Chairmanship: Ukraine

951st PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 8 July 2020 (via video teleconference)
   
   Opened: 10 a.m.
   Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
   Resumed: 3 p.m.
   Closed: 4.10 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador Y. Tsymbaliuk
   
   Point of order: Russian Federation, Chairperson, United Kingdom, United States of America

   Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the FSC of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings via video teleconferencing technology during the COVID-19 pandemic (FSC.GAL/37/20 OSCE+).

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

   Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF WMD

   – Presentation by Mr. J. Brewer, Coordinator of the Group of Experts supporting the 1540 Committee

   – Presentation by Ms. M. Budjeryn, Research Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA), Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School

   Chairperson, Mr. J. Brewer, Ms. M. Budjeryn (FSC.NGO/1/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (Annex 1), Switzerland (FSC.DEL/154/20 OSCE+), Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) On the subject of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/160/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/157/20), Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/161/20 OSCE+)

(b) On the subject of the situation in and around Ukraine: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Lithuania (Annex 5)

(c) On the subject of the illegal military exercises held by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan (Annex 6), Armenia (Annex 7)

(d) On the subject of the military exercise conducted in Russian territorial waters in the Barents Sea in June 2020: Russian Federation (Annex 8)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(a) Resumption of verification measures starting from 7 July 2020: Czech Republic

(b) Statement by the Chairperson in response to the comments on the journals of meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation raised by the delegation of the Russian Federation during the 947th and 948th plenary meetings: Chairperson (Annex 9), Russian Federation (Annex 10)

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 22 July 2020, at 11 a.m., place to be announced
The delegation of Germany, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union and its Member States thank the speakers for the quality of their presentations to the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). We appreciate the opportunity to consider together the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

At the Ministerial Council meeting in Bratislava we recalled our attachment to the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation and to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. In the commemorative declaration on the occasion of the 25th and 15th anniversaries of the relevant documents, we collectively recognized their full relevance today and reaffirmed the commitment of the OSCE and its participating States to the full and comprehensive application of the principles contained in them. The European Union reiterates its position that the promotion of significant and equal participation by women in the pursuit of peace and security should be stepped up, notably in the area of non-proliferation.

Beyond this declaration, the European Union and its Member States reiterate their support for and commitment to the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 and all subsequent resolutions, in particular the most recent, resolution 2325 (2016), and resolution 1887 (2009), which are cornerstones of the non-proliferation regime and in line with the principles of co-operation and comprehensive security on which the OSCE is based. We call for the universal application of international non-proliferation treaties. At the same time, we reiterate our deep concern at the threats to the non-proliferation regimes today. The prospect of terrorist groups acquiring WMD makes it even more imperative to strengthen international co-operation, notably in the area of combating terrorism.

The European Union and its Member States reaffirm their full commitment to and support for the work of the 1540 Committee and the effective implementation of these
resolutions in practice. We adopted a decision in May 2017 to provide 2.6 million euros to support the activities for implementing resolution 1540.

The COVID-19 health crisis has obliged us to adapt the timetable for the review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and the renewal of the mandate of the 1540 Committee. The new timetable is currently being adopted in New York. This arrangement offers an opportunity for identifying the progress achieved since 2016, the thrusts in the work and the new challenges to be faced. In that regard, the European Union still supports the drafting of a Best Practice Guide for implementing United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, as announced by the Tajik FSC Chairmanship, which could serve as a substantial contribution to the 2021 Comprehensive Review of this resolution on the part of the OSCE.

The full implementation of resolution 1540 is essential. All the Member States of the European Union have submitted implementation reports to the 1540 Committee, and several of them have elaborated national action plans that are periodically updated. We support the OSCE’s involvement in specific projects. For example, the Organization sets an example by providing assistance in the joint efforts to eliminate hazardous chemical weapons in the OSCE area and develops practical activities, such as the provision of assistance to requesting participating States in elaborating reports and national action plans, in drafting national implementing legislation, in promoting best practices, and in fostering the exchange of information on the implementation of resolution 1540.

As a forum for dialogue, the FSC has its own tools for supporting the implementation of resolution 1540. Some are already in place, such as the OSCE Points of Contact, which meet annually and are an integral component of the 1540 Committee network. We also applaud all those participating States that, in a spirit of transparency, publish and update their implementation reports.

Finally, we should like to thank the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship for providing us the opportunity today to discuss the non-proliferation of WMD. I request, Mr. Chairperson, that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Free Trade Association countries and members of the European Economic Area Iceland and Liechtenstein, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino, align themselves with this statement.

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1 The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

We should like to thank you for organizing today’s plenary meeting on the theme of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We are grateful to the distinguished keynote speaker, Coordinator of the Group of Experts supporting the 1540 Committee Mr. Jonathan Brewer, for his detailed presentation and the work carried out by him. We should also like to express our support and gratitude to the FSC Chairperson’s Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues, Mr. Andrei Lozovik.

We consider the discussion of relevant questions on the non-proliferation agenda to be important and in the interests of every single OSCE participating State, but not if the Forum’s meeting on this theme once again turns into an exchange of politicized statements and accusations. The negative tone was set in particular by Ms. Mariana Budjeryn, graduate of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy. Her ideas were of dubious academic substance and were more reminiscent of a speech by an experienced political propagandist. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship regularly invites keynote speakers who specialize in Russophobic notions and put forward narrow Ukrainian nationalist priorities. We regard her presentation as a provocative attempt to distract the Forum’s attention from the most important task, namely the fulfilment of the goals set forth in the Commemorative Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation and Fifteenth Anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which was adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Bratislava.

Mr. Chairperson,

In the current difficult political environment, United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 is one of the few areas where constructive co-operation exists and is being actively developed. This spirit of co-operation should be maintained, especially in the OSCE.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 remains the key and, indeed, the only universal legally binding instrument in the field of non-proliferation of WMD. It requires all States to take effective measures to prevent WMD, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists.
Achieving the full implementation of the resolution by all countries is a pressing and extremely important task.

We should like to recall that responsibility for implementation of resolution 1540 rests with States. International and regional organizations can provide them with some assistance as needed, based on their specific features, resources and expertise.

We see that the OSCE has managed to find a niche for itself on the resolution’s “platform”. Specific ways in which the Organization can facilitate its implementation without duplicating the functions of the 1540 Committee are outlined in FSC Decision No. 4/15 of 22 July 2015 and in the recommendations of the document entitled “The OSCE’s contribution to the 2016 Comprehensive Review of the Status of Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)” (FSC.DEL/133/16). They are well known to us and are still relevant. The main thing now is to continue their systematic implementation and also to embark on a substantive analysis of these documents with a view to their possible updating for the 2021 Comprehensive Review. It is important that the OSCE’s accumulated experience and plans for the future are taken into account during the review process and included in the new United Nations Security Council resolution following the review, which, among other things, will guide the 1540 Committee’s co-operation with international and regional organizations.

Mr. Chairperson,

It is well known that the rates of implementation of resolution 1540 in the OSCE area are the highest in the world: on average, our countries have met about 85 per cent of the requirements of the document. But it is too soon to relax. The OSCE’s assistance in strengthening the non-proliferation capacity of States, at their request, makes an important contribution to resolution 1540’s implementation.

We commend the OSCE’s expert work in developing voluntary national action plans, preparing legislation for interested States and raising awareness of the resolution. It should be noted, however, that these are strictly voluntary measures, which should not be made mandatory and imposed on anyone.

We believe that the OSCE should also remain an important platform for the exchange of views, best practices and expertise among all our countries, which are equal participants in global non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, the experience gained in the OSCE area could be useful in other regions of the world, in particular Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Over the years, the OSCE has contributed to the holding of regional events on the resolution, including in Russia. In particular, with financial support from the Organization, courses were held for representatives of national Points of Contact on resolution 1540 in Kaliningrad in 2016 and in Rostov-on-Don in 2018.

However, it is clear that the potential of such a format for sharing experiences has not yet been fully exploited. It is worth analysing how to increase the practical impact of these events. This involves looking at the make-up of the target audience and ensuring the representation of different country categories with different levels of development as regards national export control systems and non-proliferation capacity. The primary condition for the
effectiveness of the training courses for national Points of Contact on resolution 1540 is not to make their participation dependent on the political situation.

We should like to warn against attempts to involve United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 in conflict discussions. It is based on co-operation among all United Nations Member States and is not directed against individual countries. We believe that those who accuse others of “violation” of the resolution are not only placing their own political priorities above non-proliferation but also distorting its content and aims. As far as the discussion of the wide range of export control questions is concerned, there are appropriate multilateral mechanisms established for that purpose.

We advocate a substantive exchange of views on those specific aspects where the OSCE can contribute to the implementation of the resolution by participating States, as well as to ensuring an effective comprehensive review of its implementation under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee. Indeed, we see this as one of the aims of today’s FSC plenary meeting. The review process is already under way in the United Nations, but the OSCE participating States are still only at an early stage in formulating the Organization’s contribution. We believe it is important to concentrate on this task rather than on an exchange of confrontational statements, as today’s meeting started out with.

Mr. Chairperson,

We once again draw attention to the inadmissibility of distortion of the substance of the Budapest Memorandum by some participating States. In our view, its provisions do not extend to the domestic political and socio-economic circumstances that led to the anti-constitutional coup d’état in Kyiv in February 2014, which was openly supported by Western signatory countries to the Memorandum.

We should like to emphasize in particular that the Memorandum was designed as part of a set of agreements to ensure the accession of Ukraine, as a State without nuclear weapons, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The obligations of the NPT depositaries Russia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, which were reaffirmed in the Memorandum, to refrain from the threat or use of force, including the use of nuclear weapons, are being fully complied with. Those who unscrupulously present the topic in a negative light are in fact weakening the nuclear non-proliferation regime for the sake of opportunistic political considerations.

It is also worth recalling that at the signing of the Memorandum, a joint declaration by the leaders of Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Ukraine was adopted at the same time confirming the importance of the CSCE commitments aimed at countering the growth of aggressive nationalism and chauvinism. The Ukrainian Government has not fulfilled these obligations and for many years has openly condoned the growth of the most aggressive forms of Ukrainian nationalism. In the face of the rampages by national radical elements in Ukraine and a coup d’état with external support and the use of force, the exercise by the people of Crimea and Sevastopol of their right to self-determination and the region’s subsequent incorporation into Russia was the only possible way for them to protect their vital interests.
Mr. Chairperson,

In today’s world, effectively combating the proliferation of WMD is of particular importance for maintaining global and regional stability and reliably safeguarding the security of each and every State. In that connection we are counting on constructive, professional co-operation with all partners on the basis of the principles of equality and the forming of consensus through a balance of interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.
951st Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 957, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and thank you to our distinguished speakers for their informed perspectives on this important topic.

The United States reaffirms its support of OSCE commitments to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contained in the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation adopted in 1994 and updated in 2013, in the OSCE Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation adopted in 2009, and in FSC Decision No. 4/15 on the OSCE’s role in support of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

We acknowledge and applaud Ukraine’s stalwart commitment to non-proliferation, manifested a quarter century ago with the Budapest Memorandum and Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons State. We regret that Russia, a signatory of the Budapest Memorandum, has failed to honour its commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, not to mention OSCE principles and commitments in this regard. On a positive note, we also acknowledge Kazakhstan’s commitment to nuclear security and non-proliferation, and indeed that of all Central Asian States Parties to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

We further congratulate Ukraine for the substantial progress it has made more recently since the 2016 review of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, in particular by clearly assigning governmental roles and responsibilities to its ministries for the regulation and detection of exports of WMD-related materials and know-how.

The United States has been a firm supporter of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 since its inception in 2004, and we welcome any opportunity to promote further adherence to and awareness of the resolution. As noted back in February, we have continued over the course of the last 15 years to actively work through subsequent resolutions to strengthen this critical international framework for preventing the proliferation of WMD to non-State actors. Through these resolutions, the Security Council has affirmed that the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security, which United Nations Member States must address by adopting and enforcing appropriate laws and regulations. The resolutions underscore the international community’s ongoing and grave concerns about the threat from the illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials and the know-how needed to manufacture them.
With its adoption in 2004, United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 called on all States to renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral co-operation, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Other universally supported multilateral organizations such as the World Customs Organization have also begun focusing their full attention on United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, and now provide additional guideposts to States seeking to fully implement the resolution. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, the United States has observed that the overall threat from weapons of mass destruction has continued to grow. We note, in particular, the rising threat posed by chemical warfare, as demonstrated by the most significant and sustained use of chemical weapons in decades in Syria, which has been confirmed by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission for many instances since 2014.

Mr. Chairperson,

The 1540 Comprehensive Review of 2016 recommended, and the United States supports, the continued and increased co-operation, collaboration, and information-sharing of OSCE participating States with the 1540 Committee regarding the delivery of assistance and implementation of the resolution. The commemorative declaration on non-proliferation adopted at the Ministerial Council meeting in Bratislava reaffirms the readiness of OSCE participating States and the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to take an active part in the upcoming Comprehensive Review of 1540 implementation. We understand that some events have been postponed due to the global pandemic. The United States nonetheless hopes that momentum will be sustained, and that all participating States will strive to fully implement the resolution.

The United States has extensive outreach programmes to assist States in implementing the obligations of the resolution and is a contributor to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament, which addresses United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 issues. For our part, the United States is preparing a national report on the geographic and functional scope of its assistance and sharing its reporting methodology with interested States. With enhanced and more systematic reporting, the Committee and all States offering assistance will better understand remaining gaps in assistance and in assistance offers.

The United States remains committed to addressing proliferation risks and non-proliferation challenges resolutely and effectively to ensure peace, security, and stability in the OSCE area, including through the full implementation of resolution 1540 by participating States as well as through adherence to the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

We warmly welcome today’s speakers and thank them for their insightful statements. We commend the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship for including the topic of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in their programme. During the Turkish FSC Chairmanship we also dedicated a Security Dialogue to this important theme.

Mr. Chairperson,

Located in a region with particular challenges with respect to proliferation, Turkey values all initiatives aimed at preventing such developments. In this spirit, Turkey has been fully supporting United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and is party to all relevant international instruments and export control regimes.

Security policies built upon WMD do not guarantee the safety of any country or region but, rather, increase insecurity and instability. As a country that has never had any intention to pursue a WMD programme, Turkey opposes the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. We, therefore, support the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Cases of use of WMD reinforce the calls for a resolute and global approach. There is a growing risk of acquisition, production and use of such weapons by non-State actors, especially in view of the scientific advances in sensitive technologies that are increasingly available through cyber networks. No country is immune to the risks of the proliferation of WMD in the hands of non-State actors. These challenges cannot be addressed without enhanced international co-operation.

UN Security Council resolution 1540 has since its adoption in 2004 been one of the key cross-cutting mechanisms of international non-proliferation efforts. The 1540 Committee has been working through its Group of Experts to support many countries in their implementation of key provisions of UNSCR 1540 and in the development of 1540 national action plans. Turkey has been working with the Committee since its inception and contributes to its work through national implementation reports and matrices.
Turkey has in place the necessary legislation to implement resolution 1540 and abides by and participates in relevant international legal instruments and the voluntary ad hoc mechanism on non-proliferation and export controls.

The most effective way to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and all related technology is through robust export controls. Needless to say, effective inter-agency co-ordination and intelligence-sharing are very strong elements in this equation.

Mr. Chairperson,

In 2019 we celebrated the 25th anniversary of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation (1994) and the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1540 (2004), with a commemorative declaration being adopted at the Bratislava Ministerial Council (MC.DOC.2/19/Corr.1). This declaration paves the way for the FSC to enhance the co-operation between United Nations bodies and the OSCE and to further our efforts for the effective implementation of resolution 1540.

In addition, in the run-up to the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also to the 2021 Comprehensive Review of the Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, we can promote the implementation of resolution 1540 in the OSCE area and we can contribute to the comprehensive review process.

We are all aware that implementation of resolution 1540 remains a complex long-term task for the OSCE participating States, requiring co-operative effort and extended support on the part of the international community, including continuity in the functioning of 1540 Committee and other relevant international and regional organizations beyond 2021.

Since its adoption in 1994, resolution 1540 has become a key component of the global security architecture and we stand ready to contribute to all efforts for its full and sustained implementation.

In closing, we once again thank our speakers for their presentations and thank the Ukrainian Chairmanship for including this topic in today’s agenda.

Thank you.
Mr. Chairperson, thank you for giving me the floor.

I would like to exercise the right of reply to the remarks made by the representative of the Russian Federation as concerns military support provided to Ukraine by Lithuania.

First and foremost, let me underline that every country has the right to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. For the seventh consecutive year now, Ukraine is exercising this right and is defending itself from the armed aggression of the Russian Federation.

Lithuania is providing military support to Ukraine and is developing military co-operation with Ukraine. Our support is provided upon the legitimate request of the Government of Ukraine and by the decision of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania has authorized the participation of Lithuanian military personnel in joint training activities and exercises with the armed forces of Ukraine. These decisions are public and the texts are available to anyone who is interested.

The goals of Lithuania’s military co-operation are to support the Ukrainian armed forces in enhancing their defence capabilities and in transforming their forces to make them compatible with Western military standards and interoperable with the armed forces of Ukraine’s partner countries.

Lithuania provides support in an open and transparent manner, and with full respect for its international commitments. Every decision regarding arms export is taken by the competent authorities of Lithuania in full compliance with the applicable international treaties and arrangements and the European Union and national legislation. When issuing export licences to Ukraine, Lithuania strictly follows the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty, of national law and of the requirements and criteria of the European Union Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Lithuania’s co-operation with Ukraine is broad and comprehensive. Besides military and defence co-operation, it also includes political and parliamentary co-operation, close engagement between government institutions, and support for economic and governance
reforms related to the implementation of the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Ukraine is Lithuania’s key partner in the area of development co-operation, in which particular emphasis is given to support for Ukrainian people affected by the war, including rehabilitation of wounded Ukrainian soldiers, psychological support for members of the local population, and education for schoolchildren.

I would like to take this opportunity to express Lithuania’s commitment to continuing to work closely with the Ministry of Defence and armed forces of Ukraine, as well as our unwavering commitment to and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

I kindly ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF AZERBAIJAN

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Azerbaijan would like to draw the attention of the Forum for Security Co-operation to the latest flagrant violation by Armenia of the norms and principles of international law as well as of the fundamental principles and commitments of the OSCE, including in the politico-military dimension.

According to open Armenian sources, illegal military exercises were held in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan from 22 to 26 June 2020, with the participation of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia and other high-ranking officials. The exercises constitute another blow to the credibility of Armenia, which consistently fails to comply with its commitments and obligations in the politico-military dimension, despite its attempts to portray itself otherwise.

The exercises are but the latest addition to a long list of incontestable facts attesting to Armenia’s illegal military presence and activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Such exercises serve as a vivid manifestation of Armenia’s continued blatant violation of our shared principles and commitments. The exercises also run contrary to the letter and spirit of all OSCE instruments governing the military behaviour of participating States, including the Vienna Document and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. As recently as last month, during the ninth Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct, we had an opportunity to discuss at length and expose Armenia’s gross violations of the Code’s provisions.

These are the second illegal military exercises that Armenia has conducted in the territories of Azerbaijan during the current year. The first took place in late April. Both exercises were held during the COVID-19 pandemic, exemplifying Armenia’s disregard for and misuse of the health crisis. The exercises also provide yet another illustration of Armenia’s real intention, namely, to thwart the negotiations process while exercising and training its armed forces so as to consolidate its occupation of internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan.

In view of the aforesaid, we strongly urge the OSCE – in particular the OSCE Minsk Group and the countries of its Co-Chairs and likewise the Albanian OSCE Chairmanship – to condemn Armenia’s egregious breaches of our shared fundamental commitments and
obligations, and to demand that Armenia put an end to its aggression against Azerbaijan, withdraw its armed forces from the occupied territories, and engage in substantive negotiations with a view to finding a lasting political solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA

Mr. Chairperson,

In response to the statement just delivered by the delegation of Azerbaijan, I should like to state the following.

It is regrettable, yet by no means surprising, that the delegation of Azerbaijan has again chosen to use this platform to propagate its unsubstantiated allegations against Armenia. We consider that the Azerbaijani delegation’s statement is yet another futile attempt to justify that country’s military exercises, which are constantly conducted in clear violation of the relevant provisions of the Vienna Document.

For the record, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia – contrary to the claims made by the Azerbaijani delegation in its statement – have not been conducting any military activity recently. In a spirit of transparency and predictability, and in line with its international obligations and commitments the Republic of Armenia always gives prior notification, via the official channels, of all its military activities. Armenia attaches great importance to military transparency and the full implementation of commitments in the politico-military dimension, including the commitments contained in the Vienna Document.

It is worth recalling that my delegation has on numerous occasions drawn attention to Azerbaijan’s constant and unapologetic violations of the Vienna Document through the conduct of unnotified large-scale military exercises. We believe that the Azerbaijani delegation should exercise a high degree of restraint when criticizing other delegations – let alone Armenia – in view of Azerbaijan’s abysmal track record of violations of the Vienna Document.

As for Azerbaijan’s claims regarding the so-called “occupation of its territories”, we would remind you that, two weeks ago, during the Annual Security Review Conference, my delegation gave a lengthy exposition of facts and arguments clearly demonstrating that throughout its history the Republic of Azerbaijan has never had any sovereignty over the Nagorno-Karabakh.

While Azerbaijan, at the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union held in March 1991, voted in favour of staying in the Soviet Union and preserving it, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh made use of the opportunity provided by the then existing legislation and,
through a legally binding expression of their will at a referendum held in December of that year, declared their independence from both the Soviet Union and Azerbaijan, in line with the norms and principles of international law. To put these events into a broader context, we should also recall the atrocities perpetrated against Armenians in various cities of Azerbaijan and the full-scale military aggression carried out against Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijani authorities with the direct support and involvement of the Soviet Army.

Today, the Republic of Artsakh is a de facto independent State with all the attributes of sovereignty, including democratically elected authorities, a government and armed forces, which have the right and obligation to enhance their preparedness and defence capabilities by, among other things, conducting military exercises. In the light of the Azerbaijani leadership’s repetitive warmongering rhetoric and threats to use force, one should not be surprised that those who are living under the constant threat of annihilation conduct military exercises to ensure their own safety and security.

In this regard, it is essential to view the military exercises held by the Defence Army of Artsakh with reference to the wider context in which Artsakh finds itself after the trilateral ceasefire agreement of 1994 and the aggression of Azerbaijan in 2016. Given that Azerbaijan every year is holding several clearly offensive military exercises, accompanied by bellicose statements from the highest authorities of that country, it is more than natural and self-explanatory that the Republic of Artsakh should have every right to take all necessary measures to defend its people.

On a general and concluding note, we would urge Azerbaijan that, instead of trying to divert the OSCE community’s attention from its continuing blatant violations of OSCE commitments, it should reconsider its maximalist stance and rhetoric, which poses an existential threat to the security and safety of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani leadership ought to realize that its continuously aggressive and uncompromising policy towards Artsakh and its total disregard for fundamental human rights – including a people’s right to self-determination – are the main obstacles to the attainment of a lasting and sustainable peace that would ensure stability across the whole region.

Mr. Chairperson, I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.
Mr. Chairperson,

In keeping with the principle of transparency, we should like to inform our esteemed colleagues in the Forum for Security Co-operation that the Russian Federation voluntarily provided the participating States with notification via the OSCE Communications Network of a Russian armed forces exercise held from 6 to 11 June in the Barents Sea by the Kola All-Arms Flotilla.

The objectives of the exercise included testing the co-ordination of the command and control elements and the level of naval and field training of the troops. During the exercise, they worked on improving co-operation in countering air strikes, conducting anti-submarine activities and defending the coast against an amphibious attack.

The exercise involved 4,500 troops, 57 ships and other vessels, and 43 units of military and special equipment.

No military formations from other ministries or departments took part in the exercise.

In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that the voluntary transparency shown by the Russian Federation in this case goes far beyond the requirements of the Vienna Document 2011, which, as you know, does not cover stand-alone naval activities. We would also point out that the exercise involved tasks of a defensive nature.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.
Statement by the Chairperson

In response to the comments on the journals of meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) raised by the delegation of the Russian Federation during the 947th and 948th plenary meetings, I should like to state the following in my capacity as Chairperson of the Forum.

After additional consultations with the Secretariat, it has become even clearer that there is no FSC decision in which participating States agreed by consensus to use the wording “Situation in and around Ukraine” as the title of a subject regularly discussed under the standing item “General statements”. Moreover, it was not agreed upon by participating States and there have been no discussions at any FSC meetings since 2014 during which consensus somehow materialized on the use of the title “Situation in and around Ukraine” in the meeting journals.

We wish to reiterate that, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE, the journals of FSC meetings are not subject to consensus or approval in any way or form by the participating States. Nor do the Rules of Procedure provide for additional consultations to seek agreement on the title of any of the subjects raised by participating States under the standing item “General statements”. It is solely the FSC Chairmanship’s responsibility to approve the journals of meetings, with the administrative assistance of the Secretariat.

In the interests of avoiding ambiguity and the risk of being construed as biased, the title of the subject that appears in the journal should, in our firm conviction, be the one used by the initiating delegation in its statement. That delegation has the full and unquestionable prerogative to define the subject of its statement, which should in no way be misinterpreted in the journal. Rather, the title must be reflected there as accurately as possible.

As already mentioned, approval of the journals of FSC meetings is a direct responsibility of the Chairmanship. During a period of six years until late April 2020, Ukraine was not responsible for approving these journals. We therefore categorically reject any accusations that we have allegedly been abusing our position as the FSC Chairmanship. On the contrary, we strive to improve every aspect of our work in chairing the Forum and are demonstrating an appropriate level of fulfilment of our obligations. We do not prevent any delegation from introducing the title that it deems suitable for a subject it wishes to raise. Moreover, it would be irrelevant to impose on a delegation the title of a subject raised by it, all the more so as that title may not be in conformity with the content of its statement.
The Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship abides strictly by the Rules of Procedure and will remain unbiased in its work, following an approach that is fully in line with the agreed fundamental norms and principles of our Organization.

I should like to inform the delegations of my intention to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.
951st Plenary Meeting  
FSC Journal No. 957, Agenda item 3(b)  

STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  

Mr. Chairperson,  

We have listened attentively to your statement regarding the decision of the Ukrainian Chairmanship to make changes to the journal of the plenary meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), in particular, to the wording of the item under discussion, replacing “Situation in and around Ukraine” with “Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea”.  

We protest strongly against this decision by the Ukrainian Chairmanship. We deeply regret that, as the Chairperson of the Forum, you have ignored the statement by the Russian delegation on the inadmissibility of any non-consensus language in the journals of FSC meetings and call on you to refrain from this step.  

Despite our repeated requests to you, also in writing, you have decided to change the language agreed in the Forum, which has remained unchanged for six years, and to replace it with confrontational wording that further exacerbates the differences of opinion among the participating States.  

We regard this as a violation of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE, and the responsibility for this step lies entirely with you, Mr. Chairperson.  

The fact that this has happened during the Ukrainian FSC Chairmanship once again demonstrates that Ukraine, in violation of OSCE norms and rules, has used the Chairmanship position to promote its narrow national priorities while ignoring the opinion of participating States.  

Regrettably, this is not the only case where you have acted contrary to the opinion of participating States and promoted your national interests using the prominent and responsible position of the FSC Chairperson. We will no doubt have the opportunity of commenting on this situation again.
In conclusion, the Russian delegation would like to reiterate its profound regret at the decision that you have taken and to express its intention to examine the consequences of this decision in detail and to return to the issue at a later date.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.