

Chairmanship: Croatia

513th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 2 May 2007

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 11.20 a.m.

2. Chairperson: Mr. V. Matek

3. Subjects discussed — Statements — Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

None

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

(a) *Presentation on the role and perspectives of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) — present and future, by Mr. S. Papotis, Director of the RACVIAC:* Chairperson, Mr. S. Papotis (FSC.DEL/201/07 OSCE+), Germany, United States of America

(b) *Presentation on ballistic missile defence in Eastern Europe and European security, by the delegation of the Russian Federation:* Russian Federation (Annex), United States of America, Poland, Czech Republic, Belarus, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Chairperson

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

Matters of protocol: Denmark

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 9 May 2007, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/519

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Annex

ENGLISH

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513th Plenary Meeting

Journal No. 519, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

A few days ago, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, gave his annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, in which in addition to questions of domestic policy he also touched on a number of topical international problems. In particular, he drew attention to the plans to establish United States missile defence installations in Eastern Europe. It is clear that these plans are not just a problem for Russian-American relations. In one way or another they also affect the interests of all European countries, including those that are not members of NATO, for they drastically change the security situation on the continent. For that reason, this question warrants and indeed requires discussion within the OSCE. It is precisely these problems which are worrying the peoples of Europe that our Organization must deal with within its politico-military dimension.

The fact that the peoples of Europe are by no means indifferent to this problem can be seen from the broad discussion currently in progress. We also welcome the fact that this discussion is primarily taking place at the public opinion level, in the media, and not behind closed doors. These open debates can be regarded as evidence of the health of contemporary European politics and the maturity of European societies. However, multilateral official bodies too cannot and must not disregard a question that is capable of changing the European geostrategic landscape for years and decades to come. Not least of all, and perhaps even first and foremost, this concerns the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, which, as its mandate and title suggests, is called upon to deal not only with the technical aspects of the implementation of the Vienna Document or the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, but also with the truly important problems of European politics.

We might recall that the Russian delegation already raised this question at the Forum on 27 September 2006 during a special meeting on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. At that time, we expressed the conviction that the plans to establish missile defence elements in Eastern Europe contravene the commitments laid down in the Code of Conduct. In particular, I am referring to paragraph 3 of the Code, in accordance with which the participating States of the OSCE have undertaken not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Unfortunately, there has been no response to the concerns we expressed in September. There was no proper discussion of this subject at that time. The majority of delegations remained silent. We hope that this was not an indication of indifference to this pressing issue, which, and I reiterate this, affects the interests of all

countries within the OSCE area and not just the interests of Russia, the USA, Poland and the Czech Republic.

Allow me to set out our principal standpoints. The plans to establish missile defence elements in Poland and the Czech Republic mean that for the first time since the end of the “Cold War” the United States military presence on the European continent is acquiring a strategic component. The implementation of unilateral plans which affect the European security architecture will clearly not strengthen the feeling of security on the continent. In that connection, questions naturally arise about the extent to which pan-European institutions and the concept of collective security as a whole will become devalued. Another question arises as to what role NATO is to play in the implementation of the United States politico-military strategy, which, as we understand, is being formulated independently. Many are also wondering how all of this is being projected on to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.

There is no way that Russia, which is connected through its geostrategic relationship with both the United States and Europe, could objectively be unaffected by this development. What in our view are the risks associated with this project being pursued by the United States?

First and foremost, it leads to an erosion of what we call strategic stability, the advantages of which are enjoyed by virtually all the countries of the world. It could also damage the regime of “checks and balances” in global politics at large.

There has always been an objective interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons. Incidentally, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was concluded in 1972 at the initiative of the United States precisely for that reason. The development of a strategic defensive component can devalue the offensive potential of the other side. Much naturally depends on its subsequent development, but the United States is not setting itself any limits, including the development of the combat equipment of its missile defence base in Europe or the possibility of using this base to deploy an extensive network of interceptor systems on the continent. And in any case, the nature of the silos used for interceptors dangerously resembles launch facilities for intercontinental ballistic missiles. What will be in them in 5 to 10 years’ time? In short, in this matter our point of departure is not the stated intentions but the potential of the system, and it is this that causes us serious concern.

Moreover, we cannot regard this question in isolation inasmuch as the base in Europe will be part of the global missile defence system, elements of which tend to move closer to Russia’s borders from all sides.

It is already being stated openly that subsequently any future NATO missile defence system will be tailored to the national missile defence needs of the United States. In other words, the parameters of the missile defence architecture in Europe are already being predetermined unilaterally now, and this affects the interests of all European countries and most definitely Russia.

If this is about missile defence, notably in Europe, has Europe actually been consulted? If not, all previous talk about collective work involving Russia on missile defence projects on the continent is now also called into question. Yet, in recent years co-operation in

this sphere has been regarded as a major factor in overcoming the legacy of the “Cold War” in European politics and in truly restoring the unity of the continent.

Another key question is: how realistic is the missile threat they are trying to convince us of, which the European missile defence base of the United States is purported to provide protection against. We are convinced that such threat to Europe and the United States neither exists today nor will it in the foreseeable future. None of the so-called “problem countries” have missiles that could realistically threaten Europe. Building missiles that have the capability of reaching the United States would be an even taller order. This would require different technology and different production capabilities.

We are categorically against “strategic games” in Europe which may literally create a confrontational potential out of nowhere and build a European policy on the principle of “us and them”. We cannot be indifferent to the absence of the necessary readiness of our partners to collectively examine this question, including the assessment of potential threats (and, I reiterate, so far there have been no sign of any) and the adoption and implementation of joint decisions. Why the hurry and why the unilateralism — no one has been able to convincingly explain this to us yet. And this is a cause for concern. We will have to formulate our response, because the security of Russia must and will be ensured under all circumstances. And we will formulate this response building on the principles of reasonable sufficiency.

Other negative consequences must also be taken into account. We are referring, first and foremost, to the fact that these plans call into question the very possibility of resolving through political and diplomatic means problems connected with the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Progress made in the resolution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula shows that this is possible provided that all the parties display the necessary good will.

We are convinced that a serious dialogue on this problem is appropriate and necessary now. We have no intention of imposing anything on anyone. As a minimum we should have serious and reasoned discussions of matters of substance and not just briefings, which do not provide answers to specific questions. The planned disruption of the strategic balance should not be justified with hypothetical risks. Instead, we should concentrate on a joint analysis of real threats with regard to missiles. Incidentally, were such an assessment to be carried out, it would become clear that the radar and interceptors should not be deployed where planned, but further to the south. Only after a joint analysis would it make sense to adopt joint decisions, which, of course, must not be predetermined by unilateral actions.

In short, we are ready for co-operation and discussions both through bilateral Russian-American channels and within the Russia-NATO Council and the OSCE. But only on the basis of equal rights and not to the detriment of our security interests.

We trust that the serious discussion within the OSCE Forum on this topical issue will continue.

We request that the text of this statement be attached to the journal of today’s meeting.