

# Needs Assessment for the Improvement of Public Order Management of the Republic of Armenia Police

## Executive Report





# NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC ORDER MANAGEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA POLICE

Executive Report

Prepared by David I'Anson  
Police Superintendent, International Policing Advisor

Yerevan 2010

© OSCE 2010

The Report is prepared by the Consultant from the United Kingdom National Policing Improvement Agency (Bramshill) with the support of the OSCE Office in Yerevan.

ISBN 978-92-9235-850-1



Printed by "Asoghik" printing house  
15 Tumanyan str., Yerevan (office)  
45 Davit Malyan str., Avan (printing house)  
Tel: (374 10) 54 49 82, 62 38 63  
E-mail: [info@asoghik.am](mailto:info@asoghik.am)

## CONTENTS

<b>1. SUMMARY</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. POLICING STYLE</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>3. PUBLIC PROTECTION AND STAFF SAFETY</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4. POLICE TRAINING FACILITIES</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>5. STANDARDISATION OF TRAINING (POM)</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>6. SENIOR OFFICER OPERATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>7. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>8. DONOR SUPPORT</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>9. SPECIAL MEANS AND SPECIALIST SERVICES</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>10. CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>11. LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>13</b>

## 1. Summary

Between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> October 2009, a United Kingdom consultant, supported by the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) Office in Yerevan and the Republic of Armenia Police Service (RA Police) undertook an independent needs analysis review of Public Order Management capability.

Most operational policing services of the RA Police were visited and discussions; focus groups and observations were undertaken with a variety of Police Staff.<sup>1</sup>

Circumstances prevalent at the time allowed the consultant to observe a series of policing operations as well as the 2791 years celebration of the city of Yerevan. This included the 2010 Football World Cup qualifier between Armenia and Spain, two public demonstrations against the signing of the Armenia-Turkey protocol and celebrations culminating in a large open air public concert.

The initial analysis highlighted the use of the term 'Public Order Management'<sup>2</sup> as an 'all encompassing' process in its interpretation; often an approach linked to task-based and directive styles of policing. The analysis was widened to focus upon 'Public Safety Management'<sup>3</sup> of which part of that definition would include Public Order Management.

A comprehensive technical document has been compiled with five main categories for development/improvement.

1. An improvement in senior officer capability and willingness to undertake a multi-agency 'Public Safety Management' approach to policing that is much wider than Public Order Management.
2. Enhanced focus on training in the areas of tactical deployment and the use of force continuum as a direct result of an 'institutional over emphasis' on disorder resolution rather than conflict management and passive policing approaches.
3. A progression to standardised staff 'personal safety' through 'uniformed equipment' moving away from the all encompassing term 'Special Means'<sup>4</sup>. This would provide all staff with the same lower level personal

---

<sup>1</sup>Police Staff is the term used to prevent confusion over use of generic term 'officer' as in officer class.

<sup>2</sup>Public Order Management is the management of order; presence, maintaining public order and taking physical control – direct intervention as part of conflict management.

<sup>3</sup>Public Safety Management has a focus upon preventative strategies; designing out crime; people management, and use of generic safety approaches e.g. barriers, street lighting, Road Safety rather than behaviour control. Involves multi-agency planning and coordination for a common goal.

<sup>4</sup>Special Means relates to nine specialist weapons or tactics; including Stun Gun, Rubber Batons, Distraction devices (flares and sound), handcuffs, Tear Gas, vehicle stopping devices, Water Canon, general purpose dogs and special painting materials (crowd marking).

protection; thereby allowing the citizen to have greater confidence in the role and capability of the police service.

4. A more robust 'scientific approach' to the identification, procurement and deployment of 'Special Means' commensurate with successful tactical consideration but with an expressed expectation on public safety and accountability whenever authorised or used.
5. To improve the capability and accountability of incident management through the introduction of, Evidence Gathering Teams; use of Tactical Advisors for senior officers, the auditable use of decision-making policy logs and the recording of incident radio communications.

In support of the RA Police commitment towards a professional, efficient and accountable policing service forty four recommendations are made, many of which will allow the citizen to value the work of an emerging service seen to be progressing towards better citizen acceptance and a community style of policing. (See section 11)

Many of those recommendations are about policing improvements designed to enhance the reputation, transparency and accountability of the Police Service and if implemented can quickly improve not just the policing approaches around Public Order Management but also public perception, police accountability and positive media relations across Europe and further afield.

In addition, the recommendations encourage standardisation of services and considerations where efficiencies can be made through better resource utilisation and most importantly a visible police service that cares about its people whom it serves.

The development of these enhanced public relations and alignment with other nations' expectations is important for the Republic of Armenia as the growing political scrutiny and social interest from the wider European Union expands.

David I'Anson  
Police Superintendent

## 2. Policing Style

The term Public Order Management (POM) used frequently by members of the RA Police, including the Internal Police Troops, is an all encapsulating generic term but the operational reality observed was a strong leaning towards higher-level policing<sup>5</sup> and incident resolution approaches; a focus upon task conclusion rather than management of the environment, citizen freedom and the provision of a 'police service' in support of communities.

There was little visual reinforcement of a passive, visibly engaging,<sup>6</sup> style of democratic policing observed in 'day to day' activity and even less so during the evening hours.

This resulted in the needs analysis considering a much wider approach of 'Public Safety Management' (PSM) rather than just POM; to include training, equipment and operational activities and to review operational capabilities in passive incident management.

The District Police have an over-bureaucratic approach to 'Duty Team'<sup>7</sup> attendance because they do not have omnicompetent skills and whilst their education pathway is lengthy—(four years at the Police Academy) the level of individual ability, autonomy or authority to deal professionally with issues is minimal. This is, and will remain, a barrier to improvement, particularly around further progression towards a community style of policing.

The Patrol Service seems to be inefficiently utilised and operate in groups (often linked with Internal Police Troops) with little apparent decision making ability. There is a perceived inability through structure and deployment strategies to provide a contemporary police service, preferring to focus upon visibility as a preventative measure.

The overall strategic deployment, pro-activity and public engagement of the Traffic Police is poorly focused and reinforces the divide between the police and the communities.

## 3. Public Protection and Staff Safety

It was evident that Police Staff, across various services have different approaches and approval levels for the use / authority for 'Special Means'. The Traffic Police standard protection is only the pistol with no Special Means being

---

<sup>5</sup>Higher-level refers to more robust styles of policing where conflict resolution can be anticipated and often requires a greater level of control and the application of legal force to resolve.

<sup>6</sup>Visibly engaging is a policing approach whereby the Police Services are seen to be an integral part of society and are consistently involved in dialogue with the citizen in their 'day to day' activities

<sup>7</sup>'Duty Team' is an operational unit of District Police staff who operate in a single vehicle and comprises a Neighbourhood Inspector, Criminal Investigator and Juvenile Inspector.

carried. This leaves them and the public vulnerable as they have no recourse to lower level resolution<sup>8</sup> 'Special Means' i.e. they are not issued with tear gas, baton or handcuffs.

District based Neighbourhood and Juvenile Inspectors normally only carry 'Special Means' when part of an operation or as a Duty Team response unit member. At other times, even whilst working in their communities, 'Special Means' are not carried.

From both a POM perspective and officer safety position Police Staff across all the services should be afforded access to basic 'Special Means' for their own protection at a level commensurate to the threat. The public, including suspects, deserve the surety that any use of force applied will be proportionate to the threat, and standardisation of equipment should be a priority; including if necessary changes in legislation to separate 'essential equipment' from the 'Special Means' categories.

NB: There needs to be a greater emphasis placed on how to engage with the public, the use of passive cordons (open, closed and reinforced cordons) and escorting groups in standard uniform as this was clearly missing during the observed policing operations.<sup>9</sup>

#### **4. Police Training Facilities**

The Head of the Training Centre is the co-author of the report 'Concept of the RA Police Education Reforms' and the report does highlight a viable approach to standardisation of recruitment and training that is worthy of note.

The facilities at the Police Academy and Training Centre are contrasting; with the support of the OSCE Office in Yerevan the Training Centre is well maintained and conducive with a good learning environment, whereas the Police Academy is in a poor condition; highlighting in certain areas that training, particularly firearms, cannot be provided to any acceptable standard.

Firearms' training is almost exclusively delivered through simulation and whilst there is a two lane range at the Training Centre the use of live ammunition is limited. The technologies used for simulation did not replicate operational reality and two simulation exercises were observed and found to be particularly discerning; encouraging fast reaction and excessive engagement rather than a balanced and threat assessed resolution.

---

<sup>8</sup>Lower-level relates to 'day to day' contact and the policing approach to resolve minor citizen related issues through communication, use of legal powers or limited use of force.

<sup>9</sup>Attached at Appendix (II) of the Technical Report is an 'in depth' explanatory section on the policing activities, observations and summary of events observed by the consultant during the period of the needs analysis.



At both Centres there were no visual displays or wall charts<sup>10</sup> displayed in the various learning environments to psychologically reinforce the vitally important linkages between training activities, the reinforcement of Human Rights considerations and the use of force in the context of POM.

For example:

- the use of force continuum
- the location of, and guidance on, how low level application of force can be used against human pressure points as a control mechanism
- examples of techniques for using open handed restraint skills
- the use of passive handcuffing
- the use of baton as a defensive or control device

At the Police Academy, where the target audience are senior officers or students progressing to such levels, there were no specific courses developed in the management of public order incidents, contingency planning, multi-agency partnership working, critical incident management, or the concept of Command and Control, incorporating the Gold, Silver and Bronze approach which are all essential to POM and effective PSM.

Cumulatively, the learning environment, firearms simulation and police staff personal safety option highlight an inherent organisational culture to train for higher level resolution rather than reinforcing the importance and personal accountability for lower level resolution techniques to be considered at every opportunity.

A democratic populous would expect police staff to show restraint, apply techniques that are commensurate with the threat and behaviour of the suspect not an emphasis upon higher level martial arts training.

### ***Internal Police Troops***

A large training exercise at the higher level of disorder resolution and a range of cordon work, shield unit deployments, vehicle recovery, Water Cannon tactics, pyrotechnics (noise and smoke) Arrest Teams, vehicle fire, minor barricade removal (burning tyres) and deployment of a barbed wire road closure device was observed. The training was excellent; professional, restrained and fully compliant with Health and Safety, Use of Force continuum and the tactics were correctly applied to the scenario.

---

<sup>10</sup>Appendix (III) of the Technical Report provides a number of examples of visual displays and wall charts.

### ***The Patrol Service***

A series of equipment and training interventions including members of their Specialist Unit undertaking intervention tactics from vehicles and buildings as well as the use of pyrotechnics were delivered to a very high standard.

## **5. Standardisation of Training (POM)**

Whilst it can be accepted that certain roles within POM are allocated to certain departments / Units there is no common minimum standard of tactics or training for all, working to a nationally approved standard and published training manual to ensure consistency.

Common Minimum Standards are normal in contemporary policing systems and whilst some of the tactics are more 'practiced' by expert groups the standardisation of the tactic overall is important. This allows for more efficient deployment strategies as well as all staff being deployable to the minimum level and enhances the expectations of staff and the professionalism of the Police Service.

It was confirmed that there is no national or multi-service standardisation or educational oversight of all training content and trainer standards. Such standardisation would be seen as good practice, encourage a unified standard of staff behaviour and create the ability to deploy staff with better understanding of their capability and thereby maximise effectiveness.

## **6. Senior Officer Operational Incident Management**

When the RA Police is compared with contemporary 'Command and Control' approaches to incident or POM it is found to be inefficient, lacks effectiveness and is hierarchically command-led. Authority and decision making responsibility should be applied at the most appropriate level in a role not rank based approach.

To improve this 'performance gap'<sup>11</sup> a learning programme should be developed that is specific to senior officers involved in either the planning, command and control or tactical resolution of incidents across the whole spectrum. That programme would benefit from being delivered in country, practically based with supporting classroom theory and should not focus on higher level conflict resolution but the use of communication, policy logs<sup>12</sup>, specialist support i.e.

---

<sup>11</sup>A Performance Gap is the difference between the current position and the future preferred position.

<sup>12</sup>A Policy Log is a written document, completed contemporaneously to show the decision making process.

Evidence Gathering Teams,<sup>13</sup> Human Rights and legal protest and the provision of expert Tactical Advice<sup>14</sup> that would bring the RA Police more in line with an established European capability.

### ***Decision Making***

There are concerns evident in relation to the decisions making process; beginning with event approval, all the way through planning to operational activity. It was reported that if required, the commander in charge of an incident will retrospectively justify any decision-making. Whilst document retention was mentioned there is no 'Policy Log' process in place that describes; the prevailing circumstances, tactical consideration and the decision making rationale at the time; be this in a written form or where verbally made i.e. recording of radio communication.

To allow RA Police to be internally and externally transparent in its planning and incident resolution this is an important area for early attention.

## **7. Radio Communications**

Radio communications in general across the range of policing services was found to be poor; primarily in terms of the standard of technology availability and appropriate use of fixed or mobile systems. Whilst District Police Stations have radio systems they are out of date, predominantly operate on a single channel frequency with no ability for recording for future analysis or audit trail.

Donor support for a mobile system(s) i.e. specially designed and equipped Command Vehicle(s) could add real benefit at a realistic cost to the transparent and efficient use of communications.

## **8. Donor Support**

The use of donor support—financial, technical (equipment) and by way of experts should be carefully managed. It is often the case that experts within specialist fields i.e. firearms and POM are seen as higher level resolution experts and promulgate the greater use of aggressive technologies (Tear Gas, smoke and pyrotechnic) and tactics; omitting to reinforce passive use of the police in modern POM. This was immediately evident during the needs analysis.

---

<sup>13</sup>Evidence Gathering Teams have responsibility for visual and audio recording in support of investigation and prosecution as well as recording police activities in support of specialist resources.

<sup>14</sup>Tactical Advisors are specially trained, and where possible accredited, staff who provide tactical options / considerations to assist commanders with decision making.

Any donor 'training' support should be bespoke to the RA Police's future development and change in ideology around POM to PSM and not the provision of 'off the shelf', slightly amended products that reinforce the current philosophy. It is recommended that greater use of donor training support should be directed to the design of a course in 'Passive Policing Management' and delivered across all Public Services i.e. Traffic Police, District Police, Patrol Service, Internal Police Troops, Prosecutors, Municipal Authorities and where planning and organisational control is located centrally relevant staff from Headquarters posts.

## 9. Special Means and Specialist Services

### *Special Means*

The Internal Police Troops have a wide range of 'Special Means' available to them ranging from baton, stun gun, CS (Tear Gas), pyrotechnics and distraction devices. What was found to be concerning was once a Special Means type is approved i.e. Stun Gun the actual model and technical capability falls to the user to decide upon. There are no independent medical, psychological, cultural or perceptual criteria or analysis applied to provide guidance on how the device would operate in certain environments; including the identification of any inherent dangers to certain group types<sup>15</sup> or during certain prevailing weather conditions.

### *Evidence Gathering and Tactical Advisor Capabilities*

The Internal Police Troops and Patrol Service do not have either a true Evidence Gathering or Tactical Advisor capability. The Internal Police Troops do state they are currently looking at establishing an evidence gathering capability but the full concept pre and post event, as well as the use of Forward Intelligence Teams,<sup>16</sup> is not fully understood.

These important roles also supports operational credibility allowing for transparency of policing, as part of their function is to cover individual and crowd behaviour as well as recording any police response i.e. official warnings, use of tactics, detention and arrests.

---

<sup>15</sup>Group types include impact factors based on age, sex, medical condition, mental health as well as those persons who are non-participating in the incident but could be affected as a side effect of the use of Special Means.

<sup>16</sup>Forward Intelligence Teams identify individuals or groups who may become involved in disorder and provide intelligence updates to commanders.

## 10. Conclusions

The RA Police is a disparate organisation operating predominantly in a single functional model and is linked closely to a style of policing that has a focus upon 'policing the citizen' rather than a service in support of communities. This single-functional approach has caused differences to be observed in training, role and responsibility as well as a differing willingness to engage with the citizen across the various Police Services.

Whilst it is not possible within these conclusions to cover all aspects of the report it is important to highlight themes; the need for better donor support in terms of appropriateness of technical equipment; a need for reinforcement within the initial police education system for lower level conflict resolution and the need for education and training across a wide spectrum to improve senior officer capability in PSM.

At a strategic level a recommendation is made to amend legislation for lower level 'Special Means' i.e. handcuffs, baton and hand held Tear Gas to be reclassified as uniformed personal protection equipment allocated to all operational resources. In addition, the introduction of an independent scientific process for the identification and testing of higher level 'Special Means' to ensure they are proportionate, safe when used and subject to clearly auditable authorisation levels and accountability.

There are a number of 'quick wins' identified where positive improvements can be made, and at little cost. These important areas range from issues like all Police Staff being readily identifiable through visible numbers or names; a move towards a common standard of Officer Safety Training and the issue of standardised personal equipment for all Police Services.

There is limited contemporary Command and Control awareness, nor the ability to set up a functioning communications control structure due to shortages of equipment and technical ability to use it. This is a key area for effective management but also the first steps to accountability through recorded radio transmission, decision recording and visual capturing of policing of events.

There is a need to change the 'mind-set' of training through the Police Academy and the Training Centre to a 'Public Service' philosophy - as simple as ensuring people are safe on the roads and policing is visible - not intrusive yet engaging. This change is already evident through the Head of the Training Centre who is trying to realign police education and is a co-author of the report 'Concept of the RA Police Education Reforms' and aligns in many ways to the findings of this needs analysis.

## 11. List of Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

Identification numbers or names of all Police Staff, irrespective of rank or position, subject to 'exceptional' operational sensitivity<sup>17</sup>, should be visibly displayed on the exterior of police clothing so as to be able to identify individual officers and not only units.

### Recommendation 2

The curricula of the Police Academy should be reviewed to ensure purposefulness of all aspects of general Public Safety Management training during initial training. The introduction of specific modules outside of initial training that cover command functional responsibilities on a skills required basis should be tailor made to staff who need the training not just directed towards senior ranks.

### Recommendation 3

The findings and recommendations of the report 'Concept of the RA Police Education Reforms' should be positively considered and since they align in many ways to the findings of this needs analysis.

### Recommendation 4

The use of time-bound continuation training for the Police Academy and Training Centre should incorporate key themes in the curriculum from POM to PSM and address all staff across all Police Services.

### Recommendation 5

The classroom environment should reinforce the content of mutually linked modules that are in their turn conceptually and visibly linked with Human Rights, Legislation and the lawful use of force within a continuum, not just delivered as separate entities or with a focus towards extremes.

---

<sup>17</sup>Exceptional operational sensitivity should only apply to specific activities not anonymity by functional role.

**Recommendation 6**

Donor Support by way of technologies should be carefully aligned to the policing approach and requirements of the RA Police. Any simulation technology offered should reflect the weapons used within the service and operational reality.

**Recommendation 7**

Consideration should be made to incorporate less lethal options / technologies into firearms training curricula as an integrated means of resolution.

**Recommendation 8**

The use of visual charts describing use of force continuum, conflict resolution and low level use of force techniques; including the use of open hand skills and baton should be on display within the gymnasiums of training facilities and integrated within their training regime at every opportunity.

NB: The norm for such displays should be the passive use of force. Displays containing the use of shields, Special Means including batons and videos of riot control should only be used in the correct context and removed in an attempt to break the perceived culture of higher level conflict resolution.

**Recommendation 9**

All new recruits going through the Police Training Centre should have a programme developed that incorporates passive policing techniques as part of practical POM before joining their dedicated units.

**Recommendation 10**

The Police Academy Firearms Range is not fit for purpose and causes concerns over how students receive acceptable firearms training. In such a structural lengthy training period i.e. 4 years, the use of temporary facilities/alternative options is not conducive with quality learning and reinforcement, and should be addressed urgently.

NB: The assessor has been informed of US donor support for new facilities but research should be undertaken to establish how current training is being delivered.

**Recommendation 11**

A review should be undertaken to assess the suitability of tactics that are:

- a) Aggressive by nature,
- b) Seen to display an excessive police response by the citizen.

*NB:* The public image of policing is equally important as incident resolution.

**Recommendation 12**

The use of 'Special Means' during disorder (not officer personal safety) should be developed into a particular tactic for each Means requiring a clearly defined authorisation level and where possible a requirement for a verbal/visual warning to be given and recorded. This approach should begin from the use of baton when used as a specific tactic.

**Recommendation 13**

A programme should be developed, including an approved manual of techniques for Officer Safety Training through the use of open handed skills, handcuffing techniques and the use of baton as a control and defensive device rather than a use of force option.

**Recommendation 14**

Officer Safety Training should be standardised across the whole of the Police Service; applied to a well documented process of instruction and lesson planning and delivered independently to any regime of physical fitness or martial arts development.

**Recommendation 15**

Officer Safety Training should initially be delivered by way of a specific and separate course delivered during initial training with certification and refreshed on an annual basis. This will allow for continual certified competence of all Police Services.

**Recommendation 16**

A review should be made of the process of firearms training and re-training to ensure, whilst the cost of this process can be financially offset through the use of simulation technologies, that sufficient live ammunition and range usage is provided to ensure qualification is relevant to operational requirements.



**Recommendation 17**

All training, no matter where it is delivered, should come under the control of a nominated Head of Training across the whole of the Police Service to ensure standardisation, recertification, including responsibility for all work-based learning delivered outside the Police Academy or the Training Centre.

**Recommendation 18**

A manual of guidance on the use of tactics within POM should be developed that is based upon common minimum standards for all; while accepting that certain more specialist tactics would be better applied by the more practised and higher trained services those generic tactics, cordons, shield, use of baton that can be used by all police staff should be the same across all services.

**Recommendation 19**

A programme should be developed to provide staff in charge of Public Order Teams with specific training in tactical considerations, options and management considerations and responsibilities connected with controlling their teams to maximise their potential and effectiveness.

**Recommendation 20**

Enhanced Command and Control awareness should be provided to all senior officers to progress towards a more contemporary approach to incident management through delegated responsibility so incidents are managed at the correct level.

**Recommendation 21**

All planned events/operations should be inherently based on a separate planning activity, risk assessment and designed to reflect the prevailing circumstances. The continual use of generic, prior approved plans is a flawed approach.

**Recommendation 22**

A greater focus should be applied to ensuring the right persons' skills and competence are developed for POM roles and a progression away from rank/position at various levels as the automatic determinant for command of incidents.

**Recommendation 23**

A specific programme should be developed for incident / event commanders that focus upon Command and Control, communication, specialist support, Human Rights and policing lawful protests to professionalise the overall management process.

**Recommendation 24**

Policy Logs should be adopted across the whole of the police services and in particular during critical incidents in a form that ensures integrity, transparency and accountability of decision making.

**Recommendation 25**

A review should be made of the Command and Control capability of the RA Police through the use of Command Rooms / mobile communication units to allow for a more integrated and flexible system to be applied.

**Recommendation 26**

Consideration, through Donor Support, to source at least one mobile command vehicle to bring about a change in the process of incident management through the recording of radio transmissions and policy log management to support greater transparency and accountability for incident resolution.

**Recommendation 27**

The current situation of District Police in various positions and the Traffic Police not carrying 'Special Means' whilst on duty should be reviewed to ensure all police services are trained in basic officer safety and issued with equipment to support their role; ensuring the citizen and Police Staff are afforded personal and legal protection.

**Recommendation 28**

Consideration should be given to reclassifying the Special Means of handcuffs, baton as a defensive device and hand-held tear gas as personal issue officer safety equipment that can then be subject to a training and refresher recertification regime.

**Recommendation 29**

The use of donor support should be carefully managed to ensure the product being delivered fits within the requirements of the Republic of Armenia and is not from a generic off-the-shelf product approach.

**Recommendation 30**

The identification and sourcing of 'Special Means' should be through a scientific process including medical, psychological and societal analysis and be approved in all occasions by an independent body who should certify each make and model with guidance. There should not be a 'type approval' generic process allowing Police Services to source their own preferences.

**Recommendation 31**

RA Police should establish a cadre of accredited Evidence Gatherers to support policing activities; to ensure correct evidence is secured to support any prosecution as well as a visual record of police actions.

**Recommendation 32**

RA Police should establish a cadre of accredited Tactical Advisors to support policing activities; to ensure correct and balanced advice is given to commanders and to professionalise the decision making process.

**Recommendation 33**

A review should be undertaken to ensure that where an event justifies stewards to be provided by the organisers that the numbers and skills required are suitable to ensure the event passes with the minimum of disruption and that safety is the primary emphasis. Appropriate legislation may be a consideration in this area.

**Recommendation 34**

All Police Staff should, as part of their initial training and follow-up training<sup>18</sup>, receive guidance on escorting crowds and the use of cordons in normal policing activities.

---

<sup>18</sup>Also referred to as continuation training and should be reinforced throughout their service to continue to be proficient.

**Recommendation 35**

During the planning process careful consideration should be made to ensure Traffic Management and Event Coordination occurs, thereby ensuring an effective Traffic Management Plan is in place throughout the period i.e. post event with an overarching objective of PSM, not incident resolution.

**Recommendation 36**

Police Staff supervising events, particularly those using roads (processions and demonstrations) should wear high visibility clothing. Whilst culturally this is resented as it is often aligned to clothing worn by perceived lower level public servants this is no excuse and a suitable style should be identified.

**Recommendation 37**

All personnel attending events / planned incidents should receive an overview briefing of the whole event, how the event will be policed, their role within that plan and be provided with the opportunity to ask questions. Previous attendance at a similar event is no excuse for not attending the briefing or for managers not delivering a full briefing.

**Recommendation 38**

At all events justifying an operational plan to be developed a paper or electronic copy for the whole event should be provided in advance for commanders, as well as a short version covering responsibilities and duties for all personnel involved prior to or during the briefing. This documentation should include an explanation of the contingency plans applicable to the event.

**Recommendation 39**

Police Services, unless the risk assessment justifies their deployment, should not be used as a stewarding service at events or operations.

**Recommendation 40**

Police resources should be trained and deployed in tactics that support Public Safety i.e. crowd dynamics, effective crowd monitoring – use of vantage points e.g. high positions overlooking the crowds.<sup>19</sup>

**Recommendation 41**

A greater emphasis should be placed on crowd safety as part of the primary focus of PSM. Historically a series of tragedies across Europe have occurred e.g. Hillsborough, United Kingdom, Heysel Stadium, Belgium and lessons should be learned and the findings/recommendations from these incidents should proactively be introduced into event planning.

**Recommendation 42**

Police Staff attending planned or spontaneous large scale events should be briefed in advance and arrive via a Forward Holding Area.<sup>20</sup> Those who for operational reasons, attend directly to the scene should wherever possible be readily equipped, immediately briefed out of sight of the event and deploy in a professional manner.

**Recommendation 43**

All Police Staff should receive awareness training in the recognition of 'trigger incidents'<sup>21</sup> and the impact they can have on policing.

**Recommendation 44**

A review be undertaken in relation to public order deployment strategies for each Police Service as well as where services are deployed jointly e.g. preventative patrols between the Patrol Service and Police Troop to ensure the most cost effective and efficient service is delivered.

---

<sup>19</sup>Good examples of high positions include steps outside of buildings, stages or scaffolding that allows for good observations whilst still in contact with the crowd dynamic.

<sup>20</sup>Forward Holding Area is a secure location near to the event location allowing for rapid deployment

<sup>21</sup>A Trigger Incident is any activity that has the potential to bring about a sudden escalation of disorder whether connected to the specific event or not and can be caused by the police, citizen or other party.