
















OSCE Expert Workshop


GO15. Reliable and Sustainable Power Grids

Sharing Best Practices to Protect Electricity Networks from Natural Disasters


Vienna, Austria – 2nd of July 2014


GO15 Members

	<p>Voluntary initiative of the world's 16 largest Power Grid Operators (PGOs)</p>	
		
	<p>Representing together more than 70% of the world's electricity demand</p>	
	<p>Providing electricity to 3.4 billion consumers on the 6 continents</p>	
	<p>Responsible for integration of 2 518 GW of generation capacity into the grid,</p>	
		<p>Of which 21% is from renewable energy sources.</p>
		
		



To be a leader and a catalyst in the transition of the electric power industry to the power grid of the 21st century.





POWER SYSTEM RESILIENCE




9:10 a.m. EDT

High-Impact/Low-Frequency Events



March 2011
Fukushima



Solar Cycle
Peak 2013



Oct 2011
October Surprise



EMP Threat



Cyber
Security




June 2012
Derecho

Opportunities to Improve Grid Resiliency



LT - End user Power security

Basic Structure of the Electric System



Fuel supply
Generation Adequacy

Transmission adequacy
N-x redundancy

Overhead/underground network
Mean time to repair

Free market

Regulated Monopoly

- ENTSO-E Statistical Yearbook and the System Adequacy Retrospect:**
This report provides a wide range of yearly figures on member transmission system operators' power systems – including production, consumption, cross-border exchanges and network components. https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/Publications/Statistics/140318_Y_S_AR_2012_final.pdf
- Scenario Outlook & Adequacy Forecasts 2014-2030:**
Analyses the adequacy of the pan-European power system by providing an overview of generation adequacy for all ENTSO-E members, for regions and for individual countries at a mid- and long-term time horizon.
https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/SDC%20documents/SOAF/140602_SOAF%202014-2030.pdf
- ENTSO-E Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP)**
The TYNDP is designed to increase information and transparency regarding the investments in electricity transmission systems which are required on a pan-European basis and to support decision-making processes at regional and European level.
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/library/SDC/TYNDP/2012/TYNDP_2012_report.pdf

GO15 July 2014

www.go15.org

11

Short term reliability of the power system affected by:

- Failures in the distribution grids (non redundant design)
- “Excursions” from planning criteria: events that for economical reasons are not taken into account in grid planning
- Asset “health”
- Human failures
- Forecast errors for Renewable energy resources
- Combination of above mentioned risks

Emerging treats:

- Severe weather events
- Cyber attacks
- Terrorist attacks on grid infrastructure



Cascading events and Blackouts

- Simultaneous occurrence of multiple treats can destabilize power system
- Power system operators trigger “DEFENCE PLAN” to return to stable state
- Main measures are shedding of load.
- After stabilization (could be in blackout): activation of “RESTORATION PLAN”
- Systematic approach for repowering lost load
- In case of severe infrastructure damage:
 - Restoration can take days to weeks
 - Deployment of disaster recovery plan, coordination of operational teams, external contractors, consultation with public authorities, priority setting, communication.

Resilience Definition



Several indexes enable benchmarking:

- AIT: average interruption time
- SAIDI: System average interruption duration index
-



Analysis to root causes can highlight improvement opportunities

Benchmarking to be done with care and taking into account the boundary conditions of different systems

- **Cost vs security dilemma:**
 - a generic model was developed to enable experience exchange and benchmarking
 - No common standards, due to great differences in boundary conditions of the different power systems
- **Emergency response:**
 - Database with case studies on severe power system failures
 - Crisis communication protocol
 - Framework for mutual assistance

Objective:	Faster power grid restoration time following a major disturbance
Protocols of Mutual Assistance:	Pre-agreed contractual framework for members to provide services and equipment to a member experiencing a major disruption
Mapping Guide:	Provides member looking for assistance with a quick access to specialized resources around the world
Reference Library:	Shared documents on past events including root cause analyses and recommended actions
Crisis Communication Network:	Regroups members crisis communication teams to exchange best practices and promote efficient communication among members in case of a major event

- **Resilience is on the agenda of GO15-members**
- **Preventive measures are benchmarked, including costs assessments**
- **Experience exchange is extremely important for low probability/high impact events.**
- **Members agreed on a framework for mutual assistance.**

Thank you