"The OSCE's Comprehensive and Co-operative Approach to Preventing and Combating Terrorism and Related Threats"

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Introduction

The purpose of this presentation is to provide an academic point of view on OSCE counter-terrorism work as it is perceived from an outside perspective.

In this connection three key documents are noteworthy: the OSCE Proto Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (MC(10) Jour,/2, 7 December 2002); OSCE Ministerial Council Decision NO. 10/08 on "Further Promoting the OSCE's Action in Countering Terrorism" (MC Dec/10/08 of 5 December 2008); and the "Report by the Secretary General on OSCE Counter-Terrorism Activities" distributed on 1 April 2009. Consideration must also be given to the issue of the progress made in implementing UNSC Resolution 1540 in respect to its relevance to counter-terrorism works in OSCE, including nonproliferation of WMD matters.

It should be noted that the research for this paper is also based on fieldwork and studies conducted over the past four decades in the OSCE area and elsewhere. A selected bibliography of some of the sources for the presentation is attached for more detailed consideration.

Clearly, OSCE's strategies and activities constitute a function of the perception of the nature and intensity of terrorist threats within member states and the region as a whole. Additionally, the dangers originating from outside the area are also of concern to OSCE. It is therefore prudent first to provide in this presentation a generic overview of contemporary challenges and then assess the terrorism threat in Europe.

It is against this context that OSCE's security concerns and missions can be realistically assessed. Some preliminary academic conclusions and recommendations are offered with the hope that they will stimulate discussion at the Working Session III at the

2009 Annual Review Conference and encourage further research and study on OSCE's counter-terrorism strategies and actions.

I. Contemporary Terrorism: A Generic Overview

Because terrorism is a cheap, attractive and effective instrument of fear, it has been repeatedly employed by a variety of groups and even some states in the post-World War II era. Currently, it is becoming a permanent fixture of international life, threatening every nation, large and small. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have utilized tactics of propaganda and violence on an unprecedented scale, with serious implications for national, regional, and global security.

Contributing Factors

There are numerous political, social, and economic contributing factors that encourage and facilitate modern terrorism. Some of the major generic conditions that affect this reality include ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance and violence; escalation of propaganda and psychological warfare; extreme nationalism and separatism; regional conflicts that defy easy solutions; intensification of criminal activity and illicit trafficking; population explosion, migrate expansion, and unemployment; economic gap between the rich and poor; environmental challenges; and arms development and proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons.

Among the specific reasons for the escalation of contemporary terrorism worldwide mention should be made of the absence of a universal definition of terrorism; disagreement as to the root causes of terrorism; the religionization of politics; the

exploitation of the media; double standards of morality; loss of resolve by governments to take appropriate action; weak punishment of terrorists; violation of international law of states; the complexity of modern societies; and the high cost of security in democracy.

Perpetrators and Motivations

Current and future perpetrators include the following "free-lance" and sub-state terrorist groups: individuals terrorists; mentally deranged and "crusaders"-"martyrs"; single-issue political extremists; ideological-based groups; ethnic, racial, religious movements; nationalist and separatist actors; criminal and political mercenaries; and international networks, particularly al-Qaeda.

Some of the terrorists impulses cover a broad range of motivations. These consist of political discontent (a. ideological: anarchism; ambitions; and radicalism; b. nationalistic: resistance; separatism; and irredentism; c. economic discontent: low living standards; lack of opportunity; unfulfilled expectation; lost of squandered resources; and d. cultural discontent: class constraints; ethnic discrimination; religious intolerance; technological irritants; environmental irritants).

There is also a long record of governments providing terror groups direct and indirect financial and other types of support (e.g. training, intelligence, operations, and weaponry). Rogue nations utilize terrorist proxies to further their own country's interests. As formal, open, and direct malevolent actions undertaken by a government would call immediate attention to state-sponsors, using terrorist groups to carry out operations such as assassinations and bombings enables the government-sponsor to claim plausible deniability. The role of Iran, Sudan, Cuba, previously Libya, and North Korea

come to mind. Currently, Iran and North Korea are of particular concern to the

international community because of their nuclear ambitions

Current Trends

Modern terrorism is characterized by an ideological and theological fanaticism,

and education in hatred toward one's enemy, which has been coupled with rapid

technological advancements in communications (e.g. the Internet), transportation (e.g.

modern international air travel), as well as conventional and unconventional weaponry to

create a truly lethal threat.

Indeed, this threat has become much more decentralized, as it now emanates not

only from established terrorist organizations, but also from freelance individuals with the

motives, means, and opportunity to visit harm upon civil society. As a result of these

developments, contemporary terrorism presents a multitude of threats to the safety,

welfare, and civil rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of

national and international economic systems; and the expansion of democracies.

One measurement of evaluating the terrorist threat is to calculate the enormous

cost to all societies in terms of the number of incidents, the human toll, and the economic

damage. Indeed, since the 1960s, modern society has suffered dearly from the global

disease of terrorism, a reality that grows in scope and brutality with every passing year

For example, in the 1970s, a total of some 300 terrorist attacks, both domestic and

international, were recorded worldwide. Currently, almost forty years later, the count

reached over 80,000 incidents.

Clearly, no community, country, or region is immune from the impact of terrorism. In the 9/11 attack in New York City, citizens from 78 countries were killed. That year alone, a total of some 3,537 people died. During the period 2002-2008 approximately over 113,000 persons perished and hundreds of thousands more were wounded in terrorist attacks throughout the world. The economic, political, psychological, and strategic costs must also be considered in this assessment.

Future Outlooks: Super Terrorism

What is a particular concern is that unconventional weapons – biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear – are slowly emerging upon the contemporary terrorist scene. That is, as technological developments offer new capabilities for terrorist groups, the modus operandi of terrorist groups may subsequently alter most drastically. Reportedly, at least a dozen terrorist groups, in addition to al Qaeda's network, have shown an interest in acquiring or actively attempting to obtain mass disruption and destruction weapons (WMD). This worrisome trend presents a clear and present danger to the very existence of civilization itself. Thus, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains low in comparison to the use of other (WMD) weapons, the consequences for "super" terrorism could be enormous. If a nuclear bomb is stolen (or built by a terrorist group with reasonable resources and talent), an explosion of about 1 kiloton (one-twentieth the power of Hiroshima attack) in a major city anywhere will cause more than 100,000 fatalities, resulted damages in totaling billions of dollars.

Another dangerous emerging trend of contemporary international life is the growing threat of cyber terrorism. The expanding concern is that not only hackers and

criminal crackers, but also terrorists will intensify the utilization of this form of electronic "warfare" as "equalizer" weapons.

It is evident that the threat of "non-explosive" terrorist assaults is growing with every passing day. Three contributing factors account for the reality. First, the "globalization" of the Internet users makes government and industry efforts to control cyber attacks much more challenging than ever before.

Second, there are now tens of thousands of hacker-oriented sites on the Internet, thus resulting in "democratization" of the tools to be used for disruption and destruction. With the step-by-step cyber "cookbooks," the exploitation of Trojan horses, logic bombs and other electric *modus operandi* alternatives are becoming a permanent fixture of international life.

And third, terrorist organizations have broken away from their place within the formerly bipolar world, have become multidirectional, causing further complications to our technologically vulnerable societies. These new developments have enhanced the threats and capabilities of terrorist groups to the degree in which they could forever alter our planet's experience.

National, Regional, and Global Challenges

The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires states, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible responses and capabilities to minimize future threats.

Ensuring the safety and interests of its citizens at home and abroad will therefore continue to be every government's paramount responsibility in the coming months and years. Understanding the methods of operation employed by terrorists, identifying the threats and specific targets, both present and future, and realistically assessing consequences that may result from acts of terror violence will assist governments unilaterally and with the cooperation of international and regional bodies, such as OSCE, confronting terrorism for the remainder of the twenty-first century.

II. Terrorism and Europe: Historical Lessons and Future Threats

Terrorism—the unlawful use of physical force and psychological intimidation by sub-state or clandestine state agents against noncombatant targets, primarily intended to achieve social, economic, political, strategic, or other objectives—is not new to Europe. In the Middle Ages, several European maritime states employed pirates to terrorize the seas and further specific foreign policy aims. The "reign of terror" from "above" and "below" became a common practice during the eighteenth century.

Subsequently, a broad spectrum of indigenous European groups, ranging from anarchists to national extremists, resorted to violent activities to attain some "higher goals." The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 is one example of this kind of terrorism. In the twentieth century, the murder of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo by a nationalist extremist ignited the First World War. The period between the two World Wars also witnessed terrorist activities in Europe, with the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia as a case in point.

It was not, however, until the 1960s that terrorism became a permanent fixture of life in Europe. The Paris students' revolt in 1968, the emergence of indigenous separatist movements, the rise of Middle Eastern extremism, and the expansion of state terrorism are some of the contributing factors that encouraged the intensification of terrorism in Europe.

Contemporary Actors and Networks

During the past forty years, hundreds of indigenous subnational groups, mostly acting independently but sometimes as proxies of foreign governments, have proliferated in Europe. Seeking to achieve ideological, nationalist, or other goals, these groups include such major and minor actors as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Direct Action (DA), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Red Brigades (RB), and the Organization 17 November (17 N). These urban terrorist groups—some highly structured and others loosely organized—have either deliberately selected their targets or indiscriminately attacked their victims, Europeans and others.

To be sure, various European groups collaborated with each other as well as with non-European organizations, primarily those based in the Middle East and those in Asia such as the Japanese Red Army. This informal and formal relationship included ideological alliances, propaganda support, diplomatic assistance, geographic sanctuary, financial help, training, organizational assistance, intelligence, weapons supply, and operations. These networks, consisting of various terrorist groups, have resulted in a national, regional, and global framework for terror. The international character of many

terrorist efforts often compounds the difficulty of identifying the initiator or sponsor of a given terrorist attack.

An interesting aspect of terrorist networks is the formation of a "regional framework within which like-minded groups collaborate. A case in point is the European "anti-imperialist" network that consisted of several groups, such as the Red Army Faction, Direct Action, and the Red Brigades. Currently, al-Qaida is the most elaborate international network operating in Europe and elsewhere around the world. It reportedly has some sort of presence—operatives and local affiliates—in most of the OSCE countries.

The Criminal-Terrorist Nexus

Globalization, the information revolution, and economic integration efforts in a Europe without borders have enabled criminals and organized crime to do business and engage in a broad range of criminal activity. For instance, "white-collar" crimes are expanding. These crimes target such sectors as anti-trust law, securities, commodities futures, environmental activities, maritime business, gaming, the Internet, intellectual property, and tax customs. Trafficking in humans (e.g. buying and selling women and children, usually for sexual exploitation) represents another "new," substantive, transnational offense.

In addition, serious organized crime threats facing Europe consist of current and emerging challenges to law enforcement, including drug trafficking (particularly in heroin, powder and crack cocaine, and ecstasy), organized immigration crime, fraud (particularly revenue fraud), money laundering, counterfeiting, weapons possession and

sales, and "high-tech" crime (e.g. the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network). To be sure, criminals and terrorists take advantage of opportunities and loopholes within the economic system in Europe. By utilizing the existing legal structure, they are able to benefit from available financial, organizational, and operational assistance.

Legitimate companies support terrorists and criminals—directly and unwittingly—to initiate their illegal activities. Among numerous identifiable forums of such relationships mention should be made of the following interfaces: funding and laundering money; employment accessibility to equipment and personnel; generic tools (e.g. trucks); instrumentalities of terror (e.g. dynamite or explosives); information about the local landmarks and prospective targets (e.g. highlighting vulnerabilities and access to targets); communications, resources, and contacts; work permits (particularly for immigration crimes); and sponsorship (e.g. employment and resources). Terrorist groups and criminals also use front companies (which combine legitimate and illegal revenue) and shell companies (opaque firms used to hide a legitimate owner's interests) to finance unlawful operations.

In addition to the foregoing, terrorists and criminals feed off each other in a wide variety of general and specific criminal activity, including counterfeiting currency, credit card theft, misappropriating and using credit card information, forging documents, identify theft, money laundering, drug trafficking, corruption, and commercial espionage in violation of the permissible norms of the economic framework in Europe and elsewhere.

Terrorist groups use a variety of means—from the simple to the complex—to secure funds for their activities. The initial sources of terrorist funds include both legal

(e.g. personal savings and legitimate business revenue) and illegal (e.g. criminal acts such as drug trafficking and financial fraud). Once the funds are raised, they are distributed to various factions of terrorist groups through a variety of means.

The various ways that terrorist organizations fund their deadly activities include the use of traditional and alternative financial services entities (e.g. banks and hawalas—informal money-transfer systems firmly established in Asia and the Middle East); non-profits' trading in commodities (e.g. "conflict diamonds" and gold); bogus financial instruments; currency smuggling and wire transfers; drug trafficking; extortion; money laundering; smuggling products; securities fraud; and other scams.

Europe's Future Challenges

According to open sources and intelligence estimates, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Europe will continue to be targeted by both domestic and international terrorist groups for the foreseeable future. The advances of science and technology, as well as the various contributing political, social, and economic factors, particularly the criminal-terrorist nexus, will determine the nature and intensity of the terrorist threats. For instance, the European maritime industry, already plagued by organized crime, might become the next vulnerable environment for seaborne attacks by the al-Qaida network.

Available al-Qaida documents clearly indicate that there is no end to the terrorists' evil intentions, and the lesson of 9/11 is that there is no end to the terrorists' imagination. We must therefore ponder the future with grave concern.

Policy Implications

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The preliminary policy implications for Europe are three-fold:

First, as Europe moves towards expanded political and economic unification, the "region without borders" might indeed offer new security vulnerabilities to domestic and foreign terrorists and criminals. However, the new Europe could also provide incentives for increased counter-terrorist cooperation—more than ever before.

Second, there are no simple or complete solutions to the dangers of terrorism. Since the tactics used to challenge the authority of European nations continue to be novel, so, too, must be the response by the region's governments. We must also take caution to avoid the kind of overreaction that could lead to repression and, ultimately, the weakening of the democratic institutions that we seek to protect.

Third, the vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated, high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires each European nation, both unilaterally and in concert with others, to develop credible responses and the capabilities to minimize future threats.

Fourth, security measures must be developed to make certain that institutions with seemingly legitimate and often humanitarian ties to a foreign cause are in fact legitimate and are not influenced or controlled by international terrorist organizations and criminal groups. Particular attention should be paid to educational and religious institutions, foundations, banks, and corporations with links to foreign groups within the European community.

III. OSCE's Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Structures, and Activities

The central role of the OSCE in contributing to European security is well-established. Emerging out of the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the aftermath of the Cold War, this newly-formed entity has provided a unique defense architecture that is composed of the 56 states of the alliance. It enables its participating members to respond unilaterally and collectively to changing political circumstances and to the multiple internal and external security challenges. Unlike any other international body, the OSCE is built on political-military foundations combined with human dimensions of security, including the rule of law, democracy building and protecting individual and group rights.

This approach of hard and soft power, with emphasis on the latter, is incorporated in the OSCE Final Act rather than in a formal treaty. The political commitment of all parties is to establish security and cooperation in Europe on the basis of non-binding provisions. This legal status, therefore, requires the implementation of OSCE decisions to depend on membership willingness to establish a consensus on specific actions related to various security concerns, nationally, regionally, and globally.

Because OSCE countries have been affected by domestic and international terrorism, their approach to confronting the challenges has been also based on the organization's comprehensive strategy. That is, the common threat has expanded awareness of both conventional and unconventional dangers of terrorism and thereby contributed to increased cooperation among member states in developing organizational structures and instruments that were required in reducing the risk to all societies.

The following discussion presents an academic overview of some of these developments, and then offers some preliminary conclusions and recommendations for OSCE membership consideration.

Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU)

The Bucharest Plan of Action of December 4, 2001, is illustrative of the new emerging trend reflected by the international community's response to the 9/11 attacks and provided the groundwork to OSCE's mandate in combating terrorism. The Bucharest Plan asserted the following:

> The OSCE stands ready to make its contribution to the fight against terrorism in close cooperation with other organizations and forums. This contribution will be consistent with the Platform for Cooperative Security and will benefit from interaction between global and regional anti-terrorism efforts under the aegis of the United Nations. The OSCE participating States commit their political will, resources, and practical means to the implementation of their obligations under existing international terrorism conventions and pledge themselves to intensify national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism (MC 9. Dec./1 Annex)

The other critical framework is the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century. It identified terrorism as a major cause of instability, one that requires a global approach in addressing its root causes in addition to the social, economic and political context in which it occurs. It further stated that OSCE counter terror activities will focus on preventative measures to deny terrorists' ability to increase their capabilities in addition to remaining in full accordance with the rule of law and international law, including human rights law.

It is this vision and mission that has led to the establishment in 2002 of the OSCE's Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU). It serves as the organization's key

facilitator and coordinator in its counter-terrorism activities. Among the ATU's tasks are to assist participating states in implementing antiterrorism commitments as well as to respond rapidly to requests from OSCE membership for anti-terrorism assistance. Another ATU responsibility is to address gaps in anti-terrorism capabilities and develop liaison relationships with a multitude of international, regional, and sub-regional bodies.

Specific ATU activities include encouraging legal and political cooperation in criminal matters; advancing travel document security programs; establishing survey of assistance programs; developing counter-terrorism networks; organizing roundtable regional organizations; combating incitement to terrorism on the internet; enhancing container and supply chain security; countering threats to aviation security; protecting energy infrastructure against attacks; supporting public-private partnerships; and preventing intolerance, racism, radicalization, and violent extremism.

Clearly, other related OSCE bodies are concerned with terrorism challenges such as the Conflict Prevention Center; the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media. Additional relevant tasks are mandated to the OSCE Center in Ashgabad; to the OSCE Office in Baku; the OSCE Center in Bishkek; the OSCE Mission to Serbia; the OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan; and the OSCE Officer in Yerevan.

While the commendable contributions of the aforementioned and other components in combating terrorism are acknowledged, to non-OSCE observers ATU represents the organization's focal point for counter-terrorism activities.

Legal and Political Support

To combat the crime of terrorism OSCE bases its strategy within the framework of the rule of law and in accordance with obligations under international law, particularly international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.

OSCE aims at mobilizing political will and support of member states to strengthen the legal structure of counter-terrorism instruments, including the legislative implementation of various relevant regional and global existing conventions and protocols. Mention should be made of the Brussels Ministerial Statement in support of and promoting the international legal framework against terrorism (MC.Doc/5/06) and the Madrid Ministerial Statement on supporting the United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy (MC.Doc/3/07).

It is this framework that encouraged an increasing number of participating states to become parties to important treaties such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the UN Convention against Transnational Crime. Overall, the rate of members' ratification of legal instruments both on global and regional levels is the highest in the world.

Political support has also been generated by participating states to advance common security standards as initiated by the United Nations' specialized agencies and other international multilateral bodies. Case in point include the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s security standards for the handling and issuing of passports; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; the World Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade; and INTERPOL's database on lost and stolen documents.

Capacity–building Assistance

One of OSCE's major missions is to assist participating states in improving their counter-terrorism capabilities to respond to a variety of terrorist threats. The capacity-building programs available through different cooperative regional and global bodies provide useful facilitating structures and processes in accomplishing this goal.

Among the areas covered are ratification and legislative implementation of judicial counter-terrorism instruments; money lending and terrorist financing; travel document security; border control and management; and Public – Private Partnership (PPP) initiatives. OSCE's collaborative work with the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) is, indeed, exemplary. An illustration of this high-level policy coordination is the co-hosting by these organization of the 3rd special meeting of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee with international, regional and sub-regional bodies in Vienna in 2004.

Identifying and Addressing Gaps

Within its own structure it has initiated numerous activates, including an OSCE-wide workshop in 2005 dealing with the threat of suicide bombing and a conference on non-banking conducts for the financing on terrorism.

Additionally, OSCE has participated with a multitude of global organizations, focusing on specific threats and offering response recommendations. For instance, in 2004, both OSCE and ICAO co-sponsored the first conference on Man Portable-Au Defense Systems (MANPADS) concern to airports. Similarly, in 2006 OSCE collaborated with the Organization of Public Transport (UITP) in conducting a workshop

on urban transport security. Also, in 2007 it organized events aimed at enhancing PPP's role in counter-terrorism in general and in combating incitement to violence on the Internet.

International Co-operation

International Co-operation in countering terrorism is an essential element within a "best practices" comprehensive approach. Such an evolving strategy aims at setting up agreeable priorities, avoiding duplication of efforts, and establishing better leveraging resources. These discernable advantages are enhancing coordination on both vertical and horizontal levels.

The practical cross-fertilization between OSCE and other global and regional bodies have included a number of relevant roundtables for focusing attention on a variety of existing and potential problems. For example, the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was the result of the Copenhagen Working Level CT-Practitioners Roundtable in 2006. It was followed by another in Vilnius in 2007. Opportunities for similar future gatherings can be expected to trigger additional joint activities in related areas of security concerns.

One concrete outcome of such efforts is OSCE's Counter-Terrorism Network (CTN) Newsletter. This useful tool of communication covering monthly relevant counter-terrorism developments reaches not only participating members but also a wide range of the counter-terrorism community world-wide. This outreach project has already resulted in information-sharing contributions to the newsletter by non-OSCE practitioners.

Another noteworthy effort of the international collaboration is OSCE's extensive relationship with the Council of Europe (CoE). Both organizations have co-sponsored and cooperated on counter terrorism programs in areas such as combating radicalization, terrorists' incitement, and addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of violence. The OSCE also cooperated with a variety of different regional organizations, including the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) on border crossing facilitation and good governance of customs and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the links between economic growth and socio-political stability.

An important illustration of inter-regional cooperation is OSCE's interaction with Asian partners such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a bid to broaden dialogue opportunities with its partners outside the OSCE, the SCO was invited to participate in a series of meetings and initiatives on combating terrorism. In return, SCO representatives have shown their support for such initiatives by attending the Meeting of the OSCE for Cooperation in Vienna in April 2003, and the OSCE Conference on Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Lisbon in September 2003. There is a potential for expanded ARF-OSCE cooperation in the context of improved region-to-region cooperation. Confidence-building measures and preventative diplomacy underscore the similarities in the approach to security between the two partners.

Finally, OSCE has developed collaborative relations with global bodies such as the World Bank on good governance tied with political, economic power, free media, and security; the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on human rights, tolerance,

and non-discrimination and the UN Development Program (UNDP) on environmental issues that have potential to threaten security.

Protecting Human Rights

A cardinal "soft-power" component of OSCE's comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy is compliance with international law requirements, particularly relevant human rights principles, practices, and standards. These legal obligations include refugee and humanitarian law.

It is not surprising, therefore, that OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributes significantly to the counter-terrorism efforts of the organization. It actively promotes tolerance and non-discrimination activities and also offers member states opportunities for technical assistance and advice in this important field. This and other services are, indeed, necessary because the most effective long-term guarantors of conflict resolution and peace with justice is the establishment and maintenance of democratic processes in member states in the region and beyond.

Some Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations

Reviewing OSCE mission in developing a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy several preliminary conclusions and recommendations are offered:

First, in combating terrorism in all its forms OSCE aimed to ensure the implementation by member states their obligations under international laws and relevant conventions and protocols.

Second, OSCE as an international organization could take the lead, or at least play a role, in expanding existing international law to apply more comprehensively to the criminal behavior of non-staet actors such as terrorists and pirates, thereby providing greater justification and encouragement to governments to act more aggressively, in both preventative and reactive modes.

Third, OSCE consistently broadened the scope of the multiple counter-terrorism programs stressing practical preventative measures, improving socio-economic conditions, and addressing human rights issues and offering inclusive political participation.

Fourth, although OSCE's record of counter-terrorism activities has been remarkable despite various shortcomings in terms of budgetary, personnel, and other constraints, there are a number of areas that require further commitments and improvements, in strategy crafting and implementation.

Fifth, ATU must stay ahead of the policy curve. For instance, identification of cutting-edge fields and options for policy responses should continue. Further development of existing programs such as ratification and implementation of related counter-terrorism conventions and protocols; travel document security; legal cooperation in criminal matters; and combating terrorist use of the internet also deserve encouragement and support.

And Sixth, OSCE shares many principles, goals and activities with its regional and inter-regional partners. Therefore, attempts to broaden dialogue opportunities will greatly aid in the overall counterterrorism efforts of the OSCE. There is certainly a strong impetus for outreach to engage international partners and programs in OSCE

counterterrorism measures through common initiatives and programs, especially in the military-political domain.

Finally, there are three specific areas of concern that are critical for implementing more effectively OSCE's comprehensive strategy. The first is combating radicalization and extreme violence, particularly involving children and teenagers who constitute potential recruits for terrorist groups in the region and elsewhere. The following road-map is suggested:

o Build an international consensus on radicalization as a threat

o Engage governments on issue of formulating and enhancing effectiveness of policies to combat radicalization

o Identify methodologies for gathering and formulating data on radicalization

o Select influential actors and stakeholders, support their efforts, and facilitate their networking where appropriate

o Provide "out of the box" approach to counter radical messages and movements within diverse cultural and ideological contexts

o Develop model programs to counter radicalization process/efforts with an ongoing eye to evaluating their effectiveness

o Assess de-radicalization efforts on individuals and target population and their effects on future terrorist activity

o Ensure that educational programs within OSCE States do not promote intolerance, bigotry, discrimination, victimization, or stereotyping to the extent that such efforts promote extremist views and actions.

The second area that requires continued attention is related to cyber terrorist threats to our modern societies. Some of the principal measures that will reduce the exposure to "non-explosive" attacks and bring them to a tolerable level include:

o A broad program of awareness and education

o Infrastructure protection through industry cooperation and information sharing

o Immediate actions prior to the completion of a formal risk assessment:

    o Isolate critical control systems from insecure networks by disconnection or adequate firewalls;

    o Adopt best practices for password control and protection, or install more modern authentication mechanisms;

    o Provide for individual accountability through protected action logs or the equivalent

o Reconsideration of laws related to infrastructure protection

o A revised program of research and development

o A national organization structure

The third area of "added value" to consider is the contribution of the civic society to the counter-terrorism strategy. The efforts by Public-Private Partnerships are, indeed, indispensable and must be expanded. Other segments of society, such as the media's role is extraordinarily essential for the OSCE security mission. Among the selected academic views for OSCE consideration on the media's role are the following observations:

o Terrorism may be viewed as a crime and is not to be considered an act of war. Terrorists are to be treated as criminals rather than prisoners of war

o Both censorship and self-regulation are proposed by different groups as the only legitimate method of regulating media involvement with terrorism. Those who deal with terrorism directly tend to favor some form of government direction or censorship; the media generally favor self-regulation

o A balance is required between guaranteeing the public's right to security and its right to be informed. The freedom of the press to report is not, therefore, absolute

o Terrorism includes a significant propaganda dimension and therefore the media should not assist terrorists in their effort to secure positive publicity

o Terrorists exhibit psychological traits that the authorities seek to exploit in incident resolution; media coverage should be consistent with and supportive of those efforts

o The media should act in a manner consistent with and supportive of the democratic system within which they function. Associated ethics should be central to media coverage and override competitive or commercial factors

o The media have on occasion reported terrorism irresponsibly, and a negative attitude on the part of authorities dealing with incidents has resulted

o The role played by the media differs in various countries because it is influenced by relevant legal provisions, the structure of the media industry in a given country, and the nature of government-media relations derived from past experience with terrorist incidents

o In spite of differences, efforts to improve government-media cooperation, for the benefit of victims in particular, are occurring. Establishing a clear framework for

cooperation, including respect for the independence and integrity of both parties, offers a positive method of resolving these contentious issues

In sum, the aforementioned observations and recommendations are intended to serve only as preliminary considerations for discussion of the Working Session III. As an academic observer of OSCE's Counter-terrorism strategies I look forward to your guidance for research and study in this important area of regional and global security concerns.

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