Mr. Chairperson,

We join the previous delegations in warmly welcoming Mr. Dan Neculaescu, Director General for Strategic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania and Mr. Gyorgy Rabai, Head of the Defence Policy Department in the Ministry of Defence of Hungary, and thank them for interesting presentations. The Republic of Moldova aligned itself to the European Union Statement and in addition, I would like to make a few remarks in our national capacity.

We commend the Polish Chairmanship for putting this issue (Security architecture in Central and Eastern Europe) on the agenda of the FSC. We fully share the concerns expressed by the previous speakers on deficiencies of the existing security architecture in the OSCE area. Today’s discussion is very timely and we highly appreciate the inputs of our distinguished speakers on the OSCE’s contribution in addressing the existing security challenges in Central and Eastern Europe. Over the last decade, the security situation in Eastern Europe became less predictable and unstable. The suspension of implementation of the CFE Treaty by one State party, the military conflict in Georgia in 2008, the illegal annexation of Crimea and escalation of situation in Eastern Ukraine, the violation of the OSCE principles and commitments and the unresolved conflicts have seriously affected the security environment in Eastern Europe and overall in the OSCE area. The increasing deficit of trust generates additional pressure on the non-aligned countries from the region, in particular in relation to the respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In order to tackle these challenges, it is necessary to reduce the level of confrontation between the main global actors and to initiate a sincere and constructive dialogue among participating States. Any security arrangements should address the concerns of the de facto non-aligned countries in the post-Soviet space, in particular considering ways to strengthen their security. These countries should become a platform for cooperation and not serve as a field for geopolitical confrontation.

These challenges prove once again the need to strengthen the ability of the OSCE to respond to crisis situations and to make better use of the existing mechanisms. In this regard, modernizing the Vienna Document 2011 and strengthening the OSCE capacities across the conflict cycle is of particular relevance.

Mr. Chairman,
We share the assessment of Mr. Neculaescu on welcoming the resumption of the 5+2 talks in Berlin after a two years suspension. We hope that this meeting will pave the way towards a sustainable process that will advance the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

At the same time, we remain concerned with continuing military activities of the Russian troops in the Transnistrian region. Since there is no access for international inspections, it is difficult to verify the real data related to the Russia’s armed forces in the Transnistrian region. However, based on information provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense and Tiraspol’s information agency, the intensity of military activities of the Operative Group of the Russian Troops in the Transnistrian region has increased by 20% in 2015 comparatively with the previous year. Hundreds of application included military firing and involved the use of light weapons and combat vehicles. The last training concluded on the 26 May and involved around 500 military personnel. During these applications, we note the use of equipment which is not presented in any exchange of military information.

While acknowledging that these applications fall below the threshold for official notifications, it is important to take into account these military activities are conducted on the territory of another sovereign state and in a conflict zone by foreign armed forces that are present on the territory of the Republic of Moldova without consent of the host country and with no legal ground and should consequently be withdrawn in accordance with the existing commitments.

We have always advocated for more military transparency and predictability in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and incidents in the Security Zone. We expect the activities of the Russian Federation to be consistent with the official statements in which respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova is expressed.

To conclude I would like to express our hope that the today’s and further discussions on this topic will bring a real contribution to the shaping of a clear vision of the new security architecture in the OSCE area able to address efficiently the new challenges and threats to our common security.

Thank you.