for combating new threats. Furthermore, the interaction between the FSC and the PC had been intensified and co-operation with other international actors, particularly with United Nations, has been deepened. At the same time an attempt was under-way to give traditional arms control and CSBM instruments (Code of Conduct, SALW document) an increased relevance by improving their implementation involving, *inter alia*, the field missions. To facilitate this the FSC had developed the Best Practices Handbook.

Ambassador Boden concluded his statement with a quotation from the Porto Ministerial Declaration: "arms control and confidence- and security-building measures remain indispensable to our comprehensive approach to security" and added that the FSC was determined to make its contribution to that.

"European Security System in Transition" was the title of the keynote speech by the Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Professor Adam Rotfeld.

Professor Rotfeld recalled that the CSCE, which opened in Helsinki 1973, transformed into the OSCE in Paris in 1990 and supplemented its mandate at the 1992 Helsinki and successive summits. In that period the majority of the newly established States gained independence without the use of force and the role the OSCE played in this should not be underestimated. During the last decade respect for human and minority rights, political pluralism, rule of law and support for democracy and the institutions of civic society had been of key importance in the settlement of disputes and conflicts, crisis management and in eradicating the sources of tensions and potential conflicts.

The shaping of the new Euro-Atlantic security environment had been marked by two dates: 1989, the first non-communist government in Poland and the fall of the "Berlin wall" followed by the unification of Germany, and 11 September 2001, the day of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. These two dates had opened a new chapter in security issues on a global scale, making it necessary to counter threats, which by their nature and scale were qualitatively different from the threats of the past.

Professor Rotfeld stressed that today the main threats to international security were dictatorial and criminal regimes (mainly outside the OSCE area) that support, finance and shelter international terrorist networks. Access to weapons of mass destruction by such criminal regimes or terrorist groups was the most urgent challenge for the whole community of democratic States. Another main source of instability for Europe and the wider world was the existence of weak and failed States. Territories not controlled by States could provide shelter to powerful terrorist groups.

The differences in opinion between the United States of America and certain European countries on the threats to the Euro-Atlantic community are explained by some authors in terms of differing perceptions of the actual threats, while others believe that the main difference lies in the importance attached to effectiveness as against legalism. Rivalry and competition might also play a role. The Iraq crisis, according to Professor Rotfeld, merely triggered the debate on already existing differences.

The character of the relationship between Europe and the United States of America is of great importance for the future system of international security and this relationship will be affected by the redefinition of the borders of the EU and NATO. (The prospect of) an enlarged NATO, coupled with an increased United States emphasis on Asia, may lead to tensions.

As main challenges for the Euro-Atlantic community Professor Rotfeld mentioned:

- Bringing Russia into Europe, rather than attempting to exclude it;
- Making the United States of America understand that staying engaged in Europe is in its own interest; and
- Transforming the EU into a more accountable, democratically controlled and security-oriented institution.
 - What role would there be left for the OSCE?
- The OSCE is still the broadest Euro-Atlantic structure and this geopolitical factor is an asset when facing new threats and challenges;
- The OSCE has unique experience in settling internal issues;
- The OSCE plays an important role in combating terrorism, a role only enhanced by the wide scope of its activities in connection with the rule of law and the building of democratic institutions;
- The distinction between internal and external security is blurred and the OSCE concept of comprehensive security might help to give an answer to the new threats;
- Such phenomena as money-laundering, drug trafficking and corruption undermine the rule of law and trust in public administration, justice and local government. The OSCE can help fight these threats to security;
- The OSCE has the potential to transcend traditional limitations and increase the dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean region and Afghanistan.

WORKING GROUP A PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Krister Bringéus, Sweden

Rapporteur: Col. Peter Ryan, Ireland

Keynote Speakers: H.E. Ambassador Cofer Black, Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism,

United States Department of State

H.E. Ambassador Rakhat Aliyev, Permanent Representative of the

Republic of Kazakhstan to the OSCE

The Session was co-ordinated by Ambassador Krister Bringéus of the Swedish Delegation and the Rapporteur was Colonel Peter Ryan of the Irish Delegation.

The Co-ordinator opened the Working Group, indicating that the task of the group was to review commitments in the counter terrorism area, reflecting upon the past two years and putting forward practical and result-orientated ideas. He mentioned the interface between Working Group A and the Informal Open-Ended Group of Friends on the Implementation of OSCE Commitments and Activities on Combating Terrorism.

In his keynote address Ambassador Cofer Black noted the achievements of the past two years such as the liberation of most of Afghanistan, the detention of thousands of terrorists, the co-operation between intelligence services, the fostering of international relationships, the provision of assistance to less experienced nations and the prevention of atrocities. However he also emphasized that the war on terrorism was not yet won. He stressed the support of the United States of America for the OSCE's efforts to combat terrorism and praised its work at Porto, Bucharest and Bishkek in establishing standards to fight terrorism. Whilst expressing the hope that the Annual Security Review Conference would produce a new agenda for consideration by the PC in the fight against terrorism he also suggested the need for

- More counter-terrorism experts in the OSCE mission areas to assist host nations;
- The completion of the Financial Action Task Force questionnaires;
- The implementation of the twelve relevant United Nations conventions and protocols;
- The development and implementation of anti-terrorism legislation by OSCE States;
- The expansion of the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Team system to include experts in counter-terrorism;
- Further action pursuant to the Prague Economic Forum to prevent acquisition of weapons by terrorists/criminals;
- Closer co-ordination with international organizations;

- The adoption of international standards in the area of travel and identification documents and of advanced passenger information;
- The sharing of data on lost passports;
- The endorsement of common standards on the security of borders and the development of a border unit within the OSCE Secretariat.

He noted the role of the OSCE in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy, equal economic opportunities and tolerance in ethnic and religious areas as part of a process which would ultimately deny terrorists any pretext for self-serving violence.

In his keynote speech Ambassador Rakhat Aliyev praised the role of the United States of America in the fight against terrorism. He stated that the measures taken to date to counter terrorism were far from perfect and that in the security area Europe was tied to Central Asia. He recommended a common international legal structure to counter terrorism. He cited the need to take all conditions that support terrorism into account including economic, illegal migration, extremism, social deprivation and political isolationism. On regional issues he stated that a uni-polar world and charismatic leaders who claimed answers to all problems could contribute to the problem. He described Osama Bin Laden as a head of a terrorist state with no borders. He went on to comment that although the Islamic factor was very much in the foreground, terrorism must not be seen as a war against any particular religion, referring to Islam as a world religion of peace. He also stated that weapons of mass destruction increased the danger of terrorism and that the problem of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and the illegal drug issue in that country had to be dealt with. He stated that the partnership between the OSCE and Afghanistan would help Kazakhstan, a country that has suffered as a result of the illegal drug trade emanating from Afghanistan. The Ambassador mentioned the problem of illicit arms and stated that his country supported international action to counter terrorism.

The Working Group was then briefed on the work of the Informal Open-ended Group of Friends of the Chairman-in-Office on the Implementation of OSCE Commitments and Activities on Combating Terrorism by Ambassador Oskarsson, its Chairman. He spoke of the task of the group, namely to concentrate on ways that would help participating States to implement the commitments and activities that they have subscribed to on combating terrorism. The main focus was on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, the review of the need for assistance to States on implementation of OSCE commitments, the development of plans for assistance and the imparting of advice to the Permanent Council.

A number of delegations voiced support for the work of the Group of Friends on items mentioned in the brief and for the suggestion of drawing up an inventory of preventative anti terrorism commitments and also a best practice guide on OSCE antiterrorism activities.

A delegation pointed out that at the Evian G8 Conference an action plan was adopted containing specific measures concerning transport security including the threat from the use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). A United Nations group of experts is also addressing the issue. The control of the use of such systems would require support of all

OSCE participating States and it would be raised for attention at the Forum for Security Co-operation in conjunction with the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). It was recommended by another delegation that the G8 Action Plan concerning this issue should be adopted by all OSCE participating States before the Maastricht Ministerial Council in December 2003.

On the issue of the security risk arising from stockpiles of surplus ammunition and explosives existing in the OSCE area, it was proposed by a delegation that there should be an exchange of information by participating States on national measures for destruction by December 2003.

There were diverging views on the question of whether the international community should be satisfied with its achievements to date in its fight against terrorism. One delegation expressed the view that the OSCE had given an adequate answer to the continuing global threat of terrorism through the work of its missions and presences as well as its developed "acquis" in the area of countering terrorism. Another delegation questioned whether satisfaction with progress made was justified.

A delegation expressed its belief in the continued relevance and implementation of all politico-military instruments in the OSCE especially the Code of Conduct and SALW documents to prevent or combat terrorism including threats emanating from outside the OSCE area. Another delegation felt that these documents needed further development. Concerning Question 1 on the Code of Conduct, there was a proposal that the answers should get wider distribution and be used as a form of needs assessment.

A number of delegations supported the proposal to establish a border security and management unit in the OSCE Secretariat. One delegation stated that it would support it in next year's budget and that its function could be to deal with trafficking, tasks given to the OSCE concerning border security by the Ohrid Conference and requests for assistance from participating States to improve border management and policing standards. Another delegation stated that the responsibilities of such a unit should be clearly distinguished from those of other units within the OSCE.

A view was expressed by a delegation that the acquisition and transfer of fissile or biological material over international borders by terrorist groups should be addressed as an issue of priority by the OSCE. Other delegations indicated the need to focus on the prevention of terrorist access to WMD.

A delegation pointed out that the OSCE had an important role to play in assisting States to develop and reinforce common standards and relevant national legislation in the area of counter-terrorism to facilitate the implementation of the Bishkek Plan of Action, and that the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) likewise had a role to play in ensuring that human rights were protected in legislation. A number of delegations stated that human rights and the campaign to combat terrorism are complementary and both should be elements of a strategy to eliminate the threat of terrorism. One delegation offered to put its technical expertise at the disposal of States in the issue of combating money-laundering.

It was stated that the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) needs effective support. One delegation stated that it would donate \$300,000 to the ATU.

A number of delegations agreed with the proposal for using the REACT system to develop a pool of counter terrorism experts. One delegation felt it would have to be established whether the REACT system could be adapted to such a course of action.

Several delegations advocated support for organizational co-operation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), the Council of Europe, G8, The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace and others. One delegation recommended that OSCE work should support the CTC but not overlap it, especially in assisting in the development of anti-terrorism legislation. Another delegation expressed the need to build on work to date within the international community to develop core standards in the fight against terrorism.

The development of a network of national contact points as proposed by the Group of Friends was supported by a number of delegations.

One delegation proposed an exchange of information on efforts to fight terrorism and the creation by the OSCE of a list of terrorist groups. Another delegation disagreed on the grounds that it would be politically divisive and legally unenforceable.

Concerning the causes of terrorism one delegation felt that the expression "root causes of terrorism" should be avoided for the simple reason that there were no "root causes". Rather there were views and counter-views on what might or might not lead to terrorism. Some delegations felt that poverty could be a cause of terrorism and one delegation stated that in the economic dimension more might be done to address issues such as poverty and social disintegration, issues that can also lead to terrorism. Other delegations felt that while terrorism must be dealt with effectively, the factors giving rise to terrorism must be analysed and the ODIHR should be used to a greater extent in this area. A delegation stated that a failure to address the factors that give rise to terrorism entailed a risk of providing excuses to those who engage in it, and that the fight against terrorism should not lead to the infringement of the most basic values and human rights. In this regard the Secretariat had rendered a valuable service in listing specific areas where misguided zeal in the fight against terrorism could restrict or offend human rights.

A delegation focused on the links between conflicts and terrorism, between organized crime and terrorism and between areas of criminality and terrorism and cited the situation where terrorism can take on a state-sponsored form and cause problems such as economic degradation. Porous borders and nuclear trafficking were also referred to. Another delegation mentioned illegal migration and the production of illegal currency as factors contributing to terrorism.

Mr. Woo, Head of the ATU, mentioned issues to be examined including extremism, the propagation of hate, weapons of mass destruction, non-banking money sources, border management, rule of law, respect for human rights and the need to raise the profile of the OSCE. He reiterated the desire of several delegations to place greater focus on preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction and particularly bio-weaponization.

Ambassador Everts spoke of the need for good governance in the fight against terrorism and of the need to address the organizational and financial implications of the increase in units in the Secretariat.

An ODIHR representative briefed the Group on Security Council resolution 1373 and ODIHR's readiness to provide support to participating States. He disagreed with some previous speakers concerning the perceived non-existence of root causes of terrorism. The ODIHR was seeking a balance between national security concerns and human rights.

The Economic Co-ordinator gave a briefing on, *inter alia*, the provision of advice and assistance to counter money-laundering and co-ordination with UNODC. He noted the connection between poverty, organized crime and weak States.

The Council of Europe representative spoke of his organization's objective to uphold values that terrorists seek to destroy and of the need for States to act in unison to protect standards. The threat of terrorism requires strong measures but those measures must not undermine democratic standards. The requirement for balance between State action and the protection of human rights was emphasized. The Council of Europe would be happy for non-members to accede to its conventions.

In reply the first keynote speaker Ambassador Cofer Black emphasized, *inter alia*, the issues of travel security, MANPADS, border security, good governance, the rule of law, democracy and ethnic and religious tolerance.

WORKING GROUP B COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Zef Mazi, Albania

Rapporteur: Ms. Donna Phelan, United States of America

Keynote Speakers: Mr. Alexander Grushko, Director Department European Co-operation,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation Brigadier General Heinz Vetschera, LL.D, Ph.D

In his opening remarks, the Co-ordinator, Ambassador Mazi, noted that the arms control and disarmament negotiations and the relevant documents and agreements reached in the OSCE context had proven valuable for the participating States and the life of the Organization itself. He urged participants to focus on pertinent issues such as the contribution of politico-military instruments and of existing arms control agreements and treaties, with a view to ascertaining their validity and/or the need for improvement, updating and enhancement in the current circumstances. His goal was that delegations should indicate the direction in which they would like to see the OSCE go in the future.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Alexander Grushko, Director of the Department for European Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, focused on several key elements of the paper distributed in advance. He noted changes in the international environment, particularly the cross-border threats coming in from outside the OSCE region, the change in the composition of Euro-Atlantic organizations, and the variety of situations where governments were considering the use of force as an instrument. In the midst of all these changes, including the existence of some competition between different organizations, the OSCE's consensual approach made it a unique forum for ensuring the indivisibility of security. In particular, arms control continued to fulfil its function as a reliable instrument for changing politico-military ideas and the use of armed force.

Mr. Grushko noted that the reconfiguration of militaries to meet new threats would be impossible without the confidence that has arisen from confidence-building efforts over the years. Arms control allowed for transparency within the OSCE community throughout these changes. The movement away from the structures of the Cold War is now irreversible and this enabled us to concentrate our military forces on the task of facing global threats.

Mr. Grushko said that a delay in entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty would leave it in danger of not meeting the needs of the signatories. He suggested that the Vienna Document was also slightly behind the times in that it did not address modern military activities or the trend toward multinational military forces. Mr. Grushko applauded the SALW document as a tool capable of helping to ensure security both of society as a whole and of its individual members. He hoped that the OSCE would be able to exploit the potential of this Document further during the course of work on the Strategy.

In closing, Mr. Grushko recalled the "revolutionary" Program for Immediate Action adopted at the 1992 Helsinki Summit. While this was the work program for the FSC for many

years, he suggested that it was now time for the FSC to establish for itself another program of comparable focus.

The second keynote speaker, Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Vetschera, Deputy Director of the Department for Security Co-operation at the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, began with the premise that the important question was not "What should be done?" but "Why should something be done?" After this intriguing beginning, Gen. Vetschera provided a review of the conceptual framework for arms control and comprehensive security within the OSCE. He suggested that for the OSCE, as for the United Nations, the "why" for peace and security was to prevent the threat or use of armed force. He highlighted the relationship between the dual pillars of security, political stability and military stability, noting that they were complementary and mutually reinforcing. He cautioned that it was also important to address the question of "war by mistake".

In reviewing the achievements of the OSCE, Gen. Vetschera pointed out that the structure of the OSCE reflected the dual pillars of security, since the Permanent Council deals with issues of "political stability" and the Forum for Security Co-operation deals with issues of "military stability." He applauded the arms control work of the OSCE, which was not limited to balancing quantities of military hardware, but included instruments focused on the dynamic factors that must be addressed to ensure stability. Openness and transparency were the hallmarks of OSCE instruments. Gen. Vetschera noted that the OSCE communications network allowed for unlimited contacts, while risk reduction measures, even though not used, provided opportunities for focused action. He praised the OSCE as a comprehensive framework for arms control not only for its comprehensive participation, but also for its comprehensive approach.

Gen. Vetschera pointed out that many instruments for increasing military stability in the OSCE area had their roots and origins in the threat perceptions of the Cold War period, which were dominated by scenarios of large-scale conventional armed conflict. The various instruments had achieved their basic purpose - there had been no high intensity inter-State conflicts involving the use of heavy weapons. Nevertheless, there had been armed conflicts in the OSCE area, including some that started as low-intensity conflicts but took on conventional characteristics, as in Bosnia. Gen. Vetschera noted the distinguishing characteristics of these low-intensity conflicts, namely that they took place within States and were fought mostly with small arms and light weapons, often using guerrilla doctrine and tactics. The link to problems caused by terrorist activities was clear in this context.

Gen. Vetschera noted that OSCE instruments had not been able to prevent these new types of conflicts. But the difficulty in trying to address them in the OSCE is that the non-State actors involved in the conflicts are not represented here at the negotiating table. Trying to work out new measures that would include them without having them present does not make sense. He noted that it was possible to pursue arms control efforts with non-State actors, as had been done with the two Entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Article II and IV Agreements, but this was the exception, not the rule.

Gen. Vetschera welcomed OSCE efforts to address the threats posed by the new conflicts, but noted that it was little more than a patchwork of useful instruments. There had been no real strategy, and the OSCE had in most cases simply reacted to something that had happened. He noted that many of these measures had been shaped along the lines of

conventional arms control measures, and had not been tailored to deal with internal conflict. He believed there was good potential for further development of some instruments better suited to addressing the new threats, in particular the Document on Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

Gen. Vetschera closed by asking whether we could simply sit down and develop new measures to address the new threats. He did not believe this was possible, given that the others (non-State actors) would not be present at the table. He suggested that if the OSCE was to find a way forward, it would have to go back to the basic principles, i.e., focus on the non-use of force and apply the key principles of arms control, reciprocity and restraint.

Adding to the background for the discussion of the Working Group, Ambassador Zannier, Director of the Conflict Prevention Center, provided a brief review of the recent evolution of CPC work in the politico-military dimension. As most delegations were aware, the FSC Support Unit continued to provide support to the increasing activities of the Forum. Significant contributions included work related to the SALW information exchange (preparation of templates and model answers), an overview of responses to the Code of Conduct questionnaire, work related to the operationalization of Section V of the SALW document, the SALW Best Practice Guides, the May workshop on security risks stemming from stockpiles of ammunition and explosives, as well as preparation for the ASRC. Amb. Zannier noted that increased co-operation and interaction with the United Nations and other international organizations, especially in the SALW field, were stretching the resources of the CPC.

The Co-ordinator then opened the floor for discussion. A total of 18 delegations spoke before the closing remarks of the keynote speakers. Agreement coalesced around comments by the keynote speakers which noted the positive impact of arms control instruments on European stability. There was, however, some disagreement with the suggestion that the main purpose of arms control was to prevent the use of force against other States. Several delegations noted that arms control was a <u>tool</u> of national policy, not a goal. Participants did not allow themselves to become distracted by this issue, but instead took advantage of the session to look toward the future.

The main question that delegations sought to answer concerned the continued usefulness of arms control agreements and treaties. Several delegations applauded the arms control toolbox, noting the climate of greater confidence in the OSCE area. Arms control efforts stemming from the Cold War had stabilized the security situation in Europe and had made it possible to enhance co-operation. There was broad agreement that the age of these instruments did not make them obsolete; in fact, their continued existence maintained the levels of stability and security already reached. Several delegations suggested that the FSC could discuss enhancing or adapting some of its instruments, but that this did not mean changing the fundamental basis of those instruments. If something could be added to enable these instruments to address the new threats more effectively, it could be considered. But delegations were clear that the present capabilities in these arms control instruments must be maintained

A related topic, which received serious attention, was implementation of arms control commitments. It was clear that these commitments must be implemented to maintain the base

level of stability and security. This point is important when considering responses to the new threats since most delegations felt it was premature to speak of developing new measures until we had achieved full implementation of the instruments already in place. If States felt instruments were not being used and were no longer relevant, they should look first to see why we were unwilling to use those instruments, since that unwillingness would limit our ability to negotiate new instruments. Responding to some specific examples, several delegations noted that failure to implement commitments, whether legally binding arms control treaties or political agreements, had led to concern in various parts of the OSCE area.

In looking for ways to respond to the new risks we face, many delegations felt the most effective approach would be to develop new instruments, and not to alter the nature of instruments already in place. There was no doubt that the OSCE needed to find a way to respond to the new threats. In addition to the range of arms control agreements, it was suggested that the OSCE could contribute to increasing security in Europe by developing standard practices for various issues. This would permit a flexible and multi-dimensional approach to these threats. In particular, the Code of Conduct and the SALW Best Practice Guides were noted as providing a strong base for further instruments of this type. Issues that might merit FSC attention included MANPADS and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Much attention was given to the work done by the FSC regarding SALW issues. In particular, delegations welcomed the completion of the Best Practice Guides. It was noted that the work to operationalize Section V of the SALW document provided an opportunity to integrate this function into field missions. The only drawback is that no one has come forward to request assistance through this procedure. States were urged to take advantage of the opportunity presented by this procedure and it was suggested that development of the French/Dutch initiative was likely to result in similar opportunities with regard to stockpiles of ammunition and explosives.

Finally, several delegations welcomed the suggestion that the OSCE's experience in arms control and confidence-building was worthy of export to other regions, the Middle East, for example, once the situation there begins to calm. It was not a matter of expanding our instruments to include other States, but of sharing information about how and why we pursued particular types of measures. In this way, the OSCE experience should be considered both as a regional contribution to global efforts, and as an example for other regions seeking to regulate their own security.

An important aspect of the discussion in the Working Group was that delegations did not lose time seeking to define the nature of the new threats, but focused on responses. As a result, several areas were suggested for further consideration as the FSC considers what instruments might be needed to respond to the new threats. These include:

- Periodic review of instruments with an eye toward their continued relevance and possible need for improvement or updating, without changing their fundamental basis;
- Assessment of implementation of existing instruments, seeking to identify not only particular problems, but also the underlying reasons for those problems or lack of implementation;

- Possible development of standards, along the line of best practice guides, in response to new threats. MANPADS and non-proliferation were mentioned;
- Examination of ways to "export" the experience of the OSCE to other regions of the world.

WORKING GROUP C SECURITY RISKS AND CHALLENGES ACROSS THE OSCE REGION

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Ömür Orhun, Turkey

Rapporteur: Colonel Negovan Jovanović, Serbia and Montenegro

Keynote Speakers: H.E. Ambassador Kirsten Malling Biering, Chair of the Informal

Open-ended Group of Friends of the Chair for the Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the

Twenty-First Century

Mr. Gilles Andréani, Director Policy Planning Unit, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, France

The main task of Working Group C was to address security risks and challenges across the OSCE region. Within this broad topic, we reviewed the security situation in the OSCE area as stipulated in the agenda, which included the following three sub-items:

- Nature of threats and the strategy to address these threats in the twenty-first century;
- Regional issues; and
- Police-related activities.

Our aim was to analyse specific risks, challenges and threats to our security and stability, and to generate fresh and stimulating ideas as in put for further deliberations at the Open-Ended Working Group of Friends for the Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century.

In his opening remarks the co-ordinator, Ambassador Orhun, encouraged the participants not only to review the security situation but also to look to the future, notably to the forthcoming Ministerial Council, so that the review of the security situation in the OSCE area would be not only an evaluation of the present but also a vehicle for future work.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Biering, in her capacity as Chair of the Informal Open-ended Group of Friends for the Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, reported on the state of play of the efforts to develop this strategy. Ambassador Biering stressed that so far general agreement had been achieved on three food-for-thought papers:

- The general framework and structure of the strategy;
- A typology or categorization of threats;
- An outline on the OSCE's responses.

Concerning the categorization of threats, Ambassador Biering underlined that the categories were placed in random orders but started at the most general level:

- Regional, inter and intra-State conflicts, in recognition of the understanding that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the OSCE activities;
- Discrimination and intolerance;
- Terrorism and threats arising from criminal activities;
- Threats related to economy and the environment;
- Other threats of a politico-military nature, which covers a number of issues on the agenda of the FSC.

Ambassador Biering also argued that threats could originate from both inside and outside the OSCE region. Developments in the politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions could all potentially present threats to security and stability. Many of these developments would be inter-connected or cross-dimensional. There are also threats relevant to security and stability that may not fall within the purview of the OSCE or that the OSCE is not primarily suited to deal with.

Ambassador Biering pointed out that the general opinion of the informal working group was that the strategy should focus on areas and issues where the OSCE can play a role, operational or otherwise.

Ambassador Biering also stressed that working out the Strategy was a timely opportunity for relaunching the OSCE in the twenty-first century as an organization making its own distinctive contribution to the evolving pattern of international co-operation. In comparison with other international organizations, the OSCE had already developed a flexible framework that went long way towards meeting the security challenges of today. Thus, the strategic vision should not imply strategic change, bringing with it a multitude of new OSCE structures and policy areas. Rather, the focus should be on carefully rethinking, focusing and substantiating the OSCE's response.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Andreani from France, addressed the developments in the concept of security and the threats within the OSCE area. Three main elements were touched upon:

- The transformation from perceptions of threats to risks;
- Reappearance of threats;
- Consequences for our analysis of the threat.

He specifically emphasized that while the possible convergence, since 11 September 2001, of local conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction represented an extreme threat, it had not yet become a reality. Analytically speaking, these three groups of threats remain distinct: local conflicts, whether or not related to the situation of national minorities, retain their own causes and dynamics, their links to terrorism or international terrorism are not pre-determined. They must therefore be tackled separately. Security policy,

whether national or conducted in co-operation within a collective security or defence organization, is not, he said, exclusively based on an analysis of the threat. The establishment of institutional structures and of collective normative systems among States is a security objective in itself, even when is not specifically aimed at responding to a particular threat. The OSCE is particularly concerned with this dimension of security, which is not directly related to the analysis of the threat. It doubtless needs to take a more exact and realistic view of the threat and to go beyond a "security risk" concept, which is perhaps too complacent and linked with the over-optimistic climate of the 1990s. The OSCE must not give up what lends it its specific character, i.e., the elaboration of an institutional and normative security framework among its participating States.

In order to facilitate discussion on police-related activities, Mr. Timothy Del Vecchio, Police-Affair Officer in the Strategic Police Matter Unit (SPMU), briefed the participants on the role of the SPMU in police matters of the OSCE, stressing, it is mainly designed to provide assistance to the participating States in need. Underlining the threat or the importance of the threat of crime, he emphasized that the OSCE SPMU was created to deal with law enforcement issues associated with its 55 participating States. Serious crime, perpetrated by organized criminals, is a primary concern. Many participating States have felt the effects of trans-national crime and have recognized the need to join together to combat it. At the beginning of a new century the police find themselves fighting international criminal and terrorists networks with the ideas, equipment, management and personnel systems developed decades ago. The picture of crime today is very different from that of even the recent past. Assessment studies have been conducted in police departments of a number of participating States which requested assistance in updating their operations. The SPMU has assembled a wide range of international experts that can be called upon to implement many of the recommendations resulting from the assessment process. The degree of success is only limited by the amount of funding available for police assistance programs.

Mr. Del Vecchio concluded by asserting that the development of basic, modern and democratic police services operating with twenty-first century practices was one of the most critical elements in winning the fight against terrorism and organized crime and that without this crucial foundation none of the threats facing the participating States could be addressed effectively.

Discussion:

In a very lively, comprehensive and open discussion, twenty representatives of participating States and international organizations took the floor. Many of the delegates reflected on the keynote speeches, expressing their support to what was said or asked for more detailed elaboration of certain elements.

Two countries jointly emphasized the importance of the work done in addressing risks arising from stock-piles of ammunition and explosives in surplus or awaiting destruction for the overall security and stability for many participating States. This intervention was supported by many delegations.

One delegation raised the importance of all three dimensions in the fight against new threats and challenges, emphasizing the importance of the development of the OSCE Strategy to address them. It also underlined the need for caution in dealing with those threats, bearing

in mind the necessity of the use of democratic responses in order not to endanger basic human rights, economic development or environmental protection.

Two delegations used the opportunity to inform the participants about the security situation in their own countries, also suggesting possible solutions for regional conflicts. One delegation paid special attention to the need for speed in providing help or assistance to participating States in their fight against new challenges such as terrorism and organized crime.

With reference to the overall security situation in the OSCE area, one delegation commented that the threats, risks and challenges to security defied classification. They cut across all three dimensions of security, their trans-national character transcended borders, their asymmetric composition pitted State and non-State actors against each other and they are, furthermore, extensively inter-connected. It is impossible to put them in any order of priorities. The participant nevertheless proposed the following categories of threats:

- Threats arising from terrorism and organized crime;
- Threats arising from regional conflicts;
- Threats emanating from the internal fragility of States;
- Threats emanating from weapons of mass destruction programme of certain States bordering the OSCE area;
- Threats arising from intolerance;
- Threats arising from economic hardship and environmental degradation;
- Threats arising from misperceptions about each other, lack of political and other forms of dialogue.

One delegation emphasized that territorial claims, ethnic cleansing, armed separatism, aggressive nationalism, deployments of heavy weaponry in other States' territories and uncontrolled territories - always breeding grounds for organized crime and other criminal activities - also constitute threats to security and stability and called on the OSCE to devote more attention to resolution of regional problems. This latter point on uncontrolled territories was echoed by one other delegation, which referred to such territories as "dark holes" of criminal activities. One delegation denied the linkage between uncontrolled territories and criminal activities and argued that absence of central governments' control over some territories does not necessarily mean that these territories are "uncontrolled".

Two delegations addressed the importance of regional activities in the light of so-called "old" and "new" threats, emphasizing that the OSCE was the international organization best suitable to dealing with such threats.

One delegation commented on the need for balance of approach, in a sense that adequate response must be given to certain challenges while fully protecting norms, standards and human rights. Of crucial importance is to know what we want to achieve.

Several delegations raised the question of the difference between risk and threat that was elaborated in Mr. Adriani's keynote speech.

One delegation presented its national views on terrorism, emphasizing that it is a global phenomenon which calls for a global fight in which the co-operation of all international factors has a special place. The question of flexibility and adaptation to the changing character of the threats was also raised.

NATO representative emphasized the complexity of the fight against terrorism underlining its comprehensiveness and the need for co-operation by all. He stated that the plans to fight terrorism must also be part of the defence planning of the organization as well as that of individual States. He also enumerated specific fields of co-operation with the OSCE.

The representative of the Council of Europe briefly informed the Working Group about the work done in the Council of Europe, emphasizing the necessity of co-operation with all international organizations. He also stressed the necessity for each organization to concentrate on what it is doing best.

Summarizing the discussions of the Working Group, the Co-ordinator, Ambassador Orhun, noted that the larger part of the debate was confined to conceptual and philosophical remarks on the above-mentioned three specific points of the agenda, while the remaining part comprised specific recommendations and proposals on, *inter alia*, stockpiles of ammunitions and MANPADS.

Co-ordinator Ambassador Orhun also stated that the discussion under agenda item "Nature of Threats and Development of OSCE Strategy" covered the interface between threats originating "in area" and "out of area" and pointed out that most of the threats today are unpredictable, inter-connected, trans-boundary and asymmetric, frequently involving non-State actors. Emphasizing that these characteristics make preparation of an exhaustive list of threats inappropriate and indeed impossible, he praised the typology of threats developed by the Chair of the Group of Friends for the Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, Ambassador Biering, as the optimum way to handle them. Co-ordinator Ambassador Orhun highlighted the importance of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in countering these threats, including co-operation among relevant international organizations. He stated that the norm-setting function of the OSCE in that regard was still valid, as underlined by delegations as well. Ambassador Orhun also emphasized the role of the OSCE as a forum for exchange of information, for development of good practices and for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, noting that the OSCE instruments, including the field missions, must be put into good use in meeting these risks, challenges and threats.

On "Police-related Activities" agenda item, Ambassador Orhun recalled that most of the delegations emphasized terrorism, organized crime and criminality as some of the biggest threats to our societies and stated that OSCE's role in addressing these threats derived from knowledge and capabilities of the participating States as well as from their ability to assist other States through, *inter alia*, practical partnership relations. Ambassador Orhun referred to police-related activities as a good example of a cross-cutting activity that relates to all three

dimensions of the OSCE and fits perfectly into our comprehensive concept of security. Noting that law enforcement, if effective, leads to social and economic development, Ambassador Orhun emphasized the importance of training of police units as independent but at the same time law abiding agents.

Co-ordinator Ambassador Orhun recalled that under "*Regional Issues*" agenda item some delegations shared their concerns regarding some specific issues, including the question of uncontrolled territories and the suggested approach of regional approach *vis-à-vis* regional considerations.

WORKING GROUP D CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Co-ordinator: H.E. Ambassador Branislav Milinković, Serbia and Montenegro

Rapporteur: Ms. Hana Zvonková, Czech Republic

Keynote Speakers: H.E. Ambassador Professor Luigi Vittorio Ferraris

Brigadier General Ulf Henricsson, Head Department for Leadership

and Management, National Defence College, Sweden

WG D aimed at reviewing the core OSCE activities in conflict prevention and crisis management: OSCE's instruments, mechanisms, institutions and field operations. The scene was set by two keynote speakers and the Director of the CPC and representatives of two OSCE institutions - RFM and ODIHR. This was followed by extensive discussion on various topics.

The first keynote speech, given by Professor Luigi Ferraris, stressed among other things the hierarchy of principles and the priority given to human rights. The OSCE provided an example of how it was possible to create an extended region of stability, he said; it was able to take action to prevent and manage crises, at times to freeze them so that they did not degenerate. According to Professor Ferraris it would be a grave error if the OSCE were not given primacy in a diplomatic function that it can perform in Europe better than any other body. He also stressed that OSCE's political action in the field of prevention and settlement of disputes was ever more significant when the OSCE acted in conjunction with European security organizations and the United Nations. This was also stressed in the second speech, in which Brigadier General Ulf Henricsson expressed the opinion that the OSCE's strength in conflict prevention was in long-term work and that acute crisis management should be conducted by an organization with a "big stick". More efficiency could be reached through close co-operation with relevant organizations in the IC. According to Brigadier General Henricsson, the OSCE toolbox was good for long-term conflict prevention, the success of which was dependent on education and training; in order to build up enough knowledge and confidence in mission area, on the other hand, longer secondments should be the norm.

The Director of the CPC enumerated the activities of the centre, stressing that the FSC and the PC were working together to involve the missions in the related activities in all three dimensions; he furthermore stressed the importance of the quality of relationships with international actors. As an example he mentioned more frequent contacts with the United Nations, which allowed the sharing and exchanging of views, visions and experiences. As a result, the visibility of the OSCE was increasing. A representative of the Office of the Representative of Freedom of Media recalled the work of the Office in early warning, mentioning in particular the monitoring of hate speech and the protection of journalists and raising public awareness in crisis management areas often closed to any flow of information. An ODIHR representative referred to an ODIHR background paper "Addressing New Threats in the OSCE Region: The Human Dimension", pointing out that ODIHR involve itself in co-operation with the CPC and the field missions and in the processes of conflict prevention and crisis management.

The ensuing lively and interactive discussion centred on the following matters:

An assessment was made of the role of the OSCE in conflict prevention and some speakers called for better use of the existing mechanism of conciliation and arbitration. Several speakers stressed the enduring value of the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security. Attention was drawn to the importance of the OSCE Code of Conduct in military matters and to the necessity of its full implementation by all. Participants were also reminded of the need to integrate the EED into conflict prevention efforts.

The Chair of the OSCE GoF for PK recalled the mandate and the work hitherto done by the group. If the GoF is successful the OSCE will have a sharpened tool available for possible future use, but if the GoF is unsuccessful, the conclusion is that the PK market is so saturated that there is no room for the OSCE. The Chair expressed the hope that the group would record positive results. Recalling Brigdier General Henricsson's observation about the need for a "big stick" in acute crisis management, several delegations supported the idea that OSCE should be active above all in those fields where it has established instruments and mechanisms, namely in conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. It was also stressed that the root causes needed to be addressed. One delegation expressed its conviction that the OSCE should look at ways of preparing itself for running PKOs, while the technical and organizational part should be taken over by the FSC. Decision should then be made exclusively by Ministers. One speaker stated that the Organization's role in crisis management proper could only be a supportive one; he saw only a limited scope for OCSE-mandated or OSCE-led PK operation, which also required safeguards against partiality in addressing concrete situations. Nevertheless, the speeches of both KNSs, supported by several delegations, highlighted the need for co-operation with relevant international organizations; the OSCE should focus on long-term assistance, and root causes had to be addressed.

Some called for dedicating the appropriate measure of attention to be devoted to the Security Sector Reform, the concept of which was presented by one delegation and supported by some others.

One delegation, supported by another, recalled its recent proposal for creating a mechanism to facilitate a rapid reaction; this mechanism was to be used for warning, preventing, analysing, handling and solving conflicts and the delegation envisaged preparing a revised paper with this proposal. Some speakers recalled and endorsed the idea of creating a specific Border Security and Management Unit within the Secretariat and stressed the growing importance of the OSCE's police related activities.

Several delegations highlighted the importance of long-term education and training in the field of conflict prevention. In that context, it was observed that the current six-month contracts of the OSCE field missions' personnel were in need of being prolonged.

The issue of frozen conflicts was addressed by several speakers. It was stressed that those concerned needed to take into account the intra-State nature of the current frozen conflicts. One speaker was critical of the effectiveness of the Minsk Group. Another speaker referred to the peaceful resolution of conflicts as a basic principle and stressed that frozen conflicts must be understood in their whole complexity. Another speaker suggested

considering the creation of a platform within the OSCE to enable sub-State entities to take part in talks on political settlement.

The discussion also included presentations of the particular experiences of some nations from the OSCE area. One delegation proposed involving NGOs in the work of the OSCE in the field of conflict prevention.

ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 25 - 26 June 2003

Brief Summary of the Conference

1. The following table is an overview of the practical recommendations that were raised by delegations and speakers at the ASRC. These recommendations were put forward either in writing or in the context of oral presentations or discussions in the various working groups. There are more than 50 recommendations, varying in scope and content, but they all offer to underpin the need for a sustained role for the OSCE on many issues to promote greater security for its participating States. A recurrent remark by many delegations was that the OSCE need not to reinvent the wheel, but develop further the capabilities that are already in hand.

Table of practical recommendations

No.	Task/reference	Proposer
	WG A	
1	More attention to activities in first dimension	NL
2	Workshops on travel documents	US
3	MANPADS	US + various
		delegations
4	Promote CIAO (aviation) standards	US
5	Step up means to consolidate measures for non-	KAZ
	proliferation of WMD	
6	Enhance transport security	US
7	Encourage participating States to complete	US
	their FATF questionnaire	
8	Offer technical assistance in co-ordination with	US
	UN/CTC and CTAG	
9	Implement (12) UN Conventions on terrorism	US, TUR
10	Develop OSCE-wide plan for	US, TUR
	counter-terrorism-related legislation, with	
	focus on implementation	
11	Include new category of experts in REACT in	US, SWI
	counter-terrorism	
12	Work more closely with UN CTC, G-8, CIAO	US
	to develop standard practices	
13	Draw up guidelines to cover human rights	SWI, SP, CoE
	aspects of fighting terrorism	
14	Make a list of terrorist organizations within	SP
	OSCE area	

No.	Task/reference	Proposer
15	Draw up best practices guide on OSCE work	RF
	and commitments on anti-terrorism to share	
	with other international organizations	
16	Build up network of national points of contact	RF
	within field of anti-terrorism	
17	Further operationalize OSCE documents,	RF
	particularly Code of Conduct and SALW	
18	OSCE to develop co-operation with G-8	US
	Counter-Terrorism Action Group	
19	Develop questionnaire on Code of Conduct,	CAN
	and form a study group to assess and	
	implement suggestions	
20	Analyse root causes of terrorism	AUS, RF
21	Develop anti-money laundering activities	TUR
22	Promotion of tolerance	US, ODIHR
23	Develop co-operation with regional	BEL
	organizations, including CIS anti-terrorist	
	organizations	
24	Strengthening the ATU	GER
25	Strengthening the SPMU	GER
	WG B	
26	Implement Code of Conduct beyond OSCE	GER
	region	
27	Integrate politico-military dimension of SALW	GER, FIN
	and Code of Conduct in field missions,	
	including training	
28	Invite Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation	TUR
	to exchange information	
29	Consider extending the scope of SALW	TUR
	Document to non-OSCE countries	
30	Incorporate a systematic dialogue on military	RF
	doctrines within OSCE	
31	Address practices of weapons export to	GER
	non-OSCE countries	
32	Strengthen police-related activities in OSCE	several
2.2		delegations
33	Develop a best practices guide on SALW	FIN
34	OSCE should participate in UN conference in	KAZ
	2004 on combating illicit trafficking in SALW	
2.5	WG C	CED THE
35	Address more broadly and deal with frozen	GER, TUR
26	conflicts	THE
36	Encourage CiO to report on the work done in	TUR
27	the Economic Forum, especially security issues	THE
37	Address threats from outside the OSCE region	TUR
38	Focus on terrorism and proliferation of WMD	FRA

No.	Task/reference	Proposer
39	Develop co-ordination with EU, CoE, CEI,	FRA
	GUUAM, NATO, UNODC, IMO, UNDP and	
	EBRD	
40	Develop further the SPMU, more involvement	FRA, TUR
	in anti-trafficking work	
41	Organize a police experts meeting of	TUR
	combating trafficking in human beings,	
	especially women	
42	Work more on removing surplus ammunition	FRA
	stocks	
	WG D	
43	OSCE work more on economic dimension,	UK
	develop links with IFIs like EBRD	
44	Monitor hate speech and promote tolerance	FoM
45	Strengthen Secretariat and longer	SWI
	Chairmanships	
46	Enhance internal co-ordination in the	FRA
	Secretariat	
47	Strengthening the CPC	SWI
48	Form a Border Issues Co-ordination Unit in	US, GER
	Secretariat under CPC	
49	Engage OSCE in Peacekeeping	RUS, AZ, CZ
50	Invite NGOs to next ASRC	fYROM
51	Find a platform that brings all conflicting	LUX
	parties together	
52	Strengthen CPC's role in support of the	fYROM
	missions	
53	Form Analytical Capacity Unit within	SWI
	Secretariat	
54	Create a mechanism to facilitate a rapid	AUS
	reaction in the case of EW, CP, etc.	

Some of these ideas and suggestions can be implemented at an early stage. Others will require further discussion and elaboration in the relevant fora, or through consultation. A further paper, grouping the proposals into thematic areas of similarity, will follow shortly.