

Report by the Chairman of the Forum for Security Cooperation
To the Second Annual Security Review Conference

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Good morning and welcome to all our colleagues whether from here or from their capitals who have come to engage in this annual exercise. This is only the second one but we can already notice that there is a certain amount of institutionalization in the proceedings of this meeting, and that is a welcome sign.

I was encouraged by the interpretive tone and by the analytic approach of our distinguished Chairman-in-Office. Therefore while our distributed text may be a little bit more pedestrian allow me to maintain the same tone of an overview and an interpretation of the work of the FSC.

The best thing to say about our work this last year is that it is the continuation of a tendency that has actually begun right after 9/11. For the first ten years, the FSC tried to effectively respond to a situation where the primary purpose was the reduction of tension, the reduction of threats and the increase of confidence between states. The implication was that after the Cold War, we had to learn to live with each other, and learn to trust each other, and that one way to do so was as much as possible to encourage transparency, to be reciprocal and to be in many ways symmetrical. And in doing so, the idea was that as you get to know what your neighbor is probably likely to do, or wants to do, or is trying to do, you might relax a little bit, and you similarly respond to his desire to know what you are up to. Therefore, it was basically an attempt to lay the foundations of the Forum so as to make possible the building of trust. Our instruments were the Vienna Document 1999, the Code of Conduct, series of Confidence and Security Building Measures, and so on.

The terrorist phenomenon – which is old – but the terrorist threat of the last three-four years after 9/11, suddenly made it apparent that the real task of the Forum as well as of the other institutions of the OSCE is to deal now with a threat that is external. And while nobody completely assumes that peace among us is forever, we suddenly realize that war between us and some external force is just now showing its full threatening reality.

So we have to make a switch, and the switch at the Forum is to adapt without abandoning the old, may we tell you why not. Without abandoning the old we must redirect its attention to create common security towards this new outside threat, only relatively new. We can't abandon the old, simply because facing the new threat requires a very high degree of cooperation. Cooperation not with each other in order to reduce threat from each other but cooperation with each other in order to face the external threat. If we do not continue to maintain and expand our very high degree of confidence and trust in each other we will not be able to cooperate to the necessary extent, in order to create, practice, implement, but also adopt new tools which can only work if they are cooperatively designed.

The concept is this. Let's take any instrument that we have recently been working on. The denial of access to terrorists – or you may even call them more generically as the 'bad guys' – of the means by which they commit some of their crimes. However, if the glass is leaky they will of course go there, where they can get those weapons, those arms and those means. Cooperation is absolutely essential to make sure that the chain is tight and the boat does not leak.

Our Chairmanship accepted this work fully aware that we must now concentrate on bringing forward as much as possible the instruments, the tools with which we can face this common threat, and to do so with very practical and practicable means.

We noticed how difficult it would be to go into certain areas of this cooperative behavior, because sometimes, tightening that chain is either not in our traditions, not in our practices or maybe even not in certain countries' legislative-constitutional framework; as you tighten some things in one place you must also tighten them elsewhere. You cannot loosen one thing and tighten another because you then discover how the bad guys find their way around it. Actually people know very well where the loopholes are.

This has been the priority of our Chairmanship. We have used the image of a pipeline. And as the Chairman referred to the use of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), and the first decision on MANPADs – OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man Portable Air Defense Systems – is out the pipeline already. We have a few others in that pipeline: Standard Elements of End User Certificates and Verification Procedures, Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons etc. Some others are in line to get into the pipeline: for instance, questions of civil-military emergency preparedness. We are still – and you can see why, because they are of a more complex nature – we are still grappling with what kind of FSC/OSCE instruments would be best suited to deal with questions of non-proliferation. That one is not as easy as doing what it takes to deny revolvers and light weapons on the borders or registering their origins. We use the word 'registering their origins' because it shows you, while the first phase of our existence was based on transparency, reciprocity and symmetry, the new enemy we face is exactly not only motivated but operates, operates fully by taking advantage of a lack of transparency, of darkness, of secrecy. They are hidden, anonymous or hard to detect; they definitely have no interest in reciprocating our gestures; in every sense of the word the relationship is asymmetrical.

The FSC does not do all its work in a vacuum of institutional relations. From now on, I assume for the last year, the various Chairmanships – the German, the United States, and the Andorran – since the last ASRC, we are really driven by three sources of either guidance, task, or mandate. One is, from now on, the ASRC, second is the Ministerial that comes in between, and of course our own Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting which is a little bit more of an internal affair. But within the framework of these three events the Chairmanships state their program and create priorities and somehow read the wind to know in which direction it blows and then, move fast and move effectively.

Our work is driven by these constraints, by these impulses and by these motivations. Yet we must continue to take care of the FSC's existing portfolio. This old portfolio does not disappear simply because we are dealing with the immediate, very concrete recent challenges to create new instruments and to test them. The old portfolios are still there and we must refer to a potential debate on whether the old portfolios – such as the Vienna document 1999 – need to be revisited, whether they have to be simply updated, whether they have to be reassessed, whether they have to be modified, or whether they have to be amended. This will be – we anticipate, hopefully not during our Chairmanship – but during the Chairmanships that will follow ours, a subject of debate; a debate about the necessity, usefulness and advisability of revisiting some of these existing documents, some more fully than others. The challenge is to be as flexible as we can. We will of course get our political signals not necessarily from the delegations limited to the Forum, but also from the overall OSCE political corpus.

The relationship between the FSC and the OSCE at large or with its various components, particularly the Permanent Council, is and needs to remain cooperative. The lines separating our tasks sometimes are blurred, they are fluid, and they are complementary, sometimes even overlapping. And when there is an overlap there is also usually cracks through which fall certain items, because everybody believes that somebody else is doing that. The institutional dimension of this cooperation is formally taken care by joint meetings of two Troikas, by our participation in each others events. I am discovering that the amount of time I spend reporting on the FSC to others, is as much time as I spend generating things to report about.

That may not be all bad; maybe it makes our life easy. Let me however mention just a couple of additional items on our agenda in the near future. Coming during our or the next Chairmanships, the Austrian and after, such matters as the OSCE Questionnaire on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War, and others I mentioned, Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness.

Unrelated to these, we have been given the very interesting political challenge for the FSC and its Chairs: how to make co-operation with our Partners for Cooperation more real, more tangible, more interesting, and more productive. Maastricht gave us both the task to contribute to the effort to generate some guiding principles about our relations with the Partner States, as well as actually to put in practice that co-operation, the increased interaction. Our Chairmanship takes the challenge of 'outreach' seriously; we have already made some progress. Our Chairmanship believes that co-operation to be essential. However, our Chairmanship also believes that, as we used previously a rather mundane image, it takes two to tango; our Partners must demonstrate that they are ready to proceed beyond spectatorship and become active participants in that process.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, let me mention a few necessary immediate tasks, because before I get into them let me say that we are basically in a three-phase activity in all areas. We generate, initiate and pass decisions; we find within those decisions practicable practices. For instance, the broad decision was on SALW, the broad decision was on Excess of Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition and their destruction or control. The practical aspects that came out of these decisions were such things as OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) and so on. We have initiation, decision, building in

those decisions possible ways of practical application and finally in some instances implementation. One of the most positive things not only for our Chairmanship, but the previous year, has been to report that already some States have volunteered and requested FSC, OSCE and CPC to jointly help them destroy excesses in small arms and light weapons. I am referring to Belarus and their very forthcoming initiative in this matter, as well as, by the way, making more secure the non-destroyed excesses, which are as much a cause for worry as those which have been destroyed; if they are not fully secure they can again fall into the wrong hands. The Belarus request was followed by a similar request from the Ukraine and the Russian Federation, this time not about SALW but about the destruction of excess of stockpiles of conventional ammunition and their control. This activity, this phase of implementation is a welcome development; it poses new challenges. We have to learn new techniques because we have previously not been in the implementation business, except what we used to mean by implementation, that is, remaining faithful to norms and commitments. This puts us in a slightly different frame and we have discovered from the very first assessment mission to Belarus, what a professional job was done by all involved; by experts sent by certain States as well as by the CPC.

We at the OSCE and we at the FSC may well be up to the job. And in that sense, we would like to encourage others to follow suit. We are sure some are waiting to see if the first attempts will be successful and consequential. The first steps are very important, because we seriously believe that in this case success will build on success and people who are observing may well think of those first ones as rather encouraging prototypes.

Last, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the three-four particular things we must continue to do are: to deepen our co-operation in the creation and application of instruments; we must also widen the scope of our instruments. Then we must remain adaptive, flexible and willing to update and quick to respond and not remain in long debates, because in some instances the biggest slowing factor is lingering national interest interpretations which, by the time they have been ironed out, the events have already occurred. Quite important to our delegation, as chair in the FSC, which deals with the pol-mil dimension, within the realm and the expertise of most people in this room, we must not forget the cross-dimensionality of our activities. In that sense, a small modest gesture on our Chairman's agenda has been to make sure that we know what our other dimensions and institutions are doing and to let them know what we are doing in case we are able to help each other and complement each others' work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.