

Chairmanship: Finland

558th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 1 October 2008

Opened: 10 a.m.

Closed: 1.25 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Mr. M. Kangaste

3. Subjects discussed — Statements — Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Response to the statement by the United States of America on 10 September 2008:
Russian Federation, United States of America

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

(a) *Round table discussion on issues related to small arms and light weapons: Presentations by the Information Research Group on Peace and Security (GRIP), Safer World, and the Small Arms Survey: Chairperson, Representative of the Small Arms Survey (FSC.NGO/3/08), Representative of Safer World (FSC.NGO/1/08), Representative of the Information Research Group on Peace and Security (FSC.NGO/2/08 OSCE+) (FSC.NGO/4/08), Chairperson of the informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Germany), United Kingdom, Belarus, Germany*

(b) *Presentation by the Russian Federation on arms supplies to Georgia in light of the OSCE Documents: Russian Federation (Annex 1), Chairperson, Georgia (Annex 2), Czech Republic (Annex 3), Bulgaria (Annex 4), Ukraine (Annex 5), Turkey, United States of America (Annex 6), Lithuania*

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(a) *Meeting of a group of operational experts in relation to the Proliferation Security Initiative, held in Paris on 25 and 26 September 2008: France*

- (b) *Seminar on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, held in Astana from 22 to 24 September 2008*: Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- (c) *Introduction of two Ministerial Council draft decisions (MC.DD/6/08 and MC.DD/7/08)*: Chairperson
- (d) *Organizational matters*: Chairperson

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 8 October 2008, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

558th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Today the Russian delegation would like to continue the discussion of how the August tragedy in South Ossetia was possible.

At the last meeting, the delegation of the United States of America attempted to present matters as though the Georgian military adventure were a spontaneous, impulsive and ill-considered response to an exacerbation of the situation. We are forced to disappoint our United States colleagues: Their version of events, which is in line with the propaganda efforts of Tbilisi and, to all appearances, designed at least partly to justify the Georgian aggression, does not stand up to any criticism and contradicts the objective facts.

As we tried to show in our statement to the Forum on 17 September, the current Georgian leadership at least since 2006 had decided in favour of resolving internal conflicts by means of force. This can be seen in Georgia's blocking of the work of the negotiation mechanisms, its refusal under various pretexts to conclude legally binding agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the non-use of force, and constant acts of provocation in the conflict zones. It was no coincidence at all that in the summer of 2006 the then Minister of Defence, Mr. Irakli Okruashvili, publicly stated that he intended to celebrate the New Year in Tskhinvali and that if that did not happen he would hand in his resignation. Later, having already switched over to the opponents of the Saakashvili regime, Mr. Okruashvili admitted that in 2006 he had been working with the president on military plans for the seizure of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At that time, some analysts cast doubt on that statement, putting it down to a desire to settle scores with a former comrade-in-arms. However, in actual fact, in the heat of the dispute Mr. Okruashvili was telling the truth. His words are fully corroborated, in particular, by the secret plan put together as early as 2006 for the seizure of Tskhinvali by the First Georgian Infantry Brigade, which we displayed in this room two weeks ago. Incidentally, a few days ago, Mr. Okruashvili again confirmed the long-existing plans to attack South Ossetia and accused Mikheil Saakashvili of being unable to conduct the military campaign in the way it had been conceived. There is no need for any comments here.

Tbilisi's military policy serves as one of the convincing and incontrovertible pieces of evidence indicating that the aggression against South Ossetia was not spontaneous but the logical conclusion of lengthy preparations.

Under Saakashvili Georgia has become perhaps the most militarized country on the planet. It is fair to say that from 2002 to 2008 the Georgian defence ministry's budget increased from 18 million to 900 million dollars, that is, by a factor of 50! Taking into account the extrabudgetary income (army assistance funds, contributions from the diaspora, and so on), which when combined are roughly equal to spending from the budget, Tbilisi's real expenditure for military purposes, according to some estimates, exceeds 8.5 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP). A reasonable question arises: Why is a relatively small country where a considerable portion of the population is living below the poverty line spending almost a billion United States dollars on its military budget? Perhaps this is in preparation for its accession to NATO? But no other country that has joined the Alliance or wishes to do so has embarked on such unrestrained militarization. Or, perhaps, it is for its participation in peacekeeping operations abroad? However, its peacekeeping activities are not so large as to require almost a tenth of the Georgian GDP to be spent for military purposes. All the more so since peacekeeping activities do not require the accelerated acquisition of offensive weapons, on which, according to United Nations figures, up to 40 per cent of the military budget has been spent. There can only be one answer: The Saakashvili regime was making strenuous preparations to solve the problems in its relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia by military means, relying on the fact that these two small republics would be unable to offer any resistance.

It is no accident that in 2006 and 2007 the numerical strength of the Georgian army, according to the information submitted by Georgia under the terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), increased by 15,000 servicemen, i.e., almost doubled in size, and as of 1 January 2008 stood at 32,307 men. At the same time, there was accelerated training of reservists. In accordance with the Law on the Armed Forces of Georgia of 8 December 2006, all healthy men aged between 27 and 40 years are divided into three categories: "active" reserve, "individual" reserve and reserve of the National Guards. Every two years they must undergo 24 days of military training in camps, while students undergo 18 days of training. There are plans to develop eight centres to train reservists across the country. Four centres (including those at Vaziani, Sachkhere and Senaki) received 25,000 men in the course of 2007.

If we take into account the fact that we are talking about a relatively small country in terms of territory and population size there is every reason to speak of unprecedented militarization at accelerated speeds within the shortest period of time.

Unfortunately, this was possible as a result of external assistance on the part of several OSCE participating States. By way of substantiation, let us take concrete facts based, among other things, on the information we exchange under the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers.

The leading arms supplier to Georgia was Ukraine. In the period from 2004 to 2006, Kiev supplied Tbilisi with 16 T-72 battle tanks, 30 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers,

52 BMP-2 armoured infantry fighting vehicles, 12 152 mm self-propelled “Akatsiya” howitzers, six Mi-24, two Mi-8 and two Mi-14 helicopters, a consignment of “KrAz-6510” vehicles with increased lifting capacity, five MTU-20 tank-launched bridges, five PZM-2 regimental ditching machines, two IMP-2 obstacle clearance vehicles, two BAT-2 armoured route-clearing vehicles and more than 40 tons of ammunition for small arms. During this period, a “Kolchuga-M” electronic surveillance system was supplied along with two 36-D6-M radars designed to detect, identify and track aerial targets.

In 2007 alone, Ukraine supplied Georgia with 74 T-72 tanks (90 in all), five 203 mm self-propelled 2S7 guns, eight L-39C operational training aircraft and a considerable quantity of anti-tank guided missiles.

In addition, Georgia received in 2007 a battery of “Buk1-M1” surface-to-air missile system launchers, a battery of “Osa-AKM” surface-to-air missile systems, around 50 “Igla-1” man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and up to 400 missiles for them, and more than 1 million bullets for small arms and 8,000 rounds for RPG-7 grenade launchers.

In total, during the period from 2000 to 2007, the Czech Republic supplied Georgia with:

- Fifty T-72 tanks, 42 D-30 howitzers (12 units were sold in 2001 and 30 units in 2006);
- Twenty-four “Dana” M-77 152 mm self-propelled howitzers;
- Six RM-70 120 mm multiple-launch rocket systems;
- Twenty-five M-75 120 mm mortars;
- Two hundred “Strela-2M” MANPADS.

In 2004, the Czech Republic transferred 40 tons of ammunition to Georgia free of charge, including 1.5 million 7.62 mm bullets, 252 rounds for RPG-7V anti-tank grenade launchers and 1,212 RGD-2 hand grenades.

During this period alone, 3.5 million 7.62 mm bullets, 7,000 30 mm shells, 65,000 40 mm shells, 49,000 60 mm mines, 6,000 73 mm shells, 26,000 82 mm mines, 600 120 mm shells and mines, 12,000 122 mm shells and 4,000 125 mm shells were delivered.

In 2003, Bulgaria exported 578 rounds for 82 mm mortars, 70 rounds for 120 mm mortars, 1,100 hand grenades and around 1 million bullets to Georgia.

During the period from 2004 to 2005, deliveries became more substantial: 14 120 mm mortars, 150 “Konkurs” and “Kornet” anti-tank missile systems and 1,500 missiles for them, 300 RPG-7 grenade launchers, small arms (including various Kalashnikov automatic weapons and RPG-22 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers) and 150 tons of ammunition. In

addition, contracts were signed for the delivery of 500 missiles for “Igla” MANPADS and 12 23 mm “ZU-23-2M” anti-aircraft installations.

In 2006, 200 “Konkurs” anti-tank missile systems and a consignment of ammunition weighing more than 500 tons and costing in the region of 8 million dollars were exported to Georgia.

In 2007, four 23 mm “Shilka” ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft systems, anti-tank missile systems, small arms and ammunition were exported.

In addition, two small landing vessels, the “Guriya” and the “Akiya” (“Vydra” 106K project), were transferred to Tbilisi.

In 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina transferred to Georgia through procuring agencies 45 120 mm M75 mortars; in 2006 it transferred 25 82 mm M69A mortars and 500 262 mm rockets for the “Orkan” M-87 multiple-launch rocket system.

At the end of 2007 and at the beginning of 2008, the Georgian Ministry of Defence purchased from Bosnia and Herzegovina five “Orkan” multiple-launch rocket systems and a consignment of missiles for them.

Poland supplied Georgia with 30 “Grom” MANPADS and 100 missiles for them, along with ammunition for small arms.

Lithuania supplied 14,000 Kalashnikov automatic weapons.

In 2007, Israel supplied four gradLAR multiple-launch rocket systems. As part of bilateral military-technical co-operation, there has been active work on a project to create within the Georgian air force a unit with a capacity for tactical reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For this purpose, Georgia purchased Israeli-made UAVs (four “Hermes 450” and four “Skylark”) in mid-2007.

The Israeli firm Elbit Systems was involved in upgrading SU-25 jet fighters, in the course of which the aircraft were equipped with a modern Israeli avionics enabling the aircraft to be used in any weather conditions. In 2006 and 2007 the Tbilaviamsheni aircraft plant was able to upgrade four SU-25 aircraft with the assistance of Elbit specialists.

The United States of America provides military and military-technical assistance to Georgia through quite a number of federal programmes.

For example, as part of the “Foreign Military Sales Program” to sell defence articles to foreign countries, export agreements with Georgia during the period from 2004 to 2007 amounted to 180.9 million dollars and during the period from 2003 to 2006 Georgia was supplied with weapons and military equipment totalling 39.3 million dollars. In addition, Washington supplies Tbilisi with military goods and services through private channels. Notably, from 2004 to 2006 licences were issued to supply Georgia with weapons and military equipment to the tune of 5.1 million dollars, and the cost of weapons and military equipment supplied during this period through private channels came to 77.5 million dollars.

As part of the “Excess Defense Articles Program” to transfer excess defence articles to foreign countries, the United States Department of Defense transferred to Georgia free of charge between 1999 and 2007 ten “Iroquois” UH-1H multi-purpose helicopters, two patrol boats, 230 vehicles of various kinds, more than 100 radio sets as well as medical supplies, uniforms and equipment.

Since early 2008, the Georgian army has received a substantial quantity of small arms and M-16 and M-4 machine guns and automatic rifles.

In addition to arms supplies, Georgia was also given considerable assistance in training its armed forces.

For example, during the period from 2002 to 2004, as part of the United States “Georgia Train and Equip Program” four battalions and one motorized company numbering around 2,800 men were trained. Washington allocated around 64 million dollars to the implementation of that programme.

Under the “Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program” servicemen from the first, second and third infantry brigades numbering around 4,000 men received training during the period from 2005 to 2007. Units belonging to the fourth infantry brigade have recently received training.

With the aid of the United States, a long-term programme is under way to restore airfields in the districts adjacent to the Russo-Georgian border. From 2006 to 2007, the airfield near Mestiya (85 km north of Kutaisi) intended primarily for helicopters and light aircraft was renovated and re-equipped. Work has been carried out to build an airfield near Chikhareshi (75 km north east of Kutaisi). The preliminary cost is around 5.5 million dollars.

As part of the “Foreign Military Financing Program” Tbilisi was assigned free loans to the tune of 30.6 million dollars during the period from 2006 to 2008.

During the period from 1997 to 2008, Turkey exported the following products for military purposes to Georgia:

- Around 60 Turkish-made RN-94 armoured personnel carriers;
- Two “Iroquois” UH-1 helicopters;
- One patrol boat;
- A consignment of arms and ammunition, including 2,500 MP5 A1 (K) automatic weapons, 1,500 G3 A3 (A4) assault rifles, 500 T-40 grenade launchers, 4,000 122 mm rockets, 20,000 155 mm shells and a large quantity of hand grenades, anti-personnel mines and mortar shells.

Turkish specialists have taken part in the modernization of military facilities at Marneuli and Vaziani. A military base was built in Gori in early 2008.

Turkey has helped to train special forces units and divisions.

With the support of France, the Georgian Ministry of Defence formed units in accordance with NATO standards to carry out missions in mountainous conditions. These special forces units played an active role in the military operations against Tskhinvali.

As a result of such purchases and deliveries of armaments during the period from 1 January 2005 to 1 January 2008, according to information provided under the CFE Treaty, the number of tanks held by the Georgian army almost doubled (from 98 to 183), the number of armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) increased by more than a factor of 1.5 (from 83 to 134), the number of artillery pieces with a calibre of more than 100 mm tripled (from 96 to 238), the number of attack helicopters tripled (from 3 to 9) and the number of combat aircraft increased by one third (from 7 to 9).

These large-scale deliveries clearly contravened OSCE norms. We might recall that in accordance with the 1994 document entitled "Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers" all the participating States of our Organization assumed a political commitment to avoid transfers which would be likely to "prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict", "endanger peace", "be used for the purpose of repression", "introduce destabilizing military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability". All of these provisions, which were also confirmed in 2000 in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, are most clearly applicable to Georgia.

The Russian delegation has repeatedly drawn attention to the dangerous development of the situation, warning that the accelerated militarization of Georgia runs the risk of Tbilisi sooner or later using force to repress the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We also warned that the exporter countries bear responsibility for possible bloodshed. But we were told that Georgia had a legitimate right to modernize its armed forces, that there was no arms embargo on that country, that the "ceilings" set for it under the CFE Treaty had still not been exhausted and, most importantly, that "it was impossible to even imagine" that a "young democracy" like the Saakashvili regime could unleash a war. As we have seen, it is possible and not spontaneously but purposefully and in a planned manner. It is true that the international community came to understand this only after the tragedy that claimed the lives of 2,000 persons and made tens of thousands of people, including citizens of Georgia, refugees and displaced persons.

It is noteworthy that following the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that Israeli exporters henceforth refrain from supplying Tbilisi with arms. This is an example of a responsible approach, signifying that the Israeli authorities have drawn objective and appropriate conclusions from the recent tragedy. But, unfortunately, not everyone has learnt the necessary lessons from the events of August. In some countries within the OSCE area voices are once again heard in favour of providing Georgia with military assistance and quickly restoring its military potential. One has to ask why? To create the preconditions for a fresh bloody conflict? Is it not clear that the Saakashvili regime is unable to deal with the weapons at its disposal in a responsible manner?

We call on all those involved to heed our warnings and to scrupulously observe the commitments laid down in the relevant OSCE documents so as not to intensify their share of responsibility for the bloodshed that occurred in August and a possible reoccurrence of aggressive actions.

As regards OSCE norms concerning conventional arms transfers, at least with regard to Georgia, they have proven to be insufficiently effective. Against that background, we believe it necessary to adopt measures to rectify this situation. Today the Russian delegation is distributing a draft FSC decision, under which all the States of our region will, in accordance with their commitments, scrupulously avoid any direct or indirect supplies, sales or transfers to Georgia of arms and military equipment, including SALW. We believe that the scale of the August tragedy makes it both justified and necessary to extend that decision also to the delivery of any military *matériel* to Georgia and to the provision of any assistance having to do with military activities.

In our view, such a decision must remain in force until there are convincing reasons for believing that the Government of Georgia has in fact given up on force and is ready to deal with foreign military assistance in a responsible manner.

We would ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to make provision for the discussion of the Russian draft decision at the plenary meeting of the Forum on 15 October so as to enable all delegations to have an opportunity to carefully study the draft and hold consultations with the authorities in their capital cities.



558th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF GEORGIA**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson,

Dear colleagues, from the outset, I would like to draw your attention to the simple fact that we are currently witnessing Russia's blunt interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours — in this case, I mean the sovereign State of Georgia.

Actually, that has been the case for a very long time; we have had many opportunities here in the FSC to discuss open provocations previously committed by Russia against Georgia. But what we have seen in the past couple of months definitely exceeds the bounds of an ordinary provocation, casting into question the entire system of European security.

Now I would like to respond to the issues raised by the Russian delegation today.

Since 2004, after the Rose Revolution, the Government of Georgia has launched comprehensive reforms in all spheres of public life — health care, education, social affairs, culture, etc. As a result, the State budget of Georgia has experienced a seven-fold growth.

The country's booming economy, *inter alia*, has enabled us to invest in the defence sector in order to build up credible forces, in other words, modern, well-trained and adequately equipped military forces that the country and its people can be proud of. This is, of course, the legitimate right of any sovereign State.

Over these years, Georgia's defence budget has become adequate to the national security needs as well as to the commitments that Georgia has assumed as an active participant in international peacekeeping and anti-terrorist operations. While, in 2004, the defence budget amounted to some 174 million laris, in 2008, it has increased to 1.4 billion laris, of which only 31.5 per cent is earmarked for acquisitions. Of that total, 35.4 per cent is to be spent for salaries, 22.4 per cent for maintenance and operational costs, 10.1 per cent for military infrastructure, and 0.5 per cent for research and development.

As a result, salaries have been raised by 550 per cent; barracks have been repaired to bring them into line with modern standards; the social conditions of personnel have been improved; the retirement fund has been increased; State-sponsored insurance has been

introduced; and housing has been provided for Georgian officers. By the way, even the occupying Russian military personnel were amazed at the living standards of the Georgian soldiers. Here, I would like to remind you of the video footage that you were able to watch at the latest FSC meeting, showing how Russian soldiers entering the Senaki military base were astonished at the quality of the Georgian barracks. One of them said, "Look how they live... we live like homeless people compared to them..." There were many cases in which Russian soldiers stole even used Georgian uniforms and boots.

It should be emphasized here that, in the process of building a modern NATO-interoperable army, the Georgian Government acted in a fully transparent manner and in strict compliance with the relevant international arrangements, such as the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document 1999, etc.

Since 2004, Georgia has hosted:

- Eight inspections and one reduction inspection under the CFE Treaty;
- Twelve inspections and four evaluation inspections (3+1 evaluation inspections per year) under the Vienna Document 1999;
- Thirteen inspections (four inspections per year and one inspection in 2008) under the Treaty on Open Skies.

As you are aware, the Russian side always actively participated in all these inspections as well.

All these inspections have verified Georgia's compliance with its international obligations. At the same time, in the spirit of transparency, Georgia annually participates in the exchanges of information on conventional arms transfers, in both the UN and the OSCE, with which all of you are familiar.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress that Georgia is grateful to the countries that have co-operated with us in the acquisition of arms. We intend to continue this kind of co-operation in the future as well, so as to enhance our defence capabilities and ensure interoperability with NATO forces.

Despite the ill-advised attempts of our Russian colleagues to portray Georgia as a heavily militarized State, I would like to stress that our defence budget remains relatively modest and that our army is the smallest in the region.

Russia, having conducted a large-scale military aggression and occupation of Georgian territories, is trying in the most cynical way to accuse Georgia of aggression.

The truth, which I am sure is well known, is that Moscow has long been preparing to invade Georgia by illegally increasing its troop presence in the conflict zones and constantly upgrading the military capabilities of the criminal separatists, in blatant violation of its peacekeeping obligations. Allow me to remind you, distinguished colleagues, that it is Russia that, alongside with its client regimes, is responsible for the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of

thousands of innocent civilians, both in Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region, Georgia. And, last but not least, it is Russia that violated all the fundamental principles and norms that the OSCE and international law are based upon.

Actually, Russia didn't even try to hide its aggressive plans in its neighbourhood. Allow me to remind you of just a few facts:

In December 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty, and that enabled the country to further increase its troop presence in the North Caucasus.

In March 2008, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS decision that restricted the transfer of any military equipment and assistance to the Abkhazians.

In April 2008, Russia introduced offensive military forces into the Abkhazia region, including paratroopers, in clear violation of peacekeeping rules (annex 2 to the CIS decision, 26 May 1995), which allowed only infantry as peacekeepers.

In May 2008, Russia deployed "railroad troops" in Abkhazia, which repaired the military infrastructure there, laying the groundwork for the invasion.

In a huge contradiction with the peacekeeping mandate, before August 2008, Moscow illegally transferred to the separatist regimes heavy armament —artillery missiles with a 50-km range, and about a dozen Russian self-propelled radar-guided anti-aircraft "Shilka" weapon systems.

According to information available to the Georgian side, in 2008 alone, Russia also provided the separatists in both regions of Georgia with more than 90 armoured vehicles, 12 modern tanks, six T-72 tanks, five T-62 tanks, 55 T-55 tanks, 52 BMPs, 16 BTRs, 11 BRDMs, 17 MTLBs, and 15 BM-21 "Grad" rocket launchers. It should be particularly noted that, in the nearest future, the separatists are expecting to receive ten combat helicopters and three jet fighters.

In the Tskhinvali region, Georgia, in Dzhava district, a military base was built, which is going to be used by the Russian occupying forces.

In July 2008, a large-scale military exercise was held in the North Caucasus in close vicinity to Georgia's State border. The scenario of the exercise, *inter alia*, included supporting Russian "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, Georgia. "Accidentally", those very troops, which remained deployed near the Georgian border after the exercise had been completed, formed the vanguard of the Russian forces invading Georgia early in the morning of 7 August.

We should stress that all the aforementioned is just a non-exhaustive list that demonstrates Russia's aggressive plans. The list could go on almost indefinitely.

Finally, through the unilateral declaration of the "independence" of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, the Russian Federation is, in fact, trying to definitively annex these territories. The additional wave of ethnic cleansing, the mandatory distribution of Russian

passports, the recent statement of the Russian Prime Minister on eliminating the border with the Tskhinvali region and the undisguised plans to create new military bases and permanently station Russian forces in the conflict zones clearly display the real goals of the Russian side concerning Georgia and its breakaway regions.

Therefore, I believe that it is quite clear that Georgia was forced to respond to the military aggression on the part of Russia. The aggression, I want to reiterate, was meticulously prepared by Russia long before August 2008.

Now I would like to make few comments on the remarks made by the distinguished Russian ambassador today:

- Regarding Mr. Okruashvili (former Defence Minister of Georgia): Yes, it is true, he said that he would greet the New Year in Tskhinvali, Georgia, in 2007, but as often happens, my Russian colleague omitted important information in this regard. Namely, that Mr. Okruashvili was fired in the autumn of 2006 and was later detained. It is also interesting to note that other high ranking officials of the Ministry, who were also fired with him, escaped to Russia. Whom they really worked for is a matter for separate investigation.
- Regarding the peace proposals blocked by the Georgian side: Dear colleagues, at the last presentation, I provided the list of a dozen peace proposals offered by the Georgian side to the separatists, as well as to the international community. As I said — and you all were witnesses to it throughout the years — the Russian side together with the separatists rejected all of them. And it should be stressed again that each and every one of these proposals included the clause on “non-use of force”.
- The reason why the number of personnel in the Georgian armed forces doubled after 2004 is that internal military forces that previously had been within the Ministry of the Interior were transferred into the armed forces.

Mr. Chairperson,

In order to avoid any further speculations regarding the issues raised by the Russian side at the last meetings here in the FSC, we once again call upon the international community to conduct a pertinent independent investigation, and we would like to reiterate that the Georgian side was and is open to such an investigation!

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 3

Original: ENGLISH

558th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

Mr. Chairperson,

We have heard critical words by the Russian delegation concerning exports of military materiel to Georgia.

Mr. Chairperson, I wish to state the following regarding this problem:

There are very strict internal rules in the Czech Republic for the export of military materiel. Our country fully implements all international commitments and procedures in this regard and fully respects every international arms embargo applied to a particular country (or countries). There was no arms export embargo, and still there is none, applied to Georgia.

The Czech Republic carries out all exports of military materiel in a fully transparent manner and fulfils all the relevant OSCE and UN provisions (Information Exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers, etc.). In this context, we urge all the participating States to carry out all their exports of military materiel in the same transparent manner and to provide all the relevant information requested.

The Czech Republic strongly supports the legitimate right of the Georgian Government to develop and build up its own armed forces in order to protect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is especially important in the situation where Georgia is not a member of any alliance which could guarantee the independence of its territory.

The Czech Republic considers the numbers of weapons delivered to Georgia as absolutely minimal and in proportion (in the light of the constantly increasing tension and the repeated attempts to abuse the independence of the Georgian territory).

Mr. Chairperson,

We must strongly deny the Russian allegation that the Czech Republic is responsible for the escalation of the Russian-Georgian conflict as a result of its export of a limited quantity of military materiel to Georgia.

With regard to the escalation of tension in the South Ossetian region, it is still not clear who, and in what quantity, has provided the weapons and further military materiel for the South Ossetian militia. Here we would like to see full transparency.

Mr. Chairperson,

To conclude, let me add some other remarks:

It is not yet clear who really started the conflict. We are not convinced that Georgia alone “started the war” in South Ossetia, as claimed in the Russian statement. A certain share of the responsibility lies with both the Georgian and the Russian sides. But there is no responsibility on the part of the Czech Republic.

Perhaps the distinguished delegation of the Russian Federation forgot that the “small regions” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are part of the Georgian territory?

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

558th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF BULGARIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

We wish to recall that no embargo, sanctions or other restrictions of any sort have been imposed on Georgia. Bulgaria has been exporting military equipment to Georgia on a purely commercial basis. These exports have not been in contravention of any existing export control regime.

It must be noted that, immediately after the conflict started, Bulgaria stopped all exports of military items to Georgia, even cancelling export licenses that had been issued before the conflict.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 5

Original: ENGLISH

558th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF UKRAINE**

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for its presentation. We will most certainly send the text and the proposed draft decision to our capital for further consideration.

Referring to accusations related to Ukraine's arms trade with Georgia, I firmly reject them as absolutely groundless. We also consider that the discussion of Ukraine's alleged involvement or responsibility is senseless. In its military co-operation with other countries, including Georgia, Ukraine acts strictly in line with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and international export control regimes.

I would like to stress that there are no international restrictions concerning military co-operation with Georgia. Therefore, our military co-operation is legitimate and consistent with the friendly character of relations between our countries, as well as with the norms of international law. We also believe that every country has a legitimate right to define its own strategy for the development of its armed forces and their needs in respect of equipment.

I would also like to note that Ukraine is pursuing military co-operation with Russia as well, given that there are also no international sanctions applied to that country. We therefore cannot exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation could have used military equipment purchased from Ukraine during the recent conflict with Georgia.

It is also necessary to note that our military co-operation with Georgia has always been absolutely transparent and open. The appropriate information was duly distributed among the OSCE participating States pursuant to the relevant OSCE documents and requirements, which lay the groundwork for mutual confidence, trust, peace and stability in Europe.

However, the approach of the Russian Federation, which is today putting forward accusations, has so far been completely the opposite. I would like to recall that the Russian Federation has unilaterally suspended implementation of its obligations under the

CFE Treaty, thus preventing its military activities in the Caucasus from being duly reported on and verified.

Lastly, if the Russian Federation were to follow its own logic, it should set an example and duly accept responsibility for the conflicts in other regions where Russian-made weaponry is used. Otherwise, the accusations simply ring hollow.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly request this statement to be annexed to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 6

Original: ENGLISH

558th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 564, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Thank you, Mr Chairperson,

Having listened carefully to the Russian statement and the subsequent interventions this morning, we would like to record our full support for statements by Georgia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Turkey and Lithuania in support of Georgia's legitimate right to build and develop its armed forces. In anticipation of today's discussion, the U.S. delegation on 12 September provided in document PC.DEL/763/08 a statement by Under Secretary of Defense Edelman that included a summary of U.S. military assistance to Georgia.

Mr. Chairperson, although Prime Minister Putin has tried to lay blame on the U.S. for "arming the Georgians to the teeth", the Georgian armed forces were never trained nor equipped by the U.S. to fight the Russians. In fact, U.S. military assistance to Georgia began in part as a response to Russian concerns that arose after the wars in Chechnya.

Specifically, U.S. assistance began in response to concern expressed by Russia in 2002 that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels in the lawless, mountainous region of the Pankisi Gorge that borders the Chechnya part of Russia. The U.S. initiated the Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP). This sought to provide Georgia's security services with assistance in securing the country against internal threats. This programme implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance in enhancing its counter-terrorism capabilities and in addressing the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.

The follow-on programme to GTEP was the Georgian Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme (GSSOP). The purpose of the GSSOP and other follow-on programmes to GTEP was to support Georgia's deployments to Iraq. It was very successful: in the summer of 2007, Georgia deployed a brigade of 2,000 personnel to Iraq, making it the third largest troop contributor to Coalition forces at the time.

These programmes and all other instances of U.S. assistance to Georgia have been conducted openly and discussed in public documents from the beginning. The United States was in full compliance with all relevant international agreements, including the OSCE

Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, adopted in November 1993, and the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in November 2000.

We must ask, however, whether the Russian Federation was similarly in compliance. By all appearances, for many years Russia armed, trained and supported separatist militias in regions within the internationally recognized borders of a UN Member State and OSCE participating State. Russia's purported actions served to hinder reconciliation within Georgia, exacerbated the situation and generally made things worse.

Looking at the OSCE Document on SALW referred to this morning by the Russian delegation, we note that in Section III, paragraph (b) it says that participating States should avoid small arms exports if there is a "risk" that the export could, *inter alia*:

- (ii) Threaten the national security of other States;
- (iii) Be diverted to territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State;
- (iv) Contravene its international commitments, in particular in relation to sanctions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations...

Mr. Chairperson, the provision of training and arms to separatist militias in the South Ossetia or Abkhazia regions of Georgia would appear to be a clear contravention of sections (ii), (iii) and/or (iv), as well as other sections of that OSCE SALW document.

We would join other delegations in inviting the Russian Federation delegation to provide detailed information on how the militias were trained and armed and by whom. Russia has had large numbers of military and other personnel in Georgia's breakaway regions, so presumably would be able to provide detailed data.

We would also invite Russia to also explain why such arms and training would or would not: first, threaten the national security of Georgia — which is addressed by paragraph (ii) of the aforementioned OSCE SALW document; or, second, take place on territory recognized as part of Georgia, including at the time by Russia — which is covered in paragraph (iii); or, third, contravene international commitments — paragraph (iv). There are other applicable provisions of that OSCE document and other international documents, but we would respectfully suggest that our Russian colleagues take these as their starting point.

With regard to larger weapons, we recall reports by OSCE monitors of heavy military equipment with Russian markings being observed in the possession of South Ossetian militiamen. The South Ossetian militiamen seem to possess more heavy equipment, including tanks, than before. It would seem the equipment could only have been provided through the Roki Tunnel, that is, through Russia.

Thus, we would further invite the Russian delegation to explain how the militias got this equipment, how these transfers were documented, whether the transfers were transparent, and why or why not they were in contravention of such OSCE documents as the OSCE

Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. Section II, paragraphs b(ii) and b(iii) would seem to apply.

Mr. Chairperson, we cannot agree with Russia's concern raised this morning regarding democratic OSCE countries assisting another independent, democratic OSCE participating State to exercise its legitimate right to build and develop its armed forces. Democratic States indeed have the right, if not the duty, to do so.

This morning we heard the Russian Federation delegation refer a number of times to the Government of Georgia as the "Saakashvili regime." When this label comes through the headphones into English, this sounds very harsh in a sense probably not intended by the Russian delegation. To facilitate dialogue that is more in accordance with OSCE norms, we would respectfully suggest considering the term "Government of Georgia" or "Government of President Saakashvili". This would still clearly identify the government in question. We would similarly urge all other participating States to be fully respectful in references to the Russian Government and its leaders, even if being very critical. Words and labels should not inadvertently interfere with dialogue.

Russia should support forward-looking efforts by the OSCE and other international bodies to restore peace and good order to the region damaged by the conflict in Georgia. We would refer delegates to recent U.S. statements in the Permanent Council on this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

We request that this statement and the applicable passages of PC.DEL/763/08 be attached to the journal of the day.

FSC.JOUR/564

1 October 2008

Annex 6

Attachment

Original: ENGLISH

**STATEMENT OF ERIC S. EDELMAN,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

9 September 2008

United States will stand with allies, help rebuild Georgian security forces

We are here today to discuss a conflict that many of us hoped would be avoided. Regrettably, however, despite intensive, long-standing diplomatic efforts on the part of the Administration to reduce tensions in the region, serious conflict did ultimately break out between Russia and Georgia the evening of 7 August, leading to a significantly disproportionate response by Russia, its military invasion of a sovereign country, and its effort to undermine the democratically-elected leadership of one of its neighbours. Russia's subsequent decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent States was an additional misguided step aimed at challenging the territorial integrity of Georgia.

All of these developments are deeply troubling, have called into question Russia's reliability as a partner, and pose serious challenges for Russia's neighbours, the United States and our European Allies.

In response to the current crisis, U.S. policy is to: 1) Support Georgia's people, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; 2) Support our Allies in the region, who feel threatened by Russian aggression; and 3) Demonstrate to Russia that its aggressive actions do not serve its national interest, will not be tolerated, and will not be cost free.

I will seek today to outline some of the many challenges we face, describe how the current crisis developed, what we did to try to prevent it, and how we ought to proceed in responding to and reassessing our relationship with Russia.

Let me begin by making it clear: the United States, despite Russia's recent actions, does not seek a new Cold War. As Secretary Gates has said on a number of occasions, one was enough. We have never seen our activities in the region as a 19th century contest with Russia for "influence." Nor do we believe the Eurasian space should be subject to any external sphere of influence. All countries — the countries of the South Caucasus, Russia, and the transatlantic community — would benefit from a set of benign relations among all the players, great and small.

We have spent 18 years working with the countries of the region, with Russia, and with our western European allies to promote mutual co-operation in the region. Three U.S.

Administrations throughout this period have also worked hard to support Russia's stated goal of integration into major Western institutions.

We are now at a crossroads. In light of recent developments, Russia must now decide how it wants to define its future relationship with the international community.

Russia's recent actions have already diminished its standing in the world and have led to its growing isolation. The international community has resolutely rejected Russian aggression. Russia's future actions, including those it takes in the coming weeks and months in Georgia, will continue to define how it is viewed in the world and how the world defines and moves forward with Russia. We hope that on sober reflection Russia will choose a different path, but our policy will respond appropriately to Russian actions.

We will continue to work with our Western Allies and international partners to seek solutions for resolving the current crisis. U.S. resolve and co-operation with Europe has been a bedrock of the Euro-Atlantic security structure for decades. We are also consulting with our European friends as we consider options for responding to Russia's actions and begin the process of reassessing our relations with Russia.

And, we will pursue opportunities stemming out of the current crisis to build a stronger and more capable Euro-Atlantic alliance able to meet the range of 21st century challenges.

Our relationship with Russia has been an important focus for this Administration and we have consistently sought to work with Russia on a wide range of areas of mutual interest. President Bush's commitment to a partnership with Russia has been based on a realistic assessment of these common interests, evidenced earlier this year by the Strategic Framework Declaration agreed to in Sochi, which was envisioned to be the basis for long-term co-operation on a wide range of strategic interests.

While U.S. strategic interests dictate that we should keep the door open to the possibility of future co-operation with Russia along the lines we hoped for at Sochi, we should also remain open to the possibility that Russian intentions may not be what we understood them to be and that Russia may not, in the near-term at least, step back from its current course. This will demand patience and an ongoing commitment to stand firm in defence of our interests and those of our friends and Allies in the region.

War breaks out

August was a volatile month in South Ossetia. After tit-for-tat attacks in South Ossetia in late July and early August, including roadside bomb detonations against South Ossetian authorities and an assassination attempt against the leader of the Georgian-backed provisional government in South Ossetia on 3 July, South Ossetian and Georgian forces exchanged fire repeatedly during the week of 4 August.

This shelling increased substantially on 5-6 August, as South Ossetian separatist forces trained their artillery on Georgian villages to the south and north of the separatist capital. A Georgian peacekeeping armoured personnel carrier was destroyed on 7 August.

With fire constant from the South Ossetian side, Georgia sent its Reintegration Minister to South Ossetia for talks and President Saakashvili announced a unilateral cease-fire on 7 August. Despite the cease-fire, Georgia asserted that the South Ossetians continued shelling Georgian peacekeepers and villages, even from behind positions occupied by Russian peacekeepers. Despite their mandate, Russian “peacekeepers” did not fulfil their duty to stop the exchange of shelling between both sides.

That night, the Georgians announced that they were compelled to protect their citizens and began to suppress South Ossetian firing positions with ground operations. Georgia expanded operations, shelling the city of Tskhinvali. A Georgian ground operation quickly captured separatist controlled villages and much of the city of Tskhinvali.

The Georgian leadership’s decision to employ force in the conflict zone was unwise. Although much is still unclear, it appears the Georgians conducted what they thought was a limited military operation with the political aim of restoring Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia to eliminate the harassing fire from the South Ossetian separatists on Georgian civilians. This operation was hastily planned and implemented.

The use of artillery fire and multiple launched rockets into urban areas and into the proximity of Russian peacekeepers is lamentable, and we do not condone this activity.

Russia used Georgia’s ground operation as the pretext for its own offensive. Sweeping Georgian forces out of Tskhinvali, Russia quickly carried the operation into undisputed Georgian territory. Russia’s two-pronged assault, deploying forces not only through South Ossetia, but also into Abkhazia by land, as well as by sea and air, resulted in the retaking of all of South Ossetia, and the Georgian controlled Upper Kodori gorge in the Abkhazia region. This combined arms military operation used Russian conventional, airborne, and special forces based in the North Caucasus Military District, as well as Airborne troops from Pskov and Ivanovo; naval forces from the Black Sea Fleet; irregular forces — South Ossetians, Cossacks and Chechens; and special forces.

Within hours of Georgia’s moves into South Ossetia, thousands of hardened Russian combat troops and hundreds of tanks, vehicles and dozens of planes were flooding into South Ossetia and conducting air and missile strikes into Georgian areas controlled by Tbilisi. Within days, Russian troops moved without hesitation into undisputed Georgian territory.

From the beginning of the conflict, Russian defence officials told senior Department of Defense officials that Russia’s aims were limited to protecting its citizens and peacekeepers and removal of Georgian forces from their post-6 August positions. What became clear is there never seemed to be a limit to Russia’s operational — nor strategic — aims.

It is clear that Russia's political and military leadership executed a pre-planned operation to forcibly and quickly change the status quo in Georgia.

History of U.S. military assistance

Prime Minister Putin has tried to lay blame on the U.S. for "arming the Georgians to the teeth", but the Georgian armed forces were never trained and or equipped by the U.S. to fight the Russians.

Georgia has been a partner in the Global War on Terrorism since September 2001. In 2002, in response to Russian accusations that Georgia was harbouring Chechen rebels in the lawless, mountainous border region of the Pankisi Gorge, the U.S. initiated the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which sought to provide Georgia's security services with assistance in securing internal threats. This programme implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. This programme was conducted openly and discussed in public documents.

As the Georgian armed forces matured, it became obvious GTEP would need to evolve. The follow-on programme, the Georgian Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), trained and equipped Georgian forces and command staff for peace support operations in Iraq. Three Georgian brigades were trained through the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and the two Sustainment and Stability Operations Programs (SSOPs).

The purpose of all follow-on programmes to GTEP was to support Georgia's deployments to Iraq. SSOP and SSOP II included significant training for combat support and combat service support units, which allowed the three trained brigades to sustain themselves, have a higher degree of NATO interoperability, and be able to operate at the brigade level. In the summer of 2007, Georgia deployed a brigade of 2,000 personnel to Iraq, making it the third largest troop contributor and increasing its previous 858-person commitment there. Approximately \$64 million was expended to support Georgia's GTEP. Subsequently, approximately \$124.2 million in Coalition Support funds was used to reimburse Georgia in support of SSOP, SSOP II and the latest deployment of Georgia's brigade to Iraq.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. was undergoing initial military training of Georgia's 4th Brigade for its eventual deployment to Iraq in winter 2008. The Brigade was being trained with funds apportioned by the Georgian government, which the U.S. would eventually have reimbursed. Approximately \$35 million was to have been budgeted for this effort.

Georgia has been the highest per capita contributor of troops to the War on Terror. To date, 7,800 Georgian soldiers have deployed to Iraq since the beginning of OIF, serving alongside U.S. forces.

Over 50 served in Afghanistan during the Afghan elections in 2004. Four Georgian soldiers have paid the ultimate price and nineteen more have been wounded while serving in combat alongside U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. Georgia is among our staunchest Allies in the War on Terror.

While our defence and military relations with Georgia grew, we maintained an active military-to-military relationship with Russia. To ensure transparency, we provided regular briefings on GTEP and GSSOP activities to the Russians and periodically informed senior Russian military officers about the scope and nature of our capacity building activities. Unfortunately, it appears that the Russians have been unable to move beyond their Cold War-era “zero sum” thinking, as the actions of Russian military units to systematically eviscerate the Georgian armed forces appear, in part, to be “revenge” for these capacity-building programmes.

Consultations prior to and during the conflict

The Department of Defense was deeply involved both prior to and during the onset of conflict in an effort to convince leaders on both sides to de-escalate and refrain from resolving their differences by military force. The Secretary of Defense spoke with President Saakashvili on numerous occasions, including in November of 2007, and again in March of 2008 during bilateral consultations in Washington.

The Secretary of Defense continued to speak with his Georgian and Russian counterparts during the crisis, urging restraint and stressing that all forces must move back to pre-6 August positions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also spoke with his Georgian and Russian counterparts during the crisis. The latter explained to him that Russia had limited aims and would not seek to expand hostilities into areas controlled by the Government of Georgia. Russia’s actions clearly contradicted these commitments.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Fata made trips to Georgia on 17 April, when tensions were extremely high following the Bucharest Summit and Russian moves in Abkhazia, and again on 30 June. During these trips, as part of the wide array of U.S.-Georgia bilateral defence discussions, we urged Georgia to show “restraint” and not be provoked by Russia. The consistent message was one of strategic patience and to find a peaceful resolution to the frozen conflicts, as Russia was clearly adding to tension in order to provoke a Georgian response.

As the conflict sparked, the Secretary of Defense spoke with his Russian and Georgian counterparts on Friday, 8 August and with President Saakashvili on 9 August. The Secretary stressed that there were no military solutions to the conflict, as Georgia was likely to face an overwhelming Russian military action in response to any Georgian attempts to respond militarily in the separatist regions.

Despite the movements, tension, and rhetoric, which we had seen regularly in previous years, we had little warning of an impending large-scale conflict until 7 August. On

the 7th, we had indications of Georgia's general mobilization, as Georgian troops being trained for their future deployment to Iraq did not show up for training. The speed with which the fighting ensued and the ferocity of the conflict escalated rapidly.

There were no Department of Defense service members involved in the conflict. The United States had 80 service members training Georgian forces in country for future deployment to Iraq, as well as four service members who had participated in the 15-31 July, in the Spirit of Partnership for Peace Immediate Response 08 exercise involving U.S., Georgian and other regional partner nations.

It should also be noted that, at the request of the Georgian government, on 10-11 August, the United States airlifted approximately 1,800 Georgian troops from Iraq back to Georgia, per a long-standing agreement with Georgia to provide transport for Georgian forces deployed to Iraq.

Relations with Russia

The fact that this is the first large-scale use of Russian military forces outside its borders since the fall of the Soviet Union sends a chilling message. Russia's invasion of Georgia highlights a new aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy and a willingness to use military force to achieve its goals in the near abroad.

By recognizing the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's president, made clear that Moscow's goal is to take advantage of the current conflict to create new facts on the ground. These actions contradict the message delivered by then-President Putin to President Bush at Sochi in April, which indicated that Russia sought to work with the international community in addressing 21st century global challenges.

In recent months, Russian officials have questioned the legality of Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea, openly stating the Black Sea Fleet will never leave the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol (in the Crimea), lease or not, and there are also press reports of Russia issuing passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Crimea — much like had been done in Georgia. This is a concern which we should follow closely in the months ahead.

Russia's actions in Georgia have put its relations with the rest of the world in jeopardy. The U.S., European States, G7 members and others have asked what type of relationship Russia wants with the international community. There is agreement that Russian actions are leading it towards isolation, and it must reverse course-starting in Georgia.

Russia's actions have caused a reassessment, not just of U.S. policies toward Russia, but of the European Union's, of NATO's, and beyond. The Shanghai Co-operation Organization, of which Russia is a member, refused to endorse Russia's unilateral recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence; in fact, it issued a statement reaffirming the principal of territorial integrity of States. The European Union, under French leadership, met in an extraordinary session to criticize Russia's disproportionate military response, condemn Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and postpone

meetings on the EU — Russia Partnership Agreement. The G-8 is issuing “G-7” statements to let a fellow member know Russia’s actions are not condoned by the larger group.

As the statement on Georgia at the NAC has shown, the Alliance is united in its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Georgia has been a strong friend and partner of NATO.

The NATO Alliance of the post-Cold War period was an alliance of democratic and Euro-Atlantic States which shared values. The NATO Alliance of today is an Alliance that will defend the values that shaped its foundation and support aspirants from external threats.

Georgia’s NATO ambitions rest on fundamental shared values and a promise that NATO would keep its doors open to all aspirants ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. Prior to the conflict, the Georgian people and government had shown their commitment, and the U.S. and many NATO Allies felt Georgia was ready to move to the next stage to MAP. The message we send in the coming weeks and months will be heard not only by Georgians but by all those in the region who look to the West as a source of security, inspiration and freedom. We should send the right message that Russian aggression will not impact the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. NATO has decided to further NATO — Georgian relations by establishing a NATO — Georgia Commission. This body will help bring Georgia even closer to NATO membership.

Although Russia has shown an apparent lack of concern for its international image in recent days by saying it does not care about WTO and G-8 membership, it has isolated itself and will pay a diplomatic and economic price for its solitude.

Of particular note, since the start of the conflict, Russia is haemorrhaging international investment and its stock market has lost significant value. Russia may believe it has gained a tactical victory by defeating the Georgian army. Yet this victory has made it more isolated, less admired and deeply resented by its neighbours.

What are we doing today?

First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically; preserve Georgia’s sovereignty; maintain our support for its territorial integrity, and assist in rebuilding its military.

Our primary concern after the outbreak of hostilities was to stop the shooting and to help the people of Georgia. Our humanitarian efforts by air, land and sea have mitigated the human suffering and exhibited U.S. steadfast support for the Georgian people in their time of need.

As we continue with our humanitarian relief, our primary effort now is to support Georgia, and its democratically elected government. Last week, the U.S. rolled out a \$1 billion in additional economic assistance to Georgia which will help it weather the immediate needs caused by the current crisis. As we move ahead, we look forward to working with the Congress on assistance packages that best frame the U.S. commitment to

Georgia and regional partners at this critical time. We also look forward to close collaboration with our multilateral development bank partners, the European Union, and other international donors.

The Department of Defense has been primarily focused on fulfilling the President's commitment to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Georgia. Through 8 September, 62 sorties have delivered more than 1145 short tons of humanitarian aid. USS McFaul, USCGC Dallas and USS Mount Whitney have delivered humanitarian supplies through the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti.

Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Craddock, visited Tbilisi on 21 August, meeting with high-level Georgian officials and surveying the damage to Georgia's infrastructure and military. The Department of Defense is sending an assessment team to Tbilisi later this week to help us begin to consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and our response. After assessments of these needs, we will review how the United States will be able to support the reconstruction of Georgia's economy, infrastructure, and armed forces. These steps will be sequenced and will continue to show U.S. support for Georgia's security, independence, and territorial integrity.

For several years, the United States has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists and then as part of multinational coalition efforts. It is worth noting that on the night of 7 August, Georgia's best-trained military forces — which represented 20 per cent of its active duty forces — were on duty in Iraq in support of the multinational coalition effort there.

Georgia, in fact, fielded the third largest national contingent to the Coalition in Iraq, behind only the United States and United Kingdom. We recognize, of course, that because of the events of the past month, Georgia's own national security concerns may now mean it may be less able to contribute to such coalition efforts in the future. We will be looking carefully and responsibly at Georgia's needs over the coming weeks and months.

U.S. efforts to help Georgia will not be undertaken by us alone. NATO's North Atlantic Council decided on 19 August to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at supporting Georgia's relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to assist Georgia in assessing the damage caused by Russian military action, including to the Georgian Armed Forces, and to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and economic activity. NATO has already sent an Advisory Support team to Georgia as well as its Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, has logged many miles and worked tireless hours to help resolve the conflict. Stubb's performance has been extraordinary; he has single-handedly assured that OSCE's crisis response mechanisms are fully engaged and operational.

The U.S. is also committed to demonstrate support for other friends and partners in the region especially for those such as Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic nations, who have been threatened by Moscow. These countries must know the United States is with them, and just as importantly, Russia must know the same.

As we work to support Georgia and our Allies, we must also review our relations with Russia. We will not continue with business as usual. We have suspended our bilateral military interaction with Russia and are in the process of a comprehensive review of all activities.

Conclusion

Although Russia has ceased its offensive military operations, Russian forces continue to occupy parts of Georgia. Russia has not lived up to its stated obligations in the cease-fire agreement signed by Russian President Medvedev. We call on Russia to carry through with its stated promise to withdraw forces from areas outside the separatist territories, as was agreed upon in prior agreements and the 8 September agreement in Moscow with French President Sarkozy. Russia's recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, taken immediately after cessation of hostilities and as the conflicts' embers were still smouldering, suggests that Russian political and military aims toward Georgia were not limited to restoring the pre-war political-military status quo.

The United States, over the course of three Administrations, has sought to secure and sustain the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the new independent States of Eurasia.

Concurrently, we worked to assist Russia in its integration into the global economic community as well as to facilitate Russian co-operation with NATO in the new, post-Cold War Europe. Our regional policies were not zero-sum in nature, nor did they prioritize one country over the other. We firmly believed, and still believe, that democratic nations along Russia's borders are in Russia's best interest. Our policies contributed to a Europe, more united and integrated through either membership or close association with the European Union and NATO.

Europe is freer, more prosperous and more secure than at anytime in its storied history. The policy of the United States in this region is unambiguous: we want to help the nations of this region travel along the same path toward freedom, democracy and market-based economies that so many of their neighbours in Europe have travelled.

We must not, and will not, allow Russia's aggression to succeed in Georgia. Nor must we miss an opportunity to link arms in solidarity with our partners and friends in the region in the face of aggression. The U.S. has a responsibility to support Georgia and we will be doing just that in the weeks and months ahead. And we must show Russia, through our words, our policies, and our actions, that it serves Russia's best interest, as well as those of the West, for Russia to take steps to end its isolation and work towards a constructive framework of relations with the U.S. and Europe.

Thank you for your time.