



Chairmanship: Sweden

2021 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Opening session

1. Date: Tuesday, 31 August 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10.05 a.m.
Closed: 12 noon

2. Chairperson: Ambassador U. Funered (Sweden) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 1: OPENING SESSION
 - (a) *Opening of the 2021 Annual Security Review Conference by H.E. Ms. Ann Linde, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*

 - (b) *Opening remarks*

– Ms. H. M. Schmid, Secretary General of the OSCE (SEC.GAL/114/21)

 - (c) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1393/21), United Kingdom (PC.DEL/1317/21 OSCE+), Albania (PC.DEL/1303/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1302/21), Turkey (PC.DEL/1306/21 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/1315/21 OSCE+), Kazakhstan (PC.DEL/1311/21 OSCE+), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/1301/21), Canada, United States of America (PC.DEL/1299/21), Armenia, Norway (PC.DEL/1300/21/Rev.1), Iceland (PC.DEL/1298/21 OSCE+)*

4. Next meeting:

Tuesday, 31 August 2021, at 1 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Special session

1. Date: Tuesday, 31 August 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 1 p.m.
Closed: 3.05 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. H. M. Schmid (OSCE Secretary General) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 2: ENSURING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE OSCE REGION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO UKRAINE
 - (a) *Opening remarks by the moderator, Ms. H.M. Schmid (OSCE Secretary General)*

 - (b) *Keynote speakers*
 - Ambassador M. Kinnunen, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group
 - Ambassador Y. H. Çevik, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
 - Mr. F. Mondoloni, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
 - Mr. J. P. Froehly, Federal Foreign Office, Germany (PC.DEL/1385/21)
 - Mr. O. Polishchuk, Deputy Minister of Defence, Ukraine
 - Ms. F. Gillette, International Committee of the Red Cross (PC.DEL/1293/21 OSCE+)

 - (c) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1394/21), United Kingdom, Turkey (PC.DEL/1307/21 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/1304/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 1), Georgia, Canada, United States of America (PC.DEL/1305/21/Rev.1)*

4. Next meeting:

Tuesday, 31 August 2021, at 3.30 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Working session I

1. Date: Tuesday, 31 August 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 3.30 p.m.
Closed: 5.55 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador U. Funered (Sweden) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 3: CONFLICTS AND CRISES IN THE OSCE AREA – BUILDING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE
 - (a) *Opening remarks by the moderator, Ambassador U. Funered (Sweden)*

 - (b) *Keynote speakers*
 - Ambassador A. Söder, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus
 - Ambassador T. Mayr-Harting, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process
 - Ambassador A. Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference (CIO.GAL/94/21 OSCE+)
 - Mr. A. Schofer, Department of State, United States of America

 - (c) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1395/21), United Kingdom, Moldova (PC.DEL/1319/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1309/21), Georgia, Canada, United States of America (PC.DEL/1312/21), Armenia, Turkey (PC.DEL/1329/21 OSCE+), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/1314/21 OSCE+)*

4. Next meeting:

Tuesday, 31 August 2021, at 6.30 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Special session

1. Date: Tuesday, 31 August 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 6.30 p.m.
Closed: 7.45 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Mr. J. A. Andrada Parada-Vanderwilde (Spain) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 4: THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE

- (a) *Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr. J. A. Andrada Parada-Vanderwilde (Spain)*
- (b) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1396/21), United Kingdom (PC.DEL/1318/21 OSCE+), Germany (PC.DEL/1386/21), Turkey (PC.DEL/1341/21 OSCE+), Belgium, Russian Federation (Annex 2), Canada, United States of America (PC.DEL/1313/21), Armenia, Switzerland (PC.DEL/1316/21 OSCE+), Finland, Spain*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 1 September 2021, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Working session II

1. Date: Wednesday, 1 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.

Closed: 12.15 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador N. Bush (United Kingdom) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 5: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS – CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS IN THE OSCE AREA AND BEYOND

(a) *Opening remarks by the moderator, Ambassador N. Bush (United Kingdom)*

(b) *Keynote speakers*

- Ms. F. Allum, University of Bath, United Kingdom
- Ms. M. Ristic, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
- Mr. V. Cojuhari, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Moldova

(c) *Intervention by Ms. A. Kupchyna, OSCE Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats*

(d) *Interventions: Moderator, Ms. F. Allum, Ms. M. Ristic, Mr. V. Cojuhari, Switzerland, Turkey (PC.DEL/1362/21 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1320/21), Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1397/21), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1322/21), Canada, Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania, Belarus (PC.DEL/1333/21), Azerbaijan*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 1 September 2021, at 1 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Working session III

1. Date: Wednesday, 1 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 1 p.m.
Closed: 3.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador F. Raunig (Austria) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 6: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CSBMs – CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
 - (a) *Report by the Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), Ambassador F. Raunig (FSC.DEL/295/21 OSCE+)*

 - (b) *Keynote speakers*
 - Mr. A. Vulic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France (PC.DEL/1331/21 OSCE+)
 - Ms. A. Tyszkiewicz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland (PC.DEL/1336/21 OSCE+)

 - (c) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia and Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1398/21), United Kingdom, Germany (PC.DEL/1387/21), Moldova (PC.DEL/1345/21 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/1330/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation, Canada, United States of America (PC.DEL/1328/21), Latvia (PC.DEL/1339/21 OSCE+), Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania (PC.DEL/1349/21 OSCE+), Estonia, Belarus (PC.DEL/1375/21 OSCE+), Ukraine (PC.DEL/1368/21), Azerbaijan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ms. A. Tyszkiewicz, Mr. A. Vulic*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 1 September 2021, at 3.45 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Working session IV

1. Date: Wednesday, 1 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 3.45 p.m.
Closed: 5.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. T. Yrjölä (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre) (Moderator)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 7: EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION – LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY AHEAD 10th ANNIVERSARY

- (a) *Opening remarks by the moderator, Ms. T. Yrjölä (Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre)*

- (b) *Keynote speakers*

- Ms. O. Zakharova, Centre of Public Initiatives “Ideas for Change” (PC.NGO/3/21 OSCE+)
- Mr. H. Lecoq, United Nations Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations
- Ambassador L. Zannier, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

- (c) *Interventions: Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1399/21), United Kingdom (also on behalf of Canada), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1323/21), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/1327/21 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1325/21), Armenia, Turkey (PC.DEL/1340/21 OSCE+), Ambassador L. Zannier, Mr. H. Lecoq, Ms. O. Zakharova, Moderator*

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 1 September 2021, at 5.30 p.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference

Closing session

1. Date: Wednesday, 1 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 5.35 p.m.

Closed: 6.15 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador U. Funered (Sweden)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements:

Agenda item 8: CLOSING SESSION

- (a) *Chairperson's perception*

The Chairperson presented an initial perception of the outcome of the Conference.

- (b) *Interventions*: Russian Federation (Annex 3), United States of America (PC.DEL/1326/21), Ukraine

The Chairperson formally closed the Conference.

4. Next meeting:

To be announced in 2022

Chairmanship: Poland



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.ASRC(21).JOUR
31 August–1 September 2021
Annex 1

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

First day of the 2021 Annual Security Review Conference
PC.ASRC(21) Journal, Agenda item 2(c)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,
Distinguished participants,

By way of preliminary remarks, I should like to remind those who spoke before me that what we are engaged in today is not a continuation of the summit of the so-called Crimea Platform but a discussion of problems relating to the settlement process in south-eastern Ukraine. Unfortunately, apart from groundless accusations of aggression, annexation, the creation of a military threat against Ukraine and so on levelled against Russia, we have heard neither objective assessments of the current status of the settlement process, nor any constructive proposals for overcoming the conflict that would ensure the restoration of peace and calm in Donbas.

Regrettably, it is necessary to begin with a sad statement of fact: as far as the settlement of the internal Ukrainian conflict in Donbas is concerned – given what we have just heard, I should stress that it is very much an internal Ukrainian conflict – the situation has not only not improved in the course of the year that has passed since the last Annual Security Review Conference, but, rather, has deteriorated on the whole. The Ukrainian Government not only continues to pursue a course aimed at sabotaging the implementation of the Minsk agreements in the form that they were concluded – including calls for the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015 to be revised – but is also creating ever new obstacles for that purpose, not least at the legislative level.

Thus, the possibility of granting a special status to Donbas and enshrining that in the country's Constitution continues to be ruled out as before.

With a doggedness that could be put to better use, attempts continue to be undertaken to get out of implementing the key provision of the Minsk agreements, namely direct dialogue with the representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – among other ways, by discrediting those very representatives. Moreover, the high-handed argument continues to be made that negotiations should be conducted exclusively with Russia, since it is allegedly a party to the conflict. In refusing to consider the constructive proposals from the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which include relevant draft texts, the

Ukrainian delegation is openly stating that it will review such documents only if Russia assumes their authorship.

In that respect, it is lamentable that those who, by virtue of their status as mediators, ought to be facilitating implementation by the Ukrainian Government of the relevant provisions of the Minsk Package of Measures are instead delivering statements that encourage Ukraine to flout its obligations.

The Minsk format itself and its role and effectiveness are also belittled as part of the striving to drag key issues of the settlement process over to the “Normandy format” level. Additionally, the representatives of the Ukrainian Government are attempting in their statements to impose their own sequence for implementation of the Minsk agreements: starting with security, that is, the withdrawal of foreign armed formations and the disarming of illegal groups, control of the Ukrainian-Russian border, and only then moving on to a political settlement and the holding of elections. Furthermore, they view the Minsk process merely as a means of maintaining the pressure of sanctions on Russia.

After the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament) adopted, on 15 July 2020, a resolution on the holding of local elections, which was directly at odds with the Minsk Package of Measures, the work of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on a political settlement of the conflict effectively reached a deadlock. As a way out of the current situation, the representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions proposed drawing up a “road map”, that is, a joint document strictly in line with the Package of Measures that would be approved by the Verkhovna Rada and the leadership of Ukraine, thereby opening up the prospect for a just settlement to be achieved for Donbas in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2202. This was supported by Russia, which, among other things, submitted observations in writing on that score.

However, the Ukrainian side, having refused point-blank to review the document from the authorities in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and to submit written comments thereon, proposed its own alternative version, in which 40 paragraphs (out of a total of 51) directly or indirectly run counter to the Minsk agreements. The Ukrainian text, in particular, provides for “the return of units of the Ukrainian armed forces to their permanent bases in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” and for the reinstatement of full control of the Ukrainian-Russian border before elections are held in Donbas. After that, in accordance with the law on an amnesty prepared by the Ukrainian side, it is planned to “sift through” the population – to be followed, as one can only assume, by the internment of “unreliable” people identified among those who have received Russian passports and the organization of “tribunals” to deal with those rejecting the policies of the Maidan authorities.

It has finally proved possible to unblock the work of the TCG’s Political Working Group, which for a long time remained paralysed owing to the demand by the Ukrainian Government’s negotiators that Maya Pirogova, who in Ukraine had been sentenced for terrorism, be removed from the delegation representing the Donetsk People’s Republic. However, despite this, there are no discernible prospects of progress being achieved, since the Ukrainian side is unwilling to concentrate on efforts directly aimed at reaching agreement on a joint action plan and ultimately providing comments on the draft text from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, rather than just submitting replies to the questions in

Pierre Morel’s so-called table, drawn up by the Political Working Group’s former co-ordinator, which merely serve to distract from the main task, that is, from a political settlement of the conflict.

Moreover, it is important to note that the accomplishment of this task is by no means made easier by the draft law on a transitional period in Donbas currently being reviewed by the Verkhovna Rada, for not only does that draft law eliminate the possibility of granting a special status to Donbas but it is also completely contrary to the stipulations of the Package of Measures, which provide for an amnesty, the full resumption of socio-economic ties with Donbas, the holding of local elections there before the reinstatement of the Ukrainian Government’s control of the relevant segment of the Ukrainian-Russian border, and so on.

Additionally, draft laws on the legal aspects of a special status for certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as provided for by the recommendations from the Normandy Four summit held in Paris in 2019, have still not been submitted to the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Work on humanitarian issues has unfortunately been blocked owing to the Ukrainian side’s attempts to arrogate to itself the right to determine the composition of the delegation from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and its refusal to participate in meetings until Ms. Pirogova, who had been transferred to the relevant TCG working group, is removed. At the same time, there remain obstacles to continuing the exchanges of detained persons because of the procrastination, which has become chronic, on the part of the Ukrainian authorities in implementing their commitments on “legal clearance” with regard to individuals previously released and allowed to return to certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Owing to the position of the Ukrainian side, which is dragging its heels when it comes to agreeing on specific parameters for the operation of the entry-exit checkpoint in Zolote (crossing points along the line of contact; the provision of indefinite round-the-clock security guarantees, including patrolling by personnel from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) on both sides of the line of contact), implementation of the agreement on simultaneously opening two entry-exit checkpoints in that settlement and in Shchastia remains at a standstill.

The situation is no better when it comes to implementation of the socio-economic provisions of the Minsk Package. The only things that it has proved possible to agree on after seven years of discussions are ensuring the water supply for the region, the conduct of an audit at the company “Voda Donbasu” (mediated by the International Committee of the Red Cross) and the rebuilding of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska. However, other highly pressing issues – above all, the payment of pensions and social benefits, and ultimately lifting the virtually total economic blockade of the region – are yet to be resolved.

Some headway may be seen only in the establishment of a group of environmental experts (dealing mainly with the flooding of mines that are being closed) involving Ukraine, certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and Russia, although the Package of Measures does not include tackling issues of this kind among the priority tasks for settling the conflict.

As for security issues, certain progress was made in tackling these during the period under consideration. Pursuant to the instructions issued at the Paris summit, agreement has been reached in principle on four additional areas for the disengagement of the parties' forces and hardware (Slovianoserbsk, Hryhorivka, Petrivka and Nyzhnoteple) and on a new demining plan and an associated framework decision, although their formalization is contingent upon agreement on, and approval of, the aforementioned action plan ("road map") for settling the conflict in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine in accordance with the Minsk agreements.

On 22 July 2020, the parties adopted the additional ceasefire-strengthening measures proposed by the authorities in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (something that the Ukrainian side had been refusing to do for such a long time); these measures came into effect on 27 July 2020 and include a ban on offensive, reconnaissance and sabotage operations, a ban on the operation of any types of aerial vehicles, a ban on firing (including sniper fire), a ban on the deployment of heavy weapons in and around settlements, and the effective use of disciplinary actions for ceasefire violations. In late 2020 and early 2021, this made it possible to significantly reduce the number of ceasefire violations and to minimize the number of civilian casualties.

That being said, it was not until eight months later, in April this year, that – following insistent requests by the authorities in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and by Russia, including requests made within the "Normandy format" framework (at meetings of the advisers to the leaders of the Normandy Quartet countries) – the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine posted on its website the full text of the measures (without the numerous distortions that had been allowed to mar the text on previous occasions), which should ensure that Ukrainian military personnel comply with the arrangement whereby retaliatory fire may be opened only on the orders of the relevant leadership of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Despite a certain reduction in the intensity of ceasefire violations of late, civilian casualties continue to be recorded – chiefly in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and due, *inter alia*, to the detonation of explosive devices deployed remotely by means of unmanned aerial vehicles and to direct shelling and shooting (including sniper fire) by the Ukrainian armed forces. Unfortunately, the tendency for civilian casualties to occur predominantly in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as noted in the thematic report "Civilian Casualties in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine" (covering the period from 1 January 2017 to 15 September 2020), continues.

Here is some fresh information in that respect. As a result of the shelling of Horlikva (Donetsk region) on 28 August this year, a nine-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl sustained injuries of various degrees. In this connection, one would like to hope that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) will take the necessary steps to incorporate the aforementioned facts into its reports.

At the same time, as part of the policy of accelerated militarization of Ukraine supported by the United States of America and its NATO allies (no fewer than seven joint manoeuvres are scheduled to be held on Ukrainian territory in 2021 alone), the Ukrainian Government – its solemn assurances about striving for peace in Donbas notwithstanding – is intensifying the build-up of troops in the conflict zone. In so doing, it is demonstrating its lack of genuine interest in radical steps to minimize, let alone fully prevent ceasefire

violations along the line of contact – something that would be facilitated by the establishment of direct co-operation with the authorities in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions aimed at averting such violations and investigating all incidents of that kind through the co-ordination mechanism agreed upon on 22 July 2020, namely the JCCC in its current setting, that is, with the involvement of the representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk, as we and the authorities in certain areas of these regions constantly exhort the Ukrainian side to do.

Owing to the Ukrainian side's refusal to consider the updated draft regulations for the TCG's work (in which the views previously expressed on that score by all the parties had been taken into account) and draft minutes submitted by the representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions at the last TCG meeting, a decision on this important matter could not be agreed on, yet that would have made it possible to remove the lingering uncertainty with regard to the tackling of key organizational aspects and would have increased the participants' sense of responsibility for the fulfilment of their obligations.

In closing, I should like to wish Mr. Mikko Kinnunen success in his work as Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and co-ordinator of the TCG, and to thank his predecessor, Ms. Heidi Grau, along with the Chief Monitor of the SMM and co-ordinator of the TCG's Security Working Group, Mr. Yaşar Halit Çevik, and indeed all the co-ordinators (including those who have recently taken up their new duties) for their efforts to facilitate the quest by the authorities in Ukraine and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions for ways of resolving the conflict in Donbas.

I also wish the participants a successful Conference.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of today's special session of the Conference.

Thank you for your attention.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.ASRC(21).JOUR
31 August–1 September 2021
Annex 2

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

First day of the 2021 Annual Security Review Conference
PC.ASRC(21) Journal, Agenda item 4(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Moderator,

We are grateful for the fact that a special session is being held on the Structured Dialogue and thank the Spanish Chairmanship for maintaining the momentum in the activities of the Informal Working Group.

The discussions that have taken place this year on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the politico-military situation in Europe have confirmed the importance of contacts between military representatives at the OSCE, in particular with regard to risk reduction and incident prevention. We think it is useful to address these highly important topics and, consequently, that the reduction of military confrontation on the continent should be prioritized by the Structured Dialogue. There is a long-overdue need for work on this matter.

At the same time, analysis of the outcomes of sessions of the Structured Dialogue over the past few years has shown that the discussion of measures for transparency in military activities has so far not had a noticeable positive effect.

First, a number of OSCE participating States ostensibly calling for the use of modern technologies to ensure transparency during the global COVID-19 crisis are in fact helping to undermine their value. Our experience indicates that the results of using all available means for ensuring the transparency of exercises are often demonstratively ignored by several Western countries, driven as they are by a narrow, bloc-based agenda. Campaigns are under way to demonize routine military exercises conducted by participating States. We are also seeing provocative attempts at manipulating the provisions laid down in the Vienna Document 2011 so as to support some States and exert pressure on others.

Secondly, the clear signals on our part about the need to de-escalate the situation – among other means, by reducing military activity along the borders between Russia and NATO countries on the basis of reciprocity, and by enhancing mechanisms for the prevention of incidents and dangerous military activities – continue to be overlooked by the North Atlantic Alliance. The thrust of NATO's activities is, rather, aimed at intensifying military confrontation in Europe.

During the global pandemic crisis, the NATO countries' Forward Presence near Russia's borders continues to be boosted. Military infrastructure is being enhanced; stocks of materiel, weapons and equipment are being set up; routes for troop movements are being rehearsed. This summer, as part of the bloc's major exercise "Defender Europe", around 40,000 military personnel and 15,000 units of weaponry and equipment were concentrated near our frontier. Every week, the Russian air defence forces on duty detect up to 50 foreign spy planes close to our borders. Overall, strategic aircraft flights by the United States Air Force in the region have increased fourteen-fold since 2014. All this runs contrary to the fundamental OSCE principle of not advancing one's own security at the expense of the security of others.

With regard to the calls voiced today by a number of NATO countries for a strengthening of the tools that make it possible to avoid the misreading of military intentions, we wish to recall that, in view of the COVID-19 outbreak, Russia decided, as a voluntary initiative, to move the areas of large-scale exercises away from the Russia-NATO line of contact. Our country is guided strictly by this principle and will adhere to it during the joint Russian-Belarusian strategic exercise "Zapad 2021", in the course of which the troops' main practical activities will be conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation at a considerable distance from the western State border. We have also made specific suggestions for the prevention of dangerous military incidents, in particular by establishing minimum permissible approach distances between combat aircraft and warships. As before, we are open to consultations on strengthening security in the airspace over the Baltic Sea.

Unfortunately, instead of embarking on meaningful dialogue on these issues, our colleagues stubbornly beckon us down the path of modernization of the Vienna Document 2011, even though they know full well that this endeavour is impossible in the current security environment. If they imagine that, going forward, the conversation on the future of European security will run along the lines of their agenda alone, then they are mistaken in their view. Dialogue is possible solely on the basis of equality and mutual consideration of the parties' interests.

Mr. Moderator,

Today, when the efforts of many countries are focused on combating COVID-19, it is essential to reduce the level of confrontation and refrain from unfriendly steps. That is arguably the main lesson that may be drawn from the pandemic crisis for the OSCE's politico-military dimension.

In view of the manifest crisis of trust at the OSCE and the artificially heightened tension in the OSCE area, the Structured Dialogue retains its unique relevance as a platform for the discussion of specific measures for reducing military risks. We consider both dialogue and the real results arising from it to be important, as envisaged in the Hamburg Ministerial Council declaration from 2016. The prerequisite for achieving such results is the striving by participating States to find viable and mutually acceptable ways of de-escalating military tension. We count on tangible headway being made in that regard.

Thank you, Mr. Moderator.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.ASRC(21).JOUR
31 August–1 September 2021
Annex 3

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Second day of the 2021 Annual Security Review Conference
PC.ASRC(21) Journal, Agenda item 8(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

We have taken note of the efforts by the Swedish Chairmanship and the OSCE Secretariat to organize the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), which this year, owing to a number of circumstances, took place at a later date than the time frame established in the relevant 2002 Ministerial Council decision.

However, although the very fact that the event was held is gratifying, its content has once again been disappointing, like last year. The format devised almost 20 years ago for a broad exchange of views on and search for agreed approaches to pressing security issues in the OSCE area has, unfortunately, degenerated to the level of an arena for exercises in political demagoguery and juggling with ideological clichés, where a negative agenda prevails.

Unfortunately, this year too, the concept for the ASRC did not reflect the objectives laid down in the fundamental ministerial decision from 2002. Instead of giving priority to examination of the OSCE's activities in tackling contemporary challenges and threats to security and stability and of the implementation of commitments in combating terrorism, and to a broad review of politico-military problems and ways of overcoming these, the focus was once again on conflicts and on the OSCE's role in their resolution. Moreover, many have preferred to carry on the conversation in an aggressively confrontational manner, using language that has little to do with dialogue or indeed with the ethos of diplomacy. Such an approach is pernicious and naturally elicits rejection: it is clearly inconsistent with the nature of our Organization, its principles or the "back to basics" motto proclaimed by the Chairmanship.

Despite the serious challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian areas, many participants either concentrated on frankly secondary issues or relayed openly Russophobic arguments, accusing my country of being responsibly for pretty much all the world's woes. Real problems, on the other hand – for example, the situation in Afghanistan and the rise in terrorism, the demolition of almost the entire arms control architecture established over many decades with the active assistance of the CSCE/OSCE, or the emergence of dividing lines in Europe – have been left out of the discussion.

It is evident that our Organization is now a long way from implementing its approved mandate; it is steadily losing its integrity and the internal “cracks” are widening. Yet, as we have seen, most of the participating States have neither the political will nor the desire to change this trend.

We continue to observe politicized speculations with regard to what is happening in Ukraine. By the way, global events in the past few weeks clearly show how important it is to assess, in a sober and timely manner, real as opposed to imaginary threats – to analyse a situation realistically, without ideological blinkers, the wearing of which comes at the price of great suffering for civilians. Instead of a professional exchange of views on ways out of the crisis, we once again heard hackneyed and toxic fabrications of propaganda from a number of participating States that spoke about Ukraine. The logic behind their actions has evidently nothing to do with a desire to help bring to an end the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible. Quite the opposite in fact: what we are dealing with here is an attempt to use the cultivation of anti-Russian sentiment and Russophobia within Ukraine as a means of diverting attention from the Ukrainian Government’s non-implementation of the Minsk agreements and its evasion of direct dialogue with the representatives of Donbas as provided for therein. The discussions on other conflicts in the OSCE’s area of responsibility were also marked by an unacceptably high confrontational intensity.

The approaching 50th anniversary of the OSCE, which was referred to in a number of statements, is a kind of “moment of truth” for our Organization: a crossroads which will either confirm its value and usefulness for future generations or consign it, as it were, to the lumber room of history as something obsolete. It depends on us alone to what extent the OSCE will remain useful and its services continue to be in demand. The task of enhancing its effectiveness and adapting it to changing needs so as to create a common space of equal and indivisible security is long overdue.

The Russian delegation would like to make a few specific proposals and recommendations.

1. The future Polish OSCE Chairmanship should, together with the future Chairpersons of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and in consultation with the participating States, establish a modified agenda for the 2022 ASRC in full compliance with the provisions of the 2002 Porto Ministerial Council decision.
2. The Chairmanship should, together with the Secretariat and the executive structures, prepare specific proposals (“road maps”) for the implementation of the strategy documents on combating terrorism and addressing threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century that were adopted at the Ministerial Council meetings in Bucharest (2001) and Maastricht (2003), respectively. It should likewise proceed to conduct a series of joint meetings of the Permanent Council and the FSC aimed at the comprehensive review of these issues and at reaching agreement on joint recommendations for the 2022 ASRC and future conferences, and also for Ministerial Council meetings.
3. The Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre should – together with the field operations on the ground and the Special Representatives of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office dealing with conflicts, and in consultation with the participating States – analyse the state of affairs regarding the mechanisms used for conflict settlement under the existing negotiation

formats and express their thoughts on the effectiveness of the work in this area for subsequent discussion at the Permanent Council.

4. Within the framework of the Structured Dialogue and other appropriate formats, there should be an intensification of dialogue on current issues related to politico-military stability in the OSCE's area of responsibility drawing on, *inter alia*, the directives of the Hamburg Ministerial Council (2016) and other previously adopted binding decisions of our Organization's decision-making bodies, the aim being to reinvigorate the politico-military dimension.

5. Representatives of international (above all the United Nations), regional and subregional organizations that are directly engaged in matters of security and are developing partnerships with the OSCE should in future be actively involved in the ASRC. To that end, the provisions of the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 should be made use of more vigorously.

We trust that the aforementioned ideas will be reflected in the report summarizing this Conference and that they may perhaps help with the substantive preparations for the forthcoming Ministerial Council meeting in Stockholm.

We expect future OSCE Chairmanships to focus, when organizing ASRCs, on working out ways of using this forum as effectively as possible for the discussion of pressing issues related to Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security and on finding unifying factors, compromises and mutually advantageous solutions, rather than on further accelerating the spiral of confrontation.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the closing session of the Conference.

Thank you for your attention.