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**Chairmanship: Lithuania**

## **2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

**Vienna, 29 June to 1 July 2011**

## **CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**



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## 2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE CHAIRPERSON'S PERCEPTION

The ninth Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) provided a timely opportunity for participating States to convene within one of the existing frameworks to move ahead further with, and to act upon, initiatives in the politico-military sphere contained in the *Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community*. Organized under the overall theme of "Towards a Security Community: What has to be Done", the Conference proved to be a useful platform to advance ideas and concrete initiatives on how our Organization could adjust itself to respond better, both strategically and operationally, to the current security challenges and also to embrace new opportunities to strengthen comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security within the OSCE area and beyond.

Among others, three factors contributed to the success of the Conference. First, discussions during the sessions benefitted greatly from the thought-provoking and thorough presentations by our high-level guest, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and the nine keynote speakers. Second, the inclusion this year of a special session on the OSCE Partners for Co-operation was especially pertinent, given the events this year that continue to affect a number of Mediterranean Partners – namely, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt – and the commitment expressed at the Astana Summit meeting "to contribute further to collective international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan". Third, the high level and calibre of the participants from capitals and from other international and regional organizations added considerable weight to our dialogue, both in and outside of the conference room.

During the special session on the OSCE Partners for Co-operation, the participants recognized that the security of the OSCE area was inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas and that the Organization remained one of the key forums for working with the Partners on a range of security issues. There was broad acknowledgement that our Partners faced a number of challenges related to democratic transition, rebuilding of confidence, meeting of societal expectations, tackling of worsening economic situations, and addressing of the shared challenges of transnational threats, in particular relating to the combating of terrorism and drug trafficking. Moreover, given the recent developments, particularly in North Africa, priorities for co-operation needed to be revisited, especially in recognition of the fact that Partners required different kinds and degrees of support. In that latter context, the Partners were strongly encouraged to let us know their needs.

The participants supported ongoing efforts to assist the Partners in implementing reform programmes, as well as to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan, which continues to be a central issue for the OSCE as well as for other international and regional organizations. Several participants recommended the urgent establishment of a real partnership, through focused and results-oriented activities in close co-ordination with other members of the international community, maximizing the Organization's comparative advantages, and in response to explicit requests from individual Partners.

In the opening session, participants stressed the need to increase the synergy among subregional, regional and international security organizations, complementing each other's efforts through even greater co-operation and co-ordination in building, as NATO

Secretary General Rasmussen put it, a free, peaceful and prosperous Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space; to tackle new and emerging threats; and to reinforce each other's work in protecting and promoting shared values and principles.

With regard to the vision of a security community, many speakers noted that the discussions which had taken place over the last few years should be gradually transformed into action, including through the further consolidation of positions, thereby moving forward with and operationalizing the commitments made during the Astana Summit meeting. In that context, many participants pointed out that resolving the existing conflicts in the OSCE area must remain a high priority for the Organization, particularly if the notion of a security community was to have substantive meaning.

There was broad recognition in working session I on transnational threats and challenges (TNTs) that TNTs were extremely complex and multifaceted and that the OSCE response must, therefore, be multidimensional, adaptable and flexible, and take due account of the OSCE's key strengths, in particular its comprehensive approach to security. Engagement with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations also working in the field of TNTs was essential, as the OSCE's efforts should complement rather than duplicate the efforts of others. The OSCE should also make increased use of contacts with other sectors of society, including the private sector and civil society, in formulating and implementing its response to TNTs. Such responses must be in compliance with international human right laws and OSCE commitments.

The Chairmanship's proposal for decisions by the Ministerial Council on various topics relating to transnational threats and challenges attracted wide support. In particular, delegations welcomed the focus on improving the coherence and co-ordination of programmes relating to TNTs in the Organization; developing a strategic framework for policing and a concept on countering drug trafficking; as well as developing the OSCE's role in cyber security and consolidating the OSCE's counter-terrorism mandates. Attention was also called by some delegations to a number of other areas relating to TNTs that required further work.

In working session II on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, there was widespread acknowledgement that the OSCE's role throughout the conflict cycle remained one of its core tasks. Fundamental to that role was adherence to all agreed norms and standards, the full implementation of all commitments and the recognition that there was no acceptable alternative to resolving conflicts other than through peaceful means. Those all required a clear demonstration of genuine political will by all the participating States. In a similar vein, many delegations called for the resolution of protracted conflicts to be renewed and stepped up, through more constructive and intensified dialogue within existing formats.

Many participants reiterated their support for enhancing the effectiveness and capabilities of the OSCE in the conflict cycle, which would benefit all the participating States. In that respect, they welcomed the Chairmanship's intention to float a Ministerial Council decision on the conflict cycle that would seek to strengthen the Organization's early warning capacities, improve its early action, enhance its dialogue facilitation and mediation work, and consolidate its post-conflict rehabilitation efforts. A number of participants emphasized, however, that strengthening the Organization's role in the conflict cycle went beyond mere procedural and organizational improvements. At the heart of that role lay the

need to strengthen and deepen the political will and courage of the participating States, despite past and current difficulties, to make better use of the full inventory of the OSCE's existing toolbox, while respecting the principle of consensus, the need for a cross-dimensional approach and the requirement to co-ordinate and co-operate more closely with other international actors.

The discussions in working session III on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) stressed the importance of arms control and CSBMs to peace and stability in Europe. It was argued that the three main regimes – the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Vienna Document 1999 (VD 99) and the Treaty on Open Skies – needed urgent attention to ensure that they adequately fulfilled their original aims and maintained their relevance. In that context, there was a widespread conviction that progress should be made on modernizing VD 99 by adapting it to changes in the security environment, while remaining true to the original principles of transparency, predictability and accountability. Many delegations put forward a number of specific proposals related to the Document's different chapters.

With reference to the CFE Treaty, solid work on moving the Treaty forward in the 'at 36' framework must continue, and a way through the current CFE impasse should be found. A number of delegations were also concerned at the difficulties being faced by the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) and called upon the parties involved to find a way to resolve the issues so that the Commission could resume its work. Other participants also highlighted the need to pursue efforts in the areas of small arms and light weapons and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

In conclusion, the Chairmanship perceives that the 2011 ASRC provided sufficient substance for reflection and dialogue and that it offered a useful forum for the participating States to express their priorities and concerns on security-related issues. The Conference also generated various recommendations and suggestions, which will be followed up in appropriate OSCE bodies. The Chairmanship was especially pleased to note that consensus is building on some particular issues that can become part of the substance of the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius. Finally, the Chairmanship wishes to express its appreciation for the assistance provided by the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Conference Services, as well as other actors in the Secretariat that prepared the ground for fruitful and focused discussions.

## **SPECIAL SESSION ON THE OSCE PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION**

Keynote speakers: Ambassador Hesham Yussef, Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States

Mr. Askar Kuttykadam, Deputy Head, Department of European Multilateral Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Moderator: Ambassador Eoin O'Leary, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Mr. Ricardo Mor Solá, Permanent Mission of Spain to the OSCE

In his opening remarks, the Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Ambassador Renatas Norkus, explained why a special session of the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) had been devoted to the OSCE Partners for Co-operation. In that connection, he recalled that the participating States had recognized at the OSCE Summit meeting in Astana that the security of the OSCE area was inextricably linked to that of the adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia. Moreover, the OSCE participating States had committed themselves at the highest political level to contribute further to "collective international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan". It therefore remained a priority of the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship to strengthen the OSCE's engagement with Afghanistan, resulting in concrete co-operation on a number of issues in the current year and beyond.

In addition, the developments in 2011 had also drawn the attention of the participating States to a number of other Partners for Co-operation, in particular Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. In line with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Chairmanship had welcomed democratic reforms leading to enhanced regional security, and had stated the readiness of the OSCE to share its experience on processes of democratic transition with the Partners for Co-operation. The OSCE's institutions were ready to consider requests for support for the countries' ongoing reform efforts, including in electoral matters.

He encouraged the participants to identify the potential of the OSCE for an enhanced engagement, particularly with Afghanistan and with the Partners along the southern edge of the Mediterranean basin. The views of the Partners for Co-operation as to how the OSCE could best provide added value to their internal reform processes were naturally required and should form the basis for continued co-operation with the international community.

In his conclusion, he recalled that, six months earlier, in Astana, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 OSCE participating States had committed themselves anew "to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community". He emphasized that security at the borders of the OSCE region was an essential factor in achieving that security community, and enhanced co-operation with the OSCE Partners therefore represented a win-win approach.



In his introductory remarks, the moderator, Ambassador Eoin O'Leary, recalled that the participating States had declared at the Astana Summit meeting that, in today's complex and interconnected world, the OSCE must achieve greater unity of purpose and action in facing transnational threats. Therefore, the Organization also needed to enhance the level of interaction with its Partners for Co-operation in the fight against terrorism, drugs trafficking, cyberattacks, etc. He also drew attention to the issues relating to borders and migration along the southern edge of the Mediterranean basin. He invited the participants, in elaborating their ideas for improving co-operation with the Partners, to take into account the OSCE principles and commitments undertaken in the economic and environmental dimension, and the human dimension.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Hesham Yusef, opened his presentation by stating that the OSCE represented an example of success in co-operation and friendship. He divided his keynote speech into two parts: (1) the present situation in the region covered by the League of Arab States; and (2) the prospects for future co-operation between the OSCE and that region.

Despite wars and other conflicts that had affected several countries in the region, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories, not all eventualities had been foreseen. Surprises were never ending. For instance, a young man from a small town in Tunisia had set himself on fire, and that had launched a revolutionary period that had changed the face of the region, including Egypt. As a result of that change, the problems were now different. The previous focus had been on conflict management and conflict resolution. Now, however, problems were associated with hope for a better future. The revolutions that had led to the so-called *Arab Spring* had included a focus on human rights, with the key issue having to do mainly with people wanting to reclaim their dignity.

He went on to say that, since the headquarters of the League of Arab States was located in a strategic place in Cairo, he had had the opportunity to talk to many people in Tahrir Square during the demonstrations and to listen to their vision of the future of the revolution in Egypt. While many people had thought that Egyptian young people were unrealistic and were living in a virtual world, they were wrong. In Egypt, those who had been against the demonstrations had used weapons from the Middle Ages (e.g., camels and horses), while the young people had been using Facebook.

He outlined three forms of reconciliation that had taken place during the demonstrations: (1) between rich and poor (rich and poor shared food and water); (2) between Muslims and Christians (who, despite their problems, had been open to dialogue and had helped each other based on their respective faiths); and (3) between the Muslim Brotherhood and the rest of society. That was the spirit that had prevailed at the time.

But all was not as idyllic in the region as it had appeared, since transitions also involved many difficulties. At the same time, the demonstrations in Cairo were being echoed in Yemen, Syria, Libya and Bahrain. The changes were affecting the whole region in different ways. Egypt and Tunisia were countries in transition. Libya and Yemen were grappling to hold on to their old regimes, while Syria and Bahrain had so far managed to do so by force. Some people wanted to know what aspirations accompanied those events (as in the case of Morocco, among others). Other countries in the region, such as Lebanon and Kuwait, were enjoying some peace, while other countries had more resources at their disposal

to tackle discontent. However, the latter group could also expect major changes in the very near future.

Regarding prospects for future co-operation between the OSCE and the Arab States, he said that the Organization should take into account the following:

- The partnership should be a true one, following models such as the partnership between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean;
- A relationship based on the approach of donor-recipient country should be avoided; instead, the OSCE should seek genuine co-operation;
- The West should address the issues and events in the Arab world as a whole;
- The priorities of the Arab States were no longer the same as in the past. For example, the Partners for Co-operation were looked to for interaction in the field of combating transnational threats (terrorism, borders, migration), but those were no longer people's highest priorities. Hence, priorities should be revisited, as the focus was currently on: (i) the security services (i.e., rebuilding trust between the people and the security services); (ii) expectations about the economy (e.g. sustaining tourism); and (iii) ways of moving towards democracy (looking for presidential, parliamentary and constitutional models, etc.); and (iv) ways of strengthening civil society.

In conclusion, he stated that the Arab world would be unrecognizable in the future, but the transitions would come more easily with the help of friends.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Askar Kuttykadam, emphasized the challenge of ensuring a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. It was common knowledge that the situation in Afghanistan had very serious implications for regional and international security. There was clearly a need to establish a multilateral mechanism of interaction among relevant international agencies and regional organizations to resolve the Afghan issue. The efforts of the UN, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other international bodies remained of key importance.

He also mentioned the efforts of Kazakhstan directed towards assisting Afghanistan, including through the allocation of considerable funds for the implementation of a number of projects for restoration of the country. In general, while interacting with and on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan proceeded on the basis of the following priorities: development of a constructive and confidential political dialogue; promotion of trade and economic relations as an important tool for stabilizing Afghanistan; encouragement of investments in the Afghan economy for the same purposes; support for cultural and humanitarian co-operation; and provision of grant assistance in various fields.

The current situation in Afghanistan was evolving against the background of the expected withdrawal of foreign troops and the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan authorities. The latter issue had three components: military, political and economic. The methods and aims in the first two components were clear, but regardless of the success of those two components, it was necessary to start drafting a comprehensive programme for the

implementation of large and medium-sized projects in the real-economy sector of Afghanistan. That, in turn, would help to promote issues related to military and political stability. For that purpose, it would be practical to engage the capacity of international financial institutions. For instance, there was a positive experience of co-operation with the Asian Development Bank.

The drugs situation in Afghanistan had an influence on security in Central Asia and throughout the OSCE area, and that remained a matter of particular concern. Further intensification of international efforts was thus required in order to counteract the global drugs threat effectively, because, among other things, drug trafficking had long been recognized as a major source of terrorist and other transnational criminal activity.

In that regard, he welcomed the implementation of UN projects in Central Asia, including the establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), which had allowed the participating States to deploy efforts and fight in a more co-ordinated manner against transnational criminal groups along the main drug-trafficking routes from Afghanistan.

The OSCE should strive to achieve a broader and clearer view of the drug trafficking problem, as the transit of Afghan drugs through Central Asia accounted for “only” between 20 and 25 per cent of the total flow. That meant the remaining 75 to 80 per cent went to Europe and America through the “old” channels, the great majority of which were concentrated in relevant transnational criminal structures and routes to the Mediterranean and the transatlantic region.

He pointed out that there was an urgent need to develop a comprehensive OSCE programme to combat the drugs threat, including the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, trading in precursors and other related aspects. In order to collect and analyse information, make recommendations and take actions, it was important, in addition to the existing projects in Central Asia, to increase funding of the related field-project activities in the Balkans, as well as to establish thematic or rotating missions to monitor the situation in the European countries and the American continent. Otherwise, neither an intensification of attention directed towards a specific region nor a transfer of resources from one region to another (for example, from the Balkans to Central Asia) would help solve the problem.

He also spoke about terrorism, which obviously remained one of the most serious security threats to mankind as a whole. In that respect, co-operation among the nations should be strengthened, including through a consolidation of the capacity of participating States to prevent terrorism and a strengthening of the role of regional organizations in supporting the key measures undertaken by the United Nations. Regional organizations quite often possessed a better capacity to identify and respond to security challenges in their areas of responsibility, and to provide targeted assistance based on international instruments and standards. He believed that the fight against terrorism was the OSCE’s common responsibility. Effective action against terrorism required an active public-private partnership among governments, civil society, the private sector, the media and academia. In its common effort to prevent terrorism, the Organization should focus on the role of women and youth as victims and potential perpetrators of terrorist acts.

In conclusion, he said that the issues of security, human rights and the rule of law were equally important. Respect for and promotion of human rights was the most effective tool for preventing terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism.

## **Discussion**

The first speaker, representing one of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, recalled that the revolution in Egypt, although it had broken out six months previously, had actually started ten years before, and it was far from over. It had changed the public perception of the reality in that country, and only the faith of the people in the security forces had made it possible. Egypt was now working on reforms, human rights, transparency and good governance with a view to breaking down old patterns of thought. Co-operation with the OSCE would be crucial in tackling the challenges of transformation, especially as the Organization's expertise and experience could be useful in supporting the democratic reforms. The revolution was not yet finished and the post-revolutionary aspirations of the people could be at risk, due, among other things, to the current economic difficulties. In that respect, solidarity was required from international actors in supporting Egypt's political and economic efforts. He concluded by stating that there was a collective perception that a better future needed to be built, that there would of course be problems, but that democracy and political principles must be created.

The second speaker, representing the European Union (EU), recalled that the OSCE Heads of State or Government had recognized in the Astana Commemorative Declaration that there was an inextricable link between the security of the OSCE area and that of its adjacent areas, notably along the edge of the Mediterranean basin and in Asia. Developments since the Summit meeting, particularly in the Mediterranean region, had further contributed to reinforcing that view.

He stressed the EU's strong support for the ongoing efforts to assist OSCE Partners in implementing reform programmes or managing democratic transition processes. There was a significant role to be played by the OSCE in that regard, based on its specific *acquis* and expertise in all three dimensions of security. Future enhanced co-operation with Partners should, however, be needs-oriented and should take place in response to explicit requests by individual Partners.

He commended the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship on the steps it had thus far taken in the OSCE's dialogue with its Partners, which pointed in the right direction. The EU supported the action-oriented dialogue and stressed that the current special session of the ASRC constituted another key opportunity for Partners to let the Organization know of their needs and their points of view as to what steps of practical co-operation should be taken. Particularly, as the EU was aware that Partners faced different kinds and degrees of transnational threats, so their respective capacities and their degrees of need for international and regional co-operation and assistance also differed.

In that context, further exchanges of information and best practices, projects on capacity building and cross-dimensional programmes on respect for human rights and the rule of law in national prosecution and jurisdiction might be particularly appropriate. The EU believed that the regular meetings of the two Contact Groups with the OSCE Partners could be used more effectively to identify concrete needs and tools in that regard.

The EU was strongly committed to international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. It was committed to helping to improve State and institutional capacity, accountability, human rights and an efficient public administration (enabling the Afghan authorities to assume more responsibilities), while the international community gradually took a more supportive role. Further engagement by the OSCE with Afghanistan should continue to rely on associating Afghan officials with the OSCE's efforts to address transnational threats. At the same time, there was also potential in other fields, as long as duplication with other international efforts was avoided and financial and security implications were duly taken into account.

By and large, the EU believed that future and enhanced interaction with the Partners should follow their needs and requests and be geared to comparative strengths that the OSCE could offer. Duplication of the efforts of other international actors should be avoided.

Finally, a more focused and results-oriented interaction with the Partners for Co-operation constituted one of the priorities for EU action in the OSCE for the remainder of the year and at the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting, where the EU hoped a decision would be adopted on enhancing dialogue and co-operation with the OSCE Partners.

A number of participating States aligned themselves with the statement read out by the speaker representing the European Union.

The next delegation said that the dramatic changes that were taking place in North Africa and the Middle East presented moments of great challenge and great opportunity. As United States Secretary of State Clinton had said in a speech to the USA-Islam World Forum in April, the demonstrations across the Mediterranean region had destroyed a number of myths: the myth that governments could hold on to power without responding to their people's aspirations or respecting their fundamental rights; the myth that the only way to produce change in the region was through violence and conflict; and, most pernicious of all, the myth that Arabs somehow did not share universal human yearnings for freedom, dignity and opportunity.

He encouraged the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to develop a set of meaningful human dimension projects for the Mediterranean Partners which could be implemented within the OSCE region on an urgent basis. As it was clear that work beyond the OSCE region would require consensus, he called upon the Mediterranean Partners to let the OSCE know what technical assistance they would prefer to see conducted within their own countries. Involvement of the Partners in the OSCE's daily work and the sharing of the OSCE's experience and expertise with the Partners should be increased if that was what the Partners wished.

The rapid emergence of transnational security risks and threats demanded collective action, and there was certainly scope for all to work together within the OSCE to address and meet those significant challenges. The holding of a session on the Partners in the context of the ASRC was a small, yet important, step in that direction. Still more had to be done, however, in particular to assist the Afghan Partners to address transnational threats to security. In that respect, he called on the participating States to contribute, individually and collectively through the OSCE, to international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. He said that a renewal at the Vilnius Ministerial

Council meeting of the OSCE's commitment to enhancing its engagement with Afghanistan would be welcome.

Security sector reform was an inherent component of the transition to democracy. Without it, no democratic transition was complete. The OSCE's experience and expertise in police reform and community policing would be particularly valuable to the Partners. The conclusions of the Code of Conduct on ensuring civilian, democratic control of the armed forces was another area in which the OSCE could establish useful co-operation with its Partners.

He proposed that relevant OSCE guidelines be translated into languages useful to the Partners. That effort had begun with the "Guidebook on Democratic Policing" (which had been translated into Arabic), and it could yield results that could more than justify the expense. That and other translated guidebooks could be released in combination with experts' visits or in-region workshops on the application of the concepts. Such efforts could focus on other topics of interest to Partners and critical needs of the moment, such as migration management.

In conclusion, he said that co-operation should go beyond individual relationships with Partner States, and extend to other organizations active in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Enhanced OSCE interaction with the League of Arab States would be particularly welcome. Finally, he fully supported the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship's proposal for the adoption of a decision at the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting on enhancing the OSCE's engagement with the Partners for Co-operation.

Another delegation expressed appreciation of the positive contribution of the OSCE Partners for Co-operation to the strengthening of common security and to the work done together with the OSCE. The speaker also mentioned the active role of Kazakhstan and Ireland as the Chairs in the current year of the Contact Groups with the Asian Partners and the Mediterranean Partners, respectively.

The success of the OSCE's co-operation with its Partners depended to a decisive extent on a precise definition of the most pressing forms of co-operation that offered genuine added value for the Partners for Co-operation themselves. The OSCE-Mongolia Conference in Ulaanbaatar on 23 and 24 May 2011, at which ways of reacting to common threats and challenges to security had been discussed, was a positive example of effective joint activities.

He hoped that the forthcoming annual Mediterranean Conference would make a useful contribution to strengthening OSCE co-operation with the Partner States. He concurred with previous speakers in recalling that the *Arab Spring* had created a new situation in the southern Mediterranean area. He called for a rapid stabilization of the situation in those countries and supported their progress towards democracy, with account taken of the specific features and cultural and historical particularities of each of them.

Internal conflicts and crises should be settled exclusively by peaceful means and through political dialogue, and the international community should be called upon to provide assistance in the process of national reconciliation strictly on the basis of international law and with full respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and observance of the principle of non-intervention in countries' internal affairs.

That was the kind of approach that would lay the basis for OSCE co-operation with the Mediterranean Partners. In that regard, he supported the efforts of the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship to establish contacts in those areas where the OSCE could provide genuine added value within the framework of its mandate and available resources. It was vital that the co-operation should be based on corresponding appeals by the Partners and on the understanding that the final decision should lie with the Permanent Council. It was also important for the OSCE to co-ordinate its work closely with other international organizations, particularly the United Nations, and to avoid duplication and the wasting of resources.

Lastly, Afghanistan had a special place among the OSCE Partners. The failure to regulate the situation in that country remained one of the fundamental sources of threats to security and stability in Central Asia and the entire OSCE region, above all with regard to the challenges of terrorism and in the light of the never-ending drug trafficking. Those threats could be combated only through the concerted efforts of all the countries in the region and the relevant international organizations, including the OSCE, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the European Union and NATO.

The last delegation that took the floor recognized that Afghanistan was indeed a matter for discussion at the special session and thanked all the speakers for their statements concerning the OSCE's co-operation with the Partners for Co-operation in general, which was also useful to the participating States.

He recalled that Afghanistan had become a Partner for Co-operation in 2007 and that issues relating to security and other topics concerning that country had been discussed in the OSCE since that time. He welcomed the recommendations and suggestions for enhancing the co-operation with Afghanistan, including the proposals on the reconciliation process, political transition, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the identification of transnational threats.

### **Main findings and recommendations**

1. The proposal of the OSCE Chairmanship to hold a special session on the OSCE Partners for Co-operation was considered an important step, aimed at increasing the involvement of the Partners in the work of the Organization and ensuring the sharing of the OSCE's experience and expertise, particularly with Afghanistan and with the Partners along the southern edge of the Mediterranean basin.
2. There was widespread agreement that the security of the OSCE area was inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia, and that the OSCE remained one of the key forums for co-operation with the Partners for Co-operation on a range of security issues and challenges dealing with transnational threats and democratic transitions.
3. The special session conveyed the belief that the so-called spring revolutions across the Mediterranean region had paved the way towards fulfilling the Arab peoples' aspirations to dignity, freedom, respect for fundamental rights and reconciliation. As a result of those developments, the participating States were encouraged to identify the potential of the OSCE to provide added value to Partners' internal reform processes.

4. Partners' priorities need to be revisited, since new challenges have sprung up after the spring events in the southern Mediterranean, in particular in the areas of security, institutional confidence, economic expectations and democratic governance.
5. All the relevant OSCE guidelines on security sector reform should be translated into languages useful to the Partners, following the example of the "Guidebook on Democratic Policing", which has been translated into Arabic.
6. There was a common understanding that the participating States must contribute towards promoting a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan, and general support was expressed for enhancing engagement with Afghanistan.
7. In the context of the co-operation with Afghanistan, combating terrorism and drugs threats was considered of vital importance for security in Central Asia in particular and in the OSCE area in general.
8. A more focused and results-oriented interaction with the Partners for Co-operation was recommended, and the Chairmanship's strong resolve to achieve consensus at the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting on modalities to enhance the OSCE's engagement with the Partners for Co-operation was supported.



## OPENING SESSION

- Introductory remarks: Ambassador Kęstutis Jankauskas, Permanent State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania
- High-level guest: H.E. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Chairperson: Ambassador Renatas Norkus, Chairperson of the Permanent Council
- Report by: Ambassador Giulio Tonini, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation
- Rapporteur: Mr. Raimonds Oškālns, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the OSCE

The purpose of the opening session was to set the stage for the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) by exploring the notion of a security community, particularly in relation to initiatives in the politico-military dimension that can lead to strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environment and address emerging threats.

In the opening remarks by Ambassador Kęstutis Jankauskas, one of the important priorities of the Lithuanian Chairmanship was highlighted, namely, to enhance co-operation with other international and regional organizations and to promote the OSCE's profile as a suitable platform for dialogue and interaction between relevant international actors. He also emphasized the need for a strategic review of what remains to be done to realize the ambitious vision of a security community.

On increasing efforts to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area, he said that the OSCE needed consistency in its efforts, a clear political will, and frank and open exchange on persistent problems or issues of contention. He stressed that the conflict cycle was at the core of the OSCE's mandate and remained a high priority on its agenda. In view of that, the need for the Ministerial Council to adopt a decision in Vilnius aimed at enhancing and optimizing the OSCE's capacity to act throughout the entire conflict cycle was noted.

The NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, began by calling the OSCE a crucial part of Europe's security architecture, NATO being another, and pointing out that a security community must be rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals. He referred to the understanding that conflict was almost always based on a violation of somebody's human rights. If it was desired to see long-term security, those rights, freedom, the desire for democracy, and the need for justice, and for law and order must be defended and safeguarded.

When describing the OSCE as a standard-bearer of democracy and human rights, he referred to its significant role in preventing and managing conflicts, and commended it for being a major forum for pan-European arms control and confidence-building.

Commenting on the areas where co-operation between the OSCE and NATO would improve security, he particularly focused on the following:

- Completing the joint effort to build a Europe that was whole, free and at peace;
- Working together to address new and emerging threats;
- Reinforcing each other's work in protecting shared values.

Talking about accomplishments over the past 20 years, he referred to the roles of the OSCE and NATO in restoring security and stability in the Balkans. NATO's comprehensive approach had had its origins there and was currently being applied in Afghanistan. It afforded an opportunity for the military teams and the civilians to realize the true value of co-ordinating their efforts. Furthermore, maintaining that comprehensive approach was vital if further progress was to be made in bringing peace, security and stability to the European continent. Unity of purpose had to be maintained, co-operation deepened, and channels of communications kept open.

With regard to the Caucasus, he supported a key role for the OSCE in finding a solution for the region's problems. He explained how NATO was also engaged with countries of the region, for example, through assistance in defence-sector reforms.

Arms control was another important aspect of a confident and complete Europe. The successful implementation of the new START Treaty would improve the climate for progress on conventional arms control, as well as for a reduction in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

On new and emerging security challenges, he called attention to the need to work in partnership and to strengthen relationships with other nations and organizations. The OSCE's work in developing confidence-building measures in cyber security was invaluable. It would both enhance transparency and help to avoid miscalculations, thus complementing NATO's own work in that area.

With specific reference to terrorism, both organizations could build on the regular ongoing meetings and develop greater practical co-operation on a broader range of issues, e.g., joint training and education for staff before deployment, reinforcement of combined efforts on security-sector reform, and training of security forces.

In his view, the threat of proliferation of missile technology was another challenge affecting all nations, but it also provided an opportunity for co-operation between NATO and Russia, and that impulse could create a virtuous cycle in helping build the confidence and trust to tackle some of the more difficult issues in the relationship.

On the complementarity of efforts in promoting freedom, democracy and human rights, he acknowledged that the stability of the European continent and the security of its values could be affected by developments outside Europe, as the recent events across North Africa and the Middle East had shown. He specifically referred to Libya, where NATO, acting pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), had stepped in to protect the people. He emphasized that the international community, under the leadership of the United Nations, should be starting to plan for the future of that country. In particular, there was a

need to reform the military and security sectors. While NATO had acquired extensive experience in that field, the expertise of other organizations would be required in many areas as well. Some of those were the holding of free and fair elections and the building of democratic institutions and a legal system, as well as the establishment of independent media and economic development. In providing practical support for the countries of the region, it was imperative to enable and not to impose, and to help build local capability and not international dependency.

In conclusion, he pointed out that NATO and the OSCE had a shared past in making Europe more stable and secure, while the current job was to make tomorrow even more secure. To accomplish that, both organizations needed to review old problems, and find new solutions. They should be ready for emerging challenges, and devise ways of meeting them. Likewise, they should be looking outside Europe, working with partners around the globe to promote shared security.

## **Discussion**

The first delegation to take the floor, speaking also on behalf of a group of States, reaffirmed its political and financial support for the OSCE. In order to restore trust and confidence between the participating States, pertinent security concerns in the region needed to be continuously addressed. In order to achieve tangible progress, it was imperative that the protracted conflicts related to Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Transdnistria should be resolved. The active engagement by the EU, the OSCE and NATO in the Western Balkans was also noted. The OSCE's contribution in helping to move forward on consolidating democracy and bringing stability to the region could not be overestimated.

In relation to the conflict cycle, the OSCE's capabilities for acting effectively should be enhanced, in particular in early warning, post-conflict rehabilitation, mediation and early crisis response. It was looking forward to the adoption of a comprehensive decision on that topic in Vilnius. The OSCE's capacities in crisis management needed to be strengthened, especially when there was no OSCE field operation in place.

On transnational threats, the achievement of greater unity of purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats in and outside of the OSCE region was a matter of priority. It recalled the road map it had submitted for strengthening programmatic co-ordination and coherence. In that context, the work on developing an OSCE strategic framework for policing and on consolidating OSCE counter-terrorism mandates was mentioned. Other areas, such as border security and management, policing, action to combat terrorism and cyber security, were referred to as being of particular relevance for the OSCE area.

On arms control, it noted that all the participating States had a common interest in having the entire network of legal and political instruments of arms control and confidence- and security-building intact and viable. A solution needed to be found to overcome the impasse related to the CFE regime. It also reaffirmed its commitment to a substantive update of the Vienna Document.

In conclusion, it believed that a co-ordinated response by the international community was crucial for tackling new situations and challenges. In that regard, it welcomed the

intention to intensify the OSCE's engagement with its Mediterranean and Asian Partners in a complementary way, by adding value and avoiding duplications.

Another delegation expressed its conviction that it was vital to focus on the truly important issues likely to bring together the OSCE community, and that the ASRC should help in implementing the call emanating from the Astana Summit meeting for the creation of a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. The idea of a treaty on European security was consistent with that task.

Without overcoming the unfavourable situation in hard security matters and, specifically, in arms control, it would be impossible to develop co-operation in the economic and environmental, and human dimensions. It noted with concern the persisting deadlock surrounding the mandate for future negotiations on conventional arms and pointed out that the uncertainty factor would have a negative effect on security in Europe. It was confident that substantive results would have been achieved in updating the Vienna Document 1999 by the end of the year. It also recalled the draft that it had submitted on proposed further action in the field of arms control and CSBMs.

Furthermore, it expected that the OSCE concept for combating the threat of illicit drugs would be adopted at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Vilnius. It was ready to work with partners in other areas, such as combating terrorism and organized crime, ensuring information security and countering the illicit arms trade and trafficking in human beings. There was a niche for the OSCE in responding to natural and man-made disasters.

With reference to the OSCE's potential in crisis response, the existing tools should be used more effectively, and that could start with the development of uniform principles for conflict prevention and resolution.

It supported further use of the OSCE as the main platform for inter-institutional dialogue. The co-operation between Russia and NATO was developing positively in such areas as combating terrorism and piracy, training drug-enforcement officers and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The creation of a joint European anti-missile defence system deserved special attention as a key project in the formation of a common security space and a genuine partnership. That project, if carried out, would make a tangible contribution to the process of forming a "security community".

The next delegation referred to Secretary General Rasmussen's statement that the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community faced a number of challenges. It added that co-ordination and complementarity had never been more relevant. It would continue to support a greater synergy between the OSCE and NATO, but also between the OSCE and other relevant institutions.

It commended the OSCE's efforts at defining the concept of security, an endeavour from which others had largely benefited. The OSCE was currently confronted with the challenging task of carrying forward the work of refining concepts to respond to present-day needs; that included defining the concept of a "security community". That process itself would be a priority task for the OSCE and would act as a confidence-building measure to enhance mutual trust. The OSCE should be positioned to respond to challenges in its Partner countries.

Turning to the politico-military aspects of security, it voiced its support for updating the Vienna Document 1999, as well as for overcoming the impasse surrounding the future of the CFE Treaty. It hoped that the pause in negotiations in the “36 format” would not last long.

Transnational threats had emerged as the fourth pillar of security. While acknowledging the challenging task of defining a niche for the OSCE’s action, it had to be said that much was being done in that field already. It supported further efforts in the areas of cyber threats, energy security, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

Unless the so-called “frozen conflicts” were robustly addressed and resolved, a functional “security community” would not be achievable.

Responding to the previous interventions and questions, Secretary General Rasmussen acknowledged that the Western Balkans were a priority for NATO. He expressed the desire to see all the countries in the region integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures, although it was the prerogative of each country to decide on its relationship with the EU and NATO. Referring to the OSCE’s role in Afghanistan, he pointed out that the Organization was an excellent framework for consultations, given its membership. Governance and the rule of law could be possible areas for OSCE involvement. The Russia-NATO relationship had improved. While there were still some disagreements, they should not overshadow co-operation, for example, in Afghanistan or on counter-terrorism. Co-operation on missile defence could be a real-world achievement. Strengthening and modernizing conventional arms control remained a goal for NATO. Political will was required to move the process forward. Concerning practical co-operation between the OSCE and NATO, consultations and high-level contacts should take place on issues of common concern.

The next delegation recalled the determination that had been expressed by the Heads of State or Government that a Security Community without dividing lines should be created. Work should continue on countering the transnational threats of terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in human beings and drugs, illegal migration and cyber threats. It expressed support for additional efforts to resolve the so-called “frozen conflicts”. Updating the Vienna Document 1999 and overcoming the crisis relating to the CFE Treaty were mentioned. The need for constructive co-operation among international and regional security organizations was stressed.

In response to a number of questions by six delegations, Secretary General Rasmussen noted that, with regard to the conformity of NATO operations with international law, the operation in Libya was taking place in full compliance with the existing UN Security Council resolution. On the division of labour between NATO and the OSCE in conflict management, the OSCE was an excellent forum for heading off conflicts. While much of NATO’s New Strategic Concept was about crisis management, prevention was better than cure. NATO did not intend to lead, but rather to co-ordinate with other international organizations. Referring to Afghanistan, he mentioned the counter-narcotics efforts within the NATO-Russia Council, and with Partners in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With regard to NATO’s partnerships with other organizations, he noted that they had been reinforced in the New Strategic Concept. Hence, consultations and structured co-operation were required on all security-policy issues. On Afghanistan and NATO’s role in facilitating a

smooth transition of responsibilities after 2014, assistance would continue beyond the date when the military component left the country.

Ambassador Giulio Tonini, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), informed the Conference of the Forum's progress and activities since the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference.

While preparations for the Summit in Astana had taken up the most time in the second half of 2010, the FSC had also continued its regular work, which had resulted in a decision by it on small arms and light weapons with regard to increased transparency on brokering activities.

Another important decision had been taken on the methodology of destruction of stockpiles of conventional ammunition. He also briefed the Conference on the implementation of SALW projects in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

He gave an account of developments regarding the updating of the Vienna Document 1999 with a view to presenting a new version by the end of 2011. He also described the various events and meetings that had taken place in the review period in support of the thematic areas of FSC work. Among others, the Security Dialogue had provided opportunities through the participation of guest speakers, experts, academicians and field officers. A workshop had been devoted to non-proliferation in the context of implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It was going to be followed up by a joint FSC-PC meeting with high-level attendance.

In conclusion, he referred to the High-Level Seminar on Military Doctrine which had taken place in May 2011 and represented a unique opportunity for high-level military officials to exchange views on doctrinal developments and to promote co-operation between the armed forces of the participating States.

The next delegation to speak commended the ASRC as affording an opportunity to review the OSCE's efforts to strengthen security. Attention was drawn to the importance of covering efforts to co-operate with the OSCE Partners in North Africa and with Afghanistan. In that context, a multifaceted approach was necessary, which would include meeting emerging threats, preventing and responding to conflicts, and strengthening conventional arms control agreements. On transnational threats, continued work on cyber security was encouraged, along with an increased focus on violent extremism and radicalization. On conflict prevention and mitigation, the need to improve early warning systems and create effective crisis management mechanisms was mentioned. In that context, the OSCE's capabilities had to be enhanced and collective efforts redoubled aimed at resolving the protracted conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Moldova. The commitment to revitalize and modernize the conventional arms control regimes was reaffirmed. It was also urged that the OSCE should assist its Partners in implementing policing and ensuring civilian democratic control of the armed forces.

Another delegation concentrated on global drug trafficking as a factor in the overall threats to international peace and security. In its view, the fact that major international organizations had not identified drug-related security as a separate type of security or defined it under international law, prevented the international community from ensuring a systemic and comprehensive approach to improving the international security architecture, which was

being undermined by the disruptive force of global drug trafficking. It suggested that use should be made of the unique resources of the OSCE, which had been systematically promoting the linking of the regional concepts of Eurasian and North Atlantic security. That would be particularly relevant now that there were specific proposals for the comprehensive implementation of drug-related security.

The next speaker, taking the floor on behalf of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, touched upon the need for the OSCE to improve its ability to identify and respond to emerging threats to security. There should be a more systematic collection of data, and the Secretary General should be tasked with compiling and systematizing the lessons learned. He also called for a more systematic involvement of the Parliamentary Assembly. He concluded by noting that there were still dividing lines on the understanding of the term “security community”, and expressed the conviction that the ideas stemming from the Corfu Process and the “V to V” dialogue should be translated into practice.

A further delegation spoke about the notion of a security community, emphasizing that the dialogue did not take place in a vacuum. Existing tools and mechanisms needed to be invigorated and existing conflicts addressed; otherwise, the dialogue on a security community was futile. The OSCE must strengthen its focus and impact in the human dimension. The role of the ODIHR and the HCNM should also be strengthened and the institutional architecture and role of the OSCE enhanced in respect of early warning. The OSCE’s activities with regard to transnational threats should add value to and support the efforts of others, while drawing on the OSCE’s comprehensive approach. With regret, it recognized that none of the strategic proposals had been translated into practice, nor had improvements been brought about to make the lives of people on the ground more secure. It believed that the reason for that was insufficient political will. It concluded by expressing the need to adapt the OSCE to reality and make it a forum for genuine dialogue.

The next delegation expressed its readiness to discuss any proposals to enhance collective and co-operative security. In its view, a few deliverables needed to be defined reflecting the determination to bring about joint co-operation and action. Among the areas focussed on were transnational threats and challenges, with an emphasis on Afghanistan; cyber security; the OSCE’s capacity in conflict prevention and crisis management; conventional arms control; and risks emanating from fragile and vulnerable States.

Another delegation expressed its support for reviewing lessons learned from the OSCE’s engagement with Afghanistan. It also supported better co-ordination of the OSCE’s efforts to address transnational threats and was prepared to consider a reallocation of resources in that respect. It recognized that cyber security was a growing priority and that the OSCE should identify what it could undertake in that field that would contribute added value. On conflict prevention and crisis management, it suggested that more should be done to harness the contribution that civil society could make. Moreover, it was pleased to note the focus on the conflict cycle, regarding which it hoped that a decision could be adopted by the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius. On arms control, it regretted the current deadlock regarding the CFE Treaty and hoped that sufficient political will could be found to break it. In the meantime, the work on updating the Vienna Document 1999 should be speeded up. On Open Skies, it was concerned that political differences were having a detrimental effect on implementation, and it hoped the impasse would soon be overcome. Finally, it noted that violence could erupt at any time in fragile and vulnerable States, and hence the OSCE should focus its efforts on stability and capacity-building, including in Central Asia.

A further delegation said that protracted conflicts continued to pose a threat to security in the OSCE area, and hence must continue to be addressed. The problem lay in the lack of political will, as what needed to be done was generally known. On arms control, substantial progress was needed on modernizing the Vienna Document 1999 and addressing the CFE Treaty. With regard to transnational threats, it noted that the OSCE had good expertise and experience in matters of security related to police and border management, upon which the participating States could draw. It supported the intention to press forward with the OSCE's efforts in counter-terrorism, cyber security, action to tackle drug trafficking and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By and large, with reference to all topics, it was concerned at the gap between political statements and actual implementation.

A further delegation touched on its four priorities for the current year's ASRC, which were: substantial progress in discussions on modernization of the Vienna Document; conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction through closer co-operation between the OSCE and other relevant international security organizations, taking into account the Organization's comparative advantages; strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention; and engagement by the OSCE with countries from neighbouring regions. It also expected the ASRC to be the first gauge of the seriousness of the desire to strengthen the OSCE.

The final delegation to take the floor focused on the understanding of the concept of security. It suggested that, in view of an ever-expanding list of security concerns and perceptions, the task of the participating States was to create a possible common ground in the context of different approaches and assessments. After having alluded to some of the problems, it stressed that the desired option had always been to have open, continuous and trustful dialogue. It believed that there was a need to include, engage and involve everyone who had a legitimate stake in any kind of security arrangement. There was also a need to develop co-operation between different organizations and structures. In conclusion, it expressed the hope that multidimensional inclusive action, along with avoidance of a policy that could be perceived as an attempt at exclusion, would open the path towards a meaningful security community.

### **Recommendations and suggestions**

A number of proposals and recommendations were made at the opening session. Several speakers announced their intention of further discussing those subjects during working sessions. The proposals included:

1. There is a need to enhance the OSCE's co-operation with other international and regional security organizations and to promote the OSCE's profile as a suitable platform for dialogue and interaction between relevant international actors.
2. There is a need for a strategic review of what remains to be done to realize the ambitious vision of a security community. In that respect, it is vital to focus on the truly important issues likely to bring together the OSCE community.
3. Ideas stemming from the Corfu Process and the "V to V" dialogue should be translated into practice, with the goal of making substantive improvements to peoples' lives. In that respect, the participating States are confronted with the challenging task of carrying forward the work of refining and operationalizing concepts to respond to present-day needs.



A few deliverables should be defined for the upcoming Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius that reflect the participating States' determination to achieve joint co-operation and action.

4. In order to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area, which must remain a high priority for the OSCE if a security community is to have substantive meaning, there is a need for consistency in the participating States' efforts, a clear political will, and frank and open exchange on persistent problems and/or issues of contention.
5. The ASRC remains a useful venue to allow collective efforts directed at strengthening security to be reviewed. Efforts to enhance co-operation with the OSCE Partners should also be included in the Conference.
6. The OSCE should position itself to respond to challenges facing its Partners, including by being prepared to assist them, upon request, in, for example, good governance, rule of law, policing and the democratic control of the armed forces.
7. The OSCE and NATO could build on the regular ongoing meetings and develop greater practical co-operation on a broader range of issues, such as joint training and education for staff before deployment, and reinforcement of combined efforts on security-sector reform and the training of security forces.
8. On transnational threats, the OSCE's efforts should focus primarily on aspects related to counter-terrorism mandates, a strategic policing framework, action to combat the threat of illicit drug trafficking, the role of the Organization in cyber security, and programmatic co-ordination and coherence. Those efforts should be guided by the requirement for the OSCE to add value, including by drawing on its comparative advantages and complementing the efforts of other organizations.
9. The OSCE's capacity to act throughout the conflict cycle should be enhanced, including through more effective use of the existing tools, improved early warning systems, greater harnessing of civil societies and closer co-operation with other international and regional organizations.
10. In the area of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, there was broad agreement that the Vienna Document 1999 should be updated and that further efforts should be made to overcome the deadlock surrounding the CFE regime.

## **WORKING SESSION I: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES: STRENGTHENING THE COHERENCE OF THE OSCE RESPONSE AND INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**

- Keynote speakers: Mr. Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
- Ms. Anne-Christine Wegener, Transparency International UK
- Moderator: Ambassador Miroslava Beham, Permanent Representative of Serbia to the OSCE
- Rapporteur: Mr. Patrick O'Reilly, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE

In her opening remarks, the moderator recalled that transnational threats (TNTs) were a complex phenomenon which evolved rapidly and were difficult to distinguish. In order to address them, a flexible, dynamic and cross-dimensional approach was needed, which should take into account both inter-State and inter-organizational co-operation.

She recalled what the Heads of State or Government had stated regarding TNTs at the Astana Summit meeting: "...we must achieve greater unity of purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats... Such threats can originate within or outside our region."

She pointed to the action already taken since the Astana meeting in bringing that vision to fruition, including conferences on cyber security and human trafficking, and ongoing work aimed at producing deliverables for the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting in the area of TNTs, relating to: programmatic coherence and co-ordination, consolidation of the Organization's counter-terrorism mandates, a strategic police framework, drugs and cyber security concepts and trafficking in human beings. Those deliverables should enhance the OSCE's capabilities and bolster interaction with other regional and international organizations.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), spoke of the expanding range of transnational challenges and the measures taken by the CSTO to counter those threats. He highlighted the events in one CSTO member State in 2010, which had proved a serious trial for his Organization. In the light of lessons learned from those experiences, the CSTO had adapted its crisis-response procedures. In December 2010, the CSTO Collective Security Council had identified a number of areas for improvement in the collective-security system to ensure the territorial integrity, sovereignty and stability of the member States, which had required changes to the Treaty and to the CSTO Charter, as well as other relevant documents.

He noted a worrying trend towards increasing extremism, an intensification of the activities of terrorist organizations and massive levels of illegal migration. Many of those trends were emanating from the North African and Middle East regions, in particular in the wake of the so-called "Arab Spring", as well as from Afghanistan. He pointed in particular to

threats to the governments of Central Asia from extremist groups, which were warning of revenge against those assisting in the transit of goods for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). The rise of extremism was further aided by socio-economic problems in the region and by an increase in the numbers of adherents of so-called non-traditional forms of Islam.

He explained that, in order to respond to those challenges, the CSTO made use of an array of structures, such as its Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. CSTO peacekeeping forces had also been established, while the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region operated as a co-ordination mechanism to combat drug trafficking, illegal migration and the consequences of man-made disasters, as well as to ensure information security.

Combating illegal migration remained a priority for the Organization, with the CSTO Co-ordination Council focussing on joint operational and preventive measures. The CSTO was also planning a regional system to work with asylum seekers and refugees arriving from third countries. The Organization was also intensifying its co-operation with other States in the fight against drug trafficking.

He highlighted the importance of inter-organizational co-operation in dealing with TNTs, which, he noted, must be met by transnational solidarity and multifaceted co-ordination. He underlined his Organization's excellent relations with a range of international organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe (CoE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and its readiness to further expand practical co-operation with them. He drew particular attention to the warm relations with the OSCE, including the outgoing Secretary General, the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), and spoke of constructive dialogue with the Organization on the problem of resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

In concluding, he stated that, as the world was becoming less stable and since traditional and new security challenges were becoming more acute, it was more important than ever to co-ordinate the activities of individual States and international organizations in order to safeguard stability.

The second keynote speaker, Ms. Anne-Christine Wegener of Transparency International UK, highlighted the danger of corruption as a transnational threat, including corruption within the defence and security sector, the link between corruption and organized crime, and the relationship between corruption and conflict.

Noting that her organization employed former military and security personnel in order to gain access to their unique insights into the sector, she underlined three particular dangers of corruption to the security sector:

- Corruption wasted valuable and limited resources;
- Corruption reduced the operational effectiveness of security forces;
- Corruption reduced public trust and confidence in the security forces.

She pointed out that corruption in the security and defence sector could appear in many forms and at different levels, from procurement-related corruption to asset disposal or bribing of officials in order to avoid conscription. In total, she listed 29 different risks in five main categories – political, personnel, procurement, finance and operations. (The full list of risks can be found in her presentation – PC.NGO/12/11 of 1 July 2011.)

She pointed out that the security and defence sector was a particularly attractive target for organized crime groups, because individuals in that sector tended to have privileged access to sensitive information, weapons and pillars of power. She described the example of Peru under Alberto Fujimori as a prominent example of criminal infiltration of the security and defence sector, in that Mr. Fujimori had used his position of power to construct elaborate networks of organized transnational crime, run largely by the head of the National Intelligence Service.

International borders provided another opportunity for criminal infiltration of the security sector. Corruption in cross-border transport could allow sanctions or blockades to be circumvented, and taxes and duties to be avoided, and might allow access to routes that were officially closed.

Afghanistan was another example of how ignoring corruption as a strategic issue had led to significant problems for the international community's mission in the country, in that criminal patronage networks allowed money to flow upwards in return for political protection flowing downwards. In response, a unit had been established in ISAF to address corruption as it affected the NATO mission.

Turning to the issue of the relationship between corruption and conflict, she drew attention to the particular vulnerability to corruption of countries in post-conflict phases of development, since corruption eroded the legitimacy of the authorities at a time when it was particularly needed. She suggested that corruption was usually both the cause and the consequence of conflict, and that it was vital to address corruption effectively and early in the post-conflict process, and indeed, that it should form part of the thinking during conflict-resolution efforts too. She gave examples of some countries that were currently in post-conflict phases which had taken very effective steps towards reducing corruption, and that demonstrated, she asserted, that change could be effected in a relatively modest time frame.

In concluding, she made a number of recommendations for the OSCE:

- Develop understanding and build capacity in reform areas such as countering organized crime;
- Facilitate coalitions between agencies involved in countering organized crime, and between those agencies and civil society organizations;
- Build capacity in OSCE participating States to address corruption in the defence and security sectors.

On the last recommendation, she further noted that defence and security officials generally recognized the problem of corruption and were willing to address it, including by encompassing it in the context of “building integrity” rather than “tackling corruption”.

## **Discussion**

Sixteen delegations and other speakers contributed to the debate.

A great number of contributors to the discussion underscored the importance of enhancing engagement between the OSCE and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, both in order to maximize the impact of activities to combat TNTs and to avoid duplication of effort. A number of speakers highlighted the complex and interconnected nature of TNTs, and stressed the need to address them in a comprehensive and multifaceted way, using all the relevant tools across the three dimensions. Several speakers referred approvingly to the decisions in the area of TNTs that the Chairmanship-in-Office was proposing for adoption by the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius.

The first delegation noted the increasing dangers posed by terrorism, which was being fuelled by the deteriorating global economic situation and clashes in religious doctrine. That increasing danger pointed to the need to have a strategy, with systematic responses, in place. The speaker highlighted worrying trends towards increasingly brutal acts of terrorism with a rise in the number of victims. The methods employed were also changing, with atrocities occurring without demands or claims of responsibility. The terrorists’ objectives were to cause maximum damage, sow panic and undermine faith in the authorities. Terrorist groups were increasingly merging with organized-crime gangs, and were using criminal means, such as drugs trafficking, robbery and racketeering to fund their activities. Terrorist groups were expanding their technical know-how and becoming more professional in the use of explosives and toxins, as well as in their use of propaganda, especially on the Internet. They were seeking weapons of mass destruction and targeting key civil infrastructure such as nuclear facilities and transportation hubs. The speaker called for increased co-operation on counter-terrorism, including through the improvement of the legal basis for combating terrorism and its link with organized crime. He recommended also pooling efforts on countering extremism, including by involving the business community. He noted too the importance of combating corruption.

The second speaker, representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), outlined the Commonwealth’s extensive actions in the field of combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, which were carried out under the umbrella of a three-year inter-State programme adopted by the Council of Heads of State of the CIS. CIS countries had acceded to the basic UN international legal documents concerned with fighting transnational organized crime, and were preparing a number of other initiatives to provide a legal framework for co-operative action by the members. In addition, the law-enforcement authorities of CIS member States regularly conducted joint special operations, which in the past three years had resulted in the seizure of over 8,000 firearms and 23 tons of drugs and the identification of 650 cases of trafficking in human beings. Border authorities of the CIS had also co-operated with third countries in special operations, and had concluded agreements with other regional and international organizations to enhance co-operation. The CIS actively co-operated in the training of personnel. Finally, he recognized that the problem of TNTs could not be addressed by one country or one organization, and called for greater inter-organizational co-operation. In that regard, he confirmed the CIS’s willingness to

engage constructively with other organizations to help ensure stability and security in the Eurasian region.

The next delegation to speak welcomed the OSCE's increased focus on TNTs and called for a co-ordinated approach that complemented rather than duplicated efforts elsewhere, and which should take due account of all three OSCE dimensions. Addressing the Organization's role in combating terrorism and Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (VERLT), she pointed out that the OSCE was particularly well positioned to engage with civil society and the private sector and to leverage OSCE field operations to identify and respond to such threats. She also underlined her delegation's support for the OSCE's work in the areas of cyber security, border security and management and non-proliferation. In closing, she drew special attention to the Organization's contribution towards peace and security in Afghanistan.

The following delegation described some activities to combat corruption at the regional level undertaken by the country's authorities. The speaker provided information about work being conducted with partners to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, and offered the country's expertise to OSCE Partners for Co-operation that might wish to avail themselves of it. He welcomed efforts in the Organization on developing a strategic framework on police-related activities and on developing a mandate in the area of cyber security. He also noted the link between that work and progress in enhancing programmatic co-ordination and coherence in the Secretariat.

Another delegation drew attention to the positive ongoing work in the OSCE to develop a strategic framework for police-related activities, as well as a concept to combat the threat of illicit drugs and chemical precursors. The OSCE had a major pioneering role to play in the development of global cyber security, in particular in the area of CSBMs. The speaker highlighted the work under way to consolidate the OSCE's counter-terrorism mandates, and suggested that there might be scope for involving the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe in specific measures to combat TNTs. He also endorsed the step-by-step road map for improving programmatic TNT co-ordination that had been circulated by a group of participating States. All the proposed decisions on TNTs for the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting were interdependent and, if adopted, should contribute to practical work on TNTs.

The next speaker, representing the ODIHR, stressed the importance of the human dimension in preventing and combating terrorism. Action to combat terrorism would not succeed if the means employed were not in conformity with human-rights standards. Saying that human rights continued to be curtailed for the presumed benefit of security throughout the OSCE region, she noted that violations of human rights perpetrated in the fight against terrorism were not only illegal but also aggravated the conditions in which terrorism was fostered. She recalled that the participating States had repeatedly acknowledged in multiple OSCE human-dimension commitments that counter-terrorism measures which did not protect human rights were counterproductive. The speaker also drew attention to the ODIHR's Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Programme, which worked with participating States in the areas of capacity-building, expert advice and analysis, legislative assistance and co-operation with other key actors working on counter-terrorism.

One delegation drew attention to the OSCE's Principles Governing Non-Proliferation. It underlined the important contribution that had been made by the document at a key time for European security and, noting important developments since then, including the adoption of

UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and related resolutions, called for it to be updated. The delegation recalled that it and the delegation of another participating State had already circulated a draft proposal in that regard.

Another delegation called for OSCE activity in the area of security of transportation networks, given the importance of safe and secure transport networks to international business and travel. It referred to national activities its Government had undertaken within two regional organizations and called for OSCE support to be extended to those organizations.

The next delegation expressed the view that transnational organized crime was at the core of all forms of TNT, and pointed to its Government's own efforts to stamp out crime and corruption, including by strengthening the country's judiciary. It noted that both political will and political courage were essential to complete the task and provided concrete examples of how the authorities had underscored their commitment to tackling the problem. The speaker stressed the important role of the media, including investigative reporting, in combating transnational organized crime. She concluded by noting the importance of regional approaches to fighting transnational organized crime and the significant contribution that OSCE field operations could make in helping to build capacity in participating States.

The following delegation supported enhanced co-operation between the OSCE and the CSTO on combating TNTs, and suggested concluding a memorandum of understanding to set out the framework for co-operation.

The next delegation discussed cyber security, police co-operation and trafficking in human beings. On cyber security, the delegation emphasized the importance of strengthening national contact points. Noting that cyber threats had important legal implications, it agreed that the OSCE had the potential to make a contribution to the discussion. The delegation also welcomed efforts to agree a strategic framework for police-related activities, and expressed its full support for the OSCE's efforts to combat trafficking in human beings. Finally, it called for enhancement of co-operation with other international and regional organizations on combating TNTs.

The next speaker, representing the Council of Europe (CoE), highlighted the common ground between the CoE and the OSCE. Referring specifically to TNTs, the speaker described the three distinctive features of the CoE's response to TNTs: its defence of human rights was free from political, economic and military considerations; it was the only convention-based pan-European organization; and it had the tools to monitor compliance with standards and values found in the European Convention on Human Rights. He went on to note some of the CoE conventions that dealt with TNTs, and drew particular attention to the fact that they combined law-enforcement mechanisms with human-rights safeguards. He explained the CoE's activities beyond its borders, reaching into its immediate neighbourhood, which aimed to facilitate democratic transition, promote good governance and combat corruption, as well as to reinforce regional action in combating TNTs. He also warned of increased nationalism in Europe, which was leading in the most extreme cases to home-grown terrorism. At the same time, racial discrimination was also on the rise, and that was leading to an increasingly polarized Europe. To counter that worrying trend, European citizens must fully embrace diversity and acknowledge that all were equal before the law and shared certain rights and responsibilities. He concluded by pointing out that the CoE was

seeking to enhance its relations with key partners such as the OSCE, including by opening and strengthening its representation offices in Brussels, Geneva, Warsaw and Vienna.

The next delegation called on the participating States to continue developing an enhanced role for the OSCE in the area of energy security. Since the OSCE included producer countries, transit countries and consumer countries, and given that it provided a suitable platform for co-operative dialogue and for the elaboration of norms and principles, the comparative advantages for the OSCE were evident. However, negotiations on legally binding documents relating to energy security fell within the remit of other organizations. The delegation suggested that the participating States should adopt a Ministerial Council decision in Vilnius on energy security that could include the following elements:

- Energy security should become a regular agenda item of the relevant OSCE bodies;
- The OSCE's early-warning and conflict-prevention toolbox should become instrumental in avoiding energy crises and disruptions;
- The participating States and relevant institutions should be tasked with elaborating a set of energy-security principles.

The delegation also recommended the formation of a task force on energy security and called on the participating States to promote transparency in the exploitation of natural resources by making use of mechanisms such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

One delegation highlighted the need for relevant OSCE structures to have a broad range of tools to hand in order to respond to the specific needs of participating States. It expressed the view that the OSCE could contribute added value in the following areas: needs assessment, where called upon; the organization of targeted seminars, workshops and conferences to ensure an effective exchange of views and therefore promote best practices; and the building of capacity in participating States through its own structures and staff. The delegation stressed the particularly important work of the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) and expressed support for assigning priority to its activities and increasing its capacity. It also underscored the importance of close co-operation with other regional or subregional organizations, in particular the CICA. Finally, it described its contribution to the OSCE's work in combating TNTs, which had included seconding a large number of police officers and providing training to other police forces.

The next delegation raised the issue of illegal migration. It regretted that there was little inclination in the OSCE to view such migration as a transnational threat, and not just as a challenge. It pointed out that illegal migration could negatively affect bilateral relations and that there was a clear link between it and other forms of trafficking. Illegal migration had been recognized in Athens Ministerial Council Decision No. 2/09, in which the ministers had decided to step up individual and collective efforts to address TNTs. The delegation called for better co-operation with countries that were a potential source of illegal migration, a mechanism to share the burden of combating illegal migration and measures for voluntary or forced return of illegal migrants. The speaker also recommended increased co-operation with other international and regional organizations and suggested that the Platform for Co-operative Security of 1999 would be an ideal mechanism in that regard. Finally, the delegation recalled that its Government and a number of other participating States had



circulated a cross-dimensional proposal regarding an OSCE migration network which was still pending.

The final delegation endorsed the view that there was a clear role for the OSCE in combating TNTs and in enhancing capacity-building. It detailed its Government's own activities in the framework of regional organizations to combat terrorism, illegal migration and drugs trafficking, and its actions in the field of border management and security and police reform. The delegation recalled in particular its Government's co-operation with the CSTO, the CIS and NATO in those areas, as well as with the OSCE. It referred to the recent meeting of the Border Security and Management National Focal Points in Vilnius, which had provided an opportunity to discuss the impact of organized crime and corruption on border security and management. Finally, it highlighted national efforts in the area of police reform, which was being carried out in co-operation with the OSCE and the EU.

### **Recommendations and suggestions**

The Organization's increased focus on TNTs is both welcome and appropriate.

1. The OSCE should step up its engagement with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations that are also working in the field of TNTs to exchange information and pool resources. Examples of such organizations include the CSTO, CIS, EU, Council of Europe, GUAM and CICA. The Platform for Co-operative Security of 1999 could be a useful tool in this regard. The OSCE's efforts should complement rather than duplicate efforts elsewhere.
2. TNTs are extremely complex and multifaceted. The OSCE response must also be multifaceted, adaptable and flexible. It should take due account of the OSCE's key strengths, in particular its notion of the comprehensive approach to security and the work relating to the economic and environmental dimension and, in particular, the human dimension.
3. Only an inter-State and inter-organizational approach that recognizes that the security of the OSCE region is inextricably linked to security in neighbouring regions, including the southern edge of the Mediterranean and Afghanistan, will succeed.
4. The OSCE should make increased use of contacts with other sectors of society, including the private sector and civil society, in formulating and implementing its response to TNTs.
5. Trends in radicalization and nationalism are particularly worrying and should be addressed. The OSCE's efforts on promoting the UN counter-terrorism legal framework should continue.
6. The defence and security sector is susceptible to corruption and is a very attractive target for organized-crime groups. As a result, the OSCE should play a capacity-building role in raising awareness of the danger of corruption and should encourage and facilitate contacts between agencies that fight corruption, organized crime and terrorism.
7. The Ministerial Council decisions in the area of TNTs being proposed by the Chairmanship-in-Office attracted wide support. In particular, delegations welcomed work in the areas of improving TNT programmatic coherence and co-ordination in the Organization,

developing a strategic framework for policing and a concept on countering drugs, as well as consolidating the Organization's counter-terrorism mandates and developing a mandate in the area of cyber security. By the same token, the OSCE's structures should have a broad range of tools to respond effectively.

8. The OSCE should engage in the area of security of transportation networks.
9. The participating States should update the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation.
10. The participating States should adopt a Ministerial Council decision on energy security.
11. The OSCE should improve the legal basis for combating terrorism and its link with organized crime.
12. The issue of illegal migration has not thus far received sufficient attention from the OSCE and should be more fully addressed.
13. The participating States should recall that they have repeatedly acknowledged in multiple OSCE human-dimension commitments that counter-terrorism measures which do not protect human rights are counterproductive.

**WORKING SESSION II: EARLY WARNING,  
CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION:  
LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY AHEAD**

Keynote speakers: Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Mr. Richard Wright, Director for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, European External Action Service

Moderator: Ambassador Giedrius Čekuolis, Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for Protracted Conflicts

Rapporteur: Ms. Caitlin Gearen, United States Mission to the OSCE

The moderator, Ambassador Giedrius Čekuolis, opened the session by noting that early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation were core issues of the OSCE mandate and one of the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship's top priorities. Recalling the so-called Corfu Process, he urged delegations to consider the possibility of adoption by the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting of a decision on the conflict cycle. Noting that the Astana Summit Declaration called for increased efforts to resolve protracted conflicts, he remarked that much remained to be done.

Addressing specific protracted conflicts, he noted the stalemate in the Geneva Discussions on Georgia and called for an increased focus on confidence-building measures (CBMs). Pointing out that incidents were still occurring on the ground, including very serious ones, he called on all the participants in the Geneva Discussions to redouble their efforts, including with respect to the incident-prevention and -response mechanisms, as well as to direct dialogue on security and humanitarian issues. He also called for a commitment on the non-use of force, on freedom of movement, and on the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Remaining cautiously optimistic regarding a solution, he advocated the return of an OSCE presence in Georgia, based on a status-neutral agreement, to build trust at the grass-roots level through non-political CBMs.

On Armenia and Azerbaijan, he indicated that the conditions were present for the approval of the basic principles related to Nagorno-Karabakh, but agreement had not yet been reached. He lamented reports of arms transfers and an apparent build-up of offensive capabilities. Finding a mutually acceptable solution would require small first steps by the parties to the conflict. One possibility might be to operationalize the Sochi agreement related to the investigation of security incidents along the Line of Contact to reduce casualties and build security confidence. Turning to Transdniestria, he noted that no agreement had been reached on the resumption of official negotiations during the last meeting in the "5+2" format that had been held in Moscow on 21 June. He remained hopeful that agreement would be reached on making the negotiating process official during the next round of "5+2" talks. He

welcomed, meanwhile, the continued focus on direct dialogue, including the meetings in the “1+1” format at the highest political level and the expert working groups on CBMs.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Janusz Bugajski, turned from the topic of protracted conflicts to present six potential future conflict scenarios. He noted that future conflicts would be of three varieties: (1) intra-State conflicts, which included civil clashes, triggered by social and economic inequality and the erosion of government legitimacy, which might, in turn, spawn criminal gangs, anti-immigrant pogroms, or even separatist movements; (2) inter-State conflicts, which would be clashes over disputed territories, the treatment of ethnically kindred communities, and/or energy rights; and (3) trans-State conflicts, which were becoming more prevalent and included international terrorism, cyberattacks, or economic sabotage.

He then presented six deliberately thought-provoking potential future conflicts in the OSCE space: a West Balkan crisis cascade; Ukrainian and Belarusian implosions; wars in the South Caucasus; Central Asian colour revolutions; EU revolts; and Russian Federation fractures. (Details can be found in his presentation, PC.NGO/13/11 of 1 July 2011.)

Noting that the OSCE was not a mutual defence organization, he recommended that the OSCE should develop more crisis-response capacities or risk being sidelined. The OSCE should, for example, adjust its consensus mechanism, perhaps following the EU qualified-majority and blocking-minority system, to allow for rapid response. The OSCE could also enhance its effectiveness by working directly with other multilateral organizations, including the EU, NATO, and the CSTO, on specific scenarios. In developing early warning and comprehensive conflict-monitoring capabilities, the OSCE might consider contracting credible researchers and leveraging the presence of the OSCE field missions in countries involved in conflicts. That would allow the OSCE to take the lead on issuing regular reports on progress or regress to the international community. It could also hold forward-looking round-table discussions on possible responses.

On conflict prevention, he recommended that the OSCE field missions should play a role in mediation for governments dealing with cross-border disputes. In addition, the OSCE should maintain an emergency standby budget that would allow for the rapid expansion of field missions in the event of a crisis, and it should develop a simple and quick decision-making mechanism for responding immediately during the outbreak of conflict, without waiting for the Permanent Council to act. He also recommended that post-conflict rehabilitation efforts should include social reconciliation and economic development. Missions should be maintained to continue the monitoring of conditions.

The second keynote speaker, Prof. Alexander Nikitin, addressed new trends in peacekeeping operations. He indicated that today’s peace operations deviated greatly from the traditional picture; many more were being performed by the EU, NATO, and regional organizations. Moreover, most of the approximately 60 ongoing operations across the globe involved a contradiction between peacekeeping and State sovereignty. In that respect, he lamented that the international community interfered more often and more broadly, without there being full consensus regarding the objectives and limits of such operations.

The classical UN peacekeeping model, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, had seen “blue helmet” troops trained specifically for peacekeeping. The 1990s had brought what he termed “chapter six-and-a-half”. That involved not only intervention by mandate, but the

coercive use of force in conflict situations. The period from 2001 to 2011 had brought the invention of a regional organization model, in which national armed forces participated in coalitions, but were not trained specifically for peacekeeping. An example of that model was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, under NATO command. As an aside, he expressed the view that the ISAF pull-out might cause serious problems for the Russian Federation and the CSTO States.

Turning to new trends in public opinion regarding peacekeeping in Russia, he indicated that there was general support for and tolerance of UN-mandated peacekeeping activities. Conversely, there was general opposition to the involvement of NATO in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) space. Public opinion opposed intervention in the Caucasus but was more supportive of activities in Central Asia. His Government had proposed, and continued to support, a European security treaty that would supplement OSCE activities when consensus mechanisms failed in times of war.

Looking back through history, he indicated that the Russian Federation had not initially supported intervention in Iraq in 2003–2010, but public opinion had shifted over time to favour it. Other conflicts, such as the one in Bosnia, had seen good co-operation between East and West on peacekeeping. He also reviewed the relationship between NATO and the CIS in Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, and most recently, Libya. He strongly recommended a more stable mechanism for co-ordination between regional organizations and the UN in times of crisis.

There were currently three chief peacekeeping bodies: NATO, the EU, and the CSTO, all of which had some form of rapid-response or -reaction forces. He indicated that all three could be placed at the disposal of the UN or the OSCE, as forces “for hire”. He foretold a strong potential for co-operation between the Russian Federation and the West in Central Asia, particularly on the Afghan-Tajik border, as well as in Georgia, Transdnistria and Ukraine. Co-operation on Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria or in the event of a Central Asian colour revolution was, however, less likely.

Looking forward, he recommended the creation of a council of international and regional organizations engaged in peacekeeping: The secretaries general of those organizations would convene in times of crisis to co-ordinate activities. A UN mandate should come first, then the development of a coalition, followed by the OSCE taking the lead on political reconstruction and engaging with NGOs and the private sector.

The final keynote speaker, Mr. Richard Wright, began by observing that the human, economic, and political costs of conflicts appeared to have become more acceptable to all actors, leading to a lack of progress on protracted conflicts. Quoting a World Bank report on conflict, security and development, he indicated that the average cost of a civil war was equivalent to 30 years of GDP growth in a medium-sized country. Conflicts had the effect of wiping out an entire generation of economic growth.

He referred to the United States State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review as reflecting an important forward-looking strategy of reorienting American diplomacy towards civilian-led processes, as well as towards planning for conflict prevention and resolution. The EU emphasized that prevention should be at the heart of its external activities relating to conflict. In that respect, a strengthening of legitimate institutions

and governments could provide justice and jobs that would break the conflict cycle and rebuild confidence.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) had endowed itself with a wide range of conflict-resolution tools. It was now a major supplier of humanitarian aid, and had rapid-reaction economic instruments, mediators, a network of special representations, a strong intelligence base, and growing partnerships with the UN, regional organizations, and individual countries. The creation of the EEAS had given the EU more capacity for coherent action in using its array of instruments more effectively. However, implementation continued to lag behind strategic planning.

The EU was keen to improve its early-warning and analysis capabilities and to alleviate bottlenecks in the EU decision-making structure. In early warning, the EEAS would work to integrate intelligence and information, leveraging NGOs, the new media, and social networking. That could be used to develop sophisticated conflict-analysis and -mapping techniques so as to better identify and anticipate potential conflict situations. The EEAS was also working to improve its ability to manage risk, factoring in the risk of inaction, and at the same time strengthening its mediation capabilities through training, knowledge management, and the development of diplomats' expertise that could be called upon in times of crisis.

In conclusion, with regard to co-operation between the EU and the OSCE, he welcomed the Chairmanship's efforts to enhance the OSCE's capabilities in early warning, mediation, and rehabilitation.

## **Discussion**

The discussions largely focused on two themes: the development of an OSCE early-warning and -response capacity, and the importance of resolving the protracted conflicts in the OSCE space. Responding to one panellist's recommendation, several delegations advocated the preservation of the consensus principle in OSCE actions, despite the risk that seeking consensus might slow down the Organization's ability to respond in times of crisis.

One delegation began the interventions by highlighting three themes in conflict resolution: the importance of leveraging the OSCE field missions in early warning; the desirability of rapid reaction, especially on the development of confidence-building measures that fostered dialogue across dividing lines; and the need to increase the role of women in peacebuilding.

The second delegation urged the participating States to consider how the OSCE could be more effective with regard to conflict resolution. It noted the need for the participating States to agree on a common set of principles according to which all OSCE conflict-prevention and -mitigation activities would be conducted, referring to a draft decision and food-for-thought paper that it had circulated in 2010. The peaceful settlement of existing conflicts must be based on political agreements between the sides, which must be seen as equals, supplemented by a number of instruments to reduce and manage tensions that might lead to violence.

The third delegation called for the strengthening of OSCE institutions throughout the conflict cycle, and urged the participating States to demonstrate their political will and

courage to use the full inventory of tools at their disposal, including for the settlement of protracted conflicts. It also called for additional attention to be paid to conflict prevention, *inter alia*, through strengthened mediation, increased use of civil society, strengthened instruments available to the Chairmanship and greater support for special representatives. It also recommended that the Conflict Prevention Centre develop a compilation of best practices in respect of post-conflict rehabilitation.

The fourth delegation expressed its support for the OSCE's focus on confidence-building measures (CBMs), including at the grass-roots level, but lamented the little progress that had occurred on existing protracted conflicts. It called for the resumption of the dialogue in the "5+2" format on Transdniestria and for the restoration of an OSCE presence in Georgia.

The fifth delegation noted that the OSCE had a special responsibility and expertise with respect to conflict resolution. Therefore, the Organization should have the necessary tools to intervene effectively. It welcomed the Chairmanship's initiative on the "V-to-V" dialogues. It urged the parties to show restraint in Nagorno-Karabakh, called for the resumption of OSCE activities in Georgia, and indicated that the Transdniestrian conflict could be resolved through political means. Finally, it supported the Chairmanship's intention to float a draft decision on the conflict cycle at the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius.

The sixth delegation highlighted the importance of mediation, and also reminded the participants that the OSCE should avoid duplicating the efforts of other multilateral organizations.

The seventh delegation stated that, in spite of its strong mandate, the OSCE's role in conflict resolution was often challenged in practice. It reminded the audience of the genesis of the Corfu Process and the unsuccessful attempts to establish a comprehensive road map that had taken place in 2010. It expressed a desire for the resumption of an OSCE presence in Georgia, calling attention to the HCNM and ODIHR report of 2008 on occupied regions, as well as the recent UN General Assembly resolution recognizing the right of return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Lastly, it expressed concern that the State sponsorship of terrorism from a neighbouring State represented a new threat in the OSCE space.

The eighth delegation suggested that the Transdniestrian conflict was often perceived as the "lowest hanging fruit" of protracted conflicts in the OSCE space. While successive Chairmanships had made its resolution a concrete deliverable, none had been successful. Optimism had waned, and delegations were currently focusing on the resumption of the formal "5+2" discussions. It reminded the participants of the focus on CBMs in 2009, which had included direct talks, and the inclusion of Transdniestria in the Moldovan territory within the EU context. The delegation welcomed the international community's increased focus on that conflict and urged the participating States to consider how to address what happened when one side blocked progress, even on dialogue.

The ninth delegation expressed strong support for Mr. Wright's statement on the activities of the EEAS. It regretted that, after two years of discussions in the context of the Corfu Process, delegations appeared to have exhausted their productivity. Meanwhile, the gap remained between early warning and early action, just as the status quo persisted in relation to the protracted conflicts. Substantive progress was heavily dependent upon political will;

without that will, advancing the conflict cycle would be little more than a bureaucratic exercise.

The tenth delegation suggested that a broad spectrum of views was necessary for effective OSCE action. There did not seem to be a place in peacekeeping for participating States that were not members of NATO, the CIS, or the CSTO. Furthermore, the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had undermined arms-control regimes, violated human rights, and prevented the full economic development of the territories affected. It recalled PC.DEL/412/10, a food-for-thought paper on CBMs. It condemned the use of force in conflict resolution and advocated the use of CBMs tailored to specific conflicts.

The eleventh delegation expressed the view that the OSCE could not be blamed for the failure to resolve protracted conflicts. It advocated the preservation of the consensus principle and also supported efforts to strengthen the OSCE's early-warning capacity. However, discussions in Vienna took place in a vacuum; the Organization should closely examine the shortcomings of such deliberations. It emphasized the possibility of finding political solutions to protracted conflicts, but reminded the audience that a strong political will was necessary for such solutions to be effective.

The twelfth delegation called for trust-building between the parties to a conflict through constructive interaction and engagement, as well as for a clear denunciation of war as an option in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It lamented the recalcitrance by some in the search for a solution to that conflict and expressed deep concern over the use by others of bellicose rhetoric.

The thirteenth delegation supported the strengthening of executive structures in early warning and early action, while noting that the situation would not be improved to the maximum extent without the generation of a political will to make full use of all the instruments and capacities available to the OSCE. Regarding the development of a systematic early-warning capacity in the OSCE structures, it suggested that the Conflict Prevention Centre should be mandated to develop and provide participating States with early-warning reports. In addition, the capacities of the executive bodies should be strengthened so that they could offer conflict-prevention and response options. It expressed support for the preservation of the consensus principle. Lastly, it recommended the creation of an *ad hoc* working group of experts from participating States and executive structures to facilitate a structured discussion on enhancing early-warning capacities and developing a more highly automated response mechanism.

## **Recommendations and suggestions**

1. The OSCE should seek better co-operation and interoperability with other multilateral organizations engaged in conflict response and peacekeeping. A council of international and regional organizations engaged in peacekeeping could be developed and the secretaries general of those organizations could convene in times of crisis to co-ordinate activities.
2. A new, more automatic mechanism for early warning and response is warranted. The OSCE should consider the benefits of the HCNM model to allow for rapid response while still respecting the principle of consensus. An emergency standby budget would allow for the expansion of field-mission activities in times of crisis.



3. The OSCE Secretariat and field missions need to develop a strong capacity for early warning and analysis, leveraging information from NGOs, social media networks, and open media sources. The OSCE's on-the-ground presence represents a comparative advantage in relation to early warning, which is critical to conflict prevention. Regular progress/regress reports would keep the international community apprised of developments and better prepare it to respond in the event of a crisis.

4. A guiding set of principles is needed to govern the conduct of all the OSCE's conflict-prevention and -response activities.

5. Delegations were reminded to consider the role of gender in the conflict cycle, and to leverage the strengths of women as community leaders in conflict prevention, resolution, and rehabilitation.

6. Post-conflict rehabilitation, sometimes overlooked, is an equally important step in resolving the underlying causes of conflicts and creating the conditions for a lasting peace. The Conflict Prevention Centre should develop a compendium of best practices on post-conflict rehabilitation to assist participating States, including on issues of economic development and social reconciliation.

7. Delegations were called upon to renew their focus on the resolution of protracted conflicts in advance of the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius.

8. There was widespread support for adoption of a decision by the Ministerial Council on strengthening the OSCE's role in the conflict cycle, which would seek to strengthen the Organization's early-warning capacities, improve its early action, enhance its dialogue-facilitation and mediation work, and consolidate its post-conflict rehabilitation activities.

9. It is essential that the political will and courage of the participating States should be strengthened and deepened, despite past and current difficulties, to make better use of the full inventory of the OSCE's existing toolbox, while respecting the principle of consensus, the need for a cross-dimensional approach and the requirement to co-ordinate and co-operate more closely with other international actors.

10. The restoration of the OSCE field presence in Georgia was looked upon as an important step towards reducing casualties in that conflict and seeking its resolution.

### **WORKING SESSION III: REVITALIZING, UPDATING AND MODERNIZING CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Keynote speakers: Ms. Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, State Department of the United States of America

Mr. Mikhail Uliyanov, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Moderator: Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE

Rapporteur: Mr. Sam Toporowski, United Kingdom Delegation to the OSCE

Discussions in this session stressed the importance of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to peace and stability in Europe. It was argued that the three main regimes, namely, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Vienna Document 1999 (VD 99) and the Treaty on Open Skies, needed urgent attention to ensure that they adequately met their original aims and maintained their relevance. It was suggested that the participating States' inability to overcome the various difficulties facing the instruments – be it lack of full function in the CFE, the difficulties over the agenda of the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), or the lack of substance in the update of VD 99 in advance of the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius pointed towards deep-rooted political disagreements. The session provided an opportunity to take stock of the OSCE area's security concerns, and to look at ways in which problems faced by the OSCE's security *acquis* might be addressed.

Assistant Secretary of State Gottemoeller began by reiterating the views of Secretary of State Clinton, stressing the interconnected nature of both European and United States security and prosperity. Enhancing European security remained a pillar of United States policy. She was concerned, however, that the arms control regimes that had served the shared security interests so well were beginning to fray. The CFE Treaty, VD 99 and the Open Skies Treaty were complementary mechanisms and all had to be fully operational if confidence and security in Europe were to be maintained into the future.

She highlighted the success of the Open Skies Treaty, but recognized that it was currently facing some serious challenges. The biggest of those was resources, including the commitment by the States parties to update aircraft and sensors. More urgent was the current impasse in the OSCC. She noted that every State Party had the right to put an issue on the agenda, but that all parties had to use that right with restraint. She hoped that a resolution to the impasse could be found urgently, before the issue began to erode successful implementation of the Treaty.

She welcomed the ongoing discussions on updating VD 99 and called for substantive updates. The United States had two goals: strengthening existing provisions and updating the document to reflect twenty-first century military realities. More specifically, the United States was interested in increasing the number of inspections and evaluations, enlarging teams and improving the quality of the information exchanged. The United States would work with partners to mitigate the resource implications of such updates. She stated clearly that the CFE Treaty and VD 99 were complementary and that the United States did not see one as replacing the other.

She stressed both the importance of the CFE Treaty to her country and its importance to European security. The United States and its allies were ready to return to negotiations if they received a signal that progress could be made. Although considerable progress had been made in the 'at 36' framework, more work was required to resolve outstanding issues, most notably host-nation consent and interim transparency measures. Multilateral arms-control arrangements could not and should not be expected to resolve bilateral issues. Those regimes must take account of existing security relationships, however, in order to provide confidence and transparency at the subregional level and in the larger grouping. The pause in negotiations should be used to give some thought to the current security architecture and to consider future needs and measures that would help achieve those security goals.

Mr. Uliyanov argued that the current situation appeared somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, progress was being made on updating VD 99, but on the other, negotiations on the CFE Treaty in the 'at 36' framework had stalled. In his view, that was the result of a failure to use existing formats, such as the Joint consultative Group (JCG), while trying to create new arrangements which had not provided the systematic approach required. Moreover, the approach adopted had attempted to resolve regional conflicts. He cited the stalling of the discussions in the 'at 36' framework, the Astana Summit Plan for Immediate Action on Arms Control and the blocking of the OSCE as examples where attempts to resolve regional situations had led to the failure of the said initiatives and, importantly, had failed to resolve the regional issues concerned.

He suggested three possible scenarios for future European arms control:

1. Take no action and let the various regimes collapse;
2. Adopt a similar approach to that of START: a return to negotiations without preconditions and a brief depoliticized framework as the basis for further negotiations;
3. States committed to a depoliticized approach to arms control could initiate a new process for a new agreement. That could be undertaken on the margins of the CFE Review Conference.

He argued that the first scenario was the most likely, but that with sufficient political will, the second or third was potentially possible. Work could commence immediately to brainstorm possibilities either in the JCG or in another forum. The Russian Delegation stood ready to engage. He argued that that was in keeping with Ms. Gottemoeller's suggestion that, during the pause in negotiations, consideration could be given to the aims for European arms control.

It was more likely that the participating States would be able to achieve technical updates to VD 99 in time for the Vilnius meeting of the Ministerial Council, rather than more substantive revisions. He drew a distinction between vertical measures, such as the lowering of thresholds, and horizontal measures, such as the inclusion of new elements, for example, naval forces, rapid-reaction forces (RRF) or information on military transit. Both deepening and broadening were compatible, but the latter had a greater impact on transparency. Proposals on Chapter III (Risk Reduction) could potentially strengthen an important, but under-powered mechanism. However, any decision on the deployment of extra inspections to an area of conflict would have to be subject to consensus so as to obviate its abuse.

The Russian Federation intended to reintroduce its proposal on a programme for further actions in the field of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. In that respect, Russia shared the opinion of the Chairmanship-in-Office that that proposal might garner agreement in Vilnius.

## **Discussion**

Following the keynote speakers' presentations, 22 delegations took the floor.

All the delegations that spoke stressed the importance that they attached to arms control and CSBMs for European security. They voiced their support for the principles and objectives of the CFE Treaty, VD 99 and the Open Skies Treaty. VD 99 and the CFE Treaty were complementary, but separate. Updates to VD 99 could not fill the gap left by the lack of progress on the CFE regime.

All the delegations that spoke agreed on the need to update VD 99 to reflect current military and technological realities. Many delegations applauded the progress that had been made in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on updating VD 99 following a 10-year stalemate, but noted that there was still much to be done. Most delegations wanted to lower the thresholds set out in Chapter V, and to look at ways to introduce into the Document a new provision on providing information below the thresholds. Some delegations were particularly interested in finding a way to adopt both the French and the Russian proposals that covered those provisions. Another delegation believed that it would be desirable to look at both Chapter V on thresholds and Chapter IX on inspections and evaluations, including team sizes and duration. Three delegations expressed an interest in broadening VD 99 to include new measures, for example, on rapid-reaction forces, transit and naval forces. A number of delegations acknowledged the need to consider cost implications, particularly for those participating States that had small military forces; the United Kingdom food-for-thought paper and draft decision were mentioned in that context.

Costs were not, however, at the forefront of every delegation's thinking. Two delegations agreed that the Vienna Document should have no grey zones (in a geographical sense), nor should any participating State have a claim to geographical privileges. There were different views on what the level of ambition should be with regard to updating VD 99 for the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting. Some delegations suggested that the OSCE should simply aim for a technical update, while others felt that the Organization should aim to be ambitious and look for substantive updates. All agreed, however, that any progress would be a step in the right direction. One delegation stressed the importance of gaining political support for ongoing updates from the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius.

One delegation expressed concern that the OSCE had failed to implement compliance in respect of the use of force and political independence that was enshrined in a number of the OSCE's documents. It believed that updates to VD 99 should be in line with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and that they did not prejudice the security of some States. The delegation argued that arms control could not be separated from political realities.

Many delegations expressed the hope that it would be possible to return to the CFE negotiations as soon as possible. Most felt that host nation consent and interim transparency measures were the stumbling blocks to progress. The strength of the CFE Treaty lay in its legally binding nature, and therefore any successor regime would also have to be legally binding. One delegation expressed concern that the current pause in negotiations should not become permanent. Some delegations underscored the role of the CFE Treaty in providing confidence and transparency at the subregional level despite the impasse in the discussions in the 'at 36' framework. One delegation believed that, if the CFE Treaty was lost, it was unlikely that it would prove possible to negotiate anything as comprehensive again. Another delegation said, along the same lines, that no State should be left behind – security should be inclusive.

A number of delegations were concerned at the impasse in relation to the OSCC. Delegations expressed their support for the Chair of the Commission and called upon the parties involved to find a way to resolve the issue so that the Commission could return to its work. Some expressed concern at the politicization of the OSCC, which was being hobbled by the introduction of an external issue that could not conceivably be resolved through the Treaty.

A small number of delegations expressed support for strengthening and increasing engagement with the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security as a useful CSBM.

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Uliyanov restated his suggestion regarding the holding of brainstorming sessions in Vienna. He expressed the view that the most appropriate approach would be one similar to the one adopted in respect of START, namely, the drafting of a short depoliticized document with no preconditions. He commended the progress that had been made on updating VD 99. Ms. Gottemoeller reiterated how important it was that the three main regimes should be fully functional. She noted the importance of a legally binding CFE Treaty and the role it played in subregional areas of tension. There should be three goals for the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting, namely, ensuring that important principles such as host-nation consent and transparency were upheld; finding ways to enhance the security of all the participating States; and considering practical issues such as resources.

## **Main findings and recommendations**

1. Good progress had been made in changing the mindset on updating VD 99. There were both different levels of ambition and different opinions as to how much progress would be made before the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius. Ideas for possible updates included Chapter V on thresholds, Chapter III on risk reduction and Chapter IX on inspections and evaluations, including team sizes and duration. Interest was expressed in broadening the Document to include new elements, such as information on rapid-reaction forces, transit and naval forces. Resource and funding implications were important and would need to be taken into account.

2. A strategic analysis of European security requirements was needed.
3. A way had to be found through the CFE impasse.
4. Delegations expressed disappointment with the current impasse in the OSCE and called upon the parties to resolve the issue before it undermined implementation of the Treaty.

## **APPENDICES**







**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/989  
17 March 2011

Original: ENGLISH

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**854th Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 854, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 989  
DATES OF THE 2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

The Permanent Council,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides that the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference will take place in Vienna from 29 June to 1 July 2011.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/996  
14 April 2011

Original: ENGLISH

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**859th Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 859, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 996  
AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2011  
ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (ASRC)**

The Permanent Council,

Recalling Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on the Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account its Decision No. 989 on the dates of the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides to organize the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference in accordance with the programme, agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annexes to this decision.

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## **2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Vienna, 29 June–1 July 2011

### **I. Programme**

#### **Wednesday, 29 June 2011**

3.15–5.45 p.m. Special session on the OSCE Partners for Co-operation

#### **Thursday, 30 June 2011**

10 a.m.–1 p.m. Opening session

3–6 p.m. Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges: strengthening the coherence of the OSCE response and interaction with other international actors

#### **Friday, 1 July 2011**

10 a.m.–12.30 p.m. Working session II: Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation: lessons learned and way ahead

3.15–5.45 p.m. Working session III: Revitalizing, updating and modernizing conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) regimes: Challenges and Opportunities

5.45–6.15 p.m. Closing session

### **II. Agenda**

#### **Special session on the OSCE Partners for Co-operation**

(29 June 2011, 3.15–5.45 p.m.)

This session will provide an opportunity for participants to focus, *inter alia*, on strengthening interaction with Partners for Co-operation, including Afghanistan, by exploring:

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- OSCE potential to contribute effectively to collective international efforts to promote stability and security in its adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia;
- Ways to improve co-operation with other international actors.

### **Opening session**

(30 June 2011, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.)

Under the overall theme of “Toward a security community: what has to be done”, the opening session will set the stage for the Conference by furthering the vision of a security community. Following a key-note address by a high-level guest, the opening session will provide an opportunity for participating States and other Conference participants to share their views in a wide and comprehensive forum by, *inter alia*, taking stock and reviewing progress after the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, addressing topical security challenges and looking to the future. Initiatives in the politico-military dimension that can lead to the strengthening of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, including the role of international and regional organizations, could be also considered.

### **Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges: strengthening the coherence of the OSCE response and interaction with other international actors**

(30 June 2011, 3–6 p.m.)

This session will offer the opportunity for participants to focus on, *inter alia*:

- Identifying a clear profile of OSCE contributions to international efforts to combat transnational threats in such areas as:
  - Police-related activities, including police development and reform;
  - Preventing and combating terrorism;
  - Border security and management;
  - Illegal migration;
  - Combating trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors;
  - Organized crime;
  - Cyber security;
  - Curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the context of implementation of UNSCR 1540.

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**Working session II: Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation: lessons learned and way ahead**

(1 July 2011, 10 a.m.–12.30 p.m.)

This session will offer the opportunity for participants to focus on, *inter alia*:

- Strengthening the OSCE’s role and effectiveness in:
  - Preventing and resolving conflicts;
  - Crisis management and mediation;
  - Post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation;
- Improving co-ordination with international actors throughout the conflict cycle.

**Working session III: Revitalizing, updating and modernizing conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) regimes: Challenges and Opportunities**

(1 July 2011, 3.15–5.45 p.m.)

This session will offer the opportunity for participants to focus on, *inter alia*:

- The evolving security environment and perspectives for a modern OSCE arms control framework and CSBMs:
  - Current state of arms control arrangements and CSBMs in the OSCE area;
  - The process and perspectives of updating the Vienna Document 1999;
  - Future role of arms control and CSBMs in strengthening security and building trust.

**Closing session**

(1 July 2011, 5.45 p.m.–6.15 p.m.)

The Chairperson will present a first perception of the Conference, including the recommendations made by Conference participants on advancing the security dialogue.

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## **ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Vienna, 29 June–1 July 2011

### **Background**

The Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, at Porto, by adopting its Decision No. 3, dated 7 December 2002, established the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States, to provide an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

### **Organization**

A representative of the Chairperson-in-Office will chair the opening and closing sessions. The Secretariat will issue a journal of the Conference.

Each working session will have one moderator and at least one rapporteur. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) will serve as co-ordinator for preparing the sessions.

The contribution of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) will be made in accordance with its procedures, mandate and competences. The FSC contribution to the ASRC includes the chairing of the third working session by a member of the FSC Troika or the Director of the CPC.

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the Conference. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (Permanent Council Decision No. 762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation from and into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at the opening, working and closing sessions.

The Chairmanship will co-ordinate the preparation of the ASRC with the FSC Chairperson and the OSCE Secretariat.

The Chairperson-in-Office will distribute a comprehensive report on the Conference before the summer recess.

The Press and Public Information Section (PPIS) will inform the press, as appropriate.

## **Participation**

The participating States are encouraged to be represented at a high level, by senior officials from capitals, responsible for security-related policy in the OSCE area.

The OSCE institutions will participate in the Conference, as will the Secretary General and the CPC. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Partners for Co-operation will be invited to participate.

The Chairmanship may also invite some heads of OSCE field operations to participate in the Conference. Consideration should be given to the possibility of inviting heads of field operations to be present as keynote speakers or moderators.

The international organizations that may be invited are the security-related organizations mentioned in Permanent Council Decision No. 951 of 29 July 2010.

Consideration is to be given to the possibility of inviting security-related scientific institutes, think tanks of international standing, and NGOs to send keynote speakers or to be represented as members of national delegations.

## **General guidelines for participants**

The work of the ASRC will be conducted in six sessions. The opening session is intended to provide an opportunity for formal statements to be delivered and to set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions at the working sessions. The opening session will include the welcoming remarks by the Chairperson-in-Office or his representative and the report by the FSC Chairperson. The Chairmanship will explore the possibility of inviting high-level special guest(s) to address the Conference.

The working sessions will concentrate on one topic, introduced by one or two keynote speakers, whose addresses may be followed by a discussion of relevant subtopics that are mentioned in the agenda.

The aim is an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

In order to reinforce the effectiveness of security activities across all three dimensions of the OSCE, it is expected that, at each of the sessions, the interfaces of security, and also the question of co-operation with other international organizations, will be addressed.

To promote interactive discussion, the formal statements at the opening session and the interventions at the working sessions should be as concise as possible and should not exceed five minutes in length. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility for engaging in discussion.

By 14 June 2011, the participants in the Conference should inform the OSCE Secretariat of the composition of their delegations to the ASRC, in response to the information circular regarding organizational aspects of the Conference which will be sent out by the OSCE Secretariat.

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By 20 June 2011, the participating States and other participants in the Conference are invited to submit any written contributions they may have, including those that contain reactions to the keynote speeches.

Written contributions should be submitted to the Conference Services, which will then distribute them. The information could also include contributions from OSCE institutions and other international organizations, if appropriate.

### **Guidelines for keynote speakers**

The contributions of the keynote speakers should be focused on the subject of the relevant session, thus setting the scene for the discussion at the sessions, and should stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities.

The maximum available speaking time is 20–25 minutes per keynote speaker.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session at which they are speaking, and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

To enable delegations to prepare themselves, keynote speakers should provide a written contribution and their biographical synopsis to the CPC by 14 June 2011. In their presentations, keynote speakers should touch on the highlights of their written contribution.

### **Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs**

The moderator chairs the session and should facilitate and focus the dialogue among delegations. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of the opening and working sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion.

The rapporteurs' written reports should address issues raised during the relevant sessions, and should cover problem areas, improvements, suggestions made at the session, and other relevant information.

Personal views shall not be advanced.

### **Guidelines for the participation of other international organizations**

International organizations may participate in all the sessions. They are invited to concentrate their contributions on aspects of co-operation with the OSCE within the scope of the relevant session.

International organizations should provide factual information, useful for the participants of the ASRC, to the Conference Services by 20 June 2011.