

**Chairmanship: Albania**

**1283rd PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL**

1. Date: Thursday, 1 October 2020 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10.10 a.m.  
Suspended: 1.10 p.m.  
Resumed: 3.05 p.m.  
Closed: 5.50 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador I. Hasani

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Permanent Council of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings of the Council during the COVID-19 pandemic.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: DECISION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OSCE ORACLE E-BUSINESS SUITE (EBS) 12.2 UPGRADE PROJECT

Chairperson

**Decision:** The Permanent Council adopted Decision No. 1379 (PC.DEC/1379) on the establishment of the OSCE Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Russian Federation (interpretative statement, see attachment to the decision)

Agenda item 2: PRESENTATION OF THE 2021 UNIFIED BUDGET PROPOSAL

Chairperson, Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General (SEC.GAL/122/20 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 1), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate

country Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Georgia, Moldova and San Marino, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1289/20), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/1229/20 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/1251/20 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/1232/20 OSCE+), Canada (PC.DEL/1247/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1233/20 OSCE+), Norway (PC.DEL/1279/20), Holy See (PC.DEL/1235/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom (Annex 2), Armenia (PC.DEL/1262/20), Sweden (PC.DEL/1234/20 OSCE+)

Agenda item 3: REVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES

Chairperson

- (a) *Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea:* Ukraine (PC.DEL/1237/20), Canada (PC.DEL/1281/20 OSCE+), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1285/20/Rev.1), Turkey, Switzerland (PC.DEL/1236/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1239/20), United Kingdom
- (b) *Situation in Ukraine and the need to implement the Minsk agreements:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1241/20), Ukraine
- (c) *Military aggression of Azerbaijan against Artsakh and Armenia and direct involvement of Turkey:* Armenia (Annex 3)
- (d) *Aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan, and the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan:* Azerbaijan (Annex 4), Turkey (PC.DEL/1268/20 OSCE+)
- (e) *Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group:* Russian Federation (also on behalf of France and the United States of America) (Annex 5), United States of America (PC.DEL/1240/20), Germany-European Union, United Kingdom, Georgia (PC.DEL/1272/20), Switzerland, Canada (PC.DEL/1283/20 OSCE+), Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan (Annex 6), Turkey, Armenia (Annex 7)
- (f) *Violations of the rights of refugees and migrants in the European Union:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1244/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1286/20/Rev.1), Croatia, Italy, Greece, Germany, Malta
- (g) *Recent developments in Belarus:* United States of America (PC.DEL/1249/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; and the European Free Trade Association

country Liechtenstein, member of the European Economic Area, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1287/20), Switzerland (PC.DEL/1246/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom, Canada (PC.DEL/1282/20 OSCE+), Norway (PC.DEL/1280/20), Russian Federation, Belarus (PC.DEL/1253/20 OSCE+)

- (h) *Developments in the human dimension in the OSCE area: United States of America (Annex 8), Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1250/20 OSCE+), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan*

Agenda item 4:           REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
CHAIRMANSHIP-IN-OFFICE

- (a) *Ambassadorial retreat held in, Waidhofen an der Ybbs, Austria, on 28 and 29 September 2020: Chairperson*
- (b) *Launch of an OSCE webinar series organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, held via video teleconference on 28 September 2020: Chairperson*
- (c) *2020 OSCE Annual Police Experts Meeting, held on 28 September 2020: Chairperson*
- (d) *OSCE Chairmanship conference on “Addressing organized crime through strategic partnerships”, to be held on 5 October 2020: Chairperson*
- (e) *2020 OSCE-wide Conference on Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors: “Strengthening Effective Prevention of Drug Use among Youth through Community Policing”, to be held on 6 October 2020: Chairperson*
- (f) *Visit by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus to Georgia, on 14 and 15 September 2020: Chairperson*
- (g) *Meeting of the Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Ms. B. Turković, held on 24 September 2020: Chairperson*

Agenda item 5:           REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECRETARIAT

- (a) *Update on the Secretariat’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Director of the Office of the Secretary General (SEC.GAL/121/20 OSCE+)*
- (b) *2020 OSCE Annual Police Experts Meeting, held on 28 September 2020: Director of the Office of the Secretary General (SEC.GAL/121/20 OSCE+)*
- (c) *Participation of a representative from the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in the Annual Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Landlocked Developing Countries, held on 23 September 2020 on the margins of the 75th session of the United Nations*

*General Assembly*: Director of the Office of the Secretary General  
(SEC.GAL/121/20 OSCE+)

- (d) *Meeting of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings with anti-trafficking focal points, held on 25 September 2020*: Director of the Office of the Secretary General  
(SEC.GAL/121/20 OSCE+)

Agenda item 6: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Outcome of the meeting of the People's Council of Turkmenistan held in Ashgabat on 25 September 2020*: Turkmenistan
- (b) *Outcomes of the high-level online conference organized on the occasion of International Day for Universal Access to Information, held via video teleconference on 28 and 29 September 2020*: Uzbekistan (PC.DEL/1254/20)

4. Next meeting:

Thursday, 8 October 2020, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.JOUR/1283

1 October 2020

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

We listened carefully to the presentation of the OSCE Unified Budget Proposal for next year. We note that, in the absence of a Secretary General, the proposal was exceptionally presented by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, even though that is not in keeping with Financial Regulation 2.05. We would remind you that documents concerning the whole Organization may only be presented by the Secretary General, who should be appointed by a consensus-based decision of the participating States.

We are continuing to study the budget proposal. At this stage we wish merely to make a few preliminary comments on it.

We note the projected real growth in expenditure. The increase in funding that is being requested would seem to be a moderate one, namely an increase of 3.8 million euros, or 2.8 per cent. In any case, it is incomparably lower than, say, the increase in the budget of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which this year came to more than 8 million euros, or 8 per cent. Nevertheless, in the current difficult context, when the participating States are faced with major economic challenges, even such a relatively small increase needs to be justified convincingly.

We understand that in certain cases it is impossible to avoid additional costs. This refers in particular to the increase in Staff Standard Costs, which are predetermined by the fact that the calculation of base salaries at the OSCE is linked to decisions taken under the United Nations common system. Failure to comply with these decisions would lead to the Organization incurring both financial losses and a loss of prestige, since its staff would start suing the management for breach of their contracts of employment. It is essential that the participating States take measures to avert such a negative scenario.

We note that a significant part of the financial implications of updating the Staff Standard Costs at the OSCE can be ascribed to Vienna, where the Secretariat is based. Bearing in mind that increasing the funding to meet these needs is unavoidable, we are willing to consider various options that would make it possible to find the necessary resources without detriment to the Secretariat's capability to fulfil its mandates.

We would remind you that the provision of resources for the various OSCE dimensions continues to be unbalanced: it is skewed towards the human dimension “basket”. Attempts to absorb all additional Staff Standard Costs within the framework of the existing level of funding could lead to an even greater violation of the principle of parity between the OSCE’s main areas of work. In order to prevent that, we are willing to help the OSCE’s human rights institutions to identify cost savings – in particular, by making specific proposals for cutting down on costs that are not financially justified. Removing such outlays from the Unified Budget would make it possible to cover the increase in Staff Standard Costs across all executive structures.

In general, we would be curious to know what measures were taken when preparing the budget proposal for 2021 to redress the imbalance in the funding allocated to the three “baskets”. This is not the first year that we are invoking the need for such measures, yet nothing seems to have come of our earlier exhortations. Why is that?

Now, if one looks at the budgetary request of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), one may see that it once again entails a real growth in expenditure, namely an increase of almost 1 million euros, or 6.1 per cent, over the Office’s estimated level of funding for this year. We consider this request to be unrealistic and poorly justified both from a programmatic point of view and in terms of cost-efficiency. During the discussions on the OSCE Programme Outline for 2021, various participating States expressed grave misgivings about the lack of budgetary discipline in the ODIHR’s work, the critically low intensity of its efforts to identify cost savings, and its flouting of the principles of rational use of the limited resources of the Unified Budget (especially in its election-related work). In the case of the ODIHR one should be talking not about a real growth but about a real reduction in funding. We will present detailed arguments on this matter during the forthcoming discussions.

We have noticed the plans of a number of OSCE field operations – both in the Western Balkans and in Central Asia – to increase their funding. Our understanding is that the problem of growing Staff Standard Costs does not affect them as acutely as it does the Secretariat. It should be perfectly possible to find a solution within the framework of the existing resources. As for the proposals of individual field operations to step up their programmatic activities, we shall make our position on these proposals known in each specific case. In connection with the pandemic and the associated reduction in the rate of project implementation, many field operations this year have found themselves with a significant portion of their appropriations unspent. The reasons for increasing the existing level of funding for these field operations next year have to be examined carefully in order to prevent the current situation from repeating itself.

We regard as unacceptable any attempts to incorporate activities that are funded on a voluntary basis into the Unified Budget. At so challenging a time for the Organization, when it does not have enough money to fulfil its contractual obligations and pay the salaries of its staff, such proposals are inappropriate and untimely. I would remind you that, in accordance with the norms that are in place at the OSCE, programmatic activities funded from the Unified Budget are subject to the agreement of our Organization’s working bodies and to the approval of its decision-making bodies. In contrast, the details of extrabudgetary projects are worked out by the executive structures on the basis of consultations with the recipient country

and the donors concerned, without the need for approval by the Permanent Council. Designating budgetary funds for mandates in the development of which we were not involved is something that we are not prepared to contemplate.

To return to the subject of the growth in Staff Standard Costs in Vienna, we should like to ask Ms. Yrjölä one further question. If the budget proposal for 2021 were to be approved with a significant delay like the last time round, what implications would that have for the Secretariat? How does the Secretariat intend to meet the additional resource needs for paying staff salaries if during several months it will have access to funding only at the previous year's level (that is, effectively within a framework of zero nominal growth)?

We understand that the work lying ahead of us will not be easy. We are counting on constructive and pragmatic co-operation with our colleagues from Sweden, which today assumed the chairmanship of the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance. We wish them success in reaching a timely consensus on all parameters of the OSCE Unified Budget for 2021.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you for your attention.



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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**  
PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 2

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I would first of all like to thank you, Ambassador Tuula Yrjölä, for your presentation of the OSCE's 2021 Unified Budget Proposal this morning. It is right that you are here to present the budget and I concur with Switzerland, the United States of America and Norway's comments on this. I would also like to express our appreciation to the Fund Managers, and all those involved in putting together the Budget Proposal, and for the additional brochure that captures the highlights.

This year has been exceptional, as we have had to adapt to the challenge of operating during a global pandemic. And I would like here to express our appreciation for the efforts of Albania's Chairmanship in rising to this challenge, together with those of the OSCE executive structures. As we know, this challenge will persist into 2021, and it will be important that we continue to draw on the more positive experiences of recent months, including the potential for more inclusive meetings, and for cost savings in travel budgets.

As we consider the 2021 Unified Budget Proposal, it is important we recognize that the budget negotiation does not happen in isolation – it is led by the current OSCE environment, the challenges that the Organization and States face, and by our principles and commitments.

In this context, it is important to recall that the OSCE is built on the foundation of comprehensive security, encompassing a multitude of intersecting factors – including conflict prevention, military transparency, transnational threats, democracy and human rights, anti-corruption, and economic and environmental issues – which together promote the prosperity and security of States and regions. Underpinning all of this are the OSCE's principles and commitments, to which all participating States have freely signed up.

It is therefore deeply concerning to see some extremely worrying developments in the OSCE area. These include the ongoing and escalating conflicts; the challenges to human rights and democracy; and the surge that we have seen in domestic and sexual violence during the COVID-19 pandemic.

On democracy and human rights, I would especially highlight the importance of all three of the OSCE's autonomous institutions, and in particular the essential work of the



OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. In responding to their mandates, which we have given to them, it is paramount they can carry out their activities both effectively and in a timely fashion. It is therefore incumbent on all of us to ensure they are sufficiently supported and funded to carry out their work. Respect for human rights and democracy, and ensuring freedom of the press – these are all key elements of OSCE activities. We need to adapt to the increasing, and changing, demands on OSCE institutions and adopt a budget that reflects the current realities.

The OSCE's network of field operations, with their expertise and added value on the ground, also play a vital role in assisting participating States to implement their OSCE commitments, thereby contributing to comprehensive security and to sustainable peace in the OSCE area – and are another essential area of the Budget Proposal.

Integral to building a comprehensive approach to security and to achieving sustainable peace is gender equality. This is central to all that we do at the OSCE – across all three dimensions. We should continue to build on the momentum achieved in this the 20th anniversary year of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, and to ensure the necessary resources to support this.

Underpinning all that the OSCE does is good governance. It is essential to ensure that we have the right structures and processes in place for the Organization to carry out its work, including duty of care and ensuring a zero tolerance approach to sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment.

Finally, whilst it is incumbent on us all to ensure that the OSCE has the budget resources needed to carry out its work, those resources must be used efficiently and effectively. We expect the OSCE to face increased financial pressure in the year ahead due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting global economic contraction. We therefore urge realistic, result-based budgets to ensure that all activity represents genuine value for money and can be delivered effectively. We also underline the importance of continuing to streamline activities and of finding cost-savings through efficiencies and a careful prioritization of the programme of work.

In concluding, I would like to call on all participating States to ensure there is no politicization of the budget negotiations, and to work towards a timely adoption by 20 December. I would also like to wish the incoming Swedish Chairmanship, and particularly the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance, Ms. Ulrike Gruffman, who assumes her role today, every success in achieving a budget and programme that reflects the priority needs of the OSCE.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(c)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

As of 1 October, Azerbaijan's large-scale aggression against Artsakh is ongoing. Azerbaijani armed forces continue extensive aerial, missile and land attacks along the entire line of contact between Artsakh and Azerbaijan. On the fifth day of aggression the Azerbaijani army continues to use a wide range of heavy weaponry, including large-calibre artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers of various calibres, aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) targeting civilian settlements and infrastructures. In particular the city of Martuni in the eastern part of the Republic of Artsakh was targeted yesterday, which resulted in three more casualties among the civilian population.

Yesterday, on 30 September, F-16 fighter jets of the Turkish air force continued to be used in the north-eastern and southern directions of the line of contact. During the 1282nd [special] meeting of the Permanent Council and 956th meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation, we have already talked about the involvement of Turkish F-16 fighter jets, which were deployed to Azerbaijan during the large-scale Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises held from 29 July to 13 August, and remained stationed there. Since then, the Turkish air force has been carrying out provocative flights along the line of contact between Artsakh and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, after Azerbaijan unleashed its aggression on 27 September, they were providing air support to the attacking combat units of the Azerbaijani army.

The provocative actions of the Turkish armed forces seriously undermines regional security and hinders the efforts of the international community to cease the hostilities.

The international community has persistently called on the external actors to refrain from escalating the conflict, and Turkey should heed these calls.

Mr. Chairperson,

We would like to draw the attention of the Permanent Council to the fact that on 29 September, following the closed discussions on the escalation of tensions in the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict zone, members of the United Nations Security Council strongly condemned the use of force and voiced support for the call by the United Nations Secretary General to immediately stop fighting, de-escalate tensions and return to

constructive negotiations. United Nations Security Council members also expressed their full support for the central role of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

The press elements released following the discussions as well as reports in various media about the positions expressed by members of the United Nations Security Council indeed effectively disclaims, puts an end to the speculations and assertions of the Azerbaijani authorities regarding their alleged right to use military force against the Republic of Artsakh. It is obvious that all attempts by Baku and Ankara to enlist any support from international actors and organizations for their internationally wrongful acts completely failed.

During the last 28 years the actions of Baku were aimed at destabilizing the situation on the line of contact. Unwillingness to implement measures to build confidence and reduce tensions, promotion of xenophobia and hatred against Armenians, rejection of direct talks with the elected representatives of the Republic of Artsakh, attempts to isolate Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh by all means – these are but few elements of Azerbaijani policy.

Mr. Chairperson,

We are now into the fifth day of hostilities, and I do not have to even make an effort to prove the premeditated and pre-planned nature of this offensive, which the representatives of Azerbaijan and Turkey tirelessly deny. I would just refer to numerous statements made by Azerbaijani representatives at all levels, starting from the President to ambassadors to members of parliament, etc., prior to the aggression. I should simply recall the assessments that they have been giving with regards to the peace process and the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. The main message was the following: it is already a concession on Azerbaijan's part that it agrees to a peace process, if Armenia and Artsakh would not immediately concede to all the demands of Azerbaijan, it has the means and capacity, and most importantly the legitimate right to "restore the Azerbaijan's infringed territorial integrity by force". In fact, the last statement of the Ambassador of Azerbaijan contained the same message. We also firmly believe that already during the July offensive and in its aftermath the Azerbaijani leadership in its political-military calculus has already switched towards military use of force. We all remember that following the offensive the Azerbaijani leader changed its Foreign Minister thus signalling that he is not interested anymore in the negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Moreover, yesterday the President of Azerbaijan made a statement to the effect that they are not going to stop the military actions until they achieve their goal, which is to force the Armenians out from Nagorno-Karabakh. This would be the continuation of the policy of ethnic cleansing that Azerbaijan has carried out starting from 1988. The Republic of Armenia has always maintained that it will support the people of Artsakh in their aspiration to live in their homeland and will take all necessary measures, including political, to ensure the status and safety of Artsakh.

Mr. Chairperson,

During the [special] Permanent Council meeting we have already elaborated on the issue of direct engagement of Turkey in assisting the Azerbaijani aggression against Artsakh and Armenia. In the following days that engagement, involvement became even more obvious.

There also have been reports from reliable open sources testifying that Turkey prepares to transfer its elite Turkish Special Forces Command “Brigade Commandos” from Istanbul to Azerbaijan to fight against the Armenian troops in Artsakh or/and Armenia.

Moreover, the command and control of the military operations are conducted by the Turkish officers and experts, including high-ranking servicemen of the Turkish Ministry of Defence. Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, currently used during the battles, are operated by the Turkish specialists. By the way, this is not something new. During the April war of 2016 the UAVs used by Azerbaijan were also operated by foreign specialists. Furthermore, the overall air force operates under the command of Turkey, apparently from a remote air command post located at Erzurum-Kars.

Mr. Chairperson,

We have already spoken about the Syrian mercenaries in the conflict zone. Against the backdrop of tireless denials from Turkey and Baku, numerous Syrian mercenaries spoke to Reuters, The Guardian, the BBC and many other mainstream media and reputable journalists. There are credible reports that recruitment points were organized in the schools of Amir Gobari and Ajar Afrin in the Syrian Afrin. In his interview to Rudaw TV channel, Ziad Hajj Obeid, a commander of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, spoke about the reasons driving Syrian rebels to join the fight in Azerbaijan. He says: “Obviously some went to Azerbaijan for financial incentives, but others made the decision out of a sense of duty towards our Turkish allies. Turkey has been our main supporter in Syria, and we are simply returning the favour.” Therefore, there is ample evidence about the transfer of thousands of foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and Libya to Azerbaijan, including Nakhijevan, to fight against Artsakh and prospectively against Armenia, and the body of evidence is growing by the day.

We regret that Azerbaijan turned itself into a proxy of Turkey and along with other proxies of Turkey is destabilizing the entire region.

Turkey’s relocating of foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and Libya to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone has a far-reaching goal and is going to have destructive consequences in terms of the security and stability of the South Caucasus region and beyond. This policy fits the logic of foreign policy pursued by Turkey in recent years.

Terrorist fighters, Islamic fundamentalists, jihadist movements – they became mercenaries of Turkey, have been extensively used by the current leadership of Turkey for projecting their interests and influence over the neighbouring regions. In this case Azerbaijan is just a means to serve the purpose of that policy, and we have no doubts whatsoever that with time the territory of Azerbaijan will be used as a hub for such groups, even more, the presence of those terrorists will turn Azerbaijan and the region into another bloodbath.

The prospect of such a future is worrisome not only for Armenia and Artsakh, it is a direct threat to the security and stability of all the countries of the region and those neighbouring it. We have already seen the commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, strong messages of others. I hope that other countries of the region will realize sooner rather than later that relocation of foreign terrorist groups from the Middle East and

elsewhere to the South Caucasus, the area of responsibility of the OSCE, poses a direct threat to all, and I repeat again, to all countries of South Caucasus and beyond.

Mr. Chairperson,

We do believe that there are decades long realities on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh, including hundreds of thousands of people living in their homeland. Through tireless efforts the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have been building their statehood despite all the odds. The Republic of Artsakh, with its already well-established state structures and bodies is the embodiment of aspirations of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and the protector of their rights. This is the reality that can be neither denied nor ignored.

Azerbaijan considered that it had the legitimate right to use force against the demands of self-determination of the Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabakh back in 1988 and as we see that this policy has not changed. Unfortunately, civilian populations pay a heavy price for miscalculations of military might or misinterpretation of international law by Azerbaijan.

The Turkish-Azerbaijani joint aggression with the involvement of mercenaries is a clear violation of international law, including the humanitarian law. In this context we would like to recall the United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/47/84 from 16 December 1992 on the use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.

The importance of self-determination lies in the right of choice and the right of people to determine its own destiny. This right is prominently embodied in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. Among others, it is also recognized as an inherent right of all peoples in the first articles of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the International Covenants on Human Rights emphasizes that self-determination is an integral part of human rights law which has a universal application. At the same time, it is recognized that compliance with the right of self-determination is a fundamental condition for the enjoyment of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, be they civil, political, economic, social, or cultural.

We believe that the participating States should recommit themselves to the purposes and principles, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, United Nations Human Rights Covenants, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and the Helsinki Final Act. There should not be a selective approach to these principles. The attempts to introduce artificial hierarchy to the OSCE fundamental principles are not conducive for a dialogue, and for a co-operative and constructive environment needed for restoring the trust.

I thank you.



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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(d)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF AZERBAIJAN**

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Azerbaijan would like to update the Permanent Council on the ongoing aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan and the current situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

As we informed the Permanent Council yesterday, following large-scale military provocation by Armenia against Azerbaijan along the front line, which resulted in numerous casualties among Azerbaijani civilians and military personnel and also in substantial damage to civilian infrastructure, the armed forces of Azerbaijan launched a counteroffensive on 27 September 2020 to repel this act of aggression.

By subjecting civilians and civilian infrastructure in densely populated areas of Azerbaijan to intensive artillery bombardment, the politico-military leadership of Armenia continues to commit war crimes and acts of terrorism against our country. The delegation of Azerbaijan hereby informs the Permanent Council that, as of 1 October, 16 Azerbaijani civilians have been killed, 55 civilians wounded, and 36 residential buildings and 163 civilian facilities destroyed. Other social infrastructure, including medical facilities, has also been damaged. This very morning, the Armenian armed forces subjected the city of Tartar in Azerbaijan to heavy artillery fire. As a result, one civilian was killed by shrapnel from a shell that hit a bus station in Tartar. The bus station itself was severely damaged. Moreover, earlier this morning, too, the territory of Azerbaijan came under rocket fire from the region of Goris in Armenia. The rockets hit the front line in the districts of Jabrayil and Füzuli. As a result of further rocket fire, nearly 20 residential buildings have been damaged in the village of Jojug Marjanli, which was liberated in 2016 and subsequently rebuilt for the return of internally displaced persons. The Prosecutor-General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan has launched a number of criminal cases on these facts in accordance with the relevant articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

We are currently witnessing an increase in the indiscriminate shelling of densely populated civilian areas and infrastructure in Azerbaijan by the Armenian armed forces from both south-eastern and north-western border regions of Armenia. The Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan has issued a final warning to Armenia, indicating that if such shelling continues the Azerbaijani armed forces will take adequate countermeasures. Photographs showing the damage to civilian infrastructure in Azerbaijan are now being displayed on the screen.

As of 30 September, as a result of the counteroffensive conducted by Azerbaijan, around 2,300 military personnel of the Armenian armed forces have been killed or wounded. Moreover, the Azerbaijani armed forces have destroyed or disabled about 146 tanks and other armoured vehicles; more than 200 artillery pieces, multiple rocket launcher systems and grenade launchers; about 25 air defence systems; 6 command and observation posts; 5 ammunition depots; about 50 anti-tank weapons; and 55 vehicles. Two Armenian Su-25 “Frogfoot” ground-attack aircraft crashed into a mountain and exploded. During the heavy fighting on 29 September near the village of Shushakend in the occupied Khojaly district of Azerbaijan, one S-300 anti-aircraft missile system was destroyed.

As part of the counteroffensive, the Azerbaijani armed forces had by 27 September succeeded in liberating seven villages, specifically five in the occupied Füzuli district (Garakhanbayli, Garvand, Horadiz, Ashagi Abdurakhmanli and Yukhari Abdurakhmanli) and two in the occupied Jabrayil district (Nuzgar and Jojug Marjanli). Several advantageous points on the high ground around the village of Talysh, in the occupied part of the district of Tartar, were cleared of the occupying forces. Furthermore – in order to cut off the supply of weapons and ammunition aimed at sustaining the occupation and to prevent Armenia from transferring reinforcements, including mercenaries, into the occupied territories to engage in combat operations – the Azerbaijani armed forces gained control of the occupying forces’ military positions in the Lesser Caucasus mountain range. As a result, Azerbaijan now controls the Vardenis (Armenia)-Aghdara road passing through the occupied district of Kalbajar.

We wish to reiterate that Azerbaijan is acting within its sovereign territory, and that it is taking adequate and proportionate measures necessary to repulse the imminent threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to the security of its population. Azerbaijan is exercising its inherent right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law, which solidified once and for all.

For 28 years the Republic of Azerbaijan undertook efforts in good faith to resolve the conflict peacefully with mediation under the aegis of the OSCE. Regrettably, all these years of efforts have not produced any tangible results. After more than two decades of fruitless negotiations and mediation, the Republic of Azerbaijan is now entitled to draw a line in the sand: the status quo of occupation, which is utterly unsustainable, must be altered. Military occupation of the territory of Azerbaijan does not represent a solution and will never produce a political outcome desired by Armenia. At the same time, I would like to draw the Permanent Council’s attention to a statement made by the President of Azerbaijan on 30 September during a meeting with wounded soldiers at the Central Military Clinical Hospital of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan. President Aliyev said that “I am sure that the Armenian people will understand my words correctly. We have nothing against the Armenian people. [...] Azerbaijan is a multinational State and many people live here in peace and tranquillity, including the Armenian people. Thousands of Armenians live in Azerbaijan. No one disturbs them; they are our citizens.”

The continuous misinterpretation by Armenia of the principle of self-determination so as to try to impose the view that this principle may be applied in the form of unilateral secession must be resolutely rejected. In reality, such a view has nothing in common with the principle of self-determination as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki

Final Act and other international documents. International law is unambiguous in not providing for a right to unilateral secession from independent States and in not creating grounds and conditions for legitimizing attempts at secession in any sense, including within the meaning of the right to self-determination. There is nothing in the relevant international legal instruments that can be construed as authorizing or encouraging in any way the partial or total disruption of the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent States. Moreover, claims for self-determination are untenable when they are accompanied by violations of international law, in particular its peremptory norms (*jus cogens*), such as those prohibiting the threat or use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This is the main thrust of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other international instruments.

Armenia still has the opportunity to forestall further senseless casualties among its armed forces and to become a “partner in peace” by putting a prompt end to the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding districts, as demanded by the United Nations Security Council in its resolutions.

Finally, we wish to refute the baseless allegations levelled against Turkey by the delegation of Armenia. These are merely a further futile ploy, on the one hand to deflect the attention of the Armenian public from the devastating losses suffered by the Armenian armed forces illegally deployed in the territories of Azerbaijan, and on the other hand, to draw third parties, including mercenaries and terrorist groups to the conflict on its side in desperate attempt to reverse the situation on the ground. I shall now show you some official film footage of the neutralization of Armenian military installations and vehicles by the armed forces of Azerbaijan. These video clips clearly demonstrate the capacities of our armed forces and at the same time serve to dispel any allegations regarding the involvement of mercenaries and terrorists, as the Armenian delegation and other actors have claimed. Armenia’s attempts to bring up Syrian context is a sign of its lack of responsibility and of its obvious failure to involve other countries into the conflict. There is no need for Turkey to intervene in the conflict in any way. Being a responsible State and a trusted member of the OSCE Minsk Group, Turkey seeks to defend the principles that our Organization stands for. As our country’s President said yesterday, Turkey provides moral support to Azerbaijan and plays a critical balancing and stabilizing role in the region.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.





**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.JOUR/1283

1 October 2020

Annex 5

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(e)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (ALSO ON  
BEHALF OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)**

Mr. Chairperson,

I have the honour to read out the statement of the Presidents of Russia, the United States of America and France of 1 October 2020 on Nagorno-Karabakh.

“The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, the President of the United States of America Donald Trump and the President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron, representing the Co-Chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group, condemn in the strongest terms the recent escalation of violence along the Line of Contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.

“We deplore the loss of human lives and extend our condolences to the families of those killed and injured.

“We call for an immediate cessation of hostilities between the relevant military forces.

“We also call on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to commit without delay to resuming substantive negotiations, in good faith and without preconditions, under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.”

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you for your attention.



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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(e)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF AZERBAIJAN**

We take note of the statement issued today by the Presidents of Russia, the United States of America and France, and also of the statements made by the delegations of Russia, the United States, Germany (on behalf of the European Union), the United Kingdom, Georgia, Switzerland, Canada and Kyrgyzstan, and would like to offer our comments on this matter.

In 1993, in response to the occupation of a significant part of our country's territory, the United Nations Security Council adopted four resolutions, condemning the use of force against Azerbaijan and the occupation of its territories; reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the inviolability of its international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory; confirming that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is part of Azerbaijan; and demanding the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories.

These resolutions are clearly the most authoritative and binding rulings on the matter with no date of expiry. On the basis of these resolutions, the Budapest Summit of the CSCE in 1994 had entrusted the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group "to conduct speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the implementation of which will eliminate major consequences of the conflict for parties and permit the convening of the Minsk Conference". Thus, according to the step-by-step approach outlined in the Budapest Summit Declaration, the primary objective of the peace process is to ensure the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, as demanded by the aforementioned Security Council resolutions. These tasks of the peace process remain unfulfilled and valid until the conflict is resolved. The tasks in question were established in accordance with consensus-based decisions of a CSCE/OSCE summit and are not subject to renegotiation.

In the years since the adoption of the Security Council resolutions, attempts to depart from key commitments and obligations contained therein have only served to deepen mistrust, thereby making the prospect of a swift resolution of the conflict elusive. Peace, security and stability can be achieved only if the consequences of Armenia's unlawful use of force are removed. This means ensuring that the occupation of Azerbaijan's territories is ended, and that the right of internally displaced Azerbaijanis to return to their homes, property and possessions is guaranteed and implemented. That is what international law and the aforementioned Security Council resolutions require, and that is what can in no way be

introduced as a bargaining chip in the conflict-settlement process. Thus, as far back as 1994, the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized:

“The position of the United Nations is based on four principles which have been mentioned in the different resolutions of the Security Council. The first principle is the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The second principle is the inviolability of the international boundaries; the third principle is the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory; and the fourth principle is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied territories of Azerbaijan.”

This constitutes the basis for the conflict resolution.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.JOUR/1283

1 October 2020

Annex 7

Original: ENGLISH

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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(e)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to thank the Ambassador of the Russian Federation for delivering a statement on behalf of three Co-Chair countries.

Armenia welcomes the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs reacted, at the highest political level, to the use of force by way of strong condemnation. The official reaction of my Government to this statement will come out shortly. Therefore, I will refrain, at this stage, from making any further comment.

Thank you.



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**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 3(h)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Mr. Chairperson,

The United States deeply regrets that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic prevented us from convening in Warsaw for the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM). We look forward to doing so next year. Human dimension issues remain central to the work of this Organization and to the security of this region.

I wish to begin this statement by honouring the man who put a face on the human dimension of the OSCE: physicist and human rights activist Yuri Orlov, the founder of the first citizens' Helsinki monitoring group, who died at the age of 96 on 27 September. Mr. Orlov conceived the idea that citizens could and should hold governments accountable for the promises they made in Helsinki. He and a small, brave band of human rights defenders announced the formation of their group at a press conference in the Moscow apartment of Nobel Laureate Andrei Sakharov in May 1976. That first Moscow Helsinki Group inspired other such citizens' groups in the Soviet Union, as well as KOR in Poland, Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia and civil society monitoring organizations now operating in the OSCE area and around the globe. By defending the role of civil society in the OSCE process, and recognizing that the HDIM derives its unique value from the vibrant participation of civil society, we are honouring Mr. Orlov's legacy.

Like many of today's frontline civil society activists, Mr. Orlov paid dearly for his selfless defence of human rights. Soviet authorities arrested him in 1977 and sent him to the Gulag. In 1986, he was deprived of his citizenship and expelled from the USSR. He became a US citizen in 1993 and, in 2005, was the first recipient of the American Physical Society's Sakharov Prize awarded to scientists for exceptional work in promoting human rights.

The most fitting way to honour Mr. Orlov's memory is never to lose sight of the human face of the human dimension.

In that spirit, I wish to bring the following concerns and issues to the attention of this body.

Long before the high-profile poisoning of Aleksey Navalny, the United States and many others in this Council repeatedly called on Russia to end impunity for the violent –

often deadly – crimes against civil society advocates, members of the opposition and independent journalists. During the September elections in Russia, observers reported thousands of electoral violations, including physical attacks against opposition candidates and their representatives.

Journalists were detained on spurious traffic violations, and independent observers and candidates' representatives were denied access to polling stations across the country. There were also many reports of intimidation against electoral commission members. The murders, poisonings, and beatings keep mounting in Russia.

The Karelia Supreme Court decided on 29 September to increase the sentence of Yuri Dmitriev, historian, and Karelia regional leader of the NGO "Memorial", to 13 years in a high-security prison. His case is widely seen as politically motivated. I reiterate my call for his immediate release.

We are deeply troubled by arrests in Azerbaijan of political opposition members and reports of torture and denial of legal representation. We urge the government to release all those incarcerated for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms – including Fuad Gakhramanli and Polad Aslanov. We further call upon the authorities to immediately drop the charges against and release from house arrest those who are no longer in detention, such as Tofiq Yagublu.

The United States remains deeply disturbed by the arrest, poor treatment while in custody, and extradition of Bobomurod Abdullaev to Uzbekistan. Although Mr. Abdullaev was provisionally released after he arrived in Uzbekistan, his status is unclear.

We call on Uzbekistan to clarify the allegations against him and allow him to travel to any location of his choosing. We are concerned by allegations that the Kyrgyz intelligence service tortured Mr. Abdullaev during his detention, as well as by the Kyrgyz Republic's decision to extradite him to Uzbekistan despite its non-refoulement obligations. The United States will continue to raise our concerns with both the Uzbekistani and Kyrgyz Governments.

Separatist "authorities" in Moldova's Transnistria region are deploying a new so-called "anti-extremism" strategy to prosecute peaceful opposition members and dissidents. At least eight individuals face criminal charges. We are concerned by these recent developments and call on the "authorities" in Tiraspol to respect human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of movement.

We welcome Kyrgyz President Jeenbekov's decision to return proposed legislation to Parliament that would have allowed blocking websites containing "false" or "inaccurate" information. We are glad to see that the President does not plan to sign the bill and hope the Government will not pursue adoption of legislation along these lines.

Under a new law in Tajikistan, individuals and mass media can be fined for spreading "false information" about the pandemic. Similar rules in Uzbekistan deter independent journalists from providing the public access to accurate, up-to-date information to help fight COVID-19. We urge both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to refrain from applying these laws and to repeal them.

We call on the President of Uzbekistan to reject the proposed law on rallies, meetings, and demonstrations as it is broadly restrictive of the right of peaceful assembly. We commend the Government for requesting the Council of Europe and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights complete a legislative review of its revised draft law on freedom of conscience and religious organization.

The United States welcomes Kazakhstani President Tokayev's intention to pursue political reforms to ensure full participation of Kazakhstan's citizens in the country's future. Amendments to the Public Assemblies Law President Tokayev signed on 25 May were a positive step. However, the law retains concerning restrictions on the ability to conduct peaceful demonstrations. We urge Kazakhstan to revise this law to remove restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly, and to implement President Tokayev's reform agenda in actions and words.

We are concerned by the appearance of a selective investigation by the Serbian Finance Ministry against 37 NGOs and media organizations, and 20 individuals, for alleged money laundering and terrorist financing. The list from the Finance Ministry's Anti-Money Laundering Unit targets many organizations and individuals with a history of criticizing the authorities.

Serbian law requires that the government has "reason to suspect" an individual or group before requesting such financial information. We are concerned this standard may not have been met. Under the Copenhagen Document, participating States committed to allow NGOs to solicit, receive and utilize – for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms – financial contributions from national and international sources.

The United States wishes to congratulate the government and people of Moldova on their new law on non-commercial organizations. After years of public discussion, this new law is a major win for civil society and democracy. We encourage Moldova to continue making progress on reforms.

Although the HDIM will not occur this year, we must not lose focus on human rights and democratic governance in the OSCE area. We support the Chairperson's initiative to organize human dimension-related webinars and encourage governments and representatives of civil society to join. By partnering with civil society to insist governments meet their human rights obligations, we build upon Mr. Orlov's legacy and strengthen security in this region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

**1283rd Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 1283, Agenda item 1

**DECISION No. 1379  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OSCE ORACLE E-BUSINESS SUITE  
(EBS) 12.2 UPGRADE PROJECT**

The Permanent Council,

Taking note of the document “Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project Funding Request” (PC.ACMF/42/20 of 23 July 2020),

Taking note of the overall Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project requirement of 950,000 euros, of which 779,000 euros would be funded from within the 2020 OSCE Unified Budget,

Recalling the presentations “Oracle 12.2 Funding” delivered by the Department of Management and Finance to the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance on 8 July 2020 and 14 July 2020,

Decides to:

1. Approve an amount of up to 950,000 euros as the total cost of the Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project;
2. Request the OSCE Unified Budget Fund Managers to, on an exceptional non-precedent-setting basis, reprioritize from the identified 2020 underspending, an amount of 779,000 euros for the purpose of contributing to the financing of the Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project;
3. Request the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine to, through reallocating savings resulted from exceptional vacancy savings due to COVID-19 related delays in recruitments, and on an exceptional non-precedent-setting basis, reallocate an amount of 171,000 euros from the authorized assessment of the SMM 2020–2021 budget for the purpose of contributing to the financing of the Oracle EBS 12.2 Upgrade Project;
4. Authorize the use of funds in support of the total Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project through March 2022, in accordance with Financial Regulation 3.03; and



Requests:

5. The Secretary General to provide reports on the implementation of the Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project quarterly or more frequently if required;
6. The Secretary General to ensure that the activities foreseen under this Project are completed in the most cost-effective and timely manner.

PC.DEC/1379  
1 October 2020  
Attachment

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the Russian Federation:

“Having joined the consensus regarding the Permanent Council decision on the establishment of the OSCE Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) 12.2 Upgrade Project, the Russian Federation notes the following.

We regret that the decision has been adopted with noticeable delay owing to the unconstructive position of one participating State. We take note that the need to launch the project as soon as possible is dictated both by the considerations involved in ensuring the smooth functioning of the OSCE’s resource planning system after 2021 and by possible additional financial costs for the Organization due to the delayed start of work on the Oracle E-Business Suite upgrade

We emphasize the importance of the principle reflected in the decision of the fair distribution of the project’s costs among all the executive structures that will benefit from its implementation. We believe it is essential to adhere strictly to this principle in the future when considering any proposals regarding capital investments in the development of the OSCE’s information technology potential.

We request that this statement be attached to the adopted decision and included in the journal of the day.”