

Aleksander Kwaśniewski
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Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the forum of which I have the honour and pleasure to speak today, in its essence expresses processes of deep change that we witness and shape ourselves.

OSCE is a one-of-the-kind culmination of the process initiated 35 years ago in Helsinki. The meeting of experts and diplomats from 33 states in Europe and the United States and Canada in Dipoli in the autumn of 1972 to prepare mandate for the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe initiated the end of the cold war. Subsequent stages of this peace process of overcoming the divide of Europe are:

- summit meeting of the leaders of 35 states, who on 1 August 1975 signed the Final Act from Helsinki;

- CSCE review meetings in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna, and - finally
- *Paris Charter for New Europe* adopted in the autumn of 1990.

If someone asked a question what - in the greatest brief - the essence of this process consisted in, I would reply without hesitation: this was seeking answers to the question how to provide in changing conditions peaceful changes in Europe.

In other words: How to manage the change? From this point of view, the process initiated in Helsinki fulfilled the hopes laid in it. In this process, there were no winners and losers. It seems that never before in the history of Europe had so profound changes occurred without a war. It's true: we were witnessing bloody internal conflicts - mainly on the ethnic, national and religious background - in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and in Moldovan-Ukrainian borderland. However, it has been CSCE - and later OSCE - that has significantly contributed to

extinguishing some conflicts - to solving some of them and "freezing" other conflict situations. It is difficult to overemphasize the achievements of our common Organisation in this respect.

However, in recent years there have appeared some critical voices that refer not so much to the past as to the present and the future of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Doubts relate to the mandate of the Organisation, forms and method of its realisation, and most importantly, the principles and methods of its realisation and application in practice of the principles and norms as well as obligations agreed in the process of OSCE.

1. What is OSCE?

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let's begin from a basic issue and one that seems to be the most important one: OSCE, like the Council of Europe and all other inter-governmental organizations, is not

abstraction. OSCE, UN, the Council of Europe - this is all us, all states that are part of these inter-governmental structures and institutions. Their strength and effectiveness - is our common strength, but likewise, their weaknesses and inefficiency - is our common weakness. These organizations cannot do more than the states constituting them want or permit. This is a truism. But in the thinking about the present and the future of the security system in Europe, it is worth asking some questions:

What our common expectations are? What is the broadest common denominator in pursuing the goals that we have agreed together? What place do we assign to OSCE among other transatlantic security structures?

On this occasion it is worth reminding that there is no other security structure of such an extensive range of membership over the area spreading from San Francisco and Vancouver to Vladivostok. The mere fact that OSCE members are all the states of Europe, North America and Central Asia without exception, determines the special, and

incomparable to other security structures, character and place of this organization among other institutions. This gives it strength and importance, and at the same time allows to see difficulties and weaknesses of OSCE. The Organization does not only express a community of security interests, but also a community of values which are shared by the member states. The wider the composition, the weaker the aggregate tissue, the smaller the common denominator. Clearly, we have different traditions, mentalities and ways of understanding the processes which are taking place in the world. In Poland we say: when two men say the same, it does not always mean the same. In the past predominant was a belief that interests of states are feasible and measurable; on the other hand, values are only declared, not to say - they fulfill the role of a special ornament, or decoration. This is not the case.

Deep transformations in the international system have made respect for the shared system of values gain critical importance for the security of states. Clearly, the boundary between what is external and what is internal is becoming

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quite vague. Many new hazards in the contemporary world have their sources in internal processes - in violating civil rights and liberties, limiting freedoms of the media and oppressions of democratic opposition forces, in discrimination of ethnic, religious, language minorities. Before regarded as internal and belonging to the discretionary power of the state, these issues are today a reasonable and authorized object of international interest.

A great merit and accomplishment of the process initiated in Helsinki is that states have expressed their readiness to ensure that the rule of law and civil liberties, respect for democratic elections and freedom of the media become the object of common concern and interest. Since the adoption of the Moscow Mechanism in 1990 nobody can refer to "an unlawful interference in internal affairs" as totalitarian regimes used to do in the past. It is difficult to name another international organisation, which have introduced effective instruments, procedures and mechanisms counteracting new hazards and challenges for international peace and stability in an equally creative

manner. Since hazards and conflicts result increasingly from the nature of relations inside and not between states, appropriate tools, ways and forms should be necessary to allow to effectively pursue objectives requested from the international community. Appointed two years ago, the Panel of Eminent Persons submitted their Report and appropriate recommendations (*Final Report and Recommendations on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE*). It is not my intention to remind proposals contained in this document. They are well known in this audience.

I will draw your attention to one, as it seems, often underestimated, subject. In the period of the cold war, the bipolar security system developed. This was security based not so much on a balance of power as on a balance of fear - on mutual deterrence. The foundation of this system was the political philosophy of **exclusiveness**, rejection, throwing away. NATO states were creating a unique closed club whose members were joined not only by common security interests, but also a common system of democratic values: respect for political pluralism, rule of law, freedom

of press and human rights. On the antipodes - on the other side of the divide - was the Warsaw Pact, subordinate to Soviet dominance. The great political project started over 30 years ago in Helsinki has been based on quite a new political philosophy whose essence is **inclusiveness**. Implementing this philosophy has resulted in erasing the old lines of the divide. So far closed organizations and structures - have opened for new members.

Today the bipolar world is part of the past. Those who reject the concept that the bipolar world has been replaced by an unipolar order are right. Clearly, the unipolar order is nothing else but recognition of one superpower's hegemony which would perform the role of a special world policeman, or gendarme. Likewise, there is no consent to multipolarism that in turn would imply returning to the anachronistic 19th-century concept of dividing the world into zones of influence, to a unique Directory, or "concert of powers" well-known in the history of Europe.

We are living in a world where no forms of subordination of some states to others are acceptable any longer. Deluded are those who believe that in the 21st century small and medium states will agree to a special form of protectorate from the great of this world. The security system in the contemporary world is based on interdependencies, on mutual commitment, on conscious and voluntary resignation from absolute sovereignty to community, to the international institutions and security structures. There is a fundamental difference between a **multipolar** world and a **multilateral** world. It is in our common interest to consolidate international multilateral institutions. This applies equally to large and small, rich and poor states. However, under one condition that to the same extent they all accept and respect the common system of values and discharge any assumed obligations.

2. Tasks for the future

Ladies and gentlemen,

We are living in a period of accelerated changes. In our thinking we often do not keep pace with diagnosing what is the essence of these changes. Resonant and easily remembered diagnoses and recipes become popular, what does not imply that they are accurate and touch the point. More than 10 years ago two books gained prominence - "The End of History" by Francis Fukuyama and "Clash of Civilisations" by Samuel Huntington. Valuable, excellently written, both were an attempt to examine the new reality. Unfortunately, instead of reading these reflection-stimulating essays, many commentators only quoted both titles. Well, let's say it clearly and expressly: there is no *end of history* and there is no *clash of civilisations*. For millennia civilisations have never lead and also today do not lead to conflicts, but to mutual enrichment of various cultures. Unless we regard genocidal despotisms and bloody dictatorships as civilisations. Then we are talking

about "civilisation of death" whose extreme expression in the previous century was Nazi fascism in Germany, stalinism in Russia, the rule of Pol-Pot in Cambodia or Kim Ir Sen in Korea.

No conflict in Europe and in the world has been a result of the clash of civilisations. On the other hand, respect and the readiness to understand other cultures and civilisations, habits and traditions, prevents conflicts.

I am mentioning this fact because in our times the policy of international security is no longer a domain of the military, diplomats and experts. The role and importance of eminent intellectuals and thinkers is growing, who act as a kind of guides in the world dominated by a sense of uncertainty, vagueness and unpredictability.

This is not a new phenomenon. In times of chaos and confusion those who aptly read the signs of the time came into prominence. The works of Niccolo Machiavelli, Hugo Grocius, Karl von Clausewitz have enjoyed great popularity

in Europe until today. Names of eminent thinkers from Central and Eastern Europe are much less known. Here I will mention, for example, Czech King George from Podiebrad, or Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski whose works about war and peace were known and quoted throughout Europe in the Renaissance age. I will recall here one more name of Jan Gotlib Bloch whose 6-volume work published in five languages at the end of the 19th century, entitled *A future war in technical, economic and political terms* has been unparalleled until today in the whole world when it comes to relevance of prediction and the possibilities of preventing armed conflicts that Europe was facing. Bloch did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, but without his endeavours and measures taken at Russian Tsar Nicolas II, the 1st Conference of the Hague would not have been formally summoned. Likewise, without the contribution of eminent Russian lawyer Fiodor Martens, the Hague conventions, constituting a foundation of the contemporary international law until today, would not have been agreed.

We often repeat a sentence that thinking has great future. I could experience this many times, when, of the will of voters, I served the Office of the President of the Republic for two terms. I am mentioning this fact because Poland's political transformation and recovery of full sovereignty faced us with the need to re-arrange relations with all neighbours. Likewise, it is worth reminding that although the borders of Poland have not changed after 1989, all states neighboring on us did. In the east we bordered on the Soviet Union, in the south - Czechoslovakia, and in the west - German Democratic Republic. As a result of the transition instead of the old three neighbours we got seven new ones and at the same time these were new states: in the north-east - Russian Federation (district Caliningrad) and Lithuania, further two new states - Belarus and Ukraine, in the south - Czech Republic and Slovakia, and in the west, after reunification of Germany - Federal Republic of Germany.

However, in creating the foreign policy of new democratic Poland we had an easier task. Clearly, the new

strategy of arranging close and friendly relations between Poland and nations in our immediate neighbourhood in the east - Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania - referred to as UBL for short, was formulated already in the early 1960s. The authors of this concept were two eminent Polish thinkers working on emigration - Jerzy Giedroyć, editor of "Kultura" monthly published in Paris and its close collaborator in London Julisz Mieroszewski. The views of these two outstanding Poles did not meet with understanding. They stimulated objection on the part of the Polish emigration because those people did not put up with the loss of lands in the east. Likewise, hostility and anger was demonstrated by authorities in Warsaw, which named Giedroyć's and Mieroszewski's journalism as sabotage and anti-Soviet activity because they both regarded the communist system as a historical deviation and predicted revival of the national identity of Ukrainians, Belarussians and Lithuanians. They believed that sooner or later these nations would regain independence. They were right! They postulated friendly cooperation of Poland with democratic Russia and support for Polish neighbours in the east. This

was their testament that has been of service to Poland and Europe.

As a result, never in its history has Poland had as good and close relations with neighbours as now. This is true for all states neighbouring on us - except for Belarus. However, I do not doubt that sooner or later our relations will be arranged also with Belarus after the rule of law has been restored and as soon as European democratic standards are respected in this country. I will not resign from the role of the promoter of incorporating Eastern European states into the process of European integration.

A week ago in Warsaw I have announced within my *Amicus Europae* Foundation the Initiative *Direct Neighbourhood*, which is a set of proposals aimed at improving the European Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. It also serves the purpose of fostering international discussion on the best forms and methods of supporting the political and economic transformation of the East European countries and the formula of relations

between the EU and its Eastern Neighbourhood. I deeply believe that carrying out the recommendations put forward in my Initiative will help the aforementioned “*Helsinki philosophy of inclusiveness*” to prevail, in terms of stabilization and development of the entire continent - through engagement, partnership and membership in European security and integration institutions.

3. Final remarks

Ladies and gentlemen,

In our times the foreign and security policy is not and cannot be formulated only in the privacy of diplomatic offices and behind closed doors. Scholars, experts, NGOs participate in in the preparation of new initiatives and specific solutions. This has also been reflected at all stages of the process started in Helsinki. Eminent Swiss scientist Prof. Rudolf Bindschedler played a key role in preparing the European system of peaceful resolution of disputes between states. For many years Switzerland has supported different non-governmental initiatives, which effectively

contribute to democratic control over armed forces and security structures. I mean in particular the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) that in a few recent years has earned a reputation of one of the most serious institutions in the whole world in the sphere of good security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reforms (SSR). For 40 years a similar role in the sphere of armament control and restriction has been played by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Publications of these centres enjoy deserved high reputation because they represent high professionalism, are fair and reliable. In fact they have become an indispensable aid in the process of making political decisions. Several years ago we initiated works of the International Warsaw Reflection Group. Its reports supervised by **Adam D. Rotfeld** have played an important role in the debate about shaping a new cooperative security system in Europe and in the world.

Today it is particularly important to make available to the public results of the research conducted in this type of centers in Europe, United States and many other regions.

Clearly, after many years - when it has already seemed that the military dimension of security does not play a significant role anymore - we witness modernization of the army and military equipment, growth in military expenses and, what's most alarming, gradual but constant erosion and failure of the armament control regime.

In 2005 the Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT Review Conference) failed, for the first time in its long history, to agree any final document. Two years ago the final arrangements of the Jubilee UN World Summit (Summit Outcome Document) did not contain any provisions concerning armament control and non-proliferation. The list of such failures is long. There is a question mark over other agreements as well. A great common achievement of Europe was the CFE treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe) on arms and military force reduction in Europe concluded under the auspices of OSCE. The modified version of this agreement adopted on Istanbul in 1999 has not been ratified yet and the future of the CFE Treaty is unclear. The

importance of armament constraints, reduction and control in Europe conducted in the framework of OSCE has come down, in the greatest brief, not only to eliminating many conventional systems of offensive weapons, but also to changing the military doctrines and the means of building trust and security. These were agreements of historic significance. Unprecedented in the history of Europe.

Time has come to look in a different manner at new military problems of the security dimension. Instead of confrontation and suspiciousness, to see new opportunities of cooperation and building trust based on new terms. Return to the method of thinking and the rhetoric of the cold war will get us nowhere. This also applies to possible cooperation of global powers possessing nuclear missile weapons in building installations referred to as the Missile Defence system in Europe. This system should improve security of all the states concerned in Europe and North America.

In the period of the cold war, arms control was supposed to reduce the probability of outbreak of a war. The new type of arms control should completely eliminate such possibility.

Thank you very much for your attention