



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.AIAM/42/02  
13 March 2002

ENGLISH only

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**Conference Services**

Please find attached the Chairperson's Report and reports of the Working Session Rapporteurs of the 2002 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.



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**2002 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION  
ASSESSMENT MEETING**

**Vienna, 4 to 6 March 2002**

**CONSOLIDATED REPORT**

**CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**

**REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS**

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## **CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**

# **CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT TO THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION ON THE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING**

Vienna, 4 to 6 March 2002

The Chairperson of the closing plenary of the 12th Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), held in Vienna, has the honour to submit a report to the Forum for Security Co-operation on the proceedings, discussions and results of the Meeting.

The objective of this Annual Meeting was, in accordance with Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999, to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). In open discussions, the participating States exchanged their views, with the common objective of contributing to the enhancement of confidence and security in the OSCE area.

The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation and the Partners for Co-operation were invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings.

The AIAM comprised the opening plenary session chaired by Switzerland, the closing plenary session chaired by the Czech Republic and five working sessions facilitated by designated co-ordinators and their thoroughly prepared background papers and introductory remarks.

At the closing plenary session, the five rapporteurs presented their reports on the outcome of the discussions and the recommendations of each working session. Their reports will be attached to this statement, and my comments on the working sessions draw upon those comprehensive reports.

In the opening plenary, the Chairperson of the FSC delivered a report on its activities in the field of CSBMs since the last AIAM. In addition to other matters, he stressed the need for examining the operation and implementation of the relevant existing agreed CSBMs, namely those embodied in the VD99 and also other documents, in terms of their contribution to action to combat terrorism, and referred to the emerging FSC "roadmap", which the AIAM has been part of.

Working Session 1 addressed the questions of the annual exchange of military information, defence planning, the annual calendar of military activities and the communications network. The importance of the annual exchange was reiterated. It was noted that four participating States had failed to submit their annual information exchanges for 2001 despite the reminder mechanism, and without providing an explanation. Ideas for enhancing the reminder mechanism were then discussed; a reinforced assistance, both through the CPC and bilaterally, to those failing to meet their commitments was considered.

A proposal for presenting and discussing defence planning documents at the FSC was made which was generally felt worth pursuing. The repeated failure by some participating States to submit their defence planning documents was addressed and suggestions were made, which are to be pursued by the FSC.

It was noted that a number of participating States had failed to submit their annual calendars of military activities subject to prior notification. The number of activities included in these calendars was observed to be small. There was no immediate need felt to lower the thresholds for notifying activities.

The transfer of the central mail server from the Hague to Vienna and the steps that had been taken to modernize the Communications Network were mentioned. The number of participating States connected to the Network had risen to 40.

Overall, the discussion in this working session was frank and constructive, although no clarifications for non-compliance by the respective participating States were provided. Since the number of non-compliers with the provisions on military exchange of information is not declining, the matter needs to be addressed in the FSC.

The discussion in Working Session 2 took stock of the implementation of the activities set forth in Chapter IV, "Contacts", of the VD99, given the expiry of the common five-year period for visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations, and for observations of certain military activities. It was noted with concern that a considerable number of participating States had failed to issue invitations for such events, and one entire region had not met its commitments in that regard. Although there was no doubt that the obligatory measures under Chapter IV were to be implemented fully by all the participating States, no explanations of non-compliance were offered in the course of the discussion.

Experience gained through organizing events and positive observations made during events hosted by other participating States were shared. It was also pointed out that some of the events that had been organized had failed to meet all the criteria set forth in the VD99, while the parameters for other events were not defined clearly in the VD99.

The discussion identified concrete issues which would need to be addressed. Working Group A of the Forum for Security Co-operation will have to undertake further analysis and seek solutions. For example, a special reminder mechanism might be developed and implemented to remind the participating States of their commitment to host activities set forth in Chapter IV, "Contacts", of the VD99, and a list of minimum requirements for a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems should be developed and adopted.

Some technical aspects of hosting events should be discussed; visits should not be organized during the new five-year period to air bases which had already hosted such events in the past. The practice followed for fixing assembly points and points of entry for hosting activities under Chapters IV and VI needed to be addressed;

Working Session 3 dealt with prior notification, observation of certain military activities and regional measures.

Under the first sub-item, the overall decrease in the number of notifiable activities was observed, and was considered to represent a positive indication of a more secure and peaceful environment throughout the OSCE area. No need was felt to lower the numerical parameters for notification or to extend the substantive scope of such activities. One

delegation referred to the need for an adjustment to the notification regime with particular regard to peacekeeping operations.

Several delegations provided information on observations of their military activities, as well as on the plans for such invitations in 2002. Voluntary invitations to observe activities below notifiable thresholds were regarded as positive, and worth being encouraged.

A number of delegations provided information on their relevant activities within regional arrangements that were complementing, not taking the place of, the universal CSBMs. Such regional measures were considered to be the key contribution to security and stability in the OSCE area. Delegations discussed the specific contribution of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), which might possibly become a “regional verification agency” and set an example for other regions; the issue was expected to be revisited in the FSC. In this context, the compendium of regional CSBMs prepared by the CPC was found useful.

The discussions in Working Session 4 drew attention to the fact that the number of inspections and evaluation visits was high, and that the proportion of multinational activities and activities based on regional arrangements was increasing. The early exhaustion of inspection quotas (the “quota race”) was identified as problematic, and closely connected to non-observance of the timeframe for requesting inspections established by the VD99. Reference was made to failures to submit reports or their late submission. Respect for the area of inspection as defined by the inspecting State was of the utmost importance. Denials of inspections, invoking *force majeure*, would have to be dealt with by the FSC as a matter of priority. The issue of entry visas needed to be addressed. Questions related to the equipment of inspectors and the number of inspection team members merited further deliberation.

Regarding CSBMs in crisis situations, a proposal was introduced which suggested a flexible system of actions to be taken when ordinary measures were not feasible. Many delegations emphasized the “all-weather” nature of the VD99; others focused rather on its preventive and post-conflict role. It was felt that further attention by the FSC and its working groups was needed in order to bring positions closer. At the same time, there was a common understanding that no new CSBMs were needed, although the existing ones ought to be better employed in crisis situations.

Working Session 5 assessed the implementation of several sets of measures and also examined their relevance for combating terrorism. The importance of the assessment of the Code of Conduct questionnaire was highlighted. Paragraphs 6 and 18 of the Code were cited as being particularly relevant in the combating of terrorism. The third follow-up conference on the Code of Conduct, scheduled for September, was looked upon as a major opportunity to improve the document, also with regard to the combating of terrorism. It was felt that Working Group A could be assigned the task of improving the questionnaire.

The need to update both the information exchange on principles governing conventional arms transfers (CAT) and the questionnaire on CAT was discussed, and it was agreed that Working Group B should undertake the task. A meeting of weapons experts was suggested to examine potential restrictions on arms transfers.

In conjunction with the questionnaire on anti-personnel landmines, a number of activities related to such landmines were referred to. The Balkans Mine Action Programme, supported by Canada, was cited as an initiative specific to the Balkan region. The focus remained on stockpile reduction, with the Albanian Partnership for Peace project serving as a template for future projects.

The great importance of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was emphasized, along with its potential in action to combat terrorism. Several delegations saw a compelling need for timely development of a template for the second information exchange, model answers and a "best practices" handbook. The Conflict Prevention Centre was encouraged to provide further assistance in that regard. National initiatives aimed at improving the ability to trace SALW were announced. A suggestion was made to better define the categories and sub-categories of SALW by interpreting the terms "category" and "sub-category" in the information exchange to include the type and name or model of the SALW.

At the closing plenary meeting, delegations discussed at length the duration of the next AIAM, to take place in 2003. Some delegations were in favour of shortening the AIAM to two days, given that the time slots available for some working sessions had not been used to the full and that the substance had been sufficiently covered within a shorter time than foreseen by the Meeting's order of business. The need for a better organization of work was emphasized. Others disagreed, pointing to the need to preserve the necessary time allocation for sessions of AIAM, bearing in mind its function as the key annual event in the field of CSBMs, as well as the opportunity it afforded for informal contacts, which would be diminished if the Meeting were shortened. The Chairperson concluded that, given the diversity of opinions expressed, it would be neither possible nor practical to take a decision on the duration of the 13th AIAM at the current juncture. He also noted that the opinions expressed would be taken into account in further deliberations by the FSC on the modalities for the 2003 AIAM. The plenary meeting then agreed that the next AIAM would be held at the beginning of March 2003, and that the dates, agenda and modalities would be decided by the FSC.

In conclusion, the Chairperson observed that, according to Chapter XI of VD99, the objective of the 12th AIAM had been to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs, and that that objective had been accomplished.

The Chairperson referred to further meetings on CSBMs scheduled for the remainder of 2002, which would also afford opportunities for discussing implementation (in particular, the third follow-up conference on the Code of conduct, scheduled for September 2002). The debate had also shown that FSC events relating to specific sets of CSBMs needed to be better taken into account in preparing the agenda for the next AIAM.

Thanks to the preparatory work by the Swiss Chairperson and that by the co-ordinators and rapporteurs, as well as to an active involvement by many delegations, the 12th AIAM had furthered the implementation of OSCE commitments in the politico-military field. The Chairperson noted that the co-ordinators, rapporteurs and the CPC had delivered to the full on their respective assignments pursuant to FSC Decision No. 1/02 of 30 January 2002, and expressed his profound gratitude for their work.



The Chairperson stated that his report on the 12th AIAM would be submitted to the next plenary meeting of the FSC. It was expected that a working group would carefully study and address the suggestions and assessments made during the 2002 AIAM; a written report on suggested solutions that was to be submitted by the CPC within a month would greatly facilitate that process.\*

The Chairperson appreciated the participation of the Mediterranean Partners and of the Partners for Co-operation in the plenary meetings and hoped that the Partners would be able to benefit from the OSCE experience in respect of CSBMs in the pursuit of similar objectives in their respective regions and in further co-operative interaction with OSCE participating States. He reiterated his thanks to both the organizers of, and the participants in, the 12th AIAM for their work.

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\* Note by the Chairperson: Approximately 80 per cent of the suggestions made by participating States, as compiled by the CPC, have been reflected in the debates of working sessions and in the rapporteur's reports.

**REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS**

## **WORKING SESSION 1**

Monday, 4 March 2002

### **Report of the Working Session Rapporteur**

- Annual exchange of military information
  - Defence planning
  - Annual calendars and constraining provisions
  - Communications network
- 

#### **Introduction**

The session, co-ordinated by Mr. Jos Schellaars, discussed the topics, 'Annual exchange of military information', 'Defence planning', 'Annual calendars/Constraining provisions' and 'Communications network'. The debate followed the list of topics and questions prepared by the Co-ordinator (FSC.AIAM/6/02). The discussions are outlined below.

#### **1. Annual exchange of military information**

Various delegations stressed the importance of this chapter for enhancing transparency. They pointed to the fact that four participating States had not yet submitted their information for the 2001 exchange, despite the fact that the reminder mechanism had been used. They requested clarification of this implementation deficit, but no explanations were forthcoming. Explanations were also not forthcoming with respect to the documents that had been submitted late. A full discussion took place on the effectiveness of the reminder mechanism. There was consensus among the delegations that the mechanism did not motivate participating States to provide information and therefore could be improved. Some delegations were of the opinion that it might be more constructive to turn directly to those participating States not fulfilling their commitment. They could be asked what the reasons for their non-compliance were and what possible assistance they would need. The Chairperson of the FSC or the Chairman-in-Office could send out such requests. A reliable follow-up mechanism should be established in that regard. It was also suggested that the CPC could offer further support to such States and that bilateral efforts should be continued.

One delegation suggested that paragraph 10.2.5.6. could be made more precise with regard to further technical specifications for the purpose of evaluation visits. Some delegations referred to FSC Decision No. 6/01, "Implementation of data exchanges relating to major weapon and equipment systems". In that connection, one delegation pointed to open technical issues, e.g., the format of pictures, the database and the frequency of updating of the data on CD-ROM to be handed in on 15 December 2002. The Communications Group could give advice in that respect. One delegation stressed the need for different content and

scope of the information provided by the CPC; it suggested, for example, an overview on non-compliance.

## **2. Defence planning**

It was generally agreed that this measure was important to provide transparency and predictability about various matters related to countries' armed forces. Also with regard to the annual exchange of information on defence matters, it was recognized that some participating States for several years still had not provided their defence planning documents, in accordance with paragraphs 15.1 to 15.4.

Various ways and means of ameliorating the situation were discussed. One delegation distributed a proposal on defence planning (FSC.AIAM/8/02). It suggested that the information on defence planning should be presented by the participating State concerned and should be discussed in a plenary meeting of the FSC. This proposal was supported by some delegations because it might familiarize delegates with developments in countries' armed forces and with planned changes. However, two delegations questioned what the added value of such a debate would be. Another suggestion was to provide information on the dates when the relevant discussions in national parliaments would take place.

Two delegations stressed that the information provided could in some cases be more meaningful. In this context, some delegations referred to the possibility of developing a template in order to overcome this deficit. One delegation questioned the desirability of such an instrument on the grounds that it would create a further burden of implementation. Another delegation announced that it would provide additional information on politico-military aspects of terrorism under this measure.

## **3. Annual calendars and constraining provisions**

Under this chapter, too, nine participating States were not exchanging their annual calendars of military activities subject to prior notification. The number of activities being included in the annual calendars was very small. The question was discussed as to whether the thresholds for notification of activities should be lowered. Generally the fact that the number of activities included was small was regarded as a positive sign, being the expression of a secure and stable situation in the OSCE area. No delegation deemed it necessary to adapt the thresholds for notification set forth in these measures. It was recalled that the broad spectrum of CSBMs should be kept in order to respond to different security situations and to unforeseeable developments.

One delegation emphasized the usefulness of handing in "NIL" reports under these chapters.

## **4. Communications Network**

The Co-ordinator and the Chair of the Communications Group mentioned the transfer the central mail server from The Hague to Vienna in 2000 and the steps taken so far to modernize the communications network. It was announced that the Communications Group would produce a report to the FSC and that a work plan would be submitted to the FSC in due course. One delegation said that it had been connected to the network last month,

bringing the number of participating States connected up to 40. Another delegation expressed concerns about the increase of communication costs since the central mail server had been transferred. There was agreement that the matter should be dealt with in other fora.

The Co-ordinator wondered what information was provided in Table 13 of the CPC survey that was not yet available to participating States otherwise. If the Table is not used by delegations, one should consider the deletion of it. No delegation reacted to this remark.

## **5. Final remark**

The exchange of views in working session 1 was frank and constructive, although no clarifications for non-compliance were provided by the participating States concerned. The number of participating States complying with these provisions is stagnant; there is a need to address this fact.

## **WORKING SESSION 2**

Monday, 4 March 2002

### **Report of the Working Session Rapporteur**

- Visits to air bases
  - Programme of military contacts and co-operation
  - Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems
  - Provision of information on contacts
- 

#### **Introduction**

The Co-ordinator opened the session by giving an overview of the purpose of the activities set forth in Chapter IV, "Contacts", of the Vienna Document 1999.

He recalled that the common five-year period for visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations, and for observations of certain military activities had ended at the end of 2001. The time was therefore right for a stocktaking. It was noted with concern that 8 of 36 participating States with air combat units had not issued the compulsory invitations for visits to air bases, and it was particularly discouraging that one entire region had not met its commitments in that regard. The record in the area of visits to military facilities and military formations, and observations of certain military activities was even less encouraging, since 15 of the 47 participating States with armed forces had not issued invitations.

The Co-ordinator also suggested that the delegations should discuss openly what the above-mentioned activities involved, as well as how the visitors, given their professional background, could help attain the objectives of the activities in the field of confidence-building.

#### **Discussion**

Two delegations considered that the failure of a number of participating States to fulfil their commitments in terms of organizing visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations or observations of certain military activities was a serious matter; the causes needed to be explored, and means found for improving the situation. It was suggested that the delegations of the participating States that had failed to issue invitations for such events in the past five years might wish to offer explanations for their non-compliance during the working session.

Three delegations described the experience they had gained through organizing visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations, or observations of certain military activities and demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems in 2001

and also shared comments arising out of participation in events organized by other participating States. All the comments shared were positive, and attention was drawn to some instances when the requirements for such visits and demonstrations had even been exceeded by the host participating State, in terms of greater openness and transparency. It was also stressed that organizing visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations, or observations of certain military activities and demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems in combination, within the framework of one event hosted by the participating State, might help to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of such events.

However, it was pointed out by one delegation that some of the demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems organized by participating States had not given the visitors the opportunity to see a flight demonstration or operational use of the new piece of equipment. The visitors to an air base would need, as a rule, to obtain a comprehensive context briefing on the host country's armed forces, and its air force in particular. The required time frame of 24 hours for an air base visit could be defined flexibly, as meaning one day instead, as suggested by the conclusion already reached at the 2001 AIAM; the programme of the visit was in any case to be kept informal, so as to enable the visitors to observe routine activities at the air base. All the types of aircraft operationally deployed at the air base must be displayed.

One delegation circulated a written proposal with a list of elements for a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems. That proposal was supported, discussed and amended by other delegations, since the relevant provisions of the Vienna Document did not embody sufficient details for such a demonstration.

Two delegations addressed the need for clarifying the issues of "point of assembly" and "point of entry" into the territory of a participating State for visitors participating in events organized under Chapters IV and VI of the Vienna Document 1999. Under present practice, the two were often not identical, and that might cause the visitors difficulties for example, regarding the issue of entry visas. It was stressed that it was helpful if both the point of assembly and the point of entry into the territory of the host country were the same, at an international airport; however, more background information on the subject was required by the delegations.

Romania announced that it would host a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems on 17 April 2002. Relevant notifications had been issued.

Luxembourg would host a visit to military facility/military formation in 2003.

Poland drew attention to an observation of military activity being organized in the week beginning 11 March 2002.

## **Conclusions**

The discussion identified concrete issues which would need to be addressed. Working Group A of the Forum for Security Co-operation will have to undertake further analysis and seek solutions.

- It was the unanimous understanding that obligatory measures under Chapter IV are to be implemented fully by all participating States;
- A special reminder mechanism might be developed and implemented to remind the participating States of their commitment to host visits to air bases, military facilities and military formations, or observations of certain military activities and demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems;
- A list of minimum requirements for a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems should be developed and adopted;
- Visits to air bases during the new five-year period should not be organized at air bases which had already hosted such events in the past;
- The practice followed for fixing assembly points and points of entry for hosting activities under Chapters IV and VI needs to be addressed;

Solving the above-mentioned problems might help to further improve implementation practices, to enhance transparency and to promote confidence-building.



## **WORKING SESSION 3**

Tuesday, 5 March 2002

### **Report of the Working Session Rapporteur**

- Prior notification of certain military activities
  - Observation of certain military activities
  - Regional measures
- 

At the beginning of the discussions by Working Session III, the Co-ordinator, made a presentation based on the discussion paper he had distributed prior to the AIAM (FSC.AIAM/4/02), outlining the situation in respect of implementation of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) Chapters V, VI and X.

In this context, under the first agenda item, possible need for improving the measures contained in Chapter V in order to enhance transparency, addressing peacekeeping operations and revisiting the issue of thresholds of notifiable military activity in general, were enumerated as basic discussion points. The decrease in the number of notifiable military activities was also noted as a positive indication of a more secure and peaceful environment throughout the OSCE region.

In the context of applicability of VD99 in crisis situations, one delegation referred to the need to consider notifying peacekeeping operations conducted under a mandate by the United Nations or the OSCE. The need for making a distinction between peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations and the OSCE and ad hoc missions was also cited by the same country, as well as the question of periodical updates in cases when a military activity continued for a significant period in times of crisis.

With regard to the need for any adjustments to the notification regime, the Co-ordinator, also referring to a previous discussion that took place under the agenda item "Annual Exchange of Military Information" at Working Session I, concluded that at the moment there exists no expressed willingness on behalf of the participating States in that direction and the whole picture could be reassessed, if necessary, in the future while the implementation of Chapter V would continue as outlined in VD99.

Under the agenda item "Observation of Certain Military Activities", three countries declared their plans of inviting observers to military activities in 2002, one of which was offered under another VD99 Chapter, "Military Contacts and Co-operation". One country provided information on its military activities, all below thresholds, in 2001 to which observers were invited and expressed the intention to carry out further activities in the same manner during 2002. Another delegation informed the participating States that, for the first time in its VD implementation history, observers from neighbouring States had participated in a military activity in the year 2001. That activity had also fallen below the notifiable thresholds.

The Co-ordinator also mentioned practical considerations such as the financial burden of organizing observations, the duration of an observation visit as well as preparing an observation report at the end of each observation, as in VD99 inspections and evaluation visits. Another delegation emphasized that the principal aim of this very measure was for observers to ascertain that the nature of a military activity was “not threatening”.

Under the agenda item “Regional Measures”, 11 countries provided information, either on their activities carried out under the regional security arrangements that had been concluded in past years or on their plans for launching new regional arrangements with other participating States and their activities envisaged under those arrangements. One delegation also informed the participating States of additional CSBMs it had implemented and would carry out pursuant to the Concluding Document of the Negotiations under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additional information was requested on the activities of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) in the light of its contribution to regional security and stability, and also its ability to set an example for other regions, whereby RACVIAC could possibly be perceived as a “regional verification agency”. It was considered appropriate that that matter should be dealt with later on by the FSC.

There was a general understanding among the participating States that regional measures, while being complementary to the broader security arrangements such as VD99, constitute a key contribution to security and stability within the OSCE area. The increase in the number of States willing to take part in such arrangements was wholeheartedly welcomed, as was the fact that co-operation at the regional level was not limited to military matters, but was increasingly addressing common action against terrorism and civil emergencies. One delegation touched upon the advantages of the flexibility that regional CSBMs provide compared to broader security arrangements. Another delegation expressed the view that the exhaustion of evaluation and inspection quotas at the beginning of each year under the VD99 regime could be eased by the implementation of similar, additional, regional arrangements. Depicting a web of regional measures was regarded as useful by another delegation. Some delegations, however, noted that strengthening peace and stability throughout the OSCE continues to be the main objective, and therefore focusing solely on local and regional security arrangements should be avoided. On the other hand, the Co-ordinator reminded the participating States that the Framework for Arms Control adopted at the 1996 Lisbon Summit stipulated the creation of a “web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments” and suggested that regional measures should give practical effect to that undertaking.

## **WORKING SESSION 4**

Tuesday, 5 March 2002

### **Report of the Working Session Rapporteur**

- Compliance and verification
  - Risk reduction
  - Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations
- 

The session was co-ordinated by Col. Aapo Cederberg, of the Finnish Delegation, and the Rapporteur was Brig. Georg Aminoff, of the Swedish Delegation.

The session was divided into two parts. The first one was devoted to the implementation of compliance and verification, while the second one was concerned with CSBMs in crisis situations, which included risk reduction and stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations.

#### **Compliance and verification**

The Co-ordinator and several delegations highlighted the fact that, in the past year, the total number of inspections and evaluations had been high. It was also pointed out that an increasing number of inspections and evaluations in 2001 had been conducted by multinational teams, and been based on regional or bilateral agreements.

A number of delegations stressed the need to comply with the timeframes for requesting inspections and evaluations. Especially the fact that inspections and evaluations were requested earlier than allowed under the timeframe provided by the VD99 was regarded as problematic. Some delegations supported a suggestion that the formats for requesting inspections and evaluations should include information on the date and time when the request was sent. This question was related to what some delegations referred to as the quota race, in other words, the fact that the inspection quotas for some countries were already exhausted during the first month of the new year. The German delegation introduced a suggestion on this issue, proposing a system where inspections were co-ordinated beforehand and spread out over the year. There were mixed reactions to this suggestion among the delegates; some supported it, while others pointed to the uncertainties it implied, as for example how to prioritize among countries interested in conducting inspections.

A number of delegations pointed to the fact that in some cases the required reports following inspections and evaluations were not issued at all, or too late to comply with the guidelines contained in the VD99.

The fact that, under the VD99, the inspecting country defined the area of inspection, was raised. That could not be changed by the receiving State of its own volition and without

valid reasons. It was stressed that the receiving State must provide helicopter or aeroplane transport. Lack of financial resources was not a valid reason for failing to do so.

Some delegations called the attention of the meeting to the fact that “NIL” reports had to be submitted in the Annual Exchange of Military Information.

The question of the duty to give briefings and the content of the briefings was discussed by several delegations. It was pointed out that there seemed to be some confusion between the briefing requirements in connection with inspections and evaluations. One delegation drew the conclusion that, concerning briefings, the spirit more than the letter of the VD99 should be borne in mind, and that guidelines or formats for briefings would be helpful.

One delegation called attention to the fact that another participating State had recently denied an inspection for reasons that were not valid under the VD99. Other participating States also noted that fact. One delegate suggested that incidents of that nature should be discussed as soon as possible in the Forum for Security Co-operation. The discussion touched on the reference to *force majeure* when denying inspections. The meeting was reminded of one country’s suggestions relating to the topic put forward during the AIAM 2001. Although there had been a lively discussion on the issue at the time, no decision had yet been reached.

One delegation brought up the subject of visas in connection with inspections and evaluations. One factor was that the VD99, unlike the Open Skies Treaty, was not legally binding. Thus, there was no automatic right to transit through the territory of a third State; a visa had to be applied for through ordinary channels. That could take so long that it made the inspection or evaluation impossible. Another problem had occurred after 11 September 2001. State Parties had on some occasions not been allowed to take off from the airfield in their own State without showing that they had visas for their destination. The normal procedure had earlier been that visas had been issued upon arrival in the receiving State. Similar problems had occurred when transiting via an airfield in a third country. That was an issue that had to be addressed.

A number of delegations pointed to the fact that, under the VD99, inspection teams were to consist of no more than four members and evaluation teams of no more than three members, unless otherwise agreed. That norm had been violated a number of times.

One delegation suggested that digital cameras and digital video cameras as well as cellular phones and SATCOM and GPS equipment should be allowed in inspections and evaluations. This suggestion was supported by some delegations, while others noted the problems that would be entailed.

One delegation voiced the opinion that, since the Format 38 was more precise than the provisions contained in the VD99, it could lead to misunderstandings.

## **CSBMs in Crisis Situations**

The Co-ordinator opened this part of the session by referring to the tasks assigned to the FSC by the Bucharest Ministerial Council. He also introduced some thoughts on the

connection between different parts of the VD99 and stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations, on the one hand, and crises on the other.

The German delegation introduced a written proposal concerning actions to be taken when normal measures under the VD99 were not feasible. In essence, the suggestion was that a flexible system of actions should be introduced for use when normal measures were denied or were unfeasible.

A lively debate followed, the main elements of which are outlined below.

A number of delegations regarded the VD99 as being an “all-weather” instrument and the FSC’s main document for handling crises. Thus, it was proposed that the FSC should continue to consider ways to improve the applicability of the VD99 in crisis situations. Other delegations were of the opinion that the VD99 was designed for use in situations of peace and to prevent conflicts between States, and that it was not designed for use in conflict situations where one or more actors were not States. Another factor pointed to was that conflicts could be of different kinds, each requiring a specific type of CSBMs. Thus, a flexible approach would be needed to each unique conflict, which should first be discussed in the FSC.

There seemed to be a common understanding that there was no need to develop new CSBMs, but that there was a need to study how the existing ones could be better used in different crisis situations.

Several delegations stressed that, in the end, all actions that might be taken with support of OSCE norms and measures depended on the political will of the participating States.

One delegation introduced the idea that the document, “Stabilizing Measures in Localized Crisis Management”, could serve as a “mini-VD99” for use in crisis situations. This idea was supported by some other delegations.

One delegation pointed out that the emphasis in implementation of the VD99 should be on the pre- and post-conflict phases. The preventive effect of the VD99 was highlighted. The FSC could none the less continue looking for ways to improve the use of the existing documents in crisis situations.

The overall conclusion was that the German suggestions, as well as the Co-ordinator’s analysis, merited further attention in the FSC and its working groups.

## **WORKING SESSION 5**

Wednesday, 6 March 2002

### **REPORT OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEUR**

- Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security
  - Principles governing non-proliferation
  - Principles governing conventional arms transfers
  - Global exchange of military information (GEMI)
  - Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines
  - Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
  - OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- 

#### **Introduction**

Under the direction of the working session co-ordinator, Mr. Heinz Vetschera of Austria, the delegations addressed the agenda items in a two-tiered manner. First, the record of implementation of the measures was assessed, with attention being given to the reasons for any absence of implementation. Second, the measures were examined to determine their relevance in combating terrorism. The agenda items consisted of measures covering a broad range of subjects that had been agreed to outside the Vienna Document.

#### **Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security**

Delegations emphasized that the document was an important tool for the OSCE. The importance of the assessment of the Code of Conduct questionnaire was highlighted. The reasons for lack of response to the questionnaire were questioned. Several participating States offered assistance to non-respondents. Paragraphs 6 and 18 of the Code were cited as being particularly relevant in combating terrorism. The strengthening of the questionnaire, particularly question 1, was suggested as a means of improving the value and effectiveness of the Code. The task of improving the questionnaire might be given to Working Group A. The planned third follow-on conference on the Code of Conduct, scheduled for September, was targeted as a major opportunity to improve the document, particularly in reference to combating terrorism. Great attention should be paid to preparations for that conference. Sweden and Switzerland noted the assistance they had provided to other States on the Code of Conduct.

### **Principles governing non-proliferation**

One participating State suggested that not enough attention was being paid to the principles in view of the vital importance of non-proliferation. It was suggested that that item be placed on the Forum's agenda for future work.

### **Principles governing conventional arms transfers**

The need to update both the information exchange on CAT and the questionnaire on CAT was questioned, with Working Group B being suggested as the venue for undertaking the task. The unique aspect of the two documents was underscored, particularly in the light of the absence of a legally binding document to control weapons transfers and arms brokering. A meeting of weapons experts was suggested to examine potential restrictions on arms transfers.

### **Global exchange of military information**

The co-ordinator noted that while GEMI generally had a good response record, there were still some "black holes" of non-submissions.

### **Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines**

Yugoslavia said that it had submitted its information during the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. A number of activities relating to anti-personnel landmines were mentioned. The Balkans Mine Action programme, a two-year programme for 2002-2003 costing one million dollars supported by Canada, was cited as an initiative specific to the Balkan region. The focus remained on stockpile reduction, with the Albanian Partnership for Peace project serving as a template for future projects.

The OSCE questionnaire was cited as a useful instrument, in that participating States that were not party to the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction could indicate their involvement in mine action.

### **Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**

The co-ordinator said that approximately 80 per cent of the participating States had ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chair suggested that if all participating States could ratify and implement the CWC, a major step would have been taken in the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.

### **OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons**

The ground-breaking nature of this document was noted, along with its potential as an effective tool in combating terrorism. Several delegations urged that the development of a template, model answers and "best practices" handbook should be given high priority. The Conflict Prevention Centre was requested to provide assistance in that task. The first priority should be the development of a template for the second information exchange (June 2002).

France and Switzerland announced their collaboration on an initiative to improve the ability to trace SALW.

One particular shortcoming in the information exchange was mentioned: the categories and sub-categories of SALW needed to be better delineated. To remedy that, it was suggested that participating States interpret the terms “category” and “sub-category” in the information exchange to include the type and name or model of the SALW. That would greatly assist the ability to trace SALW. One country said that its next information exchange would include the type and name or model of SALW. The attachment of illustrations in the information exchange was regarded as very informative and useful. Lithuania announced the holding of a workshop in Vilnius on SALW trafficking in the Baltic region. Switzerland pointed out that it was holding what had become an annual training course on the management of SALW.





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**348th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 354, Agenda item 4

**DECISION No. 1/02  
AGENDA AND MODALITIES OF THE  
TWELFTH ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING**

4-6 March 2002

**I. Agenda**

1. Opening of the meeting by the chairperson
  - Report of the Chairperson of the FSC on CSBM issues discussed in the FSC during 2001;
  - Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC);
  - General statements.
2. Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
  - Annual exchange of military information;
  - Defence planning;
  - Risk reduction;
  - Contacts;
  - Military activities:
    - Prior notification of certain military activities,
    - Observation of certain military activities,
    - Annual calendars,
    - Constraining provisions,
  - Compliance and verification;
  - Regional measures;
  - Communications network.
3. Operation and implementation of other FSC-agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
  - Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security;
  - Principles governing conventional arms transfers;
  - Principles governing non-proliferation;

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- Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
  - Global exchange of military information;
  - Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
  - Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
  - Small arms and light weapons.
4. Closure of the meeting
- Working session summaries and concluding remarks;
  - Date of the 2003 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

## II. Timetable and other organizational modalities

### 1. Indicative timetable

#### Monday, 4 March 2002

- 9 a.m. Organizational meeting (chairpersons, co-ordinators, rapporteurs, CPC)
- 10-11.30 a.m. Opening plenary meeting
- Report of the Chairperson of the FSC on CSBM issues discussed in the FSC during 2001
  - Situation report by the Director of the CPC
  - General statements
- 11.30 a.m.-1 p.m. Working Session 1
- Annual exchange of military information
  - Defence planning
  - Annual calendars and constraining provisions
  - Communications network
- If need be: follow-up in the afternoon, 3-4 p.m.
- 3 (4)-6 p.m. Working Session 2
- Visits to air bases
  - Programme of military contacts and co-operation
  - Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems
  - Provision of information on contacts

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**Tuesday, 5 March 2002**

10 a.m.-1 p.m. Working Session 3

- Prior notifications of certain military activities
- Observation of certain military activities
- Regional measures

3-6 p.m. Working Session 4

- Compliance and verification
- Risk reduction
- Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations

**Wednesday, 6 March 2002**

10 a.m.-1 p.m. Working Session 5

- Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security
- Principles governing non-proliferation
- Principles governing conventional arms transfers
- Global exchange of military information
- Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines
- Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
- OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

3 p.m. Closing plenary meeting

- Rapporteurs' reports
- Discussion
- Concluding remarks
- Date of the 2003 AIAM
- Closure

2. The AIAM will be organized in the format of opening and closing plenary meetings together with working sessions dealing with all the topics contained in the agenda (I). The indicative timetable (II.1) provides more detail.

The working hours of the AIAM will be 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.

3. Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided.

4. The meeting will be chaired by participating States, in rotation in accordance with the French alphabetical order, following on from the chairing of the closing plenary meeting of the 2001 AIAM by Sweden. The chair of the opening plenary meeting and working sessions

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will be held by Switzerland, while the chair of the closing plenary meeting will be held by the Czech Republic.

Delegations intending to make a general statement in the opening plenary meeting are kindly requested to keep it within a limit of 5 minutes.

5. Debates in the working sessions will be oriented to problems and solutions and there will be no formal statements. These sessions are designed to be very informal meetings of national experts with the objectives of answering questions, exchanging information and allowing for constructive debate between participating States. All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide national experts to participate in the AIAM.

The CPC will circulate the revised Annual Survey 4/01 on CSBM Information Exchanged (FSC.GAL/1/02/Rev.1), the AIAM 2001 Survey of Suggestions (FSC.AIAM/41/01/Rev.1) and an indicative list of implementation problems and questions gathered from Delegations by the middle of February. These will serve as a basis for preparatory work by delegations and co-ordinators.

Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations and concrete examples of their own implementation procedures.

6. Each working session will have one designated co-ordinator and one rapporteur. The task of the co-ordinators will be to facilitate the discussion, while the task of the rapporteurs will be to present an oral report to the closing plenary meeting.

The co-ordinators will circulate a list of topics and questions for facilitating the discussion in their working sessions. They will be supported by the CPC in this regard. They will ensure that all relevant areas and specific implementation problems are addressed.

During the first part of the closing plenary meeting, the rapporteur from each working session will give an oral report to the delegates on the issues that were addressed during the working session. This report should include problem areas, improvements in implementation accomplished by OSCE participating States, suggestions for further improvement, and any other relevant information. After each oral report, the rapporteur will answer questions. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the reports presented by the rapporteurs.

The rapporteur will also provide a written report for inclusion in the survey of suggestions drawn up by the CPC.

Delegations with volunteers for co-ordinators or/and rapporteurs for the working sessions should provide the names of the individuals and working session to the Chairperson of the FSC as soon as possible, but not later than 15 February 2002. The names of the co-ordinators and rapporteurs for each working session will be made known to all delegations not later than 22 February 2002.

7. During the first FSC plenary meeting after the conclusion of the AIAM, the chairperson of the closing plenary meeting will submit a report on the AIAM to the FSC.

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8. Within one month of the conclusion of the AIAM, the CPC will provide a written report of suggested solutions made during the meeting aimed at improving the implementation of CSBMs.

9. The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Partners for Co-operation (Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) are invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings of the 2002 AIAM.