

**Chairmanship: Germany**

**958th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 21 October 2020 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10.05 a.m.  
Suspended: 1 p.m.  
Resumed: 3 p.m.  
Closed: 4.50 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador G. Bräutigam

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/83/20.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE ON UNSCR 1325:  
“20th ANNIVERSARY OF UNSCR 1325 –  
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE OSCE AREA AND THE WAY  
AHEAD”

- *Presentation by H.E. Ms. S. Baumann, Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, Germany*
- *Presentation by Mr. P. Koçi, Deputy Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Albania*
- *Presentation by Ms. J. Sumuvuori, State Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland*
- *Pre-recorded video messages by Ms. K. Abdysamatova (Kyrgyzstan) and Ms. X. Rivkin (Switzerland), graduates of the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security programme*

Chairperson, Germany (FSC.DEL/277/20 OSCE+), Albania (FSC.DEL/276/20 OSCE+), Finland, Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Ms. K. Abdysamatova, Ms. X. Rivkin, Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/286/20), France (FSC.DEL/283/20 OSCE+), Canada, Slovenia (Annex 1), United Kingdom, Switzerland (FSC.DEL/269/20 OSCE+), United States of America, Holy See (FSC.DEL/267/20 OSCE+), Afghanistan (Partner for Co-operation) (FSC.DEL/272/20 OSCE+), Spain (Annex 2), Georgia (FSC.DEL/281/20 OSCE+), Norway (FSC.DEL/271/20), Liechtenstein (FSC.DEL/266/20 OSCE+), Sweden (FSC.DEL/268/20 OSCE+), Portugal (FSC.DEL/292/20 OSCE+), Malta (FSC.DEL/288/20 OSCE+), Turkey (FSC.DEL/279/20 OSCE+), Bulgaria, Romania (Annex 3), Belgium (FSC.DEL/278/20/Rev.1 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 4), OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA.GAL/21/20 OSCE+), Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) (Latvia) (Annex 5), FSC Co-ordinator for Matters Related to UNSCR 1325 (Albania) (Annex 6)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

- (a) *Situation in and around Ukraine*: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/280/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/285/20), Canada, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/287/20 OSCE+), United States of America, Russian Federation (Annex 7)
- (b) *On the situation in the South Caucasus*: Armenia (Annex 8), Azerbaijan (Annex 9), Turkey

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Financial contribution to the Information Management and Reporting System (iMARS) project*: Slovenia (Annex 10)
- (b) *Cancellation of the military exercise "Slovak Shield 2020"*: Slovakia
- (c) *Briefing on the meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA held via video teleconference on 12 October 2020*: Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA (Latvia) (Annex 11)
- (d) *Contacts by the FSC Chairmanship regarding the Announcing and Reminding Mechanism*: Chairperson (Annex 12)

- (e) *Way ahead for OSCE practical assistance projects on SALW and SCA, and distribution of a synopsis on the Status of SALW and Conventional Ammunition Projects in the OSCE as of 30 September 2020*  
(FSC.GAL/108/20): FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on SALW and SCA (Austria)
- (f) *Matters of protocol*: Germany, Chairperson

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 4 November 2020, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SLOVENIA**

Madam Chairperson,  
Dear colleagues,

First of all, let me join the other delegations in commending the panellists for their valuable presentations and their contribution to the discussion. I would also like to express my gratitude to the German Chairpersonship of the Forum for Security Co-operation for devoting this Security Dialogue to the landmark adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). Slovenia aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union and would like to add some comments from a national perspective.

The 20th anniversary of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1325 provides a timely occasion for us to take stock of achievements and identify shortcomings in its implementation at the national, regional and international level. This anniversary is also a splendid opportunity for us to recommit ourselves to its implementation, which plays a crucial part in ensuring peace and stability in the OSCE area and beyond.

In that regard, allow me to present the latest developments in Slovenia in relation to the women, peace and security agenda. We are currently concluding the implementation of our second National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. To ensure the broad and comprehensive application of the resolution's provisions, the National Action Plan covers the work of several ministries, including the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Foreign Affairs. Regular meetings at various levels among representatives of the relevant ministries and civil society have helped to strengthen national ownership and monitoring of the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

The latest addition to the list of concrete measures and initiatives undertaken by Slovenia to advance the women, peace and security agenda is the Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre (POTC), which was established earlier this year. The founders are the aforementioned ministries, while responsibility for the execution of day-to-day activities lies primarily with the Centre for European Perspective, a Slovenian governmental organization that is engaged in such areas as security, democratization and youth. The POTC will be offering a range of certified education and training courses for military, police and civilian personnel from our country's ministries and other experts with a view to their subsequent deployment to peacekeeping operations and missions run by the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the OSCE. The focus of the trainings and activities will be on

working and living in multicultural settings, the protection of human rights, co-operation with local personnel in the host country, “training the trainers”, and techniques and skills for working in a hostile environment.

The first training course of the Centre is scheduled for November. In view of the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 and the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the course will deal with the importance of gender mainstreaming in the work of peacekeeping operations and missions. The growing number of experts who will have undergone training at the Centre will help to ensure that Slovenian personnel deployed to international peacekeeping and civilian protection missions are able to perform their duties comprehensively, which also includes applying a gender lens to their everyday work.

In closing, allow me, Madam Chairperson, to reiterate that Slovenia remains committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and, thereby, to ensuring that women are involved in peace processes in all roles and at all levels. Only in this way can we attain success and a safe future for us all.

We kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SPAIN**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I should like to convey my sincere thanks to you for including this topic on the Forum's agenda and to all the speakers for their valuable presentations. They all pointed out the vital importance of continuing co-ordinated efforts to build on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security.

Spain fully aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union.

In connection with the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325, I should also like to briefly refer to three initiatives for the development of resolution 1325 that are of particular importance to the Spanish delegation.

The Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network was one of the commitments announced by Spain during the high-level open debate in 2015. Launched in 2016, it has over 80 members, including the OSCE. Currently under the Co-Chairmanship of Canada and Uruguay, this operational network, which has already been mentioned today, has proven to be effective for exchanging experiences and promoting the commitments of States and organizations to advance the objectives of the agenda.

During the meeting of the Focal Points Network in New York in September 2019, Spain and Finland launched the "Commitment 2025" joint initiative in order to guarantee the effective participation of women in peace processes. We are confident that it can serve as a road map to ensure that women participate effectively in peace processes.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325, Spain, together with other countries, proposed to the United Nations Human Rights Council a resolution on the rights of women and girls, which was adopted by consensus.

Furthermore, I should like to recall that it has been 30 years since the armed forces in Spain were opened to women, and that since the entry into force of Act No. 17/99, the Regulation of the Armed Forces Personnel Act, absolute equality between men and women has been upheld without any limitation, with women having full access to all military units, ranks and postings.

As of 15 October 2020, there were 15,611 women (including trainees) in the Spanish armed forces, accounting for 12.8 per cent of the total number of military personnel on active duty. The average number of women in our armed forces is higher than the average among our neighbouring countries, which is around 11.3 per cent. Moreover, as of 1 September 2020, the Spanish armed forces had a total of 162 women deployed on missions abroad, accounting for 7 per cent of the total number of military personnel on such missions.

These initiatives and commitments testify to the vital importance that Spain attaches to compliance with and implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, and to the efforts it has been making in this regard. The implementation of the women, peace and security agenda is more urgent today than ever.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ROMANIA**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson, for giving me the floor.

Many thanks to the speakers and for the valuable insight they have shared with us.

While fully supporting the European Union statement, I will make a few remarks on behalf of Romania and I remember in this context the relevance and importance of national plans for proper implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325.

In July 2020, the Romanian Government approved the national strategy and national action plan regarding the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

This first plan covers the period 2020–2023.

The plan represents the basis for a series of common policies and directives for the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 used by the institutions of the national defence, in public order and national security system of Romania, as well as other central administration institutions with responsibilities in this field.

I would like to emphasize some of the objectives of the plan, as follows:

- Integration of gender equality perspective in security and defence policies;
- Increasing the representation and significant participation of women in peace negotiations, mediation processes and within peacekeeping missions;
- Preventing and combating all forms of gender-based discrimination, harassment and sexual violence;
- Co-operation with civil society in the process of implementing the women, peace and security agenda.

Obviously, we stand ready to provide further information to colleagues, if requested.

In addition, I would kindly ask this statement to be appended to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/964  
21 October 2020  
Annex 4

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to the German Chairmanship for organizing this plenary meeting dedicated to the 20th anniversary of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. We thank the distinguished keynote speakers for their interesting presentations, which attest to the progress made in increasing the role of women in addressing critical security issues, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

It is true that the number of women in national parliaments and governments has grown during the intervening period, and their participation in peace and security negotiations has generally increased. As a case in point, only four of the 850 participating delegates who signed the Charter of the United Nations in June 1945 were women. Today, women head around half of the permanent missions of the OSCE participating States in Vienna, and many hold responsible posts as deputy heads of missions and politico-military advisers.

At the same time, the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the results of the global implementation of the resolution in 2019 confirms that a number of challenges and gaps remain. In that regard, the Russian Federation, acting in its capacity as President of the United Nations Security Council, intends to hold the traditional open debate in October, during which an exchange of experience and best practices in the promotion of women in peace processes and peacekeeping will take place. Following the discussion, the adoption of a document reflecting the agreed approaches of States to these issues is planned.

Speaking of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, it should be emphasized that the framework for its application is quite clearly defined, namely improving the position of women in armed conflict situations threatening international peace and security and in post-conflict situations. In other words, it can hardly be used as a universal reference point for promoting the participation of women in all spheres of public life.

With a view to further effective implementation of the resolution's provisions, it is important to adhere to the established "division of labour" at the international level in order to prevent duplication of mandates. For us it is clear that the prerogative in this area remains

with the United Nations system. In that connection, measures taken under the auspices of that global organization should be aimed at supporting the efforts of States, since the primary responsibility for the protection of women during all stages of a crisis situation rests with them. As regards national action plans for the resolution's implementation, they are voluntary and may be used only as an additional tool to assess the relevant policies pursued by countries during armed conflicts or post-conflict settlement.

We note the OSCE's efforts to promote the participation of women in hard security and arms control issues, which has been facilitated by the adoption of the relevant Action Plan in 2004 and the launch of the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security programme for young professionals.

As for the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on the topic under discussion today, we take the position that it should be carried out strictly within the framework of the FSC mandate. It should be recalled that the decisions and declarations of the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings on the politico-military theme for 2013 to 2019 task the Forum with addressing the impact of the destabilizing accumulation of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition on women and children, and also the contribution of women to combating the illegal trade in SALW, including through participation in OSCE assistance projects. At the same time, the existing voluntary exchange of information between participating States on the resolution's implementation, including responses to the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, meets the objectives set. In the discussion of a possible draft document for the forthcoming Ministerial Council meeting in Tirana, we believe it would be expedient to follow these approaches. Conceptually, there are no points of convergence between United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 and women's participation in combating illicit SALW.

We have taken note of the question raised in the concept of today's meeting: how can the OSCE's politico-military documents be consolidated in such a way as to assist participating States in the implementation of the resolution? Undoubtedly, ensuring gender equality is an important task, to which our country attaches great importance. However, accomplishing this task – both within the OSCE and in the participating States – should not be linked to United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, should not become an end in itself and should not focus on figures alone. The process of involving women, for example, in verification activities under the Vienna Document 2011 and the Treaty on Open Skies or in any other security-related activity must be needs-based. In that connection, priority should be given to women's professional qualities, and account should be taken of their needs, personal interests and the increased workload associated with frequent duty travel.

In the Russian Federation, creating conditions for the full and equal participation of women in all spheres of public life is one of the priorities of government policy. Decisions on ensuring equality between women and men were first taken at the beginning of the twentieth century. Subsequently, this made it possible to attract bright, highly professional women into politics. In the diplomatic service, the example may be cited of Alexandra Kollontai, who in 1917 became the world's first female minister and then one of the first female ambassadors. There are a great many women in our history who heroically proved themselves during the World Wars, commanded regiments and held high military ranks.

We are paying close attention to the implementation of the National Action Strategy for Women 2017–2022. Russian women currently account for more than 70 per cent of the civil servants in our country and hold high-ranking, responsible positions in government bodies. Women consistently show a great interest in joining the Russian armed forces. Some aspects of their position in the Russian armed forces are highlighted in our responses to the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

We are convinced that direct involvement of women in the prevention of armed conflicts and in post-conflict reconstruction is an important prerequisite for overcoming violence against them. The proportion of Russian women peacekeepers in United Nations peacekeeping operations currently stands at around 17 per cent. Our country is also a reliable partner of the United Nations in the training of foreign women peacekeepers at approved educational centres, including the Peacekeeper Training Centre of the All-Russian Institute of Advanced Training of Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation at Domodedovo.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm our commitment to constructive co-operation with all interested States on the equal participation of women and men in addressing security issues on the relevant platforms, taking into account their mandate and current practices.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY  
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON  
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF  
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.  
Dear colleagues,  
Distinguished speakers,

In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, I should like to start by thanking the distinguished speakers for their valuable presentations on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. This remains a landmark resolution and provides us all with an opportunity to make real and lasting contributions to our collective security. We should do all we can to work together to support its implementation at the national, regional and international level.

In the spirit of today's Security Dialogue, I should like to recall Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/17 on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA), which tasked the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) with "creating equal opportunities for women's participation in policymaking, planning and implementation processes to combat illicit SALW as well as with regard to the OSCE assistance projects in the field of SALW and SCA". In the 2018 Ministerial Council Declaration on OSCE Efforts in the Field of Norms and Best Practices on SALW and SCA, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the OSCE participating States reinforced the urgency of that task by expressing themselves "concerned about the negative impact of illicit trafficking in SALW on our societies, noting in particular the impact on women and children", and by acknowledging "the need for the OSCE to continue to enhance its SALW- and SCA-related norms and best practices and their implementation".

At the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA, held just a week ago, the need for gender mainstreaming in the OSCE's work on normative and practical assistance was highlighted by several speakers. Incorporating gender aspects both into participating States' SALW- and SCA-related policies and into OSCE standards and practical assistance in these fields would contribute significantly to our joint efforts to combat illicit trafficking in SALW and SCA effectively.

As we are now well into the process of updating the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and SCA, and are also proposing to develop new ones, it is the right moment to ensure that gender aspects are reflected, where appropriate, in the text of these and all other relevant OSCE documents. I hope that the lessons learned and discussions held, both at last week's Biennial Meeting and during today's Security Dialogue, will further motivate and guide us in our efforts for the gender mainstreaming of best practices and mechanisms related to SALW and SCA. I would encourage you to make use of FSC Working Group A to elaborate on gender aspects when discussing the drafts of updated Best Practice Guides.

To conclude, allow me to add my voice in support of all the initiatives, including formal networks, that seek to promote the women, peace and security agenda within the OSCE, such as the Women in the First Dimension Network, the MenEngage Network, and the OSCE Women Ambassadors and Representatives. I wish them all every success in their endeavours.

Thank you for your attention.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/964  
21 October 2020  
Annex 6

Original: ENGLISH

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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY  
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR MATTERS RELATED TO  
UNSCR 1325 (ALBANIA)**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
Dear colleagues,

It is a pleasure for me to address this plenary meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in my capacity as FSC Co-ordinator for Matters Related to UNSCR 1325.

I should like to commend our esteemed guest speakers for the valuable contributions and insights they brought to today's Security Dialogue on the theme of the "20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325: implementation in the OSCE area and the way ahead".

The video messages by two of the 150 young graduates of the third edition of the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security training programme on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation helped to remind us of the relevance of capacity-building among young professionals – in particular the positive impact that the knowledge and skills acquired by them through such programmes can have on their current work and future career prospects. Developing competencies leads to enhanced self-confidence and motivation.

Madam Chairperson,

It was on 11 March, during the Turkish FSC Chairmanship, that we started celebrating here the 20th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. We continued on 20 May at the joint meeting of the FSC and the Permanent Council, which was presided over by the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship and the Albanian OSCE Chairmanship, and now we are finalizing our celebrations during the German FSC Chairmanship. The continuation of this Security Dialogue theme throughout the year testifies to the relevance that the women, peace and security agenda still has today, even 20 years after its adoption.

I wish to highlight the proposals outlined by the German FSC Chairmanship on ways of strengthening the implementation of UNSCR 1325, notably the suggestion to compile

participating States' best practices and lessons learned and to disseminate these as widely as possible (FSC.DEL/240/20).

I also wish to emphasize the need for increased efforts to achieve gender equality in the FSC's areas of work. In this regard, it is worth recalling the 2004 Sofia Ministerial Council decision endorsing the OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, which highlighted "the need to appropriately reflect a gender perspective in the activities conducted under the auspices of the OSCE, and for participating States to take all necessary measures to encourage gender awareness raising and to promote equality in rights and full and equal participation of women and men in society, the aim being to promote the practice of gender equality and gender-mainstreaming in the OSCE area, which is essential to comprehensive security" (MC.DEC/14/04).

Furthermore, the Action Plan itself states: "Effective gender-mainstreaming with the goal of achieving gender equality is important if full use is to be made of the human capital in the OSCE area. Gender equality contributes to comprehensive security, which is a goal of OSCE activities in all three dimensions." (MC.DEC/14/04, Annex)

The FSC would benefit from more detailed discussions on, and greater efforts to promote gender equality in its areas of work.

Dear colleagues,

In March 2020, the Swiss Chairperson of the Women in the First Dimension Network acquainted the FSC with this newly established network and presented its two main initiatives, which are very promising in terms of leading to tangible outcomes: first, the establishment of a list of female experts on politico-military topics, and secondly, a mentoring programme.

As a member of this network, I am proud to note that, as far as the first initiative is concerned, there are currently 84 female experts on the list (which is to be considered a living document). This plain number translates into a spectacular wealth of quality, diversity and subject-matter expertise on such fields as peacekeeping, conflict resolution, risk reduction, small arms and light weapons, non-proliferation, confidence- and security-building measures, arms control, European security, mine action and counter-terrorism, to mention but a few. Some of these experts have already taken part in various OSCE events as keynote speakers. The list can be freely accessed, but it will not be published online. It is intended mainly for the use of participating States that are planning to organize expert discussions on politico-military topics and are looking for female speakers. Should any delegations be interested in consulting the list, they are welcome to contact the Women in the First Dimension Network.

The second of the network's aforementioned initiatives is the mentoring programme, which is duly reflected in the German FSC Chairmanship's concept note for today's meeting. We are currently working on the matching process, which will result in mentor and mentee pairs based on the interests and goals identified by each mentee. The pilot programme will be launched at the start of 2021 and is expected to run for six months, most likely until the summer recess. I should like to encourage male colleagues who are interested, especially those with a military background, to get in touch with the Women in the First Dimension

Network if they wish to take part in the mentoring programme. We still have some places available and are striving for a good balance of female and male participants with both diplomatic and military experience.

Madam Chairperson,  
Dear colleagues,

Turning to the latest developments among the participating States, I should like to congratulate Bulgaria, Malta and Romania on their recent or forthcoming adoption of their first National Action Plans on the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

Most of us at the FSC have noted the importance of such national action plans in terms of providing a structure and a sequence of steps aimed at achieving the goals laid down in the resolution while tailoring these goals to the specific circumstances of each participating State.

I genuinely believe that the women, peace and security agenda can serve as a unifying agenda for the OSCE participating States. We all agree that the centre of gravity of UNSCR 1325 is the power of inclusivity of women in peace processes. In UNSCR 1325 the United Nations produced a resolution that is truly one of a kind. Accordingly, rather than trying to duplicate the United Nations' efforts, the OSCE should assess its implementation in the OSCE area and identify opportunities for improving that process.

The German FSC Chairmanship has included the highly relevant topic of today's Security Dialogue among the three key areas for the FSC's inputs to the forthcoming Ministerial Council meeting in Tirana. I would therefore encourage all the delegations to display a unity of purpose, political will and commitment in drawing up a long-term vision for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 – reaching far beyond the Ministerial Council meeting in December – that will benefit the entire OSCE community.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/964  
21 October 2020  
Annex 7

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 2(a)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

Today, as before, we preferred to leave the meeting room while the politico-military aspects of the situation in Ukraine were being discussed. We find the moralizing tone used to address the Russian Federation, which is after all a guarantor and mediator for a peaceful settlement, absolutely unacceptable. We are not in a classroom. What is more, the current situation seems absurd to us against the backdrop of Western delegations in the Forum for Security Co-operation continuing to heap praise on the Ukrainian Government for its “commitment to a peaceful settlement”. For the second month in a row the Ukrainian Government is blocking the negotiation process in the Trilateral Contact Group, it regularly calls into question the Minsk agreements and for more than six years it has been continuing a punitive operation against the population of Donbas. Perhaps our colleagues will be able to give us some clues as to how to describe such an approach. It sounds like a clear case of double standards.

It is probably also worth reacquainting our distinguished partners with the fact that the “Crimean problem” they so love to talk about simply does not exist. We feel it necessary to point out that we no longer intend to comment further on the question as to which country Crimea belongs to – the matter is definitively closed and not up for discussion.

We will consider the possibility of returning once more to a collective discussion of the politico-military aspects of the situation in Donbas, if and when our partners stop distorting reality, using propagandistic clichés about imagined “Russian aggression” and show a readiness for calm dialogue based on real facts.

For our part, the Russian Federation will continue to contribute in practice to the settlement of the internal Ukrainian conflict on the basis of the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015 through direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Madam Chairperson,

We are already into the fourth week of the war unleashed against the Republic of Artsakh and its people by the triple alliance comprising Turkey, Azerbaijan and groups of foreign terrorist fighters. For almost four weeks, the defence army of Artsakh has been resisting a massive Azerbaijani offensive involving the use of artillery, aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and armoured vehicles, as well as large numbers of ground forces.

This slide clearly shows the scale of the aggression. As of today, the Azerbaijani armed forces have suffered the following losses: 202 UAVs, 16 combat helicopters and 23 fighter jets, 580 tanks and other armoured vehicles, four “TOS” heavy flamethrower systems, and three multiple rocket launcher systems (two “Smerch” and one “Uragan”). The casualties among Azerbaijani troops as counted by the Armenian side currently stand at 6,459. Some of these casualties are of course foreign terrorist fighters. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights updates from time to time the number of confirmed deaths among foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists.

Already twice, agreements have been reached on a humanitarian truce – in Moscow on 10 October and through the personal mediation of the French President on 17 October – with a view to enabling humanitarian workers, mainly from the International Committee of the Red Cross, to help retrieve the bodies of fallen soldiers and exchange prisoners of war and other people being held captive. And twice the Azerbaijani armed forces, supported by Turkey and joined by foreign terrorist fighters of various nationalities and ethnic groups, have continued their aggression against Artsakh and Armenia.

Unfortunately, as a result of the Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression against Artsakh, 36 civilians have been killed and 115 wounded. More than 9,830 items of immovable and movable property and objects of civilian infrastructure (including industrial facilities) have been destroyed or damaged.

Since 27 September, the deliberate targeting of civilian areas and infrastructure has been a hallmark of the Azerbaijani armed forces’ operation. During the 24 days of the war launched by the triple alliance, weapons banned under international humanitarian law have been used against civilian settlements and infrastructure. Cultural and educational institutions

have also been targeted. As a result, more than 33,000 children and young people have been deprived of their right to education.

As we already informed you last week, the emergency services of the Republic of Artsakh have collected and destroyed around 673 unexploded Turkish- and Israeli-made cluster bombs and mines in the capital city Stepanakert alone. In addition, the use of cluster munition has continued during the recent shelling of the capital city of Stepanakert. Yesterday a further 260 cluster bombs were found in a civilian area in the outskirts of the city.

Madam Chairperson,

Unfortunately the aggression of the triple alliance is not limited to the territory of the Republic of Artsakh. In the evening of 16 October, the air defence system of the Republic of Armenia detected Azerbaijani UAVs that were violating Armenian airspace in the south of our country. This incursion was followed by an attack on military facilities of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, which Azerbaijan tried to justify using a flimsy excuse – by claiming that the equipment in question had been “ready to strike at peaceful settlements in Azerbaijan”. As a result of that attack, a number of civilians, including children, were severely wounded; civilian infrastructure was also damaged.

Since the beginning of the offensive, the Armenian armed forces have shot down 18 Azerbaijani UAVs in one region of the Republic of Armenia alone.

The aggression by the triple alliance against Artsakh and Armenia is being accompanied by a campaign of fake news and disinformation regarding the alleged shelling of Azerbaijani settlements by Armenia. The main aim of this disinformation campaign is to cover up the massive shelling of large civilian settlements in Artsakh since the first day of the offensive. On 16 October, Azerbaijan spread groundless accusations against Armenia alleging that a missile had been fired from the territory of Armenia in the direction of the Ordubad region of Nakhichevan. The Defence Ministry of Armenia pointed out that no such missile had been fired at all, emphasizing that this was yet another lie by the Azerbaijani politico-military leadership, which is seeking to expand the geographical scope of the conflict.

On 17 October, Azerbaijan made another attempt at disinformation, claiming that the armed forces of Armenia had opened fire in the direction of Gandzak (Ganja) – something that was resolutely rejected by both the defence army of Artsakh and Armenia’s Ministry of Defence. Indeed, this whole incident needs to be examined carefully, first and foremost to clarify what point there could possibly have been in using a rather expensive ballistic missile to target a residential compound without any strategic or military importance when there were so many legitimate and important military targets, as identified by the Defence Army of Artsakh.

At the same time, the Armenian side has presented video footage and photographs indicating that Azerbaijan has been stationing heavy military hardware in civilian settlements, cynically using their inhabitants as human shields.

Azerbaijan's allegations do not stand up to criticism and defy all logic. That is precisely the reason why both Artsakh and Armenia have advocated the introduction of ceasefire verification mechanisms, which would make it possible to maintain a ceasefire once that has been achieved. Alas, this idea, like so many other proposals before, has been rejected by Azerbaijan. It is by no means the first time we are referring to this issue here. Given the allegations against Armenia and Artsakh, no matter how groundless they are, we believe that it is essential to introduce these verification mechanisms. There have been many proposals to that end. Such mechanisms should have been put in place a long time ago, but to this day they have been rejected outright by Azerbaijan. The facts revealed in the following video expose the mendacity of Azerbaijani propaganda.

<https://twitter.com/ArmenianUnified/status/1317469956334931973?s=20>

Dear colleagues,

We have been presenting evidence of Turkey's involvement and in particular of the Turkish Air Force's role in the aerial attacks against the cities and population of Artsakh and Armenia. After the last meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on 14 October, some open sources have revealed further details about the aggression of the triple alliance, which was obviously provoked by Turkey's politico-military leadership. For two consecutive days now, the air defence units of the defence army of Artsakh have been shooting down Turkish-made "Bayraktar" combat drones, which are being operated by Turkish experts. The Turkish authorities are instigating the Azerbaijani regime to continue its military operations, providing it with comprehensive political, diplomatic and intelligence assistance.

Our delegation has repeatedly expressed concerns over the Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises held in July and August, pointing out that a large number of contingents of the Turkish armed forces had remained stationed on Azerbaijani territory in order to co-ordinate and lead subsequent offensives against Armenia and Artsakh. In particular, we informed the FSC that Turkish F-16 fighter jets that had remained stationed at Gandzak (Ganja) airport were conducting reconnaissance missions before the aggression launched on 27 September, and that since then they have been carrying out combat missions in support of Azerbaijani attacks both in the air and on the ground. Even though the Azerbaijani delegation denied this, evidence that subsequently came to light confirmed the truth of Armenia's assertions, and President Aliyev himself was obliged to acknowledge the presence of Turkish F-16 fighter jets in Azerbaijan. It took just under three weeks to prove Azerbaijan's lies on that score. But there is still more to come.

Open sources have confirmed that 600 Turkish military personnel remained in Azerbaijan after this summer's joint exercises: a tactical unit comprising 200 soldiers and 50 officers stationed in Nakhichevan; 90 military advisers in Baku, a 120-strong tactical flight team at the Gabala airbase; 20 drone operators at the Dollyar airbase; 50 officers at Yevlakh airport; 50 officers in the Fourth Army Corps; and 20 personnel at the naval base and military academy in Baku.

This Turkish contingent also included 18 armoured vehicles, one multiple launch rocket system, ten military vehicles, six fighter jets, eight helicopters and up to 25 UAVs (which were carrying out air reconnaissance missions both in Artsakh and on the territory of Armenia).

Since the beginning of the aggression there has been a sharp increase in Turkish military transport flights and arms transfers to Azerbaijan. Figures compiled by the Turkish Exporters' Assembly, which brings together more than 95,000 exporting companies in 61 sectors, indicate that Azerbaijan bought military equipment worth a total of 123 million US dollars from Turkey in the first nine months of 2020. Moreover, monthly sales jumped from around 280,000 US dollars in July to 36 million US dollars in August and 77.1 million US dollars in September, when the data were published. For comparison, military sales to Azerbaijan in the first nine months of 2019 amounted to only 20.7 million US dollars.

Turkish-made "Bayraktar" UAVs, which are operated by Turkish specialists, are actively engaged in war crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh. On 18 and 19 October, the air defence forces of the Republic of Artsakh shot down two of these UAVs, which had been operating near civilian settlements. The very fact that Turkish-made UAVs are carrying out combat missions over civilian areas illustrates the criminal nature of the politico-military leadership in both Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In addition to receiving Turkish supplies, Azerbaijan is itself engaged in the smuggling of large amounts of armaments and large numbers of foreign terrorist fighters. Azerbaijani civilian and cargo airlines are operating daily flights to military airbases in various countries. Most recently, on 16 October an Azerbaijani cargo aircraft flew from Baku to the Bagram airfield in Afghanistan, and then on 17 October from there to Lashkargah airport (also in Afghanistan) before returning to Baku. Most of these flights are not recorded in the list of international flights and some of the airports involved are not even officially listed.

Madam Chairperson,

In addition to arms sales, Turkey continues to supply Azerbaijan with foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists. Various reports from Europe and the Middle East attest to further transfers of foreign terrorist fighters from Syria to Azerbaijan by the Turkish Government. The most recent "contingent" was made up of over 400 fighters from various groups under the control of Turkey. The Armenian experts cannot assess properly the number of fatalities among foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists. According to some sources, though, 27 Syrian fighters were killed in the last 48 hours alone, bringing the total death toll among the terrorist groups deployed by the Turkish Government to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone up to at least 161. The remains of 92 fighters have so far been repatriated to Syria for burial.

To conclude, we should like to reiterate our appeal to the OSCE participating States to continue exerting pressure on Turkey to withdraw its military personnel from the South Caucasus, together with its affiliated terrorist groups, and also to halt its bellicose rhetoric, which is inciting Azerbaijan to insist on a military solution of the conflict and hence on a continuation of the hostilities. The actions of Turkey, both in the South Caucasus and in the wider region, are aimed merely at aggravating the situation on the ground, thereby leading to further bloodshed.

Thank you.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No.964, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF AZERBAIJAN**

Madam Chairperson,

The delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan would like to update the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on ongoing aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and State terror being committed by Armenia against Azerbaijan and its population. This calls for urgent and full implementation by all OSCE participating States of their relevant commitments in the politico-military dimension.

As we already informed the Forum, on 27 September 2020, the armed forces of Armenia, blatantly violating the ceasefire regime, have launched another aggression against the territory and population of Azerbaijan. In the days that followed Armenian armed forces have been attacking the positions of the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the front line. Despite formal humanitarian ceasefire agreed on 10 and 18 October, Armenian armed forces have not ceased their attacks on Azerbaijani military with the aim of regaining control over positions they lost in the course of counter-offensive conducted by Azerbaijani armed forces.

Of particular concern is continued deliberate and indiscriminate mass bombardment by Armenia with heavy artillery, rockets and ballistic missiles of densely populated cities and other residential areas of Azerbaijan, including those located far away from the zone of conflict, in gross violation of international humanitarian law. As a result of this ongoing aggression by Armenia, thus far 63 civilians, including children, women and elderly, have been killed, 292 have been wounded, 1,981 private houses, 90 residential apartment buildings and 386 other civilian facilities have been destroyed or damaged (exhibit 1).

Ganja, the second largest and densely populated city of Azerbaijan, located far away from the conflict zone, has been attacked three times in a row. Two of these attacks on the night of 11 October and 17 October were launched from the territory of Armenia with the use of Scud ballistic missiles, after declaration of humanitarian ceasefire. The consequences of these attacks have been devastating, causing the death of 25 civilians, including women, children and infants, more than 84 civilians have been wounded, a great number of residential buildings and other civilian facilities have been destroyed or damaged (exhibit 2). These two attacks will go down in history as first instances in the OSCE area when a participating State used a Scud ballistic missile against civilians and civilian objects on the territory of another participating State (exhibit 3).

Night-time attacks on Ganja with ballistic missiles of such a high devastating capacity and precision leave no doubt that it was a pre-planned deliberate strike conducted with the aim of inflicting maximum level of casualties among civilians. As such, this attack constitutes a war crime, a crime against humanity and an act of State terror, for which all perpetrators, including those at the highest echelon of politico-military leadership of Armenia bear international legal responsibility. As it was stated by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, those who planned, ordered and executed this heinous attack on Azerbaijani civilians will be brought to justice.

Azerbaijan does not respond to these provocations of Armenia and conducts its counter-offensive operation strictly within its territory in exercise of its inherent right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Azerbaijani armed forces, unlike that of Armenia, fully comply with provisions of international humanitarian law and are not targeting any civilians in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan or any objects on the territory of Armenia. They exercise a high degree of cautiousness and vigilance in order not to inflict any collateral damage to civilians residing in the occupied territories. On multiple occasions, Azerbaijani authorities and our armed forces issued appeals to civilians living in these territories and called them not to take arms and stay away from military actions, especially from firing points, military facilities and military infrastructure of the armed forces of Armenia. It has been assured that appropriate conditions will be created for their evacuation from the conflict zone and all their rights will be protected.

Another example of Azerbaijan's compliance in good faith with its obligations under international humanitarian law is treatment of Armenian servicemen who were captured in wounded condition by Azerbaijani armed forces. A couple of days ago Secretary of the State Commission of Azerbaijan on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons has visited wounded Armenian servicemen in a hospital. Guided by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, telephone conversations and video appeals of wounded servicemen with their families have been arranged.

Furthermore, in line with agreed humanitarian ceasefire, Azerbaijan assists the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in carrying out its work. In specific, Azerbaijan communicated to the ICRC its readiness to unilaterally return the remains of Armenian servicemen to the Armenian side through the ICRC. However, this initiative has been rejected by Armenia.

Dear colleagues,

Atrocious attacks by Armenia against Azerbaijani civilians, which do not spare children, women and elderly at their home and while asleep, are conducted with weapons that Armenia acquires from different countries, mainly OSCE participating States, through various schemes of trafficking.

Recent developments in the conflict zone vividly demonstrate that weapons and ammunition acquired by Armenia are diverted to and deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan in gross violation of Armenia's obligations under international law, as well as extensive set of OSCE commitments, principles and criteria for export or transfer of different types of weapons and ammunition. These weapons and ammunition are being used against

Azerbaijani civilians and are launched both from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia.

Despite a formal humanitarian ceasefire, Armenia gets a huge amount of weapons and ammunition, brings mercenaries and foreign terrorist fighters to the conflict zone. Armenia is misusing civilian aircraft for transferring military goods as well as mercenaries and foreign terrorist fighters in blatant violation of rules of civil aviation reflected in the Chicago Convention of 1944. A significant increase of air traffic to Armenia from across the globe, including from those places, which previously either had no or very rare connection with Armenia, deserves particular reflection.

All these activities of Armenia leave no doubt that its goal is to exploit the ceasefire for preparing a new massive attack against Azerbaijan and its civilian population. It is therefore of utmost importance for the entire international community to realize and fulfil its responsibility not to allow Armenia to continue its aggression against Azerbaijan and commit further war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of terror. Full and good faith implementation by all OSCE participating States of their relevant commitments is of crucial importance in order to deny Armenia any means to kill more innocent people and commit further crimes.

In this regard, we deem it particularly important to remind all OSCE participating States of their following commitments:

- In accordance with the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers (DOC.FSC/3/96), each participating State is committed to avoid transfers “which would be likely to threaten the national security of other States and of territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State”;
- Under the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1) issuing licenses for exports of small arms and light weapons must be avoided where there is a clear risk that “the small arms in question might threaten the national security of other States”, “threaten compliance with international law governing the conduct of armed conflict”, “be diverted to territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State”;
- Under the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) (FSC.DEC/3/04) decisions to authorize exports of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) must take into account the potential for diversion or misuse in the recipient country, as well as the recipient government’s ability and willingness to protect against unauthorized re-transfers, loss, theft and diversion;
- The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (DOC.FSC/1/95) commits all participating States not provide assistance to or support States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration

on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

The aforementioned are collectively agreed OSCE commitments, implementation of which in good faith is a mutual responsibility of all participating States vis-à-vis each other. Therefore, the Azerbaijani side legitimately expects all OSCE participating States concerned to take prompt actions arising from their relevant OSCE commitments and to reconsider their military-technical co-operation with Armenia.

Furthermore, we have continuously been drawing the attention of the FSC to Armenia's blatant violations of its commitments and obligations under the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, specifically by illegally deploying its armed forces in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, by taking advantage of the fragmentation of the zone of application of confidence- and security-building measure regimes and thus, concealing its military potential from these regimes, by engaging in illegal massive military build-up in these territories. We have presented on multiple occasions undeniable facts testifying to these egregious violations and repeatedly warned against the adverse effects of Armenia's outright disregard of its commitments and obligations.

The amount of weapons and ammunition destroyed and captured by the armed forces of Azerbaijan (exhibit 4) in the course of our counter-offensive operation reaffirms the aforementioned grave violations and reveals a high scale of militarization of the occupied territories, which pursued the obvious goal to consolidate the unlawful occupation of these territories. Thus, as of 20 October, Azerbaijani armed forces destroyed and captured 280 tanks of Armenian armed forces. To compare, in the latest annual exchange of military information within the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Armenia declared to possess only 145 tanks. Our armed forces also destroyed and captured 424 artillery pieces, while Armenia declared to have only 242 artillery pieces. These vast differences in numbers speak for themselves and one can only wonder how many more pieces of military equipment are still left at the disposal of Armenian armed forces in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. We would like to demonstrate the latest video of destroyed and captured tanks (exhibit 5). We will present more detailed documented evidence of this in due course.

To conclude, Azerbaijan counts on support and solidarity of the OSCE participating States in thwarting imminent threat posed by Armenia's ongoing aggression against Azerbaijan accompanied by heinous war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of State terror.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.



**958th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 3(a)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SLOVENIA**

Madam Chairperson,

As a follow-up to the recent Security Dialogue on modernization of the Vienna Document held during the 956th plenary meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on 30 September – specifically to the update on the Information Management and Reporting System (iMARS) provided on that occasion by Mr. Kristijan Podbevšek from the OSCE Secretariat's FSC Support Section (SEC.GAL/132.20) – we should like to reiterate Slovenia's strong support for the iMARS project because of the many benefits it will bring.

We regard iMARS as one of the most significant technical developments in the field of arms control in recent years.

The system will help us to develop a comprehensive and structured database, manage more effectively the information exchanged as part of confidence- and security-building measures, and achieve considerable horizontal synergies.

Moreover, iMARS is expected to reduce the workload of all those involved in the exchange of military information and to significantly increase the capacity of participating States to make full use of these data, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of existing transparency measures.

The importance of having an automated system in place along with facilities for electronic communication has also been highlighted by the FSC's work in the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when we have had to significantly reduce our physical presence at meetings and other activities.

Suiting actions to words, it is my pleasure to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Slovenia has decided to join the participating States that are financially supporting the iMARS project – namely, by providing a contribution of 7,000 euros.

We intend to carry on supporting iMARS in the future, too, and hope to be in a position to make additional contributions.

Thank you for your attention. Please attach this statement to the journal of the day.



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**958th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 3(c)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON  
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF  
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.  
Dear colleagues,

In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I should like to take this opportunity to inform you about the Group's most recent meeting, which took place on 12 October 2020 via video teleconference.

The meeting was attended by 51 participants from 42 OSCE participating States<sup>1</sup> and from the FSC Support Section. The participating States leading the process for updating the OSCE Best Practice Guides (BPGs) in general – namely, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States – provided an update on the progress made in updating specifically the guides on SALW and SCA. In addition, the United States provided a briefing on the expert meeting that was jointly organized by the FSC Support Section/Conflict Prevention Centre on 6 October to review, revise and submit final draft versions of three updated BPGs: on national procedures for the destruction of SALW; on procedures for the management of SCA; and on national procedures for stockpile management, security and destruction of man-portable air defence systems.

I am very pleased to note that seven out of the 17 existing BPGs are currently being reviewed and updated. However, we should not rest on the progress achieved and I therefore encourage the participating States that originally authored or sponsored the remaining ten BPGs to initiate the update process for these, or at least to lead the discussions aimed at assessing whether they continue to be relevant and applicable or need to be updated.

As the principles and the mechanism for reviewing and updating the BPGs are still being tested and are subject to further refinement, a revised version of the food-for-thought

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<sup>1</sup> Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.

paper “OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and Conventional Ammunition: Their Purpose, Effective Use and Systematic Review” (FSC.DEL/243/19/Rev.1, dated 6 October 2020), which reflects lessons learned since 2019, was presented to the participants at the recent meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on 12 October. Building on this paper, we may consider developing a separate guidance document on reviewing and updating the BPGs that can be used in future cycles.

In response to the participating States that had expressed interest in harmonizing the OSCE questionnaire on SALW with the corresponding template used by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the FSC Support Section presented at the meeting an updated OSCE reporting template for the implementation of the OSCE Document on SALW and its supplementary decisions.

A perception paper reflecting the discussions held at the Informal Group of Friends’ meeting of 12 October and proposing the next steps will be issued soon together with the presentations given at the meeting.

I should like to thank all the participants and all the distinguished delegations of OSCE participating States that supported this meeting and contributed to its success.

I also wish to extend my gratitude to the FSC Support Section for providing invaluable subject-matter expertise and technical support.

Thank you very much for your attention.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/964  
21 October 2020  
Annex 12

ENGLISH  
Original: GERMAN

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**958th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 964, Agenda item 3(d)

## **STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRPERSON**

Ladies and gentlemen,  
Dear colleagues,

Under this agenda item I should like to offer a brief explanation of our own.

It concerns the various information obligations provided for in our OSCE politico-military instruments. In our capacity as the country holding the Chairmanship, we have implemented the “reminder mechanism” and contacted those participating States that have not yet communicated the information that is due.

I appeal to all participating States that have not yet responded to do so and to let us know when we can expect a notification. Thank you.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.