

Chairmanship: United States of America

969th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 24 February 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.
Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.10 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. C. Austrian

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/2/21 OSCE+.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: DECISION ON THE AGENDA, TIMETABLE, AND MODALITIES FOR THE TENTH ANNUAL DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

Chairperson

Decision: The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 1/21 (FSC.DEC/1/21) on the agenda, timetable, and modalities for the tenth Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Agenda item 2: FSC CHAIRPERSON'S STATEMENT REGARDING COVID-19 AND IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE VIENNA DOCUMENT (FSC.DEL/34/21/REV.1 DATED 17 FEBRUARY 2021)

Chairperson (Annex 1)

Agenda item 3: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (Annex 2) (FSC.DEL/73/21/Add.1), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/75/21 OSCE+), United States of America, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/70/21 OSCE+), Canada, Russian Federation (Annex 3)

Agenda item 4: SECURITY DIALOGUE: EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS IN CENTRAL ASIA

- *Presentation by Mr. J. Henick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US Department of State*
- *Presentation by Mr. J. Guilbert, Chief of Programs, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State*
- *Presentation by Mr. M. Ibrohimzoda, Director of Tajikistan National Mine Action Center*
- *Presentation by Ms. T. Kassenova, Senior Fellow, Project on International Commerce, Security, and Economic Statecraft Center for Policy Research, State University of New York at Albany*

Chairperson, Mr. J. Henick (FSC.DEL/67/21 OSCE+), Mr. J. Guilbert (FSC.DEL/68/21 OSCE+), Mr. M. Ibrohimzoda (FSC.DEL/65/21 OSCE+), Ms. T. Kassenova (FSC.NGO/2/21 OSCE+), Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek (FSC.FR/1/21 Restr.), OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (FSC.FR/2/21 Restr.), Representative of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria) (Annex 4), FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues (Belarus), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/74/21), Austria (Annex 5), Germany, Turkey (FSC.DEL/72/21 OSCE+), Azerbaijan, Russian Federation (Annex 6), Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia) (Annex 7)

Agenda item 5: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Update on the registration procedures for FSC plenary meetings held via teleconference: Chairperson*

- (b) *Call for voluntary submissions for the women, peace and security section of the 2021 Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security: FSC Co-ordinator for Matters Related to UNSCR 1325 (Albania) (also on behalf of the FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Switzerland)) (Annex 8)*
- (c) *Matters of protocol: Ukraine, Chairperson*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 10 March 2021, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 1

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON**

It is understood that the public health risk posed by the spread of COVID-19 has serious implications for the implementation of verification activities under the Vienna Document 2011, as already highlighted in a prior FSC Chairperson's letter dated 23 March 2020 (FSC.GAL/33/20).

It is further understood that it may therefore be prudent for some participating States to postpone certain activities and events under Chapter IV of the Vienna Document 2011 beyond the timelines set out in that chapter's commitments.

The FSC Chairperson calls on participating States that decide to postpone such activities and events beyond the timelines as specified in the Vienna Document on the basis of COVID-19 related concerns to submit an F-41 notification so stating.



969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 3

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF UKRAINE**

Madam Chairperson,

On behalf of the delegation of Ukraine, allow me to deliver a statement on the subject of “The seventh anniversary of the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”

Seven years ago, on 20 February 2014, the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine started, bringing about numerous human losses and the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Despite the order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the human rights situation in occupied Crimea, the Russian occupation authorities are implementing a policy of oppression against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea, violating their political, cultural and religious rights in a manner that amounts to racial discrimination.

The aggressor State is seriously violating norms of international humanitarian law by changing the demographic composition of the local population, forcibly drafting Ukrainian citizens in Crimea into its armed forces and enforcing the application of its legislation. The Russian Federation has already conducted 11 illegal conscription campaigns on the peninsula. Since the beginning of the occupation, the number of persons conscripted into the Russian armed forces has already reached about 28,000.

The Russian Federation’s increasing militarization of Crimea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov is endangering the Black Sea region, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. It is detrimental to the environment and hampers the economic development of the Black Sea littoral States. In full defiance of the respective United Nations General Assembly resolutions 73/194 as of 17 December 2018, 74/17 as of 9 December 2019, 75/29 as of 7 December 2020 “Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov” and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Resolution as of 8 July 2019 on this subject Russia is continuing to transform temporarily occupied Crimea and its adjacent waters into a Russian military outpost in the region of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

We are gravely concerned that, year by year, Russia has been increasing the number and scale of its combat training activities in the vicinity of the borders with Ukraine. The Russian Federation's building up of forces for offensive military exercises can potentially lead to unpredictable escalatory actions, emanating from temporarily occupied Crimea and affecting the overall stability of the Black Sea basin (pdf presentation).

At the very beginning of September 2020, Russia conducted a special exercise of the Black Sea Fleet and airborne troops with the involvement of army transport aviation. It was followed by the active phase of the strategic command and staff exercise "Kavkaz-2020" in the last third of September. According to reports, 80,000 troops were involved in the exercise. It seriously aggravated the security situation in the region and posed a direct military threat to Ukraine, especially from the direction of temporarily occupied Crimea.

Additionally, the exercise "Kavkaz-2020" saw more than 12,000 servicemen taking part in all kind of special preparatory exercises, snap inspections and other training activities. The Russian military armada involved in the exercise consisted of 50 combat ships, 5 submarines, 250 helicopters, 300 aircraft, 250 armoured combat vehicles and 450 tanks.

The main goal of "Kavkaz-2020" was to work out the strategic operation capabilities of the Russian forces in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov region.

As a result, the Russian Federation managed to increase the combat readiness of its armed forces for offensive actions and developed its abilities to deploy troops stationed in temporarily occupied Crimea far beyond the Black Sea region.

Compared with the pre-occupation period, Russia has considerably more than doubled, indeed closer to tripled, the strength of its military on the peninsula, from 12,500 to over 32,500 persons. This military contingent also includes 410 armoured vehicles, more than 195 tanks, 283 multiple-launch rocket systems and artillery systems, 50 helicopters and 100 airplanes of different types. By 2025, the number of Russian troops, armaments and military equipment on the temporarily occupied peninsula is expected to further increase.

The Russian Federation has been preparing military infrastructure on the temporarily occupied peninsula for the deployment of nuclear weapons, including the refurbishment of the infrastructure of Soviet-era nuclear warheads storage facilities. Potential carriers of nuclear weapons, such as warships, short-range missile systems and combat aircraft, have already been deployed there.

Russia has significantly reinforced its air component, additionally deploying all types of aviation: bomber, assault, fighter and close aviation support. Hvardiyske and Belbek airfields are currently suitable for operating strategic long-range bombers.

The current military capabilities have enabled Russia to establish anti-access and area denial zones (A2/AD) around the peninsula, strengthened by sophisticated surface and subsurface surveillance information systems.

The increased combat capabilities of the naval component are alarming, primarily on account of the deployment of new carriers of "Kaliber"-type cruise missiles. As of today, the total number of missiles in one salvo is 84. Intelligence sources report that by 2025 the

Russian Black Sea Fleet is to possess 25 “Kaliber” missile carriers and that its salvo is to be more than doubled.

In militarizing the Crimean Peninsula, Russia is seeking to gain full control over the Black Sea basin by demonstrating its military power and by increasing pressure on Ukraine and other regional countries pursuing policies of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. On a regular basis, Russia deliberately violates air borders of the Black Sea countries, testing their air defence capabilities. Its aviation carries out simulations of cruise missile launches targeting ships on the Bosphorus and in naval bases in the Black Sea.

By conducting naval exercises in the Black Sea, Russia imposes significant restrictions and blocks important merchant routes in international waters, inflicting economic losses on all countries in the region. Under the pretext of naval exercises in the Black Sea, the Russian Navy is constantly creating multiple denial zones. In some cases, their total area is almost a quarter of the Black Sea basin.

The social and economic destabilization of Ukraine’s coastal regions remains among the goals of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. According to the preliminary estimates, in the period from 2014 to 2021 companies operating in the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk lost revenues of more than 6 billion Ukrainian hryvnia owing to the Russian restrictions. This amount does not include losses and additional costs related to ship down time and reorientation of cargo transshipment flows.

At the same time as turning Crimea into a large military base, the Russian occupation administration is destroying the peninsula’s natural and cultural heritage. For example, the conservation status of 40 objects classified as nature reserves has been illegally downgraded.

To revert these trends, more co-ordinated and persistent efforts of international community are needed, protecting rules-based order, and enabling de-occupation of Crimea by peaceful means.

On 14 January 2021, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled on the admissibility of inter-State claims in Ukraine’s case against the Russian Federation No. 20958/14 (concerning Crimea). Ukraine brought three other cases against the Russian Federation before the ICJ and the arbitral tribunals under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The ICJ case is related to Russia’s violations, in Crimea, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Arbitral tribunals are considering violations of the rights of Ukraine as a coastal State in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the Kerch Strait and to the illegal detention of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 members of their crews on 25 November 2018.

In order to enhance and broaden the response to the occupation of Crimea and other related breaches of international law by the Russian Federation, Ukraine has initiated the establishment of the Crimean Platform as a new consultation and co-ordination format.

Immediately after the attempted annexation of Crimea, Russia unleashed a second phase of armed aggression in the Ukrainian region of Donbas.

In an organized, orderly and deliberate way, units of the Russian Special Operations Forces (Spetsnaz) and other armed formations of the Russian Federation, with Russian military on “leave” and military advisors without any insignia, seized local authorities, police stations and Ukrainian military sites in Donbas and conducted military operations against Ukrainian army and law enforcement officers. Severe and unceasing fire was directed from the territory of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian border guards and armed forces. Russian military units carried out a military invasion, employing heavy weapons and other means, and participated in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. Quite a number of Russian servicemen were captured during these hostilities.

Russia’s military presence in the temporarily occupied parts of Donbas is ongoing. The illegal crossing of the segment of Ukrainian-Russian State border temporarily not under control of the Government of Ukraine by convoys, military equipment aimed at reinforcement and rotation of the armed formations of the Russian Federation has become routine. Information on these breaches of the State border of Ukraine are regularly reported by the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM).

These indisputable facts are duly registered and confirmed. Documentary and other evidence of Russia’s role and direct participation in the armed conflict against Ukraine has been communicated by the Ukrainian side to the international law institutions.

Any claims by Russian officials that Russia is playing a mediatory role in the peaceful settlement of the conflict do not stand any ground. The Russian Federation was and remains a fully fledged party.

From the very first day, the Russian Federation has deliberately violated the Minsk agreements and those reached within the Normandy Four (N4) format, which remain the backbone of the peaceful settlement of the conflict, negotiated under the mediation of Germany and France. As just one example, I would cite Russia’s seizure of Debaltseve and other Ukrainian territories six years ago several days after its signing of the 2015 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the decision to hold a ceasefire along the contact line.

All further actions of Russia until now have been directed at undermining efforts to end the conflict and to reach peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

For its part, Ukraine has taken unprecedented steps to find ways to advance the peaceful settlement of the conflict. We have invested enormous effort in fulfilling the N4 agreements reached in Paris on 9 December 2019. To this end, the Ukrainian side has put forward numerous proposals and initiatives, in particular within the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), for the implementation of the agreements in the humanitarian, security and political fields.

Despite all our efforts, the work of the TCG is being blocked under various pretexts, as attested, for example, by the refusal of the Russian side even to finalize the decisions agreed on the expert level. Here we are referring to the initiatives on numerous important matters: further disengagement of forces and hardware, demining, implementation of the political part of the overall agreed conclusions of the Paris Summit, opening of the entry-exit

checkpoints on the contact line, and the fulfilment of the next stage of mutual release of detainees and exchange of respective lists.

One of the most tangible outcomes of the past months, the TCG decision on additional measures to consolidate the ceasefire of 22 July 2020, is put to the test every day by the ongoing armed provocations on the part of armed formations of the Russian Federation. On a daily basis, the armed forces of Ukraine are being put under fire and shelling from a variety of sources ranging from grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, small arms and snipers to Minsk-proscribed weapons and combat drones used to drop grenade shells, not to mention distant mining.

The Russian armed formations are actively developing new forward positions and reinforcing the existing ones, conducting offensive and subversive activities in full disregard of the provisions of the TCG decision of 22 July 2020. Since the entry into force of this decision on 27 July 2020 our delegation has kept the FSC constantly informed of these violations.

These reckless actions by Russia and its forces in Donbas endanger the lives of Ukrainian defenders and civilians, further devastate the conflict-affected region, and jeopardize the fragile ceasefire regime.

International organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, still do not have access to the affected communities and illegally detained persons on the territories under temporary Russian occupation. The SMM's freedom of movement is being severely restricted by the Russian armed formations, including its freedom of movement to the segment of the State border temporarily not under the control of the Government of Ukraine.

Notwithstanding these negative developments, Ukraine remains fully committed to the politico-diplomatic peaceful settlement of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine based on the principles of the Minsk agreements, including the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015. We stand ready to work on the implementation of these documents in both the TCG and N4 formats.

Ukraine is grateful for and highly values the mediation efforts of the OSCE and our partners Germany and France in seeking solutions calculated to eventually bring peace to Ukraine.

The Russian Federation must stop misleading the whole civilized world with its ungrounded statements that it is not a party to the conflict. Its direct role and participation in the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine is well documented and well known to the international community.

Russia must recognize its responsibility for unleashing armed aggression against Ukraine and make every effort to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict that it initiated and continues to sustain.

We urge the Russian Federation to stop its aggression against Ukraine, reverse its illegal occupation of Crimea, de-occupy parts of Donbas, and restore freedom of navigation

in the Black Sea, through the Kerch Strait and in the Sea of Azov. Russia must fully implement its commitments under the Minsk agreements, including the withdrawal of its armed forces, mercenaries and armed formations and weapons from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson, I kindly ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 3

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 3

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine is the result of the February 2014 coup d'état, which was orchestrated, funded and organized from abroad.

Exactly seven years ago, around this time in February, bloody events took place on the Maidan in Kyiv that have led to tragic consequences for Ukraine and for regional stability. These events were to a great extent provoked and supported by Western countries (above all the United States of America), which thereby committed gross interference in Ukraine's domestic affairs. Apart from representatives of Western political circles and Members of the European Parliament, those actively "exerting themselves" in Kyiv at the time included the US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, US Senator John McCain and others. They all held meetings with opposition leaders and gave them direct instructions on how to act. Unfortunately, these people from countries that have proclaimed themselves "beacons" of democracy preferred then to forget that international law prohibits the organization, incitement to, funding, instigation or toleration of any activities aimed at disrupting the constitutional system of another State.

France, Germany and Poland acted as mediators between the Government and the opposition. They sought to persuade the lawfully elected President not to use force against the protesters, who were by no means peaceful, and became guarantors of the agreements reached between the two sides. However, they ended up doing nothing to ensure their implementation when the opposition demonstratively reneged on those agreements.

The more time that passes since the coup d'état in Kyiv, the clearer its consequences become. It led to Crimea ceasing to be part of Ukraine. It became the trigger for the start of the armed confrontation in Donbas and the suffering of millions of civilians in Ukraine. Regrettably, the situation along the line of contact to this day remains challenging. The Ukrainian armed forces' command continues to steer a course aimed at further escalation. The authorities in Kyiv are showing by their actions that the Minsk agreements on settling the conflict are nothing more than a scrap of paper to them. And all this is happening with the tacit consent of their Western "minders".

Madam Chairperson,

For seven years now, the Ukrainian Government's Western partners have not sought to promote a real cessation of hostilities and a political settlement of the crisis. On the contrary, they are in fact giving the Ukrainian Government the green light to commit war crimes in the east of Ukraine and inciting it to further armed violence; they are training the Ukrainian army and beefing it up with weapons and equipment, which then end up in the zone of armed confrontation. This is not conducive to reducing military tensions, as the Ukrainian Government's Western partners regularly call for – rather, it is giving a boost to the “war party” in Kyiv.

At this stage, Ukraine continues in fact to be steered from outside. According to recent opinion polls, this is recognized by around 70 per cent of the country's citizens. The goal of its Western “minders” is obvious: they are using Ukraine as a tool for stoking up confrontation with Russia. A few days ago, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, in a telephone conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart, Andrii Taran, affirmed the commitment of the United States to strengthening the military capacities of the Ukrainian armed forces with a view to taking a stand against our country. Contrary to the Western countries' self-avowed commitment to a “swift settlement of the conflict”, they continue to encourage the Ukrainian Government's confrontational policy and to give it carte blanche to fail to comply with its obligations under the Minsk agreements. We believe that they are quite aware that this could lead to an even greater aggravation of the situation.

Madam Chairperson,

We call on our international partners and Ukraine's external “minders” to bring their influence to bear on the Ukrainian leadership in order to induce it to take practical steps in the interests of peace and civil accord with a view to achieving swift implementation of the provisions of the Package of Measures (endorsed by the United Nations Security Council) in a full and co-ordinated manner on the basis of direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk. The Ukrainian Government does not – and cannot – have any other counterparties in the internal Ukrainian settlement process. The right thing for our foreign colleagues to do would be to pursue additional opportunities to stop the preparations by the Ukrainian Government and army for a potential new military venture. This would also serve as direct evidence of their commitment to peace in Ukraine and to stabilization in the field of European security.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 4

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (AUSTRIA)**

Madam Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

In my capacity as FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I would like to thank the distinguished panellists for their valuable contributions and insights.

In my intervention, I would like to pick up the thread of previous speakers and consider three points, namely, work undertaken, remaining challenges, and opportunities for support on the part of OSCE participating States.

In total, the OSCE has implemented over 15 assistance projects in Central Asia, some of which are still in implementation. The overall value of these projects has amounted to 15 million euros with donor contributions provided in the period of 2004 to 2020 by: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and one Asian Partner for Co-operation, the Republic of Korea.

Several unplanned explosions at munitions sites in four out of five participating States in Central Asia, the most recent of which occurred in June 2019 at Arys, Kazakhstan, are an important reminder of some of the challenges which still have to be addressed: degraded physical infrastructure and the need to improve stockpile management and security practices, but also, to a limited extent, the challenge of contamination through unexploded landmines and abandoned ordnance.

Given the number of successfully implemented projects, I see great potential for the development of further regional ventures. Nor has the thematic potential of the area of combating illicit trafficking of SALW yet been exhausted: for example, consideration could be given to the extension of co-operation to ministries of the interior and law enforcement agencies.

Let me conclude by thanking the above-mentioned participating States for giving assistance to Central Asian participating States in reducing and mitigating risks of explosive hazards. I cordially invite all concerned to take part in the OSCE's efforts through further support for assistance projects in the field of SALW and SCA.

Madam Chairperson, I thank you for your attention and kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 5

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 4

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF AUSTRIA**

Madam Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Distinguished colleagues,

Austria fully aligns itself with the EU statement but would like to deliver additional remarks from a national perspective.

We express our gratitude to the US FSC Chairmanship for putting the important topic of explosive hazards in Central Asia on the agenda of today's Security Dialogue and thank the panellists for their insightful presentations. We were also glad to hear about the perspectives of certain OSCE field operations and thank their representatives for contributing to the fruitful outcome of this meeting.

Austria's foreign policy has traditionally put a special focus on humanitarian issues. In this context, we have been staunch supporters of relevant international and multilateral processes such as the Ottawa Process, to name just one. In recent years we have put special emphasis on humanitarian demining projects and support for mine victims. To this end, we have co-operated with a number of non-governmental organizations and in particular with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In pursuing this objective, Austria also supports related projects in the OSCE area. For example, Austria provided financial support to the OSCE regional project for Central Asia entitled "Integrated co-operation on Explosive Hazards Programme". This innovative project reflects two core principles the OSCE was built upon: co-operation and the indivisibility of security.

The fact that the States shared common challenges and concerns in this regard led to a fostering of dialogue and technical co-operation. Austria was convinced of the great merit of contributing, together with the United States, Germany and the Netherlands, to targeted capacity development and technical assistance in reducing and responding to the risks stemming from explosive hazards.

More than seven years later, we congratulate all stakeholders involved on having taken such a forward-looking approach and even becoming in some aspects exporters of security. In our opinion, it would be very worthwhile to thoroughly analyse this

comprehensive regional programme and to consider a possible transfer to other subregions of lessons learned in mitigating and reducing risks stemming from explosive hazards.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. May I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 6

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 4

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

We are grateful to the US Chairmanship for having chosen the topic of explosive hazards management in Central Asia for consideration within the Security Dialogue framework. This is a complex, multifaceted and highly important issue. We welcome the heads of the OSCE field operations in that region and thank them for their contribution to the work on this topic. We are grateful to the keynote speakers for their presentations.

Madam Chairperson,

We have mentioned on numerous occasions that the addressing of a wide range of issues related to the provision of assistance to OSCE participating States in mine clearance and the management of explosives and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) makes a concrete contribution to the strengthening of security in the Organization's area of responsibility. We believe that updating the best practice guide on the destruction of surplus ammunition could give additional impetus to work in this field.

We concur with the opinion that efforts to counter the uncontrolled spread of SCA, improve the physical security of their storage, reduce the dangers posed by mines and tackle the humanitarian aspects of these problems are of cardinal importance and should be sustainably continued. In that respect, it is important to take into account the specific circumstances and actual capacities of the OSCE, which has traditionally seen it as its task to support the implementation of United Nations global commitments and to provide assistance to its participating States.

The Russian Federation has gained considerable experience in assisting in the organization of the storage and disposal of ammunition, missiles and mélange liquid rocket fuel components, notably in Central Asia. For example, experts from the Russian Ministry of Defence carried out work in Tajikistan on the disposal of missiles belonging to Soviet-designed S-75 air defence systems. In Kazakhstan, work was undertaken to improve the system for ammunition storage and use. And in Kyrgyzstan, military experts' efforts have focused on improving the management system for small arms.

Our country pays considerable attention to the exchange of international experience in mine clearance. Regular lectures are held with faculty staff and trainees of military academies in Central Asian States. The International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (IMAC) trains specialists in mine detection and neutralization, and the clearance of areas and buildings, mine detection service specialists and operators of mobile robotic systems. In recent years, military personnel from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have completed such training programmes at IMAC.

Madam Chairperson,

We note that a “non-proliferation” component has also been included in the agenda for today’s event, given that the OSCE has on the whole succeeded in finding a niche for itself with regard to the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. Particular importance is traditionally attached to events aimed at facilitating its implementation. We note the contribution of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in organizing workshops for export control points of contact for the countries of Central Asia. The holding of such training workshops is one of Russia’s priorities in the context of international efforts to implement resolution 1540.

It is important that the OSCE’s accumulated experience working on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and our Organization’s plans for the future are taken into account during the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and subsequently incorporated into the resulting new United Nations Security Council resolution. This will make it possible to guide the 1540 Committee’s co-operation with international and regional organizations. In our opinion, the participating States have succeeded in preparing a high-quality contribution by the OSCE to the comprehensive review of the resolution. We are confident that the document in question will be one of the best regional contributions to this process.

We should like to take this opportunity to commend the considerable and highly valuable efforts made by Belarus, as co-chair of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540, the FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues, Mr. Andrei Lozovik, and the professional team of the FSC Support Section in the CPC to co-ordinate the preparation of that document. We sincerely thank our distinguished colleagues for their work on this.

Madam Chairperson,

We believe that today there was a useful exchange of opinions, experience and practices with regard to mitigation of the risks connected with explosive hazards, materials and substances, with a focus on Central Asia. This will undoubtedly have a positive impact, on the whole, on enhancing the effectiveness of the efforts of the OSCE and the participating States in these fields.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 7

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 4

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Dear colleagues,
Distinguished speakers,

Today's Security Dialogue has once again drawn our attention to the OSCE's contributions to addressing stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) and more specifically to the clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW). In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, I should like to thank the speakers for their valuable contributions on this important topic.

Various aspects of the challenges faced in the management of explosive hazards in the OSCE area, including landmines and stockpiles of conventional ammunition, have been discussed within the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Last year, for example, the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship and the Turkish FSC Chairmanship increased our awareness of mine action, notably normative aspects, international regulation, and the application of mine action in practice; and in 2019 the Swiss and Tajik FSC Chairmanships devoted Security Dialogues to, respectively, humanitarian demining and regional co-operation in mine action.

Madam Chairperson,

Explosive hazards clearly have a negative impact on human and economic security, even leading to loss of lives. The OSCE is closely involved in efforts at the global level to prevent and mitigate these consequences.

In our norm-setting efforts, we are progressively strengthening controls of SCA to ensure their safe and secure storage. Let me note here that the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition provides indicators for the participating States to assess whether they have a surplus of conventional ammunition, explosive material and/or detonating devices, and if they do, information on how to initiate the process of destroying

any such surpluses. For this purpose, the annual information exchange on SCA could be enhanced to serve us better.

Since 1997, the OSCE participating States have used a dedicated annual questionnaire to exchange information on their policies and practices regarding anti-personnel mines and on explosive remnants of war. The information exchanged is publicly available on the OSCE website.¹ Although we can rightly take pride in the high rate of response to the questionnaire, we should explore ways of increasing the practical utility of the information exchanged – by, for example, following up with the participating States that require assistance in mine clearance, stockpile destruction, mine awareness and/or victim assistance. In 2020, for example, there were 10 States indicating that they required assistance and 38 States offering support in the area of mine action and ERW.²

Furthermore, let me recall the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA, where we recognized the need for a dedicated framework and comprehensive approach to safety and security in conventional ammunition management covering the supply chain and wider life-cycle management. To this end, we suggested the development of an OSCE Plan of Action on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, which would help us to identify steps and milestones in countering the destabilizing accumulation and diversion of ammunition.

To summarize, I believe that further strengthening the implementation of SALW- and SCA-related norms and regulations, linking them to our practical work, and making better use of information exchanges would all help enhance the FSC's ability to tackle existing and emerging challenges posed by explosive hazards.

I thank you very much for your attention.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

1 <https://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/313921>.

2 Table 18 of the Annual CPC Survey on CSBM Information Exchanged in 2020, FSC.GAL/9/21, 4 February 2021.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/975
24 February 2021
Annex 8

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 5(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON
POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY (SWITZERLAND)
(ALSO ON BEHALF OF THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR
MATTERS RELATED TO UNSCR 1325 (ALBANIA))**

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear colleagues,

This is a joint statement of the FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the FSC Co-ordinator for Matters Related to UNSCR 1325 on the voluntary submission of the women, peace and security part of the annual information exchange on the OSCE Code of Conduct.

Last week, the Conflict Prevention Centre distributed the document FSC.GAL/17/21 announcing the deadline for submissions in the Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct, 15 April 2021. As is well known, it contains a voluntary part devoted to exchange of information regarding implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. This voluntary section focuses on four key areas: prevention, participation, protection, and other issues including National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325.

According to the report on the responses of OSCE participating States concerning women, peace and security in the 2019 Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct, only 37 OSCE participating States reported on their activities in this field. In 2020 the number was even lower, with only 30 participating States submitting information on their activities in relation to UNSCR 1325.

This being the case, we would like to encourage all participating States to provide information in this part of the questionnaire so that we can continue to assess good practices and address and share viewpoints on the challenges, with the common aim of further strengthening reporting on implementation of the women, peace and security agenda across the OSCE area.

Lastly, we should like to kindly remind participating States of one of the key takeaways of the joint statement delivered at the Tirana Ministerial Council on United

Nations Security Council resolution 1325, co-signed by 52 OSCE participating States, namely, its focus on promoting the information exchange on women, peace and security issues through the Code of Conduct.

This focal point, together with the joint statement's seven other key takeaways, will surely assist in enhancing practical efforts in the OSCE, including the FSC, for the further advancement of this important agenda.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I kindly request that this joint statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.DEC/1/21
24 February 2021

Original: ENGLISH

969th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 975, Agenda item 1

**DECISION No. 1/21
AGENDA, TIMETABLE AND MODALITIES FOR THE TENTH
ANNUAL DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY**

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Recalling FSC Decision No. 12/11 on an annual discussion on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security,

Recalling the importance of the Code of Conduct and taking into account the provision of paragraph 38 of the Code of Conduct stating that appropriate bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review and improve if necessary the implementation of the Code of Conduct,

Taking into account the deliberations of the Annual Discussions on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct held since 2012,

Decides to organize the tenth Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct, which is to take place (with the possibility of being held remotely via video conference) on 16 June 2021, in accordance with the agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annex to this decision.

ANNUAL DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

I. Agenda and indicative timetable

Wednesday, 16 June 2021

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 10–10.30 a.m. | Opening session <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Opening and introduction by the FSC Chairperson– Remarks by the representative of the OSCE Secretariat– General statements |
| 10.30 a.m.–1 p.m. | Working session 1: Sharing of views on the implementation of the Code of Conduct in the context of the existing political and military situation <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Introduction by session moderator– Keynote speakers– Discussion– Moderator's closing remarks |
| 3–5 p.m. | Working session 2: Evaluation discussion on the implementation and effectiveness of the Code of Conduct including the 2021 annual exchange of information pursuant to the Questionnaire <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Introduction by session moderator– Keynote speaker– Discussion– Moderator's closing remarks |
| 5–5.15 p.m. | Closing session <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Discussion– Concluding remarks– Closure |

II. Organizational modalities

Background

In FSC Decision No. 12/11 it was decided, *inter alia*, to “regularize a focused discussion on implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security by devoting an annual special one-day meeting to the Code of Conduct” and to “invite, as appropriate, representatives of think tanks of international standing and security-related scientific institutes to a morning session of this meeting to share views on implementation, while the following evaluation discussion of the afternoon session of the meeting is to be restricted to participating States.”

The tenth Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct will therefore provide opportunities to discuss how to promote and improve the implementation of the Code of Conduct, including its annual information exchange, and to undertake an evaluation discussion and examine the application of the Code of Conduct in the context of the existing political and military situation.

Organization

The Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct will take place (with the possibility of being held remotely via video conference) on 16 June 2021.

The OSCE Rules of Procedure and standard working methods will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the annual discussion on the implementation of the Code of Conduct. For remote meetings, participants are strongly encouraged to read the procedural and technical guidelines for remote meetings (SEC.GAL/45/20) and the addendum on naming conventions (SEC.GAL/45/20/Add.1/Rev.1).

A representative of the FSC Chairmanship (Armenia) will chair the opening and closing sessions. Each session will have a moderator and a rapporteur.

Simultaneous interpretation between all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at all sessions.

The FSC Chair will provide a report on the Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct within one month, including a survey of suggestions and recommendations made during the meeting.

Participation

The participating States are encouraged to ensure that they are represented at policy and expert level at the Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct.

The OSCE Secretariat, the ODIHR, field operations, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Partners for Co-operation are invited to participate in the Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Only the morning session will be open for the invited representatives of think tanks of international standing and security-related scientific institutes.

General guidelines for participants

In accordance with FSC Decision No. 12/11, a report on the implementation of the Code of Conduct prepared by the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE Secretariat will be made available to participating States not later than 9 June 2021.

The Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct will be conducted in two working sessions.

These sessions will concentrate on major topics, which will be introduced by keynote speakers. The introductions shall be followed by discussions of any number of relevant subtopics that delegates may wish to raise. The aim is an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

For remote meetings, all written statements have to be submitted one day prior to the virtual meeting date to facilitate their interpretation under remote conditions. Speakers are requested to speak slowly. Delegations may also take the floor just to announce the circulation of their statements via Documents Distribution when there are time constraints or when they are experiencing technical difficulties.

Delegations are welcome to distribute written contributions in advance of the meeting, both on agenda items and on related matters for possible discussion, by 9 June 2021. In order to ensure the most productive discussion when the participating States are considering suggestions made during the meeting, the recommended approach is for delegations to bring forward suggestions or topics of interest by means of food-for-thought papers. Discussions on initial papers could lead to further work in the FSC.

Guidelines for keynote speakers

The introductions given by the keynote speakers should set the scene for the discussion in the sessions and stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities. The keynote speakers' contributions should set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions. The available speaking time is approximately 15 minutes per keynote speaker.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session they are speaking at and be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs

The moderator chairs the session and should facilitate and focus the dialogue among delegations. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of the opening and working session, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion.

The rapporteurs' reports should deal with issues raised during the respective sessions; they should cover lessons learned, best practices, challenges, improvements, and suggestions made at the session, and any other relevant information.

Personal views shall not be advanced.