



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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## **OSCE HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

**Vienna, 16 and 17 February 2016**

### **CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY**

**OPENING SESSION**

**CLOSING SESSION**

**REPORTS OF THE SESSION RAPPORTEURS**

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**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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1 July 2015

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**793rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 799, Agenda item 1

**DECISION No. 3/15  
HOLDING A HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Determined to enhance the security dialogue in the OSCE,

Recalling paragraph 15.7 of the Vienna Document 2011 encouraging participating States to hold periodic high-level military doctrine seminars and paragraphs 30.1 and 30.1.2 on improving mutual relations and promoting contacts between relevant military institutions,

Decides to hold a High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar in Vienna on 16 and 17 February 2016 to discuss doctrinal changes and their impact on defence structures in the light of the present European security situation.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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16 December 2015

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**807th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 813, Agenda item 2

**DECISION No. 8/15**  
**AGENDA, TIMETABLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES FOR**  
**THE OSCE HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

(Vienna, 16 and 17 February 2016)

The OSCE will hold a High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar (HLMDS) in Vienna on 16 and 17 February 2016, the seventh of its kind within the OSCE, to discuss doctrinal changes and their impact on defence structures in the light of the present European security situation.

This Seminar will be held in accordance with FSC Decision No. 3/15 (FSC.DEC/3/15) dated 1 July 2015. Such seminars are encouraged in the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures by fostering the process of transparency, openness, and predictability.

**I. Agenda and timetable**

**Tuesday, 16 February 2016**

- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| 10–11 a.m.     | Opening of the Seminar  |
|                | – Opening remarks   |
|                | – Keynote speech  |
| 11 a.m.–1 p.m. | Session 1: Security situation in the OSCE area and operational trends                         |
|                | – Introduction by session moderator   |
|                | – Keynote speakers on subtopics   |
|                | – Assessment of major present security risks, predominant threat perceptions and consequences |
|                | – Changing forms of conflict, operational trends and developments                             |

- Brief introductions by panellists
- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
- Moderator's closing remarks

3–6 p.m.

Session 2: Emerging challenges

- Introduction by session moderator
- Keynote speakers on subtopics
  - Analysis of military, technological, economic, environmental factors and their impact on security policy
- Brief introductions by panellists
- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
- Moderator's closing remarks

### **Wednesday, 17 February 2016**

10 a.m.–1 p.m.

Session 3: Review of current/updated national military doctrines

- Introduction by session moderator
- Keynote speakers on subtopics
  - Examples of military doctrines currently under review – contents and process (actors, methods, procedure)
- Brief introductions by panellists
- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
- Moderator's closing remarks

3–5 p.m.

Session 4: Implications of doctrinal changes for armed forces and security and defence policy

- Introduction by session moderator
- Keynote speakers on subtopics
  - How will doctrinal changes affect armed forces, their mandates, capabilities, and structures?
  - Implications for security and defence policy including arms control and confidence- and security-building measures

- Brief introductions by panellists
  - Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
  - Moderator's closing remarks
- 5.30–6 p.m. Closing session: Future challenges and areas of activity for the OSCE
- Conclusion and topics identified for further discussion or possible OSCE engagement
  - Closing remarks by Seminar chairperson

## **II. Organizational modalities**

### **Preparation for the Seminar**

The Netherlands, as the incoming Chairmanship of the FSC, will act as the chairmanship of the Seminar.

Chiefs of defence/general staff or other senior officials and relevant academics from participating States will be invited to attend the Seminar. Following appropriate consultations, the Seminar chairperson will invite relevant international organizations, institutions and personalities. The Partners for Co-operation will be invited to attend the Seminar.

The Seminar chairperson will nominate a moderator and a rapporteur for each session. The Seminar chairperson will also select keynote speakers and panellists for each session from among the names proposed by participating States.

Keynote speakers will be requested to submit their presentation for circulation to delegations no later than Monday, 25 January 2016.

A final preparatory meeting will be organized on 15 February 2016 between the FSC Troika, moderators, keynote speakers, rapporteurs and panellists to discuss in detail the conduct of the Seminar and how to best to manage it to achieve the desired results.

The Secretariat, in accordance with its departmental responsibilities, will support the Seminar chairperson in administrative and budgetary preparations for the Seminar.

A night owl session, buffet lunches and an evening cocktail reception might be organized by the OSCE/FSC Chairmanships.

Other necessary organizational arrangements will be dealt with by Working Group B of the FSC.

## **Conduct of the Seminar**

A key objective of the Seminar is to have interactive dialogue inspired by the keynote speakers and panellists. Therefore delegations are encouraged not to read out prepared general statements during the Seminar.

Each working session will be introduced by the session moderator, followed by presentations by up to two keynote speakers (up to fifteen minutes each), after which discussion will take place. The debate will be stimulated by appropriate interventions from up to four panellists per session (up to five minutes each). Interventions from the floor will be very welcome and should be limited to a maximum of three minutes per speaker. In order to ensure the effective conduct of the Seminar, the moderator of each session will facilitate and focus the discussions and stimulate an interactive debate by introducing questions related to the topics dealt with by that session or by reordering the sequence of interventions. The moderator is also responsible for ensuring equal access to the floor and for providing all participants with the opportunity to intervene within the established time frame of the session. During each session, the moderator may adjust time limits depending on the number of requests for the floor and the time available. Speakers who exceed the time limits will be notified by the moderator.

Prior to the closing session of the Seminar, each rapporteur, after appropriate consultation with the relevant session moderator, will submit a brief report to the Seminar chairperson covering the issues addressed during their respective working sessions.

On the basis of the reports provided by the rapporteurs for each of the four sessions, the Seminar chairperson will present a summary report of the discussions (after the completion of the Seminar) that will be brought to the attention of the FSC.

Interpretation will be provided between the official languages of the OSCE.

Rooms for informal meetings will be provided.

Other OSCE rules of procedure and working methods will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Seminar.

## **ANNOTATED AGENDA OF THE OSCE HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

Vienna, 16 and 17 February 2016

### **Agenda and timetable**

#### **Tuesday, 16 February 2016**

- 10–10.45 a.m.      Opening of the Seminar (open to the media)
- Welcoming remarks by
- Ambassador D. M. J. Kopmels, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the OSCE, FSC Chairperson
- Opening addresses by
- Chief of Defence General T. Middendorp, Netherlands
  - Chief of Defence General O. Commenda, Austria
- 10.45 a.m.–1 p.m.      Session 1: Security situation in the OSCE area and operational trends
- (i)      Assessment of major present security risks, predominant threat perceptions and consequences
  - (ii)     Changing forms of conflict, operational trends and developments
- Moderator: Ms. J. Dempsey (Carnegie Europe)  
Rapporteur: Mr. V. Pavlov (Belarus)
- Introduction by session moderator
- Keynote addresses by
- Air Commodore F. Osinga, Netherlands Defence Academy
  - Lieutenant General B. Hodges, Commanding General, Europe, Armed Forces, United States of America
  - Lieutenant General A. Tretiyak, Principal Adviser of the Advisers' Group to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
  - Chief of Defence General V. Wieker, Germany



- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
  - Moderator's closing remarks
- 1–3 p.m. Buffet lunch
- 3–6 p.m. Session 2: Emerging challenges
- (i) Analysis of military, technological, economic, environmental factors and their impact on security policy
- Moderator: Lieutenant General (retired) E. Buzhinsky (Russian Federation)  
Rapporteur: Mr. J. Schatz (Germany)
- Introduction by session moderator
- Keynote addresses by
- Rear Admiral J. M. L. Kingwell, Director of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom
  - Major General J.-F. Parlanti, Director of the Doctrine Centre (*Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations*), Ministry of Defence, France
- Panellists
- Lieutenant General W. Wosolsobe, Director General European Union Military Staff
  - Vice Admiral J. G. Foggo III, Deputy Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe
  - Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
  - Moderator's closing remarks

### **Wednesday, 17 February 2016**

- 10 a.m.–1 p.m. Session 3: Review of current/updated national military doctrines
- (i) Examples of military doctrines currently under review – contents and process (actors, methods, procedure)
- Moderator: Air Commodore F. Osinga (Netherlands)  
Rapporteur: Colonel A. Bracken (Ireland)

Keynote addresses by

- Lieutenant General D. Gyllensporre, Chief of Defence Staff, Swedish Armed Forces HQ
- Mr. I. Dolhov, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine for European Integration

Panellists

- Mr. R. Huth, Director of Defence Policy, Directorate-General for Security and Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Germany
- Lieutenant General P. Ludvigsen, Vice Chief of Defence, Denmark
- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
- Moderator's closing remarks

1–3 p.m.

Buffet lunch

3–5 p.m.

Session 4: Implications of doctrinal changes for armed forces and security and defence policy

- (i) How will doctrinal changes affect armed forces, their mandates, capabilities, and structures?
- (ii) Implications for security and defence policy including arms control and confidence- and security-building measures

Moderator: Mr. M. Pesko (Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre)

Rapporteur: Mr. A. Stapleton (United States of America)

- Introduction by session moderator

Keynote addresses by

- Mr. D. Tonoyan, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Armenia
- Brigadier General C. Campbell (retired), former Assistant Chief of Staff, Defence Forces, Ireland

Panellist

- Ms. R. Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, US State Department, United States of America

- Discussions with panel and participants from the floor
- Moderator's closing remarks

5.30–6 p.m.

Closing session: Future challenges and areas of activity for the OSCE

Closing remarks by

- Ambassador D. M. J. Kopmels, FSC Chairperson

**WELCOMING REMARKS BY  
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY  
CO-OPERATION, AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE OSCE  
HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

Vienna, 16 and 17 February 2016

Secretary General,  
Excellencies,  
Dear colleagues,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Netherlands Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), it is a great pleasure and honour for me to welcome all of you today on the occasion of the seventh High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar. It is my pleasure to share this session with General Tom Middendorp, Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces, and General Othmar Commenda, Chief of Defence Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces, representing the host State, who will deliver the opening addresses today.

The European security situation has faced a multitude of challenges since the last Seminar five years ago. In light of these events, regular high-level military to military contacts have decreased at a time when it is most necessary to maintain dialogue. It is, therefore, important and significant that we have gathered today, with such high-level participation of the armed forces and the ministries of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, to discuss doctrinal changes and their impact on defence structures in the context of the current security situation. This is in itself a non-negligible achievement and step in the right direction. The aim of this Seminar is to reinvigorate dialogue, exchange experiences, views and ideas, and to foster greater mutual understanding and building of trust and confidence.

In accordance with the Vienna Document, the participating States are encouraged to “hold periodic high-level military doctrine seminars” to foster transparency and mutual confidence, in the spirit of this cornerstone OSCE document. In view of the planned update of the Vienna Document this year, as well as of the challenges faced by existing arms-control and confidence- and security-building regimes, it is our hope that participants in this Seminar will take the opportunity to discuss and collect new ideas for overcoming these challenges together. We wish to provide a platform for fostering co-operation and transparency over the next two days, to contribute to the building of lasting stability and security on the territory of OSCE participating States and of our Asian and Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

Starting from the first food-for-thought papers on organizing the High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar, and continuing with discussion of the modalities in various formats, as OSCE participating States we have agreed on the topics for this Seminar, to focus and reflect on the most prominent current European security concerns in the context of changing and evolving trends in the formulation of military doctrines. The foundation for the Seminar sessions will be provided by the addresses of the keynote speakers and complemented by the remarks of the panellists. Building on this foundation, our skilled and highly knowledgeable moderators will facilitate a lively, interactive and creative debate between all participants and

the panel. To make the most of this opportunity, I would like to encourage all delegations to actively engage in the discussions throughout the Seminar.

The Ice Breaker session yesterday evening served as a positive platform for furthering direct, personal contacts between the distinguished participants, and it is our hope that constructive dialogue during the sessions, as well as during the reception at the Military History Museum (*Heeresgeschichtliches Museum*) this evening, will only deepen these relationships.

I would like to conclude by thanking all States and organizations that have contributed to this Seminar with ideas, high-level participants, speakers, panellists or moderators. Let me also express our gratitude to the OSCE Secretariat, and specifically the FSC Support Section, Conference and Language Services, the Communication and Media Relations Section, and all those who have helped organize this event. I would like to specifically express our gratitude to the Austrian and German delegations who have organized the panel discussion and reception this evening at the prestigious *Heeresgeschichtliches Museum* featuring a number of eminent and interesting speakers.

Thank you. Without further ado, I now pass the floor to General Tom Middendorp, Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces, to deliver his opening address.

**ADDRESS BY GENERAL TOM A. MIDDENDORP,  
AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE OSCE HIGH-LEVEL  
MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

Vienna, 16 February 2016

Thank you, Ambassador Kopmels. And thank you for your invitation to speak here today.

Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
Colleagues,

In January last year, a story entitled “The Piano” was published in the online magazine of the OSCE. In the article, an OSCE staff member – who had worked in various locations in eastern Ukraine – recounted experiences that perfectly capture the work of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The article included a photo of aircraft wreckage. In the middle was a small black piano – a child’s toy.

You can see the photo behind me with the toy piano clearly visible.

This is what the OSCE staff member recalled, and I quote: “What we were doing was trying to find clues that would help the authorities identify those who perished – people who had no interest in the Crimea, the Donbas or any other corner of Ukraine. They were innocent people caught up in the lunacy of the situation. In a way, they represent all the innocent people who are still caught up in this lunacy. Like the airplane passengers, they have no real say. Working as a monitor can mean many things: facilitating dialogue, negotiating the tricky political waters of engagement with separatist groups, and above all building relationships with the people of Ukraine. It can also mean witnessing events that will scar them forever, even if they do not yet realize it. ‘But why the piano?’” the OSCE staff member asked himself. He recalled – and I quote: “This photo illustrated what was for me the most disturbing of all my memories of that day. The toy survived, but the child did not. Why was this allowed to happen in Europe in 2014?”

Ladies and gentlemen,

This is just one personal story of one of many OSCE staff members but this individual described what was on our minds at that time very precisely. “How could this happen in Europe?”

Here we are today. On the occasion of the High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar in the beautiful city of Vienna. On 16 February 2016.

The situation in Ukraine has undoubtedly sharpened our focus. So has the rhetoric of the Russian political leadership. And we can only conclude that the recent developments have adversely affected our security climate. Just look at the increased scale and scope of military exercises in Europe. Over the last few years, the Russian Federation has conducted huge military exercises, some involving tens of thousands of military personnel and a huge amount of military equipment. The frequency and scale of these exercises are disturbing if not

alarming, given the fact that many of these exercises – largely conducted in Europe – are what are referred to as “no-notice” or “snap” exercises. This type of exercise involves no notification, no warning in advance. At best, notification is given at the start of the exercise.

Ladies and gentlemen,

This current and frequent Russian practice of conducting large-scale snap exercises adds to the risk of unintended military incidents, if not conflict. It also contributes to the general level of tension. We all know that in a situation of co-operative security, we would have been informed about these exercises well in advance. Under any circumstances. That is why, in order to protect our common security, NATO responded by taking measures, to reassure our Allies in the eastern part of our Alliance. It ramped up its manoeuvres, and tripled the number of war games held.

I'm sure that many people could not have imagined these developments a decade ago. Large-scale military exercises on European soil involving thousands of troops. Confrontation. Division. Trust being undermined.

We can only ask ourselves the same question the OSCE staff member asked himself two years ago. Why is this being allowed to happen in Europe, in 2016? In fact, our current relations are so tense and fraught with risk, I even hesitated for a moment when asked to address you here today. Because I figured: why bother to try to re-engage on Europe's security architecture?

Yet I also realize that it would be foolish to let the opportunity to speak here today pass me by. Because if we want to continue to ensure peace, stability and prosperity on this continent we cannot ignore the issue and let Europe's security architecture erode further.

For erosion has set in already. The commitments of Helsinki, to which we all subscribed, are under strain. One might argue that there is not one commitment of the Helsinki Dialogue that has not been trampled upon lately.

Yet, we should all demonstrate a readiness to take each other's security interests into account. To take each other's security concerns seriously. And not label them as “incorrect”, “inopportune” or “politically motivated”. Even if it requires sustained effort, patience, more patience and dedication. Because in the end, all of us face a tangle of thorny problems that jeopardize our common goal of creating a security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

And at this time we all face common transnational security threats. Threats, such as Islamist terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. Given the complexity of these threats and the consequences, we cannot fight our enemies with the doctrine of the past. A new multidimensional approach to security is needed. Unity is needed.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The OSCE is a crucial security organism, a sort of defensive ecosystem if you like, because of its function as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation. After all, with forty years of experience, the OSCE knows what it takes to work towards co-operative

security. It was the OSCE that contributed to the ending of the Cold War. And it was the OSCE that provided the normative framework for the post-Cold War system of co-operative security by introducing the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1999 Istanbul Document, and fostering consensus around it.

And the OSCE is still fundamental for creating conditions for real dialogue and building trust. Its comprehensive approach, for instance, represents an opportunity. Conflicts, after all, do not revolve around the military component alone. They also involve issues like the values of human rights, the rule of law and human freedom and dignity, whatever is necessary to prevent divisions within societies, and whatever is necessary to foster a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination.

However, the agreements concluded in Vienna, aimed at building trust in the military sphere between our States, are just as important. I'm referring of course to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the OSCE-wide Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures.

Let's take the last one as an example, the Vienna Document, as it is due to be revised this year. Through the Vienna Document, we all established rules for notification of any large-scale military activity, for military inspections and for military transparency. And it worked. Every year, in mid-December, officials from all participating States gather in this city to exchange information. Information on our armed forces, our military organization, our manpower, and our major weapon and equipment systems. We also share information on our defence planning, and on our defence budgets during the year. Furthermore, we use the rules to make inspection visits.

Last year, for instance, Latvia and Switzerland each conducted one inspection in north-western Russia while the Netherlands conducted an inspection in south-western Russia, along the border with Ukraine. The Russian Federation uses the Vienna Document on an equal basis for the purpose of such transparency, as was the case with an inspection of the Estonian defence forces, in May last year. And over the years, the Netherlands has also often welcomed Russian inspectors. During one of the inspections we even tried to teach our Russian colleagues how to ride a bicycle. And how to eat raw herring. Not simultaneously, of course.

What I want to say is that the Vienna Document is much like a big toolbox, providing the perfect recipe for transparency and stability with a high implementation rate and with 90 inspections and 45 evaluation visits conducted each year on average. Nonetheless, as we all know, the Document is not fulfilling its purpose as it is no longer fully in line with current insights, and with the realities of today's security needs. It is with good reason that there are currently about 20 proposals and draft decisions under discussion in the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation. Proposals including the lowering of thresholds for prior notifications of military activities. Proposals for enhancing inspection quotas and evaluation visit quotas. Proposals for the inclusion of information on naval forces. And proposals for the creation of OSCE inspections for clarification on military activities. In other words: quite a bit.

So it seems about time to make some significant changes to our mutual arrangements. I'm not talking about general guidelines. Nor minor technical and procedural changes, such as the ones implemented in the Vienna Document 2011. I'm talking about more solid ground for future progress; progress that will increase predictability and prevent escalation. Of



course I realize that this will ultimately depend on the political will and engagement of all participating States. Yet I would like to ask: Why not make meaningful changes? Why not tackle the modernization of the Vienna Document, to start with? Why not increase mutual trust in the military field? No matter how deep our perceived disagreements?

Ladies and gentlemen,

Last month, in his first address as OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, “What will help us move forward are not just acknowledgements of the value of dialogue, but an actual dialogue, sincere and engaged, that does not hesitate to identify breaches of OSCE principles”. A clear statement, and I could not agree more. Confidence and mutual trust can be built only through open and frank dialogue. That is why I sincerely hope we can abide by our common rules, adapt these rules, and establish new ones where necessary. Let us take each other’s security interests into account and listen carefully to each other’s security concerns. Let us rebuild trust. So that we can guard our precious way of life, to the benefit and well-being of our people. So that we can keep Europe secure, in a less secure world. So that we will never have to ask ourselves again: Why was this allowed to happen, in Europe?

Thank you.

**ADDRESS BY GENERAL OTHMAR COMMENDA,  
AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE OSCE HIGH-LEVEL  
MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

Vienna, 16 February 2016

Madam Chairperson,  
Generals,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a particular honour for me to welcome you here in the Hofburg in Vienna to the seventh High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar. I am especially pleased to see so many Chiefs of General Staff, Deputy Chiefs of General Staff and high-ranking officers from the OSCE participating States among the participants in this Seminar. As Chief of General Staff of the OSCE host country, Austria, I believe it is important, in addition to the substantive discussions at this meeting, to emphasize the value of bilateral talks, making a contribution in this way to the German Chairmanship's motto "Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security".

Vienna and the Hofburg have been a traditional venue and meeting place for negotiations on global and regional treaties and for the shaping of European security since the Congress of Vienna. The successful nuclear talks with Iran and the negotiations on Syria in Vienna are recent examples of this. In today's climate, a meeting to discuss security in Europe and the OSCE area as a whole appears more necessary than ever.

Armed conflicts, military disputes and attacks to destabilize societies often used to be dismissed as things of the past. However, current conflicts, especially in and around Ukraine, along with terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe and the migration crisis provide dramatic demonstration that the security and stability of our States are under threat. Furthermore, these events have led to a loss of trust among States, re-emphasized forgotten dividing lines and have also produced fresh tensions among the OSCE participating States.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Since the purpose of this Seminar is to discuss changes in the doctrines and consequences for the defence structures in the light of the current security situation in Europe, I should like to provide a brief outline of the way Austria views these matters.

The elaboration of the Austrian Security Strategy and the new plans for the Austrian Armed Forces led for the first time in 2012 to the development of "security environment scenarios", which cover the period until 2025. Seven of these scenarios formed the basis for this Strategy, including development of the armed forces. Ongoing observation and evaluation of influencing factors will help to identify new developments and enable timely changes to be made to defence planning as required.

The current defence policy trend scenario for 2016 identifies the seven most relevant factors for Austria's security environment system. These cover:

- The stability of neighbouring regions within Europe;
- The role of Russia in Europe;
- Global developments in power politics;
- The global development of conflicts;
- The future role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
- Progress in European Union integration; and
- The further development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Without analysing the trend scenario in further detail, the following will be of relevance to the Austrian security and defence policy in 2016:

- Strengthening Austria's resilience, with the aim of building a national situation centre;
- Further development of defence planning;
- Continued expansion of the Common Security and Defence Policy;
- Greater co-operation; and lastly
- The need for increased and more robust contributions by the Austrian Armed Forces to stabilization efforts.

What conclusions can now be drawn for the current armed forces development? Last year I authorized the Military Strategy Concept 2015. In accordance with that concept, the Austrian Armed Forces are to be equipped to repel non-conventional or hybrid attacks on Austria and take measures to ensure cyber defence. Furthermore, the international involvement of our armed forces is to be continued at a high level, with the aim of being able to operate as the Republic's strategic reserve. A future-oriented element of the Military Strategy Concept deals likewise with the further development of the "Austrian Armed Forces of the future". Depending on the threat situation, the capabilities required and the financial resources available, all currently available capabilities of the Austrian Armed Forces are to be developed further. One of the objectives in 2016 will be to complete the subprocess of basic planning, leading to an evaluation of deployment scenarios and concepts.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As a guarantor of security, the military is increasingly faced with challenges that it cannot meet alone, especially given the enlargement of the threat scenario to include new forms of conflicts and the change in the role of military forces both domestically and internationally. To deal with all of this, there is a need not only for ongoing adaptation of military concepts and doctrines but also for close international co-operation. This is one reason why the motto of this year's OSCE Chairmanship to renew dialogue, rebuild trust and restore security is so important. Austria welcomes this goal, and we shall do what we can to lend our support.

Openness and transparency are the cornerstones of any confidence-building effort. The Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in general and the annual exchange of information on defence planning and military doctrines in particular make a very considerable contribution in that regard. In a rapidly changing security environment, politicians and the military are both faced with the challenge of dealing with current threats and continuously adapting their basic guidelines, such as strategies and doctrines. This also raises the question whether the interval of five years should be reconsidered and high-level military contacts and talks planned at shorter intervals.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Owing to other commitments, I shall be unable to be present throughout the Seminar or to take part fully in the exchange of views. I should like, however, to take this opportunity to invite you all to the joint Austrian-German reception with a podium discussion at the Museum of Military History in Vienna. I hope that as many of you as possible will take advantage of this opportunity to continue our discussions.

In conclusion, I should like to thank all those who have made a significant contribution to enable this Seminar to take place, especially the OSCE Chairmanship and the Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation, and to wish all the participants a successful Seminar and an interesting stay in Vienna.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS BY  
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY  
CO-OPERATION, AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE OSCE  
HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE SEMINAR**

In her concluding remarks, the Chairperson said that the Seminar had provided an opportunity for high-level and lively discussions on important issues, and she thanked the speakers, panellists and delegations for their contributions. Like various participants, she called for follow-up on the topics of the Seminar in the FSC, and for a possible review of the frequency of that event. The Seminar might have served as a useful stepping stone towards fostering transparency and mutual predictability, in the framework of the OSCE's overall comprehensive approach to security.

## **REPORTS OF THE SESSION RAPPORTEURS**

## SESSION 1

Tuesday, 16 February 2016

### Report of the Session Rapporteur

#### Security situation in the OSCE area and operational trends

- **Assessment of major present security risks, predominant threat perceptions and consequences**
  - **Changing forms of conflict, operational trends and developments**
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The first working session was devoted to the current security situation in the OSCE area. The participants addressed major security risks, threat perceptions, and consequences.

The first speaker identified three periods in post-Cold War Europe, which he described as follows: 1) postmodern security based on soft power and characterized by the loss of value of military force and by the strong belief in international organizations; 2) a strategic pause accompanied by growing anarchy, terrorist threats, and a feeling of insecurity in Europe; 3) a period of further exacerbation of transnational threats and challenges, resulting in a paradigm shift in 2014. He argued that the current European security situation was affected by four major developments: the threat of ISIS and regional conflicts; an unprecedented refugee flow that was leading to social unrest in Europe; internal division within Europe with a shift to the right; and the revisionist policy of one participating State, which perceived Europe as a threat and was developing a new military doctrine based on hybrid warfare. He concluded by suggesting that Europe had witnessed a defeat of postmodern ideals and a return to the modern world based on hard power. He quoted the Munich Security Report 2016 as stating that Europe was entering a period of a growing risks and rising uncertainty. Against this background he called for the best utilization of the value of the OSCE and for the starting of a meaningful dialogue.

The second speaker stressed the importance of three factors in particular: the sovereignty of States; refraining from the use of force; and the inviolability of the borders upon which the foundations the OSCE had been built. He recalled the situations created through the invasion by one participating State of two other participating States in 2008 and in 2014 and pointed out that these acts had caused certain responsive actions by NATO to protect European allies and to deter the said State from further aggression. The speaker emphasized the openness and transparency of his country's efforts to support Europe's security. In this context he welcomed verification activities in the framework of the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies. He also pointed out that the bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted by his country were advertised months ahead and covered by the media, unlike the frequent large-scale snap exercises conducted by another participating State. All steps taken by his country and NATO were entirely consistent with their international commitments – both legal and political. He criticized one participating State for its policy of shaping relationships with its neighbours without respect for the Helsinki Principles, also referring to the public explanation of this participating State's foreign policy as being based on "four D's": dismiss, distract, distort, and dismay.

The third speaker underlined that the military doctrine of his country had not changed in recent years. At the same time he was concerned by the transformation of military risks into military threats to his country. Amongst these threats were the strengthening of NATO and the bringing of its military infrastructure closer to his own country's borders. Another threat he mentioned was the deployment of the global anti-ballistic missile system of a certain participating State that had the potential to trigger a new nuclear confrontation with wider geographical implications. The speaker expressed concerns about the internal conflict in a neighbouring participating State that had emerged after a *coup d'état* there. His country was making all possible efforts to help to resolve this conflict and to prevent its transformation from an internal into an international conflict.

He then moved on to the subject of terrorism, which was spreading the seeds of aggression and the rise of separatism and extremism worldwide. He gave an account of the efforts of his State, together with other States, to fight this phenomenon in Syria. He regretted the fact that international anti-terrorist co-operation was not very effective and did not allow adequate co-ordination of the efforts of the international community. Finally, the third speaker underlined the commitment of his country to only using military measures for the protection of its national interests and those of its allies after the exhaustion of non-violent means. The dialogue on achieving agreement in the politico-military field could only be resumed if the policy of containment of his State and the increase of military activities near its borders were brought to an end. The first step would be the normalization of relations between defence ministries and the establishment of conditions for the strengthening of the politico-military foundations of European security.

The fourth speaker presented an analysis of the root causes of current conflicts, arguing that armed conflict had returned to Europe. Amongst the key challenges were the threat of terrorism based on international networking, the refugee crisis, and the economic crisis with all its daily implications. He focused on the fact of social and democratic governance deficits providing a breeding ground for conflict escalation, and on the deficiencies of the international framework (UN, OSCE, NATO-Russia Council). In order to address these problems effectively, the armed forces would have to develop an increasing range of skills ranging from humanitarian work on conflict prevention to open confrontation. It was currently possible to observe the reappearance of national selfishness, which had the potential to escalate. He also expressed opinion that the international framework had lost influence because consensus was often jeopardized by national interests. The decisions made at NATO Summit in Wales had marked a return to previous standards of defence preparedness. Finally, the fourth speaker argued that in the OSCE framework it was necessary to renew the momentum that had led to the Helsinki Final Act.

The subsequent discussion revealed diverging views on the root causes of tensions and military confrontations in Europe, and on the conflicts in the east of Ukraine and in Syria. The moderator suggested that the speakers' presentations had revealed two competing narratives.

The moderator, arguing that the basic philosophy of the CFE Treaty was all to do with transparency, asked the third speaker if there was any chance of his country returning to implementation of the Treaty. The third speaker stated that while this was possible in theory, it was not necessary. In this context he mentioned the possibility of a return to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Furthermore, he argued that the two documents should not be considered separately in the context of promoting comprehensive security.



One delegation argued that the conflict in its country could not be equated with the protracted conflicts in the OSCE area. The present discussion was not about competing narratives: it was about a narrative of one country violating OSCE principles and commitments. The restoration of trust would only be possible after the settlement of the conflict. The delegation stressed that the other participating State denied access to the border and sent military personnel and sophisticated military equipment into its country. Emphasis was placed on the need of full implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Another delegation expressed concerns about the difficulty of co-operation and the diminishing of trust due to the aggressive policy of another participating State. If it had been possible to co-operate during the Cold War, why was it not possible to co-operate now? It also regretted that the CFE Treaty was not being implemented in full and asked one participating State why it had refused to work on the update of the Vienna Document. The third speaker replied that working on any document required the establishment of certain necessary conditions. He underlined the absence of such conditions against the background of pressure on the participating State in question, the fact of NATO approaching its borders, and other challenges. He suggested working on establishing normal conditions for such activities.

One delegation raised the issue of the format of the military presence and the trilateral peacekeeping contingent in the context of the protracted conflict in a certain OSCE participating State. Back in 1992, the main task of the military contingent had been to prevent armed conflict from restarting. As it had fulfilled this task long time ago, the delegation asked why the participating States involved did not agree even to start discussions on how to reformat the military operation and adapt it to the stable and peaceful conditions. The third speaker expressed the opinion that his country's military would only implement a task on the ground when it had been defined by political authorities, and suggested forwarding the question to diplomats.

One delegation noted that while the discussion had been concentrated around the question "whom to blame", it should rather be tackling the question "what to do", since all shared the same strategic security objectives. The delegation then asked each speaker to outline the main steps needed to reduce tensions in Europe. The first speaker argued that one participating State should abandon the narrative of NATO expansion being an attack upon it. He called on the said participating State to stop perceiving liberal society as a threat.

Another delegation called upon the parties to refrain from mutual demonization. The discussion had been unbalanced, with excessive consideration being given to one participating State. The delegation argued that every State had its own interests, which also had to be taken into account. In this context the delegation called on participants to search for points of convergence.

Referring to the first and second speakers, one delegation argued that even historical fact might be interpreted in different ways. When one participating State had started reducing its armed forces and withdrawing its forces from Europe, NATO began expanding and building up its infrastructure. The delegation asked the second speaker whether he realized that the rotational presence of military forces would violate NATO-Russia Founding Act, also asking to what extent the participating State he represented had analysed the implications of such steps. The second speaker replied that his country's action was fully consistent with

the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It was natural that States should want to join the most successful alliance.

The Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre emphasized the need to maintain the Forum for Security Co-operation as a platform for dialogue. He brought up the idea of compartmentalizing the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and on status-neutral arms control arrangements.

The moderator concluded the session by stating that that the main task would be to bring different narratives together. She emphasized the importance of addressing the issue of insufficient governance, which could be taken into consideration in forthcoming debates.

## SESSION 2

Tuesday, 16 February 2016

### Report of the Session Rapporteur

#### Emerging challenges

- **Analysis of military, technological, economic, environmental factors and their impact on security policy**
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In his introduction, the moderator enumerated various challenges faced by societies in the modern world. Those included access to raw material markets, challenges related to infrastructure, new forms of weapons, arms races in some regions of the world, the emergence of new hotspots due to a lack of government and the rise of terrorist groups, the risk of the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, especially in connection with the risk of their falling into the hands of terrorists, the use of information as a weapon and transnational organized crime, as well as demographic development and its implications for food security and access to clean drinking water, and also for the spread of epidemics.

The first keynote speaker, the director of the doctrine centre of one participating State, said that the centre had identified 23 different global trends. In terms of geography, outcome and effect, the five trends of most interest for the OSCE related to demographics, urbanization, resources, climate change and technology. The majority of population growth was occurring in the 23 poorest countries. As the societies in the richer countries aged, migration would continue, predominantly to cities. The demand for fresh water would rise significantly, as would the demand for energy and electricity. Rising sea levels would have an impact on the population along the coast, while at the same time the frequency of heatwaves and droughts would increase. Developments in processing power would make robotics and automation a common feature by the year 2025; the Internet and the role of cyberspace were becoming more important.

Those trends constituted food for thought, especially about the implications for defence and security – and for the development of doctrines. The challenges arising from those trends were manifold. Obtaining a more nuanced understanding would be essential to the operating environment. Technology would help but not provide the whole answer. Education, cultural and political awareness and engagement were essential, as would be the need to understand the risks and implications – individual vulnerability.

The second keynote speaker, the director of the doctrine centre of another participating State, took a more global view and identified several emerging challenges. Technological development would proceed ever faster, with the importance of cyberspace in particular increasing inexorably. The value of information for the population would grow tremendously, almost to the extent that the term “addiction” could be used. However, technology and its availability would not be distributed evenly across the globe, but there would be technological clubs in that some States would have access to certain technologies while others did not. An increasing global mobility could be observed – a mobility of concepts and ideas, of products and of individuals. The breaking point, however, would lie with the human being and individual identity, which added a metaphysical dimension and

potential vulnerability. The struggle for resources and growing environmental pollution and contamination also contributed to that rather emotional aspect. Every group of people could be a player with the potential to replace the State.

The first panellist noted that the strategic landscape was rapidly changing. Although military, technological, social and economic change always happened, the key to the developments would be the composition of the building blocks. Challenges were less predictable, and occurred with less warning. The world was more connected, complex and contested than in the past. The comprehensiveness of threats was not new. However, the question was whether a comprehensive understanding could be achieved and a comprehensive response to the challenges and threats delivered. The military was only an instrument; more important factors in countering the challenges were education and the ability to connect information and analysis.

In the technological field, social media could be an enabler and a threat at the same time. That development needed more analysis to understand how players posing a threat would use social media and the potential for strategic communication. The second panellist said that the current migration crisis would put Europe under enormous pressure. At the same time, one large regional power was disregarding OSCE principles. Players posing a threat were also using new technologies to attain their objectives. The impact of that was only just starting to be understood, especially the use of social media.

The representative of one participating State asked how well the international system was coping with the emerging challenges. Since there were more trends than the five identified by the first keynote speaker, such as health, food supplies or globalization, one speaker was optimistic about the process of analysis and how it would become incorporated into the system – at the level of government and internationally.

Another delegation asked how the military and civilian spheres interacted. One speaker said that the approach taken encompassed government as a whole rather than just the military aspects and that the doctrine centre informed policymakers and developed strategy for all government departments. It supported the process, but did not make policy. Another speaker said that a more global, interagency-type approach was needed, based on education and co-operation.

One participating State asked whether the increased military use of space could be avoided. One speaker said that space was mainly used for global communication and would therefore have implications for everyday life. It was an area beyond the law and geographically as well as technologically limitless. However, only a limited club of countries was using space extensively; some of those were trying to use space for defence.

The moderator emphasized the importance of space for communications, GPS and other uses, but understood the question more in relation to the weaponization of space. Progress at the relevant conference in Geneva had been blocked by two countries, which did not want to give up the option of the military use of space.

The delegation of another participating State said that an effective cyber strike could affect a country's nuclear strike capacity. That delegation asked whether cyberspace was a future battlefield and whether it would be necessary to establish cyber capabilities. One speaker said that the cyber area could not be neglected. An opponent in cyberspace could not

be identified easily, since cyber capabilities were not limited to States, but there were plenty of civilian adversaries – hackers – and cyberspace facilitated hybrid threats. The military needed to be aware that there was more than one dimension and that terrorists like IS/Da'esh did not just represent a physical threat, but that with their ideology, they also posed a threat in the information domain. A second speaker agreed that cyber technology was a weapon of ambiguous warfare, which could lead to high and increasing vulnerability. A treaty could mitigate such a threat between States. However State capacities were also necessary because of the question of how to deter an ambiguous attacker. Another speaker said that space and cyber threats were two new domains of warfare, and it was too early to see what doctrinal paths would be taken. One participating State said that where technological development was rapid, like in the cyber area, non-State actors were playing an increasing role. That State asked what State-based capabilities would be like in 2045. One speaker responded that that related to the questions of the individual's and the State's role, of identity and allegiance with the nation State, and of the implications of that for defence policy. Large-scale migration could currently be observed, but the role of the information domain (the cyber domain) and of certain actors in that development could not yet be understood. At the same time, there was significant inequality in and between nations, for example in relation to the availability of health care, which could create social tensions or contribute to migratory developments. In order to address those and other challenges, the nation State, for the foreseeable future, remained the most important building block.

A participating State asked what implications demographics, more precisely the growing populations in Africa and the declining populations in Europe, would have for the States in Europe. One speaker responded that the youth bulges in Asia and Africa could represent an opportunity and a risk at the same time; they could lead to economic growth or cause crisis. Controlled migration could be positive for economies, but the point where it would become a challenge to the current structure could not be determined. Another speaker said that demographic development alone could not automatically be equated with migration. Dealing with uncontrolled migration would have to involve treating the root causes, and the solution would not be military but political.

The representative of one participating State asked about the impact of migration, with its influx of different values and religious beliefs, on the nation State and the Westphalian concept. One speaker said that by 2045, the nation State would still be the prevalent form of State, but the research indicated trends towards regionalization. A second speaker said that the situation where fighters left a country to fight for a movement in another country was an indication of the demise of the idea of the State. Another speaker said that the question of identity had a significant influence on the role of the nation State.

Finally, one delegation asked what implications the increased importance of the cyber sphere had for the skills of military personnel and what the success factors would be from a human capital perspective. One speaker said that new technology, especially social media, and its use would have implications for operational security. Another speaker highlighted that new technology would require commanders to adapt to a new skill set, with an increased awareness of the development of their environment and of the effect of social media on the chain of command. A third speaker stressed that the amount of data and especially the management of big data would be a challenge for a commander and required special skills. At the same time, the required skill set would have an impact on recruiting, a process which would have to involve different candidates from those recruited in the past (in terms for example of age and gender) and make more use of reservists with specialized skill sets.

## SESSION 3

Wednesday, 17 February 2016

### Report of the Session Rapporteur

#### Review of current/updated national military doctrines

– **Examples of military doctrines currently under review – contents and process (actors, methods, procedure)**

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Working session 3 of the OSCE High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar was devoted to a review of current/updated national military doctrines, with the subtopic “examples of military doctrines currently under review – contents and process (actors, methods, procedure)”.

In his opening remarks, the session moderator, Air Commodore Frans Osinga, Netherlands Defence Academy, said that military doctrine was the “software of military power”. Not all countries necessarily had specific national doctrine – many adopted existing sets of best practices in the field. Doctrine was essential in that it reduced uncertainty and facilitated planning, as well as being an important tool with which to educate officers and to enable innovation and technological development. The various drivers of doctrinal change were the prevailing security environment, available finances, alliances, new types of missions, lessons learned and technological developments.

A number of presentations were then given on participating States’ current and developing military doctrines. One keynote speaker said that the paradigm of his country’s military doctrine had shifted from one of international operations in the 1990s towards one of national defence. This was mainly due to the current strategic security environment. Another speaker said that a more pragmatic and “reality-based document” had been developed in his country. One of the panellists said that the democratic control of the armed forces was of major significance in his country. A new range of threats was now prevalent, including cyberthreats, pandemics and terrorism. Doctrinal writers must include civil society and international partners in the process of preparing their seminal documents. Another panellist said that to be successful, doctrine must above all else be relevant. All the speakers said that partnerships, co-operation and interoperability were central to the development of modern military doctrine. Doctrine was also the bridge between (security and defence) policy and the deployment of military force. Military preparedness was also vital, and had the added bonus of deterring any potential aggressor. Consideration needed to be given to the definition of the much-used term “hybrid warfare”, and to the fact that observers would ultimately judge nations on their deeds rather than on their words.

The subjects of the subsequent discussion included the importance of diversity and the gender perspective when developing doctrine, making doctrine public and available to all citizens, and maintaining and fostering high-level military-to-military contacts. One participating State mentioned the importance of “stability policing” as part of its national doctrine, in relation to the situation in countries to the south of the OSCE area, where many OSCE partners were located. Another contributor advised against the proliferation of doctrine

and warned that published military doctrines could quickly become obsolete. The importance of maintaining a flexible approach to doctrinal development was also emphasized.

## SESSION 4

Wednesday, 17 February 2016

### Report of the Session Rapporteur

#### Implications of doctrinal changes for armed forces and security and defence policy

- **How will doctrinal changes affect armed forces, their mandates, capabilities, and structures?**
  - **Implications for security and defence policy including arms control and confidence- and security-building measures**
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The session opened with two keynote speeches focusing on factors in the security environment that drive doctrinal changes.

The first speaker said that volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity gave rise to rapid, unpredictable change. His country was facing a surge in ethnic violence, radical movements and armed conflict. It was also shifting from a static defence posture to a deterrence system that included precision targeting and the use of Special Forces to take the fight to the adversary.

The next keynote speaker said that instability caused by fragile States had the potential to provoke broader conflicts, and that violence between communities, terrorism, insurgency and criminality could all occur simultaneously during a conflict. In addition, the blurring of the difference between high- and low-intensity conflict and the immediate and ongoing lethality of modern conflict, with zero to short reaction time, were drivers of doctrinal change. Further principal drivers of doctrinal change were as follows. Complexity had always been present in military operations but was increasingly prominent in the contemporary operating environment, and was a major driver of doctrinal change. Leadership was another important factor, which was developed through a judicious combination of education, training and experience, and played a vital role in doctrinal change. Another important factor in doctrinal change was scale. The majority of doctrine was based on experience from major battles, in big campaigns conducted by large forces. The challenges emanating from that were significant for countries with relatively small forces. In addition, significant changes to doctrine, strategy or policy might herald changes to structure. After taking all those factors into account, the speaker concluded that the essence of doctrinal change was found in leadership, and that armed forces must address complexity, scale and elements of capability in order to stay apace of changing security challenges.

Another speaker then made a brief statement on improving security and transparency in Europe. An increase in the military actions of one participating State, coupled with a decrease in transparency, had undermined confidence. An action-reaction cycle of escalation should be avoided in favour of a pragmatic focus on the tools at hand, including modernization of the Vienna Document, improvements to the Treaty on Open Skies, and better use of the FSC Security Dialogue.



There was an extensive question and answer session. One participant asked how doctrinal changes in a neighbouring country could help resolve a conflict that two countries were engaged in.

One delegation said that confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) were becoming increasingly compartmentalized. In that connection, participating States were moving apart and using the OSCE to highlight differences rather than common ground. That dynamic had eroded trust, and the speaker urged OSCE participating States not to allow differences to block all possibility of progress.

A delegation raised the issue of taking a capabilities-based approach to CSBMs in the context of modernizing the Vienna Document. A panellist agreed that using a capabilities-based catalogue would be a good idea, but noted the difficulty involved in assessing capabilities and registering them in a mutually agreed catalogue.

One delegation said that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) had been obsolete before it had been signed. Despite his country's long-standing desire to bring that treaty into line with reality, other OSCE participating States had so far not demonstrated the readiness to engage in serious discussion of the issue. Another delegation supported that statement, adding the caveat that that dynamic had resulted in a decrease in verification know-how and capacity throughout the OSCE area.

An audience member then asked a panellist about her country's nuclear doctrine, requested information about the impact of emerging military technology, particularly precision strike capabilities using hypersonic cruise missiles, and about military doctrine and transparency. A panellist said that talking about the implications of new military technologies would be a good way to improve transparency. Speakers also said that a renewed focus on arms control, with an emphasis on mutual benefit, could be helpful in addressing the doctrinal and practical impact of emerging military technologies.

After an extensive discussion of the CFE Treaty, speakers agreed that the OSCE participating States should think about what a European conventional arms control regime would look like in the future. One speaker said that Europe had an excellent foundation of achievements in arms control to build upon, and that modernizing the Vienna Document would be a good first step towards rebuilding transparency.