1. **Adopting a new constitution; instrumental attitude towards the constitution**

   a) The Fundamental Law (the new constitution of Hungary, in force since 1 January 2012) is to be considered the product of one political party and **has been adopted** by the governing majority **without the support of any other political force** – provisions from the old Constitution that would have forced the governing majority to seek consensus with the opposition in this regard had been removed by them earlier on. Furthermore, the need for a new constitution was not supported by adequate reasons, and the new constitution was prepared in secret, without any adequate open public debate or the proper involvement of experts.\(^2\)

   b) After the elections in 2010, the old Constitution was amended 12 times by the governing two-thirds majority, while the Fundamental Law has been amended five times since it came into force. In its opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, the Venice Commission warned in this regard that **frequent constitutional amendments** “are a worrying sign of an instrumental attitude towards the constitution as is the resort to the exceptional two-thirds majority in constitution-making without a genuine effort to form a wide political consensus and without proper public debates”; and that the Fourth Amendment is “the result of an instrumental view of the Constitution as a political means of the governmental majority”.

   c) As concluded also by the Venice Commission, it became the governing majority’s “**systematic approach**” – applied already with regard to the former constitution – that **provisions** of ordinary laws which had been previously **found unconstitutional** and were annulled by the Constitutional Court **were reintroduced on the constitutional level**, overruling the Constitutional Court.\(^3\) (By inserting the respective provisions into the constitution, the Parliament excluded the possibility of review by the Constitutional Court.) Thus, the Fundamental Law has ceased to be an effective instrument in limiting the legislator’s powers. Furthermore, as stated by the Venice Commission, “constitutionalising” provisions declared unconstitutional “threatens to deprive the Constitutional Court of its main function as the guardian of constitutionality and as a control organ in the democratic system of checks and balances”.

2. **Weakening the control exercised by the Constitutional Court over the Parliament;**\(^4\) “court-packing”

   a) The Constitutional Court’s (CC) **competence has been restricted by the Fundamental Law in relation to laws on central budget and taxes**, shielding potentially unconstitutional laws from constitutional review even when budgetary problems have subsided, which was also criticized by the Venice Commission. The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law prohibited the CC from examining the substantive

---

\(^1\) For the related criticism of the Venice Commission, see: *Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary*, CDL-AD(2013)012, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 17 June 2013, [www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29012-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29012-e).


\(^3\) For examples in English of how e.g. the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law overruled decisions of the Constitutional Court, see: [http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Constitutional-Court-vs-Fourth-Amendment.pdf](http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Constitutional-Court-vs-Fourth-Amendment.pdf).

b) The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law declared void the CC decisions adopted prior to the Fundamental Law. This purely arbitrary restriction undermines the CC’s independence, contradicts the CC’s former case law, and, as put by the Venice Commission, “unnecessarily interrupts the continuity of the Court’s case-law”. Accordingly, it may also result in decreasing the level of the protection of fundamental rights (giving CC judges the possibility to deter from important principles established by the CC over the last two decades without any explanation).

c) As a result of amending the rules pertaining to the composition of the parliamentary committee nominating CC judges, the parliamentary majority may nominate and elect judges of the Constitutional Court on its own, without the support of any opposition party. Furthermore, the number of CC members has been increased from 11 to 15. These amendments lead to a situation in which the majority of current CC judges (8 out of 15) were nominated and elected solely by the governing majority. (Since the mandate of some of the judges – elected before the change in the rules – will expire soon, the election of three further judges is underway.)

d) A law adopted in December 2013 set out that the mandate of CC judges, including the mandate of the current ones, shall not terminate when they turn 70 years old, but they shall remain in their seats until the end of their 12-year term. As a result, the length of the mandate of some of the CC judges nominated and elected with the sole support of the current governing majority got extended considerably.5

5 For further details in English, see: http://helsinki.hu/en/abolishing-the-age-limit-regarding-constitutional-court-judges.
1. Threatening the independence of the judiciary

a) As a result of a thorough re-regulation in 2011, the administration of courts became centralised: the former judicial body in charge of administrating courts was replaced by a one-person decision-making mechanism, the President of the newly established National Judicial Office (NJO). The reform model chosen and the extensive powers of the NJO’s President were criticized by the Venice Commission in both of its opinions on judicial laws in Hungary, and it was stated that since the President of the NJO (who is elected by the Parliament) is “an external actor from the viewpoint of the judiciary, it cannot be regarded as an organ of judicial self-government”. Despite the criticism, the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law raised the position of the President of the NJO to a constitutional level. Later on – following the Venice Commission’s subsequent criticism – the status of the NJO president was re-regulated and her powers were restricted, but the basic concern that significant decisions may be made by an “external actor” is still in place.

b) The mandate of the former President of the Supreme Court was terminated three and a half years before the end of the regular term, as of 1 January 2012 by the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law. The government argued that the dismissal was necessary because of the reorganization of the court system, affecting the Supreme Court. On the other hand, several critics stated that the transformation of the Supreme Court had not resulted in such significant changes in the court’s duties that would have justified the dismissal of its President, and stressed that apparently the President’s mandate had been terminated and new rules to exclude him from being re-elected had been adopted in late 2011 because he publicly criticized several legislative actions of the new government. These concerns were eventually confirmed by the opinion of the Venice Commission and by the opinion of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, in its respective decision issued in May 2014 (see case Baka v. Hungary) the European Court of Human Rights held that the premature termination of the President’s mandate had violated the right of access to a tribunal, because he could not challenge the termination of his mandate. The ECtHR also found that the dismissal “was not the result of a justified restructuring of the supreme judicial authority in Hungary, but in fact was set up on account of the views and criticisms that he had publicly expressed in his professional capacity on the legislative reforms concerned”. Therefore, the President’s right to freedom of expression was also violated.

c) The Fundamental Law lowered the mandatory retirement age of judges to the general retirement age, i.e. from 70 to 62 years as of 1 January 2012. The rule affected approximately 270 judges, including a significant number of judges serving at higher courts and leaders of higher courts, resulting in their dismissal. The Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a judgment on the matter on 6 November 2012 (Commission v Hungary, C-286/12), concluding that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 2000/78/EC. Respective lower level legal provisions were also found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in Hungary in July 2012, but this decision did not

---

6 For further information, see the respective opinions of the Venice Commission:
Opinion on the cardinal acts on the judiciary that were amended following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD/(2012)001 on Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)020, Strasbourg, 15 October 2012, www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDL-AD%282012%29020-c.pdf

reinstate the legal relationship of the already dismissed judges. In order to remedy the effect of the unlawful dismissals, new legal provisions were adopted offering judges compensation or reinstatement into their judicial status, but reinstatement into leading administrative positions was not guaranteed. Thus, by decreasing the mandatory retirement age of judges the governing majority could replace practically the entire leadership of the judiciary.

d) The President of the NJO was vested with the right to appoint another court to proceed in a given case (i.e. transfer/reassign hand-picked cases to a hand-picked court) by referring to the caseload of the original court, which resulted in the controversial transfer of also politically high-profile cases. The system of transferring cases was strongly criticized both by the Venice Commission and the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for violating the right to fair trial, and respective legal provisions were found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Hungary. The possibility of transferring cases was finally abolished in its previous form in 2013, however, no solution or remedy was offered for the violation of the principle of the lawful judge in cases which were already transferred by the President of the NJO earlier on.

2. Changes in the Ombudsperson system; premature dismissal of the Data Protection Commissioner

a) As a result of the Fundamental Law, the former four Ombudspersons (Parliamentary Commissioners) have been replaced by the sole Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, which decreases the level of protection in relation to certain rights. The mandate of three of the Ombudspersons was terminated before the end of their fixed term of office, as of 1 January 2012.

b) The tasks of the Data Protection Commissioner were undertaken by the newly established National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, which is an administrative body and does not comply with the requirement of independence.

c) The issue of abolishing the institution of the Data Protection Commissioner and prematurely terminating the current commissioner’s mandate was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which concluded in April 2014 that “by prematurely bringing to an end the term served by the supervisory authority for the protection of personal data, Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 95/46/EC” (see: Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12).

3. Amendments adopted in 2010 allowed for the dismissal of civil servants without justification, as a result of which thousands of civil servants were fired from the public administration. The rules were held to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in February 2011, but were quashed by it only pro futuro, as of 30 May 2011, and dismissals continued even after the announcement of the Constitutional Court’s decision. Some civil servants turned to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the amendments effectively deprived them of an effective access to a court in Hungary, because although in theory the employers’ decision could have been challenged before a court, in the absence of reasoning it would have been close to impossible to prove that a dismissal was ill-founded. The Court confirmed these concerns when concluding in its decision brought in the K.M.C. v. Hungary case that Hungary had violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

4. In the parliamentary term of the current governing majority between 2010 and 2014, members of the National Election Committee, Vice-Presidents of the Hungarian Competition Authority and the Vice-President of the former Supreme Court were all removed before the end of the fixed term of their office by law. Former members of the Fidesz parliamentary group have been elected as the President of Republic and the Head of the State Audit Office.
THE VIOLATION OF PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Right to liberty

a) The Fundamental Law and the Criminal Code provides for the possibility of actual life-long imprisonment, i.e. life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, violating Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see e.g. the case László Magyar v. Hungary) and contradicting the respective recommendation of the CPT.

b) In November 2013, the length of pre-trial detention became unlimited in case the procedure against the defendant is conducted because of a crime punishable by a prison term of up to 15 years or life-long imprisonment, which raises serious concerns in light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.

c) Since 2010, juveniles may also be taken into confinement for petty offences up to 45 days and their detention is not applied only as a measure of last resort, which is in breach of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

d) Overruling related Decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.) of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, which stated that criminalizing the status of homelessness is unconstitutional, since it violates human dignity, and despite criticism expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law enabled the Parliament or local governments to criminalize homelessness. Accordingly, in September 2013 the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law which introduced petty offences criminalizing homelessness. Rough sleeping became punishable by community work or fine, and, if “committed” for the third time within six months, shall be punished by confinement. At the same time, the right to housing is not guaranteed by the Fundamental Law.

2. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion – the situation of Hungarian churches

Due to a new Church Act adopted in late 2011, many lawfully existing and operating churches in Hungary were forced to go through a re-regulation process, during which the government and the Parliament could decide which churches will be given status as such and receive state subsidies. Many churches that were out of favour with the government failed to regain their status as churches. The law was discriminatory and violated the right to freedom of religion.

---


9 Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 30 January to 1 February 2007, CPT/Inf (2007) 24, § 33.


12 For further information in English, see: http://helsinki.hu/en/criminalization-of-homelessness-in-hungary.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court established the unconstitutionality of the Church Act in its Decision 6/2013 (III. 1.) in March 2013, but instead of initiating legislation that would restore freedom of religion and religious equality, the government pushed ahead with the law by amending the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

The European Court of Human Rights rendered a judgment in the case Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary on 8 April 2014, determining that the Hungarian Church Act violated the applicant churches’ rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of association. According to the Court, “in removing the applicants’ church status altogether rather than applying less stringent measures, in establishing a politically tainted re-registration procedure, whose justification is open to doubt as such, and finally, in treating the applicants differently from the incorporated churches not only in the possibilities of cooperation but also in securing benefits for the purposes of faith-related activities, the Hungarian authorities neglected their duty of neutrality.” The Court claimed there was no pressing social need in a democratic society to justify these legislative steps. The decision is final, as the five-judge panel of the Grand Chamber found no reason to reassess the original verdict. The Hungarian government must now reach an agreement with the applicant churches on the restoration of their status and on just compensation for any damages. If an agreement has not been reached within six months, the Court will determine these issues for the parties.

3. Freedom of expression; freedom of information
   a) The Fundamental Law sets out that the right to freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial or religious community. Thus, the latter groups have dignity just like individuals and hence they enjoy special protection against criticism, which is in contradiction with the European Convention on Human Rights.
   b) In June 2013, the Law on Freedom of Information was amended in a way which allows state institutions managing data broad leeway in rejecting requests for public information, restricting full access to data to specific governmental institutions (such as the State Audit Office and the Government Control Office). The amended Law on Freedom of Information says that “overarching, invoice-based” or “itemized” audit of the “management of a public authority” shall not be governed by the Law on Freedom of Information.

4. The notion of family and marriage
   a) In order to overrule a Constitutional Court decision abolishing a law providing for a restrictive interpretation of the notion of family, the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law severely narrowed the notion of family, restricting it to marriage and parent-child relationships. Thus, the Fundamental Law itself discriminates against all other family configurations, in contradiction to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
   b) Marriage is defined by the Fundamental Law as the union of a man and a woman, excluding even the future consideration of allowing same sex marriages.

5. Right to social security
   The right to social security is degraded to the level of an abstract state objective: according to the Fundamental Law, the state only “strives to provide social security”. Furthermore, by stating that the nature and extent of social measures may be made determined “in accordance with the usefulness to the community of the beneficiary’s activity”, the Fundamental Law denies the principle of equal dignity.
The legal framework of the national elections was amended substantially in recent years, and, as confirmed by the report of the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission on the parliamentary elections in April 2014, “a number of key amendments negatively affected the electoral process, including the removal of important checks and balances”. At the same time, highly questionable decisions were delivered by authorities, jeopardizing the fairness of the elections.

1. Gerrymandering

Concurrent to the enactment of a new Hungarian electoral law in 2011, a new constituency map also came into effect. For constitutional reasons, the revision of electoral boundaries could no longer be postponed, however, concerns may be raised both with regard to the content of the map and its method of adoption: (i) The design of the new constituency map went ahead without professional and political consultations. Furthermore, amending the map will require a two-third majority in the Parliament. (ii) According to the map, populations in districts with leftist tendencies are typically 5 to 6 thousand larger than those in rightist districts. According to several calculations, with equal support at the national level Fidesz would be allocated 10 more single-member mandates than its rival, and the new constituency map may also convert a slight governing-party handicap into an advantage.

2. New election rules provide for a so-called “winner compensation”: not only are votes for candidates that lose in individual constituencies be added to the votes for the national lists, but also the votes for the winner that are not “used up” in gaining the individual seat in Parliament. In other words, if the winner receives 20,000 and the runner-up 15,000 votes, the party fielding the winning candidate will be allocated 4,999 further fractional votes. This method brought six extra mandates for Fidesz-KDNP in the 2014 national elections.

3. As also confirmed by the OSCE/ODIHR, “the main governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations” during the campaign for the national elections.

a) The Fourth and Fifth Amendment to the Fundamental Law created a situation where campaign for political parties is practically restricted to the public media: the elimination of profit, i.e. that commercial media outlets may only broadcast political ads for free, resulted that none of the commercial media outlets with a national coverage chose to undertake to broadcast political advertisements up to the respective deadline. This, taken together with the fact that the public (state) media is government-leaning, resulted in an uneven media representation that unduly favoured the governing Fidesz party and its candidates.

b) At the same time, government advertisements were aired on one of the commercial television channels, the campaign spot in question being composed of the same types of slogan and visual elements as an

17 For further information in English, see: http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/NGO_comments_on_the_5th_Amendment_to_the_Fundamental_Law_October2013.pdf, pp 2-3.
advertisement of the governing coalition, but the National Election Committee ruled that the advertisement broadcast did not qualify as a political campaign spot. However, in the view of the OSCE/ODIHR the use of government advertisements that were almost identical to those of the Fidesz “contributed to an uneven playing field and did not fully respect the separation of party and state”. The Curia also concluded that due to the practical identity the government’s information campaign was a covert political campaign of the governing party, so it banned the TV channel from broadcasting the material.

c) A new governmental decree, adopted only in January 2014, imposed restrictions on the placement of electoral posters. Restrictions did not apply to posters of the government, “advertising” government aims and results (of course corresponding with that of the governing majority), which were installed in a high number in the period preceding the elections, and did not apply to civil society posters either. (The latter is relevant because an NGO called “Civil Unity Forum”, undeniably having very close ties with governing parties, installed posters heavily criticizing opposition leaders.) At the same time, the Constitutional Court rejected a complaint concerning the regulation of election posters without deciding on the merits of the complaint.

d) As pointed out also by OSCE/ODIHR, the majority of campaign billboard spaces were rented by the Fidesz in the course of the campaign, and opposition parties and candidates had limited access to broadcast media and public advertising space, including billboards and public buses, most of the latter ones owned by individuals affiliated with the government.

4. The election rules discriminate between those Hungarian citizens staying abroad but having a permanent residence in Hungary and those living abroad without permanent residence in Hungary: the latter may also vote via mail ballot, while those in the first group have to vote in person at diplomatic commissions (which in some cases requires them to travel large distances). In the view of the OSCE/ODIHR the different voting procedures for the two types of voters abroad “was at odds with the principle of equal suffrage”. However, the Constitutional Court refused to deal with this issue in merit, dismissing a related constitutional complaint.

5. Media sources claimed before the elections that there was a serious suspicion that in many cases personal data and signatures of voters were copied by political parties from one recommendation sheet to another. (Under the law, recommendations from voters are required to stand as a candidate in the election, and voters may recommend more candidates.) However, concerned state authorities were reluctant to investigate the matter and/or provide remedy, the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information even concluding that checking upon individual request whether personal data was misused would pose such an extreme workload on the election authorities that it could not be managed without endangering the procedure of the elections.

6. The new Parliamentary Campaign Finance Act, adopted in 2013, makes some steps forward to combat corruption, but e.g. it omits to compel parties to give real time and ongoing account of their expenditures, and fall short of issues such as outsourcing political campaigns to GONGO and PONGO, and the source and origin of non-state secured campaign funds. On top of this, it requires parties to only submit their reports on campaign expenditures to the State Audit Office, which has so far never addressed questionable transaction in these statements and failed to compare parties’ declarations to reality. Parallel NGO assessment of the 2014 national elections’ campaign spending showed that funding coming from undisclosed resources was extensively used to promote the campaigns of the governing parties, and their expenses exceeded four times the amount foreseen by the law.

7. In June 2014, only a few months before the municipal elections, the municipal representation system of the Hungarian capital was modified unilaterally by the governing party, in a way clearly adjusted to the outcome of the latest elections, and in violation of the equality of the right to vote.\(^{18}\)

---

1. **Two new media laws were adopted in 2010.** Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Media Content (FPR Act) regulates media content and the rights and obligations of the media. Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media (MS Act) deals with regulatory bodies and their procedures, tenders, fines, etc. Both cardinal Acts (Media Laws) were submitted by individual Members of the Parliament instead of the Government to avoid procedural rules binding the Government, such as compulsory public deliberation and impact assessment.

2. The new media laws have two main features: (i) they set **strict content requirements** concerning linear, on-demand services, public services, online and print press; (ii) a **single regulatory regime** applies to all for profit media, allowing for only minor differentiation between different media products.

3. The MS Act established the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. The Head of the Authority is appointed by the President of the Republic, after the nomination made by the Prime Minister, for 9 years. The duties of Head of the Authority and the Chair of the Media Council are vested in the same person. The four members of the Media Council are elected by a two-thirds majority of MPs. **All the members of the Media Council recently elected were nominated solely by Fidesz-KDNP Members of Parliament.**

4. The competences of the Media Council and the Authority cover all kinds of media and the **amounts of fines set in the MS Act are heavy.** Media Service Providers with Significant Powers of Influence can be fined as much as 200 million forints (around € 700,000). Other maximum fines go up to 25 million forints (€ 85,000) for daily national newspapers and news websites and 10 million forints (€ 35,000) for weeklies. Private persons can be fined up to one and a half million forints (€ 5,200) in cases of non-compliance during an administrative investigation. Although these fines are rarely imposed, the sole possibility of being fined can cause a **chilling effect** among media outlets.

5. International intergovernmental organizations have criticized the media laws from the start. In response to these criticisms, in February 2011 the Hungarian Government agreed to revise some provisions, and the Parliament adopted the following changes in March. The requirement for on-demand media content providers to give “comprehensive, factual, up-to-date, objective and balanced information” was removed, as well as the prohibition against offending individuals. The amendment exempted linear services and on-demand audio-visual media services provided by foreign media from the regime of sanctions for content issues. Registration rules were changed, replacing the “permissive” regime of operation of the media that requires prior registration with a “notifying” one that reduces the power of the Authority.

6. In December 2011 a decision of the Constitutional Court annulled some important provisions of the media laws. As a result

   a) the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the fact that protection of journalistic sources had been conditioned upon the “public interest” value of the journalism,

   b) the post of Media Commissioner was eliminated on 31 May 2012,

   c) the Media Council is not entitled to oblige media service providers to reveal data outside of an official procedure.
7. After the Constitutional Court’s decision the Parliament again amended the media laws in May 2012. Beside the consequences of the CC’s decision, and without regard for the Opinion of the Council of Europe issued in March, the following amendments were adopted:

   a) the protection of sources covers only those formally employed as journalists,
   b) the post of Media Commissioner was re-established with significantly restricted powers,
   c) the powers of the Chair of the Media Council in the field of frequency tenders remain unrestricted.

8. Based on the three years track record of the Authority, no serious sanctions have been imposed against journalists or media services. However all complaints filed against public service radio or television were dismissed.

9. **Distorting the media market**

By 2014, the governing Fidesz party, based on its repeated two-thirds majority in Parliament, firmly controls large segments of the national media.

   a) The Fidesz led government **fully controls the public-service media** and transformed it into government mouthpiece. Public TV and radio stations echo the government standpoints without any relevant critics. Legal framework regulating the state media enables the **unilateral political nomination of the media authority’s leadership**.

   b) The government influences the content of non-state media through the distribution of state advertisements and, in several cases, by getting on to the ownership of several outlets or administratively distorting the market by imposing sectorial surtaxes (2014: a special surtax on media advertisements). To the part of media not controlled by the government, “soft censorship” also seems to apply.

   ➔ The special surtax referred to above is mostly detrimental for the market leader of commercial TVs, the Germany’s Bertellsmann owned RTL Klub, which is supposed to pay 40% of marginal tax rate after its advertisement revenues. The intention of market distortion, i.e. to channel the revenues towards second largest commercial TV station TV2, seems to be obvious in this case. According to media sources, TV2 was sold to businessmen who might be labeled as Fidesz cronies last year.

   ➔ The case of news portal Origo.hu displays the government’s readiness to violate the autonomy of free press by putting a pro forma independent media outlet under strong political pressure if it writes pieces against government politicians’ interests. Origo.hu, the largest Hungarian news portal in terms of unique users owned by Hungarian Telekom (being a 100% affiliate of Deutsche Telekom) revealed a fact that János Lázár (then State Secretary of Prime Minister’s Office, now Minister of Prime Minister’s Office) had spent approximately € 6,600 for three short travels abroad, significantly acceding the market price of such accommodation and travel costs. As the Prime Minister’s Office returned the journalist’s request for details of these travels without giving a proper answer, the journalist of Origo.hu took legal steps to reveal the relevant public data of these trips. (Just after the national elections the journalist won the juridical proceeding in the first instance.) As the date of the national elections of April 2014 was approaching, the portal and the journalist faced strong pressure from the government not to publish the details of the lawsuits. As the portal resisted this pressure, the editor-in-chief of Origo.hu was sacked, followed by a huge efflux of journalists from this portal at the beginning of June 2014.19

19 A concise overview of the story by an independent news portal called 444.hu is available in English here: http://444.hu/2014/06/05/deutsche-telekom-hungarian-government-collude-to-silence-independent-media/
Crony capitalism, though nominally free-market, allows for preferential regulations and other state interventions based on favouritism, personal relationships and attendance of rent seeking behaviour. If rent seeking behaviour prevails money-making becomes possible based not on market performance but on political connections. Economic actors are prone to seek the grace of the government instead of competing on a regulated market. Cronyism may be linked to state capture, a phenomenon where powerful oligarchs either outclass the government or are in symbiosis with influential public decision-makers. If a state is captured the public decision-making process reflects primarily private interests instead of the endeavours of resounding the public good. The combination of state capture and crony capitalism leads to a situation where rent seeking, a corrupt behaviour per se, that implies the abuse of public trust for private gains, is stimulated not only by the government but also by influential business groups and oligarchs.

The following two examples demonstrate the current governmental majority’s and government’s readiness to employ its legislative power to discretionarily adopt tailor-made regulations that disproportionately favour new players with tight links to the government and hurt market incumbents.

1. The tobacco retail scandal

The Parliament, through passing the Tobacco Retailing Act, established a state monopoly on the retail sale of tobacco products from 1 July 2013. The government nationalized tobacco kiosks, claiming that a centralized means of selling tobacco products would limit its use by underage members of society. The new regulation provides a state-owned company the exclusive right to award long-term tobacco kiosk licenses. As a result of the redistribution, the number of tobacco selling points in the country decreased from approximately 40,000 to 5,000. Reportedly, many of the licenses went to retailers politically loyal to the governing Fidesz party. The details of the tender have remained closed to the public, which gave rise to corruption concerns. In addition, following the reallocation of tobacco kiosk licenses, the government significantly increased the rate of return on tobacco products, turning tobacco retailing into a lucrative business, but perceived by many as a clear proof of legalized rent seeking.

In April 2013, journalists uncovered that a previous version of the Tobacco Retailing Act, submitted on 16 February 2013 to the European Commission, had been drafted on a computer belonging to the chief executive officer of Hungarian tobacco company Continental and chair of the Federation of Hungarian Tobacco Investors, or the “tobacco lobby”, who admitted his involvement in continuous consultations leading to the adoption of the legislation. Investigative journalists also found that some 500 tobacco kiosk licenses out of a total number of 5,061 went to companies belonging to the interest group of Continental tobacco. In his comment, Mr. János Lázár, then the governing Fidesz party’s politician in charge of the redistribution of the tobacco retail market, at present Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, said that the Tobacco Retailing Act admittedly aimed at improving the business environment of Hungarian tobacco companies.

---

20 For further information in English, see: http://www.politics.hu/20140512/court-orders-release-of-tobacco-retail-tender-documents/.
21 For further information in English, see: http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/05/08/hungary-government-limits-foia-transparency-law/.
2. **The savings cooperatives scandal**

Savings cooperatives are private owned financial (credit) institutions with a nationwide network of customer service points. The government, relying on its supermajority in Parliament, adopted a law in 2013 that forced savings cooperatives to join a non-voluntary integration framework entitled to substantially influence the members’ business policy and even to veto any amendment to their deed of foundation. This newly designed integration mechanism is dominated by Takarékbank [Savings Bank] Ltd., a commercial bank originally under the principal ownership of savings cooperatives, which, through state owned enterprises, has been nationalized. As a second step, the government re-privatized the quorum of this bank’s shares to an interest group closely knit to the governing Fidesz party. The newly appointed CEO of the Takarékbank Ltd., who acts in the meantime as the government’s commissioner to reshuffle the savings cooperatives sector was a co-owner of the single bidder, who, unsurprisingly, won the formally open tender. The government, due to clandestine “strategic” considerations, gave green light to the corporatization of the Takarékbank Ltd., and exempted the process from the oversight of the Economic Competition Office.

In sum, the government allocated public money to augment the subscribed capital of a private savings bank which controls the savings cooperatives to later concede the newly acquired ownership rights to its cronies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIMELINE OF GOVERNMENTAL ATTACKS AGAINST HUNGARIAN NGO SPHERE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>14-15 August 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs “serving foreign interests” are listed by government-friendly newspapers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| On 14-15 August 2013, both the printed and online versions of the government-friendly Hungarian newspaper Heti Válasz stated that the “Budapest-born American speculator” György Soros spent last year almost half a billion forints on “strengthening the ‘civil’ opposition”, or “the ‘civil’ left wing”. The article listed 11 NGOs – including leading human rights and watchdog NGOs – which received grants from e.g. the Open Society Foundations, thus, in the newspaper’s view, are “kept” by György Soros, who exerts political influence through them. The article also stated that the “Soros-crew” had an “outstanding role” also in distributing grants in the framework of the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund, stating that the Ökotárs Foundation (which leads the Hungarian consortium distributing the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund) is also dependent on Soros, and that one-third of the whole sum distributed ended up at “Soros-compatible” organisations. The article also listed 13 NGOs which received grants from the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund, again, including leading human rights and watchdog organizations.1

> In its reply dated 16 October 2013 the ambassador of Norway firmly declined the above allegations, recalling that the Ökotárs Foundation was chosen to operate the NGO Fund in Hungary in an open tendering process.2

> Allegations were also firmly declined by the Ökotárs Foundation, which reminded that the priorities of the NGO programme under the EEA/Norway Grants are the same in all of the countries covered, and that the newspaper articles inappropriately failed to differentiate between social engagement (supported by the NGO Fund) and party political activities.3

| **17 August 2013** |
| The governing party echoes newspaper’s allegations |
| At a press conference on 17 August 2013 the spokesperson of the governing party Fidesz, Péter Hoppál, stated the following: “From an investigative report we learnt that a circle of American speculators paid about half a billion forints to show its gratitude to pseudo-civil organizations who were willing to regularly denounce Fidesz and the Hungarian government, particularly abroad and in front of forums abroad. (...) These organizations kept for millions of dollars, what these organizations do, all they have to do in exchange of the American money, is to attack the Hungarian government, attack Fidesz, and attack the Prime Minister of Hungary in all possible forums.” When a journalist asked the spokesperson to name the organizations he has in mind, the spokesperson named leading human rights and watchdog NGOs.4

> The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, as one of the NGOs named, asked the spokesperson for an apology, yet he did not respond. Eventually the NGO decided to go to court, and in July 2014, the first instance court found that the spokesperson and Fidesz have

---

1 For the online version, see: [http://valasz.hu/itthon/soros-felmilliardot-adott-ellenfeleinek-67174](http://valasz.hu/itthon/soros-felmilliardot-adott-ellenfeleinek-67174).
3 See: [http://norvegcivilalap.hu/hu/node/4210](http://norvegcivilalap.hu/hu/node/4210).
4 See e.g.: [http://index.hu/belfold/2014/07/07/megjarta_hoppal_peter_amikor_lealcivilezte_a_helsinki_bizottsagot/](http://index.hu/belfold/2014/07/07/megjarta_hoppal_peter_amikor_lealcivilezte_a_helsinki_bizottsagot/).
violated the right of the organization for good reputation, arguing that these statements – which the respondents did not even try to support with evidence in court - may cause damage to the public image of the organization. The court obliged Mr. Hoppál and the Fidesz to publish an apology in two daily newspapers and on the party’s website.\(^5\) The respondents appealed against the decision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 April 2014</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office claims political influence with regard to the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund</td>
<td>On 8 April 2014 it was reported by the media that János Lázár, head of the Prime Minister’s Office wrote a letter to the Norwegian government, claiming that the money from the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund is distributed by an organisation closely linked to the opposition party Politics Can Be Different. Furthermore, an Undersecretary of State from the Prime Minister’s Office, Nándor Csepreghy, stated that if Norway will not be a partner in solving the issue that may be interpreted in a way that Norway interferes with the internal affairs of Hungary.(^6) In its response dated 24 April 2014, the Norwegian Minister of EEA and EU Affairs Vidar Helgesen reminded that the “process of selecting the fund operator for the NGO programme in Hungary has followed the regulation and procedures outlined in the agreement of the grants. The selection was done through an open tendering process where the selection criteria were publicly available and transparent. The current operator met all the specified criteria (…)”. The Minister also stated the following: “I wish to underline that the Government of Norway has not been engaged in supporting, financially or otherwise, any party political activities in Hungary. These are rather surprising accusations, and I cannot see that they are valid.”(^7) The Ökotárs Foundation also issued a statement, underlining that it had never supported the Politics Can Be Different, any other political parties or any organizations closely linked to political parties in any form; and that the list of their grants is public.(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 2014</td>
<td>Turns out that a background institution of the government lost the tender for operating the NGO Fund</td>
<td>On 11 April 2014 news sources reported that the Századvég Foundation also participated in the open tendering process for the position of fund operator with regard to the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund, but since it was apparently not impartial, it was not selected.(^9) (The Századvég group is the most important background institution of the government, preparing studies, polls and surveys. The activities of the organization are mostly financed by the state: e.g. in the first half of 2012 the Századvég received almost a billion HUF for preparing studies and analysis – which should have been prepared by the ministries themselves –, meaning that they received approx. 470,000 HUF per page.(^10))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 2014</td>
<td>Senior government</td>
<td>Undersecretary of State Nándor Csepreghy called the foundations acting as the operator consortium of the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund “party-dependent, cheating nobodies”, and indicated that there are plans to entrust the state with operating the NGO Fund.(^11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


\(^7\) For the response in English, see: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/brev/svar_lazar.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/brev/svar_lazar.pdf).

\(^8\) See: [http://norvegcivilalap.hu/hu/node/8050](http://norvegcivilalap.hu/hu/node/8050).

\(^9\) See e.g.: [http://index.hu/belfold/2014/04/11/a_szazadveg_akarta_a_norveg_penzeket/](http://index.hu/belfold/2014/04/11/a_szazadveg_akarta_a_norveg_penzeket/).

\(^10\) See e.g.: [http://index.hu/helfold/2013/04/04/otmilliardra_nott_a_szazadveg_megbizasa/](http://index.hu/helfold/2013/04/04/otmilliardra_nott_a_szazadveg_megbizasa/).


\(^12\) See: [http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140430_Csepregyh_szelhamos_gittegyletek_kezelik/](http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140430_Csepregyh_szelhamos_gittegyletek_kezelik/).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>official calls NGO Fund operators “party-dependent, cheating nobodies”</th>
<th>➔ As a reaction, on 7 May 2014 the consortium led by the Ökotárs Foundation issued an open letter, addressed to János Lázár, strongly asking him to call upon his deputy to withdraw his statements that breached the reputation of the organizations. The consortium underlined that they have a number of programs beyond operating the NGO Fund, and cited concrete examples of cooperation with actors of the government.13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 May 2014</td>
<td>On 21 May 2014 it was announced by the Prime Minister’s Office that the government requests the Government Control Office (GCO) – a state agency vested with the task of auditing state money – to launch a unilateral audit into how the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund is managed, in order to see whether the government’s suspicion that the fund’s money is used to support political organisations indirectly, or NGOs closely linked to them, may be substantiated.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 2014 State audit is launched against NGOs receiving support from the NGO Fund</td>
<td>➔ On 28 May 2014 the secretariat of the EEA/Norway Grants donor states, the Financial Mechanism Office, has made clear its position in an official letter addressed to János Lázár that the conduct of the proposed audit “cannot be accepted”, since according to the respective agreements the implementation of the NGO Fund, including its regular audit, is the responsibility of the donor states. It was underlined that since the NGO Fund does not receive any funding from Hungarian state budget, no funds from Hungarian state budget are managed by the Ökotárs Foundation in this context. It was also submitted that an audit by the donors has already been planned and will be carried out during the autumn, and the results of this audit will certainly be made available to the Hungarian authorities. Furthermore, the Norwegian government rejected again all allegations of supporting, financially or otherwise, any party political activity in Hungary.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 28 May – 1 June 2014 | After János Lázár, head of the Prime Minister’s Office had stated in an interview16 on 28 May 2014 that one of the ministries has been preparing materials on the potentially problematic NGO projects since 2011, an online news portal acquired the respective list from the Prime Minister’s Office, which turned out to contain exactly the same human rights and watchdog NGOs as the *Heti Válasz* article from August 2013 referred to above.17 (For the list of the NGOs, see the end of the sheet.) 
Furthermore, even though the name of the evaluators for the NGO Fund is not public in order to exclude lobbying, it turned out that the Prime Minister’s Office also listed evaluators with “left wing political ties”, mainly citing politically relevant activities preceding their job as an evaluator. At the same time, an online news portal stated that there are also evaluators who, following the same logic, could have been listed as having ties to the Fidesz. The governmental list also contained “incompatible” evaluators, to which the Ökotárs responded that evaluators who would be incompatible with regard to an application do not participate in its evaluation.18 |

---

14 See e.g.: [http://index.hu/gazdasag/2014/05/21/rakuldik_a_kehit_a_norveg_alapra/](http://index.hu/gazdasag/2014/05/21/rakuldik_a_kehit_a_norveg_alapra/).
16 See e.g.: [http://444.hu/2014/05/28/lazar-janos-norveg-civil-alap/](http://444.hu/2014/05/28/lazar-janos-norveg-civil-alap/).

http://index.hu/belfold/2014/06/01/az_nfu_adta_ki_a_norveg_alap_titkos_nevsorat/.
On 2 June 2014, the GCO made an on-site audit to three members of the consortium responsible for the operation of the EEA/Norwegian NGO Fund (Autonómia Foundation, Foundation for the Development of Democratic Rights - DemNet, and Ökotárs Foundation), and demanded that certain documents be handed over. Even though the foundations maintained the view that the GCO had no right to investigate, they decided to turn over some of the documents. However, the head of the Ökotárs stated that they would not like to turn over documents which contain sensitive personal data (such as the names of clients of human rights NGOs), and they had asked that their standpoint as to the illegitimate nature of the audit is recorded. Furthermore, the Ökotárs submitted a formal letter to the GCO, inquiring about the legal basis of the audit.

In order to express the Norwegian authorities’ concern about Hungary’s actions, the Hungarian Ambassador to Norway was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 June 2014, and representatives from the Norwegian Embassy in Budapest paid a visit to the Hungarian authorities on 5 June 2014. The Norwegian Minister of EEA and EU Affairs stated that he is “deeply concerned about the actions of the Hungarian authorities in relation to civil society and their attempts to limit freedom of expression” and that the Hungarian authorities’ audit does not comply with the agreements that have been entered into. It was emphasized again that a number of NGO funds were scheduled to be audited in the autumn of 2014 by the donor countries, including the fund in Hungary, and the results of these audits will be made available to the public. The Minister stated that if the Hungarian authorities would like to request access to documents related to the administration of the NGO Fund, they are to contact the Financial Mechanism Office in Brussels.

After a high-level meeting on 12 June 2014 between the states involved, it was stated again by Norway that responsibility for the NGO programme and any potential audits lies with the donor states, and that the Hungarian government’s actions “undermine the independence of civil society from the authorities”. It was expressed that halting the audit is one of the preconditions for lifting the earlier suspension of the EEA and Norway Grants. (Payments to Hungary under the EEA and Norway Grants scheme were suspended as of 9 May 2014, because the Hungarian Government has moved the implementation and monitoring of the Grants scheme out of the central government administration, which was seen by the donor states as a breach of the agreements that have been entered into.)

Since the Hungarian government failed to address the issue of the state audit of NGOs in its follow-up letter dated 17 June 2014, the Financial Mechanism Committee emphasized once again in a response dated 25 June 2014 that the cancellation of the audit against the NGO Fund operator is also a precondition of further dialogue on lifting the suspension.

---

19 See e.g.: http://index.hu/belfold/2014/06/02/megiscsakraft_a_kehi_a_norveg_alapon/, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-hungary-norway-funding-ngo-idUSKBN0ED1QW20140602?feedType=RSS&irpc=932 (in English).
20 See e.g.: http://nol.hu/belfold/okotars-nines-jogalapja-a-kehi-vizsgalatnak-1466411.
24 For the letter in English, see: http://norvegcivilalap.hu/en/node/8552.
newspaper 

\*Hető Válasz\* claimed that a draft audit report prepared by Ernst & Young supported the concerns of János Lázár with respect to the Ökotárs, with regard to the period between 2008 and 2010.\(^{25}\) Referring to the report, Undersecretary Csepreghy stated that it was possible that the Ökotárs committed fraud.\(^{26}\) On 27 June 2014 it was announced that the government requested the audit report from the EY, and that if that will support the allegations of the press, than the government will initiate a criminal procedure even before the audit of the GCO is over.\(^{27}\) (Subsequently it turned out that the EY’s report was handed over to the GCO by the Ökotárs itself earlier on.\(^{28}\))

\(\Rightarrow\) On 1 July 2014 the independent investigative news portal \*atlatszo.hu* published the EY’s draft report in its entirety, concluding that in fact the audit report considered the implementation of the program adequate as a whole, revealed no systemic deficiencies, and although it pointed out risks and problems, nothing to the extent indicated by the governmental accusations, and certainly nothing which could constitute a criminal offence.\(^{29,30}\)

---

In the course of June 2014, altogether 58 NGOs supported by the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund received a letter of query from the GCO to submit documents related to their projects financed by NGO Fund. The request covered practically entire project documentations in addition to organizational documents, and the deadline provided was very tight: they had to comply with the request approximately within a week.\(^{30}\) Some of the NGOs submitted an inquiry to the GCO as to the legal basis for the investigation, but received a sample letter which in their view did not succeed in substantiating the GCO’s right to investigate them.\(^{31}\)

\(\Rightarrow\) Four of the NGOs concerned – the Asimov Foundation (operating the investigative news portal \*atlatszo.hu*), the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, the Szívárvány Misszó Foundation (organizer of the Budapest Pride), and the Krétakör Foundation – decided to make the project documentation available on their websites instead of submitting it to the GCO, expressing their standpoint that the audit had no legal basis.\(^{32}\) At the same time, e.g. Transparency International Hungary decided to comply with the GCO’s request, but upheld the view as to the questionable legal basis of the audit.\(^{33}\) (It has to be added that not complying was not without risk, since the GCO can initiate the suspension of the tax number of any entities refusing to cooperate with it, which practically renders NGOs’ life impossible.)

\(\Rightarrow\) The GCO gave another, also tight deadline for the concerned NGOs in July 2014 to

\(^{28}\) See e.g.: \[http://index.hu/belfold/2014/06/27/norvegok_a_leleplezo_iratokban_nem_az_van_amit_a_kormany_mond/](http://index.hu/belfold/2014/06/27/norvegok_a_leleplezo_iratokban_nem_az_van_amit_a_kormany_mond/).\n
\(^{29}\) See e.g.: \[http://atlatszo.hu/2014/07/01/itt-az-ernst-young-jelentesze-a-norveg-civil-alap-atvilagitasarol/](http://atlatszo.hu/2014/07/01/itt-az-ernst-young-jelentesze-a-norveg-civil-alap-atvilagitasarol/).\n
\(^{30}\) See e.g.: \[http://tv2.hu/musoraink/tenyek/152884_adatokat_kernek_a_norveg_penzekrol.html](http://tv2.hu/musoraink/tenyek/152884_adatokat_kernek_a_norveg_penzekrol.html).\n
\(^{31}\) See e.g.: \[http://www.transparency.hu/TL turns to the Ombudsman regarding recent government audit?bind_info=index&bind_id=0](http://www.transparency.hu/TL turns to the Ombudsman regarding recent government audit?bind_info=index&bind_id=0) (in English).\n
\(^{33}\) See: \[http://www.transparency.hu/TL turns to the Ombudsman regarding recent government audit?bind_info=index&bind_id=0](http://www.transparency.hu/TL turns to the Ombudsman regarding recent government audit?bind_info=index&bind_id=0) (in English).
submit documents they failed to submit earlier, and stated that a high fine (500,000 HUF) will be imposed on them if they do not comply.\(^{34}\) However, the four NGOs who refused to cooperate earlier upheld their stance.\(^{35}\)

\(\rightarrow\) Upon the complaints of NGOs (including the Transparency International Hungary) the Ombudsperson of Hungary concluded in a letter sent to János Lázár on 23 July 2014 that the interpretation of Norway shall be also taken into account with regard to the audit of the funds. However, the Ombudsperson did not take any further action.\(^{36}\)

### 21 July 2014
State auditors demand further documents from NGO Fund operators

On 21 July 2014, the GCO sent another request for documents to the Ökotárs Foundation, now threatening to impose sanctions (fines and/or the suspension of the organization’s tax number) in case of non-cooperation. The new documents requested not only concerned the Ökotárs, but also the NGOs supported from the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund.

\(\rightarrow\) On 24 July 2014, the Ökotárs issued a statement, listing the documents they submitted to the GCO previously in the spirit of cooperation (questioning the audit’s legality though) and which are the ones they do not agree to hand over (e.g. data of non-supported applicants and documents containing sensitive personal data). The statement continued by saying that in case of the latter documents the Ökotárs questions “why they would be needed to achieve the stated goal of the investigation (…), to establish whether the use of the funds was appropriate”.\(^{37}\)

### 26 July 2014
PM refers to NGOs as “paid political activists” helping foreign interests

In his speech delivered on 26 July 2014, in which he declared that he and his government builds an “illiberal state”, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that their efforts in that regard are obstructed by civil society organizations, and referred to civil society members as “paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests”.\(^{38}\)

### August 2014
First criminal procedure is launched against the operator of the NGO Fund

In the beginning of August 2014 it was reported that the police launched an investigation against the Ökotárs on the suspicion of fraud. However, this procedure was not initiated by the government, but by a member of the Fidesz, probably for personal reasons.\(^{39}\) Later on, the underlying criminal offence was altered to “fraudulent misuse of funds” or, in other words, embezzlement.\(^{40}\)

### 3 September 2014

On 3 September it was announced that the GCO initiated a criminal procedure on the

---


\(^{35}\) See e.g. [http://vs.hu/birsag-ellenere-sem-hatrnalak-az-ellenallo-norveg-civilek-0717](http://vs.hu/birsag-ellenere-sem-hatrnalak-az-ellenallo-norveg-civilek-0717).


\(^{37}\) For the statement and the list of documents in English, see: [http://norvegcivilalap.hu/en/node/8578](http://norvegcivilalap.hu/en/node/8578).


\(^{39}\) See e.g.: [http://vs.hu/munkaalapu-allam-korszaka-kovetkezik](http://vs.hu/munkaalapu-allam-korszaka-kovetkezik).

\(^{40}\) For more information, see: [http://index.hu/belfold/2014/08/23/nyomoz_a_rendorseg_a_norveg_alapok_ugyeben/](http://index.hu/belfold/2014/08/23/nyomoz_a_rendorseg_a_norveg_alapok_ugyeben/).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 September 2014</td>
<td>DPA obliges fund operator to disclose list of non-supported applications</td>
<td>After the Ökotárs refused to hand over a government-friendly television channel the list of non-supported applicants and the reasoning as to why they were not supported, claiming e.g. that only the Financial Mechanism Office would be allowed to submit the data, the Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information reached a decision in the beginning of September, obliging the Ökotárs to fulfill the television channel’s request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 2014</td>
<td>Police raid on NGO Fund operators; documents concerning “blacklisted” NGOs are seized</td>
<td>In the framework of the investigations above – in which defendants are not identified, thus potential defendants are not protected from self-incrimination –, on 8 September 2014 the offices of the Ökotárs and the DemNet were raided by the police, who showed up in disproportionately high numbers (reportedly, 43 police officers participated in the raid). Staff members were not allowed to use their phones, and the police also conducted searches in the homes of certain staff members and at the foundation’s accountant. The head of Ökotárs was escorted home by the police in order to fetch her laptop. The police seized computers, documents, etc., and both the opinion of the representatives of the Ökotárs and the DemNet and the police’s list of the seized materials show that the police were mainly interested in the 13 NGOs “blacklisted” by the Prime Minister’s Office earlier on – giving rise to suspicions that the criminal procedure was used to access documents the GCO could not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 2014</td>
<td>The scope of the state audit is extended</td>
<td>On 11 September 2014 it was announced that the scope of the GCO’s audit had been extended to funds received by the Ökotárs in the framework of the Swiss-Hungarian Cooperation Programme, and also to funds received from other state budget sources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 See e.g.: [http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140903_Feljelentett_a_Kehi_egy_szervezetet_a_nor](http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140903_Feljelentett_a_Kehi_egy_szervezetet_a_nor)
43 See e.g.: [http://mno.hvg.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/torveny-sertett-az-okotars-1245895](http://mno.hvg.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/torveny-sertett-az-okotars-1245895)
44 See e.g.: [http://index.hu/belfold/2014/09/08/keszenletisek_akkioznak_az_okotarsnal/](http://index.hu/belfold/2014/09/08/keszenletisek_akkioznak_az_okotarsnal/)
49 See e.g.: [http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140911_Kiterjeszettek_a_Kehiviszalapot_az_Oko/](http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140911_Kiterjeszettek_a_Kehiviszalapot_az_Oko/)
In a speech delivered at the opening of the autumn session of the Parliament on 15 September 2014 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated the following: “We don’t want anything more than to see clearly, we want to have clean water in the glass, because we are bothered by insincerity and lies, and we don’t like it when someone who talks about freedom is a mercenary, or who talks about independence is a kept person. Declares himself a civilian but is in fact a paid political activist. Talks about respect for the law but when it comes to his own financial affairs, calls for exceptional procedures, saying that’s not Hungarian money. Hungarian voters don’t like this, so the government does well when it says, laws apply to everybody, to political parties, civil society organisations also to citizens who don’t organise themselves at all.”

On 18 September 2014, the tax number of the consortium’s fourth member, the Kárpátok Foundation was suspended, and the GCO stated that the tax number of the remaining three consortium members will also be suspended, on the basis that the foundations are responsible for distributing public money but they are “secretive” and they do not want to disclose certain documents.


The “blacklisted” Hungarian NGOs are the following:

- Transparency International Hungary (www.transparency.hu/)
- K-Monitor (http://k-monitor.hu/)
- Asimov Foundation (http://atlatszo.hu/)
- Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (http://tasz.hu/)
- Roma Press Center (http://romasajtokozpont.hu/)
- Krétakőr Foundation (http://kretakor.eu/)
- NaNe Women’s Rights Association (http://www.nane.hu/)
- Foundation for Democratic Youth (http://www.i-dia.org/)
- Hungarian Women’s Lobby (http://noierdek.hu/)
- Labris Lesbian Association (www.labrisz.hu)
- PATENT – Association Against Patriarchism (http://patent.org.hu/)
- LiFE – Association of Young Liberals (http://liberalisfiatalok.hu/)
- Szivárvány Misszió Foundation (http://budapestpride.hu/)
### TIMELINE OF GOVERNMENTAL ATTACKS AGAINST HUNGARIAN NGO SPHERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-15 August 2013</td>
<td>NGOs “serving foreign interests” are listed by government-friendly newspapers; it is alleged that the “crew” of György Soros has an “outstanding role” in distributing the money in the framework of the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund. Allegations are declined both by the Ökotárs Foundation (which leads the Hungarian consortium of fund operators) and the Norwegian government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August 2013</td>
<td>The spokesperson of the governing party Fidesz echoes the newspapers’ above allegations. Later on, in a civil procedure launched against the spokesperson and the Fidesz by an NGO, they do not even try to substantiate the spokesperson’s statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April 2014</td>
<td>The head of the Prime Minister’s Office claims in a letter to the Norwegian government that the Ökotárs is in his view closely linked to an opposition party. Allegations of political influence are again rejected by the Ökotárs and Norway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 2014</td>
<td>It turns out that Századvég Foundation, an important background institution of the government, also participated in the tender for the position of fund operator with regard to the NGO Fund, but was not considered impartial and was not selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 2014</td>
<td>Senior representative of the Prime Minister’s Office calls the operators of the Hungarian NGO Fund “party-dependent, cheating nobodies”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 2014</td>
<td>The government requests the Government Control Office (GCO), a state agency vested with the right to audit state money, to launch an audit into how the NGO Fund is managed. The secretariat of the donor countries states that the audit is in breach of the respective agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May – 1 June 2014</td>
<td>It comes to light that a governmental list has been prepared about potentially “problematic” NGO projects under the EEA/Norway Grants, corresponding with the list of NGOs cited by newspapers in August 2013. A governmental list of “left wing” and “incompatible” evaluators also emerges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 2014</td>
<td>The GCO pays a visit to three members of the consortium of fund operators and demands that certain documents are handed over. The Norwegian authorities express their strong concern about Hungary’s actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2014</td>
<td>After a high-level state meeting, Norway expresses that halting the GCO’s audit is one of the preconditions for lifting the earlier suspension of the EEA and Norway Grants. (Payments to Hungary under the EEA and Norway Grants scheme were suspended in May 2014 because Hungary has breached the respective agreements.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-27 June 2014</td>
<td>A government-friendly newspaper falsely states that an audit report prepared by Ernst &amp; Young supports the state’s accusations. The government refers for the first time to the possibility that the Ökotárs may have committed a criminal offence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>The GCO requests, with a very short deadline, project documentation and organizational materials from 58 NGOs supported by the NGO Fund. Some of the NGOs question the legal basis of the audit, but comply with the request (taking also into account that the GCO may suspend their tax numbers in case of non-cooperation). Four NGOs decide to make project documentation available on their websites instead of submitting it to the GCO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 2014</td>
<td>The GCO sends another request for documents to Ökotárs, now threatening to impose fines and/or to suspend the organization’s tax number in case of non-cooperation. The new documents concern also the NGOs supported. The Ökotárs questions why these documents are necessary to achieve the stated goal of the investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 2014</td>
<td>In the speech declaring that he and his government build an “illiberal state”, the Prime Minister says that their efforts in that regard are obstructed by civil society organizations, and refers to NGOs as “paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>A criminal procedure is launched against the Ökotárs on the suspicion of fraud by an individual; the underlying criminal offence is altered to fraudulent misuse of funds later on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 2014</td>
<td>It is announced that the GCO initiated a criminal procedure on the suspicion of “unauthorized financial activities”, supposedly against the Ökotárs, which states that it has indeed given loans to NGOs from its own capital to help with the financing of their EU-projects, but did not derive any benefit from it, this activity was included in its public reports, and is not related to the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September 2014</td>
<td>The Hungarian DPA obliges the Ökotárs to disclose the list of non-supported applicants and the justification for not supporting them to a government-friendly television channel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 2014</td>
<td>Offices of fund operators Ökotárs and DemNet are raided by the police, who show up in disproportionately high numbers; homes of certain staff members are searched. The police especially seize documents concerning the 13 “blacklisted” NGOs, giving rise to suspicions that the criminal procedure was used to access documents the GCO could not. The Norwegian Minister of EEA and EU Affairs states that the police raid was “completely unacceptable”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 2014</td>
<td>The scope of the GCO’s audit is extended to funds received by the Ökotárs in the framework of the Swiss-Hungarian Cooperation Programme and from other state budget sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 2014</td>
<td>In his speech delivered at the opening of the autumn session of the Parliament Prime Minister Viktor Orbán suggests that NGOs apply double standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 September 2014</td>
<td>It is announced that the fund operators’ tax numbers will be suspended.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>