

Chairmanship: Hungary

608th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 21 April 2010

Opened: 10.40 a.m.

Closed: 12.05 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador Gy. Molnár

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: OPENING STATEMENT BY THE HUNGARIAN CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE FSC: PRESENTATION BY H.E. MR. JÓZSEF BALI, STATE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE POLICY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

Chairperson, State Secretary for Defence Policy of the Ministry of Defence of Hungary (Annex 1), Spain-European Union (with the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/34/10), Kazakhstan, United States of America, Ireland, Greece, Russian Federation, Ukraine

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) *Non-compliance with the commitments of the Vienna Document 1999:* United Kingdom (Annex 2), Germany (Annex 3), United States of America, Denmark, France, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Greece

(b) *Food-for-thought paper and proposal for a draft FSC decision on establishing a procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document (FSC.DEL/9/10/Rev.2):* Slovenia, Czech Republic, Denmark

- (c) *Nuclear Posture Review, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Nuclear Security Summit: United States of America (Annex 4)*

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Briefing on projects related to small arms and light weapons: FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons (United Kingdom) (FSC.DEL/33/10 OSCE+), Belarus, Kyrgyzstan*
- (b) *Briefing on projects related to stockpiles of conventional ammunition: FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Denmark) (FSC.DEL/36/10 OSCE+), Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre, Denmark*
- (c) *Issues related to the draft decision on the OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (FSC.DD/1/10/Rev.1): Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Sweden), Hungary*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 28 April 2010, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/614

21 April 2010

Annex 1

Original: ENGLISH

608th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 614, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF HUNGARY

Mr. Chairperson, Mr. Secretary General, Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I am honoured to have the privilege of addressing the Forum for Security Co-operation on behalf of the Government of Hungary, in particular on behalf of the Minister of Defence, on the occasion of the Republic of Hungary's assuming the Forum's Chairmanship for the second session of 2010.

I would like to extend our warm thanks to the Greek delegation for their able leadership during the first session of the year, which has laid a very solid basis for our future work. We look forward to benefiting from your experience and are delighted to be having you in the FSC Troika in the coming months. We would like to welcome Ireland to the FSC Troika, and to commend the outgoing member of the Troika, the United Kingdom, in particular for preparing a substantial FSC contribution to the Athens Ministerial Council. I would like to underline our readiness, yet again demonstrated in last week's joint FSC-PC meeting, for further constructive co-operation with the Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship.

Mr. Chairperson,

The principal documents issued by the Republic of Hungary on security issues provide a proper picture of our view of the contribution of the OSCE to Euro-Atlantic security.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary states, that: "The OSCE is the only comprehensive European institution covering the three closely interlinked dimensions of security – military, economic and human – in their entirety and continues to play an essential role in promoting peace and stability, in enhancing security through co-operation and in implementing democracy and human rights."

The National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary (2009) includes the following assertion amongst the basic principles governing the country's defence policy: "In addition to the pre-eminent role of the United Nations (UN), the Republic of Hungary attaches great importance to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE) from the aspect of maintaining international peace and security, and participates in the actions and international operations conducted by them.”

While the Organization has achieved significant progress in tackling threats to the OSCE area, foreign ministers have recognized the need to address new challenges and to reconfirm, review and reinvigorate security and co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. A new dialogue on European security, the Corfu Process, has been initiated, which could and should play a valuable role in this endeavour. We hope that during our Chairmanship the FSC can contribute to this common objective.

In our view, the comprehensive set of principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe remains as relevant as ever. The problem lies not in the validity of these principles but in shortcomings to fulfil them. Therefore, the task ahead of us is not only that of finding appropriate answers to new security threats but also of strengthening the implementation of existing commitments and their review mechanisms under new and changing conditions.

As a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, my country feels a special responsibility for Europe's stability and peaceful development, most particularly, of course, in our region. That is why we see the FSC Chairmanship as a challenge and at the same time as an opportunity to show our deep commitment to the common values we believe in. We take up this position with a profound sense of duty and responsibility.

Mr. Chairperson,

The FSC is an autonomous decision-making body within the OSCE's politico-military dimension. The decisions taken here have a direct impact on the security environment in Europe. In our assessment, the Forum offers a unique opportunity for all participating States to discuss issues of particular relevance and importance. At this point I should underline the clear interrelation between the dimensions of the OSCE and emphasize that security in Europe and the security of Europe depends on all three of them.

In our judgement, the main tasks of the Chairmanship are to create the appropriate framework for fruitful work by presenting ambitious but balanced agendas for the meetings and to act as a catalyst in discussions based on proposals put forward by participating States. In the year 2010, the work of the FSC is to be guided by the ongoing Corfu Process and the relevant tasking of the Athens Ministerial Council and by the decisions on small arms and light weapons (MC.DEC/15/09) and issues relevant to the FSC (MC.DEC/16/09).

Having said that, I would now like to outline the main priorities of the Hungarian FSC Chairmanship.

The second session of the FSC in 2010 will be particularly influenced by the ongoing dialogue on European security within the framework of the OSCE. As you are all aware, the Chairmanship-in-Office is mandated by the decision on furthering the Corfu Process (MC.DEC/1/09) to prepare, in close consultation with the FSC Chairmanship, an interim report by the end of June and to present it to a joint meeting of the FSC and PC. We are ready

and willing to play our full part in fostering this process in the FSC. On the one hand, discussions within the FSC can make a useful contribution to the ongoing Corfu Process, as the Forum has vast expertise in the politico-military dimension. On the other hand, it is important that delegations bear in mind the wider framework of the European security dialogue when discussing issues relevant to the Corfu Process within the FSC. With regard to the role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, which is a cross-dimensional issue falling within the mandate of the PC and the FSC, the role we play as FSC Chairmanship and as Corfu co-ordinator for this issue will be useful to maintaining the comprehensiveness of our approach.

The Annual Security Review Conference of the OSCE is one of the highlights of the year and will be a very important step in the Corfu Process. This year's conference will be extended to three days and will have two new working sessions. The FSC has traditionally made a substantial contribution to the discussions and we expect this to continue under our Chairmanship.

The basic objective of the Corfu Process is to restore trust and confidence between participating States. We hope that a deepened FSC Security Dialogue will make a direct contribution to this goal. We will organize discussions on a wide range of issues such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), and new military doctrines in the OSCE area – and these discussions will enrich our common fund of wisdom on how to listen to each other and, more importantly, on how to have a better understanding of the developments and challenges around us. The presentations we offer for this dialogue will be relevant to the efforts of the FSC.

Introducing the concept of co-operative security into the military sphere through the establishment of unique arms control and confidence-building regimes was one of the most important steps towards the elimination of the dividing lines that once separated our countries. The Vienna Document 1999, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and the documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) remain the basic normative documents for the Forum. Hungary will continue to seek to intensify their implementation and will do its utmost to urge all participating States to fulfil their commitments to the full.

We should also continue our discussions on the future of these regimes. The proposals for the modernization of the Vienna Document and the recommendations of the twentieth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) give us a good basis on which to do so. Using the framework of our working groups and of course the plenary meeting itself, we will grant the time necessary for discussing these issues and other issues related to improvements in the politico-military toolbox and to further enhancing the culture of dialogue and co-operative security. The same is valid for the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, in particular for the Reference Guide.

Going further on the path laid down by our Greek friends, we will do our utmost to facilitate consensus on developing the OSCE Plan of Action on SALW by May 2010, as tasked by the Ministerial Council. We believe that the OSCE has been at the vanguard of the global fight against the scourge of small arms and we should make every effort to maintain

this position. One matter of particular importance in this regard will be the FSC's significant contribution to the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States being held in New York from 14 to 18 June 2010 to consider implementation of the 2001 UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms.

It is also important that we take practical steps to tackle problems associated with SALW and surplus conventional ammunition. As holder of the FSC Chairmanship, Hungary will lead by example and intends to support the OSCE projects to address this danger. I am glad to announce that the Republic of Hungary is ready to provide financial support for the elimination of the deteriorating toxic rocket fuel component "melange" in Ukraine and for the OSCE-UNDP Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM).

Mr. Chairperson,

In the Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation adopted in Athens (MC.DOC/5/09) our political leaders emphasized that "the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security." I can ensure you of the intention of the Hungarian FSC Chairmanship to continue the very pragmatic approach to addressing this issue of vital interest. We believe that the FSC can play a role in facilitating, where appropriate, the fulfilment by the participating States of the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, namely, UNSCR 1540 (2004), UNSCR 1673 (2006) UNSCR 1810 (2008), and UNSCR 1887 (2009). We welcome the signing of the successor agreement to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) by Presidents Medvedev and Obama on 8 April in Prague. The new treaty will have a positive effect on the work of the FSC.

On the basis of positive experience from the past, we are going to initiate several joint FSC-PC meetings. Last week we already had one joint meeting featuring a presentation by the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); as we have indicated, there is also a requirement to hold another one to discuss the interim report. We are also planning to hold a third one dedicated to the cross-dimensional topic of cyber security. This meeting is due to take place on 2 June, and we encourage the participation of experts from the capitals to reinforce the delegations here in Vienna.

Mr. Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen,

On 15 April we circulated the Indicative Schedule for Plenary Meetings under the Hungarian Chairmanship (FSC.INF/5/10). We hope very much that the content of this document properly reflects our intentions and we count on your support.

By way of conclusion, allow me to take you back to the world of ancient Rome and finish with a pun. When Julius Caesar crossed the river Rubicon, he coined the famous phrase "Alea iacta est" – in English, "The die is cast." The phrase is still used today to mean that events have passed a point of no return, that something inevitable will happen. As Hungarian has the same word for "dice" and for "cube", we can now say that "the cube is cast" – we have started our FSC Chairmanship, though we hope that the only inevitable matter will be our joint success. We would like you to take with you the small piece of Hungarian ingeniousness on the table in front of you, Rubik's magic cube. When we were choosing this

present we felt there were many similarities between the Rubik cube and our work in the FSC. It is very easy to create serious disorder with a few careless moves, but with diligent work and careful thinking it is also possible to restore order. Hungary's wish for all of us is for good work, a lot of success, a good atmosphere, and occasionally some free time for the mind-boggling exercise of aligning the magic cube. We will play our part, but we also count on your constructiveness and co-operation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/614

21 April 2010

Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

608th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 614, Agenda item 2(a)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Chairperson,

As you will know, the United Kingdom supports the full implementation of the Vienna Document 1999, and regards this politically-binding document as a cornerstone of the interlocking web of arms control and confidence-and security-building measures that supports peace and security in the space from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

It is with some disappointment, therefore, Mr. Chairperson, that I must report to the Forum about an incident of non-compliance with the obligations of the VD 99 that is currently in train.

On 15 April 2010 the United Kingdom delivered an F33 Notification, reference number CBM/GB/10/0010/F33/0 to the Tajik authorities in Dushanbe. The Notification set out the United Kingdom's intention to inspect a specified area under paragraph 80 of the VD 99. It was, of course, not possible to use the OSCE Communications Network in this case as Tajikistan remains unconnected to the Network. Despite a number of reminders and conversations with the Tajik authorities no response was received until 19 April, in Vienna, when their F34 (reference F34 CBM/TJ/10/0010/F33/0) was delivered under cover of a note verbale circulated to all participating States under document reference FSC.EMI/70/10. This document requested that the United Kingdom delay its inspection of the relevant Tajik military unit, due to the involvement of the unit's personnel in ongoing military exercises conducted in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Mr. Chairperson,

You will appreciate that the sole purpose of the proposed UK specified area inspection was in order to observe these CSTO exercises, and the United Kingdom's desire to do so is in full accordance with, indeed, such an inspection is the purpose of, paragraph 80 of the VD 99. The United Kingdom has approached the Tajik authorities in Vienna, London and Dushanbe requesting that they reconsider this request for delay, and the United Kingdom inspection team remains en route to Tajikistan. We very much hope that this incident will resolve itself in the next few hours, allowing the inspection to go ahead as planned. We look

for the support of the Forum in emphasizing the continued need for full implementation of the VD 99 into the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/614

21 April 2010

Annex 3

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

608th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 614, Agenda item 2(a)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Mr. Chairperson,

Germany shares the concern of the United Kingdom that the rejection by Tajikistan of the announced inspection is not in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999.

Germany takes this opportunity to bring to the attention of this forum a further fact that also gives rise to concern in this connection.

On 9 March 2010, Germany gave notice of its intention to carry out an inspection in Tajikistan under the terms of the Vienna Document. In accordance with paragraph 85.6 of the Vienna Document 1999, the note referred to the need for an overflight using a helicopter or an airplane.

In its note of reply, Tajikistan declined to provide a helicopter or an airplane, citing the following reason:

“Because of technical reasons the inspection cannot be carried out using aircraft.”

During the inspection it emerged that Tajikistan has available to it both helicopters that are ready for operation as well as transport aircraft of the type AN-2, which are also suitable for the inspection of a specified area from the air. In addition, pilot training is provided in the Tajik armed forces.

The consequence of this refusal by Tajikistan to make possible an overflight over a specified area was that this area could be inspected only to an inadequate extent. Even allowing for the fact that in other respects Tajikistan showed itself to be open during the inspection and acted in the spirit of the Vienna Document, this incident provides grounds for concern.

Germany requests Tajikistan to ensure the overflight possibility provided for in the Vienna Document during future inspections. This is also true in particular for the – it is to be hoped – inspection by the United Kingdom, scheduled for the near future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/614

21 April 2010

Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

608th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 614, Agenda item 2(c)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson,

This has been a very dynamic period in the U.S. efforts to address arms control and non-proliferation issues.

First, on 6 April, the Department of Defense released the Nuclear Posture Review – a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture. Today’s most pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of large-scale nuclear attack as during the Cold War. The conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review reflect that reality. The NPR directs us to preserve the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent for as long as it is required, reduce the potential for conflict, enhance strategic stability worldwide, and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Our updated Negative Security Assurance (NSA) reinforces the President’s objectives of reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons by making it clear that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

The purpose of this change is to emphasize to non-nuclear States the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defenses and diplomacy are geared toward those objectives and sends a clear message about this Administration’s priorities and resolve. Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been stronger. In this regard, the NPR emphasizes close co-operation with our allies around the world and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security.

Second, President Obama and President Medvedev on 8 April signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The new Treaty limits U.S. and Russian nuclear forces significantly below the levels established by the 1991 START treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and advances the security of the entire planet. It reaffirms American and Russian leadership on behalf of nuclear security and global

non-proliferation, and represents our shared commitment to co-operate substantively and effectively on issues of mutual interest.

Finally, President Obama on 12 and 13 April hosted a Nuclear Security Summit to enhance international co-operation to prevent nuclear terrorism, the most immediate threat to global security. Over 40 nations participated, including many OSCE participating States, representing a diverse set of regions and various levels of nuclear capabilities. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, leaving other broad topics such as non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy to different forums.

Among the OSCE participating States at the Summit that made commitments to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, we want to acknowledge the historic contribution of Ukraine in pledging the removal of all of its highly-enriched uranium. This is a significant and essential step in helping us all reach our non-proliferation goals. As it did in giving up its nuclear weapons in 1994, Ukraine has shown itself to be a global leader on non-proliferation. We would also like to highlight Kazakhstan's many years of continued co-operation and success in reducing nuclear threats. This includes the decommissioning of the BN-350 nuclear reactor at Aktau, and the conversion of the research reactor in Alatau and the elimination of highly enriched uranium stored there, as called for in the Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I request this statement be attached to the journal of the day.