



**84th (SPECIAL) JOINT MEETING  
OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL AND  
THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

1. Date: Wednesday, 16 February 2022 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)  
  
Opened: 3.05 p.m.  
Closed: 4.35 p.m.
  
2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Hałaciński (PC) (Poland)  
Mr. F. Osmanov (FSC) (Azerbaijan)
  
3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:  
  
Agenda item 1: OPENING REMARKS OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION  
  
Chairperson (PC), Chairperson (FSC)  
  
Agenda item 2: ACTIVATION OF PARAGRAPH 16.3 OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 2011 ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, CHAPTER III “MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION AS REGARDS UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES”, PARAGRAPH 16.3 “MEETING OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES REGARDING UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES”  
  
Chairperson (FSC), Lithuania (Annex 1), Latvia (Annex 2) (Annex 3), Estonia (Annex 4), France-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia;; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (Annex 5), United States of America (Annex 6), Canada (Annex 7), Switzerland (FSC-PC.DEL/8/22 OSCE+), Ukraine (Annex 8), Germany

(Annex 9), Norway (FSC-PC.DEL/2/22), Turkey, United Kingdom  
(Annex 10), Belarus (FSC-PC.DEL/3/22 OSCE+), Chairperson (PC)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

None

4. Next meeting:

To be announced



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC-PC.JOUR/71  
16 February 2022  
Annex 1

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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
FSC-PC Journal No. 71, Agenda item 2

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LITHUANIA**

Ambassadors,  
Dear colleagues,

Let me start by thanking the Polish OSCE Chairmanship and the Azerbaijani Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) for convening this special joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the FSC at the request of Latvia, Estonia and my own country, Lithuania.

The mechanism provided for in Chapter III of the Vienna Document is an important transparency and confidence-building measure. However, this process can be effective only when a responding State engages with it properly and provides answers in a fully transparent manner on the unusual military activity by its armed forces that has raised concerns for other participating States.

Lithuania, together with Latvia and Estonia, invoked the mechanism because of the lack of transparency regarding the unusual and unscheduled joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise “Union Resolve 2022” that is currently taking place in Belarus. We value the willingness of Belarus to engage in dialogue. As we can see from the parallel process invoked by Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia, such engagement cannot be taken for granted. However, we consider the answers received so far from Belarus to be unsatisfactory. That is the main reason why the procedure under this risk reduction mechanism is being continued today.

We ask Belarus once again to take an active part in decreasing tensions by providing the information requested on the exercise “Union Resolve 2022”, specifically information on:

1. The strength and composition of the military forces taking part in the exercise;
2. The major weapon and equipment systems deployed;
3. The date on which the Russian units and formations will return to their normal peacetime locations;
4. Which transparency measures under the Vienna Document Belarus is ready to undertake; and

5. Whether Belarus is prepared to organize a visit by other participating States to the exercise area in accordance with paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document.

All participating States pledged voluntarily to respect OSCE principles and to implement all OSCE commitments. It is, therefore, absolutely unacceptable that Belarus and Russia should now be going back on these commitments and undertaking actions that run completely counter to them.

One of the key OSCE principles is to refrain from the threat or use of force against other States. With that in mind, we noted with great concern Alexander Lukashenko's statement on 7 February that the Russian-Belarusian military exercise could, if necessary, be directed against Ukraine and NATO.

When agreeing – again, of their own free accord – on the Vienna Document, the OSCE participating States undertook a set of very concrete commitments. Chapter V of the Vienna Document requires that notification be given of any military activity that involves at least 9,000 troops, including support troops. Now, as was stated on 21 January by the Head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Armed Forces of Belarus, Major General Andrei Nekrashevich, almost all the Belarusian armed forces, together with military units from the Eastern Military District and the Airborne Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, would be involved in the “Union Resolve 2022” exercise. This, along with other publicly available information about the troops involved in the exercise, makes it clear that the threshold for notification under the Vienna Document has been exceeded.

In addition, Belarus indicated in its reply that some military units from the Eastern Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were performing tasks outside the scope of the “Union Resolve 2022” exercise. We are waiting for an explanation about the goals of those military activities, about their links to the exercise and about the exact nature of the tasks being carried out by the Russian armed forces in close vicinity to the international borders of Belarus.

Lithuania for its part is open and transparent about its military activities, including those that involve the military forces of our allies. Accordingly, Lithuania has given notification of the international exercise “Saber Strike” and the linked national exercise “Strong Griffin” as major military activities that are to be held on Lithuanian territory in 2022. At the beginning of March, we shall be hosting two Belarusian military officers for an exercise observation visit.

We welcome the invitation extended to Lithuania and Latvia by Belarus to send observers to the final phase of the “Union Resolve 2022” exercise from 18 to 20 February. However, I must reiterate our position once again: voluntary transparency can and should contribute to predictability and trust, but only as a complementary measure. Voluntary measures cannot replace the agreed measures under the Vienna Document.

Dear colleagues,

In line with the Vienna Document, the Permanent Council and the FSC are meant to jointly assess the situation and give recommendations to the States involved for stabilizing the situation and halting activities that give rise to concern. As we see it, these recommendations should include the following:

1. The Vienna Document is the key confidence- and security-building measure (CSBM) in the OSCE toolbox which we can use to build trust, promote transparency and reduce military risks. Participating States should recommit themselves to implementation of the agreed measures under the Vienna Document in full and in good faith.
2. Use of the Chapter III mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities is a legitimate and appropriate action. The goal is to mitigate risks, prevent misunderstandings and increase predictability. Non-implementation or selective implementation of agreed measures under this chapter cannot be ignored. We had expected Russia, as one of the two States organizing and conducting the “Union Resolve 2022” exercise, to be present at our meeting with Belarus on Monday and also at this special joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the FSC today.
3. Belarus should reply to the questions asked, and the answers should be precise, open and honest.
4. In accordance with paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document, Belarus should be ready to host a visit to the areas of the military activity that is giving rise to concerns.
5. Voluntary transparency measures are valuable, but cannot be regarded as a substitute for the agreed measures. The procedures for notification and observation of exercises, together with verification measures, are to be applied in full and in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Document.
6. The matter of concern raised by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should be further discussed at the FSC meetings and at the upcoming Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.
7. All participating States should engage in dialogue on how to improve the CSBMs provided for in the Vienna Document and, in particular, consider proposals for improving and modernizing the risk reduction mechanism.

Mr. Chairmen, I would kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC-PC.JOUR/71  
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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
FSC-PC Journal No. 71, Agenda item 2

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LATVIA**

Chairpersons,

I thank you for convening this joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC).

We met two days ago, on 14 February 2022, in consultations organized by the OSCE Chairmanship pursuant to paragraph 16.2 of the Vienna Document in order to receive answers from Belarus to our questions. Unfortunately, adequate answers were not provided by Belarus in its response to our F10 notification (CBM/LT/22/0003/F10/O) or during the meeting on Monday.

Therefore, we the Baltic States, in line with the procedure set out by the Vienna Document, have called for this joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the FSC in order to give Belarus one more chance to provide such answers to us and, indeed, to the whole OSCE.

This process is not, properly speaking, about Belarus; nor is it about the Baltic States. I would recall that, at the meeting on Monday, Belarus indicated that the military exercises on its territory were not taking place in close proximity to the Latvian or Lithuanian border. Estonia does not even border Belarus. No, the process is about foreign troops at the border of Ukraine and inside its temporarily occupied territories. It is thus actually of concern to all of us – not only Europe, but the whole OSCE area.

As you heard at the meeting on Monday, it is not only the Baltic States that are concerned about the concentration of Russian and also Belarusian troops close to Ukraine's border and in its temporarily occupied territories. You will hear it once again today.

For that, I believe, is the purpose and task of international organizations, namely to show where the truth lies. You can see that truth without any need for resolutions or decisions. You can see it from the number of participating States that have indicated them being the concerned States throughout this process, and you can see it from their statements. One does not even have to be a neighbour of the aggressor State to appreciate the values of freedom, independence and democracy, together with the need to protect these wherever they still exist and wherever people have expressed the will to experience and live by them.

Despite the claims made in some statements, we currently continue to see two OSCE participating States amassing troops at the border of another participating State. We see them failing to provide any or appropriate explanations as to the number of those troops and the reasons for and duration of their presence. We see the Vienna Document being disregarded, along with the refusal to act in accordance with other international obligations and commitments that those two States have undertaken and are bound by. We see direct attempts to disrupt the global security architecture. We see them abandoning, breaching and simply flouting international treaties. We see them claiming a need for dialogue, for talking to instead of at one another, yet at the same time we see them not showing up at meetings and not talking. We see Russia and Belarus amassing troops at the border of Ukraine and then claiming that they are the ones being threatened, whereas we are simply asking Russia and Belarus to sit down with all of us at this very table and answer some simple questions.

Our questions about the military activities of Belarus and Russia are indeed very simple and clear-cut. Military exercises follow very strict rules and regulations, and I am sure that those of the Belarusian and Russian armed forces are no exception.

As was pointed out at the meeting on Monday, it is extremely hard to believe that there is no information about how many Belarusian and Russian troops are in Belarus right now, or are concentrated at Ukraine's border, and that there are tens of thousands of such troops simply wandering around an OSCE participating State without that State knowing how many of them there are, where they are going, what they are doing and when they intend to leave or return to their peacetime locations. Unless Belarus provides concrete answers, we have every reason to conclude that it is not interested in acting in an open and transparent manner – that is, that Belarus and Russia have something to hide. Now, hiding something about the military is never a token of good intentions.

By initiating the risk reduction mechanism under the Vienna Document, the Baltic States, despite not having these Belarusian and Russian troops on their doorstep, have provided a perfect illustration of the indivisibility of security that some claim to be so eager to talk about. Our security is indeed indivisible. Nowadays, nothing is local any more. We understand and care about this indivisibility, and that is why we asked those questions and are giving yet another opportunity to answer them.

We are still here, extending our invitation to revert to dialogue and diplomacy, rather than concentrating troops along the borders of another State.

Chairpersons,

This is a repeated attempt to obtain clarity on the number and purpose of the troops in Belarus – both the Belarusian and the Russian troops. So far Belarus has not provided answers on the precise numbers, dates and plans as requested in our F10 notification and as stipulated by the provisions of the Vienna Document, which we have all subscribed to.

However, there is still an opportunity for Belarus to comply with its commitments on transparency and risk reduction.

Chairpersons,

In closing, allow me once again to reiterate that Russia and Belarus need to take all the necessary steps to de-escalate the situation. Latvia continues to voice its strong and continuous support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

### **Recommendations**

Latvia joins in the recommendations made by Lithuania and also in those contained in the statement by the European Union and its Member States.

I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you.





**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LATVIA**

Chairpersons, I should like to exercise my right of reply to the statement just made by the Belarusian delegation.

Our distinguished colleague from the Belarusian delegation claimed that invocation of the risk reduction mechanism under the Vienna Document by the Baltic States was tantamount to politicizing the situation.

However, seeking transparency, explanations and clarification about unusual, militarily significant activities in a neighbouring State through a consultation process is not politicization. It is simply a case of exercising the rights and using the tools provided for in the Vienna Document. What does politicize the situation is simply not to answer the questions raised and not to tell the truth about ongoing military activities, on account of which the aforementioned mechanism was invoked.

Our Belarusian colleague also claimed that the military activities currently taking place in Belarus were below the thresholds specified in the Vienna Document, and that they did not pose any threat to neighbouring States.

While we regret that all free media have literally been destroyed in Belarus and that the people of that country have only one source of information left, it is not the same for most other OSCE participating States. We do have access to other sources of information. Therefore, regardless of what you say, we will judge Belarus by its actions and these we can see for ourselves.

Our Belarusian colleague also spoke about a series of steps taken by Belarus to increase transparency.

Here I must reiterate once again that a selective approach to commitments is unacceptable. First and foremost, it is necessary to comply with binding multilateral commitments – only then can these be complemented with voluntary ones.

I thank you, Chairpersons, and kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ESTONIA**

I thank the Chairpersons of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation for convening today's joint meeting. It is the final step under the risk reduction mechanism provided for by Chapter III of the Vienna Document. Despite – or, rather, because of – the fact that Belarus and Russia have so far not provided clear and transparent answers to any of the questions posed by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in their formal request, as well as by a number of other participating States at the consultation meeting on 14 February, we will keep insisting on receiving clarification on the ongoing unusual and large-scale military activity in the territory of Belarus.

I echo the calls and recommendations voiced by my Lithuanian and Latvian colleagues before me. Estonia likewise fully aligns itself with the statement to be made on behalf of the EU Member States, including the recommendations contained therein. Additionally, I should like to make a few remarks in my national capacity.

We recognize and welcome the engagement of Belarus in the Vienna Document process. However, our questions remain unanswered – the large-scale movements of Russian troops to Belarus and the two countries' joint military exercise lack transparency. The extraordinary nature of these activities is destabilizing European security as a whole.

A joint military exercise involving the whole Belarusian army and tens of thousands of Russian troops cannot be considered an insignificant activity. The lack of transparency surrounding it runs counter to the letter of the Vienna Document 2011 and the spirit of the confidence and security building. Furthermore, the use of a great number of military personnel and tanks, together with a large amount of sophisticated military equipment, belonging to the Russian Federation for border protection in Belarus raises additional questions and constitutes a threat to the security and stability of the region and beyond.

The recent wider picture as regards the Russian military build-up around and in Ukraine, as well as in Belarus, is alarming – all the more so, since Russia has not genuinely engaged in trust- and confidence-building. Proper engagement with the Vienna Document mechanisms would be a natural step for Russia to prove that it means what it says when it states its interest in diplomatic solutions.

I call on the Russian Federation and Belarus to de-escalate and reduce significantly the tensions in the region, to adhere to the Vienna Document in both letter and spirit, to dispel the concerns expressed, and to respond to the detailed questions and recommendations raised at the meetings held this week under the risk reduction mechanism provided for by the Vienna Document.

I also call on the Russian Federation and Belarus to engage in the diplomatic process recently launched by the Chairperson-in-Office, namely the Renewed European Security Dialogue. It should be in everybody's interest to resolve differences through diplomatic talks based on the commonly agreed OSCE founding principles.



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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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## **STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The delegation of France, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

The European Union and its Member States welcome the convening of this joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and the Permanent Council by the Polish and Azerbaijani Chairmanships at the request of the delegations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Such discussion on the ongoing unusual military activities on the territory of Belarus is indeed urgently needed as the information provided so far cannot be considered satisfactory.

We are following very closely and with grave concern the massive build-up of Russian troops near the borders of Ukraine, in and around the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula, and now also in Belarus. The scale of this build-up seriously undermines European security and stability. We call on Russia to immediately reverse its build-up, withdraw its forces in accordance with its international obligations and commitments and choose the path of de-escalation and refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

In this context, we fully support the invocation of the risk reduction mechanism as foreseen in paragraph 16 of the Vienna Document last Wednesday by Lithuania, also on behalf of Latvia and Estonia. We have all signed up to the Vienna Document precisely to reduce military risks and misperceptions and to build trust among participating States. It constitutes a key element of our common security.

We took note of the explanations provided by Belarus on 11 February and at the bilateral meeting organized by the OSCE Chairmanship on 14 February. We appreciate that Belarus honoured the Vienna Document in engaging in a dialogue. However, we consider that the pertinent questions raised by our colleagues and partners have not been answered adequately and comprehensively. In particular detailed information regarding the Russian-Belarusian exercise “Union Resolve 2022”, timelines regarding the return of the troops involved to their peacetime locations as well as other unusual military activities carried out by the Russian Federation armed forces on the territory of Belarus and in the border areas of Belarus is of essence. Hence, we welcome the meeting today and reiterate our call on Belarus, as well as on the Russian Federation, to exercise full transparency and to

dispel serious concerns about the activities in question. When transparency and trust are in short supply, any provocation, aggressive rhetoric or the spread of disinformation can have dire consequences.

We, together with our partners, will continue to closely monitor the situation and will react decisively to any further development.

## **Recommendations**

As regards measures for clarifying the situation as well as halting activities that give rise to concern, the European Union and its Member States recommend to use all relevant provisions under the Vienna Document and other confidence- and security-building measures to the fullest, and in particular:

- To Belarus:
  - To provide, in accordance with its commitments under the Vienna Document, full transparency on its military activities, and those of the Russian armed forces, in particular the total number of troops, major weapons and equipment systems used for each location of the exercise, the units and formations these Russian and Belarusian military forces belong to, and the exact return date of Russian units and formations back to their peacetime locations;
  - To host a visit to the exercise area to dispel concerns about the unusual military activity in accordance with paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document, as well as to open its territory for inspection visits where the specified area could be inspected for any potentially notifiable military activity;
  - To take steps to de-escalate the situation and to engage in a meaningful dialogue and constructive consultations.
- To the participating States to use the verification mechanism as stipulated in Chapters IX and X of the Vienna Document 2011, keeping in mind the relevant national procedures to execute verification missions under COVID-19 conditions.
- To the participating States involved to regularly brief the FSC, in particular on military activities in border areas.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly request that these recommendations and our statement today be attached to the journal of the day.

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro<sup>1</sup> and Albania<sup>1</sup> and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

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<sup>1</sup> The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.



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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

The United States of America welcomes the decision by Lithuania, also on behalf of Latvia and Estonia, to call for this joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Council in accordance with the Vienna Document's risk reduction mechanism.

If ever there were a time to invoke a risk reduction mechanism, this is it. Russia has assembled a force of well over 150,000 troops along Ukraine's borders, organized in over 100 battalion tactical groups. Russia has also moved roughly 30,000 troops into Belarus, including special forces and equipment such as short-range ballistic missiles and anti-aircraft batteries.

We are, therefore, extremely disappointed that Belarus did not avail itself of the opportunity at the 14 February meeting of interested States to provide any additional transparency or clarifications or to respond to questions about its unscheduled, large-scale military exercise "Union Resolve 2022" and its other unusual military activities along its southern border. Indeed, we were dismayed that Belarus attempted to portray the invocation of the Vienna Document's risk reduction mechanism as provocative and escalatory. Nothing could be further from the truth. This instrument exists precisely to address situations like the one we have today.

The United States had hoped that Belarus would avail itself of the opportunity to provide a substantive reply to the request for an explanation of these highly unusual military activities. Let us recall the Vienna Document requires that Belarus provide "answers to questions raised, as well as any other relevant information in order to explain the activity in question and dispel the concern." As I said in our previous meeting, an honest and detailed explanation of this activity's size, composition, and purpose is long overdue.

We find Belarus's claim that the unspecified total number of participating military forces and major weapons systems in this massive exercise does not exceed the threshold established by Vienna Document 2011 to be, frankly, not credible at all. This claim is not consistent with the introduction of overwhelming numbers of Russian military personnel and equipment from the Far East Military District. Nor does it comport with public statements of

Belarusian military authorities themselves that almost the entire armed forces of the Republic of Belarus would be participating in this “complex event.”

Mr. Chairperson, the narratives and numbers do not add up.

The Vienna Document requires notification of the arrival or concentration of forces from outside the zone of application when they meet or exceed specified thresholds. We, therefore, seek clarification yet again on the number of Russian military personnel and equipment from the Eastern Military District on the territory of Belarus. For the sake of transparency and risk reduction, we seek this information even if these concentrations are purportedly below thresholds.

We also seek concrete information on the activities of Russian forces on Belarusian territory, including those arrayed along the border with Ukraine, which Belarus claims are conducting “border defence measures in parts not possible for the border service and the armed forces of Belarus to reinforce.” Why does Belarus see the need for Russian troops to deploy to its southern border with Ukraine? What exactly are they reinforcing and why are they doing it now?

To dispel our serious concerns regarding the highly unusual activity on the territory of Belarus, we sought concrete responses to specific questions that we posed on 14 February, regarding the following:

- Numbers of troops, battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft, helicopters, and heliborne landing or parachute assault activities, taking part in “Union Resolve 2022.”
- The failure to notify this massive exercise, including the arrival and concentration of troops from outside the Vienna Document zone of application.
- Belarus’s denial of an inspection request by Latvia under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic in spite of the fact that it is conducting a massive military exercise during the very same pandemic.
- The execution of the exercise and associated activities in what Belarus has described as a single “complex event” under a single operational command.
- The command and control of Russian forces on the territory of Belarus.
- The interrelationship of the military activities being held simultaneously in this single “complex event,” their command-and-control arrangements, and their objective.
- The precise numbers of Russian and Belarusian troops, battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft and helicopters taking part in “border defence measures,” their command and control, and their objectives.
- The destination and timetable for the departure of Russian troops from the territory of Belarus.

In short, we do not believe it is credible or possible that such a large number of Belarusian and Russian forces could fall short of Vienna Document thresholds for notification and observation. We have grave concerns about this highly unusual and provocative military activity, particularly in the context of Russia's unprecedented military build-up in the region.

It bears emphasizing, as we have noted previously and as I will repeat again today, that NATO Allies, in stark contrast to Russia, are committed to transparency and have provided comprehensive information on their large military exercises. "Cold Response," "Defender 21," and "Saber Strike" were all notified in accordance with Vienna Document procedures. Allies and partners stand by their arms control and confidence-building commitments and regularly notify even their below-threshold participation in these exercises and activities.

Under the Vienna Document, we have all made a commitment to respond in good faith to the concerns that other States raise regarding unusual military activities as part of our collective efforts to reduce the risk of miscalculation, lower tensions, and build confidence. We hope Belarus will reconsider its lack of transparency and selective implementation of its Vienna Document commitments, help dispel the many concerns we have heard around this table, and take immediate steps to reduce the risk of military conflict.

We specifically recommend the following:

1. Belarus answer the specific questions posed in the F10 request by the Baltic States regarding the number of troops, major weapons and equipment systems, and units involved from the Russian and Belarusian armed forces as well as all questions raised in the Chairmanship's F14 report, including those pertaining to command and control and the date of return of these troops to peacetime locations.
2. Belarus account for all military activities associated with this "complex event."
3. Belarus agree to host a visit, including a helicopter overflight, under paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document, to dispel the concerns of participating States present here today.
4. Belarus immediately enable Chapter IX and Chapter X verification measures to include aerial inspections and confirmation of the redeployment of all forces to peacetime locations.
5. Belarus brief the FSC on its redeployment of forces.
6. Finally, we recommend that all participating States endorse a full and open dialogue on modernizing and improving military transparency, which is so clearly lacking at the present time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.





**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF CANADA**

Mr. Chairperson,

Thank you for convening this important special joint meeting. We appreciate the continued efforts of you and your team. I would also like to thank Ambassadors Verba, Kaktina and Soone for requesting this opportunity to engage in discussion, and while we note that Ambassador Dapkiunas is not in attendance, we are grateful that Mr. Dovgalev is here to engage in today's discussions.

Canada is deeply concerned about Russia's recent destabilizing actions and significant military build-up of forces and equipment along Ukraine's borders, including in Belarus, and on the illegally occupied Crimean peninsula. The large-scale movements of troops, tanks, and other artillery units, without prior notification, represent threatening and destabilizing activities.

The large-scale Russia-Belarus short-notice military exercises currently underway on the territory of Belarus also contribute to the elevation of risk. These exercises involve a significant number of Russian troops and equipment from as far away as the Eastern Military District, and the employment of offensive missile systems such as the Iskandar-K. In the context of rising tension in the region, such activities would greatly benefit from real military transparency within the letter and spirit of the Vienna Document.

We commend the efforts of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to use the risk reduction mechanisms afforded by the Vienna Document in an effort to seek further transparency: not only regarding the scope and scale of these movements on the territory of Belarus, but also on their strategic intent. This is precisely what the Vienna Document was designed for: de-escalation of tense situations through dialogue and exchange of information and thereby to strengthen our collective security.

Let me underscore that I am encouraged to see Belarus participating in today's joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and Permanent Council. I believe that participation in dialogue is an essential step in growing understanding and restoring trust. And that dialogue must be genuine and engaged.

I am here today, as I hope every other person in this room is, in an attempt to discuss in an open and honest manner the concerns that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and others have about this large-scale military exercise. But dialogue is a two-way street and confidence-building depends on both sides engaging. Open sources suggest it consists of some 30,000 troops, and yet neither Belarus nor Russia has been willing to share information on this to allay the concerns of their neighbours.

I am disappointed that we have not yet heard from Belarus today, but I repeat that we would welcome any additional information to increase transparency around this large-scale military exercise, not only for the information itself and the fears it might allay, but also for the trust built by the gesture of sharing. Canada believes, and I believe that open and transparent application of the Vienna Document and its associated mechanisms is a corner stone in our shared security. Reciprocal transparency benefits everyone. Increased trust benefits everyone. Reduced risks of military incidents benefits everyone.

The Vienna Document provides these tools. Why not demonstrate transparency and provide details on the numbers of troops and equipment? If there is no ill intent, then why not share that information in order to help restore confidence, build trust and reduce military risks? It's not too late to build trust.

I would say that the recommendations suggested by the European Union and the United States of America would go a long way towards achieving these goals, of confidence and trust, if Belarus is willing to engage.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
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16 February 2022  
Annex 8

Original: ENGLISH

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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
FSC-PC Journal No. 71, Agenda item 2

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF UKRAINE**

Mr. Chairperson,

Ukraine aligns itself with the statement by the European Union. I should like, though, to make some additional points in my national capacity.

Ukraine welcomes the convening of this joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation by the Polish and Azerbaijani Chairmanships at the request of the delegation of Lithuania, also on behalf of Estonia and Latvia.

Ukraine, too, has been continuously calling for all the available tools to be used to enhance military transparency and for the existing risk reduction mechanisms to be activated to defuse tensions in the region, which have been caused by the unprovoked, groundless and unprecedented concentration of Russian troops along Ukraine's borders.

We have taken note of the bilateral contacts between the Ministries of Defence of Ukraine and Belarus over the past few days, the contacts that followed between the military attachés, and the invitation extended to military observers to visit the final phase of the exercise. These contacts are certainly a positive sign.

However, we continue to be of the firm view that such direct contacts conducted on a bilateral basis between the heads and senior officials of the defence ministries and command of the armed forces cannot and should not replace existing multilateral mechanisms of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), in particular risk reduction mechanisms.

We believe that the implementation, in good faith, of these commitments freely undertaken within a multilateral format would help to improve the existing security environment and build trust among all the participating States. It is in our mutual interest.

Ukraine has also taken note of the reassurances given by Belarus that the ongoing military manoeuvres do not pose any threat.

Some may try to portray as trivial our misgivings and concerns about the prospects for de-escalating military tensions along the State border of Ukraine.

However, the reality of the situation leaves us with a feeling of uncertainty, especially given that there is no clarity as to:

- When the Russian armed forces will start their withdrawal from the sovereign territory of Belarus;
- How long the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces to their peacetime locations in the territory of the Russian Federation will last; and
- What schedule there is for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces.

All these questions are of particular importance for us, considering that 15 battalion tactical groups of the Russian armed forces have been redeployed to the territory of Belarus. The main body of the troops is stationed along the northern border of Ukraine (in the area of Brest, Mozyr and Gomel). Moreover, Russia has substantially strengthened its military aviation in the area.

Bearing in mind our bitter previous experience, our concerns are well grounded and should be addressed with respectful understanding. I would remind you that, in the spring of 2021, the Russian Federation similarly assured Ukraine and other OSCE participating States that the personnel, weaponry and military equipment involved in the “Zapad 2021” military exercise near the eastern border of Ukraine would return to their peacetime locations at the end of the exercise.

However, what happened next? Those assurances turned out to be empty words. Regardless of the statements made, most of the weaponry and military equipment, together with the supporting logistic infrastructure, was kept in the areas where the “Zapad 2021” exercise had been conducted.

We also remember the events in Crimea of 2014, when the presence of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory was augmented without Ukraine’s consent and in violation of existing bilateral agreements and multilateral security assurances.

That is why we strongly believe that the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the territory of Belarus has to take place in a transparent and verifiable manner within a narrow, clearly defined and well-communicated time frame. The measures and procedures provided for in the Vienna Document have to be fully utilized to that end.

Distinguished colleagues,

Ukraine is additionally concerned by the fact that the existing CSBMs and the risk reduction mechanism provided for by the Vienna Document are not being used or even downright ignored.

Such disregard for the OSCE commitments and mechanisms further contributes to the degradation of confidence and trust in bilateral and multilateral relations.

It also undermines our commitments to comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which depend entirely on the political will to abide by what we voluntarily agreed on within the OSCE.

I would recall that the CSBMs were developed with the aim, *inter alia*, of giving effect and expression to the obligation of the participating States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations and in their international relations in general.

In view of these considerations, full adherence to the spirit and the letter of the Vienna Document and the willingness to address in good faith the concerns expressed by neighbouring participating States can only lead to greater transparency and help to counteract misperceptions regarding the possible intentions of some participating States.

### **Recommendations**

As regards measures for clarifying the situation and halting the activities that have given rise to concern, we recommend that all relevant provisions of the Vienna Document and other CSBMs be used to the fullest extent. In particular, these are our recommendations:

For Belarus:

- To engage in a meaningful dialogue and constructive consultations, in particular with neighbouring countries that expressed their concerns;
- To provide, in accordance with its commitments under the Vienna Document, full information on the size and structure of troops involved in the combat training and the duration of their deployment;
- To provide the participating States with information on the number of Russian troops redeployed to Belarus within the framework of the “Union Resolve 2022” exercise;
- To voluntarily host visits and inspections to dispel concerns about its military activities, in accordance with the provisions under paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document 2011.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly request that these recommendations and our statement today be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY**

Mr. Chairperson of the Permanent Council,  
Mr. Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),  
Esteemed colleagues,

Germany fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union. Allow me nevertheless to add a few words in a national capacity.

The current, acute threat to security in the OSCE area is worrying. The massive Russian troop build-up on the border with Ukraine and the unusual military exercise activities in Belarus concern not only the immediate neighbouring States. They affect all of us and threaten to undermine the entire rules-based security architecture of our region.

The OSCE was established to de-escalate precisely in times of crisis and to ensure transparency, trust and security in such situations. We need the instruments of the OSCE, which we have all agreed on together, to prevent and resolve conflicts. However, it is only by using these instruments together that we will be able to restore and maintain peace, security and stability in our region. We are grateful that the OSCE is using all available tools, including the early warning of 14 February, to address the seriousness of the current situation.

Germany expressly supports the decision taken by our Baltic partners – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – to address their security concerns and threat perceptions diplomatically through the consultation mechanism of the Vienna Document. We call on Belarus to actively and sincerely co-operate in the full clarification of the outstanding issues and in the establishment of military transparency, and thus contribute to defusing the current crisis. At the same time, we regret that Russia – which is providing the majority of the troops – is avoiding dialogue by staying away. Russia is thus not contributing to de-escalation.

Germany stands closely and unwaveringly with its Baltic partners and Ukraine. As Federal President Steinmeier reaffirmed today, our Baltic allies can rely on Germany's solidarity and practical assistance. We will not compromise on fundamental principles of the European peace order or on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of participating States.

Esteemed colleagues,

In order to restore peaceful coexistence, all participating States must demonstrate the necessary political will to co-operate and engage constructively. The OSCE's forums and informal formats, such as the Permanent Council, the FSC and the Structured Dialogue, and also the Renewed OSCE European Security Dialogue format recently initiated by the Polish OSCE Chairmanship offer a good starting point for honestly discussing the security interests of all OSCE participating States, rebuilding trust and ensuring the long-term security of us all.

In recent weeks, many have stressed the importance of military transparency, risk reduction and arms control in this process. Here today, in this meeting, we have seen a clear illustration of where the road can lead us if the existing tools for confidence-building and military transparency are not used by all.

It is now high time to abandon the path to military confrontation and return to diplomatic co-operation. We call on all participating States to engage in dialogue to strengthen our common security architecture.

Thank you.

Mr. Chairperson, I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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**84th Joint Meeting of the PC and the FSC**  
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## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, I would like to start by thanking you, the Chairperson-in-Office and your team for your efforts to convene this important and urgent meeting.

The United Kingdom shares Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's significant concerns about the lack of transparency regarding unusual and unscheduled Belarusian and Russian military activity in the border areas of Belarus.

We recognize that Belarus has been present and engaged throughout this process. However, we are disappointed that despite repeated requests, including in the Forum for Security Co-operation and throughout the Vienna Document Chapter III risk reduction mechanism, Belarus has elected not to provide the necessary transparency over these activities despite clear and legitimate questions and concerns from numerous participating States.

We fully support the use of this Vienna Document mechanism to seek clarification from Belarus on the unusual and unscheduled military activities being conducted under the umbrella of exercise "Union Resolve 2022" and those currently being conducted outside the framework of this exercise.

The Vienna Document is a key confidence- and security-building measure through which we build transparency and reduce risk. As a political agreement it is incumbent on us all to abide by the political intent of the Document, in letter and spirit, and the international norms it binds us to.

At the meeting on Monday, in which 36 participating States took part, specific questions were posed by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and other States (including the United Kingdom). These are contained in the Chairmanship's report, CBM/PL/22/0003/F14/O, and remain unanswered. This only deepens our concerns.

We would highlight that it is Lithuania's right, as a participating State, to issue a Chapter III request for explanation in relation to any unusual and unscheduled military activities outside normal peacetime locations and which are militarily significant. We call on Belarus to uphold the OSCE principles and commitments that it freely signed up to.



## **Recommendations**

We have the following four recommendations:

- Firstly – Belarus should answer the referenced questions contained in the Chairmanship’s report (CBM/PL/22/0003/F14/) without delay;
- Secondly – Belarus should host a visit to the exercise area to dispel concerns about the unusual military activity in accordance with paragraph 18 of the Vienna Document;
- Thirdly – we judge Belarus should open its territory for specified area inspections for any potentially notifiable military activity; and
- Fourthly – Belarus should take steps to de-escalate the situation including through meaningful dialogue and constructive consultations.

Mr. Chairperson, it is critical that Belarus uphold the OSCE principles and commitments that it freely signed up to, and act responsibly to de-escalate the situation.

I ask that this statement and these recommendations be attached to the journal of the day.