

OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Report

Expert Meeting on Human Rights Monitoring in the Armed Forces

Warsaw, 4-5 March 2013



Disclaimer

This report should neither be interpreted as official OSCE recommendations based on a consensus decision, nor of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or of any particular OSCE participating State; it reflects opinions expressed individually by participants in the Expert Meeting on Human Rights Monitoring in the Armed Forces. The meeting was conducted entirely under the Chatham House Rule. The information contained in this report, while not attributed to specific individuals, reflects the views and opinions expressed by panellists and participants during the meeting.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

COE	Council of Europe
CSO	Civil society organization
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Budapest 1994) participating States pledged to ensure that armed forces personnel are able to enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms. OSCE participating States have also pledged to provide for democratic oversight of the armed forces and further integrate their armed forces with civil society.

International human rights standards, a growing body of case law and practice, reflect the “citizen in uniform” approach. This approach embodies the notion that armed forces personnel are entitled to the same human rights as all other persons, subject to the limitations and duties of military service.

It was against this backdrop that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) hosted the Expert Meeting on Human Rights Monitoring in the Armed Forces on 4 and 5 March 2013. In total, 24 representatives from civil society, military associations, ombuds institutions and academia from across the OSCE region exchanged experiences and good practices in monitoring and protecting the rights of service personnel. Recommendations¹ for OSCE participating States, ODIHR and civil society were also put forward.

Some of the main issues of concern and challenges identified and discussed were: non-combat deaths, mistreatment and bullying, lack of human rights training for officers, limitations on the right of association, lack of independent oversight, as well as multiple difficulties with access to, for example, information and to the barracks for monitoring purposes.

Through systematic monitoring human rights violations can be exposed. Thus the capacity to assess the compliance of identified practices with international human rights standards is important. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can draft reports, advocate and lobby policy makers, and inform the general public. Enhancing trust and co-operation amongst military stakeholders, state authorities, CSOs and independent bodies is essential for the effectiveness and impact of monitoring activities.

The meeting underlined the importance of CSO networks at domestic and international levels. Networks can provide opportunities to exchange experiences, learn from others, and strengthen collaboration. The role military associations play in helping to ensure the rights of military personnel by representing personnel vis-à-vis military authorities was highlighted. In addition, the meeting underscored the role of ombuds institutions for the armed forces in addressing complaints, conducting investigations, and providing recommendations for improvement of organizational structures.

¹ This report does not attempt to assess the feasibility of implementing the recommendations provided here, and it is not considered whether the proposed activities are compatible with the capacities and current mandate of ODIHR.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This report provides an overview of the main themes discussed at the Expert Meeting on Human Rights Monitoring in the Armed Forces, organized by ODIHR on 4 and 5 March 2013 in Warsaw, Poland. The report focuses on key issues, challenges, good practices and recommendations for future work pertaining to stakeholders involved in monitoring human rights of armed forces personnel in the OSCE region.

In line with its mandate, ODIHR assists OSCE participating States in implementing their human rights commitments (Helsinki 1992). These commitments also extend into the politico-military dimension, as reflected in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Budapest 1994) in which participating States pledged to ensure that armed forces personnel are able to enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms. OSCE participating States have also pledged to provide for democratic oversight of the armed forces and further integrate their armed forces with civil society.

International human rights standards, a growing body of case law and practice, reflect the “citizen in uniform” approach. This approach embodies the notion that armed forces personnel are entitled to the same human rights as all other persons, subject to the limitations and duties of military service. In spite of these commitments and the evolving international human rights instruments and practice, a range of human rights concerns prevail within the armed forces in the OSCE region.

The important role played by civil society in ensuring full respect for human rights is firmly established in the OSCE (Astana 2010, Maastricht 2003, Istanbul 1999 and Moscow 1991). Furthermore, the importance of independent national human rights institutions, such as ombuds institutions, is reflected in OSCE commitments such as in the Copenhagen Document (1990) and the Madrid Document (2007). These bodies are also active in monitoring human rights in the armed forces where they often face particular obstacles due to the traditionally closed nature of the military sector and national security concerns.

The main objective of the expert meeting was therefore to exchange expertise on monitoring human rights in the armed forces in the OSCE region. The expert meeting brought together 24 participants and expert speakers (10 women and 14 men) representing CSOs, ombuds institutions, military associations and academia from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Ukraine.

The meeting provided an opportunity to exchange experiences, discuss issues of common concern, and identify good practices and recommendations to facilitate further information-exchange and co-operation in the sector. In addition, the participants provided recommendations for future programmatic work and priorities for OSCE participating States, ODIHR and CSOs working on human rights in the armed forces.

KEY ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND GOOD PRACTICES

1. The main goal of monitoring should be to collect information that help raise awareness of the need to discontinue practices that amount to violations of the human rights of armed forces personnel. This is mainly done by reporting results of the monitoring to decision makers, the general public, and international bodies that have the ability to influence policies, laws and practices. Consequently, monitoring also often involves advocacy efforts aimed at achieving systemic changes.
2. Specific human rights, which are particularly at risk for armed forces personnel are the following: right to life; prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom of expression; freedom of association; freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; and equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination. Social and economic rights, such as the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, are becoming a cause of concern in an increasing number of countries in light of current austerity measures.
3. The number of non-combat deaths of military personnel is a matter of concern, particularly in countries where there also is a lack of institutional capacity and/or willingness to properly investigate such cases. The military may also be reluctant to subject itself to independent investigations. Lack of structures and mechanisms to protect human rights of service personnel coupled with the ineffectiveness of existing judicial systems may contribute to the increase of suicide rates among service members.
4. The lives of conscripts are put into danger when ordered to carry out dangerous tasks without proper equipment, training or preparation. These types of orders imposed on conscripts and a lack of access to effective complaints mechanisms demonstrate the vulnerability of conscripts at the hands of commanders. The vulnerability of service personnel is exacerbated in an environment without independent and external oversight and monitoring.
5. Mistreatment and bullying of service personnel, and particularly younger conscripts, remain a concern in various OSCE participating States. Reports by CSOs document how such practices result in broken lives and, in extreme cases, even death. The result is fear, as well as lack of respect and trust of the armed forces by the public. Many service personnel desert or try to leave the army and young men with the support of their families try to avoid being drafted into the army altogether.
6. In some countries persons who are medically unfit for service are still called up for conscription. In other cases young conscripts are victimized once they enter service such as when conscripts are required to work despite being unfit to carry out the orders given. These issues point to difficulties in the conscription process such as in

the medical check-up of new conscripts. The problems may also stem from a lack of independence of medical personnel, as well as limited training of military officers and compliance with duty of care principles.

7. Gaining access, whether it is to information, persons, premises, overseers or legal remedies, is a key challenge for effective monitoring in the armed forces. For example, gaining access to information may depend on the existence of freedom of information laws and sufficient whistle blower protection mechanisms. Monitoring in the security sector is often confronted with the dilemma regarding right of access to information versus instances where it is necessary to preserve secrecy for national security purposes. It is often difficult for human rights monitoring bodies to acquire the necessary authorizations for inspecting military premises and consulting with all stakeholders involved.
8. A major element of monitoring involves assessing the degree to which armed forces personnel are able to enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms and the level of compliance with international human rights standards. Key instruments here are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) addresses individual cases related to human rights of armed forces personnel and has developed a growing body of case law on the subject matter.
9. There are also more specific standards on human rights of armed forces personnel that are particularly useful for monitoring purposes. The Council of Europe (CoE) Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)4 of the Committee of Ministers on human rights of members of the armed forces lists specific rights and freedoms that should be respected and implemented by CoE member States. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Budapest 1994) obliges participating States to ensure the enjoyment and protection of human rights of armed forces personnel.
10. The Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel, which was developed jointly by ODIHR and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), is considered a comprehensive and useful resource for monitoring bodies. The Handbook provides an overview of various categories of rights, the specific rights, international legal standards and OSCE commitments, as well as good practices and approaches to comply with and respect human rights of armed forces identified across the OSCE region.
11. In places where national human rights institutions and national legal systems are ineffective in addressing human rights violations in the armed forces, international institutions, such as the ECtHR and the United Nations Human Rights Council can

play an important role. However, the ECtHR has a considerable backlog of cases, and it frequently occurs that a judgement is not properly implemented by national authorities. It may also take years before recommendations by international bodies are put into practice, since reform is highly dependent on the political will to address certain issues pertaining to the military sector.

12. Where the physical access to barracks and other military installations is restricted modern technology can benefit the monitoring of the human rights situation. Service personnel can use mobile phones with cameras to document instances of human rights violations. In this way service personnel can communicate their situation to their families, friends or other contacts through phone calls, text messaging, videos, and photos. This information can then be reported to the media or human rights organizations. There are also examples of members of the armed forces that have started to blog, often anonymously, providing regular updates from first-hand experience. Various types of national website platforms exist where a person can report instances of mistreatment of armed forces personnel.
13. The armed forces themselves carry the primary responsibility of monitoring to ensure that the rights of service personnel are upheld. Military commanders therefore play a crucial role in the protection of armed forces personnel. Encouraging commanding officers to adopt a method of leadership by example, in which service personnel are given an understanding of the operational necessity of the orders they receive, can help to prevent arbitrary decisions, humiliation and mistreatment. In some OSCE participating States ethical leadership standards are integrated in the training of officers where they are also made aware of their duty not to issue illegal orders or impose illegal punishment.
14. The changing nature of military service, which increasingly includes international missions, requires that armed forces personnel, as part of their overall training, have a solid ethical outlook based on human dignity, human rights, morality and tolerance. It is necessary to include high-level human rights training in military education for armed forces personnel of all ranks. In essence, this concerns instituting professionalism based on dignity and respect, not fear.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY, NETWORKS AND PARTNER CO-OPERATION

15. The role of civil society in human rights monitoring is multifaceted and significant. By collecting information from a variety of sources, cross-checking and analysing information, and assessing compliance with international human rights standards, CSOs can expose human rights violations. Key sources of information include publicly available official documents, government statements, press releases and legislation.
16. CSOs can draw attention to specific issues of concern through awareness-raising in the media and to the public, as well as lobbying aimed at policymakers. Thus, through systematic human rights monitoring, CSOs can scrutinize and challenge instances of abuse, and provide recommendations to government and other relevant stakeholders. CSOs may represent groups with particular interests and grievances, e.g. families of conscripts, veterans, the wounded in service. Some organizations contribute to the training of military personnel on human rights issues.
17. Building trust and co-operation among the military, state authorities, the public and civil society organizations is central in conducting human rights monitoring – this includes both domestic and international dimensions of co-operation. Co-operation between CSOs, state authorities, lawyers, ombuds institutions and other human rights bodies can lead to the development of more systematic human rights monitoring.
18. Co-operation with official human rights bodies, such as ombuds institutions, can help disseminate information and grassroots demands from CSOs. Information from organizations can also feed into reports by ombuds institutions. Through more formalized co-operation, state and military authorities can facilitate access for CSOs to the barracks for monitoring purposes.
19. Several strategies exist on how CSOs can address monitoring difficulties. Organizations can include a section on restrictions imposed on their monitoring activities, as a means of raising awareness of the difficulties, in their annual reports. Another option is to send an inquiry to authorities asking why certain information has not been made available. Some CSOs also provide legal assistance to members of the armed forces, but an obstacle in their work is the lack of access to court documents connected to a case. Since lawyers sometimes have better access to confidential information and legal documents than the general public, legal assistance is particularly valuable when it comes to inquiring into cases of mistreatment in the military.
20. A network of CSOs provides opportunities for regular information exchanges and offers possibilities to gain practical experience and training by likeminded civil society actors. Members of a network of CSOs can consult each other on ways to

address specific issues, such as mistreatment or the practice of alternative service. Therefore, consulting with other human rights monitoring organizations can provide inspiration and concrete ideas on how to go about monitoring and bring about change.

21. Regional or international CSO network co-operation can also prove useful in cases where the work of one or more organizations is challenged by national authorities. Although the situation in each country can vary greatly, there are also similarities in military life, practices and behaviour between armed forces of OSCE participating States. International dialogue on this issue can give new perspectives and CSO networks can help organizations to continue their work, despite working under difficult circumstances. In this context, meetings and study tours are particularly useful for human rights monitors to explore how other civil society organizations function and to gain insight into the conditions of military personnel in other countries.
22. Having support from a regional CSO network and the international community is an essential factor in both disseminating results of monitoring and putting in place certain “safeguards” when there is political pressure from the authorities. Accordingly, a network is not only useful for sharing experiences, but it can also help in raising attention to the issue of security and safety of individuals who are involved in human rights monitoring.

THE MANDATE AND EXPERIENCE OF OMBUDS INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

23. Ombuds institutions can play an important role in monitoring the rights of armed forces personnel and in receiving and investigating complaints. These institutions can identify important needs and problems of service personnel by bringing them to the attention of the public and putting issues on the political agenda. In doing so, the work of ombuds institutions can contribute to service personnel's well-being by safeguarding their basic rights. The establishment of an ombuds institution may bring about immediate visible reforms and, as time passes, the institution itself may also become a working example of good administrative practices.
24. Essential characteristics of a well-functioning ombuds institution are accessibility, independence, fairness, effectiveness, and accountability. Countries have a variety of ombuds institution models with different functions. However, the effectiveness of ombuds institutions is highly dependent on the strength of its mandate, independence and the level of its investigative powers. If ombuds institutions are to be effective, they must be sufficiently empowered, resourced, and supported, while at the same time live up to standards of accountability and transparency. Knowledgeable and competent staff members, as well as adequate and sufficient financial resources are necessary prerequisites for a well-functioning ombuds institution.
25. Independence is perhaps the most important factor determining the effectiveness of an ombuds institution. Independence encourages members of the armed forces, who come forward with complaints, to have confidence that the ombuds institution is autonomous and distinct from the military hierarchy. Independence also provides civilian authorities and citizens with confidence that effective oversight is being exercised over the armed forces.
26. The benefits and drawbacks of having a general civilian ombuds institution versus an ombuds institution specifically for the military is a topic of on-going discussion. On the one hand, a civilian ombuds institution may encourage the military to release more information and can be better at achieving public confidence by treating the armed forces like any other institution of the public sector. On the other hand, military ombuds institutions often have a better understanding of the unique aspects of military life and recognize the importance of preserving secrecy in certain cases. It is deemed that an ombuds institution with sole responsibility for the military can more readily establish trust with the serving personnel, which can also provide a single defined point of contact for both government and the armed forces.
27. The submission of complaints to ombuds institutions that deal with military issues should not only be limited to members of the armed forces, but should also be open to members of the public. There are different models of how to submit and handle

complaints. In some systems, the ombuds institution may receive complaints as an alternative to the internal complaints system. In other systems, the complainant must first have sought redress through the internal military complaints handling system before directing the complaint to the ombuds institution.

28. The legal protection of petitioners is also a key concern. Practices vary depending on whether anonymous complaints are admissible. The complainant can be given the opportunity to remain anonymous (when possible) if there is a risk of being disadvantaged or mistreated by superiors, due to the complaint. However, other ombuds institutions refuse to accept anonymous complaints. If this is the case and the complainant is afraid of possible retaliation, the ombuds institution can choose to address the issue to the superior officer. Some argue that the option of anonymity is essential to ensure that no service member has reason to fear recrimination or adverse actions if s/he pursues a complaint. However, a system that allows anonymous complaints limits the opportunities for a person to respond to an accusation and may also make it easier to put forth false accusations. The fact that it is not possible in several OSCE participating States to collectively file a complaint to the ombuds institution is problematic. However, this does not exclude the possibility of service members filing individual complaints on the same issue.
29. There are various degrees of investigative powers given to ombuds institutions. An ombuds institution must be endowed with sufficient powers to thoroughly investigate complaints. In order to properly conduct investigations, an ombuds institution should have the right to access relevant documents, the barracks and the power to demand witness testimonials. The possibility to investigate other security agencies apart from the military should not be excluded. Some ombuds institutions only deal with torture or harassment, which means that complaints pertaining to other human rights are not addressed.
30. Conducting inspection visits on a regular basis where possible is essential for the following reasons: firstly, this mechanism may build confidence between the ombuds institution and armed forces personnel. Secondly, it can have a deterrent effect on commanders who would refrain from violating rights of their subordinates. Thirdly, it is a reliable source of information exposing problems that need to be addressed.
31. Many ombuds institutions and human rights monitoring agencies have restricted access to inspect military premises. In a number of OSCE participating States all complaints relating to mistreatment of personnel are handled exclusively within the military. In monitoring the situation of service personnel stationed in areas inaccessible to the public or monitors, alternative methods of acquiring information can prove to be useful, such as interviewing persons who have recently completed their service in such locations.

32. The annual report of an ombuds institution can have significant impact, since it identifies the types of complaints received, trends and the subsequent actions taken. The report presents the work accomplished by the ombuds institution in monitoring human rights of the armed forces personnel. The ombuds person can publicly criticize practices or inaction of authorities concerning a particular human rights violation. Raising awareness by issuing an annual report can prove to be a useful way to initiate a public debate on how to address human rights violations. Case studies in the annual report can also be added to better illustrate the practical work done by the ombuds institution during the year. Taking forward recommendations issued by the ombuds institution depends greatly on the good will of the government and the military leadership.

THE RELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY ASSOCIATIONS

33. Military associations can play a significant role in representing the interests of armed forces personnel. Although freedom of association has been enshrined in the constitutions of OSCE participating States, it often remains limited or restricted for security sector personnel. In such circumstances armed forces personnel have sometimes formed “cultural associations”, in the absence of a legal framework that permits the existence of military staff associations. Even in OSCE participating States where the freedom of association for military personnel has been enshrined in law, implementation is sometimes lacking.
34. In some OSCE participating States, military associations are prohibited entirely. Where freedom of association is limited in the military, the argument is often that such associations can disrupt the chain of command and undermine military authority. Some service members claiming their right to associate have therefore been arrested because they, according to authorities, allegedly represented a danger for the cohesion and discipline of the armed forces.
35. The experiences from countries that have eased restrictions on the right to associate, including in the military, demonstrate the multiple potential benefits of military associations. Military associations and unions can disseminate information about the problems and concerns of servicewomen and servicemen. This can help to ensure the respect of human rights within the armed forces. Furthermore, defence reform and restructuring can better take place if a dialogue is maintained with military staff associations to ensure participation and that valid points of view and arguments are heard.
36. The Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel recommends that all members of the armed forces should be allowed to join a union and that the right to associate should be protected by law. According to the Handbook, restrictions to the right of association (when recognized) should be proportionate with the necessary justification and clearly spelled out in the national legislation. The required preconditions for service members to establish their own association to represent their interests are twofold. Firstly, the will and courage of association leaders and members are essential factors. Secondly, the legislative environment should be conducive for formally registering the association.
37. Similar to CSO networks, co-operation between military associations on national and international levels has a number of benefits. Through an umbrella organization or a regional network of military associations information-sharing can be facilitated and more attention can be brought to particular issues or cases where work of military associations is being challenged.

38. Co-operation between ombuds institutions and military associations can be fruitful, because military associations are often very aware of the needs and concerns of the service personnel they represent. However, ombuds institutions do not always consider freedom of association a priority, despite receiving complaints filed by service members relating to violations of their right to associate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for OSCE participating States

- A1. Enhance integration of human rights standards for armed forces personnel throughout military training and include civilian experts in the curriculum development process and training delivery.
- A2. Promote co-operation among stakeholders involved in the protection of human rights in the armed forces, aimed at developing a co-ordinated strategy to address human rights concerns in the armed forces in the OSCE region.
- A3. Support the national ombuds institutions in their work to raise awareness of the human rights situation in the armed forces, thereby acknowledging the importance of democratic civilian oversight of the armed forces.
- A4. Present annual reports to parliaments on the status of human rights in the armed forces.

Recommendations for ODIHR

- B1. In addition to monitoring judicial proceedings in cases involving alleged human rights violations within the armed forces, support capacity building efforts for civil society organizations to improve monitoring of military court proceedings. A stronger effort should also be made to support capacity building of lawyers handling criminal cases involving mistreatment of armed forces personnel.
- B2. Acknowledging the need for the development of a training toolkit on human rights monitoring in the armed forces, develop specific training tools on the following topics: the rights of armed forces personnel, military associations and how to represent the interests of armed forces personnel; how to investigate non-combat deaths within the armed forces; and how to develop and implement legislation on conscientious objection.
- B3. Develop general guidelines on human rights monitoring in the armed forces. The guidelines could contain good practices on how monitoring visits of military units should be performed by ombuds institutions or relevant stakeholders (i.e. use of questionnaires, what procedure to follow, etc.).
- B4. On a regular basis, gather and compile information on ombuds institutions mandated to work on armed forces personnel, including data on complaint mechanisms.
- B5. Gather and compile experiences in reforming and implementing legislation on human rights of armed forces personnel. This could be used to develop a set of good practices of use for OSCE participating States.

- B6. Publish a compilation of relevant national and international judicial rulings related to human rights in the armed forces.
- B7. Develop a “rapid response” methodology for analysing and gathering accurate information of a human rights violation on a short notice.

Recommendations for civil society

- C1. In light of the long processing times of some national and international courts, file one joint court case when there are several individuals claiming to be the victim of the same violation. This can be useful not only to obtain remedies for the individual person, but also to highlight trends that point to the necessity of changing certain policies and legislative practices.
- C2. Continue to prioritize systematic human rights monitoring of armed forces personnel in the OSCE region.
- C3. Organize side events dedicated to topics concerning protection of human rights in the armed forces at the annual OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings.

APPENDIX I – AGENDA



Expert Meeting on Human Rights Monitoring in the Armed Forces

4-5 March 2013, Warsaw

MEETING AGENDA

Monday, 4 March 2013

- 09.00-09.30 Registration of meeting participants
- 09.30-10.00 Opening of the meeting
- 10.00-11.00 Presentations and roundtable discussion: key issues, challenges and good practices
- 11.00-11.30 *Coffee break and group photo*
- 11.30-13.00 Roundtable discussion (*cont.*): key issues, challenges and good practices
- 13.00-14.00 *Lunch*
- 14.00-15.15 Presentations and roundtable discussion: the role of civil society, networks and partner co-operation
- 15.15-15.30 *Coffee break*
- 15.30-16.45 Roundtable discussion (*cont.*): the role of civil society, networks and partner co-operation

Tuesday, 5 March 2013

- 09.00-10.45 Presentations and roundtable discussion: the mandate and experience of ombuds institutions for the armed forces
- 10.45-11.00 *Coffee break*
- 11.00-13.00 Presentations and roundtable discussion: the relevance and importance of military associations
- 13.00-14.00 *Lunch*
- 14.00-15.15 Presentation and roundtable discussion: ODIHR's mandate and work
- 15.15-15.30 *Coffee break*
- 15.30-16.30 Roundtable discussion: way forward and recommendations
- 16.30 Closing of the meeting