

FSC-AIAM.JOUR/19 1–2 March 2016

Original: ENGLISH

2016 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Opening session

1. Date: Tuesday, 1 March 2016

Opened: 10 a.m. Closed: 11.05 a.m.

- 2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador A. Atlason (Iceland)
- 3. <u>Subjects discussed Statements</u>:

Agenda item 1: OPENING SESSION

- (a) OPENING OF THE MEETING BY THE CHAIRPERSON
- (b) REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE FSC
- (c) PRESENTATION OF A SUMMARY REPORT (FSC.GAL/11/16) AND OF THE REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF VERIFICATION CENTRES (FSC.GAL/7/16/Corr.1) BY THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE (CPC)
- (d) GENERAL STATEMENTS

Netherlands-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.AIAM/7/16), Germany (Annex 1), Ukraine (FSC.AIAM/8/16), Slovakia (FSC.AIAM/6/16 OSCE+), United States of America, Turkey, Russian Federation, Armenia

4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

Tuesday, 1 March 2016, at 11.30 a.m., in the Neuer Saal

Working session 1

1. <u>Date</u>: Tuesday, 1 March 2016

Opened: 11.35 a.m. Closed: 12.25 p.m.

2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador A. Atlason (Iceland) (Chairperson)

Mr. L. Kleinjan (Netherlands) (Co-ordinator)

- 3. Subjects discussed Statements:
 - Agenda item 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL EXCHANGE OF

MILITARY INFORMATION (GEMI) AND THE VIENNA DOCUMENT, INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTERS I TO III: CLARIFICATIONS, ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

- GEMI
- VIENNA DOCUMENT
 - INTRODUCTION
 - ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
 - (i) INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES
 - (ii) DATA RELATING TO MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
 - (iii) INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
 - DEFENCE PLANNING
 - (i) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
 - (ii) CLARIFICATION, REVIEW AND DIALOGUE
 - RISK REDUCTION
 - (i) MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION AS REGARDS UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES
 - (ii) CO-OPERATION AS REGARDS HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS OF A MILITARY NATURE
 - (iii) VOLUNTARY HOSTING OF VISITS TO DISPEL CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Co-ordinator (FSC.AIAM/3/16 OSCE+), Russian Federation, Austria, Switzerland, Germany (Annex 2) (Annex 3), Turkey, Holy See, Netherlands

4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

Tuesday, 1 March 2016, at 3 p.m., in the Neuer Saal

Working session 2

1. <u>Date</u>: Tuesday, 1 March 2016

Opened: 3 p.m.
Suspended: 4.10 p.m.
Resumed: 4.30 p.m.
Closed: 4.55 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Atlason (Iceland) (Chairperson)

Mr. O. Picarelli (Italy) (Co-ordinator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT, CHAPTERS IV TO XII: CLARIFICATIONS, ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

CONTACTS

- (i) VISITS TO AIR BASES
- (ii) PROGRAMME OF MILITARY CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION
- (iii) MILITARY CONTACTS, MILITARY CO-OPERATION
- (iv) DEMONSTRATION OF NEW TYPES OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
- (v) PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON CONTACTS
- MILITARY ACTIVITIES
 - (i) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
 - (ii) OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
 - (iii) ANNUAL CALENDARS
 - (iv) CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS
- COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
 - (i) INSPECTION
 - (ii) EVALUATION
- REGIONAL MEASURES
- COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

Co-ordinator (FSC.AIAM/4/16 OSCE+), Turkey, Sweden, Russian Federation, Armenia, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Canada, Kazakhstan, Ukraine (FSC.AIAM/9/16)

4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

Wednesday, 2 March 2016, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal

Working session 3

1. <u>Date</u>: Wednesday, 2 March 2016

Opened: 10.05 a.m. Suspended: 10.55 a.m. Resumed: 11.35 a.m. Closed: 12 noon

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Atlason (Iceland) (Chairperson)

Mr. P. von Arx (Switzerland) (Co-ordinator)

3. <u>Subjects discussed – Statements</u>:

Agenda item 4: REISSUING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT IN 2016 AS

FORESEEN UNDER CHAPTER XII OF THE VIENNA

DOCUMENT

Co-ordinator (FSC.AIAM/2/16 OSCE+), Russian Federation, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre, Ukraine (FSC.AIAM/10/16), United States of America, Switzerland

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 2 March 2016, at 3 p.m., in the Neuer Saal

Closing session

1. <u>Date</u>: Wednesday, 2 March 2016

Opened: 3.05 p.m. Closed: 3.15 p.m.

- 2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador V. Rocco di Torrepadula (Italy)
- 3. <u>Subjects discussed Statements</u>:

Agenda item 5: CLOSING SESSION

(a) DISCUSSION

Canada

(b) POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DATES AND THE AGENDA AND MODALITIES OF THE 2017 AIAM

Chairperson

(c) CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chairperson

(d) CLOSURE

The Chairperson formally closed the 2016 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

It was agreed that the dates, agenda and modalities of the 2017 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting would be specified by a decision of the FSC before the end of 2016.



FSC-AIAM.JOUR/19 1–2 March 2016 Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

26th AIAM

FSC-AIAM Journal No. 19, Agenda item 1(d)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Mr. Chairperson,

This year's implementation meeting is taking place once again against the background of the unresolved military conflicts in the OSCE area.

We are still seeing ceasefire violations in the Ukraine conflict. Unrestricted access by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is still not guaranteed. The complete withdrawal of heavy weapons is not complete. The Minsk agreements must finally be implemented in their entirety by the parties, since they represent the only possibility for achieving a lasting political solution to the Ukraine conflict.

Elsewhere as well, unresolved regional conflicts are claiming victims – too many in our view. We hope during our OSCE Chairmanship to achieve lasting ceasefires and through small but effective steps to help rebuild trust. We are faced with growing military activities in the OSCE area, which create an increased risk of military incidents. In this environment, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) – and arms control and disarmament in general – are becoming more important once again.

While confidence- and security-building measures have proved their worth in crisis situations, in reality we must accept that the provisions specifically of the Vienna Document have often been ignored, with the result that it has not always been possible for the intended effect to be obtained.

We are greatly concerned by these developments. Trust built up over decades is at risk in the long term of being replaced by new enemy stereotypes. In the light of such experiences, we already announced last year our intention of examining and modernizing the Vienna Document.

As OSCE Chairmanship we would like to help establish conditions for fresh dialogue, to promote greater trust and ultimately once again to improve security for all of us. We attach great importance to the OSCE and would like to use it for the purpose it is ideally suited, as an inclusive forum for wide-ranging dialogue by its participating States – not least on questions of European security on the basis of Helsinki and Paris.

The High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar under the Vienna Document held on 16 and 17 February in Vienna showed that dialogue is possible – even when the individual aspects of our security are evaluated differently. We would like to keep up this momentum and will follow it up in the coming months on other dialogue platforms.

The Vienna Document is an important basis for military confidence-building in Europe. Its comprehensive modernization is therefore a central concern of our OSCE Chairmanship. It is an important pillar of the European security architecture. We have not forgotten that it served us well in the past in overcoming the Cold War and the bloc mentality.

We would like to adapt the Vienna Document to the new developments in security and military technology to enable it once again to make a full contribution to pan-European confidence-building. In times of increased military activity in particular, CSBMs can help to reduce the risk of dangerous incidents by preventing misunderstanding, spiralling escalation and conflicts.

If we succeed in this, it will send an important signal and will permit us once again to address other unresolved questions of arms control and common security.

Mr. Chairperson,

We agreed at the 2015 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting to put our words into action. In the last few months, Germany has therefore developed a balanced package of modernization proposals for the Vienna Document.

We have established the following focuses: increasing crisis resistance, greater contributions to crisis prevention and the avoidance of dangerous military incidents, strengthening verification possibilities, more wide-ranging transparency regarding armed forces and military activities, and strengthening direct military contacts.

In the last few weeks we have distributed four papers in the OSCE on strengthening military contacts and strengthening verification. I should like to provide some brief comments on them.

Strengthening military contacts is primarily concerned with improving the co-ordination of our Vienna Document contact measures, creating an appropriate mechanism and fostering joint measures. We also seek improved and more transparent reporting on military contacts through the appointment of a spokesperson for the visiting team.

As for strengthening verification – in other words evaluation visits and inspections – we should like above all to increase the size of the verification teams and the length of the visits, and also to facilitate the work of the inspectors through the use of modern technical equipment.

A further central German proposal concerns Chapter III on risk reduction in times of crisis. We are in favour of a new mechanism for de-escalation in times of crisis and propose the appointment by the Permanent Council or Forum for Security Co-operation of a permanent representative. In the event of concerns regarding the military activities of a

participating State, this representative could have a mediating function and make recommendations if necessary on how to proceed (e.g. deployment of a fact-finding mission, other bilateral CSBMs).

Germany also considers further substantive adaptations to be necessary, e.g. improved information on major weapon and equipment systems. We could conceive an OSCE database to that effect. We are also open to suggestions by all participating States in other areas of the Vienna Document.

For example, we support initiatives by other States for reducing the thresholds for the notification and observation of military activities or for increasing passive quotas for inspections and evaluation visits. We can discuss the details of our proposals and considerations of this nature during our working sessions.

Mr. Chairperson,

In spite of the generally high level of implementation of individual chapters of the Vienna Document, its potential is not being exploited equally by all participating States.

We also regret that last year individual participating States once again failed to meet their obligations in full. We appeal to all participating States to rectify recognized implementation deficits. We are willing to discuss disputed implementation issues. The challenges in implementing the Vienna Document will also be addressed at a workshop to be held in early April 2016 by the Bundeswehr Verification Centre.

In principle, Germany welcomes all developments that foster the implementation of the provisions of the Vienna Document in its area of application. We are also willing, where necessary and desired, to further support implementation efforts by other States as far as we are able. We are prepared to discuss our considerations actively in all relevant forums.

As OSCE Chairmanship we will make every effort to promote dialogue on the further development of the Vienna Document. I appeal to all participating States to make constructive contributions to these efforts, which are in the interests of all of us.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



FSC-AIAM.JOUR/19 1–2 March 2016 Annex 2

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

26th AIAM

FSC-AIAM Journal No. 19, Agenda item 2

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Vienna Document: Chapter I

The Federal Republic of Germany believes it necessary to enhance transparency regarding the major weapon and equipment systems notified in the exchange of information on participating States' military forces. The discussions during the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings in recent years also confirmed this to us. Improvements to this information exchange would furthermore make it easier to carry out verification measures under the Vienna Document. The Federal Republic of Germany has therefore considered which measures could be taken to increase transparency. From a German perspective, these include:

- A proposal for the conducting of a mandatory briefing by the relevant participating State in the Forum for Security Co-operation immediately after the introduction of new versions/models of new versions of major weapon and equipment systems already demonstrated under paragraph 31;
- The establishment of an OSCE database "data on major weapon and equipment systems", in which all available image catalogues and data on the types/versions of major weapon and equipment systems notified by the participating States will be centrally listed and managed.

The Federal Republic of Germany will soon submit its own proposal regarding the aforementioned points. We look forward to entering into a discussion with our highly esteemed colleagues on this subject in order to share our views and perhaps find a common understanding on this topic.

The Federal Republic of Germany requests that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



FSC-AIAM.JOUR/19 1–2 March 2016 Annex 3

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

26th AIAM

FSC-AIAM Journal No. 19, Agenda item 2

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Vienna Document: Chapter III

In the view of the Federal Republic of Germany and many other participating States, the Ukraine crisis has shown the need for a revision of Chapter III so that this instrument can be used appropriately in crisis situations. Last year several participating States already submitted their ideas for modernizing parts of Chapter III, which Germany welcomes as a first step towards making the Vienna Document "suitable for all weathers". They include proposals by the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and the United States of America for an additional OSCE inspection, by Canada for increasing the use of paragraph 18 of Chapter III, by Greece for revising Chapter III and by Poland for revising paragraph 17 of Chapter III. The Federal Republic of Germany has made an intensive study of the various excellent proposals for a substantive revision of Chapter III and attempted to consolidate them. We have concentrated on a revision of paragraph 16 "Mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities". We regard the revision of Chapter III as a central aspect of the modernization of the Vienna Document and firmly believe that our proposal takes due account of the proposals by other participating States and by our Russian colleagues. We look forward to entering into discussion in the near future with our highly esteemed colleagues on this subject in order to share our views and perhaps find a common understanding on this topic.

The Federal Republic of Germany requests that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.