



## EMBASSY OF GEORGIA TO THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA PERMANENT MISSION OF GEORGIA TO THE OSCE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA

## STATEMENT

## on the 16th round of the Geneva Discussions

of the Delegation of Georgia at the 867th meeting of the

**OSCE** Permanent Council

Vienna, June 10, 2011

Dear Colleagues,

Unfortunately, I am obliged to talk about the 16<sup>th</sup> round of the Geneva Discussions, which was held on 7 June 2011, against the background of the increasingly activated state-sponsored terror campaign, planned and implemented by the Russian Federation on the territory of Georgia.

Only in the first days of June 2011, Georgia's law enforcement agencies foiled two terrorist attempts, while a number of attacks were prevented in March and April 2011. Let me provide you with more detailed information regarding two recent terrorist attempts:

On June 2, 2011, two Georgian citizens were detained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIA) for being in possession of a bag containing an improvised explosive device – approximately 4 kilograms of hexogen equipped with a timer and a detonator. Both detainees are residents of Gali district in the Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia. According to the testimonies of the detainees, they were instructed by the Russian military officers who are serving in the FSB border guards unit in the town of Gali and whose identities are established, to carry out a terrorist attack in the town of Senaki in the Samegrelo region. They were promised from 3 000 to 5 000 USD as a reward for the job. The

demining unit of the MIA of Georgia successfully neutralized the seized explosive device.

On June 6, 2011, the MIA of Georgia detained a Georgian citizen who resides in the village Akhmaji, which is in the Russian-occupied Georgian district of Akhalgori, in about 40 kilometers from Tbilisi for attempting to transport to Tbilisi an improvised explosive device (1 kg. hexogen, with a timer and a detonator). According to the testimony of the detainee, he was acting under the direction of the deputy chief of the Russian FSB border guards unit located in Akhalgori district, who instructed him to place and detonate the bomb near the NATO Liason Office Building on Atoneli Street in Tbilisi. The Russian FSB border guard, whose identity is also established, promised the perpetrator 2,000 USD as compensation for the terrorist attack.

Thus, this is the 12th instance since 2009 that a case of terrorism and sabotage organized by Russian Special Services in Georgia has come under investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. As you are informed, these attempts were preceded by several other terrorist acts in 2010, which led to death of two persons – one civilian and one police officer. Let me emphasize clearly that all these terrorist attempts, as well as numerous terrorist attacks in the capital Tbilisi and in other regions of Georgia were planned, sponsored, coordinated and carried out from the occupied regions of Georgia by Russia's two intelligence services – the Main Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Defense (GRU) and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Identities of FSB and GRU officials are established. Russia's intelligence services continue to use the occupied territories as safe havens for preparing these attacks. This is verified by strong evidence, which includes videotaped testimonies of suspects detained by the Georgian police, as well as multiple intercepted telephone communications.

During the Geneva Discussions, Georgia demanded from the Russian Federation to immediately stop the state-sponsored terror campaign, which has become increasingly active during the last few months. The Georgian side once again handed over to Russia all the materials necessary to cooperate with Georgia's investigation and to conduct own investigation on the Russian side. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation failed to respond to Georgian requests, as it did during the previous Geneva round. Let me remind you that my Government, on a number of occasions, has already expressed its readiness to cooperate closely with relevant Russian agencies in the process of investigation and for this purpose, has communicated all materials to Russia through Switzerland, as well as, at the Geneva Discussions and the meetings of the Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanisms (IPRMs). However, there has been no reaction from Russia.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me reiterate the firm position of my Government: Georgia highly values the Geneva Discussions as a forum where the issues of security and stability in Georgia's occupied regions and the safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees to places of their habitual residence are discussed. However, if the organized terror campaign continues, the Georgian side will have no other choice than to reconsider its attitude towards the Geneva Discussions.

By the same token, we would like to urge the international community to raise the issue of terrorist acts with the Russian Government at all levels. Terrorism cannot be negotiated, tolerated or appeared. We cannot continue to rely on "unprofessionalism of the Russian special services or on our good luck"!

Dear Colleagues,

The Delegation of Georgia has brought to your attention specific material, illustrating in details subversive activities, acts of terrorism and sabotage organized by the Russian special services in Georgia in 2009-2011. Let me once again communicate to you a summary of the MIA's investigations, which, unfortunately, contains evidence on two more foiled terrorist attacks, since our last intervention on this matter and distribution of material. We reserve the right to come back to this issue within the framework of the OSCE.

Thank You.