

Chairmanship: Ireland

626th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 3 November 2010

Opened: 10.10 a.m.
Closed: 10.55 a.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador E. O'Leary

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS
 - (a) *New programme of defence and security co-operation between the United Kingdom and France:* United Kingdom (also on behalf of France) (Annex 1)

 - (b) *Entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in respect of the United Kingdom on 1 November 2010:* United Kingdom (Annex 2),
Chairperson
Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

Presentation by the Director of Security Co-operation, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brigadier General (Retired) Victor von Wilcken: Chairperson,
Mr. V. von Wilcken (FSC.FR/1/10), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS
 - (a) *FSC contribution to the Astana Summit (FSC.DEL/139/10 Restr.):*
Chairperson

- (b) *Issues relating to the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999:*
United States of America (Annex 3), Russian Federation, Belarus, Chairperson

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 10 November 2010, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



626th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 632, Agenda item 1(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
(ALSO ON BEHALF OF FRANCE)**

Mr. Chairperson,

I am delighted to announce, on behalf of the United Kingdom and French delegations, that a new programme of defence co-operation between the United Kingdom and France was announced by British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy yesterday, Tuesday, 2 November 2010.

The measures agreed between the United Kingdom and France include:

- Jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) as a non-standing bilateral capability able to carry out a range of operations in the future whether acting bilaterally or through NATO, the EU or other coalition arrangements – this concept will be developed over the coming years;
- Building primarily on maritime task group co-operation around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle – the United Kingdom and France will aim to have, by the early 2020s, the ability to deploy a United Kingdom-French integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries;
- Developing joint military doctrine and training programmes;
- Extending bilateral co-operation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies, for example in unmanned aerial systems, complex weapons, submarine technologies, satellite communications and research and technology;
- Aligning wherever possible our logistics arrangements – including providing spares and support to the new A400M transport aircraft;
- Developing a stronger defence industrial and technology base; and
- Enhancing joint working to defend against emerging security concerns such as cyber security.

Overall, the Defence Co-operation Treaty will enable the strengthening of operational linkages between the French and United Kingdom armed forces, sharing and pooling of materials and equipment, building of joint facilities, mutual access to defence markets, and increased industrial and technological co-operation.

Mr. Chairperson, the United Kingdom and France will be circulating the full text of the agreement separately in both English and French. I should be grateful if you would attach this statement to the journal of the meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/632
3 November 2010
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

626th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 632, Agenda item 1(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Mr. Chairperson,

The United Kingdom is delighted to inform the FSC that following the United Kingdom's ratification of the Cluster Munitions Convention in May this year the Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 November.

The United Kingdom has not produced cluster munitions for several years and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) withdrew cluster munitions from service in May 2008. Since then the MOD has started a destruction programme and just under half our stockpiles have been destroyed to date. We anticipate the programme to be complete by 2013, five years ahead of the Convention's deadline.

Through our Department for International Development (DFID) we are supporting efforts to end the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions around the world by contributing over £10 million a year to clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions.

Under the Coalition Government, the United Kingdom remains committed to working towards a global ban on Cluster Munitions. We are looking forward to attending the Convention's first meeting of States Parties, in Laos PDR (8–12 November) as a State Party and continuing our leading role in this area.

Every signature gives more weight to the Convention and brings us one step closer to eliminating these weapons that have such an enormous impact on innocent civilians during and post conflict. I urge all OSCE participating States to join this convention as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairperson,

I should be grateful if this statement was attached to the journal of the meeting.



626th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 632, Agenda item 3(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

The United States is taking this opportunity to highlight a serious problem we have encountered with implementation of Vienna Document 1999. Last week, the Russian Federation did not allow an inspection, which was clearly in accordance with the VD 99 provisions, to proceed as notified.

On 25 October, the United States requested an inspection in the Russian Federation. On 26 October, Russia accepted the inspection, but indicated that the size of the specified area had to be reduced to 18,000 km² before the inspection would be permitted to begin. The area proposed by the United States was approximately 24,800 km², similar in size to the areas of recent inspections conducted by the United States in Switzerland and Kazakhstan. The United States officially responded to Russia in an F41 notification, emphasizing that Vienna Document 1999 places no limitations on the size of the inspection's "specified area," and indicating our intention to proceed with the inspection as notified. While the United States inspection team was in transit, Russia issued an F41 notification in response, reiterating its position that the specified area had to be reduced or the inspection would not be allowed to proceed. Upon arrival, the chief of the United States inspection team attempted to negotiate an agreement with the chief of the Russian escort team on the conduct of the inspection. The attempts to resolve the issue between the chiefs of the inspection team and the escort team were ultimately unsuccessful. Our embassy in Moscow sought the assistance of the Russian Foreign Ministry on 28 October to allow the inspection to go forward, but as it appeared the response to the United States request would not be received in short order, and the Russian escort team would not allow the inspection to begin unless the specified area was reduced, the United States instructed its team to leave Russia, and no inspection was conducted.

The United States was well within its rights to conduct the inspection as requested. The specified area notified by the United States met the VD 99 criteria of not exceeding the geographic area "required for an army level military activity." Thus, Russia had no valid basis for refusing to let the United States team conduct the inspection.

The provision outlining the properties of the "specified area" originates from the 1986 Stockholm Document, and has been reviewed and preserved multiple times in the Vienna Document. Although proposals have been made suggesting limits to the size of a "specified area", there has been no agreement by the OSCE participating States to make such

a change. In the absence of an agreed change to the VD 99, there is no basis for refusing to allow an inspection to be conducted because the specified area exceeds 18,000 km².

In the years during which we have been implementing the inspection regime, participating States, including the Russian Federation, have conducted many inspections in which the size of the specified area exceeded the size of the specified area that the United States tried to inspect last week, including a Russian inspection in Lithuania in 2008, in which the specified area exceeded 31,000 km². As has been underscored numerous times in this forum, in particular by the Russian Federation, the FSC operates on the basis of consensus, and the only consensus relating to this issue is the language of paragraph 80 of the Vienna Document.

Inspections under the Vienna Document are a great demonstration of openness and transparency, with the conduct of the inspected State Party almost always representing this ideal to an exceptional degree. The actions of the Russian Federation were a rare deviation from this norm. Unless or until there is a change to the existing provision of the Vienna Document, there can be no basis for refusing to allow an inspection to proceed as notified because the specified area exceeds a predetermined size.

In a subsequent bilateral communication, the Russian Federation contradicted its earlier notification about an inspection not beginning until the issue had been resolved by expressing the contrary opinion, namely, that an inspection had been initiated and the quota therefore expended.

The United States values the contribution that Vienna Document 1999 makes to European security and stability and would welcome a decision by the Russian Federation to accept, without imposing unilateral size restrictions, an inspection from any other participating State, should one be requested.

I request that this statement be appended to the journal of the day.