

**Chairmanship: Estonia**

**553rd PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 16 July 2008

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 11.25 a.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. T. Parts

3. Subjects discussed — Statements — Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) *Declaration of a unilateral moratorium on cluster munitions by the Council of Ministers of Spain made on 11 July 2008*: Spain (Annex 1)

(b) *Signing of the agreement between the United States of America and the Czech Republic on deployment of elements of the United States global missile defence system on the territory of the Czech Republic*: Czech Republic (Annex 2), United States of America (Annex 3), Russian Federation

(c) *Co-operation between the host government and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina*: Bosnia and Herzegovina (FSC.DEL/131/08)

(d) *“Immediate Response 2008” joint military exercise in Georgia*: United States of America

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

*Presentation on the actions by Japan related to the combat against terrorism by Mr. H. Sakamoto, Minister of the Embassy of Japan in Austria*: Chairperson, Japan (Partner for Co-operation), United States of America, Turkey, FSC Co-ordinator on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Austria), Germany

Agenda item 3:           DECISION ON UPDATING THE REPORTING  
                                  CATEGORIES OF WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS  
                                  SUBJECT TO THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON  
                                  CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

Chairperson, Romania, Conflict Prevention Centre

**Decision:** The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 8/08 (FSC.DEC/8/08), the text of which is appended to this journal, on updating the reporting categories of weapon and equipment systems subject to the information exchange on conventional arms transfers.

United States of America

Agenda item 4:           ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a)    *Food-for-thought paper on a more active role for the OSCE in addressing the problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war (FSC.DEL/126/08 OSCE+):* Germany (also on behalf of France and Slovenia), Ireland, Czech Republic
- (b)    *Food-for-thought paper on confidence- and security-building measures in the naval area (FSC.DEL/120/08):* Russian Federation, Chairperson
- (c)    *Response of Kyrgyzstan to the questionnaire on small arms and light weapons (FSC.EMI/331/08 Restr.):* Kyrgyzstan

4.    Next meeting:

Wednesday, 23 July 2008, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/559

16 July 2008

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: SPANISH

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**553rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 559, Agenda item 1(a)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SPAIN**

Madam Chairperson,

The Spanish delegation wishes to inform the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) that the Spanish Council of Ministers approved last Friday, 11 July, an agreement ordering a unilateral moratorium on cluster munitions. In this way, an added impulse has been given to the process of signing and ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions recently approved at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference and of its provisional application.

This decision is in line with the firm commitment of the Spanish Government to prohibit the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of cluster munitions. Added to this is a commitment to implement the Convention's provisions regarding international co-operation and assistance, in particular as regards help for victims, their families and their communities, thus in effect acting ahead of time to bring about the effects expected of the Convention itself.

The Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions agreed on a text for the Convention on Cluster Munitions whose aim is, among other things, to prohibit the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable injuries to civilians.

Madam Chairperson,

The agreement approved by the Council of Ministers envisages the adoption by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the measures required in order that the internal procedure to enable Spain to sign the Convention in Oslo on 3 December 2008 may begin as soon as possible and that this process be dealt with as a matter of urgency. In addition, the agreement calls for the setting in train of the mechanism provided for in article 18 of the Convention so that Spain can declare that it will apply provisionally article 1 of the Convention from the time of its ratification.

Similarly, the agreement lays down that the Minister for Defence will issue the orders necessary to ensure immediate compliance with the Convention's provisions regarding cluster munitions held by the Spanish Armed Forces. In this way, we shall proceed towards

the prohibition of the use, acquisition and development of these munitions, and, more specifically, the destruction of munitions now in storage will be begun as soon as possible.

What is more, the Minister for Industry, Tourism and Trade will be called upon to take appropriate measures to enforce the prohibition of the import, introduction, export and shipment of cluster munitions, as called for by the Convention.

The agreement also provides that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation is to issue appropriate instructions to begin to make the provisions contained in the Convention part of our co-operation policies.

Lastly, it is established that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation is to co-ordinate with the Ministry of Defence regarding the information to be sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as envisaged in article 7 of the Convention text, making known as soon as possible the Spanish position and providing information on existing munitions and on the work plan that will be prepared for their actual destruction.

Thank you very much.



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**553rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 559, Agenda item 1(b)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

Madam Chairperson,

With reference to the statement of the Russian Federation at the last plenary meeting of the FSC on 9 July 2008 concerning the signing of the missile defence agreement between the Czech Republic and the United States of America, we would like to state the following:

- As all aspects of the construction of the missile defence radar facility have been discussed in depth and over a long period of time with the Russian Federation in relevant bilateral and multilateral forums, we do not understand why Russia is again and again raising this issue at OSCE forums, including the FSC;
- We are convinced that the Russian Federation knows very well that the missile defence radar in the Czech Republic does not pose any threat to Russian security. On the contrary, the construction of missile defence radar represents a significant contribution to the security of the European continent;
- We do not want to comment on the whole content of the Russian statement, but we consider the Russian intention to take “appropriate technical military measures” to compensate for emerging potential threats to be absolutely inappropriate. This type of statement is not conducive to the spirit of the collective security system we have been building together since the beginning of the 1990s;
- It is also bizarre that Ambassador Uljanov should assess or interpret results of public surveys in our country at a forum like the FSC;
- The Czech Republic is strongly in favour of a dialogue with Russia on this and other security issues, but one that is free of emotions and unfounded assertions.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

We kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/559

16 July 2008

Annex 3

Original: ENGLISH

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**553rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 559, Agenda item 1(b)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson,

Recent developments make it appropriate to offer delegations in the Forum for Security Co-operation updated information on missile defence. As delegations are aware, last week the United States and the Czech Republic signed the agreement to establish a U.S. ballistic missile defence radar site in the Czech Republic.

Russia's recent statements on missile defence at the Annual Security Review Conference and last week in the FSC, however, do not leave an accurate impression of this agreement or the purpose and nature of the limited U.S. missile defence deployments being proposed for Europe.

The ballistic missile threat to the U.S., its forces deployed abroad, and its allies and friends is real and growing. The series of missile tests by Iran is a disturbing development that unequivocally points to the need for a European missile defence.

In the 3 April 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO unanimously recognized the increasing ballistic missile threat and the contribution to the protection of Allies to be provided by the planned deployment of U.S. missile defence assets in Europe.

The agreement signed on 8 July by Secretary Rice and Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg is an important step in our efforts to protect the United States and the Czech Republic, as well as our friends and allies, from the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges and sophistication, potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Upon ratification by the Czech Parliament, this agreement will provide for the United States to construct, maintain, and operate a ballistic missile defence radar. The Czech Republic will retain full sovereignty over the site.

The U.S. ballistic missile defence radar will provide precision tracking of ballistic missiles launched out of the Middle East, and will be linked to other U.S. missile defence facilities in Europe and the United States.

This missile defence agreement is significant as a building block not just for the security of the United States and the Czech Republic, but for the security of NATO and, ultimately, for the security of the international community as a whole, as we face new threats in the future.

We strongly believe that our co-operation in this area will make a substantial contribution to NATO's collective capability to counter existing and future threats in the 21st century, and will be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. As I noted, this was endorsed by Allies at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April of this year.

Due to the location and capabilities of the European missile defence assets, the proposed system would have no capability against Russian ICBMs, and ten interceptors would certainly have no effect on thousands of Russian warheads. We have been fully transparent with the Russians on this issue, sharing with them that this is designed for a specific and limited defensive purpose — addressing emerging missile threats from the Middle East — and is not and will not be aimed at Russia.

As we have consistently made clear, our proposed deployment of a limited missile defence system in Europe poses no threat to Russia or to Russia's strategic forces.

The modest deployment of a missile defence radar and ten interceptors in Europe is designed for a specific and limited defensive purpose, that is, addressing emerging missile threats from the Middle East.

Over the last 12 to 15 months, U.S. senior officials and their technical experts have held extensive talks with their Russian counterparts.

Regarding U.S. proposals on transparency and confidence-building measures, the Strategic Framework Declaration issued on 6 April at the meeting in Sochi between Presidents Bush and Putin said that "if agreed and implemented such measures will be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns." The United States is diligently attempting to work co-operatively with Russia by offering a range of transparency and confidence-building measures.

The Sochi Declaration also mentions that the United States and Russia have an "interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners." The United States has tabled a forward-leaning proposal for a joint regional missile defence architecture in which the U.S., NATO, and Russia would work co-operatively together to defend against emerging ballistic missile threats.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Please attach the text of this statement to the journal of the day.



**553rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 559, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 8/08  
UPDATING THE REPORTING CATEGORIES OF WEAPON AND  
EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE INFORMATION  
EXCHANGE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS**

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Reaffirming the OSCE participating States' commitment to exchange data on conventional arms and equipment transfers within the agreed deadline,

Taking into account the technical adjustments to certain equipment categories covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and the invitation to provide additional background information on transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as stipulated in the 2006 UN General Assembly resolution "Transparency in Armaments" (A/RES/61/77),

Recognizing the advantages to be gained from creating and maintaining synergies between different information exchange mechanisms to increase effectiveness and avoid duplication,

Decides:

1. To change paragraph 1 of its Decision No. 13/97 (FSC.DEC/13/97) of 16 July 1997 amended by FSC Decision No. 8/98 of 4 November 1998, by establishing that from the beginning of 2008 the participating States will exchange information within the FSC, on an annual basis and not later than 30 June, on their transfers of weapon and equipment systems for the previous calendar year in the updated categories and formats set out in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
2. To replace in the Annex to Decision No. 13/97 the list of "Categories of weapon and equipment system subject to information exchange on conventional arms transfers" with the updated one, as annexed;
3. To task the Conflict Prevention Centre to follow any further amendments to the categories and formats set out in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to inform OSCE participating States of necessary changes to the list of "Categories of weapon and equipment system subject to information exchange on conventional arms transfers" for their approval;



4. That participating States will, if they are in a position to do so, forward information they exchange on SALW exports to and imports from other participating States as additional background information on transfers of SALW as an attachment to their reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and on the basis of the optional standardized reporting form, as adopted by the 2006 group of UN governmental experts, or by any other methods they deem appropriate.

## **CATEGORIES OF WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS**

### **1. Battle Tanks**

Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high-level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.

### **2. Armoured Combat Vehicles**

Tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either: (a) designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or (b) armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 millimetres calibre or a missile launcher.

### **3. Large-Calibre Artillery Systems**

Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a calibre of 75 millimetres and above.

### **4. Combat Aircraft**

Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defence or reconnaissance missions. The term "combat aircraft" does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped or modified as described above.

### **5. Attack Helicopters**

Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

**6. Warships**

Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tonnes or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tonnes, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range.

**7. Missiles and Missile Launchers**

- (a) Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres, and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories 1 through 6. For the purpose of this information exchange, this subcategory includes remotely-piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined above, but does not include ground-to-air missiles.
- (b) Man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS).