



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
MISSION IN KOSOVO

BOYCOTT AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL

Executive Summary

On 26 October 2002 the people of Kosovo went to the polls for the second time after the conflict to elect Municipal Assemblies. The municipal elections offered Kosovo's approximately 1.2 million eligible voters the chance to express their opinion on the work of the assemblies to date. In 17 municipalities the parties holding the majority during the previous mandate of Municipal Assemblies again received the majority of votes. In 13 municipalities opposition forces won the majority. This transition has not gone smoothly in all municipalities. Six months after elections were held, 10 Municipal Assemblies are still facing political gridlock: Assembly members continue either to choose not to participate in – or to boycott – Assembly and Committee meetings.

The main reasons for this boycott differ throughout Kosovo. They can be summarized into several general patterns. (i) Refusal to accept the election results; (ii) Disagreement on the distribution of seats within the committees; (iii) Views of the opposition not being considered; (iv) Loyalty to the political entity and its instructions from the central level; (v) Dissatisfaction with civil servant selection process. In all of these cases the political atmosphere in the Municipal Assemblies has remained divided, with representatives of political entities unwilling to negotiate and build coalitions to jointly tackle problems.

The results of this boycott mentality at the municipal level are severe. When a quorum¹ cannot be reached, municipal projects are held up and services are delayed. Boycott also leads to lack of transparency: the checks and balances system cannot function and the constituents are deprived of effective representation. It is finally detrimental for boycotters' interests when boycott becomes permanent.

At the local level, constructive solutions for local governance need to take a co-ordinated 'people-centered' approach. Political parties need to become responsive to peoples' needs. This process must start at the local level.

¹ UNMIK Regulation No.2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo – Section 14.1: *The quorum for all meetings of the Municipal Assembly and its committees shall be one-half of the members entitled to be present and to vote at the meeting.*

Background.

UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 provides for self-government of municipalities in Kosovo to the standards of the European Charter for Self-Government. The Regulation also outlines the powers and responsibilities transferred to the municipal level. However, OSCE reports repeatedly highlight that the sort of local autonomy envisaged by the letter and the spirit of these documents is not yet reality.

This paper focuses on the common practice amongst recently appointed Municipal Assembly members of boycotting the work of the assembly or its committees as an easy way to protest. This problem has been evident in the following 10 municipalities:

Deçan/Dečani
Kaçanik/Kaçanik
Kamenicë/Kamenica
Klinë/Klina
Lipjan/Lipljan

Malishevë/Mališevo
Novoberdë/Novo Brdo
Suharekë/Suva Reka
Viti/Vitina
Štrpce/Shtërpçë.

Identified patterns - the main reasons for boycott.

Within each of the 10 municipalities, a political gridlock has emerged as Assembly members continue either to choose not to participate in or boycott Assembly and Committee meetings. The main reasons for boycott differ throughout Kosovo but could be summarized into several general patterns:

1) Refusal to accept the election results.

A refusal to accept election results and to engage in the political process as an opposition rather than government party has been in evidence throughout Kosovo.

In **Lipjan/Lipljan**, **Kaçanik/Kaçanik** and **Kamenicë/Kamenica**, the losing parties left Assembly meetings after the first or second round of elections for Municipal President and Vice Presidents when it became obvious their candidates would not succeed in gaining either post. This is a demonstration of a lack of understanding for democratic procedures and institutions and the role of people elected to these bodies.

In **Novoberdë/Novo Brdo**, political power shifted after Kosovo Serb political entities formed a coalition giving them 10 of the 17 available seats in the last municipal elections. PDK members had been unable to accept the Serbian coalition's victory and remained non-co-operative with the Kosovo Serb Municipal Assembly President and Vice-President since their election. Specifically, they had refused to take the oath or participate in the Municipal Assembly sessions for six months, until the party realized that its 4 seats would be lost unless its appointed members would take their seats².

² UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/11 on The Municipal Elections in Kosovo, Section 7.3, gives power to SRSG to terminate a mandate and request Central Election Commission to supply a replacement name. "Terminate" is the formal decision declaring that a situation has arisen whereby a person, previously a member has ceased to be so: this could cover anything from death, imprisonment, resignation, and failure to take oath in time.

2) *Disagreement with the distribution of seats within the committees between the political parties,*

especially within the 3 mandatory committees – Policy and Finance, Communities, and Mediation – even though appointments are strictly regulated.³

In **Lipjan/Lipljan**, the distribution of seats has led to tension between political parties. Both the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and Kosovo Serb affiliated entities⁴ boycott or walk out of Municipal Assembly meetings and/or its committees because of disputes over their composition. The return to meetings is conditioned on having more members in the committees. As a result, the Policy and Finance Committee is the only functioning political body in the municipality.

3) *Views of the opposition not being considered.*

In **Viti/Vitina**, the LDK holds an absolute majority and does not feel a need to consult or listen to the PDK opposition, which still boycotts all committee work. On 29 April, the situation worsened since PDK, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Citizens' Initiative of Viti (IQV) left the Municipal Assembly meeting in dismay over the “undemocratic way the Assembly functions”. Here, the issue of contention was the unwillingness of the Municipal Assembly President to request the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is now the Deputy President of the Municipal Assembly, to submit a report he never did. The opposition says it will not come back until the report is submitted, and the former CEO, on his part, refuses to submit it.

A similar problem has occurred in **Kamenicë/Kamenica**, where PDK and AAK boycott the committees and Municipal Assembly work, in protest against LDK's majoritarian attitude. With only a plurality in the Assembly (14 out of 31 seats), LDK does not have the needed votes to govern alone. However, the necessary quorum (16 out of 31) can be achieved when the Kosovo Serb representatives show up. On 15 April, a meeting initiated by the LDK-affiliated Municipal Assembly President was held and attended by two PDK and two AAK representatives as well as the UNMiK Municipal Representative (UNMR)⁵, his deputy, KFOR and OSCE. The aim of the meeting, to reach a political agreement to end the PDK and AAK boycott was not achieved, but the meeting provided an opportunity for the political parties to talk about their reasons for dissatisfaction and boycott. It was agreed to meet again for further discussion. However after several meetings, only LDK and AAK could finally reach an agreement. The authoritarian attitude of the LDK President seems to remain PDK's main concern.

This is also the case in **Lipjan/Lipljan** where LDK's 13 members refuse to attend Municipal Assembly meetings as they consider themselves to have been neglected by the PDK in forming a coalition with other parties. Several sessions have been cancelled as a result of the boycott. Thus, Assembly members could only meet for the first time in March 2003, three months after they were elected. Almost all members were present at that time, but once again they could not make any decision as the Assembly lacked a quorum after several members walked out. On 28 April, the Policy and Finance Committee raised the issue that the LDK affiliated executive branch was not implementing its decisions.

4) *Loyalty to the political entity and its instructions from the central level.*

³ Model of Municipal Statute – Part VI on Municipal political institutions, Article 40: (...) *The membership of each committee shall be determined by the Municipal Assembly in accordance with the Regulation (...).*

⁴ KP – Coalition Return and DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia.

⁵ Since 1 April 2003 the titles of Regional Administrator and Municipal Administrator are amended to be “UNMIK Regional Representative” and “UNMIK Municipal Representative” respectively.

Due to centralized party structures, municipal branches of political parties often act according to the guidelines from the central level. This is causing problems in **Lipjan/Lipljan**, where certified election results did not bring about a majority to any of the parties and where no coalition has been formed. As a consequence, the Assembly is unable to make decisions. The Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo (PDAK) received one seat and refuses to participate, to a large extent but not exclusively, due to central level party directions. In this instance its single vote could play a crucial role in enabling the Assembly to form a government and begin work. Thus a rare opportunity for a small party to have a big influence on the local political process is being missed.⁶

5) *Dissatisfaction with civil servant selection process.*

The municipal civil service is made up of the CEO, the Board of Directors and administrative staff. All of these people are required by law to be loyal to the institutions of the provisional government without fear or favour and irrespective of political views or affiliation. To make sure that this happens, applicable law⁷ in Kosovo stipulates that independent selection panels appointed by the Municipal Assembly, make recommendations to the Assembly on the appointment of the CEO and the Directors within the Municipal Board.

The composition of the recruitment panel for the CEO position and legal procedure for the dismissal or the extension of the Director's positions is not, in itself, a political issue. However, practice has seen that political parties would expect such panels to be "fairly" composed, which often means composed according to their political view. But appointment as well as renewal or dismissal is strictly regulated by UNMIK Regulation.⁸ Re-advertisement of positions after a three years contract⁹ should only happen if there was bad performance, not for political reasons. So political leaders must not automatically and unilaterally appoint candidates or interviewers, for example within the panel for selection, after the expiration of the contract.

⁶ It must however be noted that the absolute non-participation of the PDAK member in any activities can be interpreted as a protest against the pressure put on him during the last months by different circles.

⁷ The legal foundation for the Kosovo Civil Service is provided in:

- UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on self-government of municipalities in Kosovo – Sections 30.8, 31.4, 52.
- UNMIK Regulation 2001/36 on the Kosovo Civil Service – Section 3 on *Terms of Employment*, Section 12 on *Review of Appointments at the level of Heads of Department*.
- Administrative Direction 2003/2 implementing UNMIK Regulation 2001/36 on the Kosovo Civil Service – Chapter II on *Recruitment* and Chapter IX on *Termination of employment*.
- Model of Municipal Statute and Rules of Procedure – Part VIII on the *Municipal Civil Service*.

⁸ With respect to the dismissal of directors UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on self-government of municipalities in Kosovo, Sections 30.8 and 31.4 state that both the CEO and departmental directors "*may only be dismissed by the Municipal Assembly and only on the grounds that he or she has failed to properly carry out his or her responsibilities or the post is no longer needed.*" Additionally, Section 52 states that "*The elections constitute no cause for reconsidering appointments.*"

⁹ UNMIK Regulation 2001/36 on the Kosovo Civil Service, Section 3.3: "*Contracts of employment in the Civil service shall be for a period of up to three years, and may be extended.*"

Performance and professionalism must be the only criteria applied for municipal civil servants. Political affiliation should not be considered as part of the recruitment process. This general principle of good governance is reinforced in UNMIK Regulations. But the fact that the civil service is meant to be an apolitical and professional body seems to remain irrelevant to the politicians in their attempts to gain governmental positions for their party members. In most municipalities, there are still a number of civil servants who hold senior party positions, although these two posts are incompatible, according to applicable law.¹⁰ Municipal directors, for example, would normally have to resign from their party positions.

This politicisation of the recruitment of civil servants in the municipalities has proved to be another catalyst for the disfunctioning of the Municipal Assemblies.

In **Kaçanik/Kaçanik**, the current political stalemate stems from a political competition regarding the selection of the CEO. The former CEO (PDK affiliated) was re-selected despite an agreement between PDK and the AAK that the position would go to AAK. This prompted a breakdown of the PDK/AAK coalition. The subsequent resignation of an LDK member permitted PDK to form a quorum on its own. Until a political agreement is reached on the appointment of the CEO, AAK and LDK will not participate in any Municipal Assembly session. The struggle for political power continues to derail municipal governance.

The same problem exists in **Kamenicë/Kamenica** with the domination of LDK in the recruitment process of the Directors and what PDK sees as the illegal extension of the CEO's contract. At the last Municipal Assembly meeting, PDK indeed threatened that it would not return if this extension were not annulled. However, AAK ended its boycott after reaching an agreement with LDK about the composition of the panel for recruiting the Directors during an extraordinary meeting on 7 May.

Even in **Štrpce/Shtërpçë**, where so far a good model of co-operation between the Kosovo Serb and the Kosovo Albanian representatives prevails, the climate currently is not good, especially regarding politicization of the recruitment processes for posts within the Board of Directors. It seems that at the moment there is no willingness for a constructive dialogue to reach a compromise and the risk of Kosovo Albanian political entities boycotting due to this issue is very much present. OSCE in co-ordination with the UNMR continues to foster dialogue to find an agreement. But the resignation on 13 May of the Municipal Assembly President, who had been capable of building consensus between the majority of political forces in the municipality on many issues, is not likely to help diffuse the situation.

There was similar deadlock in **Klinë/Klina** over the issuance of CEO and Board of Director vacancies and the appointing of a review panel for these posts. Some legal clarification and advice was given on this issue by the OSCE and UNMR to resolve this impasse through co-operation rather than confrontation. Although PDK and AAK participated in the vote for reissuing vacancies for the Directors, only some members from these political entities voted. At the 10 May Municipal Assembly meeting, eight of ten Directors were appointed. During this voting, PDK walked out of the meeting protesting the LDK/PSHDK-dominated Assembly appointing candidates on the basis of “political affiliation” rather than professionalism and AAK protesting the composition of the review panel that evaluated candidates. Prior to their walkout, AAK stressed it would still participate in the work of the Assembly.

¹⁰ UNMIK Regulation 2001/36 on the Kosovo Civil Service – Section 4: *Civil Servants shall have the rights to belong to political parties and other political organizations but shall abstain from active involvement in political activity.* Or see Administrative Direction No.2003/2 – Section 28-1.

In **Suharekë/Suva Reka** too, PDK is withdrawing its members from all committees, due to the majority party (LDK)'s attitude, especially its alleged political bias conducted at all levels of civil service recruitment.

Consequences of boycott for municipal governance and the people of Kosovo.

Political entities choosing to boycott the local structures fail to represent and articulate their parties' or communities' interests and generally jeopardize municipal governance.

The only objective always achieved by such attitudes is making a statement. Boycott can only remain a powerful tool if its users are flexible enough to keep open the promise of ending the boycott as well as the channels of communication.

But quite often boycott demonstrates lack of a constructive approach toward democratic participation in local governance. This often generates the following consequences:

1. Harmful consequences to the interests of the local population.

Any intentional aim to freeze the process of democratisation in the Municipal Assembly and the municipal committees, in the end, does not support people's interest. Many Assembly members often regard themselves more as delegates of a political party to whom they are accountable rather than as direct representatives of their electorate. But within municipalities, following the central level instructions – which include boycott and non-co-operation instead of co-operation – becomes detrimental to the local interests and does not leave any opportunity for more convenient solutions.

Boycott most often harms the interests of the local society for development and democratisation, because of the following:

- ***Local issues go unsolved.*** Boycott usually means a loss of quorum and adjourned meetings due to a lack of participation. It also implies that the future municipal work is hindered and delayed. As a result, the entire municipality is at a standstill. This leaves other problems unsolved. The boycott indeed hinders the Municipal Assembly from going ahead and working on the concrete issues, which need to be dealt with at the local level.
- ***All municipal work could be compromised.*** The overall work of municipal governance suffers if committees are not set up and those appointed are not participating in their work. The preparatory work of committees is crucial to the efficient work of the Municipal Assembly itself. And when the Assembly members come unprepared to a session, it often implies unfocused, lengthy and repetitive speeches.

Besides, when mandatory committees are not able to carry out their functions, collective interests of constituencies are compromised. One concrete example of this was witnessed in mid-April 2003 in **Lipjan/Lipljan**, where a donor withdrew funding from a project due to the inability of the municipal authorities to collectively reach a decision on a primary school project. Negotiations about this project had been ongoing for months and by 23 April 2003 the municipality had to allocate land for the project and agree on the location. Originally it was intended to construct a primary school for Kosovo Serb children. Following long negotiations between the parties and the advice of the UNMR, the plan changed to building "a school" which in the first year will host Kosovo Serb children and starting with the second year it would also include Kosovo Albanian children. Yet the two Kosovo Albanian parties

in the Municipal Assembly – PDK and LDK – could not agree to the project. By this practical example, the Assembly showed that, within it, party interests are above community interests, resulting to a loss of funds that could be invested to the benefit of the local population.

2. *Lack of transparency.*

The boycott mechanism fundamentally impedes the system of checks and balances, inherent in any democracy: the opposition party fails to exercise the oversight function within the municipality, as it would be expected to do. Boycotting political entities should constructively challenge majority politics through counter proposals and constructive criticism. They should ensure that Assembly decisions and actions are taken in a transparent way, instead of choosing to ignore their responsibilities to the local society by opting out and weakening the institutions they were elected to work for.

Moreover, by not participating in the Assembly, elected members deprive their constituency of the right to monitor the work of the executive by attending their plenary and committee meetings. The problem is compounded by the fact that people do not often make use of this possibility. While there were some exceptions where members of the public were refused entrance, more often the reason is lack of practical information about the timing and location of the sessions.

3. *Negative impact on boycotters' interests especially when boycott becomes permanent.*

Refusal to take part in the work of the Municipal Assembly can produce some short-term positive effects such as drawing attention to issues. However in the long term, it has a negative impact on the interests of both the boycotters and the municipality in general.

If the aim of the boycott were to achieve changes, it would sometimes appear as justified. But quite often, this kind of “silent confrontation” could prove negative if each actor prefers to keep his/her position. Besides, some matters can be dealt without the presence of the boycotters, with results which would have been better for them had they stayed to influence the debate. In other words, boycott and political gridlock are counter-productive for those responsible. Non-attendance at committee meetings means that decisions could be made without considering the position of the people absent, when there is a quorum. So, whatever could be the valuable reasons for protest, boycott only proves to be ineffective in the end. Thus, such a political form of blackmail should be better ended in favor of another more effective tool of opposition.

4. *Legal consequences*

According to the Regulation,¹¹ a member who fails to attend any meeting of the Municipal Assembly or its committees for six consecutive months ceases to be a member and therefore loses his/her position as an elected representative.

¹¹ UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on self-government of municipalities in Kosovo – Section 20.3: *If a member of the Municipal Assembly fails throughout a period of six consecutive months to attend any meeting of the Municipal Assembly or its committees, he or she shall, unless the failure was due to a reason approved by the Municipal Assembly, cease to be a member.*

Thus, the only PDAK member of the Municipal Assembly in **Lipjan/Lipljan** risks losing his seat in the Assembly. Unless he attends an Assembly Meeting before 26 May, he will complete the six months of non-attendance.

Progress made in overcoming boycott.

Positive effects of participation are witnessed when political gridlock is overcome. In **Malishevë/Mališevo**, the three-month deadlock came to an end at the Municipal Assembly session of 10 March. Despite the usual LDK members' walkout over dissatisfaction regarding the "unfair" composition of the panel and allocation of seats within the Policy and Finance Committee, a quorum could be reached as almost all PDK members were present at that time. As a sign of compromise towards LDK, it was agreed to increase the number of seats in the Policy and Finance Committee. But some problems are still expected, since LDK has already announced it will not participate in the Communities Committee.

In **Novoberdë/Novo Brdo**, both LDK and PDK had been boycotting the Serb-dominated Assembly. LDK boycott ended when its local leaders were able to come to an agreement and showed willingness to work within the system to the benefit of the municipality. PDK¹² finally decided to take up the four seats won in the October 2002 Municipal Elections, after a six-month boycott, in the beginning of May 2003. Thus, three of the four certified PDK appointees took the oath in the office of the UNMR on 9 May, and then participated in the Municipal Assembly meeting; the fourth one did not do so for personal reasons. The local PDK branch indicated that it had "reconsidered its strategy" in view of the fact that there would be no more candidates in its list to be appointed by the SRSG if those last ones would not take the oath, and the PDK seats would be lost. There is one more candidate in the party's list who can take the fourth seat once he is certified.

Another such example is **Shtime/Štimlje**, where the absolute majority gained by PDK initially led to what some thought might be an end of co-governance there. After losing a significant portion of the vote to its rivals in the 2002 elections, local LDK representatives left the Assembly while the President of the Municipal Assembly and the Vice-President were being elected. The decision was allegedly based on consultations with the LDK central level in Prishtinë/Priština. When LDK finally accepted the certified election results and agreed to the composition of the committees according to UNMIK Regulation 2000/45, their participation has provided a means for constructive negotiations with the PDK.

In **Dečan/Dečani**, the political situation has been strained because of the civil servant selection process. LDK members were non-co-operative with the AAK/PDK coalition and left the evaluation session of the Board of Directors in February 2003, despite advisory efforts made by OSCE and the UNMR. However, at the Municipal Assembly meetings of 31 March and 12 May, LDK attended and actively participated. Discussion on municipal issues within the Assembly has since been able to move forward.

¹² It will be recalled that in early November 2002, PDK planned roadblocks, picketing in front of the municipal building, to disrupt the functioning of both UNMIK and the municipality and to prevent elected Kosovo Serb members from entering the municipal building.

Conclusion

- **First, the habit of boycotting Municipal Assemblies is harmful to political life in Kosovo, as well to the democratisation of society.**

It should be stressed that no political system can function if politicians are only prepared to take part if they win. **Kosovo's politicians need to show their voters that they understand how to negotiate and compromise. These are the skills needed in democratic societies**, rather than ultimatum and boycott. These are also skills necessary for the functioning of a post-conflict society, which can only show progress if all its segments are ready to talk to each other to find commonly acceptable solutions.

Recommendations:

*Politicians at the local level should work constructively to set an example of democratic attitudes by fostering inter-party and inter-ethnic dialogue within municipalities. **Dialogue and collaboration is a proven long-term strategy to overcome political gridlock.** This approach includes:*

1. *A **willingness to discuss.** In a democratic society, issues are solved by debate. A constructive dialogue to find some compromise always creates better chances for positive change.*
2. ***Agreeing and working on common goals to be achieved at the local level.** To be successful, talks should focus on setting common goals and on jointly tackling problems, starting with the most basic and uncontroversial ones. This is the best way for political opponents to overcome their differences and to work together.*

- **Second, when local political representatives choose to boycott they forfeit the opportunity to represent their constituencies' interests.**

Local government is to deliver good services to its local population. Too often local government has been made difficult or impossible by boycott. **Responsible governance is what voters demand, and it is what they are entitled to receive. Elected representatives have a responsibility to the voters they represent who placed trust in them to represent their views, needs and concerns.**

Recommendations:

1. ***Local politicians should always bear in mind that their responsibility is to serve the people and to improve their constituents' livelihoods.** This could help them to achieve some real changes at the local level.*

***Constructive solutions for local governance come through a co-ordinated, people-centred approach, focused on people's needs.** This implies moving from a less political approach to a more results-oriented one, based on the delivery of public services. Debates among elected representative should concentrate on the real stakes for local development as a matter of urgency.*

2. *Moreover, **local constituents and civil society should react and put pressure on their representatives to participate** rather than boycott, if they want to see the problems of their communities being resolved. They could do so by attending the public meeting or presenting a*

petition to the Municipal Assembly.¹³ The members of the Municipal Assemblies would be more likely to change their stance and take a participatory and conciliatory approach if they see their supporters reacting to their behavior.

3. *The media have an obligation to inform people about the consequences and impact of the boycott of Municipal Assemblies on people's daily lives. Local media is one of the most effective ways by which the local population can be informed about issues and the workings of their municipality. The media can also articulate people's needs and draw attention to the fact that these needs are not being met while the boycotts are in place.*

□ **Third, the politicians have to be aware that there is incompatibility of the very hierarchical party structure with the concept of local self-government.**

Elected representatives in the Municipal Assemblies most often see themselves as organs of their political parties. Or at least, they are very much influenced by the dominating political party culture that limits their discretion in taking independent decisions, based on their knowledge of the circumstances on the ground. In most cases this results in polarization of positions in the Municipal Assemblies, as the constituting members prefer to follow the general party line, instead of adapting it to the local needs and circumstances.

Local self-government requires much more than just working as organs of a higher level. The work of elected representatives should focus on being creative in answering the needs on the ground. The starting point for accountability and a functional system of checks and balances is political party reform. Meaningful local self-government can only develop if it correlates with meaningful autonomy of the local party branches, and individual members. Otherwise the institutions of local self-government will remain a mere façade of what is a truly centralised system.

Recommendations:

- 1. *Political parties should improve their internal structures to become more democratic. Local party branches can only work to represent local interest of their party members if they are accountable to them. This can only be achieved if parties' statutes provide that decisions for local candidates to be put on the party's list for the municipality are made at the local, not the central level of the party.***
- 2. *Political parties should also encourage their elected members to participate in the Municipal Assemblies and work constructively with their local partners. Representatives who manage to produce some results in the municipality are bound to win more votes for the party in the future than those representatives who just opt out and leave no proof of work behind.***
- 3. *The electoral rule¹⁴ that the seat goes to the elected individual, not the party with which he or she is running should not be changed. This ensures that the elected representatives cannot be replaced when they chose to take positions independent of central level decisions. Such independence is crucial to allowing local elected representatives to serve local interests.***

¹³ UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo, section 8 on Public meetings and petitions. See also Model Municipal Statute, chap.2 on public meetings, chap.3 on other public consultation, chap.4 on petitions.

¹⁴ UNMIK Regulation 2002/11 on the Municipal Elections in Kosovo, Section 7.2.

ANNEX

Municipal Assembly Seats per Political Party

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Seats per Political Party</u>	<u>Total # of Seats</u>
Prishtinë/Prishtina	LDK (29), PDK (13), AAK (4), PD (1), PReK (1), KDTP (1), DSS (1), KP (1)	51
Podujevë/Podujevo	LDK (25), PDK (12), AAK (2), PD (1), BK (1)	41
Prizren/Prizren	LDK (16), PDK (12), KDTP (4), VATAN (2), AAK (2), PShDK (1), BSDAK (1), PD (1), DPP (1), KP (1)	41
Suharekë/Suva Reka	LDK (26), PDK (10), AAK (2), LPK (2), PReK (1)	41
Gjakovë/ Gjakovica	LDK (17), AAK (10), PShDK (5), PDK (3), UDGj (3), IRDK (2), PLK (1)	41
Pejë/Pe	LDK (19), AAK (12), PDK (4), PShDK (1), Vatan (1), KP (1), IRDK (1), BDIKHB (1), Independent Candidate (1)	41
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	LDK (23), PDK (15), AAK (2), PD (1)	41
Gjilan/Gnjilane	LDK (23), PDK (13), AAK (2), KP (1), OSA (1), DSS (1)	41
Ferizaj/Uroševac	LDK (24), PDK (12), AAK (2), DSS (1), PDAK (1), PshDK (1)	41
Malishevë/Mališevo	PDK (17), LDK (13), AAK (1)	31
Glllogovc/Glogovac	PDK (26), LDK (4), BK (1)	31
Lipjan/Lipljan	PDK (14), LDK (13), AAK (1), PDAK (1), DSS (1), KP (1)	31
Rahovec/Orahovac	LDK (15), PDK (10), AAK (3), LPK (1), PD (1), KP (1)	31
Deçan/De ani	LDK(15), AAK (15), PDK (1)	31
Istog/Istok	LDK (18), PDK (6), AAK (3), PShDK (1), Vatan (1), KP (1), IRDK (1)	31
Klinë /Klina	LDK (13), PDK (10), AAK (4), PShDK (3), KP (1)	31
Skenderaj/Srbica	PDK (26), LDK (4), PReK (1)	31
Vushtrri/ Vu itrn	LDK (18), PDK (10), AAK (2), PD (1)	31
Kaçanik/Ka anik	PDK (15), LDK (14), AAK (2)	31
Kamenicë/Kamenica	LDK (14), PDK (9), AAK (4), KP (2), DSS (1), KOS (1)	31
Viti/Vitina	LDK (17), PDK (9), AAK (2), PShDK (1), IQV (1), KP (1)	31

Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje	LDK (12), PDK (5), PDAK (1), KP (1), AAK (1), IQFK (1)	21
Obiliq/Obili	LDK (11), PDK (6), PD (1), PKM (1), OSPS (1), KP (1)	21
Shtime/Štimlje	PDK (12), LDK (9)	21
Dragash/Dragaš	LDK (8), PDK (6), Vatan (3), GIG (2), AAK (1), LPK (1)	21
Leposavi /Leposaviq	DSS (5), SNV (3), Citizens' Initiative of Leposavic Socialists (3), KP (2), SPO (1), GIPP (1), GIZ (1), Independent Candidate (1)	17
Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok	DSS (8), GISK (4), GIK (1), "SURVIVAL" Zubin Potok (1), KP (1), PDK (1), LDK (1)	17
Zvečan/Zvečan	SNV (6), DSS (5), KP (2), SPO (2), SD (2)	17
Novobërdë/Novo Brdo	KP (4), DZZ (3), DSS (2), KOS (1), PDK (4), LDK (3)	17
Štrpce/Shtërpçë	SDP (3), SSZ (3), DSS (2), PKM (1), SPO (1), KP (2), PDK (2), LDK (2), KOS (1)	17