



**65th JOINT MEETING OF THE
FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION
AND THE PERMANENT COUNCIL**

1. Date: Wednesday, 5 July 2017

Opened: 10.05 a.m.
Closed: 11.50 a.m.
2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Vorobiev (FSC) (Russian Federation)
Ambassador C. Koja (PC) (Austria)
3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: PRESENTATION OF AN
INTERIM REPORT ON THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE
BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL WORKING
GROUP ON THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE,
AMBASSADOR EBERHARD POHL

Chairperson (FSC), Chairperson (PC), Chairperson of the Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue (Germany) (CIO.GAL/121/17), Estonia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Liechtenstein, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/9/17), Spain (FSC-PC.DEL/8/17 OSCE+), Georgia (FSC-PC.DEL/12/17 OSCE+), United States of America (Annex 1), Switzerland (FSC-PC.DEL/13/17 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 2), Belarus (FSC-PC.DEL/10/17 OSCE+), Canada, Armenia, Turkey, Serbia, France, Ukraine, United Kingdom

Agenda item 2: UPDATE ON THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE OSCE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN MAUERBACH BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL, AMBASSADOR CLEMENS KOJA

Chairperson (PC), Chairperson (FSC)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Informal meeting on the safety and security upgrade of ammunition and weapons storage sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAFE-UP BiH), to be held on 13 July 2017 (FSC.INF/23/17 Restr.):* Bosnia and Herzegovina
- (b) *Meeting of the Contact Group with the Asian Partners for Co-operation, to be held on 7 July 2017:* Germany
- (c) *Matters of protocol:* Romania, Chairperson (FSC)

4. Next meeting:

To be announced



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

FSC-PC.JOUR/52
5 July 2017
Annex 1

Original: ENGLISH

65th Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC
FSC-PC Journal No. 52, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Chairperson,

The Structured Dialogue (SD) is an opportunity to use the OSCE for meaningful collaborative work on current security issues: this is an organization where we should discuss these hard issues in specific terms, seek to dispel misunderstandings where possible through expert exchanges, and identify potential ways ahead. It is an opportunity we should seize, together.

The Structured Dialogue has gotten off to a promising start with three meetings to date, two of which were capital-reinforced, plus the recent Annual Security Review Conference. At the opening session of the Informal Working Group (IWG) on 7 April, discussions among participating States identified a range of converging and diverging threat perceptions. They include the following: the conflict in and around Ukraine and the protracted conflicts; lack of respect for a rules-based international order; failure to fulfil arms control agreements; migration and instability in North Africa and the Middle East; terrorism; malicious cyber activity; and the risk of accidental military confrontation.

In addition, the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines of 4 and 5 May and Session 2 of the IWG on “Trends in military force posture” of 6 June 2017 demonstrated the importance of further exploration of divergent threat perceptions and the need to address a lack of military transparency and military exercises in the OSCE space.

In particular, we would underscore that the basic breakdown of a rules-based order and the disregard for basic principles – led by actions of primarily one participating State – is the core driver of the political military situation we face today, including the increased distrust and lack of confidence that dominate the current European security environment. Consequently, the issue of military exercises and transparency, like other issues raised in the Structured Dialogue, must first and foremost be viewed in this context.

Throughout our discussions, many delegations stressed the need for an inclusive, patient process without preconditions, preconceived conclusions, artificial deadlines, or outside agendas that do not encompass all participating States.

Many interventions underscored that many issues raised in earlier meetings would benefit from more in-depth discussion among participating States in Vienna in the future, as well as in upcoming capital-reinforced meetings. As one delegation noted, we have “not

scratched the surface” on many topics. We support all of these parameters and this approach. In particular, in past IWG meetings many participating States from different perspectives identified large-scale military exercises/activities, as well as related concerns about a lack of transparency, as major contributors to their national threat perceptions.

Consequently, after the summer recess, in addition to discussions about other threat perceptions and the September meeting on issues related to the violation of principles, we all would benefit from an in-depth look at current and upcoming military exercises and related activities to consider how to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and escalation, especially from so-called “snap exercises”.

At the same time, examining existing tools and their modernization, such as the Vienna Document, would aid in this effort, especially as many participating States noted the importance of modernizing the Vienna Document and improving its implementation during the Structured Dialogue. The giving of briefings in the FSC on upcoming exercises is also an obvious step all partners should take as part of this effort.

However, as we have stated, military exercises and related transparency issues cannot be separated from the basic breakdown of the rules-based order, led by the actions of primarily one participating State. The answer to these more fundamental core problems cannot be limited to steps that address military exercises and transparency, but also requires changes in the behaviour of States that violate international norms. We need a discussion on violations of a rules-based international order as well.

Following these discussions, additional SD meetings going forward could provide opportunities for in-depth discussions of other threat perceptions raised by participating States, including the following: terrorism and violent extremism; the threat or use of force against neighbours and resulting conflicts, including through hybrid tactics; proliferation of nuclear and other material; malicious use of cyber capabilities and information/messaging; and violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in the context of migration and refugee issues.

Looking ahead to the Informal Ministerial of 11 July, we would welcome a brief, non-prescriptive report from the Chair that notes the successful initiation of the Structured Dialogue and issues raised to date, including on threat perceptions, force posture and doctrine. It should also highlight the importance of continuing those discussions and themes in more depth in the fall, in order to, as the Ministerial Decision states, “foster greater understanding.”

Additionally, looking ahead towards fall 2017 and beyond, we believe it would be useful for Vienna delegations to meet later in the year to discuss core issues raised by participating States during reinforced meetings. The United States stands ready to contribute to this process, which has to be a genuine dialogue owned by the participating States, not merely an academic exercise. We need to flesh out concerns already raised as well as possible ways ahead to support both new reinforced meetings and the SD process in its entirety, especially as we move into 2018 and the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

I request that this statement be included in the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

FSC-PC.JOUR/52
5 July 2017
Annex 2

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

65th Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC
FSC-PC Journal No. 52, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Chairpersons,

Today's joint meeting gives us an opportunity on the eve of the informal meeting of our ministers in Mauerbach to exchange views on the progress made in the Structured Dialogue and to assess the results of its first six months. In that connection, we should like first of all to express our gratitude to the Chairperson of the Informal Working Group, the distinguished Ambassador Eberhard Pohl, for his skilful "conducting" of the dialogue and also for his statement and the report distributed yesterday, which we shall study carefully.

We take the position that the Structured Dialogue on challenges to security should serve to restore trust and to advance towards the goal set at the OSCE Summit in Astana in 2010, namely the building of an equal and indivisible security community. Constructive, depoliticized discussion is particularly called for in the current circumstances, when military infrastructure and now even NATO forces have moved right up to Russia's borders, creating significant conflict potential.

Discussing threats and challenges together should give us an opportunity to arrive at a general idea of the new model of European security overall, which takes into account everyone's interests, and of the further development of its key elements. This kind of common understanding regarding the starting point would create a platform for moving to the next stage – the discussion and agreement of practical arrangements – and would provide an opportunity to formulate its tasks. This would already be a concrete and important result. Naturally, it can be achieved only on the basis of equal rights and mutual consideration of interests. Russia's concerns are well known to our partners. They are the unjustified expansion of NATO and the advance of the Alliance's military infrastructure towards Russia's borders, the deployment of elements of the US global anti-missile defence system in Europe, the Alliance's "joint nuclear missions", the provocative build-up of the bloc's military capability on the "eastern flank", and the desire to create a new strategic situation as part of a policy for the "containment" of Russia.

As a first step, we believe it necessary to put an end to the bellicose rhetoric, to stop accusing one another and to move towards a mutually respectful discussion based on equal

rights. This will help to create the political atmosphere required for conducting an objective comparative analysis of military capabilities in Europe.

On the basis of such an analysis, it will be possible to understand where there is an imbalance and how to move forward, and what else should be done to launch a dialogue on confidence-building measures and arms control. Meanwhile, it is obvious to us that in the first instance the NATO countries must put an end to their military activities and the deployment of their forces and infrastructure near Russia's borders, stop building up the foreign presence in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, and return at least to the lines they occupied at the start of 2014.

The Structured Dialogue is an integral part of the pan-European political process. At the present stage, we should be working on reviving the culture of dialogue and restoring trust, without trying to impose one's will and values on one another or to omit the necessary stages and, for example, move immediately to discussion of proposals on the modernization of the Vienna Document. We can examine the prospects for this modernization only in the context, first, of NATO's abandonment of the policy of containing Russia, while recognizing and respecting Russian interests, and restoring normal relations with the Russian Federation, including in the military sphere, and, second, of defining the future of the conventional arms control regime in Europe. Meanwhile, however, we are still waiting for the German idea of starting dialogue on conventional arms control in Europe to be given concrete form and the framework for such dialogue to take shape.

The discussion launched within the framework of the Structured Dialogue is encouraging. We note the positive tone in statements by European experts during meetings involving representatives of defence ministries, their gradual departure from unfounded accusations against Russia, and a readiness for constructive co-operation (in particular, Spain's proposal for establishing a mechanism for discussing or "mapping" military capabilities). The dialogue during these events was less politicized and more professional. It is important to consolidate this trend.

We need to understand that filling the Structured Dialogue with diverse topics, including the settlement of regional conflicts, runs the risk of eroding the real purpose of the discussions – attempts to find a wide unifying "basis" for overcoming the crisis of confidence, first and foremost in the field of "hard security" in Europe.

We believe that in the work ahead we should avoid "dialogue for dialogue's sake", "going round in circles" and the duplication of discussions that are traditionally held within the OSCE Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation. With each new meeting, we need to endeavour to move forward, to switch from asking "who is to blame?" to asking "what is to be done?" and to focus on achieving constructive common understandings. In that connection, we believe that one of the priority themes for our future discussions should be de-escalating the situation and reducing military confrontation.

Chairpersons,

Thank you. I request that this statement be appended to the journal of the day.