



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Conflict Prevention Centre**

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Address to the FSC

A possible role for the OSCE in addressing WMD proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

the issue of non-proliferation has gained increasing importance in the course of the last decade as a result of the transition to the post-Cold War order. In addition, the events of 11 September added a new dimension, with the awareness that there is a concrete risk that WMD may be used by terrorist groups. This has resulted in making WMD proliferation one of the most serious security threats facing the international community today.

In addressing a possible role for the OSCE in dealing with the risk of WMD proliferation I would propose taking a closer look at the following menu of activities:

- Exchange information on relevant proliferation-related issues in and around the OSCE area, including with regard to risks relating to terrorism.
 - Explore ways to strengthen the regional application of individual regimes through additional measures which could be adopted at the OSCE level.
 - Support implementation of non-proliferation regimes by participating States, e.g. through assistance in developing relevant legislation and institutional structures, including on export controls and physical security of sensitive materials.
 - Raise awareness of field missions for non-proliferation issues and encourage the further development of projects in the first dimension to address proliferation-related issues.
 - Develop or further operationalise co-operation with other international and regional organizations as well as with co-operation partners.
 - Address environmental issues related to WMD.
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I will now briefly expand on the different points of this menu looking separately at the various existing regimes. A basic guiding principle should be the need for us to avoid any duplication and to focus exclusively on those areas where our Organisation could provide an original and effective contribution. On the other hand, I may also point out that there are already quite a few activities going on in this field, and our discussion could also provide a good opportunity to try to rationalise and systematise them, ensuring the development of synergies with efforts underway elsewhere.

In general, I would point out that it would be useful to introduce a greater awareness for non-proliferation related developments in the FSC security dialogue. However, if we wanted to make this exchange properly focussed and significant, it would be worth exploring the possibility of holding periodic *ad hoc* meetings devoted to a focussed exchange of information and assessments, which would make such a dialogue more concrete and operational. The information would be focussed on developments in the OSCE area or in regions immediately adjacent to it and would refer to developments in all relevant substantive areas.

Looking more closely at individual regimes, I would then submit the following additional suggestions/options. They build on the Document on Principles and go in the direction of some practical initiatives in support of its implementation.

A. Nuclear non-proliferation

The immediate focus for us in this as well as in other areas should be a review and, as appropriate, a revision of the agreed „Principles governing non-proliferation“, so as to take into account recent developments and the new risks.

It would then be important to take a closer look at the state of their implementation. For instance, Comprehensive Safeguards agreements are not in force with all pS. Moreover, it might be worth exploring whether the community of the OSCE states would be able and willing to take on additional commitments on a regional basis, so as to spearhead and encourage efforts of the wider international community in the same direction, much as it has been done with the SALW document. An example could be the additional protocol on safeguards towards which the OSCE countries might decide to undertake a joint commitment

to expedite signature, ratification and implementation, and perhaps even to making the application of the Protocol a condition for nuclear supply; attached is a Chart showing the status of signature and entry into force of the Additional Protocol for OSCE pS, as well as the status of their CSAs. As the IAEA Director General has mentioned in his statement to the 47th IAEA General Conference, "without the conclusion of the required safeguards agreements, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about compliance by States with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. And without the additional protocol, the Agency can provide little to no assurances about the absence of undeclared material or activities."

Another example, as we have heard last week, could be the „Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources“, to which OSCE pS could also commit themselves as a way to endorse and support ongoing efforts by the IAEA in this field.

More attention could be also paid to the risks posed by Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) or 'dirty bombs' which use radioactive sources that are not really WMD. While the immediate consequences may not be so disastrous, they still have the potential of causing serious economic, social, and health problems, which has led to them being defined as 'weapons of mass disruption'.

Looking at activities by our field presences, no doubt there is scope for their continuing involvement both in raising awareness of non-proliferation issues (e.g. information about abandoned nuclear or radiological materials), and in projects which could have an impact on the proliferation risk (e.g. keeping the WMD proliferation risk in mind in the context of discussions on trafficking or of border management initiatives) or dealing with WMD-related issues in the environmental field (e.g. co-operation with the IAEA and other international organisations concerning the Mailii Suu nuclear waste dump site in Kyrgyzstan, and possible development of additional projects in this field).

B. Chemical weapons

Also in this area it is important for the OSCE to avoid duplications and, in particular, not to interfere in the ongoing work of OPCW. On the other hand, the attention of our missions could be drawn to issues related to ensuring that national legislation and export controls in this area are adequate. It is doubtful whether the OSCE could play any significant role with regard, for instance, to ongoing assistance activities intended to enable CWC parties (in particular, the Russian Federation) to help them meet their obligations under the Convention. On a different point, in the field of chemical weapons there are large potential environmental

problems which are outside the immediate focus of the activities of OPCW – in fact it is reckoned that the amount of abandoned chemical weapons in the OSCE area or in its immediate vicinity is very significant and for a number of reasons the level of attention of the OSCE to this problem has been totally insufficient. This is an example of an area where the OSCE, together with other regional organizations, could seek to develop an integrated approach to address aspects of this very serious challenge.

C. Biological weapons

With regard to biological weapons, beyond the reconfirmation of the commitment of participating States to the BWC, it might be conceivable that initiatives at the OSCE level could be developed with an aim to:

- strengthening BWC implementation at the domestic level;
- promoting improvement in the control of illnesses and the mechanisms of sending teams of experts to fight illnesses;
- promoting the creation of reliable national mechanisms for the control of safety and the genetic engineering of pathogenic organisms;
- ensuring responsibility in every aspect of dealing with pathogenic organisms.

These steps, combined with a periodic exchange of information on their implementation and on developments in the BW area, could help promote fuller implementation of the BWC at a regional level and may provide a useful tool to strengthening the Convention, including in particular with respect to possible WMD-related terrorist activities.

Finally, OSCE should express support of efforts aimed at enhancing transparency and compliance with the Convention.

D. Missile proliferation

Albeit not technically a WMD proliferation issue, delivery vehicles are *de facto* multipliers of any WMD threat. Accordingly, it would be useful to devote attention to this issue, at least in terms of an exchange of relevant information on current developments. Also in this area, missions could be encouraged to continue and further develop activities of assistance to

participating States in controlling and dismantling abandoned vehicles and fuel (e.g. projects under way in Georgia to eliminate rocket fuel).

All participating States should commit themselves to acceding to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, designed to ensure greater transparency on the development and testing of these powerful weapons and requiring signatory states to prepare an annual report on their programs and to signal any upcoming weapons tests.

E. Export controls

The ever increasing degree of globalization of the economy is making export controls ever more complex, both because of the geographical spread of the production of dual use technology items, and as a consequence of the uneven framework of participation in each of the 3 main WMD related regimes (NSG, Australia Group, MTCR) and of the Wassenaar Arrangement. While it would be desirable to achieve a higher degree of coherence in the operation of these regimes, there does not appear to be an immediate role for the OSCE to play in this regard. However, exchanges of information, including on countries or terrorist organizations which should be targeted in terms of export controls in view of the potential risk of security they pose, could be useful. In addition, assistance by missions to participating States in further developing their export control legislation could be encouraged, regardless of the position of individual countries vis-à-vis the various regimes.

A good example in this regard is the work of our Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina which, together with SFOR and the OHR, has provided expertise for the drafting of a State Law on Arms Exports (adopted by the Parliament in February 2003), for the elaboration of relevant by-laws and the preparation of a State Law on arms production and trade, which was adopted in summer 2003. These laws have for the first time established clear criteria for exports, supporting existing international obligations and embargoes, and have made illegal arms imports and exports a serious criminal offence punishable by long prison terms. They have eliminated a grey area where arms had hitherto been imported and exported without appropriate regulatory mechanisms, thus providing a significant hedge against problematic trade in conventional weapons and small and light weapons, as well as other military equipment.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words on the issue of co-operation with other international and regional organisations. Non-proliferation issues appear with increasing

frequency on the agenda of our regular staff consultations, and this should be used to avoid duplications and maximise synergies. As an example, our recent consultations with the IAEA Secretariat allowed us to exchange information on our respective activities and identify areas of common interest. Issues like the IAEA “Code of Conduct”, or the need of strengthening border controls to avoid illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological materials, were identified in that context. On the latter point, we will explore the feasibility of involving IAEA representatives in future programmes, including those initiated by CPC, the SPMU and/or field missions, devoted to strengthening border management/security. Similar initiatives could be undertaken with other international partners with respect to chemical/biological agents.

In addition, in the context of possible periodic information exchanges in the FSC framework on WMD-related issues, representatives of the IAEA or other organisations active in the non-proliferation area could be invited to contribute. Special sessions could also be organised with our Partners for Co-operation to broaden the scope of these exchanges.

Mr. Chairman,

I have set out a possible menu of options which the OSCE might consider as suggestions for initiatives in the area of non-proliferation in the future. This menu is merely illustrative and many other suggestions could be added to it. My recommendation to you and to the participating States is that if, as a result of initial discussions on proliferation in the FSC, there is a sense that it may be worth exploring in more detail an enhanced role for the OSCE in addressing proliferation, we should organize in the near future a seminar open to participation of non-proliferation experts from capitals. This could be used, as we did with the SALW Seminar back in spring 2000, to charter, fine-tune and better define a course of action for this organization based on expert advice and minimizing the risk that we may duplicate or even interfere in activities going on elsewhere.

Safeguards Current Status for OSCE Member States (as of 30 September 2003)

Among 55 members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):

There are **4** States with which Comprehensive Safeguards agreements have been signed but are not yet in force:

Andorra Kyrgyzstan Moldova Tajikistan

There is **1** State with which CSA pursuant to the NPT have yet to be concluded:

Turkmenistan.

There are **25** States with which Additional Protocols have been signed but are not yet in force:

Andorra	Armenia	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	Estonia
Finland	France	Germany	Greece		Ireland
Italy	Luxembourg	Malta	Netherlands		Portugal
Russian Fed.	Slovak Rep.	Spain	Sweden		Switzerland
Tajikistan	Ukraine	United Kingdom	United States		

There is **1** State whose Additional Protocol has been approved by the Board but is yet to be signed:

Kazakhstan

There are **19** States with which Additional Protocols have been signed and entered into force:

Azerbaijan	Bulgaria	Canada	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic		Georgia	Holy See	Hungary
Iceland	Latvia	Lithuania	Monaco	Norway
Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Turkey	Uzbekistan

**Safeguards Current Status for OSCE Member States
(as of 30 September 2003)**

State	Status of Safeguards Agreement(s)	INFCIRC	Additional Protocol Status
Albania	In force: 28 November 2002	359/Mod.1	
<i>Andorra</i>	<i>Signed: 9 January 2001</i>		Signed: 9 January 2001
Armenia	In force: 5 May 1994	455	Signed: 29 September 1997
Austria	Accession: 31 July 1996	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Azerbaijan	In force: 29 April 1999	580	In force: 29 November 2000
Belarus	In force: 2 August 1995	495	
Belgium	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Bosnia and Herzegovina	In force: 28 December 1973	204	
Bulgaria	In force: 29 February 1972	178	In force: 10 October 2000
Canada	In force: 21 February 1972	164	In force: 8 September 2000
Croatia	In force: 19 January 1995	463	In force: 6 July 2000
Cyprus	In force: 26 January 1973	189	In force: 19 February 2003
Czech Republic	In force: 11 September 1997	541	In force: 1 July 2002
Denmark	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Estonia	In force: 24 November 1997	547	Signed: 13 April 2000
Finland	Accession: 1 October 1995	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
France	In force: 12 September 1981 Signed: 26 September 2000	290*	<u>Signed: 22 September 1998</u>
Georgia	<u>In force: 3 June 2003</u>		<u>In force: 3 June 2003</u>
Germany	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Greece	Accession: 17 December 1981	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Holy See	In force: 1 August 1972	187	In force: 24 September 1998
Hungary	In force: 30 March 1972	174	In force: 4 April 2000
Iceland	In force: 16 October 1974	215	In force: 12 September 2003
Ireland	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Italy	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Kazakhstan	In force: 11 August 1995	504	Approved: 18 June 2003
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	<i>Signed: 18 March 1998</i>		
Latvia	In force: 21 December 1993	434	In force: 12 July 2001
Liechtenstein	In force: 4 October 1979	275	
Lithuania	In force: 15 October 1992	413	In force: 5 July 2000
Luxembourg	In force: 21 February 1977	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Malta	In force: 13 November 1990	387	Signed: 24 April 2003
<i>Moldova, Republic of</i>	<i>Signed: 14 June 1996</i>		
Monaco	In force: 13 June 1996	524	In force: 30 September 1999
Netherlands	In force: 5 June 1975 In force: 21 February 1977	229 193*	Signed: 22 September 1998
Norway	In force: 1 March 1972	177	In force: 16 May 2000
Poland	In force: 11 October 1972	179	In force: 5 May 2000
Portugal	Accession: 1 July 1986	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Romania	In force: 27 October 1972	180	In force: 7 July 2000
Russian Federation	In force: 10 June 1985	327*	Signed: 22 March 2000
San Marino	In force: 21 September 1998	575	
Serbia and Montenegro	In force: 28 December 1973	204	
Slovakia	In force: 3 March 1972	173	Signed: 27 September 1999
Slovenia	In force: 1 August 1997	538	In force: 22 August 2000
Spain	Accession: 5 April 1989	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Sweden	Accession: 1 June 1995	193	Signed: 22 September 1998
Switzerland	In force: 6 September 1978	264	Signed: 16 June 2000

State	Status of Safeguards Agreement(s)	INFCIRC	Additional Protocol Status
Tajikistan	Signed: 7 July 2003		Signed: 7 July 2003
The Former Yugoslav Rep. Of Macedonia	In force: 16 April 2002	610	
Turkey	In force: 1 September 1981	295	In force: 17 July 2001
<i>Turkmenistan</i>			
Ukraine	In force: 22 January 1998	550	Signed: 15 August 2000
United Kingdom	In force: 14 December 1972	175	
	In force: 14 August 1978	263*	Signed: 22 September 1998
	Approved: 16 September 1992		
<i>United States of America</i>	<i>In force: 9 December 1980</i>	288*	<i>Signed: 12 June 1998</i>
	<i>In force: 6 April 1989</i>	366	
Uzbekistan	In force: 8 October 1994	508	In force: 21 December 1998

Key	
States:	States not party to the NPT whose safeguards agreements are of INFCIRC/66-type.
<i>States:</i>	States which are party to the NPT but have not concluded a safeguards agreement pursuant to that Treaty; the safeguards agreements referred to are comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT unless otherwise indicated.
*	Voluntary offer safeguards agreement.