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Delegation of the Russian Federation

**STATEMENT BY
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FEDERATION TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY SECURITY
AND ARMS CONTROL, AT THE 1107th PLENARY MEETING OF THE
OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

28 May 2025

**Agenda item: Security Dialogue
Subject: OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security**

On the adoption of the agenda

Madam Chairperson,

The delegation of the Russian Federation has repeatedly drawn the attention of the rotating Chairmanships to the abnormal situation involving the cancellation year after year of one of the main events in the annual cycle within the OSCE's politico-military dimension – the Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. At the previous plenary meeting, we duly noted your statement about the “lack of consensus” on this issue in 2025 and called on you to corroborate this assertion with submissions from participating States that are opposed to the event in question being held. Unfortunately, the request by the delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus has gone unanswered.

I should like to emphasize that, according to paragraph II(A)2 of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE, “consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the adoption of the decision in question.” Our delegation does not have any information on such objections, therefore it is premature, at least for the time being, to speak of a “lack of consensus”.

The latest cancellation of the Annual Discussion is a violation of FSC Decision No. 12/11, which documents the agreement of all OSCE participating States to “regularize a focused discussion on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security by devoting an annual special one-day meeting to the Code of Conduct ...” (FSC.DEC/12/11 of 19 October 2011). You are being pushed into committing this violation by participating States that wish to remain anonymous. This is an unacceptable situation that runs counter to the basic principles of the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation as an autonomous OSCE decision-making body, including the principle of transparency.

We are also obliged to point out that the Security Dialogues held by the rotating Chairmanships on the implementation of the Code of Conduct cannot replace the Annual Discussions. Experience has shown

that these events often turn into a platform for politicization, antagonism and the stirring up of yet more confrontation at the FSC, something that ultimately leads to the distortion of the essence, goals and objectives of the Code of Conduct. We trust that the Estonian Chairmanship has learned from the lamentable experience of its predecessors and will endeavour to have a balanced discussion that takes into account the whole spectrum of opinions of participating States from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

On the discussion of the agenda item

Madam Chairperson,

We are grateful for the organization of the Security Dialogue on the Code of Conduct. We note the presentations by the panellists and the rather interesting discussion that followed. In keeping with today's discussion of the humanitarian aspects of the Code of Conduct, we emphasize the crucial importance of contacts between the Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia and the Commissioner for Human Rights in Ukraine.

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the OSCE Code of Conduct, which for three decades has remained a unique and universal set of rules governing the activities of States in the politico-military sphere. Since the Estonian Chairmanship has proposed that delegations concentrate today on the Code's domestic elements – Sections VII and VIII devoted to ensuring democratic control of armed forces, we should like to share our national best practices in this field.

The legislation of the Russian Federation regulating the activities of public authorities, the armed forces of the Russian Federation, and paramilitary and internal security forces in ensuring the stability and security of our country is based on the provisions of the Constitution and provides that direct control of the activities of the armed forces within the framework of their mandate is exercised by the President, the Federal Assembly, the Government, the Accounts Chamber and the prosecution authorities.

Central to guaranteeing defence are the armed forces, which are intended to uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity and protect Russian citizens from armed attack. The permanent readiness of the armed forces and other troops for deterring and preventing military conflicts and for defence of the Russian Federation and its allies in accordance with international law and international treaties is ensured in peacetime. The main tasks of our troops in times of war are repelling aggression against Russia and its allies, defeating the aggressor's troops (forces) and compelling the aggressor to cease hostilities on terms and conditions that are in the interests of our country and its allies.

It is important to emphasize that, in accordance with the Constitution, the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party form an integral part of its legal system. As part of their politico-military training, our officers study thoroughly the Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Manual on International Humanitarian Law for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and several other documents governing the preparation and conduct of combat operations. As the top politico-military leadership of our country has repeatedly stated, only military targets, facilities of the military-industrial complex and related infrastructure are being hit in the course of the special military operation. All the objectives of the special military operation will be achieved.

Madam Chairperson,

The Russian delegation could conclude its statement here, but we are compelled to respond to the insinuations made today by a number of OSCE participating States against the Russian Federation. Representatives of these countries generally like to talk about “war crimes”, hold special international conferences, raise the spectre of tribunals and spout falsehoods “about thousands of Russian crimes”. But let us take a look at what they are trying to hide by dialling up this “information noise”.

In particular, both the panellists and the participating States spoke today about the importance of compliance with international humanitarian law. We also proceed from this understanding. At the same time, we see that the statistics on crimes committed by Ukraine’s armed formations against the civilian population since 2014 do not elicit any reaction from Western OSCE countries. According to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, the deaths of some 5,500 civilians in Donbass as a result of the Kyiv regime’s aggression have been confirmed. It has been established that the Ukrainian armed forces are using multiple-launch rocket systems and heavy offensive weapons of indiscriminate effect manufactured by NATO member countries, including M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, Storm Shadow guided cruise missiles and AGM HARM missiles, against civilian objects. As part of the investigation into these crimes, charges have been brought against 71 persons from among the top military and political leadership of Ukraine who took the criminal decision to conduct the so-called anti-terrorist operation in the south-east of that country.

After the start of the special military operation, Ukrainian armed formations continued their massive shelling of Donbass territories with the aim of destroying civilian infrastructure and vital facilities. The Kyiv regime is constantly attacking Russian regions. NATO missiles are being used for this purpose. These actions are resulting in the deaths of civilians. The largest number of attacks have been recorded in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk and Rostov regions, the Krasnodar territory, the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. I should like to ask how does all of this square with the objectives enshrined in the Code of Conduct, namely to consider the democratic control of armed forces “to be an indispensable element of stability and security” (paragraph 20 of the Code) and to “provide for and maintain effective guidance to and control of its military ... forces...” (paragraph 21)?

The failed attempt to invade the Kursk region of the Russian Federation was a no less horrifying chapter and testifies to the brutality of the Ukrainian armed formations and foreign mercenaries. In the wake of this, numerous instances of torture, violence, looting and abuse of civilians are coming to light. For example, on 18 January, the bodies of tortured and murdered local residents were found in the cellars of residential houses in the village of Russkoye Porechnoye. During the preliminary investigation, the involvement of a number of Ukrainian servicemen from the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade in this crime was established. Among them was serviceman Yevhen Fabrysenko, who confessed and is suspected of killing 22 civilians and physically abusing eight women. Perhaps we will hear today that the crimes committed in Russkoye Porechnoye were the result of orders from the Ukrainian leadership or that there were formations made up of thugs, formations that were not controlled by the Kyiv regime, operating in the Kursk region?

One of the most pressing problems facing the people of our country in recent weeks, against the backdrop of the resumption of negotiations on a settlement, are the massive attacks by swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types, which are resulting in civilian casualties. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has established that, in this case, the organizers of the attacks using aircraft-type unmanned combat aerial vehicles are members of the Ukrainian leadership. This raises another question, namely, is everything I have mentioned democratic control of the armed forces on the part of the Ukrainian leadership or are we talking about terrorist activities after all?

It is also very revealing that the States of the collective West, which are covering up for and encouraging the Kyiv regime, cynically avert their eyes from these criminal acts and continue to authorize arms deliveries to the Kyiv regime regardless. They happily fall into line in pretending nothing so terrible is happening, although this is a violation of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions.

Madam Chairperson,

In closing, let me say a few words about the principles of the Code of Conduct regarding the building of inter-State relations in the OSCE area. This part of the Code has been simply erased from the FSC's programme of work in recent years, and it is precisely the violation of its fundamental principles that has led to a profound security crisis in the OSCE area.

Unfortunately, some Western States recall the provisions of the Code of Conduct only when it is to their advantage. They often hold forth on matters related to the settlement of conflicts in various spots around the world, yet these strident statements do not stop them from violating international humanitarian law themselves or from flouting basic ethical principles. That was the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. I am already anticipating what some colleagues will say: what do these countries have to do with the Code of Conduct? After all, these countries are not in Europe. To answer a question with a question: do you have two sets of standards – one for the “flowering garden” and another for “everywhere else”? From your perspective, it is possible, for example, to unleash a war in Vietnam or Iraq, engage in torture and mass shootings of unarmed people in Afghanistan, recognize the independence of Kosovo, but then claim that all of the foregoing do not set a precedent. Does this not remind you of George Orwell's famous dystopia *1984*?

Incidentally, today it is time to raise the issue not only of the democratic control of armed forces, but also of control over the use of weapons supplied by the West to the Kyiv regime. The volume of destabilizing deliveries of arms and military equipment by Western countries is unprecedented, as is the scale of their use against non-military targets on the territory of the Russian Federation. As a matter of transparency, the Western colleagues who are speaking here should share with us information about how astronomical their military-industrial complexes' profits have been during almost three years of military support for Ukraine, how their arms companies have enriched themselves by the blood and tragedy of Ukrainians and Russians, and how their defence ministries have safely got rid of ageing military equipment that in any case would have had to be disposed of. And we have already spoken today about how “democratically” Ukrainian armed formations are using all this “hardware” against civilians. None of this correlates in any way with the provisions of the Code of Conduct.

We should also like to emphasize the following. The choice of the North Atlantic Alliance in favour of geographical expansion through the inclusion of the States of Central and Eastern Europe and then the “creeping absorption” of the post-Soviet space has undermined the development and strengthening of pan-European institutions, above all the OSCE. Today, the NATO countries are continuously building up their military presence near Russia's borders and working to speed up the deployment of forces to the “eastern flank”, and their course towards a Euro-Atlantic takeover of Ukraine continues to fuel the conflict.

We believe that restoring respect by the Western participants for the principles of the indivisibility of security and not ensuring one's security at the expense of the security of other States (paragraph 3) could improve the politico-military situation on the continent. As a matter of principle, we are ready to co-operate on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, but no progress will be achieved without a constructive approach by the Western camp to the building of inter-State relations in the spirit of the Code of Conduct.

Thank you for your attention.