THEMATIC REPORT

RESTRICTIONS TO THE SMM’S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO THE FULFILMENT OF ITS MANDATE

January - June 2020

November 2020
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

• The SMM’s unimpeded, unrestricted and unconditional freedom of movement is critical to the implementation of its mandate.

• In the reporting period, the Mission faced more restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments in eastern Ukraine than in the previous six months.

• Prior to the introduction of measures in the context of COVID-19 (in the period from 1 January to 20 March), the SMM experienced a systematic denial of access to non-government-controlled areas in southern Donetsk region.

• Starting from 21 March until the end of the reporting period, the pandemic-related restrictions mostly occurred at checkpoints along official crossing routes of the contact line in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and central and northern Donetsk region, while the Mission was also not allowed to cross between non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• These restrictions prevented the SMM from crossing the contact line as well as between non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, thus dividing the Mission into three separate and isolated operational areas, critically impacting its functioning both operationally and managerially and undermining its unity.

• Despite repeated requests by the Mission and the raising of the issue at the OSCE Permanent Council, these restrictions were not eased until mid-July, and problems remained beyond this date.

• The SMM continued to face restrictions in monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, including impediments to its monitoring through technical means.

• SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) continued to be subjected to GPS signal interference and gunfire, which limited the SMM’s monitoring and put Mission members and technological assets at risk.

• The Mission again encountered repeated restrictions when trying to access its camera in Petrivske.

• In June, four SMM cameras in Petrivske, Shyrokyne and at Oktiabr mine were destroyed by small-arms fire and undetermined weapons, which constituted an unacceptable impediment to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate.

• The SMM’s monitoring of border areas beyond government control continued to be systematically limited due to restrictions to the Mission’s access.

• Failure to remove mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosive objects or laying of new ones continued to restrict the Mission’s freedom of movement.
• The sides hold the responsibility to mark, delimit and demine contaminated areas; however, on both sides of the contact line, the SMM noted little progress on mine and UXO clearance.

• In addition to the systematic restrictions imposed on the Mission by the armed formations, the SMM continued to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents in non-government-controlled areas.
This report provides an updated overview of the freedom of movement restrictions and other impediments that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) faced in implementing its mandate in the first six months of 2020. The last update covering the second half of 2019 was published in April 2020.

The SMM’s unimpeded, unrestricted and unconditional freedom of movement is critical to the implementation of its mandated tasks, as set out by the OSCE Permanent Council’s Decision No.1117, and to the effective execution of its role stipulated in the Protocol and Memorandum of September 2014 and in the Minsk Package of Measures of February 2015 and its Addendum of September 2015, and also stated in the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on Mine action of March 2016 and the Framework Decision of Disengagement of Forces and Hardware of 21 September 2016. Any impediment encountered by the Mission potentially affects its ability to monitor the security situation and implement its mandate, thereby calling into question both the decision of the Permanent Council and the commitments approved by the signatories of the Minsk agreements.

The report assesses the frequency of different categories and types of freedom of movement restrictions and other impediments to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate through comparative analysis of collected data. The report also contextualizes freedom of movement restrictions and other impediments faced in non-government-controlled areas, which affect the SMM’s comprehensive monitoring of the security situation there, including in border areas, with a special focus on southern Donetsk region.

It also mentions restrictions faced in monitoring the withdrawal of heavy weapons, including heavy weapons holding areas and permanent storage sites, and obstacles to the SMM’s monitoring of border areas outside government control in all parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The key new development during the reporting period was the repeated denials the Mission faced when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes of the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk region after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The denials began on 21 March in Donetsk region and on 23 March in Luhansk region, and over time critically affected the SMM’s ability to implement its mandated tasks. They led to reduced numbers of staff and shortages in the provision of administrative and logistical support to its presence in non-government-controlled areas, which severely undermined the Mission’s unity and resulted in its de facto division into three separate and isolated operational areas: government-controlled areas, non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. Operational and monitoring capacities were also affected by the relocation of Mission members as part of the SMM’s COVID-19 measures. This situation continued until the end of the reporting period and beyond, and severely impacted the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate, particularly in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk region.

To account for these developments, this report is divided into two parts that largely correspond to two different time periods: Part 1 covers the timespan from 1 January to 20 March 2020, before the introduction of measures countering the spread of COVID19 in Ukraine; Part 2 fo-
cuses on freedom of movement restrictions experienced by the SMM in the period from 21 March to 30 June 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic. The observations discussed in Part 1 are compared to observations in a period of similar length (80 days) immediately before (13 October to 31 December 2019). Due to the abovementioned unprecedented circumstances in the second time period, the data presented in Part 2 are not directly comparable to any similar previous time period; however, in order to better visualise the challenges and the significant change in the Mission’s operational posture in this period, the numbers are at times juxtaposed to the data from Part 1.
The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 stipulates that the aim of the SMM is to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security throughout the country. The Mission’s mandate specifies that it shall have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. Unrestricted and unconditional access to all areas is essential to ensure effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation, its impact on civilians, the ceasefire, withdrawal of weapons, demining, disengagement, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The mandate also tasks the Mission with reporting on any restrictions to its freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate.

The signatories of the Minsk agreements

The signatories of the Addendum to the Package of Measures and the Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware (2016) agreed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations should ensure secure and safe access for the SMM and rapid response to specific violations reported by the Mission. They have also agreed that restrictions to the SMM’s freedom of movement, including interference with the Mission’s means of remote observation, constitute a violation of its mandate, and have committed to ensuring effective monitoring and verification by the SMM.

The Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC)

The JCCC was established in September 2014 through a bilateral initiative between the Ukrainian and Russian General Staffs of the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Ministries of Defence. The signatories of the Addendum determined that the JCCC should contribute to both rapid response to impediments to the Mission’s monitoring and verification, and to the safety of its monitors. On 18 December 2017, the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers departed from the JCCC. Until that day, the Mission had requested both sides of the JCCC – officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – to contribute to the immediate resolution of impediments encountered by the SMM.

1 In addition, in accordance with the Trilateral Contact Group mine action decision of 3 March 2016, the JCCC is responsible for overall co-ordination of demining and compliance with the ceasefire during mine clearance.
The SMM categorizes freedom of movement restrictions as the following types:

**Denial of access**: when the Mission is prevented from visiting an area of interest, including an international border area, or when it is prevented from following its planned patrol route and not allowed to pass through a checkpoint or cross the contact line.

**Conditional access**: when the Mission is granted access to an area only after accepting certain conditions, including being escorted, presenting documents (e.g., the national passports of SMM monitors) or being subjected to vehicle searches (inspections).

**Delay**: when the Mission faces waiting times, for instance at checkpoints, while those responsible check the SMM’s documents, note vehicle licence plate numbers or seek permission from their superiors. These are reported as freedom of movement restrictions on occasions when the waiting time was deemed longer than reasonable and unduly limited the SMM’s access.

**Other impediments**: a form of denied access reported when the functioning of the SMM's technical monitoring capabilities is obstructed in any way, for example by jamming of or gunfire aimed at its UAVs.

Furthermore, the Mission also encounters impediments to its efforts in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents in certain locations by civilian interlocutors, including as a result of reluctance to engage with the SMM, especially due to “orders” or “lack of permission” from those in control. This type of restriction affects SMM human dimension monitoring in particular.
Between 1 January and 20 March 2020, the SMM faced more restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments to the fulfillment of its mandate, compared with the previous 80-day period (13 October-31 December 2019). In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Mission conducted a total of 4,079 patrols, during which freedom of movement was restricted on 308 occasions (about eight per cent), an increase compared to the previous 80 days, when 4,150 patrols were conducted and 228 restrictions recorded (about six per cent). As in previous reporting periods, restrictions occurred overwhelmingly in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (297, about 96 per cent), of which 231 were denials of access. The SMM did not record any denials of access in government-controlled areas.

Between 1 January and 20 March 2020, denials of access made up 75 per cent of the total restrictions, a slightly higher share as compared to the previous 80 days (167 cases, about 73 per cent). One hundred and ninety-five of these denials of access occurred in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and 36 cases in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. Of the denials of access in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, 153 cases were recorded in southern Donetsk region, with 46 denials of access at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokovsk (formerly Oktiabr) (about 28km west of the border with the Russian Federation and 14km north of the Sea of Azov coast) alone.

The Mission experienced delayed access on 40 occasions (about 13 per cent of the total number of restrictions), a similar share as compared to the previous 80 days (28 cases, about 12 per cent). Of these, two were recorded in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and 38 in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (none in Luhansk region). About 88 per cent of delayed access in non-government-controlled areas took place in southern Donetsk region, at the abovementioned checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokovsk (35 occasions).

The Mission’s freedom of movement was conditioned on eight occasions, all at checkpoints.
in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (ten in the previous 80 days).

For instance, in northern Donetsk region, in January and February 2020, the Mission faced three instances of conditional access when members of the armed formations allowed SMM patrols to pass a checkpoint near Staromykhalivka only with an escort. In other cases, members of the armed formations briefly inspected SMM vehicles. Other impediments to mandate implementation (not counting GPS signal interference with SMM UAVs, assessed as probable jamming) constituted 29 cases (about nine per cent of the total restrictions), a similar number as compared to the previous 80 days (23 cases, about ten per cent). Of these, eight cases were recorded in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, seven of which relating to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs, and one due to the sighting of a non-SMM UAV near the SMM’s position. In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission recorded 20 cases – six in Donetsk and 14 in Luhansk region. Of these, 13 were related to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs and three to gunfire or explosions close to an SMM patrol. In addition, one case occurred in areas located between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, when the Mission had to land its UAV after sighting a non-SMM UAV flying over the area. On three occasions, interlocutors declined to provide the SMM with information, referring to those in control in these areas, which prevented the Mission from corroborating reported civilian casualties.

\* See SMM Daily Reports of 21 January, 5 and 20 February 2020.
\* See SMM Daily Reports of 4 and 27 February and 4 March 2020.
\* Whenever an SMM patrol spots a non-SMM UAV close to its position, it is required to leave the area due to security considerations.
The SMM continued to face freedom of movement restrictions involving explosions, gunfire or threats in its proximity or threats and aggressive behaviour directed towards it. The share of such cases (six, or about two per cent of the total number of restrictions) was similar when compared to the previous 80 days (two cases, or about one per cent). Four cases took place in non-government-controlled areas, one in government-controlled areas and one between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. While small-arms fire or explosions in its vicinity were not assessed as targeting the SMM, patrol members always left the area due to security considerations.

For example, in January, while positioned in non-government-controlled Pervomaisk, an SMM patrol heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 100m south of its position. Also in January, while positioned about 1km east of non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, about 3km east of the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM patrol saw a stationary anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) 150–200m north of its position and heard it fire eight rounds.

In March, in non-government-controlled Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove), two armed members of the armed formations stopped an SMM patrol consisting of two vehicles and five patrol members. One of the members of the armed formations, who was visibly intoxicated, addressed patrol members in an aggressive way and pointed a rifle at them.

These incidents put SMM members at risk and contravene the implementation of the Mission’s mandate (for all such incidents, see Annex 2).

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While the Mission recorded a higher total number of restrictions at various checkpoints along the contact line (225 occasions recorded from 1 January – 20 March 2020 compared with 169 in the previous 80 days), their share in the total number of restrictions remained similar (about 73 per cent versus about 74 per cent). Of the 225 restrictions, two occurred in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (two delays of access, one near Nevelske and the other near Mariupol), one in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (a denial of access near Leonove) and 222 in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. Of the 222 restrictions at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, about 80 per cent (177) were denials of access, a similar share when compared with the previous 80 days (129 out of 164, about 79 per cent).

Restrictions in southern Donetsk region

The SMM has continued, particularly, to face systematic and chronic freedom of movement restrictions when accessing non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. Of the 222 restrictions at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, 185 instances took place in the southern part of the region, including 82 at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyroikivsk. At this checkpoint, the Mission recorded 46 denials of access, 35 cases of delayed access and one conditional access, which constituted altogether about 27 per cent of the total restrictions, compared with 56 cases (34 denials of access and 22 cases of delayed access), about 25 per cent of the total restrictions, during the previous 80 days.

All categories of freedom of movement restrictions in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk Region

- Verkhnoshyroikivsk: 36 (16%)
- Other checkpoints in southern Donetsk region: 82 (37%)
- Other checkpoints in Donetsk region: 103 (47%)

The Mission’s passage through this checkpoint is of key importance in order to access the southern part of the region. From Verkhnoshyroikivsk, the Mission can access the settlements in the northern vicinity of the checkpoint, east towards areas along the international border not under government control, and settlements south towards the Sea of Azov, access to all of which was limited due to restrictions faced at this checkpoint.

On most occasions, members of the armed formations cited reasons such as “an ongoing operation in the area” and “demining in the area” when denying the SMM passage.10

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10 Other frequent reasons included: “orders from superiors”, “ongoing exercise in the area”, and “security reasons”.

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In many instances, even when the Mission was allowed to pass through the checkpoint without restrictions, its movement was restricted at other checkpoints of the armed formations further away, thus preventing the SMM from reaching its intended destinations in southern Donetsk region. In total, the Mission faced 103 freedom of movement restrictions (all denials except one case of conditional access near Novoazovsk) at other checkpoints of the armed formations in southern Donetsk region. Specifically, SMM patrols faced restrictions on 35 occasions (all of which were denials of access) at a checkpoint near Zaichenko, 16 denials of access at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, ten near Prymorske, nine each at checkpoints near Bezimenne and Sosnivske, six near Nova Marivka, three near Shevchenko and the remaining 15 at other checkpoints in southern Donetsk region.

These restrictions to the Mission’s freedom of movement considerably limit its monitoring activities in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. This impacts not only SMM monitoring of areas close to the sections of the international border outside of government control, but also affects its monitoring of the withdrawal of weapons and other hardware in these areas, including in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is prohibited, according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. It also impedes the Mission’s monitoring and reporting on the conflict’s impact on the civilian population. As a result of systematic denials of access to non-government-controlled areas, the SMM is unable to regularly visit the settlements of Bezimenne, Novoazovsk, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove), Sakhanka and Siedove. For instance, between 1 January and 20 March, the Mission was allowed to visit Pikuzy only twice. On 35 occasions, it was directly denied access to Pikuzy at the checkpoint near Zaichenko and on 32 occasions indirectly at the checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske, which prevented it from following up on reported damage to civilian properties. The Mission has been encountering severe restrictions to its freedom of movement in this area since 2017.

In other areas of Donetsk region, the SMM faced a total of 36 restrictions at checkpoints of the armed formations near the contact line (29 cases of denial, five cases of conditional access and two delays of access), including denials near the Petrivske disengagement area on nine occasions and Starolaspa on eight occasions.

11 Prohibition of deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment in the area delimited by the population centres of Kalmiuske (formerly Komsovomolske), Kumachove, Novoazovsk and Sakhanka, to be monitored by the OSCE.
Checkpoint near Verkhnohosyrokivske and other checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region

1 January - 20 March 2020

Frequency of FoM restrictions

- Low
- High

Other features
- GCA - EECf
- NGCA - check point
- Selected settlement
- De Facto Line of Contact
- High frequency FoM corridor
- Point 5 of the Minsk memorandum - estimated lines

Sources: administrative boundaries - OCHA; roads, rivers - OpenStreetMap; sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO sea Areas; other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

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RESTRICTIONS RELATED TO MONITORING OF WITHDRAWAL OF WEAPONS

The SMM’s ability to monitor the withdrawal of weapons remained affected, as it was again denied access to some sites holding weapons, specifically to permanent storage sites.

As in the previous 80 days, from 1 January to 20 March, the SMM faced three freedom of movement restrictions when attempting to access such sites. All three cases occurred in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (all denials of access). On two occasions, no reason was provided for the denial, while on another, members of the armed formations cited “orders from superiors” when denying the SMM access.

The Mission’s repeated denials of access to non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region (see Restrictions at checkpoints section above) also meant that the SMM was unable to visit several sites holding weapons in the area. In 12 instances, this prevented patrols from visiting heavy weapons holding areas and in seven prevented visits to permanent storage sites.
Targeting of the SMM’s technical equipment continued, despite the freedom of movement foreseen in the Permanent Council Decision 1117 and the signatories of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum explicitly supporting the Mission’s use of all technical equipment necessary, including UAVs, to fulfil its mandate. In 2020, the Chief Monitor continued to call upon the signatories of the Minsk agreements to take measures to ensure the unrestricted and secure operation of SMM personnel and assets.

UAVs

The SMM has been utilizing UAVs since 2014 in order to complement the monitoring of its ground patrols and in particular to monitor areas inaccessible due to security considerations and restrictions to the Mission’s access. The Mission operates three types of UAVs: long-range, mid-range and short-range (or mini-UAVs).

From 1 January to 20 March, the Mission conducted 1,164 UAV flights. Of these, 38 were long-range, 75 mid-range and 1,051 were mini-UAV flights. Use of UAVs (mini- and mid-range) to monitor in non-government-controlled areas was hindered due to frequent restrictions faced by the SMM (see patrol routes and UAV flights map, Annex 1). In the previous 80 days, 1,182 flights took place (51 long-range, 71 mid-range and 1,060 mini-UAV flights).

Long-range UAVs

Given the frequent restrictions to the Mission’s freedom of movement on the ground, the long-range UAV is a critical asset for ensuring comprehensive monitoring in eastern Ukraine. It is currently the only means of facilitating sustained day and night time monitoring of specific areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, especially those which SMM patrols are unable to reach due to security considerations or denials, e.g. in border areas outside of government control.

However, long-range UAVs continued to experience single and dual GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming. From 1 January to 20 March, such interferences occurred on 67 occasions during a total of 38 flights, often with multiple losses of GPS signal per flight. The rate of frequency was higher than during the previous 80 days, when jamming of long-range UAVs occurred on 54 occasions during a total of 51 flights. Given the ongoing occurrence of signal interference of SMM long-range UAVs assessed as jamming, the SMM continued to implement a number of technical measures and training to enable it to operate and safeguard long-range UAVs.

However, these operational measures cannot offer complete protection from UAVs being damaged or lost because of such interference.

12 The Memorandum prohibits flights of combat aircrafts and foreign UAVs, with the exception of those of the SMM, in the security zone, while the Package of Measures stipulates that its signatories will ensure effective monitoring and verification of ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE, using all technical equipment necessary. The Addendum provides that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations will rapidly respond to specific violations registered by the SMM, including interference aimed at impeding the use of technical equipment necessary for monitoring and verification of withdrawal of weapons. The outcome of the 22 July 2020 Trilateral Contact Group meeting regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire included a ban on operation of any types of aerial vehicles of the sides.

13 Among others, these include frequent restrictions at checkpoints, impediments such as small-arms fire directed at UAVs and sightings of non-SMM UAVs, as well as the SMM’s confinement of its patrolling to concrete or asphalt roads, which was introduced following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb. This limits the employment of some UAVs that need a soft surface for landing.

14 The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of many kilometres from the UAVs’ position. Since UAVs often fly near the contact line, the Mission is unable to assess if jamming originated from government-controlled or non-government-controlled areas.
Mid-range and mini-UAVs

From 1 January to 20 March, 131 cases of GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming were recorded during a total of 1,126 mini- and mid-range UAV flights, significantly more than compared to the previous 80 days, when about 96 incidents occurred during 1,131 flights.

On 19 occasions, small-arms fire was assessed as targeting SMM mini-UAVs: five instances in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, one in a government-controlled area of Luhansks region and 13 in non-government-controlled areas (three in Donetsk and ten in Luhansks region). In three areas, the Mission recorded such cases repeatedly: two times near non-government-controlled Obozne, two near non-government-controlled Luhansks city and two near non-government-controlled Shymshynivka (where there is a known training area). Over the previous 80 days, 15 such cases were recorded.

Since mini-UAVs have a flight range of only up to 5km, patrols operating them are at risk due to their proximity to the UAVs. Incidents involving gunfire continued to occur, despite the provision of security guarantees by the sides and advance notification provided by the SMM on the operation of UAVs. The sides continued to show reluctance to assume responsibility and to take action to avoid similar incidents.

In total, from 1 January to 20 March, the SMM lost control over six mini-UAVs, three of which crashed and were unable to be recovered. In January, connection to two mini-UAVs was lost while they were flying over government-controlled areas near Trokhizbenka and near the Zolote disengagement area. They were recovered without any damage after what the Mission assessed as remote-controlled landings not initiated by the SMM. Additionally, in February, two mini-UAVs were lost and could not be recovered after the Mission lost control over them when the aircraft experienced GPS signal interference near non-government-controlled Holubivske (Luhansks region). Another mini-UAV was lost in February while flying over areas near non-government-controlled Horlivka (Donetsk region) but was recovered with minor damage. Also in February, a mini-UAV flying over areas near non-government-controlled Yasnodolsk (Luhansks region) was lost due to technical issues and could not be recovered.

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17 See SMM Daily Reports of 10 and 18 February 2020.
SMM cameras

Since 2015, the SMM has been deploying cameras to key areas near the contact line, including areas near critical civilian infrastructure, entry-exit checkpoints (EECP) and corresponding checkpoints, in order to ensure continuous monitoring, including during night time. SMM cameras register ceasefire violations and other relevant observations on both sides of the contact line. In January and February, the SMM installed two additional cameras at the existing camera sites to help monitor the western periphery of the Zolote disengagement area and areas near Svitlodarsk, increasing the total number of cameras from 25 to 27. Also, in early March, one camera was relocated from Popasna to Petrivske, which enabled the SMM to monitor the disengagement area via live streaming.

This was an improvement over the previous camera in this location from which the Mission had had to manually download footage, something that was often prevented by restrictions and the presence of mines in the area. Also, the mast of the relocated camera is higher than the previous camera's mast, which gives the SMM a better view of the area.

Out of 27 SMM cameras, 19 are located in government-controlled areas, four in non-government-controlled areas and four between government- and non-government-controlled areas. The lower number of SMM cameras in non-government-controlled areas is a consequence of the refusal of those in control of these areas to offer the necessary support and assistance for the installation of cameras.
BORDER AREAS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL

As stated in OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 of 21 March 2014, the SMM is mandated to gather information and report on the security situation throughout Ukraine. By definition, this includes areas near the sections of the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation that are not under the control of the Government. Safe and secure access to all areas adjacent to this international border is crucial for the SMM’s comprehensive monitoring and reporting. Still, from 1 January to 20 March, the Mission continued facing frequent restrictions and impediments when trying to access such areas near the international border.

Since December 2019, the SMM has been using mini-UAVs to enhance its monitoring of the security situation along the green border (areas along the border between official border crossing points) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Also, SMM long-range UAVs continued to supplement ground patrols by monitoring border areas during the evening and night. From 1 January to 20 March, 15 long-range UAV and two mini-UAV flights were conducted near the international border in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

With a total of 188, the number of visits to border areas outside government control from 1 January to 20 March increased, as compared to the previous 80 days, when 109 such visits were conducted. In Luhansk region, the Mission faced 34 instances of denial of access during such visits, compared with 18 such instances reported in the previous 80 days. Most of these restrictions continued to persist near suspended border crossing points near Dovzhanske, Izvaryne, Sievernyi and Voznesenivka (including at a railway station in the latter area) where, shortly after the SMM’s arrival, members of the armed formations would tell SMM patrols to leave, often citing “orders from superiors” or providing no reason at all. Such repeated denials of access significantly obstructed the SMM’s monitoring capability in these areas.

In Donetsk region, to reach border areas beyond government control, the SMM needs to cross a checkpoint near Verkhnooshyrokovsk and subsequent checkpoints, including one near non-government-controlled Novoazovsk (close to the border). At both checkpoints, and others in southern Donetsk region, the Mission experienced restrictions on numerous occasions (see above).

Even when the Mission did not face freedom of movement restrictions near border crossing points, long travel times (mostly on routes traversing several checkpoints), poor road and weather conditions, and limited daylight hours, particularly during the winter months, meant it could only conduct brief visits to these areas (usually no longer than one hour). Thus, the Mission’s observations in border areas beyond government control remained limited and could not be categorized as comprehensive and fully independent monitoring.

19 According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.
However, in March 2020, some SMM patrols of border areas started staying overnight near the border. These overnight stays reduce driving time, allow for an increased SMM presence in border areas and enhance outreach to the local population.

Despite this improvement, the SMM’s ability to monitor the international border also continued to be curtailed by the ongoing failure of those in control in non-government-controlled areas to offer the necessary security assurances to open forward patrol bases (FPB) in settlements in the vicinity of border areas outside of government control.
The SMM continued to monitor the pilot disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske on both sides of the contact line by regular patrolling and remote observations, as envisioned in the Framework Decision on Disengagement.

While demining activities carried out by the sides in the context of last year’s disengagement near Stanytsia Luhanska are sufficient to enable Mission members and other civilians to enter and traverse the disengagement area via Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, large parts of the disengagement area, particularly areas with summer houses south of the Siverskyi Donets River, are still inaccessible due to possible contamination with mines and explosive objects.

The SMM’s monitoring of the disengagement area near Zolote continued to be limited due to the presence of mines laid in fields inside the area. In January and March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw explosive objects and mines in fields near road T-1316. However, in March and April, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed demining activities in Katerynivka, a settlement located partially in the government-controlled area of Luhansk region and partially within the disengagement area. This improved the Mission’s ability to monitor the disengagement area from this settlement.

Unlike the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote, the Petrivske disengagement area has no road traversing it, and the SMM monitors the area positioned east of government-controlled Bohdanivka and on the western edge of Petrivske. Road C050952 between Bohdanivka and Petrivske is located about 300m north of the area’s northern edge. Despite the Mission’s repeated requests to the sides for demining and the removal of other obstacles, this road continues to be contaminated with mines, and a trench cuts through it, obstructing the SMM’s ability to directly monitor this disengagement area. The SMM continues to monitor the area through its means of remote observation.

From 1 January to 20 March, the SMM’s freedom of movement in accessing the Petrivske disengagement area was restricted ten times (nine denials and one case when an SMM patrol saw two objects dropped by parachutes land close to its position). The nine denials of access were reported on a daily basis from 20-27 January, when members of the armed formations restricted the SMM’s access at a checkpoint near Petrivske, which impeded the Mission from monitoring the security situation and accessing its camera site to manually download camera footage.

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21 See for instance SMM Daily Reports of 3 and 13 March and 2 April 2020.
MINES, UXO AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE OBJECTS

Although the signatories of the memorandum agreed to refrain from the laying or setting-up of mines in the security zone, the threat from mines and UXO persisted in the reporting period.

In Donetsk region, the SMM continued to note the presence of anti-tank mines: in January near and on a road linking government-controlled Talakivka and non-government-controlled Pikuzy, in March on a road near Dolumitne, on road H-20 near non-government-controlled Olenivka, and near road H-15 south of non-government-controlled Oleksandrivka (both H-20 and H-15 are used by the SMM on a regular basis). In January, the SMM also saw for the first time a piece of UXO on the side of an asphalt road in non-government-controlled Nikishyne, regularly used by civilians. In March, on road H-15, near a checkpoint south-east of government-controlled Marinka, the SMM spotted for the first time a piece of unmarked UXO. Also in March, on road M-04 south of non-government-controlled Kruta Balka, which is regularly used by the SMM and employees of the Donetsk Filtration Station, the SMM saw for the first time what was assessed to be munitions placed as demolition charges.

In Luhansk region, on several occasions between 1 January and 20 March, the SMM continued to observe anti-tank mines laid across both lanes of road H-21 between government-controlled Shchastia and non-government-controlled Vesela Hora. Also, in January, the Mission spotted for the first time an anti-personnel mine (MON-50) on the edge of a road north-west of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, and in February, near a local road about 3km south-east of non-government-controlled Pankivka, it spotted for the first time a piece of UXO. The SMM also continued to observe the presence of mines, UXO and other explosive objects on and near road T0504 between government-controlled Popasna and non-government-controlled Pervomaisk, which serves as one of two roads used by the SMM to cross the contact line. For prolonged periods in January and March, the Mission could not use this road due to security considerations caused by contamination with UXO, which negatively impacted the SMM’s operational capabilities in the region.

The probable presence of mines and UXO (observed for the first time or reconfirmed) prevented the Mission from patrolling areas, in addition to those identified during previous reporting periods, along the contact line, including critical routes such as:

• Road M03 (from government-controlled Luhanske to non-government-controlled Lohvynove and from government-controlled Svitlodarsk to non-government-controlled Debaltseve);
• The road from government-controlled Myronivskyi to Rozsadky.

• The road from Zaitseve to non-government-controlled Holmivskyi;\textsuperscript{32}

• The road from government-controlled Verkhnotoretske to non-government-controlled Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan);\textsuperscript{33}

• The road from government-controlled KamiANKA to non-government-controlled Yasynuvata;\textsuperscript{34} and

• The road from government-controlled Pyshchevyk to non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.\textsuperscript{35}

Following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb, probably caused by an anti-tank mine, which resulted in the death of an SMM patrol member and injury of two others, the Mission has confined its patrolling to concrete or asphalt roads. This restriction continued to affect the following operations:

• Vehicle-based ground patrolling activities within the security zone

• Visits and inspections of places holding weapons that were accessible only via unpaved roads or surfaces

• UAV flights requiring soft-surface launch or landing sites

• Camera maintenance and data retrieval activities requiring driving over unpaved surfaces (see SMM cameras above).

Aside from the progress noted in Katerynivka (see Disengagement areas above), the SMM again observed little progress on the removal of mines, UXO and other explosive objects, notwithstanding the signatories agreeing on the need for co-ordination of mine clearance by the JCCC and the sides’ responsibility to remove such explosive objects. In the Trilateral Contact Group’s Working Group on Security Issues, as well as through his letters to the signatories, the Chief Monitor has also repeatedly called on the sides to carry out demining activities near the EECPs.\textsuperscript{36} The imposed restrictions on usage of paved and asphalt roads limit the SMM’s access to certain areas and settlements that have predominantly unpaved or gravel roads. The sides’ limited mine action collaboration and confirmation or mapping of such areas also hinder the SMM’s access to many areas and settlements and, as a result, its efforts to monitor the security situation and its impact on the population.

In Donetsk region, the frequent presence of mines, UXO and other explosive objects prevent the SMM from accessing the settlements around the Donetsk airport (government-controlled Opytne and Pisky, as well as non-government-controlled Spartak and Vesele); Zaitseve; Rozsadky; government-controlled Travneve, Taramchuk and Shyrokyne; and non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka, Kruta Balka and (certain areas of) Horlivka. In Luhans region, the roads and shoulders of the roads leading to, or from government-controlled Novooleksandrivka and Krymske, as well as non-government-controlled Donetskyi, Zholobok, Sokilnyky, Znamianka and Pryshyb, remain highly contaminated due to defensive mining by the sides, their proximity to the contact line and years of shelling.

\textsuperscript{32} Presence of anti-tank mines.
\textsuperscript{33} Presence of anti-tank mines.
\textsuperscript{34} Presence of a possible improvised explosive device or demolition charge.
\textsuperscript{35} Presence of anti-tank mines.
\textsuperscript{36} In its meeting on 1 September 2020 (outside the reporting period), the WGSI reached a common understanding upon the draft Framework Decision on Mine Action as well as the new areas for demining and disengagement of forces and hardware, as requested by the Normandy Four leaders at their meeting in Paris in December last year. However, the subsequent TCG meeting on 2 September did not come to final decisions.
In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission continued to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents through interaction with the local population. Between 1 January and 20 March, civilians in non-government-controlled areas declined to provide the SMM with information on three occasions.

All three cases occurred at medical facilities in non-government-controlled areas: two in Luhansk region, in Luhansk city and in Holubivka, and one in Donetsk region, in Donetsk city. In all three cases, staff refused to provide the Mission with information that would have helped to confirm civilian casualties (referring to the need for permission from those in control in these areas).37

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the SMM’s own mitigating measures, coupled with persisting freedom of movement restrictions imposed at checkpoints of the armed formations along the Mission’s official crossing routes posed unique challenges to the SMM’s operations. As part of its strict mitigation measures to avoid contamination and/or transmission of COVID-19 to its personnel and the local communities, starting from 20 March and 3 April, respectively, the Mission temporarily relocated and/or repatriated many Mission members. The SMM also began facing persisting denials of access when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line in Donetsk region on 21 March and in Luhansk region on 23 March.

The pandemic-related outflow of Mission members from non-government-controlled areas and the simultaneous inability to bring staff back to these areas due to the repeated restrictions lasted for more than three months, led to critical staffing levels, severely reduced the SMM’s monitoring capacities and divided the Mission into three separate and isolated operational areas.

The SMM responded to these challenges by adapting its operational posture. Nonetheless, the situation continued until the end of the reporting period and beyond, and severely impacted the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and to travel between them.
During the second part of the reporting period, the vast majority of freedom of movement restrictions took place at checkpoints of the armed formations along the SMM’s official crossing routes of the contact line, which are, except for the checkpoint near Verkhnyoshyrokinske, located in central and northern Donetsk region (near Olenivka, Kreminets and Horlivka) and Luhansk region (near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge). While, in the context of the pandemic, checkpoints were closed for civilian crossings, which increased hardship faced by the civilian population, members of the armed formations also repeatedly denied access to the SMM, which constituted a systematic violation of Mission members’ safe and unimpeded access throughout Ukraine necessary to implement its mandate. Also, restrictions between non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions made it impossible for patrols to travel between these areas.

Between 21 March and 30 June, the SMM faced freedom of movement restrictions in 351 instances during a total of 2,848 patrols in Donetsk and Luhansk region (about 12 per cent), including 263 times at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line. A total of 221 of these restrictions (including 207 denials of access, 12 delays and two instances of conditional access) occurred at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line. This left SMM patrols unable to cross the contact line in either direction and, as noted above, led to a physical division of the Mission into three parts, and severely limited the Mission’s operational capabilities in non-government-controlled areas. For comparison, between 1 January and 20 March, the Mission encountered 308 restrictions during a total of 4,079 patrols in these regions (about eight per cent). While 223 of these restrictions occurred at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line, only 86 restrictions (46 denials of access, 36 delays and four cases of conditioned access) were recorded at checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes.

As in previous reporting periods, the majority of the 351 freedom of movement restrictions occurred in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk region (337, or about 96 per cent); 260 of these restrictions were denials of access.

Notably, the SMM faced a much higher share (about 44 per cent) of the total restrictions in

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38 See for example SMM Spot reports of 22, 23, 25, 26, 30 March, 1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 20, 22, 24, 27 and 29 April, 4, 8, 22 and 29 May and 5, 12, 19, and 27 June 2020.
39 As determined in PC Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014, the Minsk Package of Measures of February 2015 and its Addendum of September 2015, as well as the Decision of the Triilateral Contact Group on Mine action of March 2016 and the Framework Decision of the Triilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of September 2016.
Luhansk region (150 in non-government-controlled areas and four in government-controlled areas) in comparison to the period from 1 January to 20 March, when only 54 of the total restrictions occurred in Luhansk region (about 18 per cent). One hundred and fifty restrictions occurred in central and northern Donetsk region (about 43 per cent) and only 44 in southern Donetsk region (about 13 per cent), while two restrictions were recorded in areas located between government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas.

Out of the 351 restrictions, 260 were denials of access (all of them in non-government-controlled areas), 140 of which occurred in Donetsk region and 120 in Luhansk region. In contrast to the period from 1 January to 20 March (and previous reporting periods), 75 per cent of all denials of access in Donetsk region took place at checkpoints of the armed formations in central and northern Donetsk region (105 cases), while only about 24 per cent occurred in southern Donetsk region (34 cases).

From 21 March to 30 June, the SMM faced a total of 205 denials of access at checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes. (In comparison, between 1 January and 20 March, the SMM faced only 46 denials of access along official crossing routes, all at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokiivske, in southern Donetsk region.) In central and northern Donetsk region, a total of 81 denials took place at such checkpoints: 51 cases near Olenivka, 26 near Horlivka, four near Kreminet and the rest at other checkpoints. In southern Donetsk region, 26 cases took place near such a checkpoint along an official crossing route of the contact line near Verkhnoshyrokiivske and the remaining cases at other checkpoints. In Luhansk region, almost 82 per cent of all denials of access (98 cases) occurred at a checkpoint along an official crossing route south of Stanitsia 40 Luhanska bridge. Of the remaining cases, 17 took place at border crossing points near Voznesenivka, Izvaryne, Sieverno and Dovzhanske, and one at a railway station near Voznesenivka.

### Freedom of movement restrictions at the checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Denials of access across official crossing routes</th>
<th>Total denials of access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January - 20 March 2020</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March - 30 June 2020</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 21 March to 30 June, the Mission encountered delays of access on 20 occasions, all in non-government-controlled areas, 19 in Donetsk and one in Luhansk region. Twelve of the delays of access occurred at checkpoints along official crossing routes – eight near Kreminet and four near Olenivka – and the rest at other checkpoints.

For instance, on 23 March and on 30 April, at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Kreminet, members of the armed formations (some of them visibly armed) allowed the SMM to proceed only after about three hours and 30 minutes, and over six hours of waiting, respectively.
On 3 April and on 29 May, at a checkpoint along an official crossing route of the contact line near Olenivka, members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage only after about four hours, and four hours and 30 minutes of waiting, respectively.\textsuperscript{41}

The Mission’s freedom of movement was conditioned on 16 occasions, all but two in non-government-controlled areas. Eight cases occurred in non-government-controlled Luhansk region, one of which near Stepanivka, where an SMM patrol was granted access towards Veselohorivka only with an escort.\textsuperscript{42} In seven of these cases (four at a checkpoint near Molodizhne and three at a checkpoint close to the disengagement area near Zolote), the SMM was told that Mission members crossing from government- to non-government-controlled areas would be subject to a ten-day quarantine.\textsuperscript{43} In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on two occasions, patrols were only allowed to pass the checkpoint near Olenivka after members of the armed formations briefly checked SMM trailers.\textsuperscript{44} Twice, patrols were only allowed to pass checkpoints (once near Novoazovsk and once near Lozove) with an escort.\textsuperscript{45} On one occasion, near Ozerianivka, members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to conduct a mini-UAV flight only in their presence and only over certain areas to follow up on reports of damage in the settlement.\textsuperscript{46} Once, at a checkpoint near Debaltseve, a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass towards non-government-controlled areas only after inspecting patrol members’ health certificates and checking their temperatures.\textsuperscript{47}

Other impediments to mandate implementation (not counting GPS signal interference with SMM UAVs assessed as probable jamming) constituted 55 cases (almost 16 per cent of the total restrictions), a higher percentage than during 1 January to 30 June, with 29 cases (about nine per cent of the total restrictions). Of these, ten cases occurred in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, nine of which were related to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs and one due to the sighting of a non-SMM UAV near the SMM’s position. In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Category of restrictions} & \textbf{Percentage} \\
\hline
Denial of access & 74\% \\
Delays & 5\% \\
Conditional access & 6\% \\
Other impediments & 15\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Categories of restrictions by percentage}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{41} See SMM Daily Reports of 4 April and 30 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{42} See SMM Daily Report 28 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{43} See SMM Daily Reports of 13, 14, 15 and 16 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{44} See SMM Daily Report 30 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{45} See SMM Daily Reports of 4 May and 3 June 2020.
\textsuperscript{46} See SMM Daily Report 21 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{47} See SMM Daily Report 1 April 2020.
recorded 43 cases – 22 in Donetsk and 21 in Luhansk region, respectively. Of these, 22 cases were related to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs, eight to explosions or gunfire close to SMM patrols and three to the sighting of non-UAVs near the SMM’s position. In April, the SMM lost one mini-UAV after it was targeted by small-arms fire near non-government-controlled Petrivske. In ten cases, interlocutors declined to give the SMM information, usually citing lack of permission from those in control, thus preventing it from corroborating reported civilian casualties. Two cases occurred in areas located between positions of the armed formations and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, one related to gunfire assessed as targeting an SMM UAV and one due to the sighting of a non-SMM UAV near the SMM’s location.

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As described above, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, from 21 March to 30 June, the SMM faced unique challenges, in response to which it adapted its operational stance to protect staff members and the local communities from the possibility of infection while at the same time maintaining the ability to implement its mandate.

As part of these strict measures, on 20 March, the Mission began to relocate some Mission members (both those over 50 years of age and volunteers) to government-controlled areas and, starting from 3 April, it began to repatriate some Mission members stationed across Ukraine to their home countries. As a result, SMM staffing levels fell throughout Ukraine. To mitigate the risk for those staff members whose presence in the office was considered essential, Mission members were asked to telecommute. Also, to ensure social distancing and in the face of declining staff numbers, the amount of Mission members per patrol was reduced.

The situation became most acute in non-government-controlled areas, after the Mission had begun facing repeated denials of access at checkpoints of the armed formations when attempting to cross to these areas. While Mission members were still able to leave them, the repeated denials at these checkpoints made it impossible to bring Mission staff back to non-government-controlled areas, which was essential to maintaining sufficient staffing levels and rotation. In consequence, the Mission’s staffing numbers in non-government-controlled areas dropped sharply, reaching critical levels. The largest decrease occurred in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

Overall, compared to the period from 1 January to 20 March, the countrywide patrol numbers dropped from 6,121 to 3,529, and from 4,079 to 2,848 in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, respectively. In government-controlled areas, the patrol numbers decreased from 1,539 to 1,108 in Donetsk region and from 867 to 687 patrols in Luhansk region. In non-government-controlled areas they declined from 764 to 489 in Donetsk and from 812 to 457 in Luhansk region.

The systematic restrictions imposed by the armed formations also led to an interruption in the provision of administrative support to the SMM in non-government-controlled areas. In addition, goods and services provision, camera maintenance patrols and logistical support were impacted.

In effect, these restrictions divided the SMM into three separate and distinct operational areas (government-controlled areas, non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region), which severely undermined the Mission’s unity and efficiency. This division was marked by different levels of staffing in these three operational areas and a significantly reduced ability to travel between them. It also created an artificial imbalance in the monitoring activities in these three areas that lasted beyond the end of the reporting period.

The Monitoring Teams in non-government-controlled areas were forced to reduce their activities and prioritize monitoring of the disengagement areas and corroborate of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Limited capacity only allowed for irregular mon-
onitoring of border areas outside government control, and it was very rarely possible to visit permanent storage sites or heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas. In addition, no routine patrolling across the contact line was possible other than limited movements of Mission members for leave rotations to government-controlled areas.

Even transferring Mission members to government-controlled areas became challenging. To transfer staff members across the contact line, patrols would bring them to a checkpoint near the contact line from where they would be obliged to pass the checkpoint on foot and walk to a location where a patrol from a government-controlled area would pick them up. The Mission had to resort to a similar approach to maintain the provision of goods such as maintenance equipment or office supplies to its offices in non-government-controlled areas. A patrol from a government-controlled area would bring trailers with goods to a location between checkpoints of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations and a patrol from a non-government-controlled area would then collect these trailers.

To make up for lower numbers of ground patrols and to take advantage of favorable weather conditions, from 21 March to 30 June, the SMM increased the number of long-range UAV flights (from 38 in the period from 1 January to 20 March to 83). The Mission also conducted a total of 856 mini- and 56 mid-range UAV flights (compared to 1,051 mini- and 75 mid-range UAV flights from 1 January to 20 March). Of these flights, 30 long-range UAV flights and two mini-UAV flights took place in areas close to the international border not under the control of the Government. However, signal interference encountered during flights remained a recurring challenge to the SMM's remote monitoring. In total, signal interference assessed as caused by jamming or probable jamming was recorded 79 times during long-range UAV flights and in 113 instances during mini- and mid-range UAV flights. Four mini-UAVs were lost as a result of signal interference and could not be recovered: one in April, near government-controlled Mariupol; one in May, near non-government-controlled Vesela Hora; and two in June, one near non-government-controlled Kreminets and one near non-government-controlled Petrivske.

Throughout Ukraine, the SMM’s mitigating measures to avoid contamination and/or transmission of COVID-19 to its personnel and the local communities limited the Mission’s ability to meet interlocutors and monitor events in person. To remedy these new limitations, the Mission reverted to alternative means of monitoring and collecting data, including through consultations over the phone or video teleconferences and the observation of events such as public protests, political debates and court hearings through live internet streaming. Limited contact with interlocutors also negatively affected the Mission’s ability to corroborate reports of civilian casualties at medical facilities. While the SMM started following up on civilian casualties over the phone, on nine occasions, interlocutors (mostly hospital staff) in non-government-controlled areas declined to share information with the Mission, in most cases referring to lack of permission from those in control in these areas.
MINES, UXO AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE OBJECTS

The SMM continued to encounter impediments to its freedom of movement due to the presence of mines and UXO. For instance, in Donetsk region, in April, the SMM spotted for the first time three anti-tank mines on a wooden plank at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokiivske that further restricted the SMM’s usage of that official crossing route.49 In May, the SMM again spotted anti-tank mines on roads near government-controlled Marinka, government-controlled Krasnohorivka and non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka, and for the first time on a road between government-controlled Maiorsk and Zaitseve.50 In Luhansk region, in April, the SMM spotted mines laid across roads north of non-government-controlled Sentianivka (formerly Frunze) and north of non-government-controlled Holmivskyi.51 Also in April, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, near an SMM camera, the SMM saw five wooden logs lying across road T-1316, which the Mission uses to traverse the disengagement area, as well as two concrete blocks (with a sign on top of one of them) on the edge of the road.52 Despite the abovementioned challenges, the SMM managed to carry out a limited number of maintenance activities at its camera sites. In May, two cameras in Avdiivka and Oktiabr mine were replaced with more modern camera systems. Nonetheless, in April and May, the presence of an anti-vehicle mine (TM-83) near road C-051532 between non-government-controlled Styla and Petrivske prevented the SMM from conducting critical maintenance of its camera in Petrivske, which had become non-operational.53 This camera is a vital component of the Mission’s monitoring of the disengagement area.

The Mission again noted that only limited demining took place. Outside the reporting period, starting from July, the SMM observed de-miners and workers conducting groundwork south of the disengagement area near Zolote, assessed as possible preparatory works for the construction of a potential new checkpoint.54 Also starting from July, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable demining activities south of Shchastia bridge, also assessed as possible preparatory works for the construction of a potential new checkpoint.55

50 See SMM Daily Reports of 5, 12 and 23 May 2020.
53 See SMM Daily Reports of 18, 25 and 28 April and 5, 6, 13 and 14 May 2020.
55 See for instance SMM Daily Reports of 30 and 31 July 2020.
DAMAGE TO SMM CAMERAS

Of great concern were incidents in which SMM cameras were destroyed. In June, a total of four SMM camera systems, in Petrivske, Shyrokyne and two at Oktiabr mine, were destroyed by small-arms fire and undetermined weapons.\(^{56}\) In response to these incidents, the SMM carried out thorough technical inspections of the respective camera sites and came to the conclusion that at least one of these incidents (the destruction of the camera near Petrivske on 2 June) was intentional, thus constituting an unacceptable direct destruction of one of the Mission’s technical assets and severely curtailing the SMM’s ability to monitor the disengagement area. The SMM camera in Petrivske remained non-operational beyond the end of the reporting period, since the Mission was again unable to conduct repairs due to the presence of mines near the camera site and the armed formations’ failure to fully demine the area, despite the SMM’s repeated requests.

\(^{56}\) See SMM Spot Reports of 3 and 22 June and 1 July 2020.
CONTRIBUTION OF THE JCCC

The Mission has maintained daily interaction with JCCC headquarters in Soledar and co-ordinated between the Ukrainian side of the JCCC and SMM patrols encountering freedom of movement violations on the ground to ensure the provision of security guarantees, notification of UAV flights and facilitation of removal of UXO and other explosive objects, among other things. The SMM regularly requested its assistance in ensuring a rapid response to impediments to the Mission’s monitoring and verification, as stipulated by the signatories of the Addendum and the Framework Decision. The SMM’s reporting provided additional information to respond to and remedy violations.

The Mission again repeatedly recalled that the JCCC was tasked by the signatories to co-ordinate demining work, as foreseen in the 2016 Trilateral Contact Group’s mine action decision.

The departure of the officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continues to have an impact in the execution of processes related to the JCCC, in particular the provision of security guarantees for repairs and maintenance of infrastructure and demining, as well as when the SMM’s freedom of movement is restricted.

The Mission remains prepared to resume work with the JCCC in its original joint configuration or in any format agreeable to Ukraine and the Russian Federation.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{57}\) The officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation departed from the JCCC on 18 December 2017.

\(^{58}\) Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire (outside the reporting period), the sides decided on the creation and involvement of a coordination mechanism for responding to ceasefire violations through the facilitation of the JCCC in its current setting.
CONCLUSIONS

The reporting period presented unique challenges to the SMM that occurred in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Starting from 21 March, and despite its timely adoption of its own stringent mitigating measures, the Mission faced systematic denials of access at checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes of the contact line and was not permitted to cross between non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which had a severe and unprecedented impact on the Mission’s operations and led to its division into three separate and isolated operational areas, thus undermining its very unity. These restrictions came in parallel with the reduction of staffing levels through relocation and/or repatriation of Mission members, in line with the SMM’s preventive measures in response to the spread of COVID-19. In this context, the systematic denials at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line put a considerable strain on SMM operations, particularly in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including near the international border. For a significant portion of the reporting period, a major part of the Mission’s resources and efforts were therefore focused on ensuring the sustainment of its operational, administrative and logistic activities in the face of these unprecedented restrictions.

Prior to the beginning of the systematic restrictions imposed by the armed formations at checkpoints along official crossing routes, the Mission was facing restrictions mostly in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region, which was the continuation of a tendency highlighted in previous reporting periods. Other trends also continued. Throughout the reporting period, SMM UAVs were again subjected to GPS signal interference, as well as to gunfire, further limiting the Mission’s capabilities. Members of the armed formations also continued to limit the SMM’s monitoring of border areas beyond government control. Of ongoing concern was a failure to remove mines, UXO and other explosive objects, and the laying of new ones, which rendered many areas inaccessible to the Mission due to security considerations.

The Mission continued to face restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments in eastern Ukraine, where the sides again denied, delayed or conditioned its access to certain areas. From 21 March to 30 June, the SMM faced systematic denials of access to non-government-controlled areas, which critically affected its monitoring capacities and severely undermined its unity.

From 1 January to 20 March, about 96 per cent of the total 308 freedom of movement restrictions occurred in non-government-controlled areas, about 63 per cent of which in southern Donetsk region. The Mission encountered restrictions at various checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line. This reduced the SMM’s ability to implement its mandate in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in border areas not under government control, or to follow up on cases of civilian casualties and damage to civilian properties.
From 21 March to 30 June, about 96 per cent of the total 351 freedom of movement restrictions occurred in non-government-controlled areas, of which 44 per cent in Luhansk region and almost 43 per cent in central and northern Donetsk region. Over 58 per cent of the total restrictions were recorded at checkpoints of the armed formations along official crossing routes of the contact line, where Mission members were systematically denied access towards non-government-controlled areas. As a result, it became impossible to bring staff members to non-government-controlled areas, which led to staff shortages, critically impacted the SMM’s monitoring capacities and effectively divided the Mission into three separate and distinct operational areas (government-controlled areas, non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region).

The Mission highlights that unimpeded passage at all checkpoints is crucial to the implementation of its mandate.

The Mission’s monitoring of border areas outside government control continued to be limited, and not comprehensive, due to the restrictions it encountered.

From 1 January to 20 March, the SMM conducted 188 visits to border areas outside government control. Many patrols continued to be unable to reach non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region, including border areas, due to systematic freedom of movement restrictions.

From 21 March to 30 June, the SMM was only able to visit border areas outside government control on very few occasions due to staffing challenges and systematic restrictions at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line.

Monitoring also continued to be impeded by the unwillingness of those in control to provide security assurances to open FPBs in settlements near these border areas. In the reporting period, the Mission responded to these limitations by enabling overnight stays of some of the patrols in areas near the border and increasing the use of its UAVs over these areas. However, the existing limitations, compounded by the circumstances under which the Mission had to operate during the COVID-19 pandemic, meant that its monitoring of these border areas could again not be categorized as independent or comprehensive.

The Mission notes that restrictions faced at border crossing points in non-government-controlled areas, as well as en route to them, negatively affect the Mission’s monitoring of the international border.

**SMM UAVs continued to be subjected to GPS signal interference and gunfire, posing risks also to SMM patrols operating UAVs.**

To ensure comprehensive monitoring during night hours or monitoring of areas inaccessible to patrols, the Mission continued to use technical equipment (UAVs and cameras). From 1 January to 20 March, SMM UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on almost 200 occasions, whereas cases of small-arms fired assessed as targeting its UAVs were recorded on 19 occasions. The SMM lost three mini-UAVs due to gunfire and GPS signal interference.

In the period from 21 March to 30 June, the Mission increased its use of long-range UAVs
to make up for reduced patrol numbers. However, SMM UAVs continued experiencing GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on more than 190 occasions, while cases of small-arms fire assessed as targeting its UAVs were recorded on 31 occasions. The SMM lost five mini-UAVs due to gunfire and GPS signal interference.

The Mission reiterates that electronic interference with and the targeting of SMM UAVs and cameras, all of which are key components of the Mission’s operational capabilities, limit the SMM’s monitoring and put Mission members and technological assets at risk.

The SMM continued to face restrictions in monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, including impediments to its monitoring through technical means.

In the reporting period, the SMM noted that large areas inside the disengagement areas and roads in their vicinity remained contaminated with mines, UXO and other explosive objects. In particular, in January and March, the SMM again saw explosive objects and mines near road T-1316 inside the disengagement area near Zolote. Starting from April and beyond the end of the reporting period, the SMM’s ability to monitor the disengagement area near Petrivske was severely limited by the presence of mines near the only road the Mission can use to access the area. On 2 June, the SMM camera near Petrivske, a new system that had been installed earlier in the year, was deliberately destroyed by smallarms fire. The Mission continued monitoring the area through UAV flights. The Mission highlights that its unimpeded access to all disengagement areas, including through technical means, is crucial to its monitoring of these areas.

Mines, UXO and other explosive objects continued to pose risks to civilians and members of the SMM crossing the contact line.

During the reporting period, the SMM’s freedom of movement was again repeatedly restricted by the sighting of mines, UXO and other explosive objects within and near residential areas and near and on local roads and main access routes between EECPs and corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in both, Donetsk and Luhansk region.

The Mission reiterates that it is the obligation of the sides to mark, fence off and clear those areas of mines, UXO and other explosive objects, as well as to refrain from laying new mines and ensure that requests from the SMM are followed up on in a timely manner.

In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission continues to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents.

From 1 January to 20 March, the SMM faced restrictions on three occasions and from 21 March to 30 June on nine occasions while following up on cases of civilian casualties in non-government-controlled areas. In most cases, interlocutors justified their denial to share information with the SMM with reference to a lack of permission from those in control in these areas.
The Mission highlights that the sides need to ensure that SMM patrols do not face impediments in following up on conflict-related incidents, in particular regarding civilian casualties.

The Mission’s safe and unimpeded access is essential to the implementation of its mandate, and to objective and accurate monitoring and reporting.

Operating under the principles of impartiality and transparency as determined by the OSCE Permanent Council, it is essential for the Mission to carry out facts-based, impartial, accurate and timely reporting of the security situation to ensure effective implementation of its mandate, which is based on the SMM’s safe and unimpeded access throughout Ukraine.

In addition, in the Common Agreed Conclusions of the Normandy Four Summit held in Paris on 9 December 2019, the Normandy Four reiterated that the SMM should be able to employ all means enshrined in its mandate and to have safe and unimpeded access throughout Ukraine in order to be able to fully implement its mandate.

The Mission again calls on the sides of the conflict to take action to ensure its unrestricted freedom of movement throughout Ukraine necessary for the full implementation of its mandate.
The number of freedom of movement restrictions,  
1 July 2019 - 30 June 2020

Denial in government-controlled areas
Conditional in government-controlled areas
Delay in government-controlled areas
Other impediments in government-controlled areas
Denial in areas outside government control
Conditional in areas outside government control
Delay in areas outside government control
Other impediments (on both sides of the contact line)

Freedom of movement restrictions by category,  
1 July 2019 - 30 June 2020

Checkpoints along the contact line
Impediment to verification of withdrawal of weapons
Border areas outside government control
Impediment to technical equipment including UAVs
Others
Freedom of movement (FoM) restrictions
1 January - 20 March 2020

Sources: administrative boundaries - OCHA; roads, rivers - OpenStreetMap; sea - VLIZ (2005); IHO sea Areas; other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

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Created: 28/09/2020
Patrol routes and UAV flights
1 January - 20 March 2020
### ANNEX 2: VIOLENCE AND THREATS AGAINST OR IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SMM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Summary of event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14/01/2020</td>
<td>Zolote-5/Mykhailivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Four shots of a probable anti-aircraft gun originating 150-200m north of the location of the SMM patrol</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 15 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/02/2020</td>
<td>Zolote-4/Rodina</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Three undetermined explosions (impacts) about 100-200m north, north-east and east of an SMM patrol’s location</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 7 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/03/2020</td>
<td>Sofiivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Two members of the armed formations behaved in an aggressive way towards an SMM patrol</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 18 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/04/2020</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard nine explosions, six bursts of small-arms fire as well as three whistling sounds near and above their location. The patrol also heard three impact explosions, one about 100m south, the second about 2050m south and the third about 50m west of the patrol’s location.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 14 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/05/2020</td>
<td>Zolote-5/Mykhailivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard an undetermined explosion originating approximately 300-400m north-west of its location.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/05/2020</td>
<td>Sentianivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol saw one undetermined incoming explosion between 1-2km north of its position and heard/felt one outgoing explosion approximately 50m north of its position.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/05/2020</td>
<td>Zolote-5/Mykhailivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard one undetermined explosion originating about 300m north-east of the location of the SMM patrol.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/05/2020</td>
<td>Olenivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard five outgoing mortar shots in a close proximity to the patrol, but at unknown distance as the subsequent explosions were heard and the shock waves were felt 300-400m west-north-west of the patrol’s location.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/2020</td>
<td>Molodizhne</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard and felt the shockwave of an undetermined explosion 300m north-east of its location.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 8 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/05/2020</td>
<td>Berezivske</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol saw two incoming flaming projectiles explode in the air, and subsequently saw and heard two explosions and smoke at an altitude of about 80m-100m from the ground, and at an assessed distance of 20m north-north-west of the patrol’s position.</td>
<td>SMM Spot Report 15 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/05/2020</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM patrol heard one undetermined explosion originating approximately 500m south-west of the location of the SMM patrol.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 19 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/05/2020</td>
<td>Vesela Hora</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>An SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire, passing about 10m above their heads, originating from an assessed distance of 270m north-north-west.</td>
<td>SMM Spot Report 23 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/05/2020</td>
<td>Molodizhne</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>At a checkpoint of the armed formations, an SMM patrol heard one incoming explosion originating about 100m south-south-west from their location.</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 30 May 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 Not including small-arms fire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs or ceasefire violations affecting cameras
# ANNEX 3: TABLE OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS AIMED AT SMM MINI- AND MID-RANGE UAVS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Summary of event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05/01/2020</td>
<td>Obozne</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire about 2-2.5km north of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/2020</td>
<td>Pervomaisk</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 100m south of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/2020</td>
<td>Novoluhanske</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire about 1.5km southwest of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 13 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/2020</td>
<td>Shymshynivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 0.71km west of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 15 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/01/2020</td>
<td>Zaichenko</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 1km west-south-west of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 16 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/01/2020</td>
<td>Shymshynivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire about 1.2km west of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 17 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/01/2020</td>
<td>Krasnyi Yar</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire about 0.8-1.5km north of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 18 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/01/2020</td>
<td>Krasnyi Yar</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Burst of small-arms fire about 1-1.5km northeast of its location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 25 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/01/2020</td>
<td>Holubivske</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms and heavy machine gun fire about 1-2km north-east from its position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 27 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/01/2020</td>
<td>Novoselivka</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Bursts of small arms fire originating 1.5-2km northeast from the location of the SMM patrol assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 28 January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/01/2020</td>
<td>Stanytsia Luhanska</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating 1-1.2km west from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 1 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/02/2020</td>
<td>Kuibyshevskiy</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots 2-3km north-northwest from the patrol location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/02/2020</td>
<td>Yurivka</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating 1.5km east from the location of the SMM patrol assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/02/2020</td>
<td>Zolote-4/Rodina</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire about 0.8-1km north-east from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 7 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/02/2020</td>
<td>Obozne</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating 2-3km north-north-east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 17 February 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/03/2020</td>
<td>Khoroshe</td>
<td>Not under government control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire, originating 1-1.5km east-south-east from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 14 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/03/2020</td>
<td>Chermalyk</td>
<td>Under government control</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire, originating 2.5km south from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 14 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Government Status</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Report Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/03/2020</td>
<td>Krynychne</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire (SAF) originating approximately 1-2km south-south-west from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 17 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/2020</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 2-3km north-north-west from the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 19 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/2020</td>
<td>Starohnativka</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 100-200m east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 19 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/03/2020</td>
<td>Stepanivka</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire approximately 22.5km south-south-east from its location, assessed as targeting at the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 20 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/03/2020</td>
<td>Stanytsia Luhanska</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Bursts of small arms fire assessed as targeting the UAV. At the moment of the shooting, the UAV was flying 200m west from the SMM’s location</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 27 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/03/2020</td>
<td>Hrutove</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire originating approximately 3km east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 1 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/03/2020</td>
<td>Molodetske</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire which was assessed as targeting the SMM UAV. At that moment the UAV flew approximately 600-700m south-east from the patrol’s position</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 1 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/04/2020</td>
<td>Sertianivka</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Bursts and shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 2-3km north-north-east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 2 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/2020</td>
<td>Taramchuk</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire and one burst of heavy machine gun fire originating approximately 3km north-north-west of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/2020</td>
<td>Berezove</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire originating 1.7km south-east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/2020</td>
<td>Holubivske</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 1-2km north-north-east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 6 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/04/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire, originating approximately 2-3km south of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 10 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/04/2020</td>
<td>Hranitne</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Shots and one burst of small arms fire, originating approximately 1.1 km east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 10 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/04/2020</td>
<td>Kalynove</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire, originating approximately 1.2-km south-west from its location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 20 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/04/2020</td>
<td>Chermalyk</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire, assessed as targeting the SMM UAV. At that moment the SMM UAV was about 4km northeast of the position of the SMM patrol</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 24 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/04/2020</td>
<td>Bobrove</td>
<td>Under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 1.5 km south-west of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 30 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Government Status</td>
<td>Type of Fire Description</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/05/2020</td>
<td>Popasna</td>
<td>Under government</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 1.5 km south-south-east of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/05/2020</td>
<td>Donetsk city</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of heavy machine gun fire originating approximately 500 m north of the location of the SMM, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 4 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/05/2020</td>
<td>Shymshynivka</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire, approximately 400 m west-north-west from their location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 11 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/05/2020</td>
<td>Novoluhanske</td>
<td>Under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire originating approximately 1.3km south-south-west of the location of the SMM, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 12 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/05/2020</td>
<td>Krynchne</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire originating approximately 1.6km west-south-west of the location of the SMM, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 12 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/05/2020</td>
<td>Almazna</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arm fire, approximately from 1.4 to 1.7km south of the patrol’s location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 14 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/05/2020</td>
<td>Styla</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating 1.2-1.8 km south-southwest of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 18 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/05/2020</td>
<td>Komisarivka</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Bursts of small arms fire, approximately 1.8km west of the patrol’s location, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 18 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/05/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3.5km east of the patrol’s position</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 19 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/05/2020</td>
<td>Vesela Hora</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire passing overhead at a height of approximately 10m from approximately 270m north-north-west of the patrol’s position, assessed as intentionally fired warning shots, at which time an SMM UAV was flying approximately 300m west-south-west of the patrol’s location</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 23 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/05/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots and bursts of small arms fire originating approximately 1.5km south-west and south of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 23 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/06/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Bursts and shots of small arms fire around, originating approximately 1.0-1.5km southsoutheast of the location of the SMM patrol, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 2 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/06/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1.3km south-west, from the SMM’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 2 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/2020</td>
<td>Bohdanivka</td>
<td>Under government</td>
<td>Shots of small arms fire while the UAV was flying approximately 3.8km east of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 5 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/2020</td>
<td>Popasna</td>
<td>Under government</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 1.2km south of the location of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 5 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/06/2020</td>
<td>Donetsk city</td>
<td>Not under government</td>
<td>Shots and bursts of small arms fire originating approximately 100-200m south-east of the location of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 9 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Under control</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/06/2020</td>
<td>Orlivske</td>
<td>Under control</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 3.7km south-south-west of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 13 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/06/2020</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Bursts of small-arms fire originating approximately three km east of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 16 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/06/2020</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots and bursts of small-arms fire originating approximately 1.5 to 2.0km west of the patrol’s position, assessed as targeting the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 16 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/06/2020</td>
<td>Kashtanove</td>
<td>Not under</td>
<td>Shots of small-arms fire originating approximately 100-300m west of the patrol’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV</td>
<td>SMM Daily Report 16 June 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>