

Chairmanship: United States of America

968th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 17 February 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.
Suspended: 1 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.25 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. C. Austrian

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/2/21 OSCE+.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/60/21) (FSC.DEL/60/21/Add.1), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/64/21), United States of America, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/59/21 OSCE+), Canada, Russian Federation (Annex 1), Poland, Lithuania (Annex 2)

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE: SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS (MANPADS)

– *Presentation by Mr. M. Schroeder, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey*

– *Presentation by Ms. K. Chandler, Director of the US Interagency MANPADS Task Force*

- *Presentation by Mr. A. Borde, Head of Risk Assessment, French Civil Aviation Authority*

Chairperson, Mr. M. Schroeder, Ms. K. Chandler (FSC.DEL/54/21 OSCE+), Mr. A. Borde (FSC.DEL/53/21 OSCE+), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/63/21), Switzerland (FSC.DEL/55/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/58/21 OSCE+), France (Annex 3), Canada, Ukraine (FSC.DEL/61/21 OSCE+), Serbia (Annex 4), Russian Federation (Annex 5), Turkey (Annex 6), Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia) (Annex 7), FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria) (Annex 8)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Financial contributions to assistance projects on small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition in the OSCE area: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein (Annex 9), Spain, FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria) (Annex 10)*
- (b) *FSC virtual lunch, to be held on 24 February 2021: Chairperson*
- (c) *Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, to be held on 25 February 2021: Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia)*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 24 February 2021, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 1

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

968th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Madam Chairperson,

February the 12th of this year saw the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which was unconditionally supported by the leaders of the “Normandy format” countries. Today, 17 February, marks the sixth anniversary of the unanimous endorsement of that document by United Nations Security Council resolution 2202, as a result of which the Package of Measures became an integral part of international law. The fundamental role of the Package of Measures is clear: it has made a tangible contribution to stabilizing the situation in the east of Ukraine by putting a stop to the most active phase of the hostilities initiated by the Ukrainian Government, and it has also marked out a path towards peace and civil dialogue.

A consistent premise for the Russian Federation is the need for full implementation of the Minsk Package of Measures through direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk. All the options and mechanisms for promoting a comprehensive peaceful settlement are in place.

At the same time, we are obliged to note with regret that the process for a peaceful settlement is being complicated by the aggressive rhetoric of Ukraine, which instead of taking practical steps to fulfil its obligations is completely disregarding them and creating a mere semblance of efforts to promote a settlement in Donbas. In violation of the Package of Measures, the shelling of residential areas continues to this day in the east of Ukraine; the trade, economic and transport blockade persists; the exchange of detainees has come to a standstill; and the amnesty issues are unresolved. In the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ukraine’s representatives have taken a “consistent and principled position”, which essentially boils down to not considering or even touching upon the proposals put forward by the representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk.

After six years, there is still no answer to the question: how exactly does Ukraine intend to resolve the conflict by peaceful, that is, non-military, means? How does the Ukrainian Government envisage the future status of Donbas within Ukraine? That is the key question to which the Ukrainian Government should, in accordance with the Package of Measures, have responded on the day following the withdrawal of heavy weapons, that is,

from 9 March 2015. The prospects for a settlement of the situation in Ukraine depend directly on resolving these problems. We emphasize that political and security measures are closely interlinked and should be implemented simultaneously.

It is telling that the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian armed forces command “celebrated” the approaching anniversary in their own way by cynically shelling settlements in Donbas. A secondary school in the village of Zolote (Donetsk region) was again hit by a hail of bullets. The Ukrainian armed forces have continued to move additional troops towards the line of contact; moreover, in many instances the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) recorded the deployment of military equipment in residential areas. Despite the fact that the armed confrontation in Donbas has already claimed over 13,000 lives, the Ukrainian Government still demonstrates a lack of interest in a stable “silence regime”. Further prolongation of the violence in Donbas is unacceptable.

Madam Chairperson,

The punitive operation initiated by the authorities of Ukraine against the population of Donbas and the subsequent attempts by certain countries to justify the criminal actions of the Ukrainian Government clearly demonstrate, in both cases, their true attitude towards the commitments set out in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Our Western partners also prefer not to remember the fact that such documents as the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons were adopted under the aegis of our Organization and continue to remain fully in force. It is clearly laid down in these documents that each participating State should, in considering proposed arms transfers, take into account the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country, along with the internal and regional situation in and around that country in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts. In violation of these commitments, foreign military equipment, which then ends up in the conflict zone in Donbas, continues to be supplied to the Ukrainian armed forces, and specialists from NATO countries are schooling Ukrainian military personnel in the “art of war” at training centres on the territory of Ukraine.

In other words, our Western partners are also openly aiding and abetting the Ukrainian Government’s violation of paragraph 10 of the Package of Measures, which speaks of “[w]ithdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE”. As we know, Ukraine has not yet ensured the withdrawal of foreign armed mercenaries and military equipment, nor has it disarmed the nationalist battalions, which have in fact been legalized and incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces and other law enforcement and security agencies. Material published in the Donetsk media in connection with the questioning of a former soldier of the Ukrainian armed forces, Anatoly Taranenko, indicates that ultra-nationalist forces, which regularly carry out provocative mortar attacks near the line of contact, continue to operate in the zone of armed confrontation.

In recent years, our Western partners have supplied the Ukrainian Government with thousands of units of weaponry and military equipment, along with millions of rounds of ammunition. Let us recall just a few facts. In September 2016, Lithuania sent some 150 tonnes of ammunition, mainly cartridges for Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, to Ukraine, and in November of the same year almost 2 million rounds of ammunition for

various kinds of small arms. In February 2017, the United States of America transferred over 1 million cartridges of various calibres to the Ukrainian armed forces. In 2018, Poland supplied Ukraine with at least 28,000 high-explosive fragmentation incendiary shells and armour-piercing incendiary tracer shells. Needless to say, this list is not exhaustive.

In that connection, I should like to hear a clear and concrete response from our colleagues in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC): what do they make of the SMM data indicating that 75 per cent of the casualties among the civilian population since the beginning of 2017 have occurred in areas of Donbas not controlled by the Ukrainian Government? And what do they have to say about the statement by the Chief Monitor of the SMM, Yaşar Halit Çevik, at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council on 11 February 2021: “During my work as the Chief Monitor, there has not been a single case of monitors reporting the presence of Russian soldiers [...]. During this period, we have been monitoring all the territories where this was possible.”

The active militarization of Ukraine is set to continue this year. The Ukrainian armed forces are expected to receive military goods worth over 100 billion hryvnias: 10 million rounds of ammunition, 3,300 missile and artillery systems, some 3,000 reconnaissance devices and dozens of unmanned aerial vehicles. Of course, all this would not be complete without active support from Ukraine’s overseas “minders”: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, in a telephone conversation that the United States was prepared to provide the Ukrainian Government with lethal weapons.

We would emphasize that OSCE participating States that provide military-technical assistance in any form to the Ukrainian Government share responsibility with the Ukrainian military for the casualties among the civilian population and for all further destruction in Donbas. It is time for the Ukrainian Government’s Western “minders” to finally stop pandering to its endeavours to portray the conflict as external rather than internal, which it does so as to continue masking its own involvement in undermining the efforts to achieve peace in Donbas.

Madam Chairperson,

As a co-mediator in the peace process, Russia stresses that any further prolongation of the armed violence in the east of Ukraine is unacceptable. All of Ukraine’s obligations under the Minsk agreements must be fulfilled. We call on our international partners and Ukraine’s external “minders” to demand in no uncertain terms that the Ukrainian leadership take practical steps in the interests of peace in Ukraine and security in Europe with a view to achieving swift implementation of the provisions of the Package of Measures (endorsed by the United Nations Security Council) on the basis of direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of today’s FSC meeting.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

968th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF LITHUANIA**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I would like to exercise the right of reply and respond to the remarks made by the representative of the Russian Federation concerning military support provided to Ukraine by Lithuania.

Every country has the right to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine is exercising this right and is defending itself from continuing aggression by the Russian Federation.

With regard to Lithuania's support to Ukraine, let me reiterate that it is provided upon the legitimate request of the Government of Ukraine, and by the decision of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania has authorized participation of Lithuania's military personnel in joint training activities and exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Lithuania develops military co-operation and provides support in an open and transparent manner, and in full respect for our international commitments. Every decision regarding arms exports is taken by the competent authorities of Lithuania and in full compliance with the applicable international treaties and arrangements, and European Union and national legislation.

I wish to take this opportunity to confirm Lithuania's commitment to continuing to work closely with the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Let me also underscore Lithuania's unwavering commitment to and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

Madam Chairperson, I kindly ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day. Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 3

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

968th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF FRANCE**

Madam Chairperson,
Dear colleagues,

France fully supports the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. We should nevertheless like to add some remarks in our national capacity.

France is delighted to welcome Ms. Karen Chandler and Mr. Matt Schroeder today, and thanks them for being here and for their high-quality presentations.

We also wish to greet our compatriot, Mr. Arnaud Borde, who shared his expertise and experience with us through a very informative presentation on the criminal use that man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) can be put to, their alarming proliferation and its effects, and the strategies that can be applied in response.

Like the United States of America, which we thank for having introduced this very important topic to the Forum for Security Co-operation for the first time, France takes very seriously the threat constituted by the spread of MANPADS and the risk of their diversion, just as it does the threat posed by small arms and light weapons (SALW) in general. The consequences of an attack using this type of weapon can be extremely costly in terms of the toll on human life, and it is very easy for non-State actors to obtain them. France is particularly concerned by the risk of MANPADS or light infantry weapons being used to fire at aeroplanes, especially during take-off and landing.

In this connection, a programme to assess and tackle the risk of such strikes using MANPADS and infantry weapons was launched in 2012; it is currently run by the Directorate General for Civil Aviation, to whose staff Mr. Borde belongs. This programme is made up of two subprogrammes, the first being a national one that deals with the assessment of potential firing sites around French airports and features a mechanism for follow-up and securing those sites. The other subprogramme is international and covers awareness-raising and training of local authorities in third countries that are exposed to the threats posed by surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons, the objective being to enable them to evaluate their aviation infrastructure on their own and to take the necessary decisions in a fully independent manner.

France participates actively, alongside the United States, in all the international meetings devoted to these matters, seeking to work towards mitigation of the threat posed by MANPADS above all to civilian populations. The OSCE's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in SALW more generally are very important and should accordingly be strengthened. This threat hangs over the entire OSCE area, and it is only by acting together that we shall be able to curb the uncontrolled spread of such weapons. Today we wish to encourage all the participating States to adopt the draft decision on revising the best practice guide on stockpile management and security and the destruction of MANPADS, which is dated 28 October 2020 and has the reference number FSC.DD/6/20. There are enough points of disagreement already without holding to ransom the potential progress on this subject.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

968th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF SERBIA**

Madam Chairperson,
Your Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

First, I would like to thank the Chairmanship for adding this important topic to the Security Dialogue and the keynote speakers for their very interesting and informative presentations. Serbia has aligned itself with the EU statement on man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS).

As we have mentioned several times before, with regard to respect for the status-neutral position of OSCE documents and materials concerning Kosovo and Metohija, we kindly ask the Chairmanship to check the political maps in the presentations before they are officially presented and distributed.

I thank you for your attention and kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 5

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

968th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

We should like to join in thanking the US Chairmanship for organizing this meeting devoted to man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). It is a topic that has not been raised at the OSCE for quite a while, even though some time ago the international community undertook considerable efforts to prevent illicit transfers of MANPADS and stop these from ending up in the hands of terrorists by adopting, in various forums, instruments aimed at ensuring reliable control of shipments. We are grateful to the keynote speakers for their instructive presentations, which have significantly enlivened today's discussion.

The Russian Federation shares the global community's concerns over the uncontrolled spread of MANPADS and advocates further consolidation of international efforts to counter this dangerous trend. Illegal arms trafficking continues to be one of the main factors in the expansion and exacerbation of conflicts, and remains the principal source of sustenance for terrorist and extremist groups. Despite some progress in a number of areas, much effort is still required to fundamentally improve the situation in terms of putting an end to illicit trafficking in MANPADS worldwide.

Our country pays due attention to the tasks involved in ensuring effective State control over the circulation of MANPADS at the national level and pursues a responsible policy in the sphere of military-technical co-operation with foreign countries, guided by the strict requirements of its well-developed system of export controls. In accordance with the Questionnaire on OSCE Participating States' Policy and/or National Practices and Procedures for the Export of Conventional Arms and Related Technology, Russia annually submits information on its relevant national legislation to the OSCE Secretariat.

Pursuant to the "Regulations for monitoring the implementation by foreign States' designated authorities of their obligations regarding the intended use of selected military goods supplied by the Russian Federation" (approved by Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 604 of 6 October 2006), the use of MANPADS by importers is subject to mandatory controls. It goes without saying that MANPADS are to be used exclusively for the purposes indicated in the end-user certificate or other official document setting out the obligations of a foreign State's designated body. Re-exporting or transferring

MANPADS to third countries without the consent of Russia is not permitted. The fulfilment of obligations regarding the intended use of MANPADS is monitored in order to rule out the possibility of these weapons being resold or transferred to illegal armed formations, terrorist and extremist organizations, criminal organizations, and States to which the supplying of military goods is prohibited or restricted in accordance with decisions by the United Nations Security Council.

It should be noted that the existing rules governing the circulation of MANPADS and their ammunition within the Russian armed forces make it possible to ensure their security in an effective manner. In line with national practice, MANPADS are not treated as a separate category of weapons when it comes to their accounting, storage and transport. The reliability of our system is attested by the fact that, over the past 12 years, no instances have come to light within the Russian armed forces of MANPADS or their missiles having been stolen or lost.

Madam Chairperson,

The assurances by Ukraine as to the Government's transparency in the implementation of conventional arms transfers are questionable. To give just one example: in 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a decision to withdraw from its Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation on the exchange of information about Igla- and Strela-type MANPADS when exporting them to or importing them from third countries. It is worth recalling that the Ukrainian Government possesses a considerable stockpile of Igla-type MANPADS (around 3,900 launching mechanisms and 14,500 missiles for these). Several consignments of various MANPADS models from the Strela and Igla series were sold off to the Middle East in 2010 and 2012. Given the unstable politico-military situation in Ukraine, the poor security arrangements at storage sites and the high level of corruption among officials, there is a risk that MANPADS may be stolen and end up in the hands of terrorist entities. We urge Ukraine not to subjugate the implementation of transparency measures in the military sphere to a narrow political agenda and to show an appropriate level of transparency, which is especially important in view of the ongoing military operation in the south-east of the country.

Madam Chairperson,

The concept note for today's meeting includes a question as to the steps that the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and the Conflict Prevention Centre ought to take in order to tackle more effectively the threat posed by MANPADS. We believe that if a best practice guide on procedures for MANPADS stockpile management and security and for the destruction of such systems were to be agreed on and adopted at the FSC, this would make a significant contribution towards fulfilling the aforementioned task. Moreover, it is important to promote the implementation of assistance projects on MANPADS on a bilateral basis. For example, our country assisted Turkmenistan with accounting and control of the use of such weapons.

In closing, I should like to emphasize that the present meeting has been useful. We support the main thrust of the discussion, namely that efforts to prevent the uncontrolled spread of MANPADS contribute to the strengthening of security in the OSCE area and should be continued.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



968th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY**

Madam Chairperson,

We thank the US FSC Chairmanship for bringing this important issue into the Security Dialogue.

We also thank the panellists for their insightful presentations.

It is a fact that illicit trafficking in man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and other firearms, including their parts and components and their ammunition, is a transnational threat and often linked to terrorism.

The proliferation of MANPADS is worrying. Terrorist groups perpetrate their heinous attacks with such illicitly obtained weapons.

Preventing co-operation and transactions between criminal organizations and terrorist groups for the purpose of acquiring MANPADS and other weapons is an utmost necessity.

All States should take all necessary measures to stem possible risks of terrorist organizations acquiring illicit MANPADS and all other kinds of weapons.

Turkey, for its part, is combating several terrorist organizations, particularly Daesh and PKK/PYD/YPG.

The MANPADS and other weapons seized in our operations against these terrorist organizations demonstrate the grim fact that these terrorists have an inventory of such weapons whose sources depend on several producer countries.

Even last weekend, MANPADS and other types of weapons and ammunition belonging to PKK/YPG were seized by Turkish security forces in the counter-terrorism operations.

The traffickers and organized criminal groups are strongly linked with the terrorist organizations. They have all kinds of creative methods for illegal trafficking.

Owing to the wide availability of weapons and ammunition on the black market in several countries, terrorist organizations are able to purchase, steal and/or smuggle high-quality explosives.

In this connection, we believe that we are all under an obligation to promote further enhanced efforts in developing and supporting programmes, including those in the OSCE, to combat the terrorist organizations' ability to acquire MANPADS.

Madam Chairperson, please attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2020
Annex 7

Original: ENGLISH

968th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Dear colleagues,

Distinguished speakers,

In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I would like to start by thanking the distinguished speakers for their valuable contributions and thoughts on the topic of today's Security Dialogue, namely, man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and the threat posed by their illicit and irresponsible proliferation and use.

Due attention must be given to the OSCE's SALW/SCA work on strengthening our norms in preventing the illicit possession, use and transfers of MANPADS, which, as also mentioned by the distinguished speakers, pose a direct threat to civil aviation, critical infrastructure, peacekeeping, crisis management and anti-terrorist operations.

For the FSC, MANPADS are part of the overall small arms framework. The OSCE has a long history of working to address the threats MANPADS pose to participating States and Partners for Co-operation, as demonstrated by FSC Decision No. 7/03, adopted during the last US FSC Chairmanship, FSC Decision No. 5/08, Ministerial Council Decision No. 8/04, and recent work on the Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Management, Security and Destruction of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). Taken together, the decisions constitute an effective set of measures to strengthen control over exports, transfers and stockpiling of MANPADS.

Let me note here that the OSCE's export control principles for MANPADS have been based on the Wassenaar Arrangement's Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems. I welcome our colleagues from the Wassenaar Arrangement to this meeting.

Madam Chairperson,

As Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the importance of the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and conventional ammunition, which have been endorsed and are generally accepted by all OSCE participating States, in providing common understanding of the approaches, procedures and terminology used, and even in some cases technical specifications.

Let me recall that the Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Management, Security and Destruction of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) was originally drafted and developed in 2006, by the governments of the United States of America, Germany, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Turkey, as Annex C to the Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security.

The best practice guide on MANPADS is primarily addressed to policy- and decision-makers and to experts in the responsible authorities of the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation in charge of the life cycle management of MANPADS, in order to help mitigate risks of illegal diversion and proliferation. Secondly, it provides guidance to stakeholders engaged in technical assistance projects under the OSCE assistance mechanism, i.e., entities from assistance requesting and providing States as well as the OSCE executive structures engaged in assistance projects.

In 2020 the United States of America took a lead in updating this best practice guide, with contributions being made by Germany, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Switzerland and OSCE field operations (Dushanbe, Skopje, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Now this draft updated best practice guide is on the agenda of FSC Working Group A. I hope that this updated normative document will be adopted very soon.

Madam Chairperson,

In your concept note of this meeting, you touch upon information-sharing. Let me elaborate on this issue.

At the OSCE, information exchange on MANPADS is conducted in the context of SALW through reporting on annual SALW imports/exports/destroyed and seized, through conventional arms transfers information exchange, and through the newly updated SALW reporting template for the implementation of the OSCE Document on SALW and supplementary decisions.

As part of the annual Information Exchange on SALW, information exchange on MANPADS does include data on imports and exports, country of origin, intermediary locations, and numbers destroyed during the previous year. But when it comes to MANPADS in SALW annual reports, the OSCE participating States rarely report on MANPADS control efforts specifically. For example, in 2020, only one State reported on MANPADS as seized and confiscated. A look at the information exchange on conventional arms transfers reveals that in 2020 only nine OSCE participating States reported on MANPADS. However, let me

note here that participating States may not specifically identify MANPADS when reporting on small arms destruction. I believe that this deserves attention and that the cause of low reporting numbers should be identified.

I encourage the participating States to make use of the updated template for information-sharing (including information-sharing on MANPADS) due on 30 June. The updated SALW reporting template (FSC.GAL/110/20) includes information-sharing on export, import, transit or retransfer control measures with regard to SALW (including MANPADS) legislation, export end-user certificates, post-delivery controls and controls in air transport. The template provides an opportunity for States to indicate their assistance requirements in the above-mentioned areas. We should use this data in identifying how to improve the information exchanges and make them useful in our work.

I thank you for your attention.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/974
17 February 2021
Annex 8

Original: ENGLISH

968th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (AUSTRIA)**

Madam Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

In my capacity as FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I would like to highlight the importance of today's topic, man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and thank the distinguished panellists for their valuable contributions and insights. As underlined by preceding speakers, the overall multidimensional impacts of unsecure and misused MANPADS cannot be underestimated. These impacts are intrinsically related to critical problems that the OSCE commitments in the field of SALW aim to address, namely (a) the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and (b) the uncontrolled spread of SALW.

In the past 15-plus years, the OSCE executive structures – to be more specific, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) and the field operations – have implemented more than ten assistance projects in the field of SALW and SCA that have at least indirectly contributed to addressing various safety and security aspects related to MANPADS. OSCE participating States in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and South-Eastern Europe have benefited from the assistance provided in upgrading SALW physical storage infrastructure, in improving regulations and procedures for SALW stockpile management and security practices, and in building capacity for disposing of surplus and obsolete SALW, including MANPADS.

Madam Chairperson,

There are clearly still concerns and challenges related to MANPADS in the OSCE area. I would see the following actions as appropriate ways of responding.

On the policy level, we must recognize that concerns and challenges related to MANPADS require OSCE participating States to follow a life-cycle management approach, ensuring adequate control in (a) manufacturing, (b) transfer of ownership, (c) secure

handling, transportation and storage, and (d) disposal. These stages need to be adequately supported by marking, record-keeping and tracing, and by information exchanges and other transparency measures. The current update and planned issuance of a separate best practice guide (BPG) dedicated to MANPADS is a good way forward, in connection with which I wish to echo the words of my colleague the Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA concerning this important normative work. However, further steps would be required to address the other stages in the life cycle of MANPADS.

Once again on the policy level, recognizing challenges and concerns related to MANPADS – as an element of SALW – is part of a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the OSCE area. In this context I would like to underline the statements of our first and third speakers with regard to problem analysis (e.g., recognition of illicit trafficking and improvisation by non-State actors) and aspects of proposed mitigation strategies (with regard to, for example, information, authority, capability and co-ordination). These challenges and concerns need to be reflected in or mainstreamed into joint meetings of the FSC and Permanent Council, Ministerial Council decisions (and declarations), and conceptual approaches related to such matters as support for overall OSCE efforts in combating illicit trafficking of SALW and conventional arms (CA). Thus, one possible way forward could be found in the Austrian food-for-thought paper on developing a stand-alone BPG on the topic of further operationalizing SALW- and CA-related norms, principles and measures on investigating, preventing and combating illicit trafficking of SALW and CA.

On the programmatic level, with regard to the discussion question highlighted in the concept note on the possible provision of support by the OSCE to participating States, let me underline the key importance of facilitating the transfer of OSCE best practices to OSCE participating States requesting assistance in this domain. In this connection, I would also highlight the importance of a comprehensive approach in assessing assistance requirements, with attention being paid to capabilities such as the following: regulatory, organizational, education/training, infrastructure and material, personnel, information management, and security. Subsequently, these requirements need to be transferred into assistance projects, which could also further consolidate the impact of the assistance already provided. Additionally, once this has been tested, outreach to Asian and Mediterranean Partners could be very beneficial.

Once again on the programmatic level, OSCE cross-departmental co-operation (on the CPC–Transnational Threats Department axis, for example) and joint project efforts that address transnational threats – such as terrorism, organized crime, or border security and management – should be considered as something regular and not as an exception. The OSCE executive structures, in response to assistance requests, have already developed and initiated several such comprehensive assistance projects in South-Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

Let me conclude by thanking the participating States for the specific work on MANPADS they have already undertaken and encourage further efforts on this topic as part of the comprehensive approach to security and stability.

Madam Chairperson, I thank you for your attention and kindly ask that this statement be attached to the FSC journal of the day.



968th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 3(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF LIECHTENSTEIN**

Madam Chairperson,

Reducing the threat posed by illicit trafficking and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) remains highly relevant to enhancing peace and security in the OSCE area. As it contributes to confidence- and security-building, the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) is a valuable forum to discuss challenges and opportunities in this connection.

Liechtenstein has been a regular provider of extrabudgetary funding for SALW and SCA assistance projects in recent years. Today, I have the pleasure to inform you about two additional contributions in this area. Both of them are related to the valuable work of the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Firstly, Liechtenstein has recently decided to support the extrabudgetary project Safety and Security Upgrade of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ammunition and Weapons Storage Sites (SAFE-UP BiH) with an additional amount of approximately 9,000 euros (10,000 Swiss francs). We have been a consistent supporter of this project since 2016 with a total amount of now almost 70,000 euros (75,000 Swiss francs) and had already supported the predecessor project Security Infrastructure Upgrade for Bosnia and Herzegovina Ammunition and Weapons Storage Sites (SECUP BiH). We are looking forward to the successful finalization of the SAFE-UP BiH project and hope that our funding will contribute to this.

Secondly, as a continuation of its support to the OSCE's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein has decided to contribute approximately 14,000 euros (15,000 Swiss francs) to the extrabudgetary project on "Addressing security and safety risks of illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina". We look forward to the work under this important new project.

In conclusion, Madam Chairperson, we would like to express our readiness to consider a continuation of our funding of SALW/SCA assistance projects and we of course encourage others to consider (further) support in this area.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of this FSC meeting. Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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Annex 10

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968th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 974, Agenda item 3(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (AUSTRIA)**

Madam Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

Please allow me to make the following announcements in my capacity as FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on SALW and SCA.

First, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Liechtenstein for its voluntary contribution to two extrabudgetary projects in the field of SALW and SCA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is encouraging to see Liechtenstein, which has always been a steady supporter, deciding to further contribute to OSCE efforts in addressing safety and security risks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Second, I am grateful to Spain for its contribution to the OSCE regional project on “Strengthening OSCE action against the illicit proliferation of SALW and SCA”. This project allows, among other things, further support for supplementing the OSCE SALW and SCA normative base and improving implementation of its practical assistance projects. In this regard, important work on updating the best practice guides or internal knowledge products such as the Guidance Notes on Assistance Projects can be driven forward. Within this project it is also planned to develop a SALW and SCA Portal to provide OSCE participating States and all stakeholders with an overview and details of the status of implementation of practical assistance projects.

I also wish to invite other participating States to join in the OSCE’s efforts in the field of SALW and SCA and support the numerous activities, for which an opportunity will be offered next month. Allow me to draw your attention to a donor meeting for the above-mentioned OSCE regional project for South-Eastern Europe, to take place on Tuesday, 23 March, from 2 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. Hosted by the US FSC Chairmanship and co-chaired by the Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE, this donor meeting will feature the presentation and discussion of the experiences of OSCE participating States and the donor community in strengthening action against the illicit proliferation of SALW and SCA in

South-Eastern Europe through assistance projects. An invitation was distributed under FSC.DEL/49/21, which I would kindly ask you to forward to capitals. Please note that for this meeting there are no limitations on the number of participants per delegation. So, I appeal to you to share this information with your colleagues from capitals and encourage them to participate in the event, as it will offer an opportunity to find out about more details of the OSCE portfolio in South-Eastern Europe. Equally, I encourage you to take advantage of this event yourselves to get an update on developments and identify possibilities for synergies, further co-ordination and support.

Madam Chairperson, I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day. Thank you for your attention.