

**Chairmanship: Sweden**

**895th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 17 October 2018

Opened: 10.05 a.m.  
Suspended: 12.55 p.m.  
Resumed: 3 p.m.  
Closed: 5.15 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador U. Funered  
Colonel J. Huovinen

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

- *Presentation by Ambassador J. Eliasson, Chair of the Governing Board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations*
- *Presentation by Ms. A. Hinojosa, Director of the Compliance and Facilitation Directorate, World Customs Organization (WCO)*
- *Presentation by Mr. A. Rached, Policy Analyst, CBRNE and Vulnerable Targets Sub-Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Directorate, General Secretariat, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)*

Chairperson, Ambassador J. Eliasson (FSC.NGO/9/18 OSCE+),  
Ms. A. Hinojosa (FSC.DEL/189/18 OSCE+), Mr. A. Rached  
(FSC.DEL/188/18 OSCE+), Austria-European Union (with the candidate  
countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro  
and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and  
potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade  
Association country Liechtenstein, member of the European Economic Area;  
as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment)  
(FSC.DEL/194/18), Switzerland, Slovakia, Russian Federation, Belarus, Italy,

United States of America, Turkey, FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues (Spain) (Annex 1)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

- (a) *Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/193/18 OSCE+), Austria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/195/18), United States of America, Canada, Russian Federation*
- (b) *Inspection visit conducted by Serbia in Albania from 25 to 28 September 2018: Serbia (Annex 2), Albania*

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Symposium on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, to be held in Berlin on 22 and 23 November 2018 (FSC.DEL/191/18 OSCE+): FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Romania), Chairperson*
- (b) *Austrian National Day on 26 October 2018: Austria*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 24 October 2018, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



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**895th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 901, Agenda item 1

## **STATEMENT BY THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES**

Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson, for including the topic of “international co-operation as a tool for supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1540” in today’s FSC Security Dialogue.

I should like to say a few words, in my capacity as the FSC Chairperson’s Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues, to illustrate how the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), has been actively supporting participating States in their implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) over the last eight years. An extrabudgetary project was established within the OSCE Secretariat in 2010 in order to provide, upon request, concrete assistance to States in matters related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to continue raising awareness of this topic and to provide relevant training.

In this respect, allow me to highlight some of the most important achievements that have been made so far:

- In line with FSC Decision No. 19/11 (FSC.DEC/19/11) on points of contact on UN Security Council resolution 1540, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) established a directory of national and OSCE Points of Contact on the resolution. Currently, 52 participating States have officially appointed national Points of Contact, and they regularly provide the OSCE Secretariat with updated information on these;
- Annual meetings of the Points of Contact were held in 2014 and 2015 under the Swiss and Serbian OSCE Chairmanships, respectively, and the first training course for national Points of Contact from the OSCE area took place in June–July 2016 in Kaliningrad, hosted by the Russian Federation. More recently, the Russian Federation also hosted a second training course for national Points of Contact from the OSCE area in Rostov-on-Don from 4 to 7 September 2018 – a course that I had the pleasure to attend;
- In order to provide direct support for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, as well as to make effective use of the expertise and resources of the UN and the OSCE, the CPC and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) concluded, in 2011, a memorandum of understanding on joint project activities to

promote regional implementation of UNSCR 1540. In 2016, the CPC also signed a cost-sharing agreement with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, covering joint activities related to UNSCR 1540 with a particular focus on Central Asia. A further cost-sharing agreement is now being negotiated between the OSCE and UNODA; it envisages a three-year programme of joint activities on UNSCR 1540, with funding to be provided by the European Union;

- Most importantly, however, the CPC, together with the 1540 Committee and UNODA, directly assisted 15 OSCE participating States in the development of their national implementation action plans for UNSCR 1540. These plans have proved to be a helpful national co-ordination tool, as well as a transparent and effective mechanism for obtaining donors' support. Currently, assistance is being provided to interested participating States in the deployment of these action plans, with a particular focus on export control and the identification of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats in Central Asia, as well as on biological and chemical safety and security in Ukraine.

The work of the CPC has also been officially recognized by the FSC, as evidenced by the adoption of FSC Decision No. 4/15 (FSC.DEC/4/15) on the OSCE's role in support of UNSCR 1540. Therein, the FSC decided to strengthen the OSCE's support in facilitating the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and related resolutions by participating States. Moreover, the FSC specifically tasked the CPC with:

- (a) Providing continuous and effective assistance to participating States, upon their request, notably in the preparation of national implementation measures;
- (b) Maintaining and developing the OSCE network of Points of Contact on UNSCR 1540;
- (c) Enhancing co-operation and information-sharing with the 1540 Committee and UNODA on all issues of relevance to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;
- (d) Continuing to act as an OSCE Point of Contact on UNSCR 1540.

Furthermore, the OSCE has also strengthened its co-operation with the European Union and other international partners in this domain.

The European Union has adopted two Council decisions in support of the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in the OSCE area during the period 2017–2020:

- Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1252 of 11 July 2017 on strengthening chemical safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSCR 1540 obligations (providing a total of 1.4 million euros of funding for four extrabudgetary projects, to be implemented by the Ukrainian authorities jointly with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine);
- Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 on regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 (providing a total of 1.3 million euros of funding for a three-year programme of activities in the OSCE area, to be carried out by the CPC jointly with UNODA).

As for the way forward:

In line with the food-for-thought paper on best practice guides for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (FSC.DEL/246/07), as well as with FSC Decision No. 7/09 (FSC.DEC/7/09) on the best practice guide on UNSCR 1540 export controls and transshipment, I should like to inform participating States that the CPC – with the assistance of a technical consultant, as well as that of the FSC Chairperson’s Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues – will initiate a process to compile effective practices from interested States related to their implementation of UNSCR 1540. Since 2004, when the resolution was adopted, a significant body of knowledge and expertise has been accumulated by the OSCE participating States. Accordingly, the CPC, in line with the relevant FSC decisions, now intends to prepare, with funding from the European Union, an OSCE compendium of best practice guides for the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



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**895th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 901, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SERBIA**

Mr. Chairperson,  
Excellencies,  
Dear colleagues,

The Republic of Serbia conducted an inspection of a specified area within the territory of the Republic of Albania from 25 to 28 September 2018, in accordance with Chapter IX, paragraphs 74–106, of the Vienna Document 2011.

The Serbian inspection team was informed that no military activities subject to notification in accordance with the Vienna Document 2011 were being conducted in the specified area. The only ongoing military activity there was the “Albanian Lion/Biza 2018” exercise, of which the Republic of Albania had given notification in the agreed format on 14 August 2018 under message number CBM/AL/18/0012/F25/O. Through that notification, the Republic of Albania had informed the OSCE participating States that, apart from 960 members of its own armed forces, 40 members of the armed forces of the United Kingdom would also take part in the exercise, which would last from 24 to 29 September.

The inspection team was also informed that the first part of the exercise had begun already on 14 September and had been completed on 24 September, that is, on “Distinguished Visitors’ Day”. We should like to draw attention to the fact that the aforementioned notification using Vienna Document (VD) format F25 did not mention that military activities would also be taking place from 14 to 24 September. On the basis of the inspection plan proposed by the receiving State, the inspection team was meant to visit those places in which the second part of the exercise was conducted and, in general, to witness only that part – specifically the national evaluation of the NATO declared battalion battle group of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania.

It should be noted that the Albanian side declared that it could not provide an observation flight over the specified area owing to the small number of available helicopters, and also because there were other tasks with higher priority. During the inspection, some of the Albanian commanders referred, on a number of occasions, to the so-called “State of Kosovo”. The Serbian inspection team duly pointed out the fact that the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, and that, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), this province is under the interim administration of the UN. With regard to that, we would like to reiterate that our

position remains unchanged and is well known and that such issues should be discussed within the format of the Belgrade-Priština dialogue in Brussels. Most importantly, this matter is not for the commanders to discuss during an inspection of this kind. We lament the provocative, politically incorrect and unprofessional behaviour shown by those commanders.

Dear colleagues,

The briefings regarding military formations and units within the specified area were all in accordance with the Vienna Document 2011. There were no sensitive points within the specified area. The inspection team was allowed to talk with the personnel of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania.

We should like to emphasize that correct answers were on the whole given to the questions raised by the inspection team. However, we are also obliged to point out that short, incomplete, controversial and vague answers were given to questions related to the conduct of the exercise, especially to those querying the participation of uniformed members of the so-called “Kosovo Security Forces”. To some questions no answers were given at all, which leaves behind deep suspicions as to the good intentions of the Albanian side.

At the Biza training area, where the exercise was supposed to take place, the Serbian inspection team was informed that the first part of the exercise – the NATO evaluation of the NATO declared battalion battle group of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania had been completed on the very day before the inspection team was supposed to visit the training area and observe the evaluation. Only the data processing was in progress.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned facts regarding the inspection, we can only conclude that the Serbian inspection team was deliberately not given an opportunity to gain insight into the activities conducted under the exercise and its real size. The inspection team can confirm that no military activities subject to notification under the Vienna Document 2011 took place in the specified area at the time of inspection. However, the notification of the exercise using VD format F25 did not fully reflect the situation on the ground, and no reasonable explanation to account for this was provided.

To the questions posed on the participation in the exercise of uniformed personnel from the so-called “Kosovo Security Forces”, incorrect answers were given and nothing was clarified.

Mr. Chairperson,

Treating the Serbian inspection team in this way has not contributed to the fostering of good neighbourly relations and of stability within the region, nor has it aided implementation of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) or enhanced trust and co-operation in the OSCE area. Unfortunately, this example has shown that our colleagues and neighbours cannot be trusted completely.

The Republic of Serbia is strongly opposed to the establishment of the so-called “Kosovo armed forces” and to the involvement of any State in that process. The participation of uniformed persons from the so-called “Kosovo Security Forces” in the “Albanian Lion/Biza 2018” exercise is clearly an activity designed to support the transformation of the

so-called “Kosovo Security Forces” into the so-called “Kosovo armed forces”. What valid reasons can there be for creating another army in the region? Against whom would such an army be directed? The creation of the so-called “Kosovo armed forces” would pose nothing but a threat for the region and its States.

We emphasize that Kosovo, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1244, is not an independent State and cannot therefore have armed forces of its own.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 must be respected by all UN Member States, and all the open issues should be addressed in the framework of the Belgrade–Priština dialogue that is taking place under the auspices of the European Union.

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the only armed force in Kosovo and Metohija that is able and has the legitimacy, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1244, to uphold peace and protect the citizens of this southern Serbian province.

I thank you for your attention and kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.