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PROMOTION OF RESOURCES FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS AND THEIR FAMILIES

CROIX-ROUGE de BELGIQUE
Communauté francophone

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INTRODUCTION

In the present document, you will find the contents of the exchanges, reflections and presentations of the three study days organized in Brussels in October 2005 by the Belgian Red Cross in the framework of a European pilot project.

These study days brought together close to a hundred European participants, who were invited for their useful competencies, reflections and experiences in terms of aid for the victims of terrorist acts.

Indeed, in the face of the increasing occurrence of terrorist acts over these last few years and their media exposure, it seemed to us to be a good idea to encourage, before action, a reflection on this complex issue. Because "to Reflect" also means "Reflecting oneself" i.e. taking a look at oneself; it also means "to Exist". To put into words a reality that often leaves us speechless and to be the active subjects of our own resilience might be the first stepping stones of a "fight" that avoids a symmetrical rise in violence.

How can the human being carry out such barbaric acts? How can the terrorism phenomenon be defined? What role does our social context play? What are the effects of exposing in the media terrorist acts and their consequences? What are the psychical and social, direct and indirect impacts? What resources do we have on hand? What lines of thought should be developed? What should we improve?

We worked together on all of these questions: health professionals, legal experts and representatives from victims' associations, victims who had to directly experience the suffering caused by such intentional acts of violence.

In order to encourage exchanges and experience-sharing among crisis practitioners, we privileged as much as possible work in "workshops" and "roundtables", rather than a simple presentation of knowledge. The reader will find in parts two and three of this document the reports of these meetings.

Certain participants launched discussions via the presentation of a point of view, of reflections or of a practical experience. These presentations appear in the shape of articles in part one.

I would like to warmly thank those who took par in the study days: the quality of their work, which is always full of generosity and humanity, was a testimony of the many professional resources available in Europe.

We hope to encourage every reader to continue thinking about the actions and responsibilities of all parties, not only from the point of view of providing support to the victims of terrorist acts and their families but also to contribute to the reflection on the causes of barbaric violence, the means of encouraging respect for differences, an appropriate recognition of their wounds and the prevention of the destructive violence that is sometimes harboured by the human being.

Delphine PENNEWAERT

Part I : Papers

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM[1]

John HORGAN

Abstract

Since the late 1980s, the face of terrorism has changed significantly. No longer can we understand terrorist groups and their motivations with reference to the old ideological distinctions that have characterized much of 20th century terrorism. Terrorism today is much more complex, dynamic, hybrid in character and motivation, increasingly frenzied and seems to know no limits. This presentation will explain how terrorism has changed, and will explain how despite efforts to arrive at a systematic definition of terrorism, the true nature and identity of the development of terrorism is much more complex than we appreciate. In addition, a number of critical issues relating to the psychology of terrorism will be raised, particularly how we might understand how and why people engage in terrorism. While victims remain neglected in most analyses of terrorism, this presentation will also highlight some important issues that need further exploration, particularly the idea that terrorists themselves increasingly claim to be victims. The presentation will, in addition, argue that despite current interventions in Iraq and elsewhere, terrorism remains not a military problem, nor a police problem, in essence, but a failure of civil society. The implications of this will be raised.

Key Words: development of terrorism, psychology of terrorism, changes in terrorism, complexity of terrorism, failure of civil society

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Less than four weeks after the collapse of the World Trade Centre, on 11 September 2001, the first book to attempt to capitalise on the tragedy was already being prepared for publication. What followed was almost as incredible: in the next twelve months, a staggering eight hundred books (in English alone) tried to make sense of what was unfolding, with one academic textbook (1) even managing to outsell the latest installment in the Harry Potter series on Amazon.Com.

There can be no doubt that terrorism is a difficult, complex and emotional subject. Terrorism remains a difficult subject to even *speak* about, let alone explain and understand. Furthermore, anyone who spends even a short time studying terrorism (and political violence more generally), quickly discovers that understanding terrorism represents a particularly onerous task. There is literally more information on the subject than even the most enthusiastic student could read in an entire lifetime, and because of its complex nature, terrorism represents a subject matter that will never be understood through any one individual discipline. Despite premature calls in the years that followed the events of 9/11 for a distinct discipline of terrorism studies, terrorism remains a multi-disciplinary subject.

Another problem faces the more seasoned scholar. Analyses of terrorism have a regular tendency to mix fact and fiction in various quantities. To some, this is not really that important – former Royal Ulster Constabulary Ronnie Flanagan once stated that: "understanding [terrorism] comes dangerously close to authorizing, sanctioning and approving" (2). Perhaps he has a point. Should we bother trying to 'understand' terrorism at all? Maybe we ought to just condemn it outright. Terrorism offends our most basic sense of morality and justice and typically provokes outrage in all of those directly or indirectly affected by it. It shocks, sickens, and deeply offends us that anyone can be at the wrong place at the wrong time and horribly killed in the name of some cause that is barely even comprehensible. Because of these and other qualities, it might be tempting to feel that 'understanding' terrorism is not useful because the problem is either too mindless, irrational, of just too complex altogether.

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[1] Some material from this chapter appeared in a short article by the author on the history of terrorism from the November 2004 edition of *An Cosantoir*, the magazine of the Irish Defence Forces.

Despite this, it is inescapable that to try to deal with the problem of terrorism we must achieve a realistic understanding of it: what it is, where it comes from, how it changes, and why it is becoming increasingly attractive to a wider array of groups than ever before. A major current debate in policy circles relates to the possibility of addressing the root causes of terrorism (3). Such a move represents an important step in realising that legitimate protest does change into terrorism for reasons that the State may be able to influence in certain ways (as a means of preventing or at least effectively undermining the capacity of extremist groups to harness support for potential terrorism). However, despite the idea that there is somehow one specific cause (or set of causes) that contribute to the development of terrorism being perhaps naïve and simplistic, this notion remains attractive to policymakers in particular: perhaps not surprisingly, thinking about terrorism in this basic way allows for the dilution of an exceptionally complex process into something more discrete and (we presume) manageable (4). However, even the most liberal observers of world affairs since 9/11 would have to concede that it is misleading, if not naïve, to assume that we can somehow prevent future terrorism by somehow addressing or removing the grievances of terrorists. This opinion might appear heavy-handed, but the grievances of many terrorist groups may well be virtual, imaginary or historical (each and all of which are invoked as a means of interpreting and working through current events), self-serving and often susceptible to change between the onset of a movement adopting terrorism and the various stages of its subsequent development. Let us make no mistake: terrorism certainly involves callousness, arrogance, barbarity, injury and death, but the reality of terrorism in today's world is that political movements that use terrorism very skilfully manipulate events (and their ensuing media coverage) to create for their existing or potential audiences deliberate and often sophisticated impressions and interpretations that serve their own particular purposes (5).

Organised terrorist-directed political violence is today part of a much more complex set of activities related to the attainment of a social or political goal, and, accordingly, what we see or hear about terrorism is always one small (albeit the most public via its dramatic impact) element of a wider and, ultimately, more complex array of activities both in terms of, for instance, a specific incident itself and its broader political significance. Terrorism may often be well organised, it may be technically adept and it can have sophisticated political ends as many of the larger and well-known movements such as the Hizbollah, Tamil Tigers, Hamas and Al Qaeda have. However, one of the many lessons we must accept from the deeply misguided War on Terrorism is that it is wrong for us to uncritically attribute such qualities to all terrorist movements at all times. This is an important theme in analyses of terrorism that relates both to pure and applied research especially, as well as policy concerns that might relate to some form of threat assessment and the management of the security problems posed by terrorist movements. The capacities, abilities and presumed intentions of terrorist movement (as well as what terrorism can and does realistically achieve – indeed what perhaps it should be allowed achieve) should neither be over nor under-estimated, but examined critically using whatever intellectual, conceptual and other tools we have at our disposal. Related to this, we ought to remember that while the State may move quickly to invoke a military response to terrorism, it remains a problem without a military solution. Terrorism is fundamentally a reflection of the problems of civil society, although ironically, it is this very dimension that remains least well understood in terms of attempting to undermine or disrupt terror networks and their activities.

THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM

One major obstacle to truly understanding terrorism is an almost complete failure to identify its long history and sense of development. It is difficult to identify when terrorism as a tactic seems to have first emerged. On the one hand it obviously depends on what it is we are willing to classify as 'terrorism', but early uses of anti-state or 'subversive' terrorism (as opposed to other forms of terrorism, e.g. from 'above' (or state terrorism)) can be traced as far back to the very foundation of Israel. Joshua's embracing of ethnic cleansing when 12,000 men and women of the town of Ai fell to his wrath, would surpass (in scale anyway) many of the activities of what we today call 'terrorism'. And where better to find a historical precedent to religious terrorism than the Crusades (the siege of Antioch in particular)? Historian Andrew Sinclair (6) described how Marco Polo, on his way to China via Persia (now Iran) brought back to Europe tales of the legendary 'Old Man of the Mountains', the Sheikh keeper of the fabled gardens in which 'every fruit of the world' grew. Only the young men who would become assassins for the Sheikh were allowed gaze upon its beauty and indulge in the delights offered in the earthly paradise. These men were later to become the core of the Shi'ite Muslim 'Hashishin' sect, so called because of the regular mandatory doping invoked by the Sheikh to convince the Hashishin that they were capable of being transported into Paradise by their leader.

The drugs also helped play a part in the suicidal behaviour which the Sheikh would order his men to engage in (by leaping over castle walls), all as a way of striking fear into the Sheikh's enemies. It is from the Hashishin sect that the word 'assassin' is derived.

Another well-described historical precedent to terrorism is to be found in the Jewish 'Sicarii' sect, so-called because of their weapon of choice, the small, easily concealable 'sicae' daggers. The Sicarii developed in an effort to expel the Romans by any means possible, including murder, which often took the form of stabbings in public places. The Sicarii were responsible for a string of horrendous activities, and the movement's leaders were eventually forced to take refuge in the legendary Palestinian fortress of Masada (overtaking a key Roman garrison stationed there), where they survived for a whole three years after the fall of Jerusalem by the Roman conquerors. When the Romans eventually managed to break through Masada's walls, they found only two women left alive, the Sicarii leadership having persuaded everyone else to kill themselves rather than face their impending captors.

The actual terms 'terror' and 'terrorism', however, come from a much later period in history when attempts to usurp state power were carefully developed and refined under the revolutionary tactics of the Jacobins in France and subsequently during the 1789 French Revolution, but the movement in orientation of terrorists (and what has been meant or understood by terrorism) has fluctuated over the years, with the instigators ranging from the 'State' to those wishing to undermine it. The motivations behind the use of terrorism are similarly varied, from religion to politics, to ethnicity and identity. However, it was not until the 19th century that terrorist groups acquired a more political and revolutionary orientation (largely via Russian and Irish revolutionaries) and firmly rooted the meaning of terrorism into how we think of it today. Since then, terrorism has not limited itself to the religious conflicts of the Middle East, with European countries and elsewhere quickly and dramatically experiencing the effects of violent political anarchists, revolutionary in their nature and aspirations. What better example of a group using terrorism than the British Suffragettes, who, between 1912 and 1914 planted well over 50 bombs, and were regularly involved in assassination attempts, all of this despite what terrorism expert Rachel Monaghan described as founder Emmeline Pankhurst's pledge not to 'recklessly endanger human life' (7).

MODERN TERRORISM

The age of international terrorism and, for some, the true psychological warfare associated with 20th century terrorism can trace its beginnings to a single date: July 23rd 1968, when members of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli airplane in Rome at gunpoint and forced the pilot to fly the terrorists to Algiers. Some think of this as the true beginning of terrorism because since that time, hijackings, public bombings, and other guerrilla tactics, when coupled with instantaneous media coverage, have become the standard *modus operandi* of many terrorist groups world-wide. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the term 'political terrorism' was largely used to refer to non-state revolutionary groups, who, working from below, sought to overthrow or effectively destabilise political regimes. Their motives were (perhaps unusually by today's standards) quite easily understood: they were firmly rooted in simple political ideologies. These included Marxist-Leninist, anti-capitalist and revolutionary ideologies, as well as strong separatist or ethno-nationalist identities (such as those influencing the Irish, Basque, Breton and Corsican movements), other more overt revolutionary motives (such as the Red Brigades in Italy), and, of course, purely ideological and religious ones. Ethno-nationalist tensions and the Cold War provided the opportunities for the birth and flourishing of such groups, and while their methods remained similar (mostly gun and bomb attacks), these similarities were dwarfed by the *heterogeneity* of these groups. Terrorist movements differed across motivation, aspirations, strategies, weaponry, organisational structure, support network location, operational areas, etc.

Many attempts to categorise terrorist movements developed around this time also, some on the basis of apparent or stated motivations, with others attempting to make sense of groups by their scale, targeting base and direction, e.g. 'terrorism from below' or 'above' – 'terrorism from above' is essentially government-controlled (or influenced) terrorism. When more than one nation is involved we might term it 'interstate terrorism' or 'trans-state terrorism', while government-directed terrorism not involving more than one state (i.e. remaining 'at home') may be termed 'state terrorism' and usually refers to the premeditated use of political violence by the government. This term could also describe the regimes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Argentina in the 1970s. Additionally, there is 'state-sponsored terrorism', when elements

of state structures promote the use of or are directly responsible for the use of terrorism, e.g. the GAL in Spain was a government-controlled paramilitary police force that was exposed for having kidnapped, tortured and murdered ETA suspects in northern Spain. A further kind of terrorism is 'pro-state terrorism', which would include Loyalist organisations in Northern Ireland such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). And finally, when small non-state actors threaten or execute terrorist attacks against more than one nation, they may be referred to as 'international terrorists', whereas those non-state groups who do not seek to export, or 'internationalise' their aspirations and means towards achieving those, have been termed 'domestic'.

In the 1990s, however, terrorism became even more complex. The extraordinary variety of those who saw the appeal of terrorism widened significantly, and there was a large increase in the numbers of states who both secretly and openly used or sponsored terrorist activities to further their own political ends. Furthermore, there was also a growth in the number of organized criminal groups using terror tactics to further their own financial and political ends. While contemporary discussions of terrorism are dominated by the unspecified threats posed by Islamist or Jihadist terrorists, of additional concern since the 1990s are the hundreds of right-wing extremist groups, sometimes only loosely organized around racist, e.g. Aryan, ideologies across Europe and the United States. There are also increasing numbers of 'Millenarian' cult groups, who proclaim the need to prepare for impending doom through the conversion of those not 'enlightened' to their level of religious commitment. In addition, there has been a dramatic rise in single-issue terrorism, whose movements are typically organised around one particular issue (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-animal vivisection rather than on several objectives which might relate to a broader more significant political objective.

Also we should note that considerable overlap could occur between these different kinds of terrorist movements, particularly when we rely on typologies to try and help us differentiate between groups in terms of helping us understand issues to do with motivation. An example of the blurring of boundaries becomes evident when we look at the activities of terrorist organisations that are incidental to their primary focus. In the case of the Loyalist Ulster Defence Association in Northern Ireland, for example, the primary aims of the group were to seek preservation of the union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain in the face of the threats posed by the potential formation of a 32-county Irish Republic (one of the aims of the Provisional IRA). However, the UDA has engaged in a wide range of fundraising activities, including widespread extortion and racketeering, trade in counterfeit goods, and drug trading. Here, the delineation between an overtly political tone and that of a purely criminal motivation seems ambiguous.

A final important point here is that amid the introduction of terms such as 'narco-terrorism' and 'single issue terrorism', there is often confusion about whether these 'new' types of terrorism are really something new at all, or whether such new activities merely constitute tactical changes within existing terrorist movements. A good example was the misuse and confusion implicitly surrounding the term 'economic terrorism.' Until the Provisional IRA cease-fires in 1994 and again in 1997, the terrorists' campaign of attacks had included London's financial districts (e.g. the Baltic Exchange and Canary Wharf areas), resulting in what was described as 'astronomical' damage. Damage estimates for the Bishopsgate bomb in April 1993 for example, ranged from £1.5 billion to £2 billion in costs. The PIRA were subsequently described as using bombs to destroy 'economic targets' – in other words, to cause financial damage to Britain in these instances, as opposed to personal damage.

POSTMODERN TERRORISM

Up to the end of the 1990s, the immense changes in Eastern Europe had obviously dealt a fatal blow not only to traditional forms of revolutionary terrorism, but also to the ways in which we have sought to understand it. It suddenly became difficult to think of the motivations of terrorists in terms of left- or right wing ideologies at all. Indeed, the ending of the Cold War probably led to a debasing of political ideologies as a whole in terms of motivating political behaviour (8).

Terrorism was to undergo an even more rapid, extraordinary change in character in the years that followed. However, whereas terrorism to this point had been used for relatively limited and predictable purposes (typically involving territorial gains), the motives were easily understandable because they fell into simple catagories. Terrorists were either revolutionary in nature (this we would associate with the ideological

terrorist groups of the 1970s), right-wing (e.g. racist), nationalist or separatist, and religious. The mid-late 1990s saw a new element that fundamentally altered the nature of terrorism and the way in which western policymakers perceived the problem – unpredictability. Until the events of 9/11, one clear trend had emerged from analyses of terrorist incidents. The number of successful international terrorist incidents was on the decline. However, the lethality of those attacks was steadily rising into the late 1990s, a point frequently explained with reference to the increased prevalence of Islamist terrorism worldwide. The psychological barriers to 'acceptable levels' of terrorist violence began to break down and the changing sense of ethical, moral and religious barriers to terrorist violence were gradually eroded.

While Palestinian militant groups continued to engage in brutal suicide attacks throughout the 1990s, the Japanese cult movement, Aum ShinriKyo, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the right-wing extremists who destroyed the Oklahoma City federal building, and Al Qaeda, all represented the vicious, frenzied new faces of terrorism, whose credibility appeared to be gained from their constant attempts to surpass each subsequent atrocity. The motivations were also utterly changed, and suddenly difficult to make sense of. Where territorial gain or control might have been the most easily identifiable terrorist objective, this newer hybrid of terrorists began to espouse objectives fusing ethnicity, ideology, millenarianism, radical theologies, and as in the case of groups like the ALF, highly-charged specific single issues. Terrorism rapidly became an attractive tactic to not just the large, cumbersome extremist political organisations but was open to anyone, and for any reason. Terrorism had taken on a frightening new face and coupled with its psychological warfare par excellence, what also came with it were completely new sets of challenges for responding to it. While terrorist attacks always bring a degree of shock with them, there was genuine surprise at the changes these groups brought with them. The perpetrators, while coming from very different backgrounds, seemed unusual, irrational and difficult to comprehend. The way in which we have sought to understand terrorism was also fundamentally altered. In fact, it became impossible to even speak of such movements as 'organisations'. Al Qaeda may once have been a distinct organisation, with a command structure not unlike those developed by the Basque ETA, for instance, but Al Qaeda might be more appropriately thought of as something which is much more difficult to understand – its nature is, to quote French terrorism expert Xavier Raufer (9), 'fluid', 'dynamic' and 'ever-changing'. In October of 2005 it was revealed that Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the spearhead of Al Qaeda's battle in the Iraq insurgency, lost his deputy in a fierce gun battle. But we cannot speak about Al Qaeda's 'Number 1' or 'Number 2' in the same way as the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland had a distinct leadership, with a regimented command structure.

Much of today's terrorism (international terrorism in particular) is conducted by small groups that are autonomous, leaderless, extremely dynamic and increasingly adaptive to survive in difficult circumstances. It has become more difficult than ever before to predict where the next terrorist attack will take place, and the terrorist movements of today no longer even have to rely on a flow of recruits from local populations. The ringleader of the Al Qaeda supporters who bombed the London Underground on July 7th of this year was a teacher's assistant living in the North of England.

In addition, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have demonstrated the ability to be both mobile, often without being necessarily located in a specific geographical location but possessing the ability to quickly embed themselves into the societies which they claim to represent.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the constantly shifting meaning of terrorism throughout the ages, terrorism is most commonly understood to be violence directed by a non-state group against the state. It is increasingly obvious that because the violence perpetrated by terrorists is interpreted primarily as a challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the State, the response to terrorist groups is often swift, brutal, and as we have seen since the events of 11 September 2001, frequently disproportionate. Although never sympathizing with those who would target noncombatants, there can be no doubt now that Iraq has become the birthplace of a new wave of international terrorism.

While many of the major terrorist incidents of the late 20th and early 21st century, from the Oklahoma city bombing to the Beslan school siege, have challenged our perceptions of what terrorists are both capable of and willing to attempt, it is important not to become distracted by polarized discussions about the differences between 'old' and 'new' terrorisms. Although the context to conflict may be rapidly changing, at

its heart, terrorism (and the terrorist) remains largely the same. All terrorism involves the use or threat of use of violence to affect the political process in some way, to call attention to those who claim to be disenfranchised and feel they have no other voice, and all terrorism involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatant civilians as part of this broad strategy.

As above, perhaps what has most obviously changed is that the terrorism of today has far less by way of limitations on what is or is not permissible. Terrorist violence is always been vicious, frenzied and horrific, but there has always been, for example throughout various ethno-nationalist conflicts, a local sense of relative balance. Sometimes terrorist groups would exceed what became the 'norm' and there would be a backlash both from within the movement and from the community that the movement claimed to represent. Now however, terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda gain credibility from continuously breaching the expected. It has perhaps never been more appropriate, therefore, to think of terrorism as a form of psychological warfare.

What has not changed, however, is both the immediate and long-term strategic result of the tactics associated with terrorism – to cause death, destruction, disruption, chaos, terror and to sustain anxiety and uncertainty over time, and to challenge the state into a dangerous process of attrition. If we continue to ignore the history of terrorism, we run a serious risk of not learning some valuable lessons from the past, the relevance of which will never inform what current perspective and experience we hope to bring to understanding the problems posed by terrorism. It was said at the beginning of this article that unless we begin to appreciate and understand the long history of terrorism in more systematic ways that we run the risk of failing to appreciate what terrorism is and how it will further develop in the future. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is how to respond to terrorism in ways that do not inadvertently lead to further terrorism (or support for it). One of the major challenges facing Western democratic society today is the uncomfortable fact that although a community that a terrorist may claim to represent may well reject or condemn an individual atrocity, that community may simultaneously be sympathetic to the actions of the terrorists and their aspirations. This is a dynamic that is poorly understood by politicians and policy makers the world over. Although we are in a better position to understand terrorism now than ever before, our frequently lack the critical perspectives needed to build a complete picture of how terrorism emerges and is sustained. One obvious issue today is that both terrorist movements and the States against whom they ultimately direct their hatred are symbiotically engaged in attempts to claim that *they* are the victims. Both claim that the other is the aggressor, and both use this logic to perpetrate even more ferocious responses against the other. Any criminologist knows that today's victims can sometimes become tomorrow's offenders (and vice versa), but failure to break this dangerous cycle in successfully combating terrorism will do nothing to prevent the victimisation of those who are both caught up in the immediate consequences of terrorist attacks and those that constitute the ever-widening circle of indirect victims.

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THE PLACE AND ROLE OF VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS IN RELATION TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS

Jessica ALMQVIST

Abstract

Criminal justice is seen as an essential tool to fight terrorism. By obliging states to bring suspects of terrorist acts to justice, the international community seeks to ensure that there is no safe haven for terrorists. However, a range of more specific issues arises in the course of implementing this obligation. One such issue is the place and role of victims of terrorist acts in relation to criminal proceedings: which rights do victims of terrorist acts have in terms of protection, participation and reparation? This paper seeks to answer this question from the standpoint of international law. It also considers some obstacles facing victims of terrorism towards the effective enjoyment of their international rights.

Key Words: criminal justice, international rights, rights of victims of terrorist acts, obstacles facing victims of terrorism.

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Criminal justice is seen as an essential tool to fight terrorism. The dozen (plus one) of international anti-terrorist conventions that were adopted prior to 9/11 oblige states parties to bring the suspects of terrorist acts as specified in these conventions to justice ('extradite or prosecute')[1]. Also the Security Council considers criminal justice to be a key counter-terrorism measure. According to its resolution 1373 (2001), states shall:

> ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts.[2]

By obliging states to bring suspects of terrorist acts to justice, the international community seeks to ensure that there is no safe haven for terrorists. However, a range of more specific issues arises in the course of fulfilling this obligation. One such question is the role and place of victims of terrorist acts in relation to criminal proceedings: what are the rights of victims in terms of protection, participation and reparation?

The international counter-terrorism framework gives only modest attention to the fate of victims. The *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages* (1979) proscribes restitution of objects which the offender has obtained as a result of taking hostage [3] and the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (1999) urges States Parties to consider 'establishing mechanisms whereby the

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[1] *Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft* (1963); *Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft* (1971); *Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation* (1971); *Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons* (1973); *International Convention against the taking of hostages* (1979); *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (1980); *Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation* (1988); *Convention on the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection* (1991); *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings* (1997), *International Convention for the Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorism* (1999).). The 13th international instrument is the recently adopted *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (2005).

[2] UNSC Res. 1373 (2001), para. 2(e).

[3] *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages* (1979), article 3.2: If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the taking of hostages comes into the custody of a States Party, that State Party shall return it as soon as possible to the hostage or the third party referred to in article 1, as the case may be, or to the appropriate authorities thereof.

funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized to compensate the victim…' (article 8.4). Additionally, some regional anti-terrorist conventions, such as the *Convention on the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism* (1999) (paragraph B.4) and the *Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism* (2005)[4] incorporate a general concern with assistance to victims of terrorism. To find more specific guidance on the rights of victims of terrorist acts it is necessary to turn to other areas of international law.

THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF VICTIMS

It is a general principle of public international law that any wrongful act—i.e. any violation of an obligation of international law—gives rise to an obligation to make reparation.[5] Since the time of this pronouncement of the Permanent Court of Justice in 1928, the rights of victims have been steadily extended and clarified. Especially the idea of human rights, formally introduced in 1948, has had a revolutionary impact on the progressive development of a victims-perspective in international law. Above all, it recognises the human person as a subject with international rights.

International human rights law formulates the rights of victims in broad terms as a right to 'effective remedy'. According to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), 'everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law'.[6] Also the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) affirms the human right to an 'effective remedy', and stipulates that:

> any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by the competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State.[7]

The *Convention against Torture* (1984),[8] the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1965),[9] and the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (1989)[10] entail similar provisions and

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[4] *Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism* (2005), article 13: 'Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to protect and support the victims of terrorism that has been committed within its own territory. These measures may include, through the appropriate national scheme and subject to domestic legislation, *inter alia*, financial assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism and their close family members'.

[5] *Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction*. Judgment No. 13 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A. no. 17, p. 29. See also *Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 184. See also Article 1 of the draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001: 'Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State' (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev., 26 July 2001).

[6] *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

[7] *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 2(3): Each State Party to the Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by the competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

[8] *Convention against Torture*, article 12: Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.

[9] *Convention against the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, article 6: State Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.

[10] *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, article 39: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse: torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: or armed conflicts. Such recovery or reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.

so do regional human rights instruments, including the *European Convention on Human Rights* (1950),[11] the *American Convention on Human Rights* (1978),[12] and, to some extent, the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (1981).[13]

Additionally, also international humanitarian law considers the fate of victims and their rights,[14] including a right to compensation (see *Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (1949),[15] and *First Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts* (1977).[16]

The *Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law* (2005)[17] is an attempt towards the progressive codification of the right to an effective remedy.[18] The *Principles* understand 'reparation for harm suffered' as entailing restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction (Principle VIII), and as being an integral part of the right to an effective remedy. Other dimensions of the right include 'access to justice' as well as 'access to relevant information concerning the violations and reparations mechanisms'. In addition to affirming a right to an effective remedy, the *Principles* recommend states to protect the privacy and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation before, during and after judicial, administrative or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims (Principle VII). Thus, it recognises the need for victims to protection in the course of criminal proceedings.

Besides building on international human rights and humanitarian law, the *Principles* incorporate some of the rights of victims that were recognised in the *UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power* (1985).[19] According to the *Declaration* victims of crime have rights

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[11] *European Convention on Human Rights*, article 5(5): Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation; and article 13: Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.

[12] *American Convention on Human Rights*, article 25:1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognised by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties. 2. The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; (b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. Article 68: (1) States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. (2) That part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damage may be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of judgments against the state. Article 63(1): If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.

[13] *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, article 21(2): In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.

[14] See generally common article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions (1949) that invokes an obligation of respect for the human person, and developed further in the two additional protocols (1977) are often referred to in support of victims' rights.

[15] *Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, article 68: Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of personal effects monies or valuables impounded by the Detaining Power under article 18 and not forthcoming on his repatriation, or in respect of loss alleged to be due to the fault of the Detaining Power or any of its servants, shall likewise be referred to the Power on which he depends. …

[16] *First Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts*, article 91: Responsibility: A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.

[17] *Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law*. Annex to Human Rights Resolution 2005/35 of 20 April 2005.

[18] Principle VI. The right to remedy entails: (a) equal and effective access to justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and (c) access to relevant information concerning the violations and reparation mechanisms.

[19] *Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power*, G.A. res. 40/34 of 29 Nov. 1985.

to access justice and fair treatment. It also affirms that responsiveness of judicial and administrative mechanisms to the needs of victims should be facilitated by informing victims of proceedings, allowing participation of victims when their interests are affected, providing assistance, protect the privacy of victims and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation (paragraphs 4-7). Furthermore, pursuant to the *Declaration*, victims have rights to restitution, compensation and assistance (paragraphs 8-17).

RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

The right to an effective remedy is formulated in general terms and is meant to be a means of protection and entitlement in relation to public institutions in general, including judicial, administrative and criminal ones. More detailed guidance on international rights of victims in the context of criminal proceedings, whether international or domestic, can be found in the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (1998) and the *ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence* (2002); the Council of Europe *Recommendation 85 (11) on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure* (1985); the *Council Framework Decision in combating terrorism* (2002) and the *Guidelines on the protection of victims of terrorist acts*.[20] While the *Rome Statute* and the *ICC Rules of Procedure* regulate the relationship between victims and the International Criminal Court, the other instruments focus on the role and place of victims *vis-à-vis* domestic criminal proceedings.[21]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

The Rome Statute marks a significant advance in the development of enforceable international legal rights of victims in relation to international criminal jurisdictions. None of the two *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia consider the fate of victims in the course of their proceedings. The possibility of participation is limited to intervention as witnesses. Some protection measures (confidentiality and anonymity) have been established, but several commentators mean that these measures are not enough. Moreover, victims claiming reparation must bring an action before 'a national court or other competent body'.[22]

The International Criminal Court (ICC), in contrast, sets up a much more elaborated framework for implementing rights of protection, participation and reparation for victims. Protection rights, to begin with, are meant to safeguard the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses (Rome Statute, article 68). The Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry will provide protective measures and security arrangements, counselling, etc. Victims also have the right to participation in the proceedings of the Court (Rome Statute, article 68.3, ICC Rules of Procedure, rule 89). Participation may occur at various stages of proceedings and may take different forms. In most cases, participation will take place through a legal representative (ICC Rules of Procedure, rule 91) and will be conducted 'in a manner which is not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial' (Rome Statute, article 68.3). Finally, victims also have the right to claim reparation. The Court may (either upon request or on its own motion in exception circumstances) determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury. It may either order the convicted person to afford reparations or where appropriate, order the award for reparation through the Trust Fund (Rome Statute, article 75).

DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Notwithstanding the significant progress made in carving out a secure place and role for victims in relation to the ICC, much less has been done by the international community to develop a similar set of guarantees for victims, including victims of terrorist acts, in relation to domestic criminal proceedings. There are no similar international legal provisions requiring states to afford rights to protection, participation and reparation for victims of violations of international law in these proceedings.

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[20] *Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of victims of terrorist acts*, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2005 at the 917th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.
[21] For an analysis of whether international or national jurisdictions will dominate in achieving the goal of bringing perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice, see Madeline Morris, 'Terrorism and Unilateralism: Criminal Jurisdiction and International Relations' 36 *Cornell Journal of International Law* 473 (2003-2004).
[22] *ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, rule 106.

In the European context, some efforts have been made to find common ground on the rights of victims (of terrorist acts) in relation to domestic court proceedings. First is the European Union's *Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism* (2002),[23] which affirms the applicability of the *Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings* to victims of terrorist acts. It furthermore obliges member states 'if necessary, to take all measures possible to ensure appropriate assistance for victims' families' (article 10). The 2001 *Decision* recognises the rights of victims to receive information, protection and compensation in the course of domestic criminal proceedings. The right to protection requires the adoption of measures to safeguard the safety and privacy of victims (including their families or persons in a similar position). Special consideration is given to the special needs to vulnerable victims (article 8). Furthermore, the right to compensation obliges member states to ensure that 'victims of criminal acts obtain a decision within reasonable time limits on compensation by the offender in the course of criminal proceedings, except where, in certain cases, national law provides for compensation to be awarded in another manner' (article 9.1). The 2001 *Decision* also considers some form of participation: Each member state shall ensure that 'victims have a real and appropriate role in its criminal legal system' and shall recognize 'the rights and legitimate interests of victims with particular reference to criminal proceedings' (article 1.1). Furthermore, each member state shall 'safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence' (article 4).

The Council of Europe has sought to improve the situation for victims in relation to criminal proceedings for decades. In 1985, it adopted a *Recommendation on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure*,[24] which outlines some of the most essential aspects, including compensation, information, protective measures as well as safeguards against undignified questioning of victims. At the time, however, there was no consideration of participation.

In 2005, the Council of Europe adopted a set of *Guidelines on the protection of victims of terrorist acts* that urge member states to take a broad range of measures to ensure full respect for the rights of this category of victims in criminal proceedings. First of all, 'where there have been victims of terrorist acts, States must launch an effective official investigation into those acts … [I]n this framework, special attention must be paid to victims without it being necessary for them to have made a formal complaint' (Principle IV). Victims should also be given 'effective access to the law and to justice which entails 'the right of access to competent courts in order to bring a civil action in support of their rights' and 'legal aid in appropriate cases' (Principle V). Furthermore, 'states should ensure that the position of victims of terrorist acts is adequately recognised in criminal proceedings' (Principle VI.2). Also, 'States must ensure the protection and security of victims of terrorist acts and should take measures, where appropriate, to protect their identity, in particular, where they intervene as witnesses' (Principle IX.2). Additionally, victims of terrorist acts should receive compensation. 'When compensation is not available from other sources,… the State on the territory of which the terrorist act happened must contribute to the compensation of victims for direct or psychological harm' (Principle VII). Finally, information should be given 'to the victims of terrorist about the act of which they suffered, except where victims indicate that they do not wish to receive such information' (Principle X).

OBSTACLES TO THE UNIVERSAL ENJOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS

Notwithstanding the proliferation of international rights of victims, including victims of terrorist acts, in terms of rights to effective legal remedies, and in relation to criminal proceedings, the actual exercise of these rights can be difficult. Nevertheless, the problem of implementation of international individual rights is essential. Several obstacles get in the way to enjoyment. This is especially true for victims of terrorism.

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[23] *Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002* (2002/475/JHA), article 10: (1) Member States shall ensure that investigations into, or prosecution of, offences covered by this Framework Decision are not dependent on a report or accusation made by a person subjected to the offence, at least if the acts were committed on the territory of the Member State. (2) In addition to the measures laid down in the Council Framework Decision 2001/220JHA of 15 March 200 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, each Member State shall, if necessary, take all measures possible to ensure appropriate assistance for victims' families.'

[24] *Recommendation No. r (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure*, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 June 1985.

DIFFERING NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS

Notwithstanding attempts to find common ground, at least on a regional level, on the more specific rights of victims of international law violations, including victims of terrorist acts, there are differing national perceptions on what the role and place of victims in criminal proceedings should be: *common law* jurisdictions (service-oriented provisions)[25] and *civil law* jurisdictions (rights-based provisions)[26] diverge. This reality creates obstacles to the universal enjoyment of the rights having been granted in international instruments.

The common law jurisdictions do not offer victims 'locus standi', i.e. no formal legal position in his capacity as victim. The victim's opportunities to actively participate in the trial are limited to acting as witness (or as a *private prosecutor*).[27] Moreover, victims in common law jurisdiction cannot act as civil claimant (*partie civile*) in adhesion to the criminal process. This means that, while the criminal court may impose a compensation order (which is a penalty, of its own accord on the convicted person and enforced on behalf of the victim by the state), the victim does not have a right to personally address the court about his compensation claim. At most, he will have filled out a compensation form to inform the court of his injuries and losses.

In the civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, the victim can actively participate as a party to the criminal proceedings, either as a civil claimant and/or as an *auxiliary prosecutor*, i.e. as somebody who 'seconds' or supports the prosecution. The civil claimant has several active participatory rights both in the pre-trial and the trial stages Although there are variations between the jurisdictions, generally speaking, once the victim has adopted the role of civil claimant he has the right:

1) To be questioned in the presence of a lawyer;
2) To request the authorities to perform certain investigative acts;
3) To present, substantiate and clarify his claim for compensation in court;
4) To put questions to witnesses and experts, as long as they are relevant to his civil claim; and
5) To appeal decisions which affect his civil interests.[28]

The common law tradition is encouraged to take steps towards inclusion, recognition and respect for victims in the light of recent international legal developments. However, in its status as a longstanding legal tradition, any change is likely to be slow and controversial.

THE LACK OF A DEFINITION OF "ACTS OF TERRORISM"

Another obstacle to the effective enjoyment of rights is the lack of a shared understanding of who is a 'victim of terrorist act'? Is a victim of terrorist act a victim of crime, of serious international crime, crime against humanity, or of violations of international human rights or humanitarian law? Because 'act of terrorism' is a term that remains ill defined in international law, there is a risk that victims of terrorist acts have no firm legal basis to argue their case in court.

As it is now, in an international legal context, a victim of terrorist acts may best be seen as a victim of 'crime' as defined in the *Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power* (1985). According to this Declaration:

> "Victims" means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental suffering,

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[25] There are *common law jurisdictions* in England and Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, the United States (except: Louisiana and Puerto Rico, Canada (except: Quebec), Australia and South Africa, among others. The *common law* is a body of principles and doctrine that have emerged from case-law rather than from a system of legislation. Special components of the criminal justice system of a common law jurisdiction include its adversarial nature, the use of plea- or sentence bargaining, and the extensive use of juries. See Marion Brienen and Ernesine Kohne-Hoegen, *Victims and witnesses: A European overview* (2001). Available from: http://iap.nl.com/miniconference/mini3.html.

[26] In practice, acting as a private prosecutor is rarely used because it is an extremely difficult and costly process. *Ibid.*

[27] In practice, acting as a private prosecutor is rarely used because it is an extremely difficult and costly process. *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*

economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.[29]

However, a victim of terrorist acts may also be considered as a victim of 'serious international crime' as recognised in the dozen of international anti-terrorist conventions that exist. The problem is that these conventions do not cover all kinds of terrorist acts.[30]

Furthermore, a victim of terrorist acts might also be seen as a victim of 'crimes against humanity' as recognised in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (1998). According to the ICC Rules of Procedure:

a) 'Victim' means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;

b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.

Nevertheless, at the moment, it is not clear whether terrorist acts are matters that fall within the jurisdiction of this court as crimes against humanity in the absence of any legislative act having been adopted by the General Assembly of States Parties for the purposes of clarification.[31]

Moreover, a victim of terrorist acts might be seen as a victim of a 'violation of international human rights law'. However, while this field of law accords considerable attention to victims, it is primarily framed so as to regulate the rights of victims in relation to states (rather than non-state actors). It is applicable if terrorist acts are carried out by states or if the responsibility for terrorist acts (carried out by non-state actors) can be attributed to states understood as a failure of the state to protect the life, liberty and security of persons.[32]

Finally, a victim of terrorist acts can be seen as a victim of a 'violation of international humanitarian law'. For this, however, the act must have taken place during a conflict (internal or international).

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AS AN INEFFECTIVE MEASURE TO OBTAIN JUSTICE

A third obstacle to the effective enjoyment of international rights from the standpoint of victims of terrorism is that terrorism and especially 'catastrophic terrorism'[33] create many victims, victims whose perpetrators are difficult to bring to justice ('suicide bombers' or 'master minders' in distant places). The rights to receive information about proceedings, protection as victims/witnesses in case of questioning or testimony, and to actively participate, including making claims for compensation, ring hollow in the absence of actual proceedings, or proceedings without any significant outcomes.

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[29] *Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power*, G.A. Res. 40/34 of 29 Nov. 1985.

[30] For a comment on the 'partial' criminalisation of acts of terrorism under the international anti-terrorist conventions regime, see Michael Sharf, 'Defining Terrorism By Reference to the Laws of War: Problems and Prospects, International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council, Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation' (Milan, ISPAC, 2001), p. 135.

[31] For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, see e.g. Richard J. Goldstone and Janine Simpson, 'Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism' 16 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 13 (2003).

[32] See e.g. Principle I of the *Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism*, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002. It reads: States are under the obligation to take the measures needed to protect the fundamental rights of everyone within their jurisdiction against terrorist acts, especially the right to life. This positive obligation fully justifies States' fight against terrorism in accordance with the present Guidelines. See also *Digest of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism*, pp. 11-12 on international case law related to the state duty to protect. The *Digest* is available from http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/index.htm.

[33] The term 'catastrophic terrorism' was coined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and freedom for all* (March 2005), section III.B.

The 9/11 victims are facing this situation. While there have been some 119 terrorist trials in the United States since 9/11, there are few visible results. US courts have indicated relatively few individuals on the charge of direct acts of terrorism and convicted only one (Richard Reid).[34] The recent Spanish proceeding against Al-Qaeda members involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, though leading to convictions, indicated the evidentiary difficulties involved. None of the 21 accused were tied to the actual commission of the act of terrorism, 16 were found guilty of belonging to a terrorist organization or for conspiracy or collaboration in the formation of a terrorist act. 5 were acquitted.[35]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Victims of terrorist acts are an ever-increasing concern in the international community. Since 9/11 more serious efforts are made to consider the special rights, interests and needs of this category of victims, also in relation to criminal proceedings.

However, while there are several rights for victims in international law, including in the context of criminal proceedings, there are obstacles facing victims of terrorist acts in seeking to enjoy these rights. One explanation for this is the existence of differing legal traditions on the role and position of victim. Another problem is that since 'act of terrorism' is a term that remains ill-defined, there is a risk that victims of terrorist acts have no firm legal basis to argue their case in court, neither at a domestic nor at an international level. A third explanation, finally, is that even though the criminal justice system is seen as an essential tool to fight terrorism, it may be problematic to use in practice. It is difficult to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice if these are suicide bombers, are acting as master minders in distant places or belong to a complex global network of terrorist organizations.

Given these realities, it is necessary to give considerable attention to additional ways for victims of terrorist acts to obtain justice. Some responses are indicative of this trend. In July 2004, the OSCE Permanent Council adopted a decision on solidarity with victims of terrorism, in which it 'invites the participating States to explore the possibility of introducing or enhancing appropriate measures, subject to domestic legislation, for support, including financial assistance, to victims of terrorism and their families'. Furthermore, in October 2004, the UN Security Council requested its Counter-terrorism Committee to consider 'the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families'.[36] In 2005, finally, the Council of Europe emphasized the importance of emergency and continued assistance as well as the state duty to pay compensation to victims of terrorist acts.[37]

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[34] For an analysis of post 9/11 trials, see Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law, *Terrorist Trials: A Report Card* (Feb. 2005).

[35] Sentencia num. 36/2005, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, 26 September 2005.

[36] UNSC Res. 1566 (2004), para. 10: '*Requests* further the working group, established under paragraph 9 to consider the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families, which might be financed through voluntary contributions, which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its recommendations to the Council.'

[37] *The Council of Europe Guidelines on the protection of victims of terrorist acts*, principles 2, 3 and 7.

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THE IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT OF BROADCASTING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE MEDIA

Louis CROCQ

Abstract

"A terrorist is someone who uses violence or the threat of violence to bring about extreme fear or terror within a target population and to urge this population to pressure its authorities into giving in to demands." On the basis of this definition, one can distinguish seven "partners" in the terrorism phenomenon: 1/ the authors of terrorist acts 2/ those who ordered these acts to be carried out, 3/ the primary victims (who are directly hit), 4/ secondary victims (their families and friends), 5/ the target population (on which terror is applied), 6/ the authorities and their employees (police, rescue workers), and 7/ the media.

As far as the psychological impact on victims and population is concerned, there is:
- the psychological trauma experienced by primary victims in its three stages: the immediate (surprise, intense fear, horror, the feeling no-one is there to rescue them), post-immediate (meditation of traumatic neurosis) and delayed chronic stages (traumatic neurosis or post-traumatic stress disorder, with its flashbacks, its fearful withdrawal, and its obsessive questions: why?, and why me?);
- the compassion and sadness of the secondary victims;
- the impact of terror on the target population: one cannot in the strict sense of the word use the term 'trauma' (personal confrontation with the reality of death) but of psychological shock, leading to a break from one's former lifestyle, a feeling of being vulnerable to violence, attitudes of alertness, and inspiring fearful behaviour (keeping away from public places, giving up holiday plans, stocking up on food, pressure of opinion on the authorities).

We shall take a particularly close look at the role of the media: a positive role because they provide objective information that stems runaway imaginations and puts an end to rumours, and because they manage collective emotion, even providing a catharsis (or enlightened relief) by delegation , and also a negative role because of their competition for sensationalism, the emotional impact of the pictures and sounds, the non-respect for the intimacy of the wounded (who see an image of their shattered bodies revealed to all and will remain fascinated by this image) and, above all, because by broadcasting the existence of terrorism and of its effect, they become an involuntary relay for it.

Keywords :.Terrorism, the media, impact of pictures seen on television, misinformation, *catharsis* by delegation.

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION : DEFINITION OF TERRORISM, IDENTIFICATION OF ITS PARTNERS

Before looking into the impact of terrorist acts' diffusion in the media, it seems very important that we should recall what terrorism is, and who are the various actors or partners in this phenomenon.

A relevant definition of terrorism must relate to its essence and apply to all types of occurrence. We therefore suggest the following definition of terrorism (1):

1/ essentially: "*the fact of using violence or its threat to bring about extreme fear or terror within a target population",*

and 2/ accessorily: *"and to bring this target population to adopt types of behaviour that are damageable to the community or to press its authorities to give in to requests*". (our translation)

We can see that this definition expresses the very essence of terrorism, which is to bring about terror within a whole population and to do this by threatening to use violence (violence against people, as in bomb attacks, machine-gun firing, mass poisoning, mass intoxication, kidnapping etc, and violence against things, such as the destruction of public buildings or private housing), and sometimes implementing this threat. Each

member of the target population feels threatened, feels insecure and experiences fear so much so that they modify their attitude and their behaviour (alert attitude, avoidance of public places, cancellation of trips, restriction of plans and spending). Accessorily, but not in all cases, the terrorist or the terrorist organisation acts in this way to bring the target population, via its power of opinion, to apply pressure on its authorities so that they give in to requests, such as the reversal of alliances, the release of political prisoners or the payment of a ransom. In this case, terrorism is not unlike blackmail. Some terrorists have no declared aim and only seem to be there to create fear (and possibly chaos) within a population. Other claims amount to declarations of war, and aim to foster social chaos and the economic downfall of the country they attack. Others, who are more subtle, practice blackmail politics, or pressure politics, to have an impact on the attacked country's foreign affairs policy. Political experts refer to this type of terrorism as "political" terrorism and file it in the "indirect strategies" of so-called "terrorist states".

When one looks at the phenomenon of terrorism, one realises that it involves various partners, who can be put into seven categories.

The first partners are obviously the authors of terrorist acts. They are individuals – heads of commandos and their men – who commit terrorist acts, either on their own initiative or commissioned to do so by organisations. They can work either alone or in commandos that are specially recruited, informed and trained for this purpose. In this category of partners, we shall include accomplices who infiltrate the target country or are hired there. They make the terrorists' activities easier by collecting funds, setting up caches for the weapons and explosives, providing clandestine accommodation for the terrorist agents and organising networks for their infiltration or for getting out. All of these partners directly take part in the terrorist act and are aware of their participation. On the other hand, supporters who approve of the terrorists' politics and welcome their actions are not terrorists, at least not yet… until, taken in by the propaganda, they join the terrorists' ranks, go abroad for training in camps or become active by helping and hiding terrorists.

Behind these first partners, there are others, who commission them.. These are individuals who work together in clandestine associations, who prepare and organise terrorist acts, or who produce propaganda for these actions. They are all known as "terrorist organisations". They can also be states, who use terrorism as an indirect strategy, and often do not declare this. They finance terrorist organisations who carry out attacks in other countries. They welcome on their territory the terrorists pursued by the victim states. They set up training camps on their territory for terrorist agents.

The third partners are the direct victims, who are either attacked physically by terrorists (killed, wounded, intoxicated) or whose belongings are destroyed. Direct victims undergo an emotional shock and experience the attack as a trauma, with its effects of surprise, the confrontation with death, the incomprehension, the unanswered question: "Why are they doing this?", "Why me?".

The fourth partners are the indirect victims, i.e. the families and friends of the direct victims. These indirect victims either grieve if the direct victim was killed or distressed by his/her wounds.

The fifth partner is the target population, that the terrorists which to frighten. It is the terrorists' main target, which is to be scared and destabilized. Although the likelihood of being directly hit by an attack is very low, each member of the target population, as they live in an analogous situation to that of the direct victim, who was anonymous and affected at random, and in view of their empathy with this victim, believe they are directly threatened and feel very insecure.

The sixth partner is the government of the target country: the authorities and their teams, and the officials responsible for order and the citizens' security. They feel defied, flouted and know full well that no government can guarantee its citizens total security in all places and at all times. The authorities react by expressing their empathy for the victims, by reinforcing security measures and by pressing for enquiries. But they also have to take into consideration the fluctuations of public opinion and balance their actions according to the citizens' wishes and their wish for peace. We have put civil servants responsible for order in this category – the police and the armed forces – because, unlike the target population, they play an active role: they take part in protecting their fellow citizens and searching for and pursuing the terrorists. In this active role, their perspective is different: they do not undergo passively.

Finally, the seventh partner is the media. The media have to do their job, which is to inform the public. But they do this in the usual way, by using "sensationalism", and sometimes competing for the most sensational pictures, which increases the disruptive emotional impact of terrorism on the population. Terrorists know this very well and they preferably carry out their actions shortly before prime time news in the evenings. Terrorists use the media's amplification of their action and, in a way, we can say that the media are involuntary accomplices for the terrorists. If the media did not say anything about terrorist acts, there would be no effect of these acts on the public, or at least, very little.

THE REACTION OF THE POPULATION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

For the majority of the population (except the direct witnesses and the authorities), the news of a terrorist act is heard in the media, i.e. on the radio or television, or in the written press.

We shall very briefly look into the reactions of direct victims, who are either wounded or unscathed, but all shocked from an emotional point of view and, in most cases, traumatized in the long term: immediate reaction of surprise, fright, horror and powerlessness, sometimes the impression that no-one is coming to the rescue. After this immediate reaction, which can be an adaptive behaviour of safeguard and mutual aid or a non adapted reaction of sideration, agitation, panicked fleeing or automatic actions, comes the time of the post-immediate reaction: either the gradual disappearance of all of these signs of fright and derealization, or their persistence with the emergence of signs of a lasting psychotraumatic effect: the intrusive and repetitive reliving of the event, a permanent state of alertness, jumping at the slightest noise, insomnia, phobias pertaining specifically to anything that reminds of the event and an alteration of the personality, which becomes fearful and pusillanimous, a loss of interest in previous pursuits, affective dependence and a tendency to retreat from society. This psychological state can be lasting or become chronic over many years.

Indirect victims are afflicted and sad but are not strictly speaking "traumatized" as they were not directly confronted with the reality of death. However, they can have experienced something akin to trauma, being unprepared, surprised, having to discover suddenly the reality of death and not understanding the meaninglessness of the event, and the notion of "traumatic grief" can account for their reaction.

The target population is only informed of the terrorist act via the media. We shall deal later with this mechanism of emotional disorganisation that is induced by the perception of violent images, particularly if there is no commentary. This perception produces a feeling of horror and a feeling of empathy for the victims. But it also disrupts the illusion of invulnerability that we all have, and our narcissism collapses. From then on, although the likelihood of being a victim of a terrorist attack is tiny, everyone experiences strong feelings of insecurity and adopts attitudes and behaviours in consequence. The attitudes are either energetic attitudes of mobilisation and support for the government and the forces of law and order or, more subtly, attitudes and behaviours of vigilance and protection, such as a permanent state of alert (the attention is aroused by a suspect package or an unpleasant-looking individual), a restriction on places to go to and on the use of public transport, the cancellation of travelling plans or even, in line with a very old but irrational tradition, storing "fetish" foods (coffee, sugar, rice, pasta) and even fuel. One degree further and one sees a pusillanimous attitude, a retreat from democratic values and the wish to attain security at any price, even by pressuring the authorities to negotiate with the terrorists.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIA TODAY. THE MEDIA AND VIOLENCE.

The media are everywhere on the planet these days, particularly in western democracies, and their influence on mentalities and public opinion is so great that they are sometimes known as the "fourth pillar of power". The word "media" itself implies that they ensure communication between the citizens and between the governments and the citizens. However, the word "communication" is often misused since it implies a two-way exchange of information, which only concerns a small part of the media's activities, i.e. readers' letters, "opinion columns" and polls. More often than not, the action of the media consists in dispensing information to the public, which is a one-way process without any return.

What does informing entail? If we refer to the Littré dictionary, it means "*to bring the existence of a fact to someone else's knowledge"* (our translation). Let us go through this definition one element at a time.

The element "*to bring*" designates the media and pertains to their job of conveying information (via the written press, brochures, posters, prospectuses, the radio, television, a megaphone) but also, in so doing, transforming (putting into shape) the thing to be transmitted (you deal with a phenomenon or a fact from a particular camera angle, you reduce the phenomenon to words). This inevitable transformation process means that the fact you want to bring to the public's notice reaches it in an inevitably deformed or truncated form. The element "existence of a fact" covers a broad range of facts, events and phenomena, from the discovery of something, its structure, the emergence of an event, the manifestation of a thought or a feeling. The element "*knowledge*" should mean that getting hold of information is a purely cognitive process: to perceive the information, to process it, identify it, appreciate it according to an evaluation system (it is insignificant or important, innocuous or serious, beneficial or harmful), to compare it with knowledge that was formerly acquired (to confirm or modify our opinion as a consequence) and file it in our information store. But any perception implies – right from the liminal or even infraliminal stage of emerging identification – an emotional aspect, which weighs on the orthodoxy of the chain of cognitive processes. In particular, images involving violence, destruction and death arouse a wave of disruptive emotions in us which continue to weigh on the rest of the cognitive chain. This is what is known as "live death": to see on our television screens someone agonizing in a disaster or being shot dead deeply upsets us and inspires feelings of empathy or indignation which will then modify our estimation, our judgment and our opinion. The most well-known examples of these "live death" effects are the agony of a little girl stuck under rubble in a pool of water imploring the powerless rescuers when the Nevada del Ruiz volcano erupted near Armero, Colombia in November 1985, and a Palestinian boy being shot down who was desperately trying to shelter behind a low wall during shooting between Palestinians and Israelis in September 2000. The "*someone else*" element refers to the person(s) who receive(s) the information. It can be an individual, who is informed directly by word of mouth, or a wider audience, such as readers of the daily press, listeners of a radio station or viewers of a news programme. This "someone else" feels the need to be informed, a need that is almost as essential as the need to breathe, drink, eat or sleep, and consists in wanting to find their bearings, to know which day it is, in which environment they live and which event are taking place close to them or further away. This "someone else" is in the passive situation of someone being given out food prepared for them without them having asked for it, and you immediately see the possibilities of misinformation, disinformation or even manipulation of opinion. However, this "someone" does retain a margin of initiative and activity: they can decide to buy the newspaper or not, to switch the radio or television on or not. they can decide to not read such and such a press article whose title does not arouse their curiosity or is not in line with their beliefs or their interests. They can "drift off", relax their attention when the radio or television journalist moves on to an issue that does not interest them. They can "zap" television programmes; they can turn away any time their interest has not been caught. They can, above all, be critical.

These days, thanks to advances in information-gathering and transmission technologies, the media are not what they were only twenty or thirty years ago. The media of today are mostly audiovisual, and they are quick, penetrating, realistic and emotion-rousing. The media are *quick* because, thanks to satellite transmission, they can show viewers within a few minutes what is happening at the other side of the planet, thus reinforcing their impression that the world is now just a large village. The media are *penetrating* in the sense that, because of these same technological advances, particularly in the western world, radio or television sets are affordable for all and there is not one home, in the remotest village, which does not have a television set in it. The media are *realistic* since, as they relay mostly live pictures and sound, they show us reality directly and crudely, without the mediation of the words or sentences that the written press use as an intermediary for our comprehension. On our television screens, we see landscapes and people as if they were a few metres away, and we hear the sounds, the cries and the words as if we were there. Yet, as competition between television stations leads to competition in sensationalism, we are shown by preference scenes of violence – cries of pain and agony. In so doing, the media are *emotion-rousing* because, as we said earlier, any perception of an image, and particularly of a bloody image, arouses a wave of deeply disruptive emotions in us which continue to weigh on the rest of the cognitive chain of information-taking.

FUNCTIONS OF THE MEDIA.

In view of their characteristics, the media of today fulfil other functions than simply informing. And among these new functions, the function of managing collective emotions is not the least. When the viewers are shocked, upset by violent pictures and cries of pain thrown live at their eyes and ears, when they are without warning confronted with the reality of death and oblivion without having had time to put up as a

shield their system of meaning including words and symbols, while this proximity with death arouses in them the worst fantasies of destruction and obliteration that were lying dormant deep down in their subconscious (the report, in pictures and sound, gave them a presence and a reality), the commentator says for them the words they were looking for and that bring meaning to the absurd and to the incomprehensible. And this commentary brings a certain relief, something like the *"catharsis"* (enlightened relief) that Aristotle identified as the main effect of the Greek tragedy (2). In the Greek tragedy, the audience watches with anguish and powerlessness as a cascade of misfortunes falls upon a deserving hero without understanding why destiny is so fierce. And yet, in the fifth or sixth act, the chorus turns around and moves from the left to the right of the stage (the *strophé*), which announces a change, and the coryphaeus (the chorus leader) moves forwards and pronounce words revealing the play's meaning and deep truth. If Oedipus (in *Oedipus, the King* by Sophocles), a deserving character who returns to his kingdom after many undeserved adventures and that the gods abuse to the point of making him kill is own father and copulate with his own mother, discovers his ignominy and blinds both of his eyes in despair, it is for the edification of future generations, who will have to doubt happiness until the last day ("No-one can say of a man that he has been happy before having accompanied him until the last day of his life" (our translation)). In our modern-day tragedies, that bring with them death, oblivion, incomprehension and absurdity, i.e. our television reports on violence in the world, the commentator, like the coryphaeus in the Greek tragedy, says words when there are only pictures and cries, brings meaning where there was only absurdity, and provides the viewer with the means to replace this crude reality in a meaningful context, a reference of values and culture. It provides, by delegation, a *catharsis* or enlightened relief (3).

Then, the whole media system will take over from this initial operation in order to manage collective emotion day after day. After this commentary that at the same time echoes and reduces the viewers' emotions by verbalizing them, everyday will bring its choice of pictures and words of horror; other pictures will show us expressions of compassion towards the victims and their families, attitudes of admiration and encouragement for the rescuers, agreement with the surveillance and protection measures reassuring the population, a call for justice and revenge (a projection outside oneself of the overflowing anxiety induced by the crude pictures), with supportive attitudes towards the police, the investigators and the authorities (the perpetrators must be found and punished), the expressions of collective mourning (places of public mourning and religious ceremonies), then expressions of reconstruction (offers of help, donations and money, a way of reducing the guilt felt by those that destiny spared) and, finally, the necessary retreat needed for appeasement until it is time to conclude, at least provisionally, since the final conclusion will only be possible after the trial, in several years' time. But, in the meantime, collective emotion has been managed, in a programmed and simplified way, on a day to day basis as an echo of the viewers' feelings, who have seen and heard their emotions mirrored on their screens, and who have learned and understood that they shared them with others, which strengthened their sense of belonging to the community. In this programmed management of collective emotion, it is almost as if the media show the audience the way it should feel on a given day: on day one: emotional shock; day two: compassion; day three: support; days four: revenge etc. Should one conclude from this that the media guide the audience? No, because they echo its feelings and mirror its soul, and it is up to the journalists to have the intuition of this echo (4).

The media fulfil other roles. To recall, their main function is to transmit information, to precisely recount the event, its chronology and its causes. This function is important because it dampens down the exaggerations of runaway imaginations and puts a stop to suppositions and rumours. Another function, which is accessory, is that of educating, i.e. to make known the measures of caution and safeguard to be adopted. Its consequence is also to abate the public's worries. Another function is to broadcast the opinions of those at the head of the country, of political figures and of Joe public, interviewed in the street, and with whom the viewers will identify. It reinforces the sense of belonging to the community.

The media are part of our everyday life. They satisfy our need to be informed, to know where we stand and what is going on around us and in the rest of the world. In the mass of information that they receive every minute of every day (information diffused by picture banks and information prospected and collected specifically for a particular event by such and such a channel), their job of evaluating, selecting and ordering by priority (Which information should be presented as a priority and maybe reinforced by technological means?) is not easy, and we cannot criticize them for showing us the violence in the world. At most can we criticize them for competing for sensation, for their commercial purpose of wanting higher ratings than their rivals, and of choosing and even of collecting as a priority the most shocking pictures, that

flatter the secret and morbid attention of some mindless people for blood and violence (as was the case at the circus games in Rome) but which have a damaging effect on the budding personalities of children and teenagers and revolt citizens attached to moral values. As for the medical doctors, they are opposed to the wounded's intimacy being violated, these wounded people that their families and friends discover bleeding on their screens and who might then develop a morbid fascination for the photography of their shattered body that appeared in a high-circulation weekly and who, as a result, will have trouble reconstituting the integrity of their persona. More than ever, the media of today are the "mirror of their audience's soul" in responding to their need to know, but also flattering their morbid and least well controlled drives. At the price of a code of good conduct that they should stick to, we shall forgive them because they fulfil their mission of informing, they avoid disorganising rumours from emerging and spreading, they provide a *catharsis* by delegation and they contribute towards managing the emotion caused by the pictures and the news of violence in the world.

TERRORISM AS SEEN BY THE MEDIA: TWO EXAMPLES

The bombing on 17th September 1986, rue de Rennes in Paris. On Wednesday, 17th September 1986 at 5 P.M., a terrorist bomb exploded rue de Rennes in Paris opposite the Tati department store, causing five deaths and wounding around fifty people. On Wednesdays, children do not go to school, and many mothers take this opportunity to go shopping with their children. 5 P.M. is a very busy time, and the 8 o'clock news is broadcast a few hours later. The victims, lying on the pavement, are first of all helped by passers-by distressed by the extent of the damage (shattered displays, broken windows, many victims lying everywhere) and then by official rescuers (fire brigade, ambulances, police) a few minutes later. But a Korean television crew, which happened to be nearby, gets there before them and shamelessly films the bodies and the wounded people who were either shocked or asking for help. A fundamental question occurs here: Should any journalist or cameraman who arrives on the scene before the emergency services do their job of journalist or drop their equipment and go to the aid of the victims? We think that the moral and civic obligation to aid the wounded and people in danger is a priority, and that those who do not should be held liable not assisting persons in danger.

That same evening, the three French channels (and also foreign channels) showed their horrified audiences the crude report (pictures, begging, cries) filmed right after the attack. The emotional impact is heavy in people's homes. The following day, the written press covers many of its pages with the event. We carried out a quantitative analysis of this: 19% of France Soir's 43,200 cm2, which is 24-pages long that day, 5% of the Figaro's 72,000 cm2, which is 40 pages long, 11% of the Monde's 32 pages, 8% of the Parisien's 36 pages, 6% of Humanité's 28 pages, 5% of Le Matin's 42 pages, 4% of Libération's 56 pages, but 1.70% of Ouest France's 30 pages, the most read daily in France with its 800,000 copies and which, according to the well-known death-kilometre rule (the surface given by a paper to an event, particularly on the first page, depends not only on the number of deaths but also on the proximity of the event to the town where the paper is sold), notes on just a quarter of its first page: "*A bomb in the crowd near Montparnasse*", a way of telling Bretons going to Paris that the station of their destination is becoming dangerous.

Surfaces on the attack on the first page vary from, for instance, 70% for France Soir and the Figaro, to 40% for Le Monde. However, the number of articles covering the event vary according to each newspaper's tradition: 27 for Le Monde, 24 for Le Figaro, and just 12 – which is already exceptional–for France Soir.

The division by sub-categories is significant: France Soir is the newspaper that uses the most space for the factual (and even dramatic) description of the event, with 15% of its space (from a total of 19% on the event), while the Figaro and Libération give it 4.5%, and Le Monde and Ouest-France 1.7%. On the other hand, the space used for declarations by political figures, which makes it possible stand back from the event, makes up 3.30% in Le Matin, 2.47% in Le Monde (with 7 articles), 2.20% in Libération, 1.37% in Le Figaro, 1.24% in Ouest France, and only 0.63% in Le Parisien and 0.25% in France Soir. Direct reference to the terrorists, either the actors or commissioners, reporting on their power and effectiveness, is found most in Le Matin (2.79%) and L'Humanité (2.82%), against 2% for Le Parisien, 1.90% for France Soir, 1.70% for Le Monde and Ouest-France, 1.05% for Le Figaro, 0.70% for Libération. Government action amounts to 1.45% in France Soir, 1.25% in Le Parisien and Libération, 1.10% in Le Monde, 0.40% in Le Matin, 0.20% in Le Figaro and 0.02% in L'Humanité. Criticism about the police's powerlessness and inefficiency was mostly

found in Le Matin (5.50%) and L'Humanité (4.70%), while the other dailies only used 2.38% (Le Monde), 0.90% (Libération), 0.54% (Le Parisien), 0.40% (Ouest France), 0.30% (Le Figaro), and 0.15% (France Soir), and in less strong terms. The repercussions of terrorism on social life (public places being less frequented, giving up plans for trips etc) brought about by the series of attacks that have hit Paris since the beginning of the summer of 1986 are underlined most in Le Matin (0.70%), Libération (0.42%) and Le Monde (0.42%), while L'Humanité only uses 0.32% of its space on this issue, as do France Soir (0.30%) and Le Parisien (0.24%), and Le Figaro, like Ouest France, do not mention it at all. Finally, mentions of other terrorist attacks carried out abroad mostly appear in Le Monde (1.86%), Le Figaro (0.96%) and Libération (0.90%), and to a lesser extent in Ouest France (0.11%) and L'Humanité (a 0.02% paragraph), while neither Le Parisien nor France Soir nor Le Matin mention the subject.

When we consider the distribution of space per subcategory, we can see that each paper has its policy for producing a newspaper, a policy based not only on presentation but also on the choice of subjects to work on as a priority, and four profiles emerge: Profile I, which gives priority to facts (France Soir and Le Parisien), Profile II, which balances facts with declarations from personalities (Le Figaro and Libération), Profile III, which informs about terrorist organisations and writes polemic articles on police work (Le Matin and L'Humanité), and Profile IV, which is relativist, balancing equal space between all four subcategories (Le Monde, Ouest France).

On top of this quantitative analysis of space covered by the event and their distribution per subcategory, we carried out a qualitative analysis over one week on content: titles, subtitles, content of the articles, subjects of the photos and sketches and the keywords in their legends. Without going into the detail of this analysis, we shall mention here that the contents and the keywords followed the development of the population's psychological state and, as an echo, this development evoked the role of the press consisting in managing collective emotion. On day one, the words and photos describe victims, bodies and wounded people, destruction, blood, atrocity, suffering, disorder, confusion. Words also reflected the population's reaction: shock, a state of shock, surprise, horror, stupefaction, sideration. On the two following days, priority was given to commiseration, empathy, sadness, admiration and encouragement for the rescuers, support for the government and police, and also indignation and revolt, a desire for justice and revenge, a mobilisation of the citizens and a combative atmosphere. But, as of day four, besides the vocabulary on grief and empathy for the affected families, themes started to emerge noting the police's powerlessness in the face of the terrorists' organisation and effectiveness, words expressing worry, feelings of insecurity, a tendency to retreat from society, pusillanimity and sometimes cowardice, with critical questionings regarding government policy, an emerging "understanding" of the terrorists' ideology and a desire for negotiations to be entered into with them, to have peace, all of these themes coexisting with the former themes of mobilisation, desire for revenge and the approval of the measures introduced by the government. All in all, the press reflected the three phases of the population's reaction: an initial phase of shock, then a reaction of positive empathy, solidarity and mobilisation, and then a negative phase of pulling back, with uncertainty, a feeling of insecurity, a retreat from society, which replaced dissolving consensus, and pusillanimous attitudes.

The attacks of 11th September 2001 in the United States, a more recent example. On Tuesday, 11th September 2001 at 9.01 eastern time (USA) and 15.01 in Western Europe, disbelieving viewers see on their television screens – running programmes having been interrupted in the circumstances – an airliner crash into the upper stories of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York, which are over 100 floors high and cause a large cloud of smoke while – in the absence of any commentary – a banner goes across the bottom of the screen saying "This is not fiction". This same sequence of pictures with the same subtitle are then shown over and over. But, ten minutes later, a second airliner is seen crashing into the second tower, slightly lower down but still in the upper storeys, to go through and also cause a cloud of smoke. Only then do we hear a commentary, invoking the hypothesis of a terrorist attack. The viewers, who are flabbergasted, do not say much amongst themselves. Thirty minutes later, at 9.40, the viewers hear that a third airliner has gone down on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and see part of a seriously damaged building on their screens, and officials rushing out. The commentary confirms the terrorist attack hypothesis. Then, twenty minutes later, at 10.05, the first New York tower collapses (i.e. an hour after having been hit by the plane) in a cloud of dust and a pile of joists, burying under them the occupants who had not had time to evacuate and the rescuers who had rushed in there. We see the survivors and eyewitnesses, covered in dust and haggard, running all over the place. Twenty minutes later, the other tower also collapses, with the same rubble and

dust. The horror does not stop there because we hear that a fourth plane, which missed its target, the White House, crashed down near Pittsburgh, and that in New York, a third tower nearby, destabilised by the collapse of the Twin Towers, has also crumbled to the ground. We hear that several thousand people are buried under the rubble of three towers, that the attack on the Pentagon is thought to have caused several hundred victims and that all passengers on the four plane have died. We also learn that these four attacks were the object of a concerted plan by a mysterious terrorist organisation known as Al Qaeda, that is known to the American secret services, whose agents had been living for a long time in the United States under an honourable cover (businessmen or students) and that some of them were even having lessons to pilot airliners in American schools. Having stepped on board the airliners, they assaulted and gained control over the crew with knives, sat behind the controls and crashed the planes into their targets. We hear that the man at the head of this organisation is a certain Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi billionaire who lost his nationality because of his extremist Moslem activism, who sought refuge in Afghanistan in Taliban country and is using his intelligence and his money to destroy the Western World in general and the United States in particular. For those familiar with Marco Polo's writings, this Bin Laden is repeating, nine centuries later, the story of Hassan ben Sabbah, the Old Man from the Mountain: he sets up a terrorist organisation using the sacrifices of fanatics to damage the states in place and destabilise them, and seeking in particular to assassinate the heads of state, because we know that at the White House, George Bush Junior was the main target. The American government is clear on this, and its first reaction will be to take over from the President for 24 hours, which almost damaged his image of decision-maker close to his people in bad times. He reappears the following day, incapable of controlling his emotion and his sadness, which re-establishes his image of a sensitive head of state communing with the population.

We shall digress here by taking a closer look at the legend of the "*Old Man from the Mountain*". In 1298, on his return from his voyage in the Middle East and in China, the Venetian traveller Marco Polo relates in his *Wonders of the World* the misdeeds of the terrorist organisation led by the legendary *Old Man from the Mountain*, a man known as Hassan ben Sabbah, the son of a rich and powerful Iranian family, disappointed at having been dispossessed of his position of vizier and persecuted for his extremist interpretation of the Koran (already). He retreats into the Alamut fortress in 1090 (in the Elborz mountain range, 500 Km. to the north of Tehran), and swears he is going to make the whole eastern world tremble under the onslaught of his revengeful actions. He uses his huge fortune to recruit young people, to indoctrinate them and to prepare them to commit terrorist acts while accommodating them in luxury and pleasure to give them a foretaste of Heaven, which will be theirs for eternity: Intoxicated with wine and hashish (hence the hashashins or assassins as they were known), the young warriors bathe, eat succulent meals and enjoy the pleasures of women at their disposal while preparing for the mission assigned to them. Some are sent under an honourable cover (pseudo-traders or pseudo-students) to integrate the population of a neighbouring country until they receive the order, on a given day, to assassinate a head of state or a high-ranking official. Between 1092 and 1124, the great vizier of Baghdad, the mufti of Ispahan, the prefect of the Bayaks, the Shah of Karramya, the quid of Ispahan, the quid of Nishapor, the general-in-chief of the Egyptian army and two of Hassan ben Sabbah's own sons, who had disobeyed him, are assassinated. And the assassins, caught and tortured, will claim responsibility for the acts and defend their extremist religion. This terrorism carried out via fanatics is not only the work of a single fanatic but of an entire long-lasting organisation. After Hassan ben Sabbah's death, which is kept secret to contribute to his legend of immortality, Buzorg Humid succeeds him and commissions ten political assassinations between 1124 and 1136. Then, Kya Muhannad takes over (ten assassinations between 1136 and 1157), followed by Qadal al Din Hassan (six political attacks from 1157 to 1192, including three attempted murders against the sultan Saladin). There will be other successors, and Roc el Din will be the last big leader of the assassins (three assassinations, including Philippe de Monfort's in 1270 and a foiled attempt against Edward of England in 1272), until the Alamut fortress is attacked by the Mongols. Marco Polo brought the existence of this type of terrorism to the knowledge of the western world: a terrorism which uses fanatics to set up an organisation, recruit, indoctrinate with the promise (foretaste) of heaven, infiltrate the target country as a mole, then attack on the given day. The assassination of a head of state or of a dignitary in spite of their protection demonstrates the power of the terrorist organisation; it destabilizes the targeted state and creates chaos, terror and distress within the population.

For the American audience, and for the audiences in western nations, these combined attacks were a shock, a revelation of the end of the world, an apocalypse (in the Greek sense of the word *apocaleptein*). The Towers, which symbolised the United States' economic power, their technological prowess (towers of metal

and glass, they were an architectural prowess), their domination of the world, the invulnerability of American soil, the attraction on immigrants and travellers (like the Statue of Liberty fascinates them), collapsed. In one hour, where there had been plenty, "superb" overabundance (in the sense of "arrogance") in American civilisation, there was now only a void. And the viewers had witnessed live, through the appearance (or *epiphany*) of crude pictures, this disaster (the planes crashing into the towers, the smoke, their collapse, the mess, the dust, the cries, the panicked fleeing), without understanding as there was no commentary. Like the viewers, the commentators had been stupefied into silence, they had not been able to carry out their mission of putting up a protective and reductive shield of words in the face of the incomprehensible reality of nothingness and thus provide, by delegation, the *catharsis* or enlightened relief by providing a meaning (6).

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FANATICISM AND WARS OF DESTRUCTION[1]

Jacques ROISIN

Abstract

The author examines how fratricide fanaticism appears: the genocide in Rwanda, the terrorist war in Algeria, the war of destruction in Kosovo. Looking at fanatic statements, he suggests considering the degradation of social contacts as a regression of the instances of idealness. Psychoanalysis distinguishes two psychological instances in the unconscious construction of ideals: the "ideal ego" (which appears at the time of the fraternal complex and consists in building a purely narcissist representation of the ego) and the "ego ideal" (by which the subject integrates moral and ethical values). It is when the ego ideal regresses to the ideal ego that man's submission to destructive hate appears, and this regression is caused by fanatic statements. Finally, the author determines three factors for the appearance of barbaric fanaticism in a society: the existence of social tension, fanatic statements leading to a regression of ideals, and the barbaric potential of man based on his fascination for destruction.

Keywords : Fanaticism, wars of destruction, genocide, ego ideal, ideal self, mirror stage, intrusion complex, hate, barbarity

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

When I worked with war victims – terrorist or extermination wars in Rwanda, Kosovo and Algeria, the following question was thrust in my face: *How can such monstrosities be possible?* The term "monstrosity" designated the barbaric acts committed in times of war, their contagion, the fanaticism that supports them. They were Kosovar refugees, who told us, without understanding, that after Milosevic's speech in Kosovo Polje in April 1987, all of a sudden, "neighbours, friends who invited each other round for tea, for christenings or weddings had become archenemies: "Go away, Kosovars", cried the Serbs as they spat, "You are here in Great Serbia, go back to your country, your country is Albania!". They were some Algerians I met, who wondered: "Why do Moslems massacre innocent villagers, sometimes taken by surprise right in the middle of a religious feast?". They were survivors of the Rwandese genocide, who said, for instance (1): "A remark that always gets me, when I talk about that time, is the savagery of the killings. If they had to kill, then kill, but why chop off arms and legs? Those who did that are not demons, nor are they drugged Interahamwe, as the Whites keep repeating. They were neighbours with whom we used to chat on the way to market."

THE FORMATION OF IDEALS: FROM NARCISSISTIC VALUES TO MORAL VALUES

In a mythological story (2), Freud imagined the introduction, at the dawn of humanity, of a social pact aimed at regulating drive tensions within human groups. He distinguished three fundamental prohibitions as the basis for the pact: the prohibition of incest, of murder and of cannibalism. It is not for nothing that cannibalistic practices re-emerge in times of social barbarity (such as in the war in Kosovo or very recently in the Congo): the prohibition of cannibalism is a request to give up the mightiest of drives. But at the level of the individual, how are the ideals formed according to which everyone regulates their behaviour? Freud situated the place where unconscious ideals are formed that the subject refers to to regulate his/her social relationships in the psychical instance of the *ego ideal*. In other words, this dimension is called upon when social tensions solicit the subject. Yet Freud discovered (3) that the formation of an ideal against which the subject measures his present ego is the result of the convergence of narcissistic development and of the internalisation of moral values. The instance of the ego ideal emerges therefore from the child's

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[1] The present document covers the contents of the oral communication presented during the Study Days. A more detailed text, on which the oral communication was based, is available as an annex (see the following document on this site, in the "Articles" section: "Hypothesis on barbaric fanaticism", followed by "The Hutu-Tutsi split, a pretext for a genocide"). This last version contains long references to Freud's and Lacan's theories, looks into the place of the paternal function in the fanaticization process and develops more testimonies on fanaticism.

primary narcissism! "What Man projects in front of him as his ideal, Freud stresses, is the substitute of the narcissism lost in childhood. At that time, he was himself his own ideal. He does not want to do without the narcissistic perfection of his childhood" (our translation). In fact, the child's primary narcissism has had to face the reprimands and criticisms of the people around him thanks to which he internalises cultural and ethical representations and the repression of his drives' demands becomes possible. We can see that the Freudian conception of the ego ideal formed in this way joins the double-meaning expression "ideals", i.e. the ideal narcissistic realisation of a person and the realisation of his/her fundamental moral values. Freud did not analyse in depth the narcissistic basis from which ideals have had to undergo transformations to become moral ideals, he just underlined the insistent presence of primary narcissism in ethical ideals.

Lacan's first contribution to psychoanalysis was to describe the formation of the original, completely idealised, image of the ego, that he referred to as the "ideal self"[2]. From, among others, studies[3] on the first relations of children with their images in the mirror and with their peers, Lacan detailed the stage where the first narcissistic representation is constituted, which he called "the mirror stage"(4). Lacan's analysis concerns the identification that takes place in the small child when, aged at least six months, he is put in front of his image reflected in the mirror. Lacan uses this model of the mirror relationship when he wants to understand certain games played by young children. He recalls the following experiment. Children aged between six months and two years are confronted two by two, without anyone else being present, and are left to play spontaneously. When the age gap between the children is under two-and-a-half months, one can see them adapt their postures and gestures in provocations and ripostes. When the gap is greater, parading, seduction and despotism dominate the game, where the child is captured by the postures: either he ignores the other's presence or keeps on making gestures to the other but without us really knowing yet who, for this child, is the seducer and the seduced, the despot and the submissive child etc. How will Lacan analyze these various observations?

So Lacan calls "ideal self" the first image of itself that the child recognizes, this "primordial form in which the I rushes" (our translation). Identifying with the image in the mirror produces jubilation and extreme tension within the psyche. The jubilation at the moment of recognition in the mirror is due, Lacan explains, to the fact that the image presents a unification of the body at an age where the *infans* (the "non-speaker") is still badly coordinated from a motor point of view and caught up in proprioceptive bodily sensations that give it the impression of a body in pieces. At this stage, the relation of the child to the mirror ("specular relation") provides a model for the relation between the child and the image he receives from other people's speech (this happens even without the intervention of real mirrors). This model is also the one to mould the child's representation of others when he realises the presence at his side of others who are like him, i.e. he realises he has brothers (family brothers, young neighbours etc). In the primordial experience of a peer, the other in which the child recognizes himself objectivises the ideal self: as in the relation to the mirror, the child finds his image outside himself but this time embodied in someone else. This introduces extreme tension within the relationship to the other because this other in another himself who is always experienced as an intruder, which is why Lacan speaks of an "intrusion complex" (5).

Theories are there to be used! Which is why I have taken the liberty of taking the next step. Freud used the concept of ego ideal to designate not only the ideal image of the ego that emerged from the formation of the moral ideals (that we shall call the "ego ideal") but also the psychic instance where it is formed (that we shall call the "Ego Ideal"). In the same way, I suggest we use the concept of "Ideal Self" to designate, beyond the ideal image of the ego (the "ideal self"), the instance which forms the first, purely narcissistic, ideals. And I now ask the question: What would happen if the Ideal Self became the instance of ideals which regulated social conducts, instead of the Ego Ideal? I propose that this is precisely where the process that builds destructive fanatic behaviour lies. In other words, I support the hypothesis whereby it is in the regression of the Ego Ideal towards the Ideal Self that appears the social phenomenon of Man's submission to the destructive hatred of the other, and this regression is what fanatic discourse causes. Indeed, a series of typical traits of the specular relation to the other can be found in fanatic speeches and behaviours

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2 This is how Lacan translates Freud's expression "Idealich" (Freud (Pour introduire le narcissisme (1914). In : La vie sexuelle. Paris : PUF; 1982)) next to « Ichideal ».
3 See the works of Wallon, Elsa Kohler (Die Persönlickeit des dreijahrigen Kindes. Leipzig ; 1926), and Charlotte Bühler (Soziologische und psychologische Studien über das erste Lebensjarh. Iena : Fischer ; 1927), and of the Chicago school quoted by Lacan in LACAN J. Ecrits. Paris : Seuil, PUF; 1966 : 98, 111 and 180.

full of hatred. They gravitate around the affirmation of a common imaginary identity of a narcissistic type and hate for differences. I shall take the example of a few fratricide wars: a war with a view to establishing a Hutu nation in Rwanda, for an Islamic republic in Algeria, and for the supremacy of the Serbian nation in the Balkans.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPECULAR RELATION IN FANATIC PSYCHE AND BEHAVIOUR

I decided to go through the typical traits of the relationship of a subject with his/her ideal self (embodied by his/her image in the mirror stage and by the image of his/her peer in the intrusion complex) in a systematic way, and to show that they are found in the speeches and behaviours of fanatics.

FIRST TRAIT : IMAGINARY ILLUSION

The specular relation is imaginary and therefore illusory

Not only the experimental observations carried out on young children but also psychoanalytical testimonies reveal the imaginary nature of reality and of relationships at this stage: the captivation of the subject is produced by an image, the image of one's own body, that the image of the other objectivises. This explains the observations of young children who, aged between six months and two-and-a-half years and left alone to play spontaneously, show in their playing either an attempt to adapt postures and gestures as provocations and ripostes, or expressions of parading, seduction or despotism.

Fanatic reference to an imaginary scenario

In the case of the Rwandese genocide, the Hutu referred to a mythical scenario about their origins which they had taken from the white colonizers and transformed. According to this story, the Bahutu, of the Bantu race, were the first to inhabit ancient Rwanda. They were farmers (the colons, however, had said that the Twa, of the Pygmy race, had been the very first inhabitants of Rwanda). Later, the Tutsi, of the Hamitic race, had arrived. They were breeders who originated from Abyssinia-Ethiopia, and had enslaved the Hutu.

This story was told at the barricades where the Tutsi were arrested or taken to for them to be executed with a machete. In 1992, Hutu dignitaries were calling for "the Batutsi to be sent back home, in Ethiopia". Léon Mugesera exclaimed:"[…] I asked him if he had not heard the recent story of the Falasha who had gone back home from Ethiopia to Israel. He answered that he knew nothing about it. And I retorted: You must be deaf and illiterate, I'm telling you that your country is Ethiopia, and that we're shortly going to send you back there via the Nyabarongo [river] on an express trip" (6) (our translation). Already during the Hutu insurrection of 1959, fanatic Hutu "were impatiently stamping about with their machetes crying: "They have to return to Abyssinia!" (7) (our translation).

SECOND TRAIT : NARCISSISTIC INTRUSION

The specular relation is narcissistic and intrusive

The relation at this level totally deserves the term "narcissistic" in the sense that the libido is invested on one's own body and through it on the inaugural form of the image of the ego, the source of all following identifications. It is in this sense that the specific narcissism of this phase was called "primary narcissism". But if the image of the body (or of the peer who relays it) give the ego its first unified picture, it is always an intrusion in the sense that it is imposed from without, as if it was foreign with regard to the ego that it represents, with the surprise and giddiness of a split that is always a threat. This experience can therefore be referred to as a narcissistic intrusion.

The narcissistic character of fanatic discourses

The speeches of the warriors consider the fight for the group they belong to to be a supreme value, and the enemy's fighting to be Evil. The Hutus' ethnic scenario extolled the Hutu farmers' value for work, these farmers having made Rwandese land fertile and having been unfairly exploited by the Tutsi colonisers.

Similarly, the Serbs' fight to create a Great Serbia – *Ubi Serbii, ibi Serbia* – was supposed to repeat the nationalist war of independence of the Serbs and of the Christian world against the Ottomans, who were Moslems. The fierceness against the Albanian-speaking Kosovars was heavy in symbols recalling the war that the Serbs had waged in Kosovo against the Ottoman invaders. A historical fact full of humiliation but surrounded by mythical elements was recalled to stimulate nationalistic feelings. The word "Kosovo" evokes this event. The central point of the Kosovo plain is Kosovo Polje, the "Blackbird Field" ("Kosovo" is the genitive of "Kos", blackbird). At this site took place on 28th June 1389 the famous battle opposing 30,000 Serbs to 1,000,000 Turks, which the Turks won. Prince Lazar I Hrebeljanovic was decapitated there and the Serbian nobility was destroyed. Kosovo went under Ottoman domination and, in 1392, the Serbian despotic state became a vassal to the Ottoman empire. In heroic stories, the death of Prince Lazar I was turned into a sacrifice: on the eve of the battle, Saint Elie appeared to Prince Lazar in a dream. He allowed him to choose between a victory on Earth or in Heaven: "If you choose the celestial empire, make your army take communion because, tomorrow, you shall all die!" "It is better for us to die in glory than to live in shame. (…) Let us die to live for ever. We have to fight Islam," Prince Lazar proclaimed before the Serbian nobility. Since that event and until the autumn of 1912, when the Serbian army "freed" Kosovo during the first Balkan war, Serbian nationalist young ladies wore black scarves as a sign of mourning for lost freedom. And when, as of 1990, demonstrations brought together Serbian nationalists, the Serbian flag floated next to portraits of Prince Lazar and President Milosevic.

THIRD TRAIT : LOVE FOR WHAT IS IDENTICAL

The specular relationship mixes up love and identification

At this stage of the other's reality and of the subject's own, loving interest is for another who has the traits of the ideal image of oneself. This is actualised in the passion of love jealousy where interest for the image of the so-called rival is what drives the passion. It is identification with sameness which explains a characteristic which is typical of aggression at this stage: that it is always as much undergone as accomplished.

Added to this trait is its corollary at libidinal level: "the brother, in the neutral sense, is the elective object of libido's needs which, at the stage we are looking into, are homosexual." (10) (our translation). It is a narcissistic homosexuality: the libido invests the image with which the subject identifies[4].

Fanatic obsession for what is the identical and for the slightest difference

During civil wars and ethnic cleansing conflicts, the fighters check for signs that the person definitely belongs to the group. They examine traits that prove that the identity is "absolutely identical" and differences, even slight ones, which might separate the individual from the group. In Rwanda, identity cards were checked at the barricades to see whether individuals belonged to the Hutu or to the Tutsi group; in this case, a few letters written on the identity card determined whether a person lived or died! In Algeria, most terrorists who, unlike the AIS (Armée islamique du salut: Islamic salvation army), which is the FIS's armed wing (FIS: Front islamique du salut: Islamic salvation front), did not just fight against the military authorities and their allies but also the civilian population, were Islamic fundamentalists who massacred all those who, even if they were of the Moslem faith and even during religious celebrations, did not respect either the salafist faith or its rites[5], or who did not contribute to the jihad, the holy war. In this way, a little girl was

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4 When the image of the identical is psychotic, precisely those protests against this type of homosexuality are the ones to produce the various paranoid delusions. See FREUD S. Remarques psychanalytiques sur l'autobiographie d'un cas de paranoïa. (Dementia paranoides). (Le Président Schreber) (1911). In : Cinq psychanalyses. Paris : PUF ; 1977 : 306-310.

5 The salafists call for a return to the sources of the Coran and of the Sunna (tradition). They want an Islamic republic based on the sharia and the Prophet's Medina city. It seems that at the beginning of the mssacres against civilians in 1992, the salafists were the majority members of the GIA – Groupe islamiste armé (islamist armed group) (see MALTI D. La nouvelle guerre d'Algérie, Dix clés pour comprendre. Préface de José Garçon. Paris : Edts La Découverte ;1999). In 1998, they created the GSPC - Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, a GIA dissident group with an exclusively salafist membership.

spared her life during the massacre of a village's inhabitants: "I was wearing the hadjib", she explained[6] – in the village, terrorists had come to intimidate the population : «You have to wear khimars! », they had told the female villagers.

The unconscious root of fraternity between members – fraternity of the peers – advocated by many fundamentalist or totalitarian movements can be considered to be a type of identification with the identical. This is where an identification-type of homosexuality can be sublimated.

FOURTH TRAIT : HATRED FOR THE OTHER

The specular relationship includes aggression and murderous hatred

Aggression at this stage has two structural reasons. One identifies with an image showing what the subject's ego is by breaking in from the outside. One now has to aspire to be this other self, even if it holds the place of a rival. At this stage, the identification process (and not for instance a situation of vital rivalry) comes first and aggression, second. This aggression can be qualified as *jealous* aggression.

Furthermore, the need to coincide with the image of oneself causes a tension that becomes paramount if the subject does not step back from the attractive force of his identification. This causality produces with regard to the ideal self an aggression that is recalcitrant to any logic of narcissistic satisfaction or disappointment (in the sense that successes and failures in accomplishing narcissistic needs would be the real causes of the aggression). This is *alienating* aggression.

Because of its link with the image of a unified body and with the presence of another, imaginary aggression targets the body's division and the murder of the other.

The fanaticism of hatred

Hatred was churned out daily on the radio waves of RTLM, the Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille collines (the Thousand Hills' free radio and television). (RTLM was created in 1993, funded exclusively by people from President Habyarimana's entourage.) Before and during the genocide, many messages every day called for the total extermination of the Tutsi race: "Do not forget to kill newborns. The cockerels that sing today were only eggs just yesterday!". Similarly, they said of Fred Rwigyema, the charismatic leader of the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), who had been living in exile in Uganda since 1959 and who was killed during the first days that the FPR moved into northern Rwanda in October 1990: "Do not forget that even Rwigyema left the country on his mother's back!" (our translation) On 22nd December 1992, Colonel Bagosora, who had been sent to Arusha to torpedo the peace agreements, declared: "I'm returning to Kigali to prepare the apocalypse!".

The incorrect denominations used by the genocider carry the significance of their deadly hatred. One has to know the significance of the cockroach in popular Rwandese mentality: it is an ugly animal that you find in latrines, that you have to stamp on. To call a human a cockroach is to call for him/her to be trodden on and to feel pride rather than guilt. "I squashed a cockroach!", the genociders said after their crimes. Many Tutsi bodies were thrown into the latrines[7].

In the relationship to the enemy, imaginary hatred accomplishes the logic of radical exclusion: only one can stay alive, the other or oneself.

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6 Témoignage d'une petite rescapée (testimony of a young survivor) In : L'arc en ciel éclaté (film de HADJADJ B.). Production « Imago Production » (Algérie) and « Les films de la Passerelle » (Belgium) ;1998. According to salafist rites, girls have to wear the hadjib (islamist scarf), and women, the khimar (long traditional veil), and men, the kamis (long traditional robe).
7 According to information sent to me by Jacques Havugimana.

FIFTH TRAIT : TRANSITIVISM

The specular relationship is transitivist

The term "transitivism"[8] » is used in psychology to designate a type of behaviour observed in young children. It consists in designating the other as the author of an action that the subject himself carried out, while the other was the object of this action (or the opposite). It is therefore a particular type of projection formed on the reversal of the agent and the object of an action. The term was adopted from psychiatry, where it means a "delusional mechanism observed in schizophrenia whereby the patient projects part of himself onto another person or onto an object of the outside world. His thoughts, his actions, his hallucinations are experienced by the patient as being the experience of the other person. . […] [In this way], a patient sees a shadow. He becomes afraid, cries out then is surprised that the shadow has cried out." (11) Children play with transitivism well beyond the mirror stage. It often happens that a pupil hits someone and then complains that the other hit him.

Transitivism in destructive fanaticism

Discourses encouraging destruction of the other often include attributing to the enemy the authors' own intentions. It is more often than not on these reversed accusations that the legitimacy of the destructive intentions used in their argumentation is based: the positions of the guilty party and of the accused are interchanged.

I shall first of all use the Rwandese conflict as an example. The transitivist phenomenon can clearly be seen when reading the "10 Hutu commandments", of which an excerpt appears below:

"4. Any Muhutu has to know that any Mututsi is dishonest in business. He only seeks the supremacy of his ethnic group.
 "RIZABARA UWARIRAYE"
As a consequence, is a traitor any Muhutu who:
– creates an alliance with the Batutsi for business purposes;
– invests his money or State money in a Mututsi company;
– lends or borrows money from a Mututsi;
– does favours to the Batutsi in business (granting import licences, bank loans, building plots, public contracts…)
5. Strategic posts, whether they are political, administrative, economic, military or to do with security must be given to the Bahutu."

In a similar vein, the Serbs practised against the Albanians what the propaganda introduced by Milosevic's regime stated to be the Albanians' doing: torture, rape, massacres, mass graves that had supposedly been discovered in publications, exhibitions and television reports that had been completely fabricated (trick photography, films from the last war etc). This practise made Nahoum-Grappe say: "This work of shameless propaganda […] functioned like work in the negative: the Serbian military and police system, with extreme-right militias in the lead, practised in the field what their ideologists condemned in such detail, which historically identified them and therefore *nationally as victims*, i.e. the victims of "ethnic cleansing" (our translation).

This type of activity is a type of deliberate propaganda against the enemy, the international fabrication of hate that I propose to call "hatification". Hatification deliberately exploits the unconscious transitivist mechanism: one can recognize in the object of the accusations against the enemy the desires and the premeditated acts or the acts perpetrated by the accusers themselves against the accused. A South-African researcher called du Preez (14) refers to the creation of an enemy as "enmification".

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[8] The term "transitivism" was built from the word transitivus used by Latin grammarians for the verb that shifts the action from the subject to the direct object. The word comes from transire, to "pass" (from A. Rey)

SIXTH TRAIT : BLIND BELIEF

The specular relationship mobilises the belief phenomenon

This trait is explicit in child's play when a conflict appears, as the faith put in transitivist accusations shows: "He hit me." It emanates from the imaginary nature of any relationship that has regressed to this level (which is why people "blindly" trust what they have seen with their own eyes). The fundamentally narcissistic structure of the ego, which alienates the subject in his perception and his representation of the world and of himself, is for Lacan the human being's fundamental error.

Blind belief in fanatic affirmations

This trait appears in violent conflicting relationships that reactivate the imaginary nature of relationships to the other. The belief opposes strong resistance to reasonable arguments. As I have already mentioned, the Serbs, of Orthodox Christian faith, inspired their fight against the Kosovars of Albanian origin, who are mostly Moslems, from the war of their ancestors against the Ottomans. Yet the slightest preoccupation for History could have revealed how grossly incorrect this is, because the Albanians, at the date of the famous battle of Kosovo Polje, were Catholics, integrated within the Serbian empire and fighting the Ottomans. They went under Turkish domination in 1479 and converted to Islam in the 16th and 17th centuries. Several Albanians told me that "until the generation before their grandparents' grandparents, all Albanians had two first names: one of them, the real one, was used within the family home and was a Catholic first name like Luke or John, Peter or Thomas, while the other was the official first name for life outside, which was a Moslem first name, like Ali or Mohammed, Xhemal or Mourad. Until recently, they said, "our ancestors still celebrated Christmas."

We know that belief is a denial of reality. I have noticed this several times. For instance, an affirmation presented as an absolute truth can be contradicted by an opposing affirmation at another time or in another context. A Kosovar made the following claim to me: "All Serbs are assassins and they all want us dead." "All of them?", I asked him. "Yes, all of them!," he answered. During a day spent in the countryside in the company of Belgians and Kosovars – we had organised this trip to celebrate the end of our contacts a few days before the refugees' return to Kosovo – the same person told his children and myself: "I wonder what has happened to Mister X? Is he still alive? Has he been killed?". I could see that they were all worried about this family friend. "Who is he?", I asked. "X, he's our neighbour, he's a Serb," he answered. "He took up arms with the UCK right at the beginning of the war because he came on our side, against the militias and against the ideas that were spreading about pursuing all Kosovars out of Kosovo." "So there are also "good" Serbs, then?", I said, referring to the good-bad division (good Kosovars, bad Serbs) that, as they knew full well, I had always refused to share with them.

The strength of the blindness in relation to beliefs is to do with the power of the imaginary identification process. It was thought in Rwanda's genocide that all Hutus were descendants of the race of the first inhabitants in Rwanda, Hutu farmers who had been enslaved for centuries by Ethiopian immigrants, Tutsi breeders. I shall tell you who of whom the Tutsi and the Hutu, now classified as such, were really the descendants. In 1931, the Belgian administration ordered each Rwandese person to carry from then on an identity card mentioning in three languages – French, Dutch and Kinyarwanda – the ethnic group they belonged to. As the words "ethnic group" and "race" did not exist in Kinyarwanda, they used the word for "clan", which is *ubwooko*. Yet in the same clan, there were Rwandese people of all classes: Twa, Hutu, Tutsi… To carry out their task, the colonial administration's employees received the following instruction: they had to ask how many cows the Rwandese being questioned had, because anyone who had at least ten cows was to be considered a Tutsi, and anyone who had less was Hutu! This is how the whole Rwandese population was racially labelled… Brothers, children with the same father and mother, were put in opposite racial categories. And the descendants of these labelled people massacred each other several times with machetes in Rwanda's subsequent History!

The logic of all of the traits specifying the imaginary relationship are contained in the formula on the transitivist phenomenon: the other is the same. Such an unconscious identification is a source of gratification and unbearable internal tension. *This inaugural mode of relationship to the other runs through the history of each of us like a fascinating unconscious model, prepared to determine the subject in his fundamental*

identification as soon as a threat can be experienced as a threat to identity. This particularly happens when social relationships are tense. This phenomenon is exacerbated by war situations.

In light of this comparison, we can read the emergence of wars of destruction or of ethnic cleansing as cases in point where the Ego Ideal's "disconnection" leads to a regression towards the Ideal Self. Fanatic discourse puts the Ego Ideal aside by discrediting any reference to speeches with different contents by playing on the fascination that this narcissistic identification and this idealisation exert on us from deep down and which we all had to give up when working on transforming our narcissistic ideals into social ideals. Situations of social tension are a breeding ground for "spontaneous" imaginary regression, i.e. for translating social threats into threats to one's identity, particularly when the subject is or perceives himself to be the victim of an aggression. I remember having been amazed right at the beginning of my work with the victims of aggressions by the following: wishes to respond or to carry out reprisals appear with the specular character, whether it applies to actions, sufferings or gratification. A person of foreign origin who had just been assaulted was telling me the other day: "What I'd do? I'd hit him as he hit me, make him suffer as he made me suffer!". This is the kind of statement that made me think very early on: "It looks like the assaulted subject is suddenly projected backwards to the time when he enters the intrusion complex". Fanatic discourse only exploits this tendency to allow one's ideals to regress.

TO CONCLUDE

We could go back to the old roots of all wars of terrorism, genocide or ethnic cleansing. The history of the links between the communities warring with each other to exterminate them reveals for each of them several conditions for them to appear:

The first is the *existence of tensions* between the communities. Rwanda's History is an example of this between Tutsi and Hutu (17), considered to be social classes before colonisation, with tensions between the southern, central and northern Hutu when they were fighting for political power when Rwanda became a democratic State. The tensions between Serbs and Albanian-speaking Kosovars in Kosovo, and between those in power, the people and the islamists in Algeria. But this condition does not explain how destructive hatred appears.

To understand the transformation of social tension into civil war or ethnic cleansing, an extra condition is needed: the *exploitation of a power of "fanatisation"*. It is, in Algeria, the call for a fundamentalist solution to the intellectual, economic and political standstill. It is, for the Serbs, the call that was made and heard for tchernic nationalism. It was, in Rwanda, the exploitation of the split between Hutu and Tutsi. Sociologists and political experts tell us about the historical motives for having recourse to fanaticism. I have tried to provide here a psychoanalytical understanding of the power that "fanatisation" exercises on the psyche: I think I have shown that it responds to the regression of the Ego Ideal to the Ideal Self, a radical shift in one's mentality propitious for the original formation of a completely narcissistic identity. This way of thinking is a giddiness that fascinates us all because we are all built from this imaginary basis. Violence full of hatred is the consequence of this imaginary logic even when the ideological values of the group do not explicitly call for destruction. History bears good witness to the fact that imaginary totalitarianism (communism's for example) is enough.

But another reality cannot be explained by the above. I am talking about *Man's potential for barbarity*. The recognition of this reality is not everything. For instance, a fashionable conception consists in recognizing everything and giving it the status of being Unspeakable or Incomprehensible. This is a mystic attitude, an attitude of adoration before Evil. Only humankind knows barbarity, which consists in dehumanizing humans. Barbaric enjoyment is based on drives that push to destruction: Freud called "death drive" the fascinating call from deep down that encourages people to accomplish to the end the destruction of things. To annihilate a being is beyond imaginary hate! That is a human reality, that is particularly tangible in trauma therapy and in the words and actions of genocidal warriors. Radovan Karadzic, who called for ethnic hatred and "cleansing" in former Yugoslavia, had written in the poems of his youth: "I was born to live without a tomb, this human body shall never die, it was not only born to smell the flowers but also to destroy with fire, to kill and to reduce everything to dust" (18) (our translation).

In therapy for aggression and trauma, we can bring into question the propensity of our imagination to translate any threat into a threat to identity. We can weigh the barbaric potential of each of us against our *aptitude to live a civilized life*, i.e. with the subjective reference to the human law which prohibits violent and annihilating attacks against human beings. As citizens, it is important to speak in terms which refuse being closed in in an absolute truth or the "mirror" positioning in the face of fanatic words or behaviours: let us not fall into transitivism! That is precisely what maintaining a reference to humanity's law means, a law that is a third party between people.

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HOW DO CHILDREN COPE WITH THE EXPOSURE TO TERRORISM?

Barbara JUEN

Abstract
When terrorist attacks occur children may be victims, they may have parents, siblings or friends who are victims or they may witness these events by watching TV, hearing people talk at school, hearing people in public places discuss the events, etc.

For instance, the World Trade Center attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing received widespread attention and media coverage that many children were exposed to. But how should we speak to children about these events? Should we shield them from such horrors or talk openly about them? Findings from a study following the Oklahoma City bombing indicate that more severe reactions were related to being female, knowing someone injured or killed, and bomb-related television viewing and media exposure (Pfefferbaum et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum et al., 2000).

There is a wide range of emotional and physiological reactions that children may display following disaster. Children´s reactions depend on their age and the degree of exposure as well as on their caregiver´s reactions. In helping children cope, the most important thing seems to answer children´s questions openly. Children need much help in order to make sense of traumatic events. Especially violence threatens children´s assumptions about the safety of the world and about the reliability of other people. Furthermore children have to be protected from too much exposure. Caregivers and therapists therefore have to take care that they do not confront the child too often and too much and therefore support also the child´s need for creating distance to the event.

Key words: exposure of children, reactions to disasters, caregiver's reaction, children's questions.

PRESENTATION

According to Fischer and Riedesser (1) Trauma produces a gap between perceived threat and capability to cope which leads to shattered assumptions of world and self. From a psychological point of view a terrorist attack can be defined as a sudden, unexpected violent attack. The victims are noncombatants and therefore are completely innocent. The attack itself is aimed at creating fear. A Terrorist attack therefore is a traumatic event which especially affects our basic assumptions and leads to an enhanced feeling of vulnerability.

Our basic assumptions are mainly about the following three topics (2):

1. Benevolence of the world
2. Meaningfulness of the world
3. Worthiness of self

These basic assumptions are strongly linked to our feeling of vulnerability. Terrorist attacks threaten all of the three assumptions.

The struggle with shattered assumptions is one of the most prominent consequences in the aftermath of traumatic events not only for adults but for children as well. In the following I will give you some examples of how children try to cope with shattered assumptions after the exposure to trauma:

STRUGGLING WITH SHATTERED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT BENEVOLENCE

Lisa, a seven year old girl, who has been the victim of a sexual assault, cannot understand why the perpetrator has not learned to be good at school: „Why did this man not learn how to be good at school?" she asks her mother repeatedly. The four year old Peter thinks that in America all airplanes are crashing into buildings because he has seen this on TV. When his mother has to go to America he asks her: „Mama, will

your airplane fly into a skyscraper? Will you come back?" And Kai, whose friend has been killed by his mother during a suicide attempt says to his own mother: „Leave me alone, you are a mother".

STRUGGLING WITH BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MEANINGFULNESS

Peter (6 yrs), who is a flood victim, does not understand how God could let the event happen. He says "I am angry with God because he took away my Teddy Bear". Mary, the victim of a sexual assault, believes that to her sister this would not have happened because "she is bigger and stronger than this man".

STRUGGLING WITH SHATTERED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WORTHINESS OF SELF

Mary also thinks she should have run away from the perpetrator, but she was not able to do so. She says: "My girlfriend said I should have run away but I was so shocked I could only cry."

CHILDREN ARE ALSO STRUGGLING WITH THEIR BELIEVES ABOUT EMOTIONS

Lisa (11yrs) already knows that one can have two contradicting feelings at one and the same moment: "I feel broken hearted but I feel happy that he is with God" Peter (4 yrs) does not know that. He says: "You cannot have two feelings at once because you do not have two heads"(3). Especially younger children need help to understand their rapidly changing emotions after a traumatic event.

PROTECTIVE FACTORS

In the re-establishment of shattered assumptions external and internal protective factors are especially important.

First of all, social support seems to be crucial for the coping process. The following external protective factors are most important:

- Social, community, family cohesiveness
- Support systems
- Shared values and belief systems

On the internal level, emotion regulation and cognitive factors play an important role. The following internal protective factors may help the child to cope with the traumatic experience:
- Child´s capacity to recognize and avoid dangers
  (*Janine talks to her kidnapper while lying in the back of the car*)
- Child´s ability to use adults for caretaking activities
  (*Janine asks for help in a nearby house*)
- Child´s capacity to manage anxiety
  (*Janine goes to school at the same day and uses the routine in order to restore a feeling of safety*)
- Child´s ability to devote him/herself to a cause and to find meaning in the experience
  (*Janine says: "He is a bad man and I have to talk to him and tell him that one is not allowed to act so mean"*)

SYMPTOMS

Children´s responses to trauma are comparable to those of adults, except that children´s responses are mediated through a developing organism (physically, cognitively, socially and emotionally). I shall try to explain this with each of the main symptoms.

Fear is the most important symptom after a terrorist attack, it can be seen as the defining factor. As you can see in the following list, adolescent´s and adult´s fears differ from those of children.

Adolescents and Adults are imagining the situation over and over:
- How it might have been different
- What would have happened if they were killed

- Flashbacks start to appear a little bit later
- Guilt-feelings are common
- Anger and the wish to take revenge are common

On the one hand, children´s fears differ from those of adults according to their impaired understanding of the traumatic event. Most children have specific fears (e.g. of loud noises, -a balloon exploding, a loud voice shouting, a door slamming, etc.):

- Some children try to hide
- Others cannot sleep without their parent holding their hands
- Children also feel guilty and angry
- Children are often confused about the event because they cannot explain how it happened

On the other hand, children´s fears mostly are about separation because of their higher dependency on adult caregivers and the family system as a whole:

The following fears are characteristic for children:

- Fear that someone in the family would be hurt
- Fear that friends would be hurt
- Feelings of anxiety and nervousness

TRAUMA SYMPTOMS IN CHILDREN

Although children´s trauma symptoms are very similar to those of adults (Intrusions, arousal, numbing), there are several symptoms that are typical for children (4):

- Separation anxiety
- Fear and anxiety
- Regression
- Aggression
- Withdrawal
- Clinging behavior

WHAT CAN WE DO TO HELP CHILDREN COPE?

BALANCE BETWEEN PROBLEM FOCUSING AND EMOTION REGULATION

With regard to trauma symptoms, a balance between problem focusing and emotion regulation seems to be necessary for the healing process (3). Trauma symptoms may lead to long lasting disturbances but they may also be seen as a part of the healing process. If we take a look at the symptoms, we can differentiate problem focusing and emotion regulating symptoms: Intrusions and hyperarousal for example can be viewed as problem focusing whereas denial and dissociation may be seen as emotion regulating, because they help to gain distance to the traumatic experience.

Children as well as adults need the possibility to keep the balance between problem focusing and emotion regulation in order to cope with the traumatic event. Therefore we should encourage problem focusing by helping them understand, by promoting action and confrontation.

This means we should:

- Answer children´s questions (but not interrogate them)
- Help children to express themselves
- Allow but not force confrontation and farewell
- Give opportunities for action and decision making

PROBLEM FOCUSING

As I have already stated, it seems to be especially important to appreciate the fact that children as well as adults struggle with basic assumptions. We should encourage caregivers to seek answers to some of their questions together with their children. "Why did God let them kill my brother?" asks Peter and his mother answers: "Perhaps he could not do anything against it". But do never forget: Shattered assumptions cannot be mended by talking alone, they need new experiences to heal. Also caregivers struggle with their basic assumptions which shows how especially important it is to support them in order to help children cope. Caregivers struggle with their own shattered assumptions as the following example shows when a mother of a six year old says "I can never again tell my daughter that she can trust in me, that I shall be always there for her" (her daughter has been the victim of a sexual assault). She has to regain trust in herself as a caregiver in order to support her daughter. Therefore it seems very important to encourage caregivers to tell their children that they will remain a family and that they will try to cope with this together and to not forget to help caregivers to take care of themselves.

EMOTION REGULATION

On the other hand, children as well as adults need help with emotion regulation. They have to find distance and express their emotions. This can be done via the following interventions:

- Give opportunities to play
- Normalize feelings (sadness, anger, guilt feelings) by talking about them
- Help to express anger but differentiate between reality and phantasy (e.g. revenge phantasies)

After a terrorist attack it is furthermore one of the most important goals for children and adults to reestablish a feeling of security. Therefore we should:

- (Encourage caregivers to) re-establish daily routines
- (Encourage caregivers to) give affection
- (Encourage caregivers to) set clear limits

Furthermore, children do not have the same ability to deal with strong negative feelings as adults. So they need a special protection with regard to their defence mechanisms as well as their emotion regulation capacities. Caregivers and helpers have to become an adult protection shield for the child but they also have to allow the child to confront him- or herself to negative emotions.

RESPECTING CHILDREN'S DEFENCE MECHANISMS

In children it is even more important to respect their defence mechanisms than in adults because they are not so able to control and cope with strong emotions. Therefore:

- Do not force them to talk about the event if they do not want to
- Give opportunities to play and find distance to the event
- Limit exposure to media (stay with them, explain)
- Do not confront the child without his or her consent

Sometimes children want to confront themselves: Let them be active and confront themselves if they want to:

- See a photo of the perpetrator
- Go to the crime site
- ….

HOW TO DEAL WITH ANGER

Anger is one of the feelings resulting from exposure to violence. In children it seems to be crucial to allow a safe expression of anger in order to help them cope:

- Normalize anger
- Allow safe expression of anger
- Allow expression of revenge phantasies but help to differentiate between phantasy and reality
- Do not allow aggressive behavior towards other persons
- (for example: Lukas (4 yrs) uses a punching ball to express his anger after his mother has told him that he is allowed to feel angry, that she also feels angry about the father´s death but that he is not allowed to kick her every time he feels angry and sad)
- Mary and Nina tell other children in what they would do to the perpetrator if he came to them again-punch him in the stomach, beat him on the head until he lies on the ground, then step upon him….we play how we find the "thief" and put him into jail together with the pirates)

CHILDREN'S COPING MECHANISMS

Adults most often use language in order to cope with traumatic events. For children language is not the primary tool in order to cope with traumatic experiences. Therefore we should help children to use their own coping mechanisms such as:

- Play
- Phantasy
- Drawing pictures and telling stories

PLAY

Notice the themes that children express through play: Children do not always play exactly what has happened to them. But they often express topics that are similar to their experience. For example: a child who has been the victim of a hijacker uses the doll house to play a princess being held in jail:

- Children project their feelings to dolls and figures (this helps them to regain a feeling of being in control – as an adult we can help the child to express and name feelings)
- Children often need help to complete the course of action (the king falls from a high tower – his wife comes and cries, an ambulance car comes and helps the injured king)

PHANTASY

Phantasy helps children take a step back from their stressful experience and cope with it. Mary uses her doll who "has dreamed the whole event" to tell the police officer how the perpetrator looked like.

DRAWING PICTURES/TELLING STORIES

Drawing pictures is another important means in order to express feelings and regain a feeling of control:

- Let them draw pictures of the event but do not forget to encourage drawing of rescue and protection
- Tell stories about similar events

In this picture the child draws herself being chased by a man, together we draw a police officer who has a gun and is ready to catch the perpetrator and put him into his police car.

When somebody has died, children often need help in order to remember (5) – You can use:

- Remembrance boxes
- Draw deceased person in heaven….

RESUMEE

First of all children as well as their caregivers need to restore a feeling of safety and trust after a terrorist attack. This takes time. But there are several important first steps such as:

- Receiving care and affection from parents and friends
- Comprehending what has happened and how the events have happened
- Re-experiencing (and learning to tolerate) the negative affects associated with the event

Furthermore we should try to assist caregivers with the following tasks:

- Help caregivers to be
  - Nurturing, giving reassurance and affection
  - Good listeners, hearing and acknowledging the child´s experience and answering the child´s questions
  - Interpersonally sensitive, responding to what the child is experiencing-respecting the child´s defence mechanisms

- Help caregivers to regain
  - The structures and routines that make life seem more predictable

We all want to protect our children from traumatic experiences, we want to keep them in the trustful world where people do not harm each other and where the world is a safe place to live. When terrorist attacks strike, this worldview is threatened and children as well as adults begin to struggle with the same crucial questions. The worldview will never be the same as before, trust will never be fully restored after this experience. But this does not mean that the child has to become an adult without any trust in others and with no illusions about the safety of our world. In dealing with trauma we have to appreciate the fact that some wounds will never completely heal, there will always remain scars, but in the best case there will remain no open wounds and development will be promoted instead of impaired.

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PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS ON VICTIMS

Nathalie TOLEDO

Abstract

I propose to explore the question of the psychosocial impact of legal proceeding from two angles:

1. an objective angle, which refers to the penal legal system as defined by law, to its <u>functioning</u>, its <u>powers</u> and its <u>limits</u>, its various <u>actors</u>, its <u>issues</u>, the <u>place</u> it gives to <u>victims</u> at the different phases of the procedure, etc…

2. a subjective angle, where we shall look into the way the victim <u>experiences</u>, <u>perceives</u> and <u>integrates</u> in his/her personal history each stage of the proceedings, which means not only taking an interest in the <u>expectations</u> and <u>hopes</u> of the victims regarding Justice and their <u>"mandate"</u> for it, but also in his/her <u>beliefs</u> and <u>representation</u> of the judiciary world and in the <u>knowledge</u> he/she has built concerning Justice's functioning.

My presentation will try to put these two angles into perspective with various examples from the situations we have come across in our department.

The conclusion will be based on the value of specific support for victims in the context of legal proceedings.

Keywords: functioning of the penal system, experience and representations of victims, support for victims

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

ABOUT THE JOB OF "JUSTICE ASSISTANT", RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPORTING VICTIMS

Justice Assistants were hired by the Public Prosecutor's Offices and by the Courts (but are now administratively attached to the "Justice Houses") to give particular attention to the needs of victims of criminal offences involved in court proceedings. This means they essentially work at the level of the legal consequences of victimisation.

To this end, they have several missions to fulfil: to meet victims in a suitable and confidential room, to listen, to guide and to support the victims in the stages of the procedure that are emotionally more difficult such as confrontations, reconstructions, consulting the file, going to hearings before the courts and tribunals etc. The victims are also contacted after the sentence, when applications for prison leave are examined or if the author is on parole.

LIMIT OF MY INTERVENTION IN VIEW OF MY FUNCTION AND MY EXPERIENCE

It is important for me to say that my experience has led me to meet many victims of criminal offences who were involved in legal proceedings in Namur (Belgium), and it is therefore as an onlooker that I speak about the psychosocial impact of legal proceedings. As a result, my presentation is not exhaustive but is rather an illustration of reality or rather of realities – the realities of victims who are, in spite of themselves, in contact with the legal world.

My testimony is no doubt at odds with the other presentations on the problems that the victims of terrorist acts face since I personally have no professional experience on the issue and that the situations of victimization were rarely of a collective nature.

While lacking experience, I can however try to imagine the suffering and distress that the victims of terrorist acts go through, as well as their families, and their needs and the difficulty for them to get their bearings among the multiplicity of national and international bodies that are competent to cope with and then

react to such disasters. I simply hope that the information I bring to you hereafter will provide a few pointers for reflection on the issue we shall be dealing with over these three study days.

THE PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT OF LEGAL PROCEEDING ON THE VICTIMS

To look into the psychosocial impact of legal proceedings on the victims means taking an interest in two poles:

- An **objective** pole, that refers to the system set up by society to do justice, its functioning, its principles, the issues at stake, the powers and limits of its responses. This pole needs to be balanced by the way the legal actors will actually implement it.

- A **subjective** pole, which refers to the way the victims will perceive the legal response, will experience it and will integrate it into their personal history. This entails taking an interest in the expectations and hopes of the victims regarding Justice and the mandate they give it, but also in their beliefs and representations of the legal world and in the knowledge they put together about the way Justice works.

The first thing that springs to mind: I do not know of a single victim for whom the legal proceedings were not a source of violence.

This is easy to realize when looking at the **main stages of criminal proceedings**:

- The hearing
To put into words a traumatic experience, to say what cannot be said, to tell perfect strangers about the deep wounds inflicted on them, to recall in intimate detail a moment that has split life into a before and an after.

This is violent.

- The need for proof
To realize that one's word and suffering will not be enough for Justice to be done, to learn that the offender is presumed innocent i.e. considered to be innocent by society as long as s/he has not been sentenced, while the victim feels very deeply the acts s/he has undergone, to see the possibility that if the facts are only too real for the victim, they might never become a legal reality, to understand that s/he is going to have to be and remain "credible" during the whole procedure.

This is violent.

- Medical and psychological experts' reports
To give over your body and mind, to expose them to the eyes and hands of strangers not for them to heal, but so that the wounds can be legally recorded, proof sought for and the victim's credibility analyzed.

This is violent.

- The confrontation with the offender, revisiting the site, reconstructing events
To put the offender and the victim face to face in an unequal power relationship, to ask the victim to repeat once more his/her story, and sometimes to take part in its re-enactment before a crowd of legal actors and a photographer, to make the victim put up with the offender's words and attitude, his/her defence strategies (denial, lies, dismissal, laying responsibility on the victim, role reversal…)

This is violent.

- The waiting
After the commotion at the beginning of the enquiry comes a long wait for the victim, an indefinitely long wait with an uncertain conclusion with uncertain consequences, a wait that leads to confusion and dismay and which brings about feelings of isolation, insecurity, non-recognition but also powerlessness and incompetence. The victim gradually realizes that his/her tragedy and his/her status is not enough for Justice to approach him/her and keep him/her informed.

This is also violent.

Then the enquiry ends

- Consulting the file

Consulting the file means above all to move back in time and to regress in your life, going back to the source, to what brought about the proceedings, to relive the facts, to relive the ordeals that followed and to re-experience the emotions that went with it and, sometimes, to realize more sharply what went on.

Consulting the file also often means getting information for the first time on Justice's work, the way the victims' words and life histories are digested by the legal machine; it means seeing the "finished product", what comes out after many months of investigations and measuring the extent of the abyss that often separates reality from a reconstruction of the truth.

Consulting the file also means that the victims receive feedback about themselves from Justice.
Ex. 1: The "information" headings in the reports: "We bring to the knowledge of the King's Prosecutor that the victim is well-known of our departments for…"
Ex. 2: Expert examination reports: a mother files a complaint at the police station because her daughter, who is mentally handicapped and in legal infancy, has been sexually abused. The young woman and her mother were seen by a psychological expert, who stated in his report that the mother's care of her daughter was totally inadequate as her fusional relationship with her was seriously damaging.
Other examples: witness hearings, spontaneous letters or letters collected by the offender from the victims' entourage that denigrate their behaviour or tarnish their reputation.

Finally, consulting the file means meeting the reality of the facts and their consequences head-on via the photo file compiled after a death or assault and battery.

All of this is violent.

Already decisions

- The case is filed although unsolved or it is dismissed (unknown author)

The author could not be identified, s/he remains "unknown" and the legal authorities can only note that the measures it introduced have failed. This is when justice is seen at its weakest and most vulnerable in the eyes of the victim, who very much needs to be reassured. The case remains unsolved, and the victim now has to put his/her life back together without being able to rely on the feeling that Justice has been done and the offender has been punished. Not only does the victim have none of this but also, every passer-by in the street remains a suspect for the victim, who now more than ever fears being assaulted again.

- The case is filed although unsolved or it is dismissed (insufficient charges)

The author is known but the facts have not been established, proof is insufficient for a judge to rule that the offender is guilty. Therefore, the legal authorities do not put this case before a court and file it.

- The case is filed although unsolved or it is dismissed because of prescription or because the State's action is "extinguished"

The author is known, and the charges against him/her may be sufficient for him/her to stand trial but the facts are prescribed, came to light too late… A penal sanction is no longer possible. Case filed.

This is violent

Sometimes, the case will go before a court. A new stage of the procedure begins, with new actors, new rules, a new type of involvement for the victim, a difficult time, a struggle, fears and hopes.

- The first steps in the court room

To walk into a courtroom for a victim means first of all to be put in close proximity to many people who are going to play very different roles depending on where they are positioned, in impressive decorum. All of this will bring about lots of feelings and representations. The victim will meet new legal actors who, in turn, are going to appropriate the victim's story. It is also above all sometimes the first time since the beginning of the proceedings that s/he meets the accused and, possibly, his/her family and allies. S/he will also meet the public, the media, i.e. means by which the victim's story is spread outside. It also sometimes means being put in the presence of incriminating objects, which pulls the victim back into the heart of what s/he went through. Quite often, the case is rescheduled, with all of the deflation that goes with it for the victim.

All of this is violent.

- The evidence in the courtroom

To hear the facts being retold in the slightest detail, to be confronted with what the offender claims and, in some cases, with his/her lies or attempts to belittle the facts or reject responsibility onto the victim, to have to remain silent whatever the victim might be feeling at the time.

This is violent.

To testify. to retell the events, this time before the judges, an audience and the offender. To fear collapsing, crying, losing control, abusing or hitting, no longer being able to speak, not being able to remember, not knowing what to answer, not being able to convince the judges, not being credible, being hurt by the question and being judged.

This is violent.

To fear the publicity of the debates and its repercussions on everyday life, to fear being pointed at or stigmatized.

This is violent.

- The closing speech for the prosecution and the speech for the defence

To hear people speaking about oneself from various angles, with different hypotheses, deductions and interpretation, to be confronted with the defence's strategies, to realize that this moment you have been waiting for for so long will never completely express what you, the victim, really went through.

This is violent.

And then….

After the sentence, the realization hits you that the means Justice has are very poor. Poor means of investigation, poor means to protect the victim effectively, poor carrying out of the sentence and poor possibility that you shall ever receive any real compensation, poor control of the conditions imposed on the offender if s/he is given an alternative sentence to imprisonment…

The victim then feels deep disillusionment, and that is also violence against everything s/he might have always believed about Justice.

AND YET …

In telling you all of this, I have not yet said anything abut the psychosocial consequences of legal proceedings on the victims.

Because the time I have been given would be too short, but I could go through all of the stages of the procedure again and give you concrete examples where these stages have been a source of recognition and provided a real basis for the victim to put his/her life back together.

To talk about the psychosocial impact of legal proceedings also supposes that I tell you how each victim perceives, experiences and integrates this "product" of the judiciary system into their personal history. This is what I called the subjective pole. And at this level, each life experience will be unique. It is therefore difficult for me to tell you about them, and I no longer have the time today.

And to talk to you about the way victims receive the "product of Justice" inevitably brings me to tell you about "how" Justice actors concretely and really apply the procedures, do justice, and "how" they came into contact with the victims, each at their own level, from the police officer to the judge.

To explain the limits of criminal law, its shortcomings regarding the place of the victim is not enough to describe the psychosocial consequences for the victims. For this, we need to know how the victim has been informed or confronted with these limits or shortcomings, how his/her reality was listened to, and with how much availability, how legitimate his/her feelings of anger, revolt, disappointment were considered to be, what openings were provided for him/her to react and keep an active role…

TO CONCLUDE

Many efforts still need to be made to improve justice's functioning and make a more adequate place for the victims. But it is just as vital to go on raising actors of the legal world's awareness about victims' issues to promote a better understanding of their specific needs and to encourage, beyond the quality of the technical actions they make, attitudes and behaviours that are respectful and humane, and which express solidarity.

Finally – and because this is an issue very close to my heart and linked to this one – the attitude of the offender during the whole legal proceedings and the execution of the sentence is also a factor that will also have an impact on how the procedure is specifically experienced by the victim.

Initiatives that aim to make the offenders more accountable regarding their victims and make them take into consideration the damage they have done (I am thinking here of the mediation procedures and the concept of restorative justice) are, in my mind, to be encouraged. This means that our society needs to give itself the means to carry out these initiatives and that it gives the offenders means too, for instance by offering the chance of "repairing" themselves and personally and socially rebuilding themselves before they can turn to others.

THE IMPACT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND 'TROUBLE' ON VICTIMS IN BRITAIN

Joanne DOVER

Abstract

The Northern Ireland conflict known as the 'Troubles' has been happening since 1969. Predominantly the people most affected by this are those living in Northern Ireland itself. However, Britain has been the focus of a terrorist campaign by republican paramilitary organisations since the early 1970's and many people here have been affected - 16% of those killed in the conflict were from Britain.

The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Trust was set up by the parents of one of the children killed when the IRA placed two bombs in Warrington in 1993. The Trust set up the Legacy Project in 2001 to address the needs of victims, survivors and veterans in Great Britain affected by the conflict. We conducted a needs analysis which highlighted many psychological, medical and financial needs, along with issues surrounding justice, stoicism and communication of information.

We are now attempting to meet the long terms needs of victims in the area of acknowledgement and recognition of their experience and helping them to understand why the conflict was brought to Britain. For many people the conflict was removed from their everyday experience and knowledge and this has had a profound effect on their long term ability to deal with their experiences.

The year long study provides a detailed insight into 35 years of unmet need, and how the lack of support in the immediate aftermath has led to an increase in the long term effects on those recovering from trauma. This study is a useful tool for the planning of services to respond to the needs of victims of future terrorist attacks.

Key words: Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Trust, legacy project in 2001, needs analysis of victims.

PRESENTATION

On the 20th March 1993, the day before Mothers Day, 2 bombs detonated in a small market town in the North West of England, as part of a long campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Johnathan Ball aged 4 was killed instantly and Tim Parry aged 12 died five days later. Bronwen Vickers died as a result of her injuries 15 months later. 56 people were injured. It was 24 years into a long and bitter conflict in and around Northern Ireland. The parents of Tim, though devastated, called for peace - for this not to happen to any other families. The community of Warrington stood behind the families and became a town marked for its response to peace when its town had been torn apart. They have shown that through the hardest times, a positive impact can emerge. It is now 12 years later, and not everyone has been traumatised in the long term, many went on to recover well. This in part has been due to the strength of the community, but for all individuals, it is mostly dependent on the support available at the time, their family network and support, relationships, and services offered.

Tim Parry's parents, Colin and Wendy, chose to deal with their son's death in a positive way. They created the Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Trust in 1995 (1), with the idea of bringing young people from the different areas together to learn more about each other so that future conflict could be prevented. This continued for a number of years and in 2000 a dedicated Peace Centre in Warrington was opened. In the 5 years since it's opening, the Trust has built five other conflict resolution based programmes, ranging from work with very young children in schools to working with victims of conflict. We are working with young offenders and people disengaged from schools and society generally. Part of the conflict resolution process is about building for the future. Another part is about dealing with the past, so that it helps that future become more secure. The Legacy Project was created to deal with the legacy of the violence on the people in Britain, as a result of the Northern Ireland 'Troubles'.

Whilst building the work of the Trust Colin & Wendy were also a family dealing with the loss of a child due to a terrorist bomb. Throughout their own grieving process, the Parry family came across many other people who had lost loved ones or become injured in similar circumstances. They recognised some commonalities, but also some differences in the experiences of others. They saw a lot of initiatives happening in Northern Ireland for victims of the conflict, but no one was doing this in Britain. The Trust was granted funding from the British Government's Northern Ireland Office to establish the Legacy Project, to work with those affected by the conflict who live in Great Britain (England, Scotland & Wales). The project is providing support to those who have been bereaved, injured or traumatised as a result of the Northern Ireland 'Troubles'. This includes those bereaved, injured or witness to the bombs in Britain, emergency services workers impacted, soldiers who had served in Northern Ireland and were affected (Losing friends, involved in bombs, shootings and injured / traumatised) and families of soldiers killed in the conflict.

The first year of the project was spent finding people, trying to work out what incidents had happened, and trying to work out what needed to be done. We recognised a more formal approach needed to be taken and so we commissioned a consortium to undertake an independent needs analysis to identify the needs. The work was carried out by the Centre for Trauma Studies in Nottingham and Holden McAllister. Legacy staff were on the research team and we went out and interviewed people about their experiences and the support they had had. The needs analysis was published in 2003 (2) and we have now been funded for a further three years based on the recommendations from this report. We are now working to meet the identified needs.

In order to show the effects on people in Britain, I would like to give you a background to the Northern Ireland 'Troubles'. It would be hard for me to cover the whole difficult history surrounding Northern Ireland's recent conflict but it is necessary to give the events some context as this is an important part of meeting the needs of the victims – how they ended up becoming victims. I also realise I'm putting forward one view, and that it is also focused mostly on the group I work with from Britain. There has been over 800 years of contested history and violence in our islands but this current conflict is certainly related to Britain's colonial past. Ireland was under British rule from the 17th Century. In 1921 the island was divided – Northern Ireland as it is today came into existence, mainly because the protestant settlers were in the North East part of Ireland, and this was also where a great part of industry was based.

It is widely recognised that the current conflict started in 1969, around areas of civil rights. There were many demonstrations about inequalities in elections.housing and employment that discriminated against the Catholic / Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Violence erupted in the communities and the British Government sent troops to Northern Ireland in August 1969 to protect the catholic communities. Things started to change as the troops were seen as State forces by those who didn't recognise British

Authority in Ireland. Many shootings and bombings occurred on both sides and the first bomb in mainland Britain happened in 1971 in London at the Post Office Tower.

Of course over the last 36 years there have been many hundreds of incidents in Britain including Birmingham, Harrods, Brighton, London, Manchester etc, and many more in Northern Ireland itself of course. To date, there have been over 3,700 people killed, more than 40,000 people injured and many more who are still living with the trauma. Particularly in Northern Ireland, there are many who have had to live with more than one incident and their feelings of safety and security are still threatened.

The UK population as a whole is 58.6million. Northern Ireland's population is 1.6million, and the GB (England, Scotland and Wales) population is 57million. As most of the conflict took place in Northern Ireland, it's not fair to compare the scale, but the numbers can give you an idea of the impact in GB.

The majority of the incidents took place in Northern Ireland and so most of the population if not directly affected themselves, usually know someone who is. In Britain this is vastly different as the numbers affected and the size of the population means that spread out within 57 million people, you are unlikely to know other people affected by the 'Troubles'. This has been one of the biggest impacts on the victims.

Thought the numbers affected are smaller, they are not insignificant. Of the 3,700 killed, 622 of the people were from Britain, most of these were members of the armed forces and the majority of the deaths occurred in NI. More than 2,000 civilians treated in hospital. 350,000 members of the armed forces served in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2002, with 6,500 veterans on injury related war pensions. Not everyone has been impacted in the long term, in fact the majority of people go on to recover. However, if even 5% of these people are affected in the long term, there are still thousands of people impacted, not included the families who are left behind or who are caring for the injured and traumatised.

The needs identified in our report covered many different issues, and many of which will be common to any traumatic incident, not just terrorism. However, terrorism itself created some additional issues, as there was deliberate intent to kill and maim behind the act, as well as create terror, and thereby compromising people's feeling of security. This is likely to be the case for victims of other terrorist acts.

It is useful to remember us that our study was conducted some years after the event, in some cases the event was 20 years ago.

The context of the Troubles – this was vitally important as with many victims, how they came to be a victim influences how they react – there was a deliberate and political motivation behind incidents. Many people in GB don't feel a connection with the 'Troubles', there has been a lack of education Northern Ireland and about the British role in it, so when an incident happens, victims felt like they were catapulted into something that was nothing to do with them. A few people have tried to learn more to try to understand why it happened. Others reached out for peaceful solutions to the conflict.

There were many issues about recognition and acknowledgement of what happened to them. Victims in Britain haven't felt recognised by government, paramilitaries, the justice system, the general population. They also felt less recognised than Northern Ireland victims.

There were many different psychological needs in relation to the traumatic experience – not everyone will have long term needs but some do, especially if these needs were not met at the time. Some people may require therapeutic intervention to address these needs. There are many health needs: in relation to medication, dealing with the physical injuries, sometimes adjusting to disability, issues relating to carers.

We found that many victims seemed to accept what happened to them –because these kinds of events do happen in society – however they felt very let down by the government in being looked after and a lack of services provided. Overall they managed to cope, but this is not a reason to justify non-provision of support services. It is important to note that response to incidents has developed much further in recent years; this has been shown particularly in the wake of the London bombings in July this year. However, there is still more to do.

Victims were often unaware of where to get help as there was not much information available. They also felt that agencies didn't communicate and they often had to say the same things over and over again. Again, there is improvement in this area.

There were a variety of social needs. Victims felt a sense of isolation from others because of what happened; their social networks and relationships often broke down. There were also financial consequences, often people were unable to work due to injury or trauma, some were unable to sustain employment in the long term, there have been difficulties accessing and understanding the compensation schemes, and often if they did return to work they were in low income work.

So what are we doing to meet these needs? We are not a large organisation, we're not clinicians and so a lot of our work is around trying to direct people to the right services where we can't meet their needs. Also because our participants are spread out all over the country, they need local services to help them. A lot of the work we are doing is due to the lack of support services available in the aftermath of the event, so it's important to address this.

Our main focus is addressing the needs related to contextual issues, such as understanding the conflict and the political dimensions and also on acknowledgment and recognition of their experiences. We are working with those already affected to address their needs, and from this we are also feeding in to policy and service development for future incidents. We've split this in to two areas: Advocacy and Direct Support.

Advocacy: We have set up an Inter Agency group who include influential Government departments and organisation involved at a policy and provision level. The group is working to identify the long term impact and services needed following critical incidents and will provide guidance on long term response. We are also establishing an Advocacy Group to empower the victims to advocate their own needs through training on awareness raising, lobbying and handling the media.

Direct support: We have a number of initiatives in our direct support work. We've created a website to connect people on a peer level. There is information and advice on trauma, where to get help and a section where people can meet others and share experiences. We are also training several people to become peer supporters, they will be available on the website, telephone and at residentials to listen to others and support them. We have a series of residential weekends bringing people together for mutual support, to share their experiences in a group setting, be acknowledged and heard. As mentioned previously, a significant amount of our work is signposting people on to other forms of help and support. Finally we are in the process of securing funding for an archive of experiences. This will be a formal place where people can record their experiences for the wider public to acknowledge and learn about the human impact.

We have learned a lot from our participants which could be helpful for victims of other and future events. As well as the many needs already highlighted, there are other impacts for victims in the longer term.

Anniversaries or birthdays of a loved one can be painful, especially when it is a significant birthday or anniversary (1st, 5th, 10th, etc). These anniversaries can make people more aware of the losses they have experienced, whether that of a loved one or the loss of previous quality of life.

Other events where there is great suffering can also have an impact, such as 9/11, Bali, Madrid and more recently the tsunami and London bombings. Many of our participants have wanted to reach out to others in pain, they feel connected to it, they can re-experience the loss (though not always intensely). For one of our group, the London bombings were very close to home for her and she relived her own incident. This actually allowed her to recognise for herself that she needed help and so has had a positive effect.

Political events and news also bring back strong feelings and memories, or hurt and pain if it is felt to be an injustice in some way. This has been seen in our group when there was a recent statement by the IRA regarding disarmament. Prisoner release was part of a political settlement during the Peace Agreement in 1998 (victims in Britain were not consulted) and so the victims feel that there has been a lack of justice / criminal justice or reparation.

Even the recent riots in Belfast had the effect of provoking memories of the past, an increased fear of a return to violence, and also a despondency that nothing has actually changed or progressed.

All these outside influences can be difficult and our victims have said it would have been useful to have been told to anticipate these kinds of things happening later on.

So what lessons can we take from these experiences?

The first and most important is for us to realise there is a wider impact that we might think. The impact goes beyond the bereaved and injured to those who were present and many of them will need support. It is useful to keep this in mind when planning responses.

Every person is different and will have a wide variety of need in both the short and long term – this is different for everyone and this needs to be taken into consideration.

Consideration needs to be given to the longer term provisions. Often trauma is identified months and even years later, peer experiences can be helpful and the context may need to be addressed – the political motivations behind the acts, or understanding why.

Acknowledgement and Recognition of what has happened is important for some people. There will be different levels needed for different people at different times. This may take the form of memorials, compensation, recording of stories as history, criminal justice, encountering others, and even sometimes meeting the 'other side'.

Governments and organisations need to form strong networks and work together, sharing information and co-operating on initiatives means that it will be less likely for people to fall through the gaps.

It is important also to remember the resilience of human beings. We have the ability to cope with the most demanding and horrendous circumstances, something I see in my work every day. People come through these experiences and come out the other side with a good quality of life, having integrated the experiences and losses into a new existence. Not everyone needs long term support, but it is important to have support structures in place if they do.

Peer support can be a useful tool for recovery, there can be great support in the shared pain, commonality with others that can decrease the feeling of being isolated from life and other people.

I hope the lessons we have learned from our experiences in Britain can be of benefit to you all in your work. Thank you.

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IMPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS OF TERRORIST ACTS ON EMERGENCY RESCUE WORKERS

Barthold BIERENS DE HAAN

Abstract

In the face of terrorist acts, the crisis workers are professionals who can be involved in two ways: either as rescue workers, whose job is to rescue victims and are, as such, subject to the various stresses of their jobs, or as victims themselves, whether directly or indirectly targeted by the terrorists. For the crisis workers and for their managers, these two possibilities will be treated differently. In the first case, the recognition and management of the various types of stress will be at the forefront, including the usual measures of briefing, support during the intervention and debriefing on their return. In the second case, once the operational decisions have been made and the immediate staff management operations carried out, the support for all people involved in an often painful grieving process will be a priority. This will include contacting families and providing them with psychological support, informing surviving colleagues and their psychological support if necessary, the organisation of ceremonies, internal communication within the organisation and informing the media.

Keywords: terrorist acts, responders, support, burnout, psychological trauma, debriefing

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist acts can have a double impact on emergency responders, whether they are rescuers or humanitarian workers, police officers, firefighters, mine-clearers, doctors, nurses, pathologists, technicians, stretcher bearers or cleaners etc. These acts, first of all, can have an impact on their state of stress when, as professional rescuers, they go on site to rescue victims. They can also influence them directly when they are brutally targeted: these rescuers then become victims themselves, who are traumatized or killed. It is important to bear in mind both eventualities and to remember that with growing threat in present times and for all responders, a terrorist act can happen anywhere: in Western metropolisses, at faraway tourist sites, in places where humanitarian interventions are taking place or in war zones. One can recall, for instance, the attacks that hit New York and London, Djerba and Bali, Northern Caucasus and Iraq.

The following reflection is based on ten years of experience as the head of the *Psychological support programme for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, Geneva) staff in the field.* The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement was born from this organisation, which is impartial, neutral and independent. The Red Cross has the exclusively humanitarian mission of protecting the life and dignity of the victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It also strives to prevent suffering by promoting and reinforcing universal humanitarian law and principles.

Over these ten years of work, support for emergency rescue workers involved in the first eventuality, ie of rescuing victims of terrorist acts, has been exceptional. However, I also had to work, in emergency circumstances, following acts of terrorism, crime or war that had directly targeted the organisation. These attacks, that the ICRC qualifies as *serious security incidents* when they lead to the death of one or several employees, suddenly turned humanitarian workers into victims, one might add innocent and revolted victims, which is precisely what the terrorist act sought to provoke.

RESPONDENTS HELPING VICTIMS

On 7th August 1998, a double terrorist attack using boobytrapped lorries targeting the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi killed 213 people in Nairobi and 12 in Dar es Salaam. Most of the victims were African civilians, plus a few US diplomats. The Nairobi attack took place in the business quarter in the middle of the day, right in the city centre, and wounded over 4,000 people. Certain ICRC collaborators, men and women, went on site to help get the victims out. I remember debriefing them on their

return to Geneva. They needed to talk about the shock they felt on seeing this disaster, the heaps of smoking ruins, the number of people affected, also to express the fact that this attack could just as well have targeted the headquarters of their own organisation and that the intervention on site had taken place in the fear of a second terrorist attack and a new explosion. This was **traumatic stress** as we had often seen it on returns from missions, a stress that needed careful listening – a critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) – at the end of the mission to ensure that these people can get back to normal within three months after the incident.

The other experiences I have are the same as everyone's when reading the daily press: I particularly remember a photo in the media. The *L'Express* weekly had selected it for its 2002 Retrospective. You could see a man on it, wearing an orange fluorescent vest and a black skull cap, the kippa worn by religious Jews. He was leaning over a head, that he was photographing carefully. This head had rolled into the gutter. Its eyes were open. The rescuer was leaning over what was left of a victim, the kamikaze himself. At the same time, this man is unbearably stared in the face by Death, like the head of the Medusa, which, even decapitated, kept its evil power (1) (our translation). Just seeing this isolated head, the head of the terrorist whose body had been blown apart by the explosives he had been carrying round his belt, was enough to evoke horror. The attack had taken place in Jerusalem. I had no doubt that these rescuers had a very hard time because the violence was not only new and extreme but also repetitive, as terrorist attacks took place month after month, leaving the responders no opportunity to recover from one attack to another.

WHO ARE THESE RESCUERS ?

ZAKA is the Hebrew acronym of an Israeli organisation that takes care "Identifying Victims of Disaster" (2). Its members are ultrareligious Jews, all volunteers, who work as "undertakers" and as first aid staff at the sites of the suicide attacks that keep taking place in Israel. They are often the first to be on site, when the smoke and smell have not yet dissipated, before the Magen David Adom ambulances and rescuers arrive. Their job is to pick up the pieces of the victims' bodies and shroud them as Jewish law, the Halacha, requires. Their motivation is essentially of an ethical and religious nature. For them, to shroud all parts of the deceased's body is a strict religious duty owed to the victim. They often pick up bits of bodies but sometimes also whole limbs that they quickly dispatch to the hospital where the victims are sewn back together, particularly in the case of children. Many studies of this very special group of rescuers who are present on all sites of terrorist attacks in Israel reveal that the PTSD and psychological suffering rates are extremely low while the stress that this work involves might be very high. It seems that these people are protected by their families (they all have children), their ethics, their religious convictions, their *esprit de corps* and the extraordinary public recognition they enjoy. In 2001, the United Nations awarded it the honorary title of best Israeli volunteer organisation of the year.

Therefore, it makes sense to look at Israel to study the repercussions of terrorist acts on emergency respondents. This country has unfortunately accumulated the most experience on extremely violent trauma that affects the country's entire population. Professor Arik Shalev (3), Head of Hadassah Hospital's emergency psychiatry unit in Jerusalem is only too aware of this. It is his job to ensure the wellbeing of his team of psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers. For some of them, access to the emergency room, where the terrorised families gather after each attack looking for hope or information, is simply denied. Why? Because he knows that these people from families that have survived the Holocaust or who have already been affected by terrorism in Israel are fragile. They are not allowed in the emergency room but have to stay on site, in the unit, to support and debrief the team's men and women who, being in permanent contact with the families, are exhausted in the evenings. The debriefers need debriefing too. And burnout needs preventing by forcing the people concerned to go and rest over a long weekend when they risk exhaustion and the refusal to rest.

One more word about the intervention of the workers involved in the particular situations that are terrorist acts. Indeed, this intervention needs great courage. One only has to remember New York's firemen, who did not hesitate to rush into the Twin Towers and sacrifice their own lives although the flames and the unstable structure led to believe the buildings might collapse.

All of these rescuers, in Israel and in New York, benefit from the public's and society's recognition, a factor that is now known to protect against the development of a PTSD. At least they, when they survive, do not return from their mission in silence and discretion, facing the criticism of their fellow citizens, as was the

case for those who returned to the USA from the Vietnam war, or to Israel from the war in the Lebanon. And for those who do not return, their families are supported, honored and, if necessary, provided with financial compensation.

RESCUERS WHO ARE VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS

When rescuers are victims of terrorist acts, they are usually deliberately targeted by the kamikazes and bombers and those who are behind the attacks, who choose – or even prefer – them because of the media impact. They are *soft targets*, ie ill-defended, as opposed to hard targets, such as the military or politicians, who are far more difficult to reach. In this way, rescuers are either targeted at the workplace or at home, when they are travelling, relaxing or resting. The attack aims to kill the person/people involved, more rarely to kidnap them in order to negotiate their freedom against political advantages or money.

Many humanitarian agencies, either NGOs or United Nations bodies, have been victims of these attacks; One of these, against the UN's headquarters in Baghdad, killed on 20th August 2003 Sergio Viera Di Mello and his main collaborators. A few years earlier, the High Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR) was the target. Vincent Cochetel was captured in North Ossetia in January 1998 and kept hostage for 317 days in Chechnya. During the Timor conflict, the HCR was targeted once again and lost three collaborators in Atambua, East Timor. MSF has mostly been hit by the hostage-taking of one or several collaborators, in North Caucasus for instance, or recently in Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo. As for the ICRC, it has suffered ambushes of teams on the move, deliberate attacks against its residences, offices and hospitals, as well as hostage-taking. Like other organisations, the ICRC has had to learn to react adequately to these dramatic situations and provide the immediate survivors, families and colleagues with the support they ask for.

It is not possible for me to go into detail about the management of these various crises, I shall however focus on two of them as examples: the collective assassination of six ICRC members in Chechnya and the hostage-taking of one of its collaborators in North Caucasus.

SUPPORT AFTER A COLLECTIVE KILLING: THE NOVY ATAGI DISASTER (4)

In the night of 16th to 17th December 1996, six members of the Red Cross team at the ICRC hospital in Novy Atagy, Chechnya were shot dead in their sleep by a commando of masked killers with silenced weapons. A seventh delegate, who was wounded, survived the butchery.

On the morning of 17th December 1996, an ambulance plane left Geneva for North Caucasus to fetch the wounded man who had survived the night's massacre. On board were three ICRC officials: the delegate-general, responsible for operational activities in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia area, the chief medical officer of the Health Division, which oversees the surgical hospital, and myself, as doctor responsible for supporting and managing the collaborators' stress. On site, three people shared a double task: on the one hand, the enquiry into the causes of the tragedy and the operational decisions that needed making urgently (for instance in terms of security), and on the other hand, supporting the colleagues and managing this collective grief.

We arrived in Naltchik early enough to welcome our colleagues from Novy Atagi. Their convoy arrived at around 10 P.M. after having driven at low speed in snow for over eight hours. Christophe Hensch, our wounded colleague, who had received first aid on site, was immediately taken care of. He told us what happened during the killing as he experienced it then settled down in the ambulance plane. He took of an hour later for Geneva, where he was hospitalized. During that same night, events of the previous night were evoked for a first time during a meal including everyone. Then everyone tried to get a little sleep.

The following day, we gathered all members of the delegation together to inform everyone of our mission's objectives. I then proceeded with the *critical incident stress debriefing (CISD)* of the hospital's escapees. This meeting brought together the thirteen people present at the hospital on the night of the killings and two other members of this team who were exceptionnally absent that evening. It lasted two-and-a-half hours and gave everyone the opportunity to recall "their night" and to share their emotions with the group.

In the afternoon, we all met at Naltchik's morgue to place the bodies of our colleagues in their coffins. At the end of the day, a long convoy including a lorry transporting the six coffins and about fifteen vehicles set off for Mineralnyje Vody airport, a hundred kilometers away. In the evening, the bodies left the airport with the accompanying team and the survivors. Earlier on, a ceremony had taken place in one of the airport's hangars in front of the coffins covered with ICRC flags. Around a hundred people were present: the dramatic event's survivors, other delegates leaving for Geneva, but also those who were staying. In the freezing cold and racket of the planes landing and taking off, sober and moving last respects were paid to the six victims, then each person, in a slow procession, walked past the coffins.

A similar ceremony is organised on the tarmac of Cointrin, Geneva airport in the presence of the local authorities, members of the Committee, officials from the ICRC's directorate and representatives of the National Societies.

In the meantime, I went ahead with my work in Naltchik, listening, sharing emotions and providing collective and individual support for the colleagues who remained in the country: a first group of 25 Chechen employees from the hospital is welcomed on the day of official mourning, then the five colleagues from the Grozny delegation are welcomed. Finally, a meeting with all the expatriate staff of the Grozny mission and the offices in Naltchik, Khazavyurt and Nazran gives everyone the opportunity to talk about the dramatic event. And also about the consequences for the future of the ICRC's work in North Causasus.

The *second CISD* is organised six weeks later and brings together the fourteen escapees from the hospital, including this time the wounded colleague who had not been able to take part in the *first CISD* in Naltchik, as well as a nurse and myself. This series of discussions makes it possible to consolidate the support and prevention work regarding *posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)* while facilitating the grieving process.

Supporting collective trauma following the death of one or several members of the Red Cross team

When a serious incident takes place, during which one or several members of a Red Cross team are killed, the survivors' trauma needs particular support. A series of measures then need to be taken or, at least, looked into.

- A *team of "rescuers"* must immediately be sent on site. It will include the person from headquarters responsible for the area concerned, who will take the necessary operational decisions, and a person who is solely in charge of managing emotions and grief. These two people, who are unscathed and were not present during the incident, represent and symbolise, in a way, the response that an organisations's headquarters wants to put at the disposal of staff in the field when a tragic event might temporarily weaken everyone's resistance and the management abilities of the bosses. These "rescuers" have the necessary distance regarding the tragedy; they also have necessary experience of similar situations.

- The c*ritical incident stress debriefing (CISD)* must be carried out in the two or three days following the event. As it deliberately favours a collective approach, this *stress debriefing* brings together all survivors of the disaster in a quiet room within the delegation. *A group leader* (the doctor from headquarters) outlines two rules: everyone is free to speak; everything said will remain confidential. The *leader* also stresses his/her priority preoccupation: to enable everyone to express how they experienced the incident and to transmit their emotions to the whole group. Then, progressing stage by the stage, the *leader* will endeavour to evoke an accurate and detailed account of the facts, an expression of the thoughts and reflections of everyone and then, a description of the emotional reactions and symptoms that remain after the trauma (such as sleeping disorders, states of anxiety or excitement, repeated flashbacks). Finally, the *leader* underlines the normality of such stress reactions and, for all of the group, looks to the future. This might be the continuation of activities, a period of rest or a return to headquarters. Such an exercise makes it possible to identify those who might need individualised support.

- A *funeral ceremony in the presence of the coffins* is vital and should not be neglected. This ceremony enables the group of survivors, the families and friends and the accompanying staff to feel united. It is for everyone the starting point of the grieving process, brings support to the sharing of emotions that has already begun and introduces the indispensable spiritual or religious dimension.

- The *speedy return of the survivors*, on board a specially chartered plane, at the same time as the bodies of their deceased comrades, is an important symbol for the survivors and for the families. The first phase of support is now over, as is the emergency intervention of the institution's headquarters.

HOSTAGE-TAKING

The ICRC, like other organisations, has experienced hostage-taking. I particularly remember the first one that came to my attention, in 1989. Elio Enriquez, a young orthopaedist, left with his colleague, Emmanuel Christen, for Saida, South Lebanon, on an ICRC mission; A few weeks after their arrival, they were both kidnapped. They were only freed 312 days later, in a very bad physical and moral state. "I am returning from the world of the living dead", Elio had declared on his arrival in Switzerland. This is proof that, from one moment to the next, a rescuer can turn into a victim.

And then hostage-takings became more common. In Somalia, Sudan, Chechnya, Colombia. It was always the same story. One or several collaborators were kidnapped or held hostage at their workplace. Heavy negotiations start. The media get hold of information. The families lose confidence. The collaborators lose patience. All of this lasts a long time and the tension at headquarters keeps getting higher.

In July 1999, an ICRC male nurse of Brazilian origin but with New-Zealander nationality was kidnapped righ in the centre of the city of Naltchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria by armed men, transported to Inguchia then to Chechnya and held for 66 days. Over these two months, intense negotiations took place in Geneva, Moscow and the Caucasus. The Brazilian and New-Zealander families were welcomed in Geneva, several support missions were organised in Brazil, New Zealand, Moscow and Naltchik, experts were consulted, the emergency cell met around twenty times, frequent contacts were also organised with the local and international press to finally lead to our colleague's release and his checkup and debriefing in Geneva.

Hostage-taking always leads to a crisis at institutional level, and hence within any organisation, a crisis that we at the ICRC had to learn to deal with, little by little, from hostage-taking to hostage-taking.

- Principles of negotiation. In the case of hostage-taking with a request for a ransom, all experts agree that negotiating with the kidnappers is in itself a factor of success. To not negotiate leads to running the risk of the hostage being eliminated, while to immediately give in to the conditions that have been requested immediately leads to increased demands. In practical terms, this means that it is necessary to enter into discussions while refusing the initial conditions to make time and to get organised with the idea that it will take time, to not come across as a target that will easily give in, to keep control over the situation with respect of for instance the family and the press, to communicate on the issue with the local or international community, to regularly inform the family and friends, the collaborators and the media. Experts recommend that, in all cases, the communicator should not be the negotiator. In other words, crisis management will start with the creation of a crisis cell that includes a *strategic committee,* which negotiates*,* and a *task force*, which coordinates and informs. The task force comprises representatives of the units concerned with the kidnap, ie Operations, Security, Stress Management, the Legal division, and Press and Internal Communications.

- Confidentiality : Hostage-takings can only be solved optimally if there is some secrecy. This means that all members of the *task force* must stick to it *vis-à-vis* their hierarchy. As for collaborators, they have to accept that they will only receive limited information.

- Consultants : Using experts in hostage-taking, professionals of this type of crisis management is very important as it enables us stand back slightly and therefore to better analyse the stakes and strategies (see the Control Risk Group in London).

- Families : Supporting the families is one of the core elements of managing the crisis. It is said that close to 40% of the time and energy invested must be spent here. To build trust right from the first hours is a key element for success. We bring across the message that we shall never lie but this does not mean that we shall tell them the whole truth. To inform, to offer the families and friends a link to the organisation via a single person, to provide psychological support, to offer constructive tasks, to help the family protect itself against media invasion, all of these tasks are part of the crisis cell's activities. And one should also not forget that the immediate collaborators of the kidnapped people are to be handled like a second family.

- The hostages' release must be planned in detail: welcoming phase, reunion with the families, medical examinations, and operations, CISD, repatriation and rehabilitation debriefings. At the ICRC, we have chosen to priviliege the "English type" of rehabilitation (5), ie the one they devised following the return of their hostages from the Lebanon. This rehabilitation leaves nothing to chance. The hostages are taken care of immediately on their return, on site if possible, then in their home country when leaving the plane. Contacts with family and friends and with the media are controlled, reduced, dispensed in small doses. The physical examination is thorough. The person or persons in charge of the debriefing sleep in the clinic with the hostage and are available night and day to listen to them. A very careful debriefing is carried out, respecting the chronology of the whole period of detention. After these first days, a residence away from society and the media is offered to the former hostage and to his family and friends. The return to "normal life" is delayed.

SUPPORT FOR THE RESCUERS

PROGRAMME FOR MANAGING THE STRESS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF COLLABORATORS IN THE FIELD (6).

Most humanitarian organisations, whether they are governmental or non-governmental, are providing their collaborators on missions with psychological support programmes. Indeed, the emotional burden and the different forms of stress weighing down on the staff are so heavy that their health, security and operational efficacy might suffer in the long term. Added to the difficult aspect of humanitarian work itself (*job related stress*) and to the interrelational problems that can arise in any group of humans (*day to day stress*) are the reactions of *critical incident stress* that are associated with the risks of war, terrorism and insecurity.


These three types of stress, to which we have to add *burn-out*, the consequence of cumulative stress that has not been recognised and is out of hand, must be taken into consideration in the field and controlled following the same principles:

1) The reactions of stress observed in the field are **normal.** They do not mean that psychological fragility was present beforehand but are a reaction to a crisis situation that each person has to learn to control. This crisis expresses itself differently from person to person. It is the consequence of abnormal critical events that are the source of more or less violent traumas that volunteers experience on mission. Each person remains responsible for their emotions.

2) Dealing with these reactions of stress or controlling them are the **responsibility of the head of the delegation** (or of the head of operations). This person suggests support measures to the people concerned, based on careful listening, a CISD and (or) on time off for resting. These measures must be offered immediately, on site, simply and in the hope of getting back to normal soon.

The support programme on stress includes three phases of intervention: information *before* the mission, support *during* the mission and protection on *return*. It involves different people at the different stages: trainers, during the courses before leaving for the mission, the executives on site during the mission and finally, on return, those responsible for planning human resources.

This programme requires the cooperation of all collaborators: everyone, in the field and at headquarters, must feel concerned by stress management. If the doctor responsible for this stress management is in charge of devising the programme, giving advice to various instances of the institution and supporting executives in the field, these executives are the ones who have to implement these measures. The extent of the disaster, whether collaborators have died or not, therefore commands ICRC heaquarters intervention.

PRINCIPES DE GESTION DU STRESS SUR LE TERRAIN
PRINCIPLES OF STRESS MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD

Privilieging a non-medicalised and non-psychiatric pragmatic approach, this programme is essentially based on good team dynamics and strong executives who are aware of the problem of staff stress and trained to control it. The programme should benefit from the spirit of solidarity that is high within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which is particularly the case when facing disasters of the extent of Novy Atagi. Such a tragedy brings the action of the whole Movement into question, shakes its Fundamental Principles and causes its humanitarian volunteers or workers much distress.

The aim of the programme is not to help tolerate the intolerable nor to get volunteers used to stress in the field but rather to offer via empathic sharing a chance to heal without permanent damage and some consolation.

BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR SUPPORTING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS FACING TERRORIST ACTS

We can never say often enough that, for a group of rescuers or a humanitarian organisation, the possibility of falling victim tp a terrorist act must be envisaged, anticipated and rehearsed. There is no way that improvisation can respond to the physical and emotional cataclysm, to the feelings of horror and endless questions that such an attack wreaks on the rescue workers, their families and the whole of the organisation that employs them. Each organisation of respondeers or rescuers is responsible for introducing adequate measures to fight against the various forms of stress and possible secondary handicaps. It has to be known that the consequences of a badly managed terrorist act can last for a very long period, handicapping the responders, their families and friends and the whole organisation for months, and that managing the consequences takes up a lot of time and energy and efficient task distribution.

After the attack, which always leads to one or several victims, good management will rely on a *checklist*, that each organisation must draw up. The ICRC checklist includes at the present day the following points and questions:

- Operational decisions : Should activites be totally or partially suspended? Should expatriate staff be pulled out totally or in part? How and when should activities be resumed? To determine this, one should bear in mind that pulling out considerably complicates the rescue of the victims, the analysis of the terrorist act's causes, a return that might take place in a context where one quickly loses contact with reality in the field. One must therefore "get out of the shock of the tragedy" before taking the decision of pulling out.

- Management aspects : Should the crisis be managed with a crisis cell? Who is responsible for the colleagues' follow-up? What about the ceremonies? Who is responsible for the internal enquiry, the factual report detailing what needs drafting, analysing and, finally, filing? Is an autopsy of the victims required, as well as a ballistics report? Have photos of the site of the attack been taken, or of the body (bodies)? What degree of confidentiality should the issue be given? The fundamental question "Who is responsible for this tragedy?" should not be put to one side, on the principle that there "should be not witchhunting, but no impunity either". Finally, the question of court action must also be posed. The final decision is to define in detail how activities should be resumed. During this whole process, we rely on the security-stress cell, which acts in an advisory capacity but which does not have decision-making authority, unlike the United Nations' security unit.

- Contacts with the deceased's family: Who writes the letters of condolence to the families, the letters of sympathy on the first anniversary of their deaths? Who shall represent the organisation at the family funerals? Shall the organisation provide support for the families to travel to the site of the tragedy? Shall a brochure be handed to the families retracing the deceased's career, a video of the ceremony or ceremonies, a selection of letters of sympathy, possibly a medal… Shall good wishes be exchanged on a regular basis, and shall a yearly invitation be sent at a a key date to visit the "Garden of Memories", which is a place of commemoration at the organisation itself dedicated to the women and men who lost their lives in the course of their work?
These contacts with the families require transparency and truth (we say everything) but this should not, for all that, encourage court action.

- Informing collaborators : One should seek transparency and trust, regularly and systematically inform, either orally or in writing (intranet), include national straff and regularly have an update on the enquiry's progression.

- The psychological follow-up of surviving colleagues : The doctor of the security-stress cell goes on site. Delegation employees must be included in the debriefing of the staff. Support is all the more efficient when it is anchored in a favourable environment including a boss who is aware of the importance of good HR management in these particular circumstances, good group dynamics, crisis management that respects the group's cohesion, an adequate response

        from the organisation's headquarters (which sends at least 3 people), the organisation of a ceremony on site, a welcome for the families of the victims, the collaborators and their families at headquarters in Geneva, a post-crisis follow-up with the identification of particular cases needing therapy, including people from headquarters involved in managing the crisis at a distance from the "front". Finally, one should ask the question whether, following a serious security incident involving the death of a collaborator, the boss should be systematically replaced or not.

-   <u>Institutional mourning</u> : Institutional mourning must satisfy the staff's three needs: to know, to hope and to remember (7). This involves a whole series of measures including the possibility of putting the flag at half mast (for the Red Cross Movement), the publication of a death announcement, opening a condolences register that can be signed at the organisation's headquarters, informing the whole staff about observing a minute's silence, the organisation of a day of mourning, possibly of a silent march (as was the case in Geneva in the case of the attack in Chechnya, which affected the ICRC, and the attack in Baghdad, which hit the United Nations building), a moment of meditation in the "Garden of Memories", writing articles for the press and the possibility of creating a Foundation in memory of the victim(s).
    The organisation of ceremonies in the field in the presence of all collaborators and agencies involved in humanitarian work, on the tarmac at the airport of departure and of arrival and in Geneva or at the place of residence of the deceased (cathedral or outside a religious building).

-   <u>External information</u>: A clear attitude *vis-à-vis* the media (press release, public statement) is important.

-   <u>Discussions with the various parties</u>: These steps taken with the parties involved in the conflict, other States, donors, the Red Cross Movement, and possibly other stakeholders are essential not only to obtain information but also and above all so that they intervene.

        In particular in the eventuality of a terrorist act, which frequently leads to physical, emotional and sometimes spiritual upheaval, or deep questioning, it has to be recalled that the strength of the people involved will depend prioritarily on the **cohesion of the team** and on **preexisting leadership**. Managing the crisis will therefore rely as a priority on prevention and the consolidation of these two pillars. And as Figley has underlined, certain environments, known as "healing environments", are therapeutic in themselves (7). It is precisely on creating such an environment that leaders have to work. For instance on a working environment in which the elements of stress and burnout are considered to be real and inevitable. These problems affect the whole group and not only certain individuals. A working environment in which solutions are sought for each and everyone instead of stigmatising someone, an environment where support is offered clearly, openly and transparently, where tolerance is high for the fragility of one person or another, the group's cohesion (*esprit de corps*) is strong, communication is open and efficient, any verbal violence is repressed and, finally, an environment where people do not resort to alcohol or drugs and where, in all cases, space and time for consolation are available on top of psychological support.

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THE IMMEDIATE AND POST-IMMEDIATE INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES IN CASES OF TERRORIST ACTS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE

Keld MOLIN

Abstract

In the wake of fear and psychological reactions different kinds of behavioral reactions will arise. This behavior might be adaptive or non-adaptive for the survivor.

Some behavioral reactions can result in secondary problems, suffering and diseases. The survivor's behavior can cause problems for hospitals, society and the authorities. These problems might be of an even greater magnitude and complexity than the primary problems of the terror impact.

Hospitals will be crowded with survivors with no need for treatment, and are not prepared to receive a lot of potentially contaminated survivors in a short time and neither prepared for the survivor's psychological needs. Non-adaptive use of protective device and medication will cause suffering or death.

The authorities relief and rescue operations will focus at the center of the damaged area. But are the information services, the risk communication and public health efforts well integrated in emergency preparedness plans?

In a modern society it is of vital importance that psychosocial aspects is an integrated part of the emergency preparedness plans. In the presentation it will be argued that risk communication, and crisis management is even more significant in preventing psychological reactions, suffering and non-adaptive behavior. In this way it is mandatory that the central authorities emphasize to possess empathy and public health knowledge.

Key words: public health, psychological and behavioural reactions, adaptation, emergency preparedness plans, psychosocial aspects

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

In this presentation I will emphasise the public health perspective of terrorism. I will focus on how the authorities can assist the public in dealing with terrorism and its aftermath.

Several recent books emphasise the public health perspective. This is a new perspective reflecting that even though the direct and immediate consequences of a terror attack are scary, the indirect and long-term effects may present the greatest challenges for humans, society and the authorities.

First I will present terrorism and it's consequences in a psychological frame.

Second I will review some of the malevolent consequences of terrorism, and especially emphasise the indirect, psychological and public health issues.

Third I will discuss the role of fear and risk communication, and how the authorities can establish institutional resources capable for crisis management to mitigate the adverse effects of terrorism that is mediated of psychological issues.

I have dealt with these three issues in my book "The psychological sequelae of terrorism", where CBRN-terrorism is the main issue [1].

The issues are relevant and exist in all types of terrorism, but are highly visible in case of CBRN-terrorism, why this is the focus point in my book. Unfortunately the book is yet only available in Danish.

TERRORISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The direct consequences of terrorism are obvious. There will be deaths and physical destructions. But they are not the endpoint in and of themselves. Terrorism is psychological warfare. The success of future terrorism will not be measured in a body count nor in the number of buildings destroyed. The success will be measured by its impact upon the minds of those targeted.

Sometimes the authorities compare and mix up terrorism and disasters.

This is a mishap and failure because the phenomenology and mental and practical consequences is very different.

Disasters have a local effect in a country, but even though a terror attack might have the same local effect, it is more than the physical destruction.

We are talking about two very different psychological and health scenarios and kinds of impact.

Contrary to popular belief, terrorism is not a tactical weapon; rather it represents a strategic weapon.

Terrorism is not a question of local destruction but that the country and population is under attack, which especially will be obvious in case of CBRN terrorism.

Historically we have underestimated the pathogenic virulence of terrorism. This is changing and a new perspective has arisen as result of contemporary research, which is reflected in several recent books [2-5].

The concept, which is important to understand, is the concept of psychological contagion.

In the present context, contagion refers to the ability of the terror and demoralisation to be transmitted to those not directly affected by the initial terrorist event.

In this way psychological contagion represents a toxic cascade of psychological and behavioural events, that threatens to erode the very foundation of society by attacking its most basic psychological needs, safety and security, - concepts which Maslow has made well-known years ago.

It has been noted that there may be what we refer to as an "iceberg effect of terrorism" resulting from terrorism. The "iceberg effect" is reflecting the fact that terrorism will create more psychological casualties than physical casualties, and that many of those casualties may exhibit a latency or other effect that makes them invisible to public health resources.

THE DIFFERENT MALEVOLENT CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

It is possible to add up the consequences of terrorism in different ways.

One possibility is a psychiatric approach in terms of PTSD, depression, anxiety, and so on.

Another possibility is a psychological approach, which in greater magnitude will catch up the public health issues.

The public health consequences will be seen all over the country: psychological reactions and disorders, fear, fear of repetition, psychosomatic symptoms, and different behavioural consequences.

One of the intermediate and dominant factors in the different consequences is fear.

Fear is not only an emotion; fear is also an incentive for behaviour and behavioural reactions.

Let us illustrate this from the research:

ISRAEL, GULF WAR

Karsenty et al. (1991) [6]: "A study of 1059 casualties at emergency departments following Iraqi SCUD-missile attack in Israel".

Everybody were aware of the threat, that Iraq would use non-conventional weapons, which in this case primarily means nerve gas.

22% of the patients are directly injured by the missile explosions (234 persons):
- 78% (182) physical injuries
- 22% (52) acute anxiety and psychological reactions

78% of the patients are **indirectly** injured; not by the missiles (825 persons): (A lot of the patient where not even living in the areas, which were attacked)
- 0,5% (4) died of intercurrent myocardial infarction
- 1% (7) died due to inappropriate use of gas masks
- 5% (40) sustained physical injuries while rushing to safety
- 28% (230) inappropriate injection of atropine
- 66% (544) acute anxiety and psychological reactions

SARIN POISONING ON TOKYO SUBWAY, 1995 [7]

The nerve gas sarin was released and spread on 3 different Tokyo subway lines:

Most of the victims went to the nearby hospitals for medical treatment of their own accord.
- 12 died
- 17 was critically injured
- >4000 had no need for anti-poisonous treatment

Only 15% had need of treatment, and all the train passengers with an urgent demand for medical examination created chaos at the hospitals.

BRAZIL, GOIANIA, 1987

The same picture was seen in Brazil in 1987 when *radioactive powder was spread in the city of Goiânia* [8]. 4 died and 250 had a minor, non-significant radiation syndrome.

Still 112.000 wanted medical examination and treatment.
Of these 5000 had unmistakeable symptoms of a radiation syndrome with vomiting and diarrhoea and showed blisters and reddened skin – but they presented *no* contamination and had never been near the radiation.

Fear and psychosomatic reactions was the casual factors.

The fear also had societal consequences; let me mention one example:

"In the city of São Paulo, a car with Goiânia licence plate vas stoned and the same happened in the city of Brasilia. The fear in other states of Brazil was *stronger* than in Goiânia."

USA, NEW-YORK, 11 SEPTEMBRE

Also 9/11 *had behavioural consequences* [9] due to fear:
Instead of flying – people where driving, and thereby rising their risk of injury.
Thousands took the antibiotic "Cipro" to prevent Anthrax – and thereby accelerating antimicrobial resistance.

Many people bought guns for self-protection – despite most guns is used in suicides or a crime or harming someone accidentally.

There were several cases with violence and harassment of Muslims and ethnic minorities and indifference and carelessness amongst the young people – for instance: reckless driving, substance abuse and so on.

CONCLUSIONS

The above cases show that fear not only is an intrapsychic state that can be neglected but is a phenomenon which can cause injuries, disorders, death, non-adaptive behaviour, social conflict and riots challenging the authorities. And this is true both in the event phase and the post-event phase of the terror attack.

Terrorism's broad scope and range of potential impact, highlights the need for a commensurate public health response
.

In US the conclusion is [3]: The nation's mental health, public health, medical, and emergency public health systems currently are not able to meet the psychological needs that result from terrorism.

For the European countries I think that the conclusion is the same. But what can be done?

PUBLIC HEALTH AND RISK COMMUNICATION

Terrorism is endangering and challenging the public health, and is capable of creating social disruption.

Which institutional resources are necessary and are able to prevent these adverse effects?

In an attempt to answer this question we first of all have to recognise the real physical danger we face from being afraid.

It is obvious that fear is as dangerous as a terror attack. The research gives evidence but the authorities are not yet fully aware of this fact.

Before we are going to give advice to the authorities we must know something more of the substance of fear.

It is anxiety and fear that is priming the non-adaptive behaviour which cause injuries and social problems. We have to study the literature of risk perception to understand why we fear and how we are going to be afraid.

The research shows that [10]:
- the more uncertain (no knowledge) we are, the more afraid we are.
- we are more afraid of a risk when it's new (unfamiliar).
- the more we trust the people who are supposed to protect or inform us, the less afraid we will be.
- if we feel some control over events, we are less afraid than if we feel we have no control.

(This helps to explain why fear of driving is low. Many of the actions people took in the wake of the 9/11-attacks – driving instead of flying, buying guns, taking drugs, and avoiding crowded places – were in part an effort to act and, by acting, to establish some sense of control).

One of the conclusions from the literature on risk perception is that knowledge and familiarity might restrain fear, and that a sense of control will contribute to this.

The second we can learn from the risk perception literature is, that every human makes his own risk perception. Nobody adopt the authorities authorised risk evaluation in a critical situation, but subconsciously "decides" what to be afraid of, how afraid to be, and which behaviour that may be adaptive.

Therefore, the advice we can give to the authorities about institutional resources will be:

Information is the first and last to consider in crisis management – information is the all-important concept.

In times of crisis and terrorism the concept used is not general information, but risk communication [11].

Risk communication is needed for the pre-event, event, and post-event phases of terrorist attacks.

The contents of risk communication might be knowledge of the nature of terrorism, the possible types of weapons, how to deal with physical damages, how to protect one selves, what to do in a biological contaminated environment, how to deal with stress reactions, knowledge of how the authorities are dealing with the attack and its consequences.

Risk communication is neither sheer and cold information nor orders, but may necessarily reflect, that the authorities with empathy relate themselves to the individual.

What characterise risk communication is:
- Communication – not information
- Dialogue – not monologue
- The good friend – not patronizing

The medium for risk communication is radio, television, the Internet, mobile phones, and other electronic devices, but also newspapers and other written material.

A lot of authorities are able to give information in a situation of terrorism, but risk communication is something else. It should be an integrated part of the national crisis management. These emergency preparedness agencies are often equipped with hard-core personnel, but risk communication demands soft-core skills as for example empathy and communicative skills.

In this presentation it is not possible to elaborate further about the role of fear, public health and risk communication. But it is concepts that emergency preparedness planners have to be familiar with to establish the necessary institutional resources for the population to minimize injuries, disorders, riots and public health problems. Especially I can draw attention to the literature of risk communications, where a lot of books are handbooks about how to establish systems for risk communication [12].

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RESOURCE AND PREVENTION FACTORS FOR RESCUE WORKERS

Sue ROBERTON

Abstract

At this present time Kent and other Police Services are using TRiM which is Trauma Risk Management System that allows organisations to manage the psychological aftermath of critical incidents, which includes Terrorism.

TRiM is not about forcing an organisation to rely upon external providers for the immediate management of adverse psychological consequences of traumatic events. It seeks to empower managers to attend to their staff's needs in a logical and informed manner. The principles of TRiM are to ensure that an organisation does not support a victim culture. Instead TRiM training and practice attempts to converse manpower and effectiveness rather than accept that people will not function after being exposed to traumatic events.

Key words: Critical incidents, risk assessment, duty of care.

PRESENTATION

WHO AM I?

I'm a lifetime member of the Red Cross and was awarded their badge of honour for the work I did in Zeebrugge and here at home, following the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise at Zeebrugge in March 1987.

I have been for 14 years a Welfare and Adviser Trainer for Kent Police, which is a county Police Service with over 6 000 personnel. My role is the care of Police Personnel and their families.

TRAUMA RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TRiM)

WHAT IT IS?

At this present time, Kent and other Police Services are using TRiM, which is a trauma Risk Management System that allows organisations to manage the psychological aftermath of critical incidents, which includes Terrorism. It has been used by the Royal Marines and other elements of the U.K's Forces since 1997… Other organisations using TRiM include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the BBC, London Ambulance Service and now several Police Forces including Kent.

TRiM is not about forcing an organisation to rely upon external providers for the immediate management of adverse psychological consequences of traumatic events. It seeks to empower managers to attend to their staff's needs in a logical and informed manner. The principles of TRiM are to ensure that an organisation doesn't support a victim culture. Instead TRiM training and practice attempts to converse manpower and effectiveness rather than accept that people will not function after being exposed to traumatic events. The motto "Be strong in stress" is one the Royal Marines endorse and the TRiM system supports this notion.

It is a system of common sense post incident procedures carried out by individuals who are tasked to provide a peer group strategy to manage those exposed to traumatic events. This process is completely separate from any official investigation which my look into why incident occurred.

It is a framework for managing adverse psychological consequences for officers exposed to traumatic events during the course of their work.

WHY HAVE TRiM?

- Duty of care

- Encourages management involvement and responsibility
- Encourages peer support
- Early intervention
- Demonstrate to the workforce that the organisation cares
- Normalises responses following trauma

WHEN IS IT USED?

- The trauma involves death, disablement or disfigurement to colleagues or vulnerable persons
- The trauma is complex, long lasting or multiple
- Someone has been involved in a near miss
- Someone experiences overwhelming stress immediately following an event
- When it is asked for

THE FRAMEWORK

Its six aims are:

1. To carry out effective psychological management at the site of a traumatic event (including identifying individuals and groups at risk and could include rescuers and helpers)
2. Convening and conducting a meeting with key managers to plan a response
3. Analyse traumatic events and allocate personnel to group or individual risk assessment
4. Conduct a risk assessment interview
5. Conduct a briefing meeting
6. Facilitate a timely referral to an appropriate agency for treatment

TRiM response to critical incident:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Incident reported to risk       │
│ assessor/ TriM practitioner or  │
│ welfare (1)                     │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼                         │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  Management and Planning (2)    │  24 hours
└─────────────────────────────────┘    │
              │
              ▼                         │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐    │
│ Risk Assessment/Briefing/       │    │
│ Leaflets (3)                    │    │
└─────────────────────────────────┘    ▼
              │                      72 hours
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  Review Monitor and Support     │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```

(1) Effective Site Management

(2) Careful planning is required for:

- Any effective intervention within 48 hours after an incident, a meeting should be arranged to engage the organisational management structure and to examine who was involved. Key organisational personnel need to attend to who knows about the event and about those exposed to the event. Meeting should include Occupationnal Health and Welfare Department and identified risk assessor.

- It is important at this stage to analyse, to see if any intervention is required –then allocate personnel. (There is an analysis tool).

(3) Is there to be a briefing ?
Is there to be a risk assessment interview (referred to as BDA?)

Risk assessors use a BDA (Before/During/After) grid. Its purpose is not to eliminate or reduce post trauma reaction but to allow assessor to identify those at risk of developing psychological problems.

BDA (Before/During/After) Response to Critical Incident

```
                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │ Second risk assessment (1) │          28 days
                    └──────────────────────────┘
                      │                      │
          ┌───────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────┐
          │ Referral to welfare/ │      │ Monitor and      │
          │ occupational helath │      │ support (Local)  │
          └───────────────────┘      └──────────────────┘
                      │                      │
                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │ Review Individual/group   │          6 months
                    └──────────────────────────┘
```

(1) Follow up risk assessment 28 days later to:
   - May expose personnel who develop psychological problems after a delay and a stand –alone interview will not detect these
   - Some individuals continue to experience psychological distress following initial assessment and are at risk of developing long term psychological problems
   - An individuals adjustment to the traumatic event can be measured by comparing their initial risk assessment score with the one month follow up assessment score

COMMENTS

- " It helps to know that concerns and reactions are normal"
- " A good TrIM procedure will be a benefit and support, following any future incidents."
- " I feel that having undergone this experience (TrIM) I have a greater understanding."

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

- A pilot study (2003-2004)
- Officers and welfare staff trained-14
- Business plan for training trainers and assessors to be submitted 2005**.**

WHAT NEXT?

- Increased training of TRiM assessors?
- Incorporate TRiM into standard operating procedures?
- Refine response process protocols?
- Continue with and develop study?

FOLLOWING LONDON BOMBING INCIDENT : JULY 2005

- Two TrIM briefings completed involving 24 Kent Police personnel (team members of casualty bureau staff set up within 12 hours of initial incident). Leaflet issued.

- One TRiM assessment for the exhibits officer (part of investigation team).

CONTINUED

- Two TRiM assessments completed (Family liaison officer appointed to support Kent families of victims).
- Two TRiM assessments completed (Familiy liaison coordinators appointed to work in London Family Liaison Bureau).

Part II: Roundtables

S.O.S. ATTENTATS

Françoise RUDETZKI

Abstract
Every day, terrorism affects civilian populations in the world. In the face of this scourge, SOS Attentats has for the past 20 years been spending time with over 2,000 victims to support them and have their rights recognised. Thanks to our actions, an original type of compensation was introduced in France in 1986: a Guarantee Fund, funded by national solidarity, whose functioning is disconnected from penal proceedings. Also, a particular system giving victims the status of civilian victim of war was set up in 1990. Furthermore, the epidemiological studies we initiated made it possible to improve the psychological care of victims. SOS Attentats also had a memorial built in Paris dedicated to all victims of terrorism. To fight terrorism and impunity and to enable victims to fully rebuild their lives, we take legal action in court proceedings.

Keywords : terrorism, victims, compensation, Guarantee Fund, civilian war victim status, epidemiological studies, memorial, legal complaint

PRESENTATION

S.O.S. ATTENTATS ("attentats" means "terrorist attacks" in French), was founded on 24th January 1986 by Françoise Rudetzki, Delegate-General, who was herself a victim of a terrorist attack in Paris on December 23rd 1983.

At the beginning of 2003, it was awarded the status of NGO by the United Nations' Public Information Department and plays a consultative role at the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

S.O.S. ATTENTATS brings together over 2,000 victims of terrorism, as well as the families of the deceased.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS has two main objectives: the protection of victims' rights, the association speaking on behalf of the French, European and international authorities, and the fight against terrorism while fully respecting human rights.

PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

When S.O.S. ATTENTATS was created, the victims of terrorism had no specific rights, neither compensation-wise nor concerning the recognition of certain specific medical disorders. S.O.S. ATTENTATS has worked for them to be granted a special status which is recognized.

As far as compensation is concerned, S.O.S. ATTENTATS achieved in 1986 the creation of the *Guarantee Fund for the victims of terrorist acts* (Law of 9th September 1986).

The competence of the Fund was extended retroactively to include the victims of terrorist attacks carried out since 1st January 1985 and broadened to other victims of criminal offences by the Law of 6th July 1990.

The Guarantee Fund is an autonomous public body that defines the rules for compensation. It is governed by a Board with a Chairperson, four representatives, one from each of the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Social Affairs and Internal Affairs, three people having expressed an interest in the victims, and an insurance professional.

S.O.S.ATTENTATS serves on the Board and represents the victims from the outset.

The Fund is financed by a national solidarity contribution taken from insurance contracts for possessions (house, company and car insurance). The contribution is set for 2005 at €3.30 per contract.

The Guarantee Fund pays **full compensation** for the damages suffered by the victims, including psychological and personal damages. This compensation is totally independent from criminal proceedings since the victims retain in all cases their rights in criminal law and can therefore sue the authors of terrorist acts.

The Fund offers compensation to the victims or to their successors, whatever their nationality or their administrative status in France, when the terrorist act has been committed in France.

Concerning terrorist acts committed abroad, only victims or successors with French nationality or with double nationality can receive compensation.

The Guarantee Fund also offers compensation to freed hostages, and provides an advance payment for the families of the hostages who have not yet been freed.

As soon as a terrorist act takes place in France, the Guarantee Fund is informed of the identities of the victims by the District Prosecutor. The Guarantee Fund is informed of terrorist acts committed abroad by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS helps victims to prepare their case and presents it before the Board of the Guarantee Fund.

On another front, victims were granted in 1990 the **status of civilian victims of war** (Law of 23rd January 1990). This law applies retroactively to terrorist attacks committed since 1st January 1982.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS was successful in obtaining for victims that they *be assimilated to civilian victims of war*. This legal achievement means in concrete terms that terrorism is assimilated to "war in times of peace". Beyond this moral recognition, the victims of terrorist acts enjoy the rights and benefits granted to civilian victims of war by the code for military disability, as well as civilian disability pensions, and enjoy specific social benefits.

On the medical front, finally, S.O.S. ATTENTATS battled for a *psychological support system* to be set up that is appropriate for the victims of terrorism. To this end, S.O.S. ATTENTATS initiated and made possible the medical investigation of the victims.

The epidemiological study carried out in 1986 and 1987 by the INSERM (France's national institute for health and medical research) made it possible to change the rules for compensation with, among others, the creation of a *specific prejudice for the victims of terrorist acts*.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS contributed to the creation in 1995 of the emergency medical-psychological cells.

The epidemiological study on the public-health consequences of the terrorist acts committed in France in 1995 and 1996 was carried out under the responsibility of an international scientific council and was published in 2001. The results of these two studies made it possible to produce a practical guide for professionals on medical-social care for the victims of terrorist attacks, collective disasters and collective accidents.

VICTIM SUPPORT

Generally speaking, S.O.S. ATTENTATS informs, guides and supports all victims of terrorism who ask us to. The organisation helps them in all of their social, administrative, medical and legal procedures by giving them advice and by putting at their disposal a network of competent medical and legal professionals. The association, which is present at the victims' sides, organises meetings and group sessions. It advises on medical expert evaluation procedures by, among other things, contributing to the victims and their families being taken care of immediately and in the long term, holistically and with multidisciplinary support.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS has an internet site, which enables us to diffuse up-to-date information (http://www.sos-attentats.org/index.asp?lan_id=eng), and publishes a newsletter (1).

THE FIGHT AGAINST OBLIVION

S.O.S. ATTENTATS had the first memorial dedicated to all victims of terrorism built, which was inaugurated by the French President on 3rd December 1998. This bronze fountain sculpture by Nicolas Alquin is called "A message borne in memory of the victims of terrorism" and stands in the "Jardin de l'Intendant" at the National "Invalides" Hotel in Paris (Seventh Arrondissement).

S.O.S. ATTENTATS organizes ceremonies around this monument every year in memory of all victims of terrorism.

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND IMPUNITY

S.O.S. ATTENTATS, being against the death penalty, against any discrimination based on race, nationality, religion or any other particularity, advocates fighting terrorism by legal mean and is against impunity.

Concerning French legal proceedings in criminal courts, S.O.S. ATTENTATS obtained the possibility of claiming damages in all proceedings concerning not only terrorist crimes (assassination, attempted murder and complicity to murder, and financing assassination) but also crimes to do with crime syndicates (terrorist networks). This right, that is exclusive to S.O.S. ATTENTATS, is laid down in the Law of 6th July 1990 in Article 2.9 of the Code of criminal proceedings.

At international level, S.O.S. ATTENTATS intends to make the voices of the victims heard with the general aim that victims should no longer be forgotten, that there should be no discrimination in the treatment of victims, and that a real international criminal court should be competent in terrorist matters.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS remains convinced of the fact that justice remains the only response worthy of democratic states when prevention has failed. A trial remains, whatever the circumstances, the last stage of reparation that society can offer a victim, the ultimate phase that can enable him or her to move on from the status of victim and to exercise the duty to remember those who were killed.

To fight against this impunity, the association is present in a great number of criminal proceedings involving terrorism.

We also work *at European level* to work towards real European legal cooperation with a view to harmonizing policies concerning prevention, repression and the fight against terrorism funding.

Similarly, S.O.S. ATTENTATS is working *at international level* towards the harmonization of the compensation systems for the damages suffered by all victims of terrorism by bringing closer together the European states' internal legislations.

S.O.S. ATTENTATS wants no-one involved in terrorist crime to escape justice. All people responsible for terrorist acts - perpetrators, accessories, those who are behind the acts, and also leaders in office – have to be taken to court, judged and convicted.

To this end, S.O.S. ATTENTATS organized at the French National Assembly on 5th February 2002 a symposium on terrorism and international responsibility in criminal law. On this occasion, the association published a "Black Book" (*Le Livre Noir (2),* which is a compilation of 32 contributions from international personalities, academics and researchers. This symposium was inspired by an exemplary case: on 19th September 1989, a terrorist attack against a DC 10 plane of the French company UTA flying from Brazzaville to Paris caused the deaths of 170 people. Since then, the families of the victims, brought together by S.O.S. ATTENTATS, have been fighting, in vain, for justice to be done. The proceedings, that took place *in absentia*, ended with six Libyan high-ranking officials being sentenced to life imprisonment by Paris's Court of Assize. This judgment was never implemented. For justice to be done for all, S.O.S. ATTENTATS has kept up the fight by filing a complaint against Colonel Gaddafi. The public prosecutor's office in Paris, invoking international custom, prevented this complaint from being addressed. The Court of Cassation (France's

highest court) ruled on 13th March 2001 that foreign heads of state in office enjoyed immunity, even for particularly serious crimes, except in cases of crimes against humanity.

With the aim of justice being done to the victims and to serve as an example, S.O.S. ATTENTATS appealed before the European Court of Human Rights for denial of justice. At the same time, the association made it possible for seven American families who had lost a member on board the DC 10 to sue Libya before Washington's Federal Court by providing their lawyers with the full records of the French trial.

For the future and to prevent such crimes, that are commissioned or encouraged by heads of state and of government, S.O.S. ATTENTATS's ambition is for terrorist crimes to be included in the competency of the International Criminal Court without waiting for the revision conference scheduled in 2008.

In line with its objectives and to follow-up on the *Livre Noir*, the association published at the end of 2003 a new collective book called *"Terrorism, victims and international criminal responsibility"* (3) and (4).

S.O.S. ATTENTATS is also a member of the Global Coalition for the International Criminal Court. The association is striving today for the harmonization of the status of the victims of terrorism at international level, whatever their nationality, and for the inclusion of terrorist crimes in the competency of the International Criminal Court.

To this end, the association aspires to create a real worldwide network of associations of the victims of terrorism.

To conclude, in the face of present-day threats, S.O.S. ATTENTATS's ambition is to go on listening to victims, and to have victims' rights truly recognized by advocating equal compensation and reparation for all victims.

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ASOCIACION DE AYUDA A VICTIMAS DEL 11-M

Maria LOZANO ALIA

Abstract

AAV11M gives legal, psychological, and social support to victims of the 11th of March Attacks and their families.

AAV11M with another Organizations have realized the lack of specific knowledges and capability of people working in some NGO and giving support to victims, and they have designed the Project CELEO which consists of two main actions:

- Master's Program for Professionals Supporting Victims of Terrorist Attacks.
- Creation of the Victims of Terrorism Support Mutipurpose Center.

CELEO will be a great opportunity to all the national and international organization which give any kind of support to victims of terrorism, to improve their aid and work with victims and to develop an efficient tool to fight against the terrorism.

Key Words: association of victims, support to victims of terrorist attacks, CELEO, Master's Program for Professionals Supporting Victims of Terrorist Attacks, Creation of the Victims of Terrorism Support Mutipurpose Center.

PRESENTATION

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen;
First of all, I would like to introduce myself:
My name is María Lozano and I am manager of the AAV11M.

Before telling you about our organization and its labour as a community instrument against terrorism, I would like to bring close to you the feelings of the people of Madrid the morning of the 11th of March of 2004, when the major Terrorist Attack in the History of Spain was carried out in the name of God.

At 7:37A bomb explodes in a train at Atocha station. Only one minute later other two explosions take place in the same train. Chaos and confusion invade the platforms and mechanical stairs of the terminus. It´s 7.38 A.M. when other two bombs blast in a convoy at the El Pozo station and a third one in Santa Eugenia station.

At 7.39, four more explosions destroy another train 500 meters away from Atocha subway station. In only three minutes, 10 bombs rewrite History: Madrid has just suffered the major terrorist attack never perpetrated in Spain.

191 casualties and more than 1.500 injured make oblivion impossible and force the whole Spanish society to act and fight against terrorism and to give all the necessary support to all surviving victims and their families.

Thus our Organization is born under these objectives, being formed by a group of persons who coincide in these terrible attacks or in medical centres and finally who have common demands, not only for themselves but for other victims.

So, the need to communicate with other victims and to offer the psychological, social, and legal support and personal contact, which had not been offered by any other Organization, arises in us.

Misinformation, pain, fear, isolation and an unfortunate political misutilization of these terrible acts, are the circumstances that we identify surrounding all the victims from that moment on.

We constitute a non political association, detached from any type of ideology, totally independent and without spirit of profit, with date of constitution of October 26, 2004.

Then, our fight against the terrorism is carried out in our daily labour, pretending not only giving support to victims and their families, but also working with and for the whole Spanish society. Main Objectives of the Organization:

- **To Provide legal, material, social and psychological support to victims of terrorist acts and their families.**
- **Design and development of mass media campaigns to raise awareness of Spanish society against the terrorist acts.**

In order to achieve these objectives, The AAV11-M has developed the abovementioned / the following programs and actions, plus the adequate information and communication tools:

PROGRAMS/ACTIONS

- Personal and group psychological support to victims and their families. Special attention on children.
- Social reintegration Programs. Searching for employment and occupational training Programs.
- Individual legal support.
- CELEO. This is the most important project to be developed by the Organization. Its main objectives and contents will be widely and detailed exposed in this presentation.

INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION

- Main tools:
    o Association Newsletter: Huellas.
    o Web: www.ayuda11m.org
    o Information campaigns to inform victims (not only associated victims but any victim or relatives of terrorist attacks on 11 of March 2004) about public and private economical grants and any other kind of aid.
    o Summer camps for children victims of terrorist acts, based on intercultural education, education for tolerance and education for the peace.
    o Information campaigns to instruct victims and professional personnel involved about post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety.

FINALLY, OUR MAIN PROJECT:CELEO

INITIALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND A JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT

In Europe despite a longstanding stance against terrorism, there are currently no formal structures providing **long term support** to the thousands of victims and their families. Thus, relief efforts have concentrated on an immediate and institutionally leading response ("shock therapy") thereby overlooking long-term approaches, which in turn, demands more skilled and professionalized personnel.

Incidentally, **personnel often lack the necessary organizational skills to fully assist victims and families**. This is so due to the inexistence of consolidated systems which can study, develop and apply different approaches to victim relief.

Large scale terrorist acts such as M-11 triggered in Europe the need to articulate a sound mechanism that could guarantee a sustained and long-term approach. The latest London attacks tragically confirmed this fact.

THE PROJECT

From this point, the "Asociación de Ayuda a Víctimas del 11-M" (11M Victims Association), with another organizations linked to all kind of support for terrorist attack victims and their families, have designed an innovative Project which consists of two simultaneous actions:
1. Master's Program for Professionals Supporting Victims of Terrorist Attacks.
2. Creation of the Victims of Terrorism Support Mutipurpose Center.

1. The Master's Program for professionals Supporting Victims of Terrorist Attacks.

The Master's Program is **targeted to all professionals providing formal assistance to terrorist attack** victims who often lack the necessary skills to fully deploy support to victims on a daily basis.

The staff involved shall be made of around 35 experts and professors from the University's Psychology Dept. and "Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid" (Psychologists Official Association), and a group of lawyers with quite great experience in giving legal support to victims, in charge of designing the course outlines and its pedagogical focus.

The Master's Program includes forums and testimonials provided by other victims' support associations in the partnership; I mean the organization of the previous speaker, Madam Rudtezki, from SOS Attentats, as well as non-European victim organizations from the USA such as "Peaceful Tomorrows", (www.familiesofseptember11.org) and from Latin America and Israel, all of them with consolidated organizational experience with long-term victim support.

2. The program will be held at the Victims of Terrorism Support Multipurpose Centre

In this sense, the project contemplates testing and consolidating a new post-graduate training program (Master's Degree) which satisfies the need to enhance the overall skills of a wide array of professionals working with the victims & families as demanded by college graduates, volunteers, NGO professionals, civil servants (Interior, Justice and Social Affairs), policemen, psychologists, etc, not only in Spain and the European Union but also in Latin America and the USA, specially its hispanic community affected by S-11 attacks.

There's also a need to locate this program in a multi-purpose facility as a focal point from which all victims and their families can obtain support. The facility will be in Alcalá de Henares.

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

The **organizations** involved in this project are

- Fundación Cardenal Cisneros (Head of the Project)
- The Government of the Region of Madrid. Comunidad de Madrid
- Council of Alcalá de Henares.
- Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos · Psychologists' Official Association
- SOS Attentat
- Asociación de Ayuda a Víctimas del 11-M

The "Fundación Cisneros" (Cisneros Foundation) shall coordinate the program which will consist of a 1-year, (540 hours) course distributed among the following subjects-modules yet to be fully developed and tested;

1) Contexts of terrorism
2) Psychological support
3) Legal and administrative advice
4) Social and labour insertion
5) Awareness building strategies
6) Single project management
7) Non profit organization management skill

In addition, a prospective report on victim's demands and training needs of beneficiaries will be conducted.

MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

1) To Upscale the level of competences and skills of victim relief professionals

2) To Develop new practical and pedagogical contents as results of recent victim healing research.
3) To Lead a transnational co-operation process of all public and private actors in victim support around effective victim support approaches.
4) To Launch the Victims of Terrorism Support Multipurpose Centre
5) To Display an array of professionalized victim support mechanisms and approaches.

WHY CAN CELEO BE A GREAT RESOURCE AGAINST TERRORISM?

1. First of all because we have Expert Professionals involved in CELEO

All the Organizations involved in CELEO have demonstrated deep **knowledge** on this subject:

- Alcalá's City Council is currently creating a Victims of Terrorism Multi-purpose Support Centre.
- An epidemiological study on the psychological consequences of the attacks on adolescents was carried out by an in-house research team at F. Cisneros.
- AAV11M is currently studying the victim's demands to be published and presented in December 2005 at a public event.
- The City Council also participated in a research on the M-11 psychological effects on the local population in Alcalá de Henares (Madrid).
- The Government of the Region of Madrid has its own department of support to victims of terrorist attacks.

2. Also because CELEO has been designed as an effective tool in order to reach the main objectives in the fight against terrorism

CELEO articulates both the operation of a Victims Support Centre and new Master's program addressed to professionals and volunteers providing support to victims and their families.

The program is intended to upgrade their capability in mobilising psychological, legal, bureaucratic, economical, social, communicational and organizational resources which ought to improve their efficiency and ultimately, accelerate the victims' overall social and psychological healing process.

3. CELEO is also an innovative project.

S-11 triggered an unprecedented victim relief effort focused on psychological research and long-term assistance, all of which this program intends to learn from.

Despite having suffered longstanding terrorist actions (IRA, Red Brigades, ETA and now Islamic terror) in Europe there are no permanent or long term structures working for the victims' recovery from a holistic perspective. Response to attacks has been based on "shock-therapy" and the project intends to complement this approach.

CELEO AS AN ADDED VALUE

All the organizations involved intend to make CELEO an European and international reference in the field of victim support and recovery.

European experts in the fields of psychology, law, social work, communication and project management shall gather around the program as lecturers and speakers.

All European professionals who have given care to victims will eventually have a training program specifically geared to the development of their skills. Moreover, the Victims Support Centre provides a unique model.

RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES

We have also considered the possible risks and difficulties that CELEO could find since its birth :Terrorism victim support is a relatively new field of expertise. Therefore, there are no unified criteria, whereas uncertainties over the full commitment from the social, academic and political arena do exist.

Response to victims' demands as well as terrorist acts themselves not always gathers equal support or condemnation from society and politicians. This is partly due to the proliferation of diverse ideological, national and political attitudes which tend to overlook its nature and scope. Inevitably, further attacks would eventually dissipate passive attitudes.

In Europe, especially Northern Ireland, London and the Basque Country, civic movements and authorities have been contacted to guarantee support and dissemination of this initiative.

Also, current structural support to victims and their families, as well as organizational models in the USA, Israel and Latin America, are to be benchmarked through a calendar of guest lecturers, which may also help the program's visibility.

THE FIRST VICTIMS OF TERRORISM SUPPORT MULTIPURPOSE CENTER

Alcalá de Henares and its City council are creating the first Multi-purpose Centre specialized in providing permanent support to victims of terrorism and their families. The location isn't casual. It was the most severely affected city in the March 11th killings, and in the aftermath of the tragedy the local civil society provided such a level of support and solidarity that the city authorities aim to make of the Centre a national and European reference regarding citizen, institutional and expert support to victims of terrorism. In addition, the Centre is located alongside a series of public health and social service facilities that shall complement it.

Also, one of the difficulties often faced by non-profit organizations providing support to victims of terrorism is the lack of fully qualified personnel with adequate skills in the fields of public awareness campaigns, project development, and management, as well as professional support abilities, which the Master's program shall provide.

FINALLY

We have chosen these workshops organized by the Red Cross, due to the amount of important Organizations in the field of fighting against terrorism which have been invited to participate, and that we hope will be interested in this Project, and also due to the excellent forum that these workshops offered to our Association to present this project and obtain the support on it of all the organization which have come to this Seminar.

We have pretended to disseminate all the great possibilities of CELEO and want to invite to all the interested professional personnel and Organizations to collaborate with us in this ambitious project, sharing experiences and knowledge in this subject.

We sincerely want to thank to the Red Cross for the effort and work shown to organize these workshops and to make possible the meeting of all these important Organizations in the fight against terrorism and the support of victims of terrorist attacks and their families.

Thank you very much.

IMPACT FOUNDATION

Magda ROOZE

Abstract
Impact Foundation, Dutch Knowledge and Advice Centre for Post-disaster Psychosocial Care
The Knowledge and Advice Centre for Post-Disaster Psychosocial Care is a national institute promoting high-quality and effectively organised post-disaster psychosocial care, gathering experience and scientific knowledge, disseminating information, stimulating cooperation between parties, developing standards and guidelines and advising professionals, policy makers and managers.

Victim support groups in The Netherlands
There are several victim support groups who were founded after the different disasters in The Netherlands. To join the efforts Impact wants to facilitate the foundation of a national organisation of victim support groups.

National support group as a specific resource against terrorist attacks
The threat of terrorism as well the consequences of terrorism itself are about fear. Real or perceived threat makes no difference.

Social cohesion, both pre- and post-incident, is widely advocated: Existing social support mitigates the fear and helps people to recover. A national support group can contribute in enhancing resilience against the threat of terrorism.

Key words: post-disaster psychosocial care, victim support groups, social cohesion , national support group, resilience

PRESENTATION

THE IMPACT FOUNDATION

The Impact Foundation has now been in existence for three years. Its main function is to collect and process information and experience in the field of psycho-social care for the victims of disasters and to make this information available to aid organisations, administrators and policymakers. The Impact Foundation provides advice, particularly on how to offer high quality psycho-social care in times of major crises and disasters

One thing that we have learned from disasters in recent years is that providing care to the victims lasts longer than you might think. A group of European scientists has highlighted this fact in the European Policy Paper "Psycho-social support in situations of mass emergency". In the three charts that I am going to show you, they have identified a pattern that seems to apply to many disasters.

Discotheekbrand, Göteborg, oktober 1998

Chart 1, for example, shows information on the help that was provided after the discotheque fire in Gothenburg in 1998, which killed 60 people. Around 200 young people who managed to escape from the burning discotheque needed medical treatment. Afterwards, this need for medical treatment quickly subsided, except in the case of those with the most serious burns, who needed treatment for a long time afterwards. The need for psychological support increased during the week immediately after the disaster and remained high for the entire first year. Two years after the disaster, 30% of the young people involved were still receiving treatment for PTSD and other psychiatric problems.

Negen jongeren verstikt in mensenmassa op popfestival
te Roskilde, Denemarken, Juli 2000

Chart 2 looks at the accident at the Roskilde festival in Denmark in 2000, where 9 people were crushed to death against the stage by the weight of the people behind them. Medical care consisted mainly of treating the injuries sustained by other people who had been standing there and ferrying the injured to hospital, while practical care involved providing information to families. Psychiatric help consisted of receiving victims at the crisis centre, diagnostics and follow-up treatment.

Treinbrand te Kaprun, Oostenrijk, november 2000

The third chart contains information on the fire in the ski-train Kaprun in November 2000, in which 155 people died. This chart shows the care that was provided for the family members of one victim. The need for psychiatric help was by far the greatest and consisted of helping the family express their grief on the loss of a son and brother and of support during the 'coming to terms' stage. Two members of the family needed long-term care.

This pattern is also recognisable for the situation in the Netherlands. From research carried out into the health of the victims of the Enschede disaster, we know that many people are still suffering from effects attributed to this disaster. A second health study carried out 18 months after the disaster, shows that more than a half of the residents thought that their health had deteriorated after the disaster while 40% of the residents still suffer from the memories of living through and escaping from the disaster. One third reported high anxiety levels and 26% still suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. In this case, we have about 800 people that suffer serious long-term problems.

In Volendam too, 3 years after the café fire, there is still serious concern for the victims with serious burns, but also for the younger victims who were less seriously injured and the parents. In Volendam, we see an entire community that was affected and that is still trying to come to terms with the effects of this fire.

If we finally look at the information collected by the Organisation of Economic Coordination and Development, which has catalogued disasters occurring all over the world during the last 50 years, it becomes clear where our responsibilities lie in the provision of psycho-social care for disaster victims.

Long term trends in disasters

If we look at these charts, we see that the first two relate to a number of natural and technological/man-made disasters. The number of these disasters has risen annually from ten or so in 1950 to hundreds in 2000. In line with this trend, the number of fatalities has also risen dramatically, particularly in technological/man-made disasters. Finally, the charts also show the financial implications.

All the more reason for focussing our attention on preparing for such large-scale crises and disasters.

Good psychosocial care does not come out of thin air and it follows, therefore, that the knowledge centre has tasks to do with disaster preparedness. Considering that the point of time when an accident happens is virtually impossible to predict, being prepared is an on-going process.

In the acute and post-acute phases of a disaster, the knowledge centre should be able to offer advice, in the immediate short term, on how psychosocial care can be organised and implemented in accordance with current best practice during the initial crisis support stage for victims. To this end, practical protocols and scenarios should be made available.

The knowledge centre has a role to play in the recovery phase. Depending on the severity and complexity of the disaster or calamity, this recovery phase can be prolonged. The length of time for which psychosocial care is required will, in many cases, exceed the active period of the disaster plan.

NETWORKS AND SUPPORT GROUPS FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS

The Knowledge and Advice Centre for Post-Disaster Psychosocial Care is a national institute built on collaboration between a network of institutions and organisations with relevant knowledge and experience in the area of combating disasters (on the medical front), psychosocial care and psychotraumatology. This co-operation between various institutions will facilitate the collation of the fragmented knowledge and experience which is not always readily accessible. Moreover, the knowledge centre will also have the on-going task of promoting "disaster awareness" among the relevant authorities and support organisations.

- ➢ promotion of high-quality and effectively organised post-disaster psychosocial care
- ➢ gathering experience and scientific knowledge
- ➢ disseminiation and implementation
- ➢ stimulating cooperation between parties
- ➢ developing standards and guidelines
- ➢ advising professionals, policy makers and managers

There are several victim support groups who were founded after the different disasters in The Netherlands. To join the efforts Impact wants to facilitate the foundation of a national network of victim support groups.

National Organisation Support groups

Objectives:

> ➢ be united
> ➢ companionship
> ➢ feedback group
> ➢ together strong
> ➢ solidarity
> ➢ support
> ➢ join expertise and experience

An important source of knowledge are the affected people by a disaster. They can, like nobody else, give their experience to others. From different support groups we have learned that contact between affected people can enhance their resilience and help them restore their self control. Listening, recognition, the feeling to be together strong and exchange of information all can have a positive effect. To use these different support groups and connect them as a network on a national level will empower the affected people.

NATIONAL SUPPORT NETWORK AS A SPECIFIC RESOURCE AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS

The threat of terrorism as well the consequences of terrorism itself are about fear. Real or perceived threat makes no difference. People experience elevation in vital signs: increased hart rate, increased blood pressure, fastened breathing, other hyper arousal symptoms and so on. Especially in the case of CBRN attack, individuals who believe that hey have been exposed to a CBRN agent or are insure if they were exposed, begin to experience psychical symptoms triggered by their mental response. Their symptoms are very real and in most cases they will seek medical attention or at least behave as if they are truly injured or ill.

This misattribution of normal arousal can, in case of lack of information about the event in combination with mistrust of authorities, lead to Mass Sociogenic Illness with major short and long-term consequences for the health system in the affected area. In fact, lessons learned from recent incidents show that this reaction is more likely than e.g. PTSS.

These different mental and physical health problems will also have strong social and economical impacts in the long run. In the acute phase fear and panic among the public can obstruct the emergency-response and lead to a run on the medical assistance which is quickly overloaded by victims and perceived victims. What was learned about the effects of the terrorist attack of September 11 and the following anthrax attacks is that fear had powerful public health implications. In October 2001 thousands of people were buying broad-spectrum antibiotic ciprofloxacin and taking it prophylactic ally to ward off anthrax. In fact this kind of indiscriminate use of such powerful drugs contributes to antibiotic resistance and increases the risk of serious disease; 59% experienced depression, 31% had difficulty concentrating and 23% suffered from insomnia. Dysfunctional reactions by the people not directly involved were seen all over the USA where drug and alcohol abuse increased substantially. Handgun sales jumped to 39%. According to treatment, an increase in admissions to treatment facilities up to 10-12% nationally. Prescriptions for sleeping pills increased with 25%.

Therefore we must recognise the real physical danger we face from being afraid and the potentially harmful actions people take by seeking a sense of safety because they are afraid.

Social cohesion, both pre- and post-incident, is widely advocated: existing social support mitigates the fear and helps people to recover. A national support group can contribute in enhancing resilience against the threat of terrorism.

Most victims won't need a professional to feel better. In case of major casualties not only the victims need to be addressed. We'll have to deal with a whole nation affected. There simply won't be enough professionals to help everyone and the professionals are affected themselves. Besides that: there is not much evidence about effective early interventions by mental health professionals. The public should know how to react on victims, how to help them and how to help themselves. We'll have to rely on a community-based approach and public information campaigns.
1. Key figures in the community can be contacted in advance, eventually be trained on themes on post-terrorism public reactions and pro-active behaviour. A neighbour helping neighbour approach is essential. Every citizen has to be a part of the solution, by managing the emotional response as best as possible and by reaching out to their neighbours in their home and work communities.
2. Information in advance is central. This information must balance the true risk of terrorist attacks (not exaggerating) and the negative consequences of fear.
Also post-incident information is central. It helps to restore control for the public, which is a well-known protective factor against fear and trauma-related mental problems.
This leads to the following objectives:

 Short term:
1. Raising awareness about the possibility of terrorist attacks, without increasing fear or inducing panic.
2. Giving information about the consequences of (the threat of) terrorist attacks on the wellbeing of the people, how to handle these consequences for themselves, their family and children, their community and affected people. Resilience can be taught.
3. Giving information for professionals, policy-makers and community-leaders on these topics.
4. Raising awareness about the importance of prevention of health complaints by giving information and psychosocial aftercare related to terrorism.

 Long term:
5. Create and maintain an informal expertise network about psychosocial care topics regarding terrorism (information, risk-communication, crisis communication, crisis intervention, early intervention, aftercare and long term-effects).
6. Make use of existing networks like victim support groups who have experience in the field

In view of the urgency that accompanies the threat of terrorism in these days, we are in need of a speedy exchange and accumulation of knowledge and experience. To make this possible we should use the structures which are already available. We should include the support groups, use their knowledge, use their networks and listen to their advice.

CONCLUSION

To make it possible that support groups play an important and structural role in the preparedness for terrorism, the following conditions should be met:

➢ Support groups should be structural financed by government
➢ It is necessary to promote image and perception of support groups by public relations
➢ Quality of support groups should be improved
➢ Publications about personal experiences can create more understanding for the position of victims
➢ There is no evidence based method for support groups, this should be developed
➢ A format for the organisation of a support group should be developed

Establishment of victim support groups is often an ad hoc decision. We should prepare a format, a structure and facilities in advance. So we can be prepared in the light of terrorism and the threat of terrorism

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DISASTER ACTION

Pamela DIX

Abstract

Disaster Action's members are all survivors and bereaved people from major emergencies - including terrorist incidents - both in the UK and overseas. Formed as a charity in 1991, we represent over 20 disasters. As an advocacy service, DA has three primary objectives: to support those affected by disaster; to raise awareness of those directly by disaster amongst the emergency response community; to help create a safety climate in which disasters are less likely to occur. DA seeks to influence central and local government policy and procedure in relation to emergency response and has contributed substantially to the drafting of new policy concerning human aspects response to emergency (*Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies*, in draft as of September 2005). Following a major emergency, the police and/or central and local government can call upon DA to act as lay advisers on the response. DA highlights the actual needs of survivors and the bereaved, trying to ensure that meeting these needs is seen as a top priority. DA facilitates the formation of family support groups (self-supporting groups of survivors and bereaved). DA uses its experience of all forms of disaster, including the additional dimensions relevant to terrorist attacks, to inform its work. We stress the importance of cross-border understanding and working in anticipation of disaster and a cohesive, structured response in the aftermath.

Key words: Disaster Action, advocacy, needs of survivors and bereaved, police, multi-agency, counselling, disaster trust funds/compensation, helping prevent future similar disasters, long-term self-help, best practice response, individual needs, common international approaches.

PRESENTATION

I would like to thank the Belgian Red Cross for the opportunity to be here and speak to you today. We have particularly close links with Belgium, as our founder and chairman's daughter and son-in-law died in the Zeebrugge ferry sinking. I would also like to thank Moya Wood Heath of the British Red Cross, who helped to bring about my presence here. I am personally here because of the death of my brother in the Lockerbie bombing.

Disaster Action is a charity, founded in 1991, whose members are all survivors and bereaved people from major disasters affected people from the UK. The disasters we represent cover a period of 30 years. Everything I am going to say today comes from the perspective of those directly affected by disaster. We have seen a period of great change in the UK concerning the human aspects of emergency response, from a highly paternalistic attitude in which the needs of those directly affected were not taken into account, to one of attempting to perform a service for survivors and the bereaved. Disaster Action has played an important part in the shift in attitude by the authorities over the past decade in particular.

Our membership consists of individuals and family groups affected by a wide range of disasters of different origin. Disaster Action is an umbrella association, which concerns itself with the general principles that apply to any disaster, whatever its origin, not with individual campaigns. A number of our members have experienced terrorist incidents, including Lockerbie, the UT 772 French airliner bombed in 1989, 9/11 and Bali. We are entirely independent and receive no government funding. Our funding comes primarily from The Joseph Rowntree Trust in York, UK and occasional one-off gratuities from organisations such as the British Red Cross.

Disaster Action is an independent advocacy service, which offers lay advice service to central and local government, the police, and the statutory and voluntary agencies that respond to disaster. Disaster Action was part of the steering group that created the recently published (UK Cabinet Office, September 2005, UK Resilience website) *Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies*. This document was created after extensive consultation and sets out the roles and responsibilities of the organisations likely to be involved in a major disaster, whatever its cause. In addition, the document sets out a framework for the creation of a

Family Assistance Centre. Disaster Action is also part of the UK Home Office Working Group on Mass Fatalities.

Satisfying the information needs of survivors and the bereaved should be a top priority for those responding to a disaster. There is then the additional complexity where a disaster is the result of deliberate intent to kill and injure such as in the case of a terrorist incident. Following the London bombings, Disaster Action assisted in the creation of the first Family Assistance Centre in the UK, alongside the Metropolitan Police Service and the British Red Cross. Trying to influence the way in which the needs of those affected by the tragedy were recognised and met was of paramount importance to Disaster Action.

The intensity of the experience cannot be overestimated, with additional pressure from the media, politicians and others, many of whom wish to claim the disaster as 'theirs'. In our view, 'closure' is something artificially imposed on the bereaved and survivors by the media and the outside world, which is hastening to go back to 'normal'.

The *perceived* needs of the bereaved have traditionally been:
- Counselling
- Someone to 'make it better'
- Protection from reality
- To return to 'normality'

In our experience, the *actual* needs of the bereaved are:
- Access to information
- Openness, honesty, sensitivity
- Being offered choices
- Non-judgemental assistance
- Emotional first aid
- Financial and other practical help.

Meeting people's practical needs, including information about what is happening in relation to all aspects of the response, has been shown to be extremely important in reducing the likelihood of those exposed to a major trauma going on to develop disorders such as post traumatic stress disorder. When I visited Lockerbie on Christmas Day 1988, if anyone had tried to counsel me, I would have been extremely angry. Making available non-judgemental emotional first aid, and information on how and where to access help in relation to psychological need should, however, be integral to a major emergency response. If people are in need of further psychological support, care or treatment, then they should be able to access this through the state.

The setting up of an effective two-way communication channel between the relatives, survivors and the authorities is essential. In the UK, this is largely done through a police family liaison system, whereby police officers, while acting as part of the investigation into the incident, play a key role in supporting families through all aspects of the identification of the dead, the inquest and the criminal inquiry. Offering choice in relation to, for example, visiting the incident site and seeing the bodies of the loved ones who have been killed is an important part of the police function.

Disaster Action facilitates the creation of family support groups, work that we have been involved in since 9/11. So, what are family support groups for? Well, a key role for them is in offering each other mutual support – only they know what it is to have survived or been bereaved in *their* disaster. People are empowered through such mutual support, and are far more likely to get answers to important questions about how, and why, a terrorist incident occurred than single individuals. They may develop their own agenda, such as campaigning around the prevention of future similar disasters. Each group will have its own 'life', and the success of such a group cannot be judged by its longevity. The important thing is in facilitating such groups to be self-supporting and self-determining, with assistance in order to do this as required from government, the police and other agencies such as the Red Cross and Disaster Action.

While every incident is unique, they all have common features and the same basic principles as outlined above in relation to the actual needs of those affected should underpin any major emergency

response. It is important to keep objectives practical – what can we do to make a real difference to the lives of those who experience major trauma? We can underpin this work by putting in place plans and procedures to respond to the human aspects of emergency, something the UK government, the police service and others now places high on their agenda.

Disaster is no respecter of artificial geographical boundaries marked on a map. It is likely to affect people from a wide range of backgrounds, cultures and ethnic origin. Hence the need for all European nations to engage with each other in drawing up plans and procedures to meet the needs of our citizens of whatever nationality. Listening to the experience of those who have been on the receiving end of a disaster is essential, as is then assimilating that experience into future response.

Disaster Action's website is a resource for families, survivors and professionals alike. There are a series of leaflets on the site, all of which were written by those directly by disaster *for* those directly affected.

Thank you for the privilege of speaking to you today.

REFERENCES

Internet Site of Disaster Action: www.disasteraction.org.uk

THE PLACE OF THE MEDICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CELL WITHIN THE RESPONSE PLAN TO TERRORIST ATTACKS

Didier CREMNITER

Abstract :

The Cellule d'urgence médico-psychologique – the Medical-Psychological Emergency Cell (CUMP) is completely integrated within the Service d'Aide médicale d'Urgence (SAMU) – the Emergency Medical Aid Service. After some experimenting after the 1995 terrorist attacks, the network was set up in France in 1997 and reinforced in all regions in the country and particularly in the Ile-de-France (the Paris area) in 2003. Thanks to a doctrine based on the experience of the 1995 attacks and constantly renewed in view of new types of terrorism such as the multiple attacks in Madrid and London and new NRBC risks, the CUMP offers immediate and post-immediate care and a follow-up for people who develop a psychotraumatic pathology. Immediate care refers to the principles of "frontline" psychiatry. Post-immediate care involves the psychological debriefing that takes place in line with psychodynamic principles and psychopathological knowledge which are, in French-speaking countries, the reference.

Keywords: medical-psychological emergency cell, immediate care, post-immediate care.

PRESENTATION

We shall particularly concentrate on the role of the Cellule d'urgence médico-psychologique – Medical-Psychological Emergency Cell (CUMP) (1), which was created in France at the request of the President of the Republic following the terrorist attacks of 1995. Its doctrine is a French doctrine of immediate and post-immediate intervention.

When a critical event occurs, a terrorist attack for instance, specialists of emergency situations, of disaster medicine and psychological trauma meet the victims within the first hours following the disaster, which is precisely when things start (2). Indeed, the first hours and the first days are the worst in terms of clinical symptoms and psychical suffering, not only from the point of view of their intensity but also of their prevalence among the victims, as this is a collective event. This makes it possible to organise straightaway efficient therapeutic care for these victims of a terrorist act, which more often than not causes somatic and psychiatric damage (3). And this is why this medical-psychological care needs to be perfectly integrated in the somatic care provided by the resuscitation doctors working in the Services Mobiles d'Urgence et de Réanimation (the Mobile Emergency and Resuscitation Services) of the Services d'Aide médicale d'Urgence (SAMU - the Emergency Medical Aid Services). This first contact consists in an evaluation, a screening process to determine the extent of these pathologies in the initial phase after the event.

While it is essential to carry out this immediate care for the states of acute stress that often occur at the same time as clinical manifestations of serious psychical disorganisation that can even look like acute psychosis, taking the psychical trauma into consideration as such will be done after the immediate care during a later phase, which sometimes kicks in very quickly, already on day 2.

The post-immediate phase is less specific than immediate care because, as the specificity of the French doctrine recommends, this phase aims to provide fundamental treatment of the psychical trauma thanks to the psychological debriefing (4).

Without going into any detail over the controversies in international literature about this question over the last few years (5), it should be recalled that French doctrine underlines the necessity of integrating this psychological debriefing into a solid medical background with diverse knowledge of psychopathology. Furthermore, this type of therapeutic care, which is often well adapted to collective work, must be established in a well-defined context. This does not mean applying a pre-established formula or a technical protocol. The context of each event changes the way the debriefing is set up. Similarly, the particularities of the traumas suffered by the victims might modify or even rule out its application. Also, this therapeutic care cannot be dispensed by any health worker. The debriefing imperatively has to be carried out by people who

are highly qualified in this area, who have practice in dynamic psychotherapy's methods' and screening, and in group work and with solid experience and knowledge about the stakes of psychological trauma. But, above all, this act cannot be considered separately from the therapeutic follow-up's framework. It must be integrated in the previous stage, starting at the initial phase of immediate care, which prepares it, and the following stage, the follow-up in psychotrauma counselling sessions. It is particularly essential that, already in the initial phase, the perspective of providing the victims with this more specific care be looked into with regard to the victims, their families and the conditions of space and time in which the terrorist act took place.

This care targets a population which can artificially be split into two distinct categories:

1. The first category is characterised by the large number of involved people with signs of acute stress, which is often pathological or extreme., with variable symptoms, for whom there is the hope that they will gradually and very much improve during the post-immediate phase, and the hope that they will recover.

2. The second category includes far fewer patients. At the initial screening phase, it is not possible to distinguish them from the first category. The second category is characterised by the development of a traumatic pathology during the post-immediate phase or later. And yet research in the literature on predictive factors for the occurrence of such pathologies has not made it possible to define reliable criteria. The variability of contexts, be it the circumstances around the event or the nature of the populations, makes this screening of those victims who will develop a pathology more difficult

This is why setting up immediate and post-immediate care is only of interest if they can lead to specific care which is adapted to the psychotraumatic pathology of those who need it. In this perspective, the French doctrine, in the same way that it created immediate interventions and post-immediate care, aims to establish a psychotrauma consultation linked to the Medical-Psychological Emergency Cell, either in a specific place or in the framework of the psychiatry-by-sector networks, with however the reservation that the victims are not always happy to go to places that bear the stigma of chronic psychiatry.

When setting up a follow-up for victims who develop pathologies, the system and the procedure should be organised to enable, whenever possible, victims to be followed up by the same practitioners who worked during the initial and secondary phases, in collaboration with the centres where they work.

This leads us to recall that each Medical-Psychological Emergency Cell is managed by a psychiatrist who practises in a hospital in the "Département" designated by the "Prefect". This psychiatrist works closely with a psychologist. A list of volunteers is also available, which includes psychiatrists, psychologists and nurses, who are mobilised in such an event. It is therefore usually a good thing for this psychotrauma consultation to originate either in this pool of volunteers, or the referent or the CUMP's psychologist. This can only facilitate the trust that is sometimes so difficult to establish with the victims when they have to resort to such care.

ADAPTAPTING THE FRENCH SYSTEM TO NEW RISKS

After these principles were devised to provide victims with specific care in the best possible conditions, developments over these last few years led the SAMUs and the CUMPs to take new risks into consideration, risks which were discovered in the recent history of terrorism and also derived from other traumatic experiences not concerned with terrorism but which led to reflections whose conclusions cover the question of terrorism.

The first risk is the risk of mass terrorism like the attacks of 11th September. There are also the risks of new types of attacks, in particular bacteriological weapons like the anthrax found in envelopes after the 9/11, or that were found in France, but which, luckily, were hoaxes. These new bacteriological risks aroused fears about other agents than anthrax, such as smallpox or viral agents, and lead to reflections that are generally integrated in the fear of an attack with nuclear, radiological, bacteriological or chemical risks (6).

In France, the need to secure a warehouse containing bombs of the First World War in a "Commune" in northern France, Vimy, in March 2001, was an opportunity for a "life-size" exercise in rescuing victims of a terrorist attack with such risks, chemical risks as it happens. The SAMUs and the High Official for Defence's department, which is part of the Ministry for Health, started thinking about the type of intervention needed in such a context.

Besides building up stocks making it possible to vaccinate a majority of the population against bacteriological risks such as smallpox, each SAMU in France is now in a position to use protection and intervention methods in such a context, as well as decontamination by a now well-known system which has been used in many exercises in France's different "Départements" (7).

With mass terrorism also posing a threat, we are also carrying out theoretical and practical reflections, supported by simulations in the field, concerning multiple attacks in particular. Seeing the events in Madrid and London lead us to look into, in particular in the Paris region, the activation of new resources to cope with large numbers of victims already in the first hours, or on multiple sites. This thinking already began when the AZF factory in Toulouse blew up, when it became apparent that it was necessary to establish, already during the immediate phase, multiple medical-psychological emergency posts put up all along the devastated area's perimeter.

If multiple attacks were to take place in the Paris region, the recent reinforcement of the network of emergency medical-psychological cells in France and particularly in the Paris region, where a permanent team has been created by the "Département", makes it possible to mobilise right from the immediate phase a large number of specialists and volunteers, just as the SAMUs of the Paris region would do.

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MEETING THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS AFFECTED BY AN INCIDENT: UK STRUCTURE

Moya WOOD-HEATH

Abstract
The scope of the presentation was to describe the UK structure as it exists for victims of crisis situations and terrorist attacks, and to explain the current psycho-social provisions. It focussed on the immediate to medium term response, rather than the longer term. The presentation outlined the key principles that underline the approach; the support locations that would be set up; and the range of support activities that would be provided in those locations. It provided an explanation of new models of support now established for psycho-social care within the UK.

Key Words: UK structure, immediate to medium term response, new models of support, psycho-social provisions

PRESENTATION

PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The principles of responding to emergencies and disasters in the UK include integrated emergency management, where all responding organisations, whether government, statutory (including emergency services like Police, Fire and Rescue, and Ambulance) and voluntary, share agreed common goals and objectives and function according to agreed common generic planning. This structure is now supported by legislation: the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which places a statutory duty to respond in emergencies on primary responding organisations, such as Police, Fire and Ambulance Services, Health and Local Authorities. In the UK, the voluntary sector (including the British Red Cross) provides a key supporting role, not a statutory role. Key elements in UK arrangements are (i) responding to the needs of individuals affected, and (ii) responding to the effects of the incident, and not the cause. In the UK these are generic, all hazards plans, which would include terrorist incidents.

SUPPORT LOCATIONS

When an incident occurs, practical, emotional and medical support (psycho-social) will be provided in support locations set up as necessary:

- **Casualty Bureau** to service calls from members of the public who wish to report someone missing in an incident or to express concern. A casualty bureau is an information receiving and giving service set up by police.

- **Family Assistance Centre (FAC)** is a premise set up to:
    - act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved families and survivors
    - enable families to gain as much information as is currently available about missing family members and friends
    - enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enables the ability to identify loved ones quickly.

- **Friends and Relative Reception Centre** is a secure area set aside for use and interview of friends and relatives arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port). Established by the police in consultation with the local authority.

- **Survivor Reception Centre** is a secure area set up by the local authority to which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.

- **Rest Centre** is a building designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees, with overnight facilities if necessary.

- **Casualty Clearing Station** is an area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation.

- **Documentation teams at hospitals** are a team of police officers responsible for completing police casualty record cards in hospitals.

- **Temporary Mortuary** is a facility established with capacity to deal with all the processes associated with large numbers of fatalities in an emergency: identification, post mortem, DNA collection, viewing by relatives, preparation and reunion of remains, and storage.

These support locations will be set up and staffed according to need and will be a multi-agency activity.

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Within the support locations just described, a range of support activities are provided to bereaved, survivors and worried relatives in the immediate and medium term:

- information on identification and investigation process undertaken and progress

- practical, emotional (psycho-social) and medical support whilst in the centre and on return to home

- Police Family Liaison Officers – trained specialist police officers allocated to support bereaved persons and seriously injured through identification and investigation procedures

- multi-agency Crisis Support Teams – a new initiative where Social Services and voluntary organisations work together to support Police Family Liaison Officers taking over longer term care and working with bereaved and seriously injured.

- telephone support line – to supplement the casualty bureau and to respond to distressed persons anxious to discuss their situation, and to obtain information.
- dedicated mortuary facility with appropriate dignified support structures separate from normal mortuary facilities – sometimes temporary structures large enough to accommodate all the post mortem procedures.

- Family Assistance Centre - single site for service provision/a 'one-stop shop' to act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved families, individuals and survivors.

- network/website for individuals affected – information about incident and organisations who can assist, and useful publications.

- support groups – The British Red Cross works with individuals affected to support them in establishing family support groups if they wish – specific to need.

- access to National Health Services (primary and mental health) – to help individuals through the necessary bureaucratic processes.

- financial appeals, funding and compensation – working with local authorities and central government to set up/launch appeal.

AIM OF UK PSYCHO-SOCIAL PROVISION

The overall aim of psycho-social service provision is to meet the range of practical, emotional and medical support needs presented by victims at an emergency, whatever its cause. The response should be seamless on a continuum from immediate response through medium to long term, and using the skills and resources from specialist, voluntary and statutory organisations. The response will be locally driven and provided and, depending on scale, may have a regional and national involvement. An issue of primary importance is financial support through funding, appeals, or compensation, and the speed with which individuals are able to access such financial support.

The UK now has a new document published in September 2005 – 'Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Guidance on Establishing Family Assistance Centres', which is a joint product from Central Government departments, professional institutions and the voluntary sector. It includes new models, such as the Family Assistance Centre, Establishing Support Groups and Support Lines through multi-agency involvement.

The UK has sadly been affected by many emergencies over the years, and has developed its response to meet the needs of individuals affected. When an incident occurs involving terrorism, the same responses and activities are generated, the main difference arises from security measures, which will be necessary to protect the scene, the survivors and the respondents.

RESPONSE FOR VICTIMS OF CRISIS SITUATION:
IRISH RED CROSS

Gerry O'SULLIVAN

Abstract
The worst atrocity ever to hit the Irish Free State since the start of the troubles in 1974 was the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

On May 17, 1974, 3 Bombs exploded in the city centre of Dublin all within 90 seconds of each other. Later on in the evening,another bomb exploded in Monaghan town with several fatalities.
No warnings were given and as a result 33 people killed, mostly women, and 250 injured, thus it became known as Dublin's black Friday.

Investigations were carried out for three months. No support to victims at the time. Relatives of the victims have for years tried to get the truth. A wall of silence remained in tact. The Irish Government refused to hold a public inquiry and this in turn has angered the families. The secrets of the bombings will remain in vaults until such time as Governments release the relevant information. In the meantime the families of the dead and the survivors remain victims. Impact on survivors and families included loss of a loved one; mutilated bodies; pain and suffering. For many years and long after the external wounds had healed, many people suffered psychologically looking for answers and with probing questions but with no replies. These were known as the forgotten victims.

On our experience of terrorism attacks on innocent victims in the past, the needs and supports in their recovery is being recognised and we have included psycho/social support in all our emergency planning and training in conjunctions with our Health Service Executive and Primary & Community Continuing Care.

Key Words: *Dublin and Monaghan bombings*, *investigations, impact on survivors and families, emergency planning, psycho/social support*

PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for inviting me here and affording me an opportunity to give my presentation.

It is important you have some idea or understanding on how some of the incidents came about; so let us look at the past history.

PAST HISTORY

Ireland is divided by a Border with Northern Ireland: from 1968 to 1969 a number protest marches took place seeking Civil Rights for the Catholic population. This involved inequality, intimidation and homes being burned. As a result families became displaced and ended up as Refugees into the South of Ireland. They came from one conflict and were then placed into Military Camps and old Army Barracks.

All this created a vacuum, as law and order had broken down and quickly filled by groups like IRA on one side and on the other side we had UDA/UVF.

These groups are still in existence today. We had 37 years of terrorism. Over the years a number of events had taken place which involved innocent civilians.

We had Dublin and Monaghan bombings: Aid India Jet. These I will talk about later. Air craft hi-jack of Are Lingus jet to Dublin from London – diverted to France: Iranian hi-jack which lasted one day and another type of incident which has not yet been covered is Corporate Targets

THE BLACK FRIDAY

On 17th May, 1974, we had three car bombs in Dublin City. This resulted in 33 dead and 250 injured, mostly women.

This became known as Black Friday. Later a fourth car bomb exploded in Monaghan town, again the results were more fatalities and wounded.

This very quickly changed people perception as this was around time they tried to introduce Power Sharing.

IMPACT

Survivors and relatives experienced loss, sadness, anger. There was no public enquiry, despite numerous requests from survivors and relatives. There were many unanswered questions, with little or no support and therefore no closure. These people became known as the forgotten victims.

EFFECTS

Victims felt helpless and powerless to prevent death. There was loss of security.

EFFECTS OF DEATH

No recovery or partial recovery of bodies. The thoughts of pain and suffering. Multiple loss and trauma as many suffered psychologically and fear with this was created – Lack of information, to this very day there is still no closure for the survivors and relatives. Peoples perception changed very quickly.

TRAINING

We have taken the steps to introduce training in Psycho/Social Support to all Red Cross personnel. It is fully supported as we now recognise the need for Psychological Support in Crisis and Trauma. We have fully trained Response Team available at all times to all parts of the country.

STRUCTURE IN CISM

We have a Director who is a Clinical Psychologist and our National CISM Co-ordinator.

Team of Peer Supporters

Members given training in Stress Awareness and how to look after themselves and to recognise stress within their colleagues.

PRESENT DAY IN IRELAND

We have a guarded peace, now there is alternative decommissioning of Weapons from IRA. There is also a danger if dissidents who do not want peace and of course the criminal elements will always be around.

FUTURE

We are not associated with any war at present. We do have American aircraft stopping over and refuelling at Shannon Airport, so there is a danger of acts of terrorism which we have had in the past with attacks on some aircraft by Protestors to war in Iraq.

People want to live peacefully and children to grow up happy with no recrimination or prejudices.

KEY OBJECTIVE

Our over-all key objectives are to have: "The right people with the right skills in the right place at the right time".

PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTION IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF A DISASTER : THE BELGIAN RED CROSS

Koen VAN PRAET

Abstract

When confronted with major disasters, Belgium activates a mechanism that aims to meet the psycho-social needs of victims in emergency situations. This procedure is known as *"PIPS": plan d'intervention psychosocial* – the psychosocial response plan, which is fully integrated in Belgium's national disaster response plan. We shall give you here a brief presentation of this plan's structure, which is based upon three levels of intervention: the reception, information and counselling of victims and their families. On the one hand, it aims to meet in the immediate term the needs of those involved in the disaster. On the other hand, once the emergency is over, it endeavours to ensure continuing care by working closely with the structures of the communities' psychosocial networks. Central to this mechanism is the need to establish networks around the victims and to respect the development not only of their needs but also of their resources.

Key Words: psychosocial intervention plan, reception, information and counselling of victims, immediate term and long-term needs, psychosocial network.

PRESENTATION

Ladies and gentlemen,
My name is Koen Van Praet, and I work for Belgian Red Cross in the Social Intervention Service. In the next five minutes, I shall briefly introduce you to the SIS's response to the psychosocial needs of individuals involved in a disaster and consider some of the consequences that a terrorist act can have on our operations.

## SOCIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE (SIS) : AN OVERVIEW

Our mission is to reduce the stress experienced during the immediate phase of a disaster and to reinforce the links that the crisis has strained or even severed! The response structure to disasters that the Belgian Red Cross has developed is based on the needs expressed by the victims: the need for safety, the need for information and the need for guidance. This means that besides safety and guidance, two ingredients which always appear in every definition of "psychosocial assistance", we put a lot of energy into informing our target group. Fulfilling the victims' and their relatives' need for information is a need which is very often underestimated. For us, it is a major task. In Belgium, the Belgian Red Cross is responsible for collecting and processing the identities and whereabouts of all people involved in a disaster. Our philosophy during this immediate phase is therefore of a psychosocial nature, i.e. centred on a process where not only the changing needs but also the changing resources of the victims and of their communities are included and taken into consideration. The Federal Public Health Service and each of its representatives in the Belgian provinces mandate the Red Cross to carry out these missions in the framework of the psychosocial section included in the disaster plans. Our action is based on the preventive work done upstream in preparing (or not) the local network affected by the disaster.

OUR RESPONSE

Our volunteers, all of whom are trained professionals in the psychosocial field, are able to act within minutes following the phone call which alerts them: an SIS co-ordinator is sent to the scene to collect information on the **psychosocial** needs, SIS volunteers are dispatched to agreed locations (where they set up the various centres), SIS couriers go to the different hospitals (where they start interviewing the wounded). Meanwhile, an information centre is set up where we process the collected data, whilst at the hospitals, SIS volunteers turn their attention to assisting hospital staff with the reception of friends and relatives. If we are requested to, we open a helpline and a Friends and Relatives Reception Centre.

Later, a reunion area is set up, a guidance team starts its activities, and a lodging centre is equipped. In the worst-case scenario, SIS responders assist those individuals interviewed by the Disaster Victim Identification team. SIS volunteers also prepare individuals to pay their last respects to their loved ones.

After 8 hours, the SIS responders are replaced by a new team. We stop our intervention as soon as the existing social services can cope again.

Our operational structure (fig.)

The **reception of victims** – those directly involved in the disaster - takes place in the reception centre, and, if necessary, in the lodging centre. We offer people a safe place, and fulfil their primary needs, shelter and safety, with a warm welcome, where emotions have their place and people can be listened to. We comfort them and give them a brief explanation of what we can offer, in what way and for how long by ensuring necessary relays with the other resources available to the victims.

Information on the identity of the victims is collected at every location by the courier unit. This information goes to our processing unit, which produces lists on the whereabouts of the victims. The information then goes back to the SIS volunteers in reception centres, hospitals, the Friends and Relatives Centre and the helpline unit.

The **guidance** team seeks and organises specialised or psychological support for those who need it.

OUR RESPONSE IN THE CASE OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

Our response structure, presented above in a nutshell, has proven to be quite effective. But will this be the case when Belgium is the victim of an act of terrorism? At this very moment, the issue is the subject of discussions within our own organisation. We have no reason to believe that the needs of the victim **in the immediate phase** following a terrorist attack will be dissimilar to the needs of victims of disasters.

However, in this very particular context, we have to look very carefully into several closely interlinked questions.

The first concerns the intentions behind the event and the geopolitical context in which the terrorist act takes place. Apart from the psychological impact *per se* of the event is the shockwave it causes at community level and therefore also in the media, which is the second question. Finally, the third concerns information management, an issue already touched upon above. Indeed, since one of the terrorists' main aims is to terrorise a whole population, we can expect the number of calls from citizens who are directly but

also and above all indirectly involved in the event to be much higher than in other types of disasters. In the words of Pamela Dix from Disaster Action: survivors need information, information and information. This call for information is thought to be in contradiction with the wish of the authorities to control information flow.

Whichever way we respond, we have the responsibility of focusing on the most vulnerable people, in this case the survivors, the victims and their families. In the last 25 years, the Belgian Red Cross has had a good working relationship with the authorities in a wide range of interventions and crises. Our position within the official contingency planning has given us the opportunity to stand up for the victims in the best possible way given the circumstances of all involved. We believe this will be the case in a terrorist attack too.

THE ASSISTANCE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

Maria FERNANDEZ SANCHEZ

Abstract

I will try to explain the Assistance Office for Victims of Terrorism (under Department of the Interior) structure and its responsibilities, and in particular how the Office, with its human and material resources, responses to a terrorist attack. I am going to illustrate these plans of action with real examples and data taking from the March 11, 2004 terrorist attack.

Key words: social assistance tasks, compensations, immediate intervention, information

PRESENTATION

THE ASSISTANCE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: ORGANIZATION AND CORE FUNCTIONS

The Spanish Department of the Interior, has developed a cover system over the last three decades, devoted specifically to the special needs of these victims. At first, this help was mainly economical, had the intend of alleviating the terrible consequences and damages derivated from terrorist acts.

Nevertheless, a new Assistance Office created in 1996, aimed for more ambitious goal: to provide the victims with an integral assistance support. The new office decided to add to the economical actions a personal and human assistance that will alleviate innocent citizens beaten by violent acts led by terrorist groups. At the beginning, the Office helped mainly victims of the Basque terrorist group ETA, whose terrorist activity has lasted over 40 years, but nowadays, due to increase of international terrorism, this unit supports and assist a greater variety of victims.

Today's Assistance Office for Victims of Terrorism, has a complex pattern focused in two sections: economical compensations and social assistance.

The Compensatory-Section part of our office, manages the public aid system for the victims: compensation programs to reimburse victims for damages, and terrorist related-expenses such as medical bills. At this point, Spanish legislation has a double way: Ordinary Law and Solidarity Law:

- Under Ordinary Law compensations, financial help is stipulated according to body injuries and property damages. Other aids for particular cases of need such as reimbursement for psychological treatment up to 3,000 €and special treatments are also covered

- The Solidarity Act establishes compensations in case of decease or different levels of disability on a sliding scale (e.g. in case of a deceased victim with two minor dependents, the ordinary scheme would compensate a total of three hundred thousand euros). All the people, dead or injure in a terrorist attack, are considered as potentially repaid by the system.

Both compensatory programmes are fully compatible between them and with other public funds, such as the Regional Government of Madrid, the Railway Company Compensatory Programmes, etc.

The Assistance-Section of the Office, assists victims with a different sort of resources in relation with social, psychological, or other needs victims might have after the attack. Mainly, the assistance work-team -with a head of area, nine social workers and four assistants- perform different tasks such as mental health treatments, counselling, transportation fees, and accommodation for illegal and foreign people. Other duties of this section are: to inform about the benefits provided by the Spanish legislation, (especially about requirements, possibilities and procedures to apply for compensatory programs), to deal with other aids -like tax exemptions and grants for school and university- and to handle different certificates and communications that will allow victims further benefits from other units and public agencies.

The Assistance-Section cooperates with associations of victims of terrorism, and grants them subsidies for their projects and programmes.

Our unit also cooperates with other Assistance Offices, established by Courts or Public Prosecutor Offices, to help victims of violent crimes.

Once the general functions have been reviewed, I would like to highlight the role of our unit. I will particularly focus in the plan of action of our Office when a terrorist attack takes place.

IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION IN CASE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS: THE ROLE OF THE ASSISTANCE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

First of all, it's important to mention, that we distinguish between two different scenarios, and each one of them has a specific plan of action a) The first scenario states a massive attack with different locations and a big number of victims, like on March 11 in Madrid or July 7 in London, or b) The second scenario presents (a smaller) terrorist attack with a fewer number of victims and smaller repercussions and damages. I will focus my intervention on the first hypothesis because of the social alarm that the latest events have caused.

Once we receive the notification of the terrorist attack, the Head of our Office calls the Emergency Evaluation Committee to an urgent meeting. The head of the Office, the head of the Compensatory-Section and the head of the Assistance-Section, together with their group of experts, evaluate the situation and state a plan of action according to the magnitude of the strike, the number of victims and the damages caused by it.

At that point, the Assistance Office deals with three major functions: Social-Assistant task, Compensatory-Section task, and Information to citizens.

THE SOCIAL-ASSISTANCE TASKS:

The personnel of the unit acts under the principles of Proximity, Accurate Information, Simplicity and Unity. The social assistance team acknowledges and utilizes as much as possible the sources of nearby areas.

Normally, the efforts are focused on the following measures:

1° Create a follow-up unit that will :

- Schedule visits to the different hospitals to learn about the health conditions of the victims.
- Elaborate a complete and accurate casualty-list.
- Inform families and relatives (e.g. the March 11 bombing was the first terrorist attack in Spain where victims weren't clearly identified... so the Office had to contact hundreds of injured peoples in the first two weeks, to gather phone numbers from different sources, mainly hospitals ….).

2° Collaborate with Emergency Health units deployed in the affected area: e.g. S.A.M.U.R. of Madrid, Civil Defence Organization, Red Cross.

3° Provide emotional support and counselling. A team of social workers and psychologists attend and assist people injured or affected by the attack. (e.g. almost 300 people received psychological help and applied for social benefits). Later on, a report should be written about the psycho-social impact of the attack.

4° To locate the victims families or nearest relatives, and in case necessary provide free transport, provisional accommodation, etc. All this paperwork is doing in collaboration with flight companies, travel agencies and, in case of foreigners, embassies as well. In this aspect, there are two priorities: relatives from casualties and disappeared people, and relatives of seriously wounded victims. The most important issue is to calm down the affected people and cover as soon as possible their basic needs.

5º Contact all official units and public or private institutions involved in providing help for victims of terrorism, compiling as much information as possible and write a social report on it (e.g. on March 11 social workers reported about 2,000 people files, including victims and relatives).

6º If necessary, improvise an Emergency Morgue in collaboration with the Council Social Services, where families and relatives could identify the victims (on March 11, Pavilions 6th and 8th of IFEMA Showground were used to shelter the deceased, and to facilitate the identification and handling of corpses processes).

7° Offer support and help to families and relatives with the painful process of organizing the funerals and burials of their love ones.

8º Encourage the coordination with other official units involved in providing help for the victims.

Finally when a terrorist attack affects foreigners, there are some other problems to deal with such as:

- Language difficulties (March-11 there were 11 nationalities).
- Repatriation of corpses.
- Emergency visas and transportation of relatives (in collaboration with Foreign Office).
- Difficulties due to the lack of legal documents of some victims.

THE COMPENSATORY-SECTION TASK:

The duties of the Compensatory Section are:

- Contact the specialized firm (previously selected) in charge of executing the clearing-up, shoring-up, and repair operations. This actions are developed in coordination with the local urbanistic authorities (there is an ordinary legal agreement on this with the Council).

- Acconditionate an emergency shelter and organize the relocation of people living in damaged buildings.

INFORMATION TO THE CITIZENS

It has been observed -especially after March 11- that just after a massive attack, there arises a great demand of information from many people, linked in different ways to the victims. This way, the telephone lines will be for sure overloaded by citizens desperately seeking friends and family. An appropriate reaction to resolve this situation perform in three ways:

- **Telephone**: the Department of the Interior's Press Service, trough the mass-media (TV, Radio), provides citizens with the numbers of our "hotlines", a toll-free telephone where citizens can get information related with the attack. (e.g. in march –11 the Office established a voluntary group of people -who working day, night and weekends- answered 19.649 calls)

- **Voice Portal**: we have also a voice portal that provide automatic information about hospitals and mortuary addresses, numbers of telephones, location of transports, etc.

- **Internet:** (Web & e-mail) We have a digital mechanism through special banners in the Department of Interior Web Home Page, linking to a set of pages that can be updated several times per hour. The main information given was a casualties-list in order to thousand of citizens can find easily friends an family. (e.g. in March-11 the first official list arrived at 14:00 p.m, hundred of fax pages, and all the lists were assembled in less that one hour and published on-line, providing also an additional list with data from different sources (police, hospitals, emergency).

About email, likewise, in 3-11, 2.016 e-mails were answered providing injured lists (mostly sent to foreign countries).

- **Department of the Interior Press Service**

THE DAY AFTER: CONSTANT ASSISTANCE IN TIME.

After the first days it's very important for the whole collective affected to maintain as much as possible the supporting measures and make periodical monitoring. The unit follows each case individually, with phone and familiar monitoring, and makes sure that all the victims have been informed of the rights and compensations that Spanish laws grant. This way the unit provides:

- Information to people about the benefits provided by the Spanish legislation/ The unit informs about the requirements, possibilities and procedures to apply for compensations programs of the Ministry of Interior, Insurance Companies Consortium, Autonomous Community of Madrid, etc.
- Information about how to get the badges and medals that terrorism victims are given by the Ministry of Presidency (Gran Cruz y Encomienda)
- Derivation and Coordination with Immigrants Associations and NGO's and monitoring task.
- Guidance and Orientation about procedures on relation with extraordinary pensions of terrorism (Social Security System and Civil Servant Social System)
- Derivation to Legal Consultancy Services
- Information about the Especial Judicial Office created by the Court (Audiencia Nacional)
- Information to the family and relatives and coordination with Scientific Policy to locate lost property.
- Guidance and Orientation about Spanish Health Target
- Assistance on relation with Minor Tutelage in coordination with Family & Minor Public Prosecutor Office
- Handle the procedures to get home-help and residential homes for elderly
- Looking for interpreters to make communication easier for foreign victims and relatives of the deceased people
- If necessary, support and assist victims in a new job search
- Derivation to public services of laboral guidance, working with the Municipal Office Victims Assistance, Municipal Socio-Laboral Insertion Program (ISLA), and IMEFE.
- Actions of socio-laboral guidance to make easy the relocation in adequate jobs of the victims.

CONCLUSIONS: TO LEARN OF THE EXPERIENCES

Although this protocol is quite complete, when a terrorist group strikes, it's not easy to find the best and most efficient way in which all the personnel, units, and officials can work together to turn chaos into order as quick as possible.

Tragedies events like March 11, and July 7, show that a Joint Emergency Protocol between all affected units is dramatically necessary:

1.- A massive terrorist attack requires an immediate and effective handling of the economical resources, facilities, people, and logistics, availables.

2.-The personnel in charge in emergency situations, must be professionals/experts trained on how to offer short and long term psychological help and financial support to victims and families

3.- The Assistance Office for Victims of Terrorism has the responsibility to inform and guide victims and their families. It also helps them fill out administrative, legal, and social services paperwork.

4.- Our daily experience with victims of terrorism has taught us that the benefits/compensation they get from the State, shouldn't only be economical. The State has to provide victims with a specific unit (on call 24 hours) that will make them fill protected and supported .

5.- With a coordinated intervention, we can contribute to the social recovery of the victims in all its aspects. We also need to facilitate ways that allow victims to contribute to their own recovery and to their successful integration into society after experiencing such a dramatic event.

Part III: Workshops

WORKSHOP 1.1: THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN RELATION TO THE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS

Group I

Rapporteur: Koen VAN PRAET
Facilitator: Jessica ALMQVIST

SYNTHESIS

The participants discussed and evaluated different public and civic responses to the needs for emergency assistance and claims of reparation (rehabilitation, compensation and access to justice) in the case of mass victimization resulting from a terrorist attack.

The first theme in focus was emergency intervention of civil society organizations to relation to victims of terrorist attacks. The Red Cross has a significant role to play in aiding the victims during the first days following an attack. Seeking to assist victims of terrorist attack poses special challenges. For example, security arrangements were established for the assistance facilities of the British Red Cross that were set up in connection with 7 July. While there is a special concern with security following a terrorist attack (intense police search for suspects), it complicates access to the victims. Moreover, in the context of violent crime (as opposed to, say, natural disasters) the line between victim and suspect is not clear. A person who is a victim in the eyes of the Red Cross might be subject to police interrogation as a suspect. This is especially evident in the case of airplane hijacking. In the case of *Lockerbie*, all persons coming out of the plane—whether hostages or hijackers—were interrogated. Also, in hostage situations, terrorists have asked the Red Cross to aid them in negotiations with public authorities. Finally, public authorities rely on the work of organizations of the Red Cross in the aftermath of a terrorist attack (and other situations of mass victimizations). The Red Cross, in turn, often rely on public authorities to facilitate their assistance work. In an important sense, there is a positive (and inevitable) interplay (a division of labour) between public institutions and civil society organizations. At the same time, this interplay can give rise to difficult questions related to Red Cross basic principles of neutrality, independence and confidentiality.

The second central theme that was debated in the workshop was the policies adopted of public authorities in the UK, US and Spain in the case of mass victimization following devastating terrorist attacks. The making of such policies, the participants agreed, raises a host of difficult ethical questions. Especially problematic for public authorities is to create a viable policy in relation claims of justice by victims of terrorism that is fair, not only in relation to *all* victims of terrorism (in the past and the future), but also in relation to victims of other violent crime, and perhaps even victims of natural disasters as well as victims of terrorist acts committed abroad. As it is now, the compensation or aid you receive as a survivor of a terrorist attack depends on where you as a victim are (the state is only responsible for victims of terrorist acts carried out on its own territory); the nature and the source of the violence (e.g. terrorist act v. other violent crime or natural disaster); and the particular regulation of the state (there is no European or international compulsory regulation that all states must follow). As a result, there seems to be no *equity* across states and victims.

A third theme was that of (psychosocial) rehabilitation. The participants agreed about the importance of this aspect of reparation, but several problems are encountered in seeking to ensure universal, meaningful and timely access to this form of assistance for victims of terrorist acts. One impediment is societal attitudes towards psychosocial interventions ("My daughter doesn't have psychological problems"). Another obstacle is the lack of timing. This kind of assistance is often offered too early to victims (when victims still are in shock and have more immediate practical questions to deal with). Once needed, it may no longer be easily accessible. Because of this time lag, it can also be more difficult for the victim of a terrorist act to demonstrate that his or her depression or anxiety is the result of the act (as opposed to other incidents).

The fourth and final theme was access to the courts. The participants shared the view that this dimension of reparation for victims (access to justice) might have less practical or immediate relevance compared to compensation and rehabilitation. For a start, there are few trials against terrorist suspects. Also,

the trials themselves can be frustrating for the victims because there is no knowledge of whether those who stand accused actually carried out the attacks. Furthermore, in the case of devastating terrorist acts, compensation claims of victims may already have been dealt with by public authorities. Still, victims of terrorist acts should be given the option to observe and take part in future criminal proceedings and given information about such trials.

Group II

Rapporteur : Delphine PENNEWAERT
Facilitator : Olivia VENET

SYNTHESIS

A member of the French association "SOS Attentats" shared her experiences on the subject with the group. Since July 1990, for instance, the association can claim damages in court proceedings. This role is all the more important since the victims are often not familiar with the legal system and fear being confronted with the magistrature and the legal institution in general. Yet positive and adequate contacts between the magistrates and the victims foster recognition by society of what the victims went through. These days, French law imposes on magistrates the obligation to inform the victims of the case's progress. The fact that magistrates who have become "specialised" in terrorist issues are used is generally seen as a good thing.

Participants with a more "legal" background also posed many questions about the different reactions and expectations that victims have regarding the legal world:

- What do the victims want and what do they expect from the legal system?
- Why do they feel so frustrated?
- Is it necessary to have a (legal) definition specifically for terrorism?

The workshop's participants also looked into the role and functions of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT). This was an opportunity for them to exchange their views, on the one hand, on the importance for the victims that what they have been through is officially recognised in the most symbolically appropriate spheres and, on the other hand, on keeping the ICT's objectives intact to ensure the Tribunal's correct functioning.

Concerning the question of a "place'" for the victims in the various jurisdictions, it is important that they should be officially recognised and given support. Indeed, informing and supporting the victim before, during and after the trial are determining factors for the effect and the adequacy of the victim's acceptance and integration in a court.

Support is necessary right from the contacts and meetings with the lawyers, which are often painful and difficult experiences because of their contents.

Thanks to the trial, the victims can be recognised as "subjects", and their suffering can be accepted and heard. Unfortunately, the procedure often does not result in a conviction as it is often difficult to arrest and judge the terrorists. In this case, contacts with the investigating judge are very important and might satisfy, if only in part, the need of the victims to be recognised.

During the trial, the accused's attitude is often very hostile and violent. Psychological preparation and support are therefore essential in this context.

As for the status of the victims of terrorist acts, certain countries such as France grant them the status of "civilian victims of war" so that they can benefit from the corresponding social benefits, even if this qualification might be legally and socially inappropriate.

THE GROUP'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

- The acts must be qualified as "terrorist" acts so that the victims can feel that their suffering is recognised and heard.

- The confrontation between victims and authors, as long as support is provided, can enable the victims to rebuild their lives. The authors also have to recognise them as "subjects" and no longer as "objects".

- The trauma experienced by civil society following terrorist acts is an important factor for change and mobilises the states.

WORKSHOP 1.2 : VICTIMS, TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA

Group I

Rapporteur: Stephen REGEL
Facilitator: Nana WIEDMANN

SYNTHESIS

There was a wide-ranging discussion on all three of these aspects in the Workshop.

First of all, the common theme was the balance between information about an event and its consequences, and how this relates to media responses to an event. Another recurring theme was that, in many ways, media reporting was uncontrollable and, therefore, there was a need to monitor and filter information in a constructive, informative and ethical way. A further issue was how to balance the demands of the media, the needs of the victims and the overwhelming need, at the time, of those affected to receive accurate and concise information regarding the event, the fate of loved ones, personal security and other issues. It was felt, in the group, that it was not possible to 'control' the media and that a key factor, in terms of addressing the balance, would be education of the media in terms of their response to acts of terrorism. A common view was that news reports were often emotionally driven, and sensationalised. Obviously, this is different across the European community, depending on the style and pattern of news coverage, vested interests and the prevailing political climate.

Key themes that emerged from the above discussion were issues of partnership and education of the press, and media, from the early stages. Working with them in a collaborative framework, highlighting the needs and vulnerability of the victims, the need to report both the impact on the victim and the wider community, in the most sensitive and ethical way. Education as a theme also emerged in terms of the victim. How do we educate the victim when dealing with the press? Recently, we have seen, as in the case of the recent London bombings, the victim as journalist. Many of those who were either present or near-by the event at the time, took photographs, as well as video phone clips, and these were given to the press. Therefore, the importance of this parallel process of educating both the victim and the media is an extremely important issue, which should be taken forward in the longer term. This could be in the form of joint seminars, workshops and ongoing collaboration, using lessons learned from previous experiences. It is also possible to educate potential victims by advising on protective strategies in dealing with the media. This could perhaps be included as part of the written information that is often distributed after a disaster, eg. many Red Cross societies and other agencies issue leaflets on coping with traumatic events. This information could also include strategies for dealing with the media, and may help prevent some of the problems that victims encounter when telling their stories.

Another issue that emerged from the Workshop was the demonising of specific communities following acts of terrorism. Again, this could be a key and crucial aspect of the educative process in working with the media and could involve local community leaders. This would help to build bridges within communities, stop rumours and prevent discrimination and intolerance towards certain communities. This process could also be used in schools and be a broad-based educational initiative.

Another issue that was discussed within the Workshop was how do we watch, process and assimilate news reports and media reports of terrorist activity? This could be especially relevant when children are involved. For example, repeated viewing of distressing and harrowing imagery can have a negative impact on children and their perception of their personal safety and the world at large.

Another issue that was raised within the Workshop was media reporting of psychosocial interventions and psychosocial support for victims following a man-made disaster, eg a terrorist attack. There are often frequent reports in the media, following such incidents, of emergency personnel, and those 'affected', receiving counselling. Whilst this is inaccurate and does not occur (counselling and therapy being a later intervention), it nevertheless enters the language of media coverage following a major event, which is

traumatic in nature. This again relates back to educating the media in terms of accurately describing different interventions and the aims and objectives of those interventions following a terrorist incident, or any other major disaster.

Therefore, some of the key themes that emerged from the Workshop are:

- Educating/collaborating with various sections of the media on the reporting of terrorist incidents and other traumatic events. This would include collaboration and partnership, and can be achieved through joint seminars and workshops.

- Preparing and educating potential victims following terrorist attacks. Preparing them with strategies as to how to deal with the media and perhaps including written information within the standard information that is given out following traumatic events.

- Briefing media and journalists beforehand would also be advantageous, and this could also be linked into the joint collaboration and education as mentioned above, but could also be a further initiative.

- Utilising educational initiatives within schools, and other areas, as to the impact both on communities involved, and in terms of exposure to distressing or harrowing imagery. This could be done with teachers, for example, and a useful collaboration could be undertaken again with educational establishments and media sources.

- Ongoing involvement and partnership with the media, humanitarian aide agencies and victims' agencies would make a significant difference to the process of reporting of terrorist incidents.

- Providing the media with accurate information regarding early interventions and support mechanisms, for victims and communities, would also be of benefit as it would dispel a number of myths as to what is the best provision for victims following traumatic events.

Group II

Rapporteur : Sylvie BOSMANS
Facilitator : Etienne VERMEIREN

SYNTHESIS

The aim of this workshop was to initiate a discussion on the links between terrorism, its victims and the media.

Over the two-hour discussion, several main points were looked into.

It is often said that the media are the fourth pillar of power in our society. By thinking about their position and the influence they sometimes have, the working group discussed several topics that are narrowly related to each other. Two main issues stand out from this debate: ethics and education.

The question of the media's ethics in view of the impact of their work in the context of terrorist acts was abundantly discussed. Then, not only was the question of the need to educate journalists regarding the psychosocial impact of their actions discussed but also the question of educating the public about the work of the media themselves.

ETHICS

The workshop started by underlining the importance of respecting the intimacy and the suffering of the victims and of their friends and families, and the work of the respondents. Indeed, the arrival of the press on the site of a disaster is often seen as an intrusion. The victims discover photos of themselves in the press,

which is a renewed shock, and the rescue workers have to be able to work without having to face the ceaseless solicitations of certain journalists.

However, the important role the media play in diffusing information to the general public during critical situations is clearly recognised and underlined! The media can meet very important needs in the affected community and in the various groups it includes! But not in a haphazard way, nor just at any time.

In response to participants who put forward the point of view of journalists arguing that " more often than not, the victims agree to be interviewed or filmed", it was recalled that the psychological state of the victims does not, at that moment in time, enable them to make a free choice, i.e. to be capable of imagining the result and the consequences of this choice. Many victims are horrified or traumatised a second time and bitterly regret having allowed themselves to be filmed, photographed or interviewed. Particularly since it has already happened in certain disaster situations that the victim's first contact with the "community of survivors" is with a journalist who is there on the job! The journalist's role at this time goes beyond the job of a simple reporter, whether s/he is aware of this or not!

Finally, positive aspects of media coverage of terrorist acts were mentioned:

- Depending on the way they handle information, the media can promote (to very variable degrees, depending on the context and the people) catharsis by delegation. Journalists' commentaries, by putting things into words, can contribute to this search for meaning and the processing of the crude emotions expressed, for instance, in the pictures. These pictures tend to replace words in the face of the unbearable. This catharsis phenomenon and the way the victims and the whole community experience it in the context of our modern society was briefly dealt with. Is it a catharsis or the starting point of a catharsis? The question of the symbolic function that the media might have at this level remains.

- By broadcasting their reports, the media can enable the victims to be recognised by humankind.

- The media also make it possible to perpetuate the memory of an event.

- Finally, the media make it possible to broadcast useful information very quickly such as free phone numbers, messages of support…

At a more general level, participants felt if would be interesting to add finer points to certain aspects of journalists' code of ethics. They also recalled the importance of using regular press updates and press conferences to respond to the needs of the media and of the victims in an organised and coherent way.

EDUCATION

Educating the media

Participants felt it would be interesting to raise the medias' awareness and to support them regarding the content of the information to be broadcast and the way of presenting it. Several ideas concerning this topic were raised:

- It is important to raise journalists' awareness about the negative impact that showing certain pictures might have of the victims, their families and friends and sometimes even the general public.
- The media should also be informed about the possible effects of manipulating information (for instance, not showing a whole speech).
- Within the scope of terrorism, it is important that the media should be made aware of the publicity they are offering the terrorists by broadcasting certain terrifying and chaotic pictures. By acting this way, they are precisely playing into the hands of the terrorists.
- It is also important to raise the media's awareness about the many dangers of broadcasting information that is too detailed, as the authors of terrorist acts might thus have access to information

concerning the weaknesses of their plans or the state of progress of the enquiries, which makes it possible for them to act as a consequence.

- It is essential that the media become aware of the fact that the financial stakes they are playing (viewership, maximising the sales of a newspaper…) do not always justify broadcasting or publishing certain pictures or interviews.
- Finally, broadcasting only excerpts of non-contextualized fanatical speeches that are not explained in further detail can indirectly put the media in the position of recruiters.

Educating about the media

On the other hand, it seems just as important to educate the general public about the media. The economic principle of supply and demand with regard to the various media was looked into at this point. It emerged from the discussion that the consumer of media products also had a responsibility, including his/her interest, curiosity and even fascination for sensationalism! The difference was also underlined between the way different media handle information according to their political tendency and their funding. Sensationalist exaggeration can be countered at individual level by buying products that provide information in a less spectacular way.

The idea that educating the media should go together with education about the media was largely shared by participants in the workshop. Each target of terrorism, either victim, citizen, journalist or general public, might benefit at their own level.

WORKSHOP 1.3 : HOW TO AVOID THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM BECOMING "TERRORISM" ITSELF

Group I

Rapporteur: John HORGAN
Facilitator: John HORGAN

SYNTHESIS

Terrorism and political violence are extremely complex phenomena and there is a general consensus that single-cause explanations of these will fail. There is no single factor that causes terrorism (or 'root cause', rather it is the case that a multitude of interacting factors contribute to make the emergence of terrorism more likely in certain situations than others. Related to this is the need to consider terrorism as a heterogeneous phenomenon. Terrorism is not an ideology, but a strategy open to use by a multitude of very different kinds of actors, who may not necessarily share much else in common apart from the willingness to kill non-combatants as part of their immediate tactical use of terrorism. This heterogeneity is rarely appreciated in attempts to consider how we might effectively aim to counter terrorism. For many, counterterrorism represents something that can be measured with respect to say, the head counting of captured or killed terrorists, or by short-term changes in either the extent of, or severity of, particular terrorist groups' operations. While this may have been the case for a limited range and type of terrorist movements in the past, today's terrorist groups are very different. How does one combat Al Qaeda for example, which does not have an organisational command structure much like the Provisional IRA, or ETA once had?

In fact, on a broader level, it is increasingly obvious that what is lacking in our analyses of terrorism is a sense of how we might measure the effectiveness or otherwise of both specific and broad aspects of counterterrorism initiatives. One issue that does seem to be apparent, particularly given the fallout since 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq that followed soon after, is that we seem to be failing to learn from our mistakes in responding to terrorism (at a range of levels) because it seems obvious that many measures designed to 'combat' terrorism only feed into either the terrorism itself, or the support for it. It may also be the case however, that perhaps states do learn from their mistakes but it may be the case that they have come to realise that sometimes it is simply inevitable that policies inadvertently lead to further support being created for terrorism: the problem may be that states are simply unaware of other, more beneficial and flexible ways of responding to terrorism.

It has often been said that terrorism is a creature of its own time and place, and it follows that efforts to combat terrorism must also be developed from the specific context in which the campaign is being waged. The security and other challenges posed by terrorism require a flexible, dynamic response that is mindful of cultural, language and local sensitivities and the realisation that there is no 'single' solution to (or cause of) terrorism.

One of the clearest areas of unanimity in this group was the recommendation that in combating terrorism, counterterrorism initiatives need to employ a multi-level, context-based, focused approach to responding to terrorism. The main goal of such an approach has to be the preventative effect against causing either further terrorism, or an escalation of what terrorists do, or an escalation of support for the terrorists.

Given the need to appreciate context, it is still possible to generate some broad principles which ought to be strenuously upheld in any effort to counter terrorism.

These would include, but not be exclusive to, the following assumptions and assertions, which the group felt were the most important issues to emerge from discussions on this topic during the Study Days:

1. There is a responsibility of the State to hold the moral high ground in responding to terrorism, at all levels. Therefore the fight against terrorism must not ever become a form of terrorism itself: we cannot support the use of terrorism against terrorism, which often involves the abuse of human

rights, including the use of physical and psychological torture, which is increasingly being excused away via euphemistic efforts to produce technical distinctions between what is 'appropriate' torture and what is not. An overabundance of evidence exists to support the view that such tactics only create 1) animosity towards the State and 2) frequently more support for terrorism through further victimisation.

2. One of the key features of terrorism is that it is a form of psychological warfare involving the calculated exploitation of people's anxieties, emotions etc. It is primarily a form of violence that aims to exploit (and serve as a form of) communication. We must become increasingly aware of the dynamics of the relationship between terrorism and the media in enhancing public resilience against the terrorist threat, and we must also express the need for restraint by the media in coverage of terrorist events and campaigns. Resilience may well be a key factor in publicly combating terrorism and is an area meriting further study.

3. Related to this is the acknowledgement that terrorists thrive in psychological terms when its audience is rendered 'helpless' (or has the perception of being helpless). One of the many lessons from the resilience shown by the broad London population in response to the July 2005 bombings, we suspect, was largely due to the effectiveness of the Emergency response shown in the wake of the bombings. The efficiency of the response was largely itself due to the extensive drills, preparation and exercises in the time leading up to the bombings. It is increasingly the case that there may be little we can do to prevent any terrorist attack from taking place, but we can ensure that effective mechanisms exist with which to respond to terrorism.

Group II

Rapporteur : Brigitte BUREAU
Facilitator : Frédéric CASIER

SYNTHESIS

Discussions developed more around the psychological, sociological and political aspects of the issue rather than strictly on the legal side.

The group particularly looked into the importance of understanding terrorism before carrying out a repressive policy against the phenomenon.

MAIN IDEA AROUND WHICH OUR REFLECTION WAS BASED

It is above all up to the State to inform the population on the origins of terrorism and, as a consequence, to provide appropriate solutions in the framework of the fight against terrorism.

1. First of all, the role of the State consists in identifying terrorist acts, recognizing their severity and condemning them publicly.

2. Secondly, the gravity of the terrorist acts implies that the State has to respond in an adequate way, which is above all based on an understanding of the phenomenon:
    -   Proportionate measures (not only in court)
    -   Awareness-raising work on terrorism for the population so that they understand the phenomenon better (identifying the reasons why the authors commit terrorist acts, their context…)

    Researching the origins of terrorist acts would make it possible to avoid the author/victim division , the extreme security policies adopted by certain governments and the excessive exploitation of the image of the victim (the notion of "invoked victim" mentioned by Denis Salas). Indeed, if someone commits a terrorist act, it is because they were the object of an injustice, meaning they also feel they are a victim. The authors react, therefore, with means

that seem legitimate to them to express their uneasiness in society and which enable them to be heard.

PRINCIPAL THOUGHTS EXCHANGED

Before engaging in a fight against terrorism, it is important to understand terrorist acts in order to devise an adequate response and to react preventively in the longer term.

Understanding terrorism implies taking several factors into consideration:

1. The psychological point of view (which takes more interest in the origins of terrorism) and the legal aspect (which is more concerned with the fight against terrorism and repression) need conciliating.
   - From the psychological point of view, it should be stressed that the authors of terrorist acts are also the victims of an injustice that pushed them to commit their crime(s). Furthermore, there is also the suffering of the offenders' families, which try to understand the reasons which pushed their family members to act in this irrational way.
   - From the legal point of view, terrorist acts are offences. The author must, as a consequence, be punished.

2. Terrorism has to be analysed from different perspectives (historic, linguistic, philosophical, theological, sociological, psychological…) and therefore with different actors (participation of the citizens, the States, international organisations). A multidisciplinary approach might lead to a multidisciplinary (and not just a legal) intervention which is adapted to the phenomenon. It would be accepted more favourably by the population than if it were strictly handled from a criminal-law perspective.

3. The "victimisation" phenomenon, used for instance by the media, needs to be avoided. The victim of a terrorist act is no more "sacred" than the others. Also, the authors of terrorist acts are also the victim of an injustice, which encouraged them to take action. Finally, accentuating the status of "victim" would have the negative effect of putting the person into this category indefinitely.

4. Understanding and fighting terrorism need beforehand a clear definition of the phenomenon, from the legal point of view, for instance. Terrorism cannot arbitrarily encompass just any act and according to the States' purely strategic and geopolitical interests. The States cannot qualify as "terrorism" any action that does not include any of its characteristics (for example terror) just to justify a repressive policy inside their territory and beyond..

RECOMMENDATIONS

A preventive and efficient fight against terrorism must have as a starting point an analysis of the phenomenon in order to understand it better. This might be organised in the following way:

- The State has to raise the population's awareness and explain the terrorist act to improve its understanding of it. It must also provide better information on the reasons for and the use of an anti-terrorism policy.

- Terrorism needs approaching in a broad and subtle way. The author of an attack is also a victim of society. The legal instrument (the courts) is therefore not the only way to handle terrorism. A multidisciplinary search for the origins of the terrorist offences and an in-depth analysis of the author's personality are vital tools to prevent terrorism in the future.

- The victim's image must not be excessively exploited to justify a policy that only concerns security. The victim must be able to leave his/her original status behind him/her to avoid being manipulated and used as a tool by the State and by the media.

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WORKSHOP 2.1: THE EXPERIENCE OF CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE GROUPS

Group I

Rapporteur: Sirry THORMAR
Facilitator: Barbara JUEN

SYNTHESIS

In this workshop we first had a discussion about the following main questions. We exchanged many of our experiences in working with children. Our primary focus was Beslan.

1. How to support a child, a parent, after a traumatic event?
2. What determines that a child is better supported in a hospital than at home?
3. How to respond to "secrecy"?
4. How to respond to "questions asked on the side"?
5. How to help children who have witnessed horrifying events where they felt helpless?
6. What are the differences between collective crisis and individual crisis?
7. Do we need different support with terrorist attacks than with a train accident?

After posing all these questions we tried to find the most important arguments when dealing with children and terrorism. One of our main topics was how to protect children from the fear which accompanies terrorist attacks, how to give them the information they need but at the same time helping them to (re)establish their view of the world as a safe place to live in.

These were our four main arguments:

1. The importance of going along with children's questions and not giving them more information than they ask for. In order to protect children on the one hand and to give them all the information they need on the other hand, we suggested to listen to children's questions and to be careful not to give them more information than what they have asked for.

2. The difference between an individual experience and the collective experience. Selecting the most vulnerable people and approaching them should ideally start from an individual level. As the example of Beslan has shown, a terrorist attack is always an event which affects a community as a whole. Fear and anger may lead to problematic community responses such as the view that there is a good versus a bad form of violence. Children may be especially vulnerable to these attitudes. In dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, one should start with the individual child but never forget the collective group level.

3. How do we prepare our children for terrorist attacks?
The teaching of morals and values seems to be of special importance in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. We have to react to the requests of children. If the context is realistic, sometimes teaching them skills might be an option but the line between the two is not clear. In order to not overreact, we should explore children's fears and work from there as well as from a realistic context.

4. Children need special attention and are often forgotten. Every programme should include approaches with children. It should include specific elements for children, whether they are showing symptoms or not. It seems especially important for us to differentiate between programmes for all children versus programmes for children with symptoms. Both approaches are of particular importance.

Group II

Rapporteur : Caroline JOACHIM
Facilitator : Delphine PENNEWAERT

SYNTHESIS

The aim of this workshop was to initiate a discussion on the way children and vulnerable groups experience terrorism.

The working group's discussions focussed first of all on the different ways a child could be a victim of a terrorist act. We noted three aspects in particular:

1. Children are victims when their parents have been victims of terrorist acts.

2. Children are victims when they are direct victims of terrorist acts, because they are on site when the attack takes place.

3. Children are victims when they are used as strategies (in Algeria, for instance, where whole families were massacred before the eyes of the youngest child. The life of this child was systematically spared so that s/he could talk about it and diffuse the horror s/he had gone through).

The working group then looked into the question of whether children and the elderly were vulnerable groups or not. Several lines of thought provided answers to this question.

1. The first question addressed by the working group was whether children born in a "secure" environment were potentially more or less vulnerable in the face of terrorist acts than children who were originally born in "insecure" contexts.

2. The working group's second line of thought was whether the parents' traumas could be passed on to their children. The answer was that traumatised parents sometimes do transmit their trauma to their children, particularly if it is hidden and not spoken about.

3. The third and last point developed by the working group was the elderly. Experience has shown us that, in the face of certain natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes…, elderly people were far from being the most affected by such events, as their life experiences seem to sometimes be priceless resources that help them to cope.

All of these thoughts led us to conclude that we should rather speak of unfavourable contexts or factors which increase vulnerability rather than of vulnerable groups or people. In our opinion, nothing can really predict that a particular person or group is vulnerable or not since it is the context which weakens or strengthens the capacities that a particular person or group develops when confronted with a critical event. It is interesting in this context to analyse "unfavourable contextual factors" even if such an analysis is limited by the singularity of human reactions in crisis situations.

The working group then worked on the differences between adults and children in their ways of communicating and expressing themselves. We noted here that it is important to:

1. Attract adults' attention to the way their own behaviour can project onto children's experiences of events.

2. To not under-evaluate what children sometimes express clearly.

3. To respect the defence mechanisms which children individually and collectively set up to protect themselves from certain situations.

4. To pay attention to the physical symptoms (stomach ache, skin problems…) that some children might display since their occurrence can sometimes partially be determined by the presence of psychological disorders.

5. To keep children within their families (either their immediate families or their families in the broader sense).

Finally, the working group noted that crisis workers are often more vulnerable and fragile when they work in situations where certain victims are children; Similarly, public opinion is often more "touched" by events in which children are involved, which means that children might therefore become a particular strategic target for terrorists in the short or longer term.

WORKSHOP 2.2 : PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ON VICTIMS

Group I

Rapporteur: John HORGAN
Facilitator: Joanne DOVER

SYNTHESIS

Another important, and alternate defining feature of terrorism, is that for terrorists, there is a distinction to be made between the immediate target of *violence and terror* and the overall target of *terror*: between the terrorist's immediate victim (e.g. such as the person who has died from a bombing or a shooting) and the terrorist's *opponent* (e.g. a government). Sometimes, terrorists bypass the symbolic intermediaries to target politicians directly, by assassination for instance. Again, as above, because of this dynamic, terrorism might be viewed as a form of *communication* - a violent, immediate, but essentially arbitrary means to a more distant political end. Although the attacks of 9/11 may have resulted in the deaths of almost 3,000 people, the more potent immediate and long-term rewards for those responsible for planning and organising the attacks were the humiliation of the American government and the subsequent psychological arousal for the greater populace: the immediate victims in this case may be only tenuously related to the terrorists' opponents.

On an individual level, terrorism provokes shock, horror and outrage by offending our sense of justice and fairness in the world. It sickens us that any person can be simply at the wrong place at the wrong time and be killed in the name of a cause they have never even heard of. While terrorists may claim to be victimised and in need of reparation, the methods used by them are fundamentally irreconcilable with human rights. Terrorists do not recognise the basic human right to choose to live, and their methods cause untold psychological suffering on those directly and indirectly affected by it.

In this context, the group discussion on these topics identified three specific needs to be addressed, which were as follows:

1. It is clear that there is a need for systematic planning involving a coordinated multi-agency approach to emergency responding that places critical importance upon the establishment of clear and unambiguous roles (i.e. who is responsible for what, and when, at what point, where they interact with others etc.). From previous disasters and terrorist atrocities, this is an issue which has not always been treated with the seriousness of the implications surrounding it.

2. A more 'micro-level' issue to be considered is the systematic identification of victims' needs, at a variety of levels, and at different stages of the recovery process. Recovery from being affected by terrorism is a complex, and usually lengthy, journey. An identification and acknowledgement of victims' needs will entail a sense of recognition at symbolic and other levels of what has happened to victims and reflect an acknowledgement of the obvious and less obvious physical, psychological and other consequences of being a victim of terrorism.

3. As all disasters, including terrorism, are international, we need to consider what this means in the context of supporting the recovery of victims of terrorism. A basic principle has to be reflected in the need for a flexible and dynamic approach to the treatment of victims that hold at all times the dignity and respect needed to facilitate recovery from trauma. These issues will always be context-sensitive (despite the international dimension), but some basic principles always need to be adhered to. We need to see much more evidence of this across, for example, some of the practicalities of dealing with victim issues (including for example, the allocation of funding etc.).

Group II

Rapporteur : Benjamin ADANT
Facilitator : Thibaut LORENT

SYNTHESIS

The group approached the subject with two difficulties. First of all, few of us were knowledgeable, in view of our clinical practice of traumatology, of the specificity of the repercussions of terrorist acts in particular on the victims. Secondly, the presentation on the subject having been cancelled, we could not refer either to the questions that should have been looked into then.

DEFINITION OF THE FIELDS AND SPECIFICITIES

The impact of terrorist acts on the victims is strongly determined by the definition given to these terrorist acts. What do they cover? What makes them constitute an identifiable category? What are their attributes? It is crucial to look into the meaning of each terrorist act before being able to reflect on its particular impact.

To determine the impact of these events, we determined first of all in what way terrorist acts are specific compared with other acts of violence. We then considered how this specificity could cause particular consequences for the victims. This is a very restrictive *a posteriori* view since terrorist acts are also linked to any type of collective traumatic event and are partly assimilated to them.

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere, outside, and, as is often the case, in places accessible to the public. Although they target places with a determined function, their aim is rather to provoke a general feeling of disquiet of the type: "This can happen anywhere." In short, in terms of localisation, if the terrorist act has a precise target, its social impact is aspecific.

When one sees certain campaigns, one might suppose that the status of victim can specifically apply to terrorist acts. In France, for instance, these victims benefit from the special status of "civilian victims of war".

One regularly sees the victims of terrorist acts trying to give meaning to relational violence. The victims seem more intent on finding causes, on trying to understand their aggressors and the debates at the source of these violent acts than the victims of other acts such as robbery with violence, whose motives seem to be more directly accessible.

EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES, REPERCUSSIONS AND IMPACTS

While terrorist acts mostly affect people collectively, the impact that is sought and obtained develops at individual level. However, the individual is not targeted personnally but rather in his/her capacity as a citizen. In other words, the individual taken in his/her societal dimension becomes representative of an organisation with its rules and powers (a nation, a country, a regime, a society, a government, an authority…).

From a clinical point of view, it has been noted that terrorist acts lead to more cases of PTSD and psychiatric disorders than other intentional acts of violence. These clinical consequences can find an echo in the fact that terrorist acts aim to destabilise the fundamental link that is trust in others. This necessary feeling of trust in others is also disrupted in all intentional acts of violence. However, in the case of terrorism, this impact is sought for its own sake; it is at the core of these acts and not an unfortunate consequence.

SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

The working group concluded with the three following ideas:

1. Do the victims of terrorist acts, because of the terrorists' claims, need a specific status and specific

recognition?

2. Terrorist acts aim to have an impact on the individual from a societal point of view (ie as a citizen) more than for who s/he is.

3. Terrorist acts aim to destabilize the fundamental link of trust for others, while in other acts of violence, this destabilisation is a consequence and not a goal.

# WORKSHOP 2.3: WHEN THE RESCUE WORKER BECOMES A VICTIM

Group I

Rapporteur: Olivier NYSSENS
Facilitator: Moya WOOD-HEATH

SYNTHESIS

Our group discussed various aspects whereby the rescuer can be affected by his/her sheer involvement in his/her the job. It is a challenge to reflect the path our conversation went through. To make a long story short, the minutes' editor has chosen to re-organise the whole discussion by themes.

Central to our discussion was the rescue task itself. Then, we can represent the other elements of the environment in which psychosocial rescuer work as layered like in an onion. The second layer is then labelled the rescuer, the third: the team, fourth: the leader, fifth: the context and last: culture, as illustrated inthe figure below:

We put several reflections under each of those headings. They are based on experiences shared by group participants

Rescuers : Is there a way to select people to work in difficult situations like a large mortuary ? Young, inexperienced volunteers feel invulnerable and may volunteer for the job although they may never have actually confronted with similar situations. Mature people have experience and may at times be reluctant to go on a mission. A fair response to this dilemma is to work as a team combining a diversity of experiences and profiles.

In most cases, the personnel has absolute faith in the hierarchy and does as it is told to. However, at times, the new wave of staff expects assistance to cope with the hard aspects of the rescue jobs whereas the older worker says "I wish we had that sort of programme twenty years ago".

Sometimes, many ordinary people or professional psychologists volunteer and take up roles in the job we do. How can we provide them with adequate support ?

The team, A team is a group with mutual support among members based on a common knowledge of assets and weaknesses. As such, a team is stronger than the addition of individuals and reinforces each of its members.

A risk exists that overlarge teams tend to be excessively anonymous and lose the meaningfulness and relationship quality that a reasonably sized team has.

The leader: Traditionally, leader tend to get things done without paying much attention to team management. They may at times argue that they did similar jobs without special (psychosocial) provisions and thereby disqualify attempts to include new values and behaviours in rescue programmes.

A good leader will tell his people to stop work and get some rest. But who says that to him ? Who trains the leaders or the management team to include psychosocial provisions in their own management style ? It seems that using very experienced workers as trainers works well.

The context: Context has many dimensions. Two of them are territory and time.

It is often difficult for rescuers to work in their own community. This is, for instance, because there is less personal distance and more individual involvement in a familiar setting.

The fact that the different players come and go at a fast pace (forensic police, family, political figures, etc) leaves little room for rescuers to manage contacts with those affected by the crisis. Working in a structured manner is more difficult in such a context.

The time element also hides an element of risk. The worst example is in the case of a second bombing hitting the rescuers when they are on the site of a first explosion.

If the job of the rescuer is perceived as satisfactory, then the rescuers need little or no debriefing. Therefore, the human context of an intervention plays a role. Yet, this does not elude the need for a follow-up later on. Humanitarian staff is often over-exposed to long term mental risks.

The culture: We often work in an (organisational) culture of success where priority is given to completion of the task above any other consideration. The dominant culture of a group or organisation may conflict with values and recommendations from sound psychosocial programmes. In other words, the old paradigm is task-oriented whereas the new one is process-oriented.

To sum up, we see two major areas for action : the psychological and the physical sides.

In the first area, we want to stress three points : (1) the importance of pro-active, preventive action, (2) management training on rescuer care, which is of crucial importance, and (3) the necessary changes to organisational culture change.

Concerning the last point, our observations are that although it is spontaneously being taken care of, adequate attention also needs to be given to those "health components" called fresh air, water and coffee, breaks and rest.

In other words, what victims are provided with should also be available for rescue workers. After all, even fire extinguishers are periodically checked and maintained.

Group II

Rapporteur : Benjamin ADANT
Facilitator : Thibaut LORENT

SYNTHESIS

The group approached the subject with two difficulties. First of all, few of us were knowledgeable, in view of our clinical practice of traumatology, of the specificity of the repercussions of terrorist acts in particular on the victims. Secondly, the presentation on the subject having been cancelled, we could not refer either to the questions that should have been looked into then.

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SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

The working group concluded with the three following ideas:

4. Do the victims of terrorist acts, because of the terrorists' claims, need a specific status and specific recognition?

5. Terrorist acts aim to have an impact on the individual from a societal point of view (ie as a citizen) more than for who s/he is.

6. Terrorist acts aim to destabilize the fundamental link of trust for others, while in other acts of violence, this destabilisation is a consequence and not a goal.

WORKSHOP 3.1 : INTRAPSYCHICAL RESOURCES AND RESILIENCE

Group I

Rapporteur : Koen VAN PRAET
Facilitator : Thibaut LORENT

SYNTHESIS

The issue of intrapsychical resources or, more generally speaking, of "mental" resources as they were redefined in the workshop led participants to discuss another topic: the contexts in which these resources are built. Our history and the values passed down via the education we each receive at the different stages of our development were underlined by the participants to explain the development and preservation of our mental resources. The complexity of resilience was also examined, which lead to the identification of several factors which participate in this phenomenon.

Concerning the contexts, participants used as a starting point the assumption that individual resources are closely linked to the resources of society and of the community in which the individual lives.

Two questions that should be looked into in more detail emerged from the discussions on the subject:

1. Do the individuals victims of terrorism who grew up in a comforting environment have more or less mental resources than people brought up in less safe conditions?

2. Does teaching children to have a critical approach towards the media have a protective effect?

Concerning resilience, the participants agree that the concept is complex. Below are a few factors which might, according to participants, have an impact on individuals' capacities of resilience:

1. The locus of control
2. One or more earlier traumas
3. Problems in daily life
4. Premorbid state(s)
5. The presence of a sufficient number of coping skills
6. Sufficiently developed self-esteem
7. A feeling of competence
8. The ability to give meaning to what is happening
9. Communication capacities

These different points were also put into perspective with the place where the critical event takes place and the individual's level of preparation when confronted with the particular traumatic situation.

To conclude, human beings seem to be naturally resilient and able to put their internal resources to good use! These resources are closely interlinked with the resources of the individuals' families and friends, and of the social groups and the communities to which they belong. Finally, participants agreed that crisis workers should ensure that the victims' internal locus of control be reinstated.

Group II

Rapporteur : Mélanie GALIEN
Facilitator : Jacques ROISIN

SYNTHESIS

Resilience might be <u>defined</u> in two different ways :

1. Resilience as the set of resources that a person has (i.e. their *capacities*)

2. Resilience as in setting to work to get out of a situation (i.e. a type of *work*)

The first meaning, the capacities, is of no use to us. Once we have noted that some people have more capacities than others to cope with and/or to get out of a potentially traumatic situation, we are none the wiser regarding the focus to be given to the work. The working group therefore decided to consider the second meaning of resilience. To work in terms of resilience means to wonder what might promote resilience *work*.

To get the reflection process on resilience work going, one of the workshop's participants recalled the elements noted about the destiny of <u>posttraumatic impacts</u>.

- If nothing is done for the victims, it is noted that 80% of them recover naturally by themselves!

    This figure can be explained by two essential factors:

    1. They are better "vaccinated", are more resistant, have a higher stress threshold.

    2. They are integrated within society and within their families.

- Of the 20% whose states chronify, the causes are:

    1. Lack of information (retrospectively: information about the event, and prospectively: what is going to happen, the symptoms…). This is purely at cognitive level (tunnel effects can be encountered…)

    2. Non-recognition (whether financial, political, by the insurance companies or by those responsible…)

    3. An inadequate and non-functional approach by the victim (for instance, only using medication). We could add to this cause the effect of culture (for example, a foreign psychologist should not work in a country without having been immersed in local culture).
    4. The lack of rituals (for instance, it has been noted that to hold a religious service is not enough for traumatic grief, the victims not being "active" enough)

    Two other causes might be added:

    1. The pre-morbid state

    2. The victim's lack of integration in his/her social and professional environment

    A few other ideas were put forward by the group :

    - Intrapsychical resources only work if contacts are maintained between individuals
    - The importance of rituals, of the memorial, and of naming things

- The role and responsibilities of politicians, of the State
- Antisocial behaviour can develop following a disaster (in New Orleans, for instance, some people started pillaging, raping…)
- There are direct and indirect victims (those who belong to the targeted community, those who are terrorised…) on whom events can have multiple impacts (psychological or philosophical impact, or an effect on identity as was the case in the 1989 earthquake in Armenia).

Following these ideas and this information, the group asked itself what the basic pillars of resources were, what classical knowledge bring us, how should the resiliencies be developed. In other words, <u>what are the factors which could contribute to resilience work</u>? We found seven:

1. <u>Information</u>

2. <u>Recognition</u> (at several levels). We should however stress that the "recognition" of the victim is a term that might lead to confusion. One should be very careful not to go as far as to <u>stigmatize</u> the victim in his/her position. The victim therefore needs to be recognized in his/her *situation* and to not comfort him/her in the *position* of victim!

3. An <u>adequate approach,</u> which meets the <u>real expectations</u> of the victim and is adapted to his/her culture (for example by respecting the burial rites)

4. To propose functional and participative rites.

5. To listen to the victims

6. To increase <u>psychosocial resources</u>: to put the victims in the position of <u>active, resourceful people</u>. The example of the "city link houses" was given. These were set up in England following a traumatic event where all people concerned were invited to go. They are not support cells as such since all of the victims are invited to <u>participate</u> and make themselves useful, by serving coffee, for instance… These houses are open to everyone (politicians, insurances, priests, psychologists, there are telephones…). Furthermore, they are not closed down once the emergency is over but can last for as long as they are needed.

   To propose <u>group activities</u>, organized and guided groups, because groups without a coordinator can have the effect of making one person's aggression affect the whole group. A case is known of a group bringing together the parents of children who had been victims of a coach crash. After a few months, a mother one day took the liberty of expressing the fact that her sadness was diminishing so she felt less need to join the group. Another mother then became very aggressive, asking her how it was possible for her to no longer think of her son everyday, as if she was, in a way, becoming a "bad mother". The husbands got involved and the whole group almost started a fight…!

   It is also necessary in these group activities to respect everyone's cultures because certain populations cannot talk about personal problems in a group, as it is considered to be "shameful". It is then possible to get round the problem by creating cooking groups where people do come and share something, like a good meal or a recipe, and maybe talk later.

The group then looked into the question of whether there is a resilience that is specific to victims of terrorist acts and, if so, <u>what would be the specific factors that would help the resilience work specific to such victims</u>?

We worked from the following two lines of thought: terrorism's aim is:
- The individual as a reflection of the community
- To sever social contacts

We concluded that if the aim of terrorist acts is social contacts and not the individual, then to re-establish contacts should be a way of reconstructing the subject more quickly.

Resilience work would therefore consist in *rebuilding* links, *reintegrating* people into the social fabric and *preserving* this social fabric (to avoid what happened in New Orleans but also to avoid deviant behaviour or extremists latching onto the situation…).

WORKSHOP 3.2 : INTERPERSONAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES

Group I

Rapporteur: Sirry THORMAR
Facilitator: Maureen MOONEY

SYNTHESIS

The discussion centred around how to map, prepare and include social resources in the response to victims of terrorist acts and their families.

We discussed the following main points and the main emphasis in the ideas is in dark lettering.

1. **Preparation beforehand is necessary in order to plan appropriately**, taking timeframe into account. We need to learn from experiences of others both experts and people with experience (who have lived such a situation): Networking is necessary.

2. **In the immediate needs, it is important first to listen to what people need**. What they need may not be what the responders expected. It is important, even in an urgent response to take time to solicit the people implicated in order to hear their needs and expectations and match them with the response. The initial response centres often, around basic needs being met in a practical way.

3. **Information giving is vital. That is giving correct and confirmed information. That giving no information is also important, as a defusing factor.** It allows people to know they are being heard, or taken into account and that they have a focus for where information will be defused from. Sources of information could be: Secure website, Hotline number, radio spots. There needs to be co-operation and co-ordination within relevant bodies.

4. **Community leaders are a source of assessing the community.** We need to look at how we can prepare them to face the challenge of informing people of an event and how they can help the community to be an active partner. This may limit stigmatisation.

5. **Strengthening the sense of community support groups is necessary.** This can be started in the preparatory phase and continued throughout the response. Mass care centres which are pre-identified can be part of any plan designed for large scale events.

Group II

Rapporteur : Virginie TAYZEN
Facilitator : Etienne VERMEIREN

SYNTHESIS

The group reflected on the differences between social resources and interpersonal resources.

Social resources are found in the society in which we live, the term "society" being used here in the broadest sense. Interpersonal resources concern intrapsychical and relational resources.

SOCIAL RESOURCES

Social resources are activated from the outside; they are not spontaneously organised for the benefit of victims. The initiative therefore comes from the care-giving network or system in the broad sense, from meeting the victims to making oneself available to them. Upstream from these 'proactive' interventions, as they are referred to, are the preventive actions which the network mobilised within society may introduce. Resources are organised collectively and in a structured manner, and are offered by professionals who are trained and recognised by the members of society. They have to prove their efficacy or risk being excluded from the aid-providing structure.

INTERPERSONAL RESOURCES

Interpersonal resources are organised spontaneously as a reaction of a person's acquaintances and for the benefit of this person. They are natural, non-organised and bear witness to the person's intrapsychical and relational organisation.

We all base our work on the needs of the victims, which can be grouped around the concepts of recognition and information (communication), to which we have to add social support, immediate and post-immediate care and the link with long-term follow-ups if necessary.

A relay between interpersonal resources and social resources is vital in order to ensure continuity and an overall dimension to the aid relationship.

Our discussion turned to the resources available in other areas such as the legal, administrative, economic or police (enquiry, trial…) areas.

Absolutely basic resources must also imperatively not be neglected (food, care…).

One of the main conclusions reached by our group was that , in our work, we must consider not only the person as a whole but also available resources as a whole.

PUBLIC CONCLUSIONS

1. When listening to the needs of victims through a relational prism, social resources are built via an organised group, and interpersonal resources are based on natural and spontaneous reactions.
2. Social and interpersonal resources are based on a process aiming for recovery by relying among other things on communication and recognition.

When looking holistically at care for victims, we try to foster the recovery process and limit psychosocial impact.

WORKSHOP 3.3: INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

Group I

Rapporteur: John HORGAN
Facilitator: Caroline JOACHIM

SYNTHESIS

We discussed the following main points:

1. To correctly identify the resources needed, we need to firstly identify correctly the basic needs of victims, survivors, and bereaved. The delivery of services will always vary from country to country, and context to context, but we must carefully identify the individual and collective needs of victims and base this identification on what vicitms themselves say (and have said in the past) that they need.

2. At an institutional level, we need to avoid duplication of effort. We realise this is a sensitive issue – we may need to encourage greater specialisation of effort, which may lead to some inter- and intra-institutional tensions. However, it is clear that from the perspective of victims we need to put in place clear and unambiguous perceptions of what each agency can do for them. We need to do this at an institutional level without encouraging competition or tensions. Each agency needs to feel unique and perhaps each agency needs to be enabled, through various means, to achieve its full potential through open, constructive exchange.

3. Finally, we need to consider the development of a practical measure that our group strongly identified as currently lacking: a resource package, based along a type of quick index for responding to a wide range of terrorism-related emergency scenarios. This index would comprise procedures, telephone numbers, priority actions etc., location-specific (e.g. airport, harbour etc.) and problem-specific (e.g. chemical, biological, bomb) scenario guidelines for responses. This index would be kept up to date, and each Red Cross agency would have one in their own country. The specific contents would probably have to be informed by a series of country by country study days, but our group strongly felt that the benefits would far outweigh the costs of such an exercise.

Group II

Rapporteur : Rémy TORNATORE
Facilitator : Delphine PENNEWAERT

SYNTHESIS

The question of institutional resources was first of all approached in terms of limits and of areas of concern. The group felt that they have to be considered at three different stages with equal importance:

1. Prevention
2. Short-term – immediate term
3. Medium- and long-term

It seems that most States, when they take an interest in the problems of the victims of crises, are only preoccupied by them in the acute stages of the crises. Yet, preventing acts of violence and accidents and being prepared for their occurrence are determining factors that weigh on the outcome of the potential ensuing crisis.

The victims of crises' specific questions and needs are generally not much taken into consideration by public health bodies or by the world of mental health practitioners in particular.

Institutions and States are often victims themselves of the well-known mechanism of "denial" in the face of risks and consequences until an act or event actually takes place. Sometimes, we see "heads buried in the sand" in the face of full knowledge. Or the development of means that are completely insufficient to meet the targets, which are perceived as not being priorities.

It also seems that the risk of terrorism is, in spite of events over the last few years, largely underestimated by company bosses and political decision-makers alike. Psychosocial intervention plans and systems do exist but without any official recognition nor any efficient implementation because of the lack of means (human resources, communication, training, insufficient budgets…).

Furthermore, certain members of the group underline the fact that supporting projects and the existence of measures in favour of victims should not just be the business of a "particular individual" but should be officially institutionalised, and the missions pertaining to the measures should clearly be included within "functions".

Associations of victims constitute resources for the State's institutions, so they should more often be consulted and integrated in the support mechanisms.

This working group also noted how important it was to take into consideration, at all levels, cultural realities. We became aware of the difficulties and limits of European multicultural work. Indeed, the fact of having to respond in, for instance, 20 languages and to work with different nationalities means above all to work with different views of the world and different potential effects of the crisis.

It is important to have, at the least, a "smallest common denominator" to serve as a general guide regarding the categories of resources that are needed to adequately deal with the crises and their effects caused by terrorist acts.

To manage information for not only the victims but also the population is a vital category in preparedness and response systems. Therefore, handling contacts with the press and their ethics is a determining factor in the occurrence and extent of the crisis.

In the media, the topic of terrorism seems at times to be "taboo", and crudely overkilled at others.

Public health institutions in each State should adequately inform the population about risks and resources in the context of crises following disasters and intentional collective acts of violence.

The States are responsible for victim support mechanisms before and after terrorist acts and concerning different target groups. Similarly, when resources seem to exist, communication and organisation between them is often lacking.

THE GROUP'S CONCRETE PROPOSALS

- The creation of a neutral European support association responsible for supporting the systems introduced by the European States, as well as for evaluating the way they can be made operational and their adequacy.
- The creation of a "European Fund for Victim Support", whose work would be based on the French organisation S.O.S. Attentat's guarantee and solidarity fund.
- The strengthening of existing resources (institutions and associations) in a medium- and long-term policy but also with more preventive work, and in a coherent and "unpolitical" way.

CONCLUSION

The richness of the contents and the density of the discussions over these three days mean that it is difficult for us to conclude. We will however take the liberty of going over a few "beacon ideas" that can guide us in further reflections and the improvement of victim support schemes. This should encourage readers to consult the proceedings in depth as they provide details of various more concrete recommendations.

CONTEXT

Since the 1990s', we have had to face a new type of terrorism compared with the past. Not only has our understanding of the phenomenon increased in its complexity but also the means used to fight it. In this respect, the issue of terrorism challenges several disciplines and has to be looked into as such, i.e. with a holistic approach using multidisciplinary European resources. Indeed, terrorism, above all, reflects problems in civil society and can therefore not be dealt with piecemeal.

The different terrorist groups should not be considered as homogeneous and prototypical. Analysing the capacities, intentions and movement capacities of terrorist movements benefits from being based on a critical approach that uses as many analysis tools as possible. Terrorist acts are, at the present time, more unpredictable since terrorist organisations are very mobile and are "integrated" in our societies. Terrorism today can be seen as a weapon of "psychological warfare".

In a perspective of preventing human suffering and the risk of victimisation, one of the main challenges is responding to terrorist acts without leading to an increase of their risk. It is our duty to reach the objective, at the very least, of not causing more damage when we plan the strategy and the choice of tactics to face a terrorist act.

THE VARIOUS EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ACTS ON THE VICTIMS AND ON THE POPULATION

The diffusion of terror, which is terrorists' main objective, increases the targeted citizens' feeling of vulnerability and leads to many harmful effects. Analysing these effects and in particular the psychological impact of terrorist attacks teaches us that the shockwave does not only affect the direct victims, i.e. those who suffer physical wounds, but also wider social networks, the indirect victims, including those who provide aid (First Aid workers, rescuers, protection services,…).

Although some victim support systems and the efforts of governmental and non-governmental organisations exist, the victims still feel, in many European countries, often misunderstood and sometimes forgotten. Knowledge of victims' needs, based on listening to the people concerned (those who are directly and indirectly involved and victim associations) and on the creation of coherent schemes, must therefore be deepened in the future.

Personal resource factors were identified. The ability of human beings to bounce back, resilience, was more specifically looked into from the perspective of it being an active process of work on one's psyche. Certain factors seem to facilitate this work: maintaining/reinforcing contacts and the social fabric, functional and participative rites, information that is adapted and delivered at appropriate times, consideration for what the victims and the population have to say… This is all the more important since the terrorists' aim is to spread terror by severing contacts and targeting the human being, the subject, as the reflection of a community. Furthermore, certain internal protective factors (self-protection, confidence, meaning) and external ones (social contacts, beliefs and values, the community) may help.

We also had specific questions about two particular target groups: Are children more vulnerable? Do crisis workers run specific risks?

One thought emerged from these discussions: rather than "vulnerable people", it would seem that we should rather think in terms of unfavourable contexts. Nonetheless, children have special requirements regarding the way they express their needs and the resources they can use to cope with their emotions. The age of a child, and therefore its stage of development, are criteria of reference.

Although it may seem obvious, to look into the question of support for children leads us to wonder about support for their parents. Indeed, it would be a good idea for professionals to concentrate on providing the parents with guidance on how to manage their children's reactions.

As for rescue workers, they can be victims in two ways: first of all, as crisis and humanitarian actors and, secondly, as targets of terrorist acts, in which case they become "primary" victims.
Support systems for crisis actors and the attitudes of their managers must take this into consideration.
Indeed, the people who provide aid have specific needs, on an individual level and collectively (as a team), whether they are volunteers or paid for their work. Their organisations are responsible for providing the workers, and their families, with not only support but also appropriate preparation and prevention in the face of events that have become a real risk in present times. In this perspective, management tools such as checklists were suggested. Prevention for crisis workers can only be effective with good "human resource management", by working everyday on capacity-building and the teams' protective factors (group cohesion, management abilities of the decision-makers…).

CRISES' THREE MAIN ACTORS

The work carried out during the study days highlighted the determining roles of three central actors in the prevention and management of terrorist acts' psychosocial consequences: justice, the media and the states' public authorities.

JUSTICE

Even though specific rights are provided for at international level, victims are often confronted with obstacles when they seek their fulfilment.
Depending on the type of "judiciary tradition", it is not always possible either for the victims to be recognised as such or to associate with the public prosecutor as a private party in a court action (Common Law). Also, the legal qualification of "terrorist acts" and identifying which jurisdiction is to rule on their case seem to be problematic: Crime? Crime against humanity? Human rights violation? Violation of international humanitarian law? Finally, for various reasons, procedures in national criminal jurisdictions only deliver slim results.

On top of a reflection in purely legal terms, it is therefore necessary to take an interest in alternative strategies and means to satisfy the victims' need for justice. Each country should take steps, laid down in its national legislation, to help victims and their families.

It should be stressed that the judiciary, and in particular the way it rules on terrorist acts, is a determining factor for the victims to feel that their suffering is recognised.
Whether there is a trial or not, police and judiciary representatives' "humaneness" fulfils a vital role.
When there is a trial, supporting the victims and preparing them for this trial is an indispensable condition for preventing extra traumatic effects. In this respect, associations which support victims and are at their sides when they take steps play a vital role.

However, legal provisions are far from being a panacea. Social actions and certain more political decisions can also contribute to the feeling of recognition and consideration.

An international compensation fund for victims could for instance play a part in this. Via this fund, a harmonisation of the European systems would lead to better recognition for the issue and would contribute to meeting the victims' material needs.

It appeared that alternatives to a symmetrical rise in violence do exist in the shape of projects by victims' associations. To mention just a few examples, offering activities based on social contacts, mutual

respect and understanding, and mediation in conflicts between communities, make It possible to avoid certain social groups being stigmatised.

THE MEDIA

The role of the media, the second central characters, was at the heart of heated discussions.
A few pieces of clinical research, as well as experience-sharing, revealed that the media are privileged partners in crises. However, certain broadcasts can have harmful effects.

Indeed, journalists and editors diffuse sensitive contents at the risk of being involuntary relays for the terrorists and for the damage they cause. In fact, terrorists count on media amplification.

Also, the harmful psychological effects of competition for sensation and the lack of respect for the intimacy of the wounded and of their families were also criticised.

The heavy media attention given to terrorist acts which is broadcast to the population at large can generate an increased feeling of vulnerability in the audiences. The ensuing feeling of insecurity leads in turn to a series of damaging attitudes and behaviours. Indeed, fear itself can even cause wounds, troubles, death, ill-adapted behaviour, social conflict and collective manifestations of aggression and violence.

In the context of crisis management, it is important to differentiate between the notion of "information", which is a one-way process transformed by the journalists, and the concept of "communication", which involves, in principle, reciprocity.

The media today fulfil many essential roles, for instance the management of collective or individual emotion. They also act as objective "information vectors".

The daily programmed management of images and facts, with a stepwise and commented approach following a critical event, might keep in check the runaway imaginations of the victims and of the population.

The media are useful for crisis managers, on the one hand, to broadcast information about protection and prevention measures to be taken, and on the other hand, to relay political reactions, various comments and testimonies that can strengthen feelings of belonging to the community and can make people realise it is supporting them.

In this context, it seems useful to move away from a sterile debate opposing the freedom of the press on the one hand, and the fierce protection of the victims against any media attention on the other. The following recommendations were suggested: More awareness-raising of the media about their responsibilities seems useful, not only from the point of view of their positive effects but also of their harmful impact, even if it is unintentional. The population and political decision-makers should also benefit from "media education" information and processes.

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Finally, the states' public authorities were identified as being responsible for prevention measures before the crisis, managing it as it takes place and responding to the needs of the victims afterwards.

Victim support systems have been set in many countries, sometimes by the state, sometimes by humanitarian organisations or associations of victims.

The object of the intervention varies according to the way aid for the victims and for their needs is defined.

Two main trends of practices can be made out. One is integrated in the medical field and promotes the screening of disorders and their clinical symptoms as the first step of an immediate therapeutic intervention. This intervention is organised with the aim of preventing somatic and psychiatric consequences. The intervention units are known as "medical-psychological" units. The idea here is to "cure". The other

trend focuses more on the social and psychological needs, attention being given to their developments in the medium and long term. This perspective, which concentrates more on prevention, uses intervention units called "psychosocial" or "social assistance" units.

A few areas of progress were identified next to the institutional resources that are available for the victims and their families.

- It seems that existing initiatives should be coordinated better and should work more coherently. In this context, "network practices" could be useful for us. Bearing this in mind, existing resources would be used more efficiently, instead of new ones having to be introduced.

- Psychosocial systems often only remain theoretical concepts: they exist in emergency plans but their effective implementation with appropriate means is lacking.

- Resource-actors need better preparation at all stages of the crisis. Indeed, existing systems concentrate on the immediate phase and aim to provide relief or to meet urgent needs. Non pathological suffering, which appears in the medium and in the long term, arouses far less interest.

- Finally, as with the analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism, setting up victim support systems must be integrated in a holistic, multidisciplinary and constant analysis of needs. In this respect, the states' public authorities are responsible, particularly for needs related to health, social affairs, and the citizens' security and protection.

The work carried out in the different groups highlighted the need to reinforce these public resources through adequate advice and guidance on the way they will address the population and communicate with it. Indeed, the feeling of security, which has already been heavily shaken by a terrorist act, can be further weakened by certain unfortunate statements or pieces of information that increase fear within the population and bring about inappropriate and dangerous behaviour.

Like the media, the national and international authorities must be supported so that they can manage not the "crisis information" but rather the "crisis communications" and the effects of certain stances in communications.

Managing the indirect and long-term effects of crises therefore seems to be, in this day and age, one of society's major challenges.

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