

Chairmanship: Armenia**977th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 26 May 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.
Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.15 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Papikyan
Ms. L. Grigoryan

The Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/31/21 OSCE+.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: ARMS CONTROL AND
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

- *Presentation by Ms. A. Nalbandyan, Lecturer and Head of Editorial and Publishing Section, Vazgen Sargsyan Military University, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia*
- *Presentation by Mr. D. Weekman, Acting Director, Office of Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, US Department of State*
- *Presentation by Mr. A. Mazur, Deputy Director, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*
- *Presentation by Mr. V. Mantels, Head of the Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*

Chairperson, Ms. A. Nalbandyan (FSC.DEL/205/21), Mr. D. Weekman (FSC.DEL/203/21 OSCE+), Mr. A. Mazur (FSC.DEL/201/21/Corr.1), Mr. V. Mantels, Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/212/21), Canada, Switzerland (FSC.DEL/206/21 OSCE+), Belarus (FSC.DEL/207/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/202/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 1), Turkey (Annex 2) (Annex 3), United States of America, Ukraine (FSC.DEL/211/21 OSCE+), Armenia (Annex 4) (Annex 5), FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document (Sweden)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/208/21) (FSC.DEL/208/21/Add.1), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/213/21), Canada, United Kingdom, United States of America (FSC.DEL/204/21 OSCE+)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Military exercises “Strike Back – 21”, being conducted from 24 May to 6 June 2021, and “Balkan Sentinel – 21”, being conducted from 21 May to 4 June 2021:* Bulgaria
- (b) *Military exercise “Slovak Shield 2021”, to be conducted from 1 to 24 June 2021:* Slovakia

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 2 June 2021, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/983

26 May 2021

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

977th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 983, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

We are grateful for the preparation and holding of the meeting on a highly relevant topic at the heart of the mandate of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Conventional arms control in Europe, including disarmament and confidence-building measures, is integral to the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. We thank the keynote speakers for their professional analysis of the topic, which has demonstrated its complexity and depth.

At the same time, we were disappointed at the presentation by David Weekman, Acting Director of the Office of Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the United States Department of State, who chose to speak in a highly politicized manner. As for the supporting pillars of European security, it is perhaps worth recalling that it was the United States of America that originated the alarming trend of erosion of stability on the continent. It withdrew from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, then frustrated ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and left the legal framework of the Treaty on Open Skies. We have repeatedly warned our US colleagues about the counterproductive nature of confrontational schemes and have suggested moving away from them. We regret that they have continued to pursue this line at today's FSC meeting as well.

Mr. Chairperson,

Politico-military security in Europe and its essential components – conventional arms control and confidence-building measures – are in crisis. The reason for the current state of affairs as seen from our perspective is that the proclaimed pan-European principles and commitments regarding the creation of a common, equal and indivisible security space in the OSCE area have remained on paper. Instead of eliminating dividing lines in Europe, a number of countries have deliberately opted for a closed security architecture based on the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of the development and strengthening of pan-European institutions.

While professing a commitment to preserving, strengthening and modernizing conventional arms control in Europe and CSBMs, NATO countries concentrate on “containing” Russia and further shifting the balance of forces in the European region in their favour, including in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders. Attempts by the United States and its allies to “flexibly” interpret the NATO-Russia Founding Act’s “substantial combat forces” provisions, coupled with the build-up of heavy weaponry and military equipment in the Alliance’s European forward-based units and depots, are *de facto* a dangerous form of brinkmanship in violation of the provisions of this crucial document. Actions speak louder than words.

It will be very difficult to create a new conventional arms control architecture in Europe in the context of the acute trust deficit in Europe and the rapid shift in NATO policy and military planning towards schemes for the military “containment” of our country. We see the prospects for restoring relations with the Alliance – noting, by the way, that the rift was not initiated by Russia – through a policy of mutual respect for interests and a willingness to build equal and indivisible security for all. So far we have not seen any such willingness on the part of NATO. Russian proposals to de-escalate politico-military tensions in Europe remain unanswered. Instead of moving military training areas away from Russia’s borders, we note an intensification of operational and combat training and reconnaissance aircraft flights by NATO countries near our borders.

As the keynote speakers correctly pointed out today, transparency measures are designed to build confidence. We take the position that the transparency and control mechanism set out in the Vienna Document 2011 makes it possible in general to obtain the necessary information on the armed forces of the OSCE participating States and to ensure sufficient openness and predictability in their military activities. However, the policy of “containment” undermines the very basis for negotiating a fundamental updating of the Vienna Document 2011.

The use of CSBMs in a largely politicized manner rather than for their intended purpose does not add to the optimism about modernization of the Vienna Document 2011. There is no need to go far to find examples. Most recently, a number of participating States stood out for their use of the Vienna Document 2011 toolbox to support one State and exert pressure on another. The pretext they chose held no water, to put it bluntly – annual planned exercises to conclude the seasonal combat training of the armed forces of the participating State concerned. It is something of a sad irony that colleagues have endorsed a mindset of blatant “demonization” of these training exercises, while showing moral solidarity with a country that has been committing widespread violations of CSBMs in their zone of application for almost a decade. We doubt that this policy of devaluing the toolbox of confidence-building measures is consistent with the call by the group of 34 participating States to improve it.

I should also like to draw the attention of colleagues to the fact that our delegation has repeatedly commented on the question of conducting combat readiness inspections on Russian territory in April of this year. A detailed comment on this subject was also given today in the presentation by the keynote speaker Anton Y. Mazur, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. We do not intend to address this topic again.

The withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on Open Skies was a significant blow to confidence-building in the military sphere. Throughout the year, we have sought through the Open Skies Consultative Commission to reach agreements with the remaining States Parties to the Treaty to refrain from sharing data obtained during observation flights over Russia with the US Government and to provide assurances that US military facilities in Europe can be observed. Since there has been no constructive response to our legitimate concerns, the Russian leadership has decided to initiate domestic procedures for withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies. We have repeatedly stressed that, should the United States decide to return to the Treaty, our country would be prepared to give constructive consideration to the situation. Otherwise, by the end of this year Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty will be a *fait accompli*.

Mr. Chairperson,

The objective relationship between CSBM mechanisms and the regime of conventional arms control in Europe makes it necessary for them to be considered as a package. It is impossible to radically modernize the Vienna Document 2011 when the original CFE Treaty has lost all connection with reality and the adapted CFE Treaty has never entered into force. By the way, the proposals promised by our colleagues for restoring the viability of the regime of conventional arms control in Europe have still not been forthcoming.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, the way to create a normal atmosphere for dialogue on CSBMs and conventional arms control in Europe is to "freeze" the military capability of NATO countries on the eastern flank and to continue the withdrawal of continuously rotating forces and hardware to their permanent locations. Trust can be built only if military co-operation is restored and our partners refrain from escalating confrontational activities and rhetoric.

Such an approach would also help to significantly reduce the risk of dangerous incidents. We remain disposed in principle to discussing measures to prevent dangerous military activities. We already have a number of bilateral agreements with individual countries in this sphere. We are ready to work in a similar fashion with other States through bilateral channels. Furthermore, the ongoing discussion on politico-military aspects of security within the framework of the Structured Dialogue gives reason to look forward to a move towards discussing and agreeing on practical arrangements in the field of hard security. This is in our common interest. The Russian Federation is open to co-operation on the broad agenda of ensuring politico-military stability on the principles of equality, mutual respect and consideration of each other's interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the FSC journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/983
26 May 2021
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

977th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 983, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY**

Mr. Chairperson,

We welcome today's speakers and thank them for their presentations.

Comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security remains the key component of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

Conventional arms control and CSBMs are vital for confidence, security and stability in the OSCE area and beyond.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document continue to be the main pillars of our conventional security architecture.

All three instruments are mutually reinforcing; none of them can be substituted by any of the other two.

Implementation of the existing instruments in full and in good faith is essential.

We must continue to make full use of these mechanisms in order to achieve a stronger security community, which is in our collective interest.

As we confront current and emerging challenges, it is vital that we strive for consistent implementation of our agreed commitments.

We must continue to build upon our collective *acquis*. We should not allow erosion of, or disrespect for, our principles. The relevance and value of the aforementioned instruments remain intact.

In this regard, we very much value the Vienna Document 2011 and support its full and enhanced implementation, and also its modernization.

A modernized and enhanced Vienna Document would help to promote military transparency and predictability.

Turkey is also committed to the CFE Treaty and its full implementation. The basic parameters of the Treaty, its legally binding nature, and a regional component that preserves the very essence of the Treaty's flank regime should be maintained. Security objectives should be pursued in a holistic fashion.

Despite the suspension of verification activities within the CFE Treaty's area of application owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey is accepting, on an exceptional basis, inspection teams to inspect the reduction of battle tanks from 26 May to 30 June 2021 by way of promoting transparency and confidence. We provided detailed information on this matter during yesterday's meeting of the Joint Consultative Group.

The Sixth CFE Treaty Review Conference, which is expected to take place in October 2021, will be a good opportunity to take stock of implementation of the Treaty.

The Treaty on Open Skies remains one of the most valuable tools for Euro-Atlantic security. It has served as a good model of co-operation aimed at increasing transparency.

Recent developments in relation to the Treaty deserve greater attention. The withdrawal of the main States Parties will inevitably reduce the Treaty's effectiveness.

Mr. Chairperson,

As is known, the motto of the current Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation is: "Rebuilding trust and confidence through implementation of politico-military commitments".

In this regard and in line with the topic of today's Security Dialogue, I should like to bring to the kind attention of our Forum that one participating State, Armenia, has been violating its commitments and obligations by unilaterally refusing to accept military inspections from Turkey under the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty.

There can be no doubt that such a selective implementation harms the effectiveness of our instruments, leads to a severe reduction in transparency and trust, and increases risks.

We invite Armenia to fully implement its commitments under the Vienna Document and its obligations under the CFE Treaty.

We also request all the participating States to provide a staunch response to the aforementioned violations.

I kindly ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/983
26 May 2021
Annex 3

Original: ENGLISH

977th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 983, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY**

Mr. Chairperson,

We should like to exercise our right of reply in connection with the statement by the Armenian delegation.

We shall be very brief.

In our earlier statement we referred to a fact, or reality, which is technical in nature and in line with the topic of today's Security Dialogue.

However, the attitude and language adopted by the Armenian delegation in its response were quite unfortunate.

We completely reject these groundless allegations.

Mr. Chairperson,

Professional diplomats should seek to build bridges.

Sustaining enmity, hatred and intolerance is easy.

Trying to find a common ground for peaceful and sustainable neighbourly relations based on a constructive language, on the other hand, is much more difficult.

Our delegation will continue to take this difficult path.

Mr. Chairperson, please attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/983
26 May 2021
Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

977th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 983, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

I should like to exercise my right of reply to the remarks made by the delegation of Turkey. The position of Armenia regarding the suspension of Turkish military inspections and the participation of Turkish inspectors in multinational inspections on the territory of Armenia is well known, and I do not intend to restate it here. Moreover, calls for the implementation of OSCE commitments voiced by the delegate of Turkey – a country that has been engaged in violations of those very commitments, a country that promotes the use of force and justifies war crimes and atrocities, a country that has transferred thousands of foreign terrorist fighters into the OSCE area – can surely sound credible only to him.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
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FSC.JOUR/983
26 May 2021
Annex 5

Original: ENGLISH

977th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 983, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

In July 2020, Armenia suspended military inspections by Turkey on its territory: that decision was based on the legitimate security interests of Armenia. The security of the population of Armenia is not subject to any compromises.

The delegate of Turkey has today been teaching us some lessons about what diplomats should and should not do. In reply, I should like to tell him what countries should not do in their relations with one another. They should not use force, they should not justify war crimes and atrocities, and they should not use foreign terrorist fighters.

Thank you.