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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
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
KEA-2003-248

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to all Delegations/Missions of the OSCE Participating States, the Secretariat of the OSCE, Partners for Cooperation in Asia and Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to the OSCE and, with reference to the former's Note KEA-2003-181 dated 20 August 2003, has the honour to forward to the latter a copy of the Consolidated Summary of the OSCE-IFANS/MOFAT Workshop on "Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia Revisited", which was held on 22-23 September 2003 in Seoul.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Delegations/Missions of the OSCE Participating States, the Secretariat of the OSCE, Partners for Cooperation in Asia and Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to the OSCE the assurances of its highest consideration.

Encl.: as stated

Vienna, 6 November 2003



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**The Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe**



**The Institute of
Foreign Affairs and National Security**

OSCE-IFANS/MOFAT Workshop

**'Applicability of OSCE CSBMs
in Northeast Asia *Revisited*'**

*22-23 September 2003
Orchid Room (2nd Floor), The Westin Chosun Hotel
Seoul, Korea*

Consolidated Summary

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I. Programme

Sunday, 21 September 2003

- 17:30-18:30 Registration
“Rose Room”, The Westin Chosun Hotel (2nd Floor)
- 18:30-20:30 Reception hosted by Ambassador Young-jin Choi, *Chancellor of the IFANS*
“Violet & Cosmos Room”, The Westin Chosun Hotel (2nd Floor)

Monday, 22 September 2003

- 08:30-09:30 Registration and coffee
In front of “Orchid Room”, The Westin Chosun Hotel
- 09:30-10:00 **Opening Session**
- Opening remarks:**
Ambassador **Young-jin Choi**, *Chancellor of the IFANS*
Ambassador **Ján Kubiš**, *Secretary General of the OSCE*
Ambassador **Francisco Seixas da Costa**, *Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE; Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia*
- 10:00-12:00 **Session 1: Recent developments and achievements of the OSCE—Political dialogue and operational activities**
- Moderator: Ambassador **Francisco Seixas da Costa**, *Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE; Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia*
- Rapporteur: Ms. **Elizabeth Abela**, *Senior External Co-operation Officer, OSCE Secretariat*
- Presentation: Ambassador Dr. **Dieter Boden**, *Head of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE – 'OSCE--Conceptual Approach, Achievements and Further Perspective: A German View'*
- Discussion
- 12:00-13:00 Buffet luncheon, The Westin Chosun Hotel

13:15-15:15

Session 2: Validity and applicability of OSCE experiences in Northeast Asia—Challenges and opportunities

Moderator: Ambassador **Francisco Seixas da Costa**, *Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE; Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia*

Rapporteur: Ms. **Elizabeth Abela**, *Senior External Co-operation Officer, OSCE Secretariat*

Presentation: Mr. **Jean-Marc Journot**, *Brigadier General (Air Force); Senior Military Adviser at the French Mission to the OSCE: 'Validity and Applicability of OSCE Experiences in North-East Asia Challenges and Opportunities'*

Dr. Yuri Kryvonos, *Senior FSC Support Officer, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat: 'OSCE Regime of CSBMs: Is It Applicable?'*

Discussion

15:15-15:30

Coffee break

15:30-17:30

Session 3 : Application of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula (1) — Problems and obstacles

Moderator: Ambassador **Young-jin Choi**, *Chancellor of the IFANS*

Rapporteur: Dr. **Seo-hang Lee**, *Professor, IFANS*

Presentation: Dr. **Kang Choi**, *Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defence Analyses*

Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, *School of International Public Policy, Osaka University: 'Continuity, Reciprocity, and Transparency: Towards a Sustainable Six Party CSBMs in Northeast Asia'*

Discussion

19:00-21:00

Dinner at The Westin Chosun Hotel

Feature speech: 'Prospects for North Korean Nuclear Questions,' by Ambassador Kyung-Won Kim, *President of the Institute of Social Sciences*

Tuesday, 23 September 2003

09:30-11:30 **Session 4 : Application of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula (2)**
— Tasks for implementation

Moderator: Ambassador **Young-jin Choi**, *Chancellor of the IFANS*

Rapporteur: Dr. **Jae-seung Lee**, *Professor, IFANS*

Presentation: Dr. **Sung-han Kim**, *Professor, IFANS: 'North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Issues and Prospects'*

Discussion

12:00-13:30 Luncheon at the “Violet & Cosmos Room”, The Westin Chosun Hotel (2nd Floor)

Luncheon Speech: *'The Relevance of European Integration for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia'* by Ambassador Dorian F. Prince, *Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Korea*, on behalf of Mr. Guenther Verheugen, *Commissioner for Enlargement, European Commission*

14:30-14:45 Coffee break

14:45-16:45 **Wrap-up of the Workshop**

Moderators: Ambassador **Young-jin Choi**, *Chancellor of the IFANS*

Ambassador **Francisco Seixas da Costa**, *Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE; Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia*

Reports by session rapporteurs

Sessions 1 and 2:

Ms. **Elizabeth Abela**, *Senior External Co-operation Officer, OSCE Secretariat*

Sessions 3 and 4:

Dr. **Seo-hang Lee**, *Professor, IFANS*

Dr. **Jae-seung Lee**, *Professor, IFANS*

Discussion

18:00-20:00 Dinner at the Korea House

Wednesday, 24 September 2003

07:10-13:00

Optional tour to the Panmunjom/Dorasan Station (the northernmost railway station in the South)

II. Reports by session rapporteurs

Opening session

Report by Elizabeth Abela, OSCE Secretariat

Ambassador Young-jin Choi, Chancellor of the IFANS, welcomed all the participants in the Workshop on the Applicability of OSCE confidence- and security- building measures (CSBMs) in Northeast Asia revisited. He pointed out that an OSCE-Korea Conference on a similar subject had been held in March 2001 in Seoul. Briefly comparing the two regions, he stated that Europe had myriads of institutions such as the OSCE, NATO, and the European Union (which furthermore was expanding), while Northeast Asia had promising prospects for multilateral relations, but, at the same time, was a region full of uncertainty.

The Inter-Korean Summit had awakened great expectations, and although there was mutual engagement and the first steps in confidence-building had been taken, traditional inter-Korean problems were still looming. The six-party talks that had commenced in August 2003 were very promising for the future, and could be compared to the Helsinki process.

In that context, Ambassador Young-jin Choi posed the question to the participants in the Workshop whether it was possible to proceed with a kind of Helsinki process for Northeast Asia without having passed through the phase of *Ostpolitik*, given a situation where North Korea did not recognize the *status quo*. Furthermore, he asked whether confidence-building measures could be launched in the Korean peninsula, despite the prevailing circumstances.

Ambassador Ján Kubiš, Secretary General of the OSCE, stated that the Workshop was timely against the backdrop of the current situation in Northeast Asia, and the recent promising six-party talks. He noted with interest the 'Peace and Prosperity Policy' of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which, inter alia, was expected to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula by helping to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem peacefully, together with the international community, and to contribute to peace, co-operation and common prosperity in Northeast Asia as a whole. The OSCE was prepared to share its expertise and to provide insight into current developments, in particular, in the politico-military area of its work, which was not only limited to CSBMs as set out in the Vienna Document 1999. A wide range of other documents and decisions, such as the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, Principles Governing Non-Proliferation or the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, covered a variety of security problems.

In highlighting the OSCE's co-operative and comprehensive approach to security, he stated that the OSCE participating States were committed to further improving and enhancing existing tools as well as considering additional ones, taking into account the changing character of current conflicts. The task of preventing and combating terrorism was high on the OSCE's agenda. New questions that were being addressed included preventing terrorists' access to MANPADS and weapons of mass destruction, as well as eliminating security risks arising from ammunition and explosives for use in conventional armaments in surplus or awaiting destruction. A bigger role for the OSCE in improving border security and reforms of policing and combating transnational crime was also under consideration.

In speaking about relations with the Partners for Co-operation, he welcomed the closer involvement of the Partners in various OSCE activities, and underscored, for example, that the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) was looking forward to a presentation on Korean defence policy, thus contributing to the process of increased transparency that reached beyond the OSCE area. The OSCE and its Secretariat stood ready to continue supporting efforts for enhanced dialogue and co-operation with the Partner States.

Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE, and Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia, commenced by welcoming the strengthening of co-operation with the Asian Partners as a result of the establishment in 2003 of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia. That had facilitated the sharing of mutual concerns and experiences. In 2003, Afghanistan had also been welcomed as an Asian Partner. He elaborated on the concept of CBMs and highlighted the universality of some European CSBMs and their possible applicability in different regions of the world.

He stressed that experience in international relations had demonstrated that a starting point for a confidence-building process was evident, once States agreed on the fact that the benefits of peaceful and co-operative measures outweighed the costs of confrontation, conflict and mistrust. In that regard, the OSCE's effectiveness in promoting peace and stability could be an example of paramount importance. While CSBMs had a great potential, they also had limitations. During negotiations, CSBMs were a factor in a broad process for the harmonization of inter-State relations rather than a solution for all international security problems. CSBMs were worthwhile if designed to serve broader objectives of security and the well-being of society, the main goal being co-operative security.

To guarantee the political framework when considering CSBMs, negotiating partners should agree on a set of broader political commitments. Bearing in mind different stages of State formation, different political cultures and outlooks, it was important to adopt a phased approach on subregional and bilateral agreements in order to avoid the risk of misunderstanding and misconceptions. Finally, the implementation itself of agreed CSBMs was the cornerstone for success. The elaboration of a CSBM regime required taking into consideration the peculiarities of a given region and the countries involved.

Session 1 : Recent developments and achievements of the OSCE – Political dialogue and operational activities

Report by Elizabeth Abela, OSCE Secretariat

Ambassador Dr. Dieter Boden, Head of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE, introduced the first session by focusing on the subject: *The OSCE-conceptual approach, achievements and further perspectives: a German view*. OSCE policy, he argued, was based on the German *Ostpolitik*, a derivative of the past East-West confrontation. At the time, an indispensable initial step had been the agreement on the renunciation of force in an era when huge nuclear arsenals existed on both sides and politics followed military logic. The long-term objective had been to overcome the political *status quo* through peaceful change. *Ostpolitik* had led to the Moscow Treaty of 1970, followed shortly afterwards by the *Grundlagenvertrag* between the two German States. The OSCE's three-basket approach, adopted in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, based on the bilateral German concept, had led to a multilateral Euro-Atlantic policy of détente. The momentous changes in Europe, which had witnessed the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, had also been based on peaceful change. In discussing whether the OSCE had served its purpose after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he hastened to underscore that the Organization had fulfilled a number of important tasks that had helped to stabilize a new political order.

In the 1990s, the OSCE had successfully created a set of tools for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. It also had 18 field missions, which were operating in particular in Southeast Europe and the former Soviet Union countries. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), among other OSCE institutions (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media), was playing a leading role. The OSCE's broad *acquis* in the politico-military field among other comparative advantages was a unique system of disarmament, arms-control and confidence-building measures.

In the wake of new threats and challenges to security, the OSCE had responded resolutely, in close co-operation with other international actors, in particular the UN. Terrorism continued to be a key challenge to international peace and stability. Special attention was being devoted to capacity-building, as well as to addressing the challenge of implementing effective measures against terrorism, in full accordance with the rule of law, human rights standards and international law.

In the new millennium, Ambassador Boden argued, the OSCE had an important role to play, as no single State or organization was able, alone to meet risks and challenges to security. A well co-ordinated effort by all the relevant international organizations was required, as laid down in the Platform for Co-operative Security (in the Charter for European Security adopted at OSCE's Summit in 1999 in Istanbul).

Referring to relations with the Partner States in the Mediterranean and in East and Southeast Asia, he stated that it was pertinent for the OSCE to 'look beyond its fences' and engage in meaningful co-operation with interested partners outside its area of activity. Consideration could be given to transferring certain principles, norms and measures, for example in the field of confidence-building, though not in the form of a mechanical transfer of experience. He recalled that, during the Annual Security Review Conference, a proposal had been put forward to promote the Code of Conduct beyond the OSCE region.

Key points in the discussion

In addition to questions about a step-by-step approach and the input by the major powers (the USA and, at that time the Soviet Union) that had led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act - the OSCE's founding document - a strong interest was expressed in the prevailing political conditions, including in the politico-military and economic areas.

After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE had proven to be resilient and adaptable, as a result of established institutions and field activities. In that context, questions were raised regarding the non-legally binding nature of OSCE commitments and possibilities for enforcing compliance when governments failed to fulfil those commitments.

In response, it was stated that the question of legality versus commitment was part of a long-standing debate at the OSCE. Several decades of dialogue had led to a solid understanding regarding participating States' expectation of compliance with the principles and commitments. That was also relevant for the implementation of CSBMs under the Vienna Document 1999.

The OSCE, in developing its norms, principles and commitments, had also established a series of review mechanisms that amounted to a 'peer review'. Although intrusive by nature, the mechanisms were not regarded as interference in internal affairs. For example, participating States were clearly addressed in the entire OSCE region, inter alia, in plenary meetings, and challenged to provide replies and clarification regarding a number of matters.

The strength of the Organization's commitments went considerably beyond actual obligations under international law. For example, the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons went much further than what would have been achieved in a legally binding document. Consensus-building was a political process. The wide range of documents that had been adopted was exemplary.

An essential ingredient of the comprehensive approach to security was that all the participating States were equal, thus affording possibilities for genuine co-operation. The advantage of the OSCE's regional approach was illustrated. A characteristic of the process was the potential for exploiting common and shared interests, as well as a common set of norms, principles and commitments.

The point was made that there was a lack of knowledge about the OSCE in Asia. In reply to a question by a Member State of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the development of possible contacts with the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), it was stated that the OSCE, in its 2001 Ministerial Council decision on combating terrorism, under the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, had called upon the participating States and the Secretariat to broaden dialogue with partners outside the OSCE area. Further developments in co-operation depended on mutual discussions and efforts between the OSCE and such regional organizations.

The SCO was invited to various OSCE activities. In that context, reference was made to the participation of the SCO in an OSCE meeting with regional and subregional organizations and initiatives on preventing and combating terrorism (held on 6 September 2002).

One of the central messages that emerged in discussions of the first session was that the OSCE should become more relevant and actively engaged in reaching out beyond its area as well as sharing its experiences with other regions.

Session 2 : Validity and applicability of OSCE experiences in Northeast Asia — Challenges and opportunities

Report by Elizabeth Abela, OSCE Secretariat

Mr. Jean-Marc Journot, Brigadier General, Senior Military Adviser at the French Permanent Mission to the OSCE, commenced by stating that problems such as those in the Korean peninsula had a direct impact on European interests. Some decades ago, in Europe, in dealing with problems that to a certain extent were similar to those faced in Northeast Asia today, confidence had been agreed upon as a prerequisite to any further improvement in relations.

Developing confidence measures at the regional and subregional levels helped to alleviate regional tensions. Any measure aimed at increasing transparency in the military sphere constituted an essential element of progress towards limitation of armaments at the global and regional levels. 'Light' measures such as exchanges of information on military budgets and doctrines had proven to be very effective in instilling confidence. The speaker cited an aspect of the report on the OSCE-Korea Conference held in 2001 that was reiterated by participants throughout the discussions in the Workshop, namely, 'The content and structure of an indigenous confidence- building measures regime, with its institutional mechanisms, of co-operation and dialogue, could only be developed by the interested parties and could not be directly imported'.

The principles of the UN Charter had always inspired the OSCE process and they still inspired its development. That was why, logically speaking, the principles of the OSCE process could serve as a source of inspiration in confidence-building and disarmament for other regions. In speaking about the peculiarities of the European and Asian regions, Brigadier General Journot said that, while in the European context, bloc-to-bloc confrontation had had the 'advantage of simplicity', the current situation in Asia was characterized by a number of different actors, each playing its own role on the regional stage. Furthermore, both regions had their own history.

Nuclear disarmament would make no progress if not paralleled by similar progress in conventional disarmament. Confidence-building, an area in which the OSCE undoubtedly had the greatest experience, was also a prerequisite to conventional disarmament. The OSCE confidence- building measures had opened the way for an unprecedented disarmament process at the regional level. The OSCE was continuing to develop measures, at the regional level by taking part in the elaboration of universal measures such as the UN Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). In that context, it had developed good practice guides on the fight against the dissemination of SALW.

The North Korean nuclear programme (which constituted a threat to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime), a subject that required urgent attention, was considered to be not only a regional but also a global challenge. Brigadier General Journot discussed possibilities for initiating a multilateral dialogue on security and confidence- and trust-building issues in Northeast Asia. The multilateral approach had been implemented through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), now paralleled by the intensification of the inter-Korean dialogue and the six-party talks. A unilateral approach to confidence was encouraged, as unilateral measures of disarmament were often a starting point for successful bilateral and multilateral processes. Unilateral and bilateral agreements were conducive to inter-State co-operation in reaching multilateral agreements on the same basis of confidence

and reciprocity. It was important to involve civil society and the younger generation in mutual understanding, confidence-building and disarmament processes. Visits and contacts between military units were also very significant.

He suggested that in the Asian context, a first step might consist in the implementation of measures that were not legally binding. As far as arms control was concerned, a unilateral undertaking of restraint was easy to institute. A confidence-building process could be started which would then allow further improvements in relations based on reciprocity. Such a development could take place in the form of a simple, light and formal bilateral agreement on reciprocal inspections. Verification and confidence were inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

An offer was made by the French representative to welcome, in the bilateral context, an exchange of military delegations with the Partners for Co-operation. In addition, France was ready to send experts from its national verification unit.

In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of the OSCE's relations with the Partners for Co-operation. It would be in the mutual interests of the OSCE and the Partner States if the latter would more closely follow the work carried out by the OSCE in Vienna.

Dr. Yurii Kryvonos, Senior FSC Support Officer, Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE Secretariat, commenced by citing the German philosopher Karl Jaspers: 'Peace never comes through co-existence, only through co-operation.' All efforts to conclude arms-control and disarmament agreements within the CSCE/OSCE process, and agreement on politico-military CSBMs were rooted in the participating States' obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations. That had been one of the ten basic principles guiding international relations between the CSCE participating States incorporated into the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. He aptly brought out that the Vienna Document 1999 contained the most comprehensive set of mutually complementary confidence- and security- building measures (CSBMs), which shaped relations between the OSCE participating States in the politico-military sphere of security. The areas of regulation comprised transparency measures, a verification regime, mechanisms for consultation, military contacts and, finally, military co-operation. That applied to the entire OSCE area of application as well as to bilateral or subregional relations. The CSBM package had been gradually expanded over a period of more than 25 years.

On the Korean peninsula, it would be premature to initiate a discussion on establishing regimes for exchanges of military information or for compliance and verification. He proposed that it would be more effective and productive to start with measures aimed at providing information regarding countries' intentions in the military sphere. In that context, he highlighted Chapter III of the Vienna Document 1999, on risk reduction, which set forth three mechanisms aimed at decreasing risks to security and crises preventing in the case of concerns relating to the employment of armed forces, namely, a mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities, voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concern about military activities, and co-operation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature.

He also described in detail other measures that dealt with preventing crises, such as the prior notification of certain military activities and annual calendars. The OSCE Communication Network, that was itself regarded as a CSBM, had been established in 1992 for the transmission of notifications in accordance with the Vienna Document 1999, the CFE Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies. With reference to the OSCE Programme of Military Contacts, he also emphasized the importance of exchanges of military delegations at all levels, including representatives from military colleges or sports teams, voluntary invitations for the

observation of certain military activities, and joint military exercises, as they provided the opportunity for the better understanding and alleviation of mistrust between military personnel.

Based on the OSCE concept of the indivisibility of security, regional CSBMs (a chapter on regional measures was included in the Vienna Document 1999) complemented existing mechanisms. The Vienna Document was not a panacea for solving all security-related problems, but was one element in the common system of politically and legally binding standards and regulations in the field of military and security policy in the OSCE area.

Key points in the discussion

Participants recognized the challenge of launching a multilateral process and dialogue in an ongoing complex situation. The question was raised about how one could promote regional security co-operation in a situation when a country was reluctant or not available to participate in such a framework, in addition to finding the optimum moment to institute such a process. It was difficult to foresee when a breakthrough would take place.

One of the key arguments was that the States concerned should identify common values as a starting point. The next step would be to establish negotiations to include economic prosperity and development issues. So far, North Korea had refused to participate in Track One, and only took part in Track Two discussions. If North Korea would recognize the *status quo*, then CSBMs were bound to be a next step. Currently, the six-party talks remained limited to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue.

The point was raised that all the countries in the area were ready to embark on multilateral relations. In discussing ways on breaking out of the existing impasse, it was proposed that like-minded States should initiate a multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia, not by leaving North Korea out of such a process, but by considering 'attractive conditions', whereby North Korea would be induced to join in when it felt that that was appropriate. Once a process was in existence, it could be exploited further by introducing sub-regional frameworks. The Dayton Peace Agreement was referred to as an example.

The OSCE embodied a system of values (in that context, the human dimension commitments of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document were referred to). The question was raised as to whether it was possible to envisage co-operation among States that did not share a common system of values. It was argued that the politico-military system did not necessarily have to be interconnected with a system of values, and therefore, most CSBMs could be studied independently and from a technical point of view (apart from the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security).

Furthermore, reference was made to the advantages of possible co-operation through the introduction of subregional CSBMs, or perhaps, 'tension-reduction measures' in the areas of environment, fishing or search and rescue at sea. Once such measures had come to be perceived as non-threatening, it might be easier for other States to join in. Other participants added that there was a need for a minimum common understanding as a basis for confidence-building and the reaching of an agreement. It was argued that disarmament should follow confidence.

One of the OSCE Partners for Co-operation stated that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was a venue for multilateral dialogue that was based, *inter alia*, on the principles of consensus and non-interference. Member States were expected to move beyond the stage of CSBMs to

conflict resolution. Furthermore, the ARF was focusing on CSBMs, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, arms-control and SALW, as well as encouraging networking among military officials. Defence white papers had also been published. Therefore, mechanisms were already in place. A next important step would be participation by North Korea.

The Treaty on Open Skies was also mentioned as an example of a confidence-building measure which provided for aerial observation between two countries on the basis of reciprocity in bilateral relations. The significance of participating in an ongoing dialogue was mentioned. It was underscored that the intention to forge ahead with dialogue did not threaten the dialogue itself.

Session 3: Application of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula (1) — Problems and obstacles

Report by Professor Dr. Seo-hang Lee, IFANS

This session began with a presentation by Dr. Kang Choi, research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses, in which he described some of the obstacles to CSBMs on the Korean peninsula. While some progress had been made in achieving more secure relations with the North, there was a great deal of room for progress. Internal disagreements had been a problem as politicians in Seoul had debated whether to continue adhering to the peace and prosperity ideology, or to adopt the more conservative tension-reduction framework.

It had been mentioned that, before the Republic of Korea decided on an official course of action, efforts should first be made to mitigate escalating tensions. Without easing military tensions, political and economic progress would be severely limited. Dr. Choi also raised the issue of the two Koreas' not clearly agreeing on what the terms of peace should be. The North was seeking to reach an agreement with the United States to sideline the South, whereas the Government in Seoul preferred an inter-Korean agreement.

The presentation went on to highlight some of the economic difficulties that North Korea was experiencing. For more than a decade, North Korea, had been in steady economic decline, with no increase in national output. The economic problems had been compounded by internal inefficiencies that precluded successful economic reform. In spite of all that, the collapse of North Korea was clearly undesirable. A gradual, stable, *de facto* recognition of the North was the preferred alternative.

Dr. Choi stated that, after adopting the OSCE motto for peace, “dialogue against all odds,” the Government of the Republic of Korea had tirelessly pursued an array of options in an attempt to bring its reclusive neighbour out of its shell. One example had been a promise of economic aid. The North had not yet reciprocated in any way that could be considered desirable, so what the next course of action would be was 'still up in the air'.

Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, from the School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, made a presentation on 'Continuity, reciprocity, and transparency: Towards sustainable six-party CSBMs in Northeast Asia.' Dr. Hoshino noted that, although there had been dialogue in Northeast Asia, the number of participants had been very limited. However, new ground had been broken with the inclusion of North Korea in last month's first round of six-party talks. It was likely that the North had acquiesced to the talks in large part thanks to China's role as an intermediary.

Dr. Hoshino suggested that the North had adopted a power-based approach, as demonstrated by its declaration of nuclear capabilities. That was further evidenced by its admission that it had abducted Japanese nationals. It was likely that those announcements had been made to obtain economic assistance from Japan, although the outburst of public disapproval had resulted in none being rendered. Dr. Hoshino also stressed that the key to progress was continuity rather than a focus on isolated transient events. He advised that the emphasis should be on transparency, and the entrance strategy should be thoroughly thought out.

Key points in the discussion

The discussions revolved around the continued reluctance of North Korea to engage in dialogue, in opposition to the global community. It was mentioned that much effort had been made to reach out to the Government in Pyongyang, but its top-down approach was at odds with the efforts of other nations seeking to work from the bottom up.

Similarities between the inter-Korean and Helsinki agreements were noted. The vital role of international organizations as intermediaries that could bridge the ever-present gaps between conflicting schools of thought was discussed. It was also observed that the will of the people was a very important element of change in the progression towards safety and stability. That had proven to be a formidable obstacle in North Korea, given that, in general, the masses were literally in the dark. It was pointed out, for example, that the Internet, television, radio and other sources of mass communications were prohibited altogether or heavily censored. It would be no exaggeration to go even further to say that electricity for lighting was in such short supply that reading a newspaper after dark was beyond the reach of most North Koreans.

Participants also indicated, however, that a similarly bleak picture had been painted of East Germany prior to reunification, and that the citizens had never imagined how rapidly some very dramatic changes could occur. Germany, however, had had the advantage of being aided by pre-existing organizations such as NATO and the EU. It was suggested that the proactive creation of such systems in Northeast Asia could conceivably spur additional progress in the reunification of the two Koreas. It was pointed out, however, that all such processes must be considered from a long-term perspective.

The possibility was raised that the inability of North Korea to make choices could very well be a result of the isolation and nature of the regime. No matter what the case, a dilemma that would persist for Chairman Kim Jong Il was how to take into account the need for new social liberties and openness that would likely be well-received by his people, but which at the same time would paralyse the workings of the regime as it currently existed. It was in that context that admonitions for perseverance and patience were received, citing the delayed success of the Open Skies Treaty, first tabled in the 1950s by US President Dwight Eisenhower, which had finally been enacted only after decades of deliberation.

A representative from a Partner for Co-operation in Asia noted that one of their primary concerns revolved around the abduction issue. It was made clear that negotiations with the Government in Pyongyang were not a possibility unless and until an acceptable resolution had been reached. Some participants acknowledged that position to reflect a legitimate concern. European participants reiterated their position that the six-party talks in Beijing were a welcome indication of progress. There was, however, along the same lines, some unease with regard to being excluded, especially if the EU was expected to meet its financial commitments to the peace process without being allowed to provide input. It was further stated that the EU was unwilling to make any further pledges as long as it had no say in how its contributions were to be used.

Suggestions and conclusions

In concluding the session, Dr. Hoshino expressed approval for a process that would culminate in normalizing relations with the Government in Pyongyang. He suggested that time was on the side of the global community rather than on North Korea's side, in that it was likely that

the latter would encounter more difficulties than the former if the process was long and drawn-out. He also noted, however, that the people suffering because of the present regime's policies should not be forgotten. He favoured multinational talks to be institutionalized to serve as a forum that would broaden the scope of dialogue.

Finally, Dr. Choi emphasized that now was the time to raise serious security concerns with North Korea while channels of communication were open. In the past, too much attention had been focused on avoiding anything that might derail discussions. He acknowledged that including that issue would mean disagreement, but expressed optimism that common ground could be found.

Session 4: Application of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula (2) — Tasks for implementation

Report by Professor Dr. Jae-seung Lee, IFANS

This session explored ways of implementing lessons learnt by the OSCE in Northeast Asia, based on previous discussions of the problems at hand and obstacles to CSBMs on the Korean peninsula.

In his presentation, Professor Kim Sung Han of IFANS provided specific prescriptions for deterring North Korea's nuclear threat based on a concrete and comprehensive analysis of its position and intentions when playing its nuclear card. He began with a brief review of the recent six-party talks and touched on basic issues and prospects surrounding the nuclear issue. He noted that the multilateral approach had both advantages and disadvantages. It was a useful way of combining efforts so as to be more effective in persuading North Korea, although integrating diverse and competing interests was never an easy task.

After analyzing the pros and cons of the current bargaining position that North Korea was confronted with, Professor Kim inferred that the non-aggression pact that North Korea was so adamantly pursuing might not be its highest priority, but instead what was considered a useful fulcrum for diplomatic and political leverage. Professor Kim reasoned that, from North Korea's point of view it was still premature to make any deals, given that the stakes were not yet high enough. It was therefore very unlikely that North Korea would respond to the 'carrots' that could be offered during six-party talks any time soon.

He therefore underscored the need for a roadmap for resolving the current impasse. A tentative course of action proposed by Professor Kim involved a three-stage approach. The first would be an exploratory dialogue that would seek to induce North Korea to declare the abandonment of its nuclear programme. The second would involve implementing verification measures. The third would be based on a bold approach to resolving pending issues and establishing a stable mechanism for peace on the Korean peninsula. Close co-operation and co-ordination among allies would continue to be crucial as far as burden-sharing was concerned. Such a roadmap would also have to contain a specific list of 'carrots and sticks' to make the future predictable for North Korea, and that would represent an immense contribution to the implementation of the process.

When dealing with North Korea, he urged that countries must be prepared for either of two eventualities: a negotiated resolution or North Korea ending up as a nuclear power. One could not afford to wait and see what negotiations would bring. Both scenarios must always be kept in mind. He concluded by suggesting that anti-proliferation measures to which North Korea would have to adhere ought to be explored.

Key points in the discussion

Participants highlighted the possibility of miscalculation as the greatest risk associated with the irrationality of the North Korean regime. Professor Kim suggested that it would be prudent to assume that North Korea would behave rationally. There would otherwise be no other option than to complete engagement or containment. It was pointed out that North Korea had very few options. The moderator of the session, Ambassador Young-jin Choi, commented that, given the experience the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO) had had, it was North Korea's 'inabilities' that should be considered first rather than its rationality, since in the end its problems became everyone's problems.

The discussion then progressed to the applicability of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula. The dissimilarity between the current conditions in Northeast Asia and the nascent OSCE experience was raised. There had been military parity among interested countries when the OSCE came into being, whereas participants agreed that there was no such military equilibrium in Northeast Asia. The historical background of North Korea's emergence as a nuclear power was also mentioned as distinctly different from the European experience, given that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons to compensate for its military inferiority to South Korea.

Subsequent to the discussions, participants re-examined the possibility of initiating CSBMs without the immediate participation of North Korea, so it could be invited to join at some point in the future. It was noted, however, that North Korea might feel even more left out and isolated as a result of regional CSBMs without its participation, in which case the effort would turn out to be counterproductive. Follow-up clarification indicated that the point was not to exclude North Korea from participating in the regional mechanism in question, but rather to make the option attractive enough so that North Korea would opt to join after a careful analysis of its own interests. It was agreed that if the regional framework were based on genuine efforts to attract North Korea by ensuring that its interests would be furthered, that could be a meaningful starting point for confidence building.

Professor Kim asserted that the international community had to be clear about what would follow if and when North Korea declared denuclearization. It was pointed out that offering "incentives" such as security guarantees or economic assistance was one way of inducing North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.

The discussion then turned to the underlying reasons for North Korea's pursuit of the nuclear option. There was a general consensus that North Korea wanted nuclear weapons in order to ensure its own survival. Hence, if North Korea's survival was not threatened, it might become more amenable to talks. It was also observed, however, that survival could be understood in different ways, whether as a matter of compensating for military inferiority or of blackmailing the US to obtain economic assistance. Differing interpretations would necessarily give rise to different responses.

With regard to the 'red lines' mentioned in the presentation, Professor Kim clarified that setting specific boundaries might not be desirable because North Korea would then be tempted to cross them. Strategic ambiguity was inevitable to some extent, but there still needed to be consensus as to what the red lines implied. If North Korea tested nuclear weapons, engaged in nuclear reprocessing or test-fired ballistic missiles, for instance, the international community should respond to obstruct such activities.

In connection with the above, reciprocity issues were also raised. It was noted that, although rewards could easily be provided, punishments such as military action or economic sanctions were often avoided, or postponed indefinitely. In response, it was argued that, if it became too obvious which consequences could be expected to follow certain behaviours or actions, North Korea might be tempted to raise the stakes.

On the issue of bilateralism, it was noted that, unless and until North Korea became more co-operative, bilateral talks would prove to be difficult if not impossible. If on the other hand, the six-party talks made any headway, it would be natural for participants to engage in

bilateral talks. Relying too heavily on the US to resolve the North Korean issue was not desirable, and concerted efforts should be made to persuade North Korea. The participants were reminded that the real threat for North Korea was not the possibility of military attack by other countries, but rather an internal and systemic contradiction that could only be overcome by North Korea itself.

Major findings and suggestions of the Workshop

It was suggested that the Republic of Korea might be able to improve the current situation by engaging North Korea economically given that the latter had first developed nuclear weapons in the 1970s in response to the perceived threat of falling behind the South in terms of economic development. Many participants agreed that past experience had demonstrated that North Korea was not genuinely interested in joint economic activities, and that had caused previously enthusiastic proponents of this approach to recognize its limitations.

There was an overwhelming consensus that further efforts should be made to expose North Korea to the OSCE processes. On the question as to whether North Korea could be admitted straight away as an 'OSCE Partner for Co-operation', Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE, responded that although the OSCE was very flexible when admitting new Partners, it was still premature to consider accepting North Korea as a member of the Contact Group. Ambassador Young-jin Choi, Chancellor of the IFANS, noted that the problem was not whether the OSCE was ready, but whether North Korea was ready to commit itself. He pointed out that North Korea had been reluctant to come to the table in the first place, which suggested that the mere act of admitting North Korea as a Partner State might not prove to be a durable solution. He went on to remind the participants how difficult a negotiating partner North Korea could be, and hence, advised countries to be patient and wait until conditions were ripe.

There was general agreement among the participants that it was difficult at present to identify the proper approach to rapprochement, but making use of existing regional organizations such as the ARF, with the co-operation of the OSCE, would be a good starting point. It was suggested that, as a first step towards CBSMs, establishing channels of dialogue between the ARF and the OSCE, and making it attractive for North Korea to join, could be a workable option.

A representative of an OSCE Partner for Co-operation responded that a channel of communication already existed between the ARF and the OSCE, and efforts had been made to encourage North Korea to actively participate in ARF activities. He added that as the ARF evolved, it could consider adopting some characteristics of the OSCE framework.

There was a general consensus that the six-party talks provided a starting point for multilateral security co-operation in Northeast Asia, and that the talks might create the conditions needed for CSBMs and subsequently result in a more concrete and productive dialogue. The participants further agreed on the principle of 'no taxation without representation' in the process of multilateral talks.

The final session concluded with a general understanding that a gradual bottom-up approach would be crucial in establishing a lasting peace in the region. The gradual implementation of viable methods, as shown in the roadmap introduced by Professor Kim, suggested CBMs as a way of reducing tension and eventually eliminating threats that had heretofore made a genuine

solution elusive. In that context, a bottom-up approach that first dealt with easy and soft CBMs, before moving to the thornier issues would be most effective.

The key to solving the puzzle this time was multilateralism, and each stakeholder (including the EU in the future) should play its due role in implementing peace-building on the Korean peninsula. The participants reaffirmed that, even though North Korea was a reluctant party, the allies should keep knocking on its door to bring about gradual change.

Workshop Wrap-up

The Co-Chairmen, Ambassador Young-jin Choi, Chancellor of the IFANS, and Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE, concluded the Workshop by engaging participants in an open discussion. Ambassador da Costa, in his capacity as Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia, was requested to provide follow-up to the Workshop by briefing North Korean Embassy officials in Vienna on the findings of the event. Ambassador da Costa indicated that he would be pleased to inform the North Korean representatives in Vienna of all the developments that had emerged at the Workshop.

A participant suggested that the present state of world affairs might preclude CSBMs on the Korean peninsula, and that an alternative might therefore be to focus on a different terminology that might reduce tensions by making policies more marketable. The phrase 'CSBMs' itself was potentially problematic.

It was reiterated that the Workshop was particularly timely against the backdrop of the current situation on the Korean peninsula, in particular the recently held six-party talks. The North Korean nuclear programme (a threat to the NPT regime), was considered to be not only a regional but a global challenge, and a subject that required urgent attention. The event provided the opportunity to discuss possibilities on how to initiate a multilateral dialogue on security and confidence- and trust-building issues in Northeast Asia.

Ambassador da Costa expressed his view that the Workshop had afforded an important occasion not only to express lessons learnt, but also to reflect on the past work and actions of the OSCE. He observed that it had provided an ideal opportunity to reflect on the Organization's methods, and, although the applicability of the OSCE's experiences to other areas was somewhat limited for political and historical reasons, OSCE lessons learnt and principles could nonetheless be adapted as a general framework.

Ambassador da Costa added that such Workshops brought the OSCE participating States up to date on current developments in the region. He stressed that it was important for the OSCE to hear from those directly involved how they were affected by the issues. The event had provided a good opportunity to be heard regarding progress underway. That was especially true of those nations that had been involved in the recently held six-party talks in Beijing. Ambassador da Costa emphasized that the North Korean nuclear issue was not a bilateral or regional problem for Asia alone to settle, but rather an issue that involved the global community. He concluded by noting that that was the message he would convey to the OSCE community.

Ambassador Choi emphasized that, as the global community continued to grow ever closer by the day, it was clear that events in Northeast Asia had an impact on people around the world. He appealed to the participants to maintain following developments in the region, pointing out that Northeast Asia was one of the three economic epicentres, along with North America and the European Union, with a bright future. Given that Northeast Asia had double the population of the European Union and North America combined, and approximately 25% of global GDP, Ambassador Choi stressed that the region deserved consistent and continued interest from OSCE participating States.

The Co-Chairmen concluded the event by expressing their gratitude to all representatives for their active participation in the event.

III. Opening Statements

Statement by Ambassador Ján Kubiš, OSCE Secretary General

Ambassador Young-jin Choi, Chancellor of the IFANS,
Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE
Partners for Co-operation in Asia,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure for me to be in Seoul and to introduce, together with Ambassador Choi and Ambassador da Costa, the OSCE's experience gained in the area of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). I would like to express our appreciation to our Korean hosts for the initiative to hold this Workshop and for the hospitality.

I consider this event indeed timely against the backdrop of the current situation in Northeast Asia, and the recent promising six-party talks, which, I hope will continue. Also, in this context, I have noted with interest the 'Peace and Prosperity Policy' of the Korean government, which, i.a, is expected to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, to help resolve the North Korean nuclear problem peacefully, together with the international community, and to contribute to peace, co-operation and common prosperity in Northeast Asia as a whole.

The holding of the Workshop documents, i.a., the interest of the Republic of Korea in the OSCE's experience and lessons learnt, from the development and application of OSCE CSBMs to OSCE arms control norms and principles. The OSCE, on the other hand, is prepared to share its expertise and to provide insight into current developments, in particular, the politico-military area of its work. Such an exchange of views on different aspects relating to the OSCE CSBMs could provide an inspiration and input that might be useful for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the wider region.

It is significant that this is the second time in just over two years that the OSCE has been welcomed in Seoul to discuss its developments and achievements in the field of CSBMs after the first OSCE-Korea Conference held in March 2001. The fact that the Workshop is organized by the think-tank of the Korean Foreign Ministry and the interest of the academic community in it speaks best about its importance and gives it additional value.

The OSCE and CSBMs

Freedom, democracy, prosperity and stability, in other words, the well-being of the individual and society at large in a democratic and well-governed state, accountable to its citizens and co-operating with its partners, has always been at the core of the OSCE's co-operative and comprehensive approach to security.

Although the OSCE, today, is perhaps better known for its work in the human dimension or through its field missions and activities, the politico-military dimension has been an integral part of the original Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and its Helsinki Final Act, adopted in 1975, and has accompanied the whole OSCE work since then. The European experience with CBMs and CSBMs has been widely analysed and is generally and rightly regarded as a success story.

Originally, in conditions of enmity and distrust during the cold war, two opposed politico-military blocks managed – in a regional format and accepting as individual, equal partners, all states, participating in the Helsinki process - to negotiate and agree on a regime that helped to establish a regime of increased confidence and co-operation in the military, political and other spheres. The emphasis in the politico-military area was on building up predictability through increased openness and transparency, and otherwise on building up co-operation in all dimensions, including the human, economic and environmental ones, and contacts among people.

The first set of CBMs, adopted in the Helsinki Final Act, more symbolic than substantive, opened the door to negotiations on military matters in an all-European setting. The fact that the confronting parties sat down in this format at the negotiating table was the first achievement and an example of how to proceed even in a situation when there seems to be a deadlock, or positions of parties concerned are contradictory and mutually excluding.

The gradually expanded CSBMs package has had a significant influence on relations between the OSCE participating States:

- it helped reduce tensions by increasing transparency of capabilities and intentions, allaying anxieties or suspicions, clarifying intentions about military activities and, thus, improving predictability for the Parties involved;
- it helped assure each participating State, and their alliances that others are not preparing offensive military actions;
- it helped provide conditions for avoiding misunderstandings in the case when some military events or policies could cause a feeling of ambiguity that otherwise might result in mistrust increasing.

The OSCE activities relating to the politico-military dimension are not limited to only the CSBMs set out in the Vienna Document. A number of wide-ranging documents and decisions cover a variety of security problems beyond classical CSBMs. Among them, there are such important instruments such as the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, Principles Governing Non-Proliferation or the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Although some of these documents reflect a strategic security environment, which has evolved significantly, this does not diminish their significance and validity. Therefore, the strong commitment of OSCE participating States to compliance through their full and timely implementation remains essential for enhancing political and military security and stability.

The OSCE participating States have proven that they are committed to further improvement and enhancement of existing tools and are prepared to consider additional ones. To illustrate – only recently, the OSCE marked a transition of the OSCE Communication Network to a system, based on the Internet, with greater security and at reduced costs.

With the significant changes of the situation in Europe, which resulted from the collapse of the communist regimes in the East, co-operation and dialogue, have replaced previous confrontation. This increasingly allowed shifting the focus of the Organization's efforts to solving other security-related issues, notably in the areas of democratisation, institution and capacity-building, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, as well as to broader economic and environmental aspects of security.

New risks and challenges have emerged globally. Potential threats affecting not only OSCE States are more complex and less predictable than before. The changing character of present conflicts, from external to internal ones, the changing nature of actors, with a prominent place taken by non-state actors, as well as a great variety of ethnic, religious, ideological, social and economic factors at play do not allow for an all-encompassing recipe or model applicable to all conflicts in various regions. But a response to new challenges must be sought and the OSCE is actively engaged in this process.

The task of preventing and fighting terrorism is high on the agenda of the OSCE activities. In this regard the issues of preventing terrorists' access to MANPADS and weapons of mass destruction are new specific questions to address. Eliminating security risks arising from ammunition and explosives for use in conventional armaments in surplus or awaiting destruction is another challenge at hand. A bigger role for OSCE in improving border security, and in reforms of policing, and in combating transnational crime, is also under consideration.

I also wish to draw your special attention to the OSCE contribution to the implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Document on SALW and, more importantly, measures undertaken by the OSCE community on its implementation, are significant steps forward in this crucial area. We are proud of the results achieved that are applicable not only within the OSCE area, but also provide a useful experience for other countries, especially in adjacent regions.

Deepening of relations with the Partners for Co-operation

The signatories of the Helsinki Final Act had the foresight to state that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of the world. From the beginning of the Helsinki process, the OSCE has underscored the importance of the Mediterranean for its participating States' security. In the same vein, after the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, in the past decade, the OSCE has welcomed Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and most recently, Afghanistan, as Partners for Co-operation. Our interaction takes place at numerous forums, and covers different areas, including security issues. For example, the OSCE Partners for Co-operation took part in the recent and first ever OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, and they are more frequently invited to attend the Permanent Council – no doubt, a trend, which will continue.

Both the cross-dimensional nature of new threats and close ties between the participating States and Partners for Co-operation are mentioned in the elaboration of the 'OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century' to be adopted at the forthcoming OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2003 in Maastricht. The work on document is in progress now, and our Partners contribute to it. This year saw the establishment of the Contact Group with the Partners for Co-operation in Asia under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa of Portugal.

I would also like to express our appreciation with regard to the productive co-operation of our Partners within the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) activities. Here, I would like to say that it is the FSC and its Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting that review the implementation of the CSBMs and negotiate new measures. Last June, the FSC warmly welcomed a presentation on Japanese defence policy. Now, it looks forward to the Korean contribution soon, thus contributing to the process of increased transparency on this subject reaching out beyond the OSCE area.

Closer OSCE contacts with organizations where our Partners belong also help establish better understanding and open the door to future co-operation. Last year, at the Ministerial Council meeting, in Porto, we welcomed for the first time the Presidency of the ASEAN Standing Committee/ASEAN Regional Forum, represented then by the Foreign Minister of Cambodia, H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong.

In the same spirit of co-operation that marks today's gathering, we look forward to the planned OSCE-Japan Conference on issues related to preventive diplomacy. There also the participation is foreseen of academics that have enrolled in an OSCE - Asia network, as a result of a proposal submitted last June during an OSCE-Thailand Conference in Bangkok on 'the Human Dimension of Security'.

To conclude, this Workshop in Seoul will no doubt contribute not only to enhanced dialogue but might make the latter more regular and focused on the issues of topical importance for the Partners for Co-operation where OSCE would contribute with its experiences and expertise. In the future, the OSCE could envisage the transfer of relevant principles, norms and measures, contained in a number of politico-military documents to adjacent regions. It could also encourage its Partners for Co-operation to take part in some existing information exchanges. The OSCE and its Secretariat stands ready in continuing to support such efforts.

Thank you for your attention.

Statement by Ambassador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Permanent Representative of Portugal to OSCE, Chairman of the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia

Ambassador Young-jin Choi, Chancellor of the IFANS, Ambassador Ján Kubiš, Secretary General of the OSCE, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me, while chairing the Contact Group with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation in Asia, to report today on an assessment about the applicability of OSCE Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in Northeast Asia.

I feel proud to say that 2003 is an important year in the strengthening of our mutual co-operation. For the first time this year, we were able to convene meetings of the Contact Group bringing together the OSCE participating States and the Asian Partners. We had full sessions with substantive agendas, sharing our mutual concerns and trying to take advantage of our different experiences.

Also this year we took the necessary steps to make Afghanistan the newest member of our Asian Partners, thus giving proof of our commitment to address one case that needs to mobilize our attention. I cannot hide that I feel proud to be in the Chair of the Contact Group this very year!

My country, due to its historical diplomatic tradition, has always placed great importance on the multilateral dialogue of the OSCE with our Asian Partners. One important reason for this dialogue is the contribution that OSCE could offer to other regions, or to other organizations, because of its unique experience in building measures for peace and stability throughout 55 countries on three continents.

Bearing in mind the necessity to give the maximum opportunity to the Workshop's outstanding speakers, I will intervene on two topics.

First, I will elaborate on the concept and the different Confidence-Building Measures that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has developed during its existence.

Second, I wish to highlight a few significant accomplishments that show the universality of some European CSBMs and the possible applicability in different regions of the world.

OSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

Allow me, in my personal capacity, to make a few considerations for the further discussion on the topic of CSBMs.

The concept of CSBMs derives from the CSCE founding document agreed in 1975 - the Helsinki Final Act. The CSCE and its successor the OSCE, gained in 28 years the necessary experience to have at its disposal nowadays a variety of instruments that could be used by other regional organizations concerned with the enhancement of security.

As you may understand, this achievement is not an easy task, particularly in an Organization where the decision-making process is based on everyday consensus-building among 55 nations.

The OSCE is undoubtedly the regional Organization that possesses the greatest experience in the world, regarding confidence-building measures. These measures were negotiated and improved over the years, developing the initial confidence phase to a different and more ambitious level of CSBMs. This was tailored by all 55 nations on the OSCE's political military forum, in seminars, workshops, special meetings thereby increasing transparency and mutual trust.

These measures proved to be one of the most important of the OSCE's conflict prevention tools, contributing to: fostering ties between all participating States; avoiding misperceptions and misunderstandings; and, restraining and increasing transparency in military activities.

In general, as we are aware, the objective of CSBMs is to enhance assurance in the trustworthiness of the other partner.

The OSCE CSBMs fall under three different categories: transparency measures, access or communication measures and constraint measures. The OSCE measures were agreed and improved upon in different important OSCE documents.

Allow me now to expand more on that point for a moment.

The most important document is the Vienna Document 1999. The measures foreseen in this document range from the exchange of military information to the exchange of defence planning; from risk reduction to military contacts; from prior notification of certain military activities to notification of adoption of subregional measures; and, from measures adopted to allow the observation of military activities to measures related to compliance and verification.

Equally important are the agreements on other documents and measures that the OSCE is taking.

First, the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): this document contains measures for information exchange on transfers of weapons, for facilitating weapons collection programmes, for destruction of weapons and ammunition and measures for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Let me try to be more specific. The trafficking and proliferation of small arms across borders is indeed a major obstacle to peace throughout the OSCE region. This is also a phenomenon closely related to trafficking in drugs and human beings that requires an integrated approach.

One of our main findings is that almost all governments see a need to harmonize the principles of their national arms legislation and export controls with the other countries. For this reason, several small arms initiatives and comprehensive projects are launched every year in the OSCE region.

The ultimate goal is to achieve from the national governments involved, a real political commitment to counter illegal possession and trafficking.

This issue is of utmost importance and due to the fact that in most cases, the surplus weapons and ammunition will show up again in conflict areas or in the hands of criminal organizations, they can have a direct impact on the security of non-OSCE countries.

The sharing of the OSCE experience in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW) with the United Nations proved recently to be the correct direction to pursue.

The United Nations First Biennial Meeting of States to consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and

Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held this July in New York, demonstrates the importance and contribution that OSCE's initiatives can do for the overall security in the world on this subject.

What can the OSCE offer on the subject of SALW?

The OSCE is able to:

- Provide a wide-ranging experience in gathering information (information exchanges on arms control programs), technical expertise for stockpile security, stockpile management, risk assessment and the destruction process;
- Consult with other organizations to develop a co-ordinated response to any request for assistance.

The second OSCE document to take into account, is the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. The Code adopted in Budapest 1994 reaffirmed the OSCE concept of comprehensive and co-operative security, as well as fundamental UN principals of sovereign equality of States and the non-use of force. The main purpose of the Document is the setting forth of a set of principles aimed at establishing and further developing democratic control and oversight of Armed Forces, internal and security forces.

As you may realize, regarding the norms concerning the control of Armed Forces, this was the first time that an international organization intruded in such an area of State power.

Allow me to make just a short reference to the existence of other OSCE documents that also embrace CSBMs:

- The Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation;
- The Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations;
- The Global Exchange of Military Information;
- The Questionnaires on Anti-Personnel Landmines and on the Process of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After referring to these OSCE documents, let me also refer to the importance of various regional meetings and workshops organized every year in the OSCE region and to some existent sub-regional agreements based on the OSCE CSBMs' documents.

- The Annex 1B, Regional Stabilization to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- The document on CSBMs in the naval field in the Black Sea, the agreement on BLACKSEAFOR;
- The various bilateral and regional agreements settled among different European countries to further strengthen relations between neighbouring States

These are just a few examples of sub-regional agreements based on the OSCE experience of CSBMs.

Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in different regions of the world

After revisiting the genesis and the variety of sources for CSBMs, let me now address the applicability of these measures to areas outside the OSCE region. Some experiences conducted in non-European regions may prove the universality of European CSBMs.

Elementary confidence-building is being pursued actively in regions that either enjoy a sufficient degree of security dialogue (Southeast Asia) or lack major incentives to engage in arms reduction programs (Latin America). Regarding the countries of the Mediterranean area, we are aware of the initial steps undertaken in the field of the "partnership building measures".

Bearing in mind some recent developments in the North African region, we believe that this approach has good conditions to be developed in the near future.

Using a historical approach, the idea could be defensible that the success of CBMs/and CSBMs in Europe is linked to a limited number of particular factors, such as fear of inadvertent nuclear catastrophe, the absence of long-standing deep antagonisms and some affinity of social values.

That said, it could also be argued that while looking for the adaptation of confidence measures for a specific region, those factors should occur, as a precondition for success. If we insist on going in this direction, we will not go very far. Each region has its own political, social, economic and military characteristics as well as specific idiosyncratic peculiarities. That particularity should be taken into account while deciding to start the voyage towards strengthening confidence among States.

However, international relations experiences demonstrate that once States agree on the fact that the benefits of peaceful and co-operative relations outweigh the costs of confrontation, conflict and mistrust among them they have a starting point for a confidence-building process.

In this regard, the OSCE effectiveness in promoting peace and stability could be an example of paramount importance. While aiming at such a regime, one may say that those seeking the development of future Confidence and Security Building Measures, ought to take into account, among others, the following premises:

CSBMs have a lot of potential but also a great deal of limitations. On a negotiation process, CSBMs are not a miraculous cure for all international security problems, but just an element of a broad process for the harmonization of inter-state relations.

CSBMs, by themselves, are only worthwhile if designed to serve the broader objectives of security and the well-being of society. It is advisable that parties in their pursuit of better mutual relations, simply to prevent conflict or build durable peace, share strong overarching political goals. The main goal should be co-operative security and not State security. States should also take into account the interests and perceptions of neighbouring countries. Renunciation of violence, non-violation of borders and non-intervention are also important and essential factors.

When considering the application of CSBMs in different regions, the negotiating partners should agree initially on a set of broader political commitments, guaranteeing the political framework to assist on the future implementation of those CSBMs.

Another important element is the political culture of the region. Political decision-makers need to bear in mind that countries at different stages of state formation, with various political cultures and outlooks, risk mutual misunderstanding and misconceptions. This perception favours the adoption of a phased approach on subregional and bilateral agreements. This

solution seems to be more effective for the achievement of confidence at the early stages of a confidence-building process, than the negotiation of an overall regime as the miraculous way out to grant the security on a broader region.

And finally, while pursuing better mutual relations, the negotiating parties need to bear in mind that the implementation of the agreed CSBMs is the cornerstone for success. It does not have any value to agree on beautiful and promising documents if the States do not have any intention to honour them.

To conclude:

The OSCE is an Organization that has the ability to function as a framework for conflicting parties towards security and stability. The utilization of the OSCE's expertise in the area of Confidence and Building Measures is already a fact in some sub-regions and regions. The experiences conducted so far, proved the possibility to expand the CSBM regime to other regions.

Any similar process will have to be carefully thought out, well-prepared, and executed on a step-by-step basis and respecting the peculiarities of each country.

I very much hope that the Workshop will be able to help us define the validity and applicability of the OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia.

IV. List of Participants

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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(in alphabetical order of State)

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V. List of documents circulated during the Workshop

Number	Author	Document
001	IFANS	Programme and preliminary list of participants
002	Ambassador Ján Kubiš, <i>OSCE Secretary General</i>	Opening statement
003	Ambassador F. Seixas da Costa, <i>Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE</i>	Opening statement
004	Ambassador Dr. Dieter Boden, <i>Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE</i>	'OSCE – Conceptual Approach, Achievements and Further Perspective: A German View'
005	Mr. Jean-Marc Journot, <i>Brigadier General, (Air Force); Senior Military Adviser at the French Mission to the OSCE</i>	'Validity and applicability of OSCE experiences in Northeast Asia - Challenges and Opportunities'
006	Dr. Yurii Kryvonos, <i>Senior FSC Support Officer, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE</i>	'OSCE Regime of CSBMs: Is it applicable?'
007	Dr. Kang Choi, <i>Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defence Analyses</i>	'Application of CSBMs on the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Obstacles'
008	Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, <i>Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan</i>	'Continuity, Reciprocity, and Transparency: Towards a Sustainable'
009	Dr. Sung-han Kim, <i>Professor, IFANS</i>	'North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Issues and Prospects'
010	Ambassador Dorian F. Prince, <i>Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Korea, on behalf of Mr. Guenther Verheugen, Commissioner for Enlargement, European Commission</i>	'The relevance of European Integration for peace and stability in Northeast Asia'