Note Verbale

The Embassy & Permanent Mission of Denmark in Vienna presents its compliments to all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, and has the honour to provide the 2020 response to the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in accordance with FSC Decision 2/09.

The Embassy & Permanent Mission of Denmark in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 18 May 2020
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON
POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

Section I: Inter-State elements

1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, subregional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

The status of Denmark as regards the relevant international conventions is given below. (A number of provisional territorial reservations with respect to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, eventually to be withdrawn, do not appear in the list.)


1.2. What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements?

Danish legislation including in particular The Danish Criminal Code and The Danish Extradition Act has been amended a number of times in order to fulfil the obligations that follow from the conventions and protocols listed in 1(a).

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 16 December 1970) was implemented into Danish law by Act. no. 95 of 29 March 1972, which amended the Danish Criminal Code.

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 23 September 1971) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 538 of 13 December 1972, which amended the Danish Criminal Code.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 14 December 1973) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 268 of 26 June 1975, which amended the Danish Criminal Code.

The European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Strasbourg, 27 January 1977) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 191 of 3 May 1978. Denmark made a reservation to Article 1 (4) of the convention in accordance with Article 13.
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 18 December 1979) and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna and New York, 3 March 1980) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 322 of 4 June 1986, which amended the Danish Criminal Code.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 15 December 1997) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 280 of 25 April 2001 by which the Danish Criminal Code and the Danish Extradition Act etc. were amended.

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999) was implemented into Danish law by Act no. 378 of 6 June 2002. See answer to 1.4.

On 25 January 2006 the Danish Government presented a bill (proposal L 130 amending the Weapons Act, Criminal Code etc.) to the Parliament which, in the light of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, proposes new national legislation relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The bill introduces a general ban on all activities related to such weapons, including restrictions on extraterritorial transportation. The bill was adopted on 11 May 2006.

On 2 June 2006 the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism were implemented into Danish law by Act no. 542 of 8 June 2006. See answer to 1.4.

By Act no. 157 of 28 February 2012 the Danish Criminal Code was amended in order to meet the obligations deriving from the decision of 11 September 2008 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to add the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to the treaty list appended to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
1.3. What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

Police

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningsstjeneste abbreviated PET), which is an entity of Danish police, is the national security authority and thus plays an important role in preventing terrorism.

According to consolidation Act no. 231 of 7 March 2017 on the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (the PET Act), section 1, one of the main tasks of the Service is to prevent and investigate actions and undertakings that may jeopardise the independence, security and legal order of the State, and to prevent such actions or undertakings from being implemented or developed.

The actions that, in this connection, fall within PET’s area of responsibility are primarily defined by Chapter 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code. Such actions include attacks on the Constitutional Act of Denmark, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and espionage. PET must provide the basis for handling such threats as early in the process and as appropriately as possible.

PET’s actions are essentially preventive. From the information gathered, processed and analysed by PET, the objective is to procure as much information as possible on the capacity, determination and ability of PET’s target persons and target groups to commit any such action as mentioned above. On this basis, the PET prepares assessments and risk analyses that again provide the basis for an evaluation of what action that must be implemented to prevent any threats from developing further.

Defence

The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningsstjeneste abbreviated FE) is Denmark’s foreign intelligence and military intelligence service. The service is an agency under the Danish Ministry of Defence, and the legal framework for the service is set out in consolidation no. 1287 of 28 November 2017 (the Defence Intelligence Service Act). The act also states that FE is Denmark’s National Information and communications technology (ICT) security authority, and the responsible authority for military security.
FE collects, analyses and disseminates information concerning conditions abroad which are of importance to Denmark and Danish interests. The intelligence activities e.g. include collection of information about international terrorism and extremists abroad. Moreover, FE directs and controls the military security, both for installations and units in Denmark and for units, ships and aircraft deployed on international missions abroad.

1.4. Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining inter alia to:

Anti-terrorism package I in 2002

On 13 December 2001 the Danish Government presented a legislative package (four bills) to the Danish Parliament containing a broad range of initiatives aimed at combating terrorism and the financing of terrorism – including all the legislative amendments, which were necessary to comply with international standards and requirements after the events of 11 September 2001.

The four bills were presented by the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economic and Business Affairs, the Minister of Taxation and the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, respectively. The Anti-Terrorism Acts based on the four bills were all adopted by the Parliament on 31 May 2002.

The Anti-Terrorism Act no. 378 of 6 June 2002 includes the following main elements:

1) Insertion of a special section (114) on terrorism in the Danish Criminal Code. A large number of the offences typically designated terrorist acts are punishable under specific provisions of the Criminal Code. Thus, for example, homicide is punishable under section 237 of the Criminal Code regardless of the offender’s motive for the act. The Government wanted to signal more clearly that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable in a democratic society. Therefore, a terrorism section defining the concept of terrorism has been inserted into the Criminal Code. The provision comprises very serious offences committed to disturb the established order and intimidate the population, and the maximum penalty has been fixed at life imprisonment. The provision implements the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism.

2) Insertion of a special section (114 a) of financing of terrorism, according to which it is an offence, to a wider extent than today, to provide or arrange for financial support to a terrorist
organisation or otherwise to contribute to the promotion of its criminal activities. The maximum penalty is fixed at 10 years imprisonment.

3) An amendment to section 77 (a) of the Danish Criminal Code to make it possible to carry out confiscation of money and other property (and not just “objects”), which it is feared will be applied to commit crimes. And at the same time an amendment to sections 802 and 803 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act on seizure to make it possible to seize money and other property (and not just objects) for the purpose of confiscation under section 77 (a) of the Criminal Code.

4) Amendments to the rules on criminal responsibility for legal persons (companies, etc.), repealing the requirement that a violation of the Criminal Code must have been committed to obtain a gain for the legal person. It is further specified that legal persons can be punished for attempted offences to the same extent as natural persons. Finally, it is specified that the period of limitation for the criminal responsibility of legal persons must follow the period of limitation for natural persons.

5) An extension to the provision on the seizing of aircraft and ships in section 183 (a) to include other means of public transport or goods transport.

6) Aggravated violations of the Danish Arms Act are serious offences that may be connected with terrorism. To make it possible to impose heavier sentences for particularly aggravated violations, the maximum penalty in section 192 (a) of the Criminal Code in respect of aggravated violations of the Arms Act has been increased from four years to six years imprisonment.

7) A clarification of section 192 (a) of the Criminal Code to make it appear expressly that the development of chemical and biological weapons or research to that effect falls within the provision. A similar clarification has been made of section 5 of the Arms Act.

8) A new provision on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. has been inserted in Chapter 13 of the Criminal Code with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for up to six years.

9) In order to improve the investigative possibilities of the police, insertion of a provision into section 786 of the Administration of Justice Act, according to which telecommunications companies and Internet service providers have to record and store (“log”) for one year the information on tele and Internet communications of relevance to police invasion of the secrecy of communications, etc. The recording and storage only concern traffic data and not the actual contents of the communication.
Furthermore, only the companies have a duty to record and store the traffic data in question. The provision does not involve extended police access to these data. A detailed set of (technical) rules on such data logging has been laid down by the Ministry of Justice in an Executive Order on the retention and storage of traffic data by providers of electronic communications networks and electronic communications services.

10) Moreover, the Act contains improvements of the investigative possibilities of the police on several points where, in practice, difficulties arise in connection with the actual implementation of invasion of the secrecy of communications.

Thus, a provision has been inserted into the Administration of Justice Act authorising the Minister of Justice to prescribe rules on the practical assistance by the telecommunications providers to the police in connection with invasion of the secrecy of communications following negotiation with the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation. The provision replaces a corresponding, non-utilised enabling provision in the telecommunications legislation. Also on this point it is assumed that the industry will be involved in connection with the drafting of the rules.

The purpose of this part of the Act is to ensure rapid and effective access for the police to the information to be provided by invasion of the secrecy of communications.

11) The Act further includes provisions on the access for the police to the nation-wide directory inquiry service, which contains name and address data concerning all telephone subscribers listed by name in Denmark, including unlisted telephone numbers, regardless of the subscriber’s telecommunications provider.

12) Under the previous rules of the Administration of Justice Act, the police could already acquaint themselves with communications between computers by means of interception, and at a search the police could also acquaint themselves with all the records of a computer, including electronic messages received and copies of messages that have been sent. However, for technical reasons and owing to the risk of discovery of the measures, it was not possible for the police in all cases to exploit their existing right to acquaint themselves with electronic messages and data in a computer. For that reason a new provision (section 791 b) has been inserted into the Administration of Justice Act, according to which, in cases of very serious offences, the police can obtain a court warrant allowing them to capture data in an information system not available to the public by means of software or other equipment (data
capture) without being present at the location where an information system (i.e., a computer or another data system) is used. This has made it possible to permit measures whereby, by means of a so-called “sniffer program”, the police will receive a copy of all data input by the data system user.

13) The Act also includes an amendment of section 799 of the Administration of Justice Act to provide a right to secret searches in cases of aggravated arson, explosion of bombs, hijacking and addition of toxic substances to the water supply or foodstuffs, etc. The right to keep information on searches in such cases secret may, for example, be of crucial importance where the offence were presumably committed by several unknown co-offenders, and where it is therefore necessary to keep the investigation secret to be able to identify and arrest these individuals.

14) At the same time the Act contains an amendment of section 799 of the Administration of Justice Act to authorise the court to allow the police, with only one warrant, to carry out several individual searches without immediate notification (repeated secret searches) within a period not exceeding four weeks. This may be necessary where, for example, no drugs or weapons were found at the first search, but where it is still suspected that delivery on the location in question will take place within a short time, or where a search has had to be interrupted owing to the risk of discovery of the investigation. The court has to fix the number of searches in connection with the search warrant. In special cases the court may decide, however, that the police may carry out an indeterminate number of searches within the specified period (not exceeding four weeks).

15) In addition, the Act includes an amendment of section 806 of the Administration of Justice Act, according to which it is possible to order a third party to surrender documents, etc. (discovery) without prior warrant in cases where the purpose will be forfeited if a warrant has to be awaited. This might, for example, be thought relevant in a situation where the police need prompt surrender of the passenger list of an airline company.

16) The Act also includes an amendment of section 25(3)(1) of the Extradition Act, according to which extradition for an act comprised by Article 1 or 2 of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism cannot be refused with reference to the prohibition against extradition for political offences at extradition to an EU Member State. The exception from the prohibition on extradition for political offences has been extended to include all requests for extradition for acts comprised by Article 1 or 2 of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, whether or not the extradition concerns extradition to an EU Member State or to another (European) State that has ratified the Convention. Nor
is it possible to refuse requests for extradition in respect of counts comprised by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism with reference to the prohibition against extradition for political offences.

Anti-terrorism package II in 2006

As part of the ongoing work to ensure that the appropriate counter-terrorism legislation is in place, the government set up an inter-ministerial working group in the autumn of 2005. The working group was tasked with examining the regulatory framework and drafting a proposal for a reform in order to ensure that the system of counter-terrorism remains up-to-date and functional. The working group publicised its report on 3 November 2005. The report contains recommendations for further strengthening the Danish counter-terrorism effort, albeit the working group came to the conclusion that the current effort is not insufficient. On the basis of the recommendations the government has developed a counter-terrorism action plan, and a plan for legislative initiatives.

On 31 March 2006 the Minister of Justice presented a bill proposing an amendment of the Danish Criminal Code, the Danish Administration of Justice Act and several other bills. The amendment is part of an anti-terrorist legislative package from the Danish Government, which also includes bills from the Minister of Science, Technology and Development and the Minister of Defence.

The second anti-terrorist legislative package Act no. 542 of 8 June 2006 includes the following main elements:

1) Insertion of a section (114 a) in the Danish Criminal Code in the containing a list of offences which do not fall within the scope of section 114 of the Criminal Code (terrorism), but which are defined as acts of terrorism pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. If one of the offences listed in section 114 a is committed, the sentence may exceed the maximum penalty prescribed for the relevant offence by up to 50 per cent. With the insertion of this provision, the former section 114 a on financing of terrorism was replaced in a new section 114 b.

2) Insertion of a section (114 c) in the Criminal Code prohibiting recruitment for terrorism. A person is liable to imprisonment for up to ten years if he recruits persons to commit or further acts falling within the scope of section 114 or 114 a (terrorism) or to join a group or an association for the purpose of furthering the commission of acts of such nature by the group or
association. In particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particularly aggravating circumstances typically include cases of systematic or organised violations. Section 114 c (2) prohibits recruitment of persons to finance terrorism, whereas section 114 c (3) extends the field of criminal liability to include any person who allows himself to be recruited for terrorism.

3) Insertion of a section (114 d (1)) in the Danish Criminal Code prohibiting training, instruction or otherwise teaching of a person to commit or instigate the acts covered by the provisions on terrorism (sections 114 to 114 a of the Criminal Code). A person violating this section is liable to imprisonment for up to ten years. In particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particularly aggravating circumstances typically include cases of systematic or organised violations. Section 114 d (2) criminalises the training, instruction or otherwise teaching of a person to provide financial support, etc., to any person, group or association which intends to commit an act covered by the provisions on terrorism. As in section 114 c (3), the field of criminal liability in section 114 d is extended to include the trainee, cf. section 114 d (3).

4) Insertion of a new provision into the Administration of Justice Act (section 116), which allows a less restricted access to exchange of information between the Security Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. In continuation thereof, the access of the Security Intelligence Service to information held by other administrative authorities has also been widened when the information has significance for the prevention and investigation of offences related to terrorism.

5) Insertion of a new section in the Air Navigation Act (148 a) allowing the Security Intelligence Service to a more prompt and effective access to standard information about airline passengers in connection with the investigation and prevention of violations of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitutional Act of Denmark and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.) by allowing the retrieval of such information without a warrant. This section also obliges the airline companies to register and store information about crew and passengers for one year. The section has not yet entered into force.
6) Section 791 c was introduced into the Administration of Justice Act. This section allows the police (including the Security Intelligence Service) (on the basis of a warrant) to jam or cut off radio communications or telecommunications in order to prevent violations of, i.a., Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.

7) Section 783 of the Administration of Justice Act was amended, allowing the police (including the Security Intelligence Service) to obtain an interception warrant following a person rather than the particular means of communication. As a result thereof the police only needs to obtain a single warrant in order to tap the telephone(s) of a suspect. As soon as possible after such interference, the police must notify the court of the telephone numbers subjected to the interference but not stated in the warrant. It should be noted that the specific conditions for interception of communications, as set out in sections 781 and 782, remain unaltered. The amendment, moreover, only applies in cases concerning violation of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitutional Act of Denmark and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.).

Anti-terrorism legislation from 2008 to today

With Act no. 490 of 17 June 2008, which entered into force 1 July 2008, amending inter alia the Criminal Code, the Danish provisions on criminal jurisdiction have undergone a comprehensive review.

In respect of preventing and combating terrorism and in order to strengthen the protection of Danish victims, Section 7 a has been inserted in the Criminal Code creating Danish criminal jurisdiction on acts committed abroad by persons without relations to Denmark when the act is aimed at a person who was a Danish national or had his or hers abode or other habitual residence in Denmark when the act was committed. Section 7 a applies to inter alia terrorism as provided for in section 114.

By Act no. 634 of 12 June 2013 the Danish Parliament adopted a number of initiatives to ensure the best possible conditions to prevent, investigate and prosecute economic crime. The Act included inter alia the insertion of a special provision on temporary seizure of money in section 807 f of the Danish Administration of Justice Act. This provision allows under certain conditions for temporary seizure of money, if there are reasons to presume that the amount is connected to money laundering
or financing of terrorism and temporary seizure of the amount is considered necessary in order to secure a later claim for confiscation.

By Act no. 176 of 24 February 2015, which entered into force on 1 March 2015, the Danish Parliament adopted amendments to the Act on Passports for Danish Citizens and to the Alien Act regarding the efforts against recruitment to armed conflicts abroad.

The Act contains two main elements: 1) measures relating to Danish nationals entailing amendments to the Act on Passports for Danish Citizens and 2) measures relating to resident aliens entailing amendments to the Alien Act.

With the amendments to the Act on Passports for Danish Citizens, the police can refuse to issue a passport to a Danish national or revoke a previously issued passport for a specified period of time when there is reason to believe that the person intends to participate in activities abroad that may involve or increase a danger to national security, public order or other states’ security. In addition, the police can supplement such a decision with a travel ban for a specified period of time.

With the amendments to the Alien Act, the Immigration Service can repeal a residence permit or a right of residence if an alien is staying or has stayed outside of the country, and there is reason to believe that the alien during the stay participates or has participated in activities that may involve or increase a danger to national security, public order or other states’ security.

By Act no. 1880 of 29 December 2015 the Danish Parliament passed a bill regarding penalty for joining a hostile armed force.

With the amendment to the Criminal Code foreign fighters risk life imprisonment if they join a hostile armed force. Recruitment for and incitement to join a hostile armed force can be sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

The Act entered into force on 31 December 2015.

By Act no. 1706 of 27 December 2018 the Danish Parliament passed a bill on the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR-data). With the new PNR Act PET continues to have access to information about PNR. The Act entered into force on 1 January 2019.
It should furthermore be noted that the Danish Parliament by Act no. 624 of 8 June 2016 adopted an act on armed conflicts occurring overseas.

Firstly, the act introduced increased sentences if the relevant person accepts being recruited to commit any act of terrorism, as defined by section 114-114 d in the Danish Criminal Code, or in other ways facilitates the activities of a person, a group or an association committing or intending to commit such an act, while being a member of an armed force. Thus, if the relevant person is a member of an armed force, the sentence may increase to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or in particular aggravating circumstances – such as participation in combat – to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 16 years.

Secondly, the act introduced two new Sections in the Danish Criminal Code (Section 114 i and 114 j).

Thus, according to Section 114 i imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years is imposed on any person who receives financial support in the form of money or other services for the establishment or operation of an institution or activities or for similar purposes in Denmark from a group or an association committing or intending to commit acts falling within section 114 or 114 a of the Danish Criminal Code.

Section 114 j concerns the possibility to administratively assert that in an area where a terror organisation is a party to an armed conflict, a ban must be imposed on Danish nationals and residing aliens entering and residing without permission from the Danish authorities. However, entry and residing in such an area as part of the pursuit of Danish, foreign or international public service or duties is possible without prior permission. Entry and residence for other purposes require prior authorisation, which may be granted upon application if the purpose of the entry or stay is creditable.

On 28 September 2017, an executive order (executive order number 1200 of 28 September 2016) that covers certain districts in Syria and Iraq was issued. The executive order entered into force on 30 September 2017.

**Financing of terrorism**

The Danish Parliament has adopted Act no. 674 of 8 June 2017, which provides a legal basis for temporarily stopping the granting of social benefits to foreign terrorist fighters. The grant of social
benefits stops if the police revokes a passport from a Danish citizen when there is reason to believe that the person participates in activities abroad that may involve or increase a danger to national security, public order or other states’ security. Moreover, the act provides a legal basis to reclaim social benefits that have been paid to convicted foreign terrorist fighters while they were in foreign conflict zones.

Furthermore, Denmark has adopted Act no. 262 of 16 March 2016 on the registration of beneficial ownership, which makes it mandatory for all legal persons, such as companies, businesses and foundations to obtain and hold up-to-date information on the entities’ beneficial ownership and to take reasonable measures to obtain such information. The information on beneficial ownership has to be registered in the Danish Business Register (CVR) and is publicly available. The entities are also obliged to hold information regarding their beneficial owners and attempts to identify their beneficial owners for 5 years after the identification or the attempt.

In September 2018, a new national 4-year strategy on combatting money laundering and terrorism financing was published. The aim of the national strategy was, among other things, to ensure the most efficient way of collaboration and coordination between the relevant authorities in order to significantly reduce the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Furthermore, the national strategy was focused on the importance and relevance of the national risk assessments and puts emphasis on the need to collaborate between the relevant authorities when drafting the risk assessments.

In 2016, the PET conducted a National Risk Assessment on Terrorist Financing in Denmark. It was distributed to Danish authorities and to a limited private sector audience in order to strengthen the national efforts against terrorist financing. In January 2020, PET completed and made public a new National Risk Assessment on Terrorist Financing in Denmark (NRA TF). Denmark was evaluated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2017, whose remarks have been an inspiration for the new NRA TF. The NRA TF is available on PET’s website, but has also been shared with relevant stakeholders and with the Money Laundering Forum, which is a strategic forum for coordination among relevant authorities.
In the new NRA TF, the non-profit organizations sector (NPO sector) is identified as a high-risk area. As a result, PET has conducted a separate National Risk Assessment on Terrorist Financing in The NPO sector in Denmark (NRA NPO). The NRA NPO was finalized and made public in the beginning of April 2020. The NRA NPO is made in cooperation with relevant Danish authorities, the NPO sector and other stakeholders. Among these are The Danish Tax Authorities, ISOBRO (The NPO trade organization) and The Fundraising Board.

In 2010, PET prepared a leaflet on the financing of terrorism and how to be cautious when contributing to collections, etc. called “Your contribution could be abused”. The leaflet was drawn up in several languages and distributed to relevant mosques, cultural associations, etc.

Based on the findings in NRA TF and the preliminary results from data analysis and interviews concerning the NRA NPO, PET and ISOBRO have published a new version of the leaflet “Your contribution can be abused” in order to inform the donor community about possible TF-risks in relation to NPOs. The leaflet contains information about risks areas and concrete advice to donors, who have doubts about the use of their donation. The leaflet was made in cooperation with representatives from both the public and the private sector. The new leaflet is currently being translated into a number of different languages, including English, Arabic, Somali and Urdu.

In cooperation with The Fundraising Board and ISOBRO, PET has also launched a preventive campaign on social medias in order to raise awareness on TF-risks in relation to NPOs. The campaign is also called “Your contribution can be abused” and consists of graphics and short videos, where representatives from PET, The Fundraising Board, ISOBRO and the NPO sector (Danish Red Cross, Save the Children and GirlTalk) inform about possible risks in relation to fundraising activities and advice on how to avert the abuse of donations. The campaign links to the leaflet and the Fundraising Board’s website, where a list of approved fundraising campaigns and organizations can be found.

The campaign ended in the beginning of April 2020. The results showed that the campaign was seen numerous times by 1,5 million Danish citizens, which constitutes a substantial number of the Danish population. Furthermore, the see-through rate, the rate of people watching an entire video, was unusually high.
The Danish Parliament has adopted Act no. 105 of 4 February 2020, which is an amendment to the Danish Fundraising Act. The amendment entered into force on 1 March 2020. The purpose of the amendment is to enhance control with fundraising activities as part of the effort against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The amendment consists of several elements.

Firstly, NPOs now have to apply for a permission from the Danish Fundraising Board. Previously NPOs were required to notify the Board before initiating fund raising activities.

Secondly, the requirements to such organizations’ financial statements are increased. Now the organizations are obliged to give information about each fundraising campaign including income and expenses of each campaign.

Thirdly, the amendment enhances the Board’s ability to discover instances of money laundering and TF by expanding the Board with a member with insight in identifying money laundering and TF.

Finally, the Board’s obligation to share information with relevant authorities is now a requirement by law. This includes an obligation to report to the Danish police, if the Fundraising Board suspects that a crime has been committed and an obligation to report to the Money Laundering Secretariat, if the Board has knowledge about, suspects or has reasonable suspicion that raised funds are used for money laundering purposes or financing of terrorism.

In addition to the amendment of the Fundraising Act, The Danish Fundraising Board has implemented new guidelines for a risk-based approach. The Board has changed its supervision of the financial statements to the effect that the Board examines the financial statement immediately upon receipt. Among other things, the examination includes the accountant’s opinion as well as the relation between receipts and expenditures. Based on the information given in the financial statement, the
Board assesses if a more detailed supervision should be introduced, e.g. if the Board suspects that the funds are being used for purposes other than those stated in the application.

In November 2019, the Danish Government formed a new Operative Authority Forum (OAF) in order to enhance the coordination and information sharing between the relevant authorities in relation to preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing. The legal framework was in place mid-January 2020. The first operational meeting has since taken place, and the Forum is established as a standing working group under the Money Laundering Forum. The OAF is led by The State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK). The participants can vary according to requirement, but the PET, the Money Laundering Secretariat, The Danish Tax Agency, The Danish Business Authority, The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, The Danish Gambling Authority and The Danish Police is regularly invited to participate. The Forum will support the sharing of both multilateral and bilateral information and coordination of operational cases regarding ML and TF.

A number of standing working groups have been established under the framework of Money Laundering Forum. Among these a group chaired by the Danish Business Authority focused on coordinating outreach and education. The joint efforts regarding further outreach and education will be formulated and coordinated in this forum. The outreach and education group has formed a public-private cooperation with key partners from the financial sector on producing educational cases and case-based learning modules.

**Administrative deprivation of Danish nationality**

In October 2019 the Danish parliament passed a bill that introduced an access to administrative deprivation of Danish nationality for persons with dual nationality. Previously nationality could only be deprived by a court of justice.

The introduction of administrative deprivation of Danish nationality has provided the authorities with the opportunity to deprive persons of their Danish nationality even if the person is still abroad. This was not possible under the previous legislation.
Administrative deprivation of nationality will require a specific assessment regarding whether the person in question has conducted him or herself seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of Denmark and that the authorities conduct an assessment of proportionality of the significance of the deprivation in conjunction with the severity of the person’s conduct.

Procedural guarantees will apply throughout the process, including e. g. hearing the person in question about information relevant to the decision and the right to give an opinion. The decision can also be appealed to the courts.

The deprivation will not apply to any children of the person who is deprived of Danish nationality.

**Deprivation of Danish nationality by court order (offences against the State’s indepence and security, and offences against the constitution and the supreme State’s authority and terrorism)**

Pursuant to Section 8 B of the Danish Nationality Act, any person convicted of a violation of one or more provisions of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code (offences against the State’s indepence and security, and offences against the constitution and the supreme State’s authority and terrorism) may be deprived of his or her Danish nationality by court order unless this will make the person concerned stateless. If a person has been punished abroad for an act which may, according to Danish legislation, lead to deprivation of Danish nationality, such person can be deprived of his or her nationality pursuant to Section 11 of the Danish Criminal Code.

**Foreign terrorist fighters**

Limitation of consular assistance to foreign terrorist fighters

On 12 December 2019, the Danish Government presented a Bill to Parliament with the aim of enabling the Danish Foreign Service to refuse or limit its consular assistance to foreign terrorist fighters. The Danish Parliament passed the Bill on 23 January 2020.

The Act on the Foreign Service no. 63 of 28 January 2020 contains a new provision, stipulating that the Foreign Service can refuse or limit its consular assistance to a person, if there is reason to believe that the person concerned has stayed in a conflict zone or has participated in activities
abroad, which may pose or increase a threat to national security of Denmark or other states. A “conflict zone” is defined in Danish criminal law.

More specifically the new provision enables the Foreign Service to either refuse or limit its consular assistance to a person, if:

- a person has been in a conflict zone without prior permission or creditable purpose,
- a person has been denied a (renewal of) passport by Danish authorities, e.g. if there is reason to believe that the person concerned intends to travel to a conflict zone to join a terrorist movement,
- a person has been convicted or detained in custody in absentia (by a Danish court) for i.a. acts of terrorism or treason,
- information from i.a. the Danish Security and Intelligence Agency, or other relevant Danish or foreign authorities, gives reason to believe that a person meets the criteria.

In cases concerning foreign terrorist fighters, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the specific case in question to see if the person meets the criteria set out in the provision. When conducting this assessment, the MfA will also take into consideration if there are specific concerns calling for issuing consular assistance such as humanitarian aspects.

The Danish Foreign Service will thus be able to refuse or limit its consular assistance, such as prison visits or participation in court hearings, to foreign terrorist fighters. The Foreign Service will, however, continue to provide assistance covered by other legislation, such as issuing of passports or providing assistance in extradition cases.

Children of foreign terrorist fighters are exempt from the Act. Hence, under-aged children of foreign terrorist fighters will not be subject to the limitations in consular assistance. Only in exceptional circumstances, can the provision apply to a person under the age of 18 if there is specific reason to believe that the person concerned meets the criteria. The MfA will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the case in question to see if the person under the age of 18 meets the criteria set out in the provision.

**Border controls**

In Denmark, border control is based on the Schengen Borders Code and implemented in Danish law through the Danish Aliens Act, the Aliens Order and the Visa Order and by rules and guidelines issued by the Danish National Police.
The Danish Police is the main authority responsible for integrated border management and is also responsible for carrying out border checks at the external border. Border control is carried out by the police and the Danish Defence as part of general law enforcement tasks, as Denmark does not have a specific border police force. Police and civilian officers carrying out border controlling tasks receive special border control training. Border surveillance at the maritime borders is carried out by the Royal Danish Navy and the Royal Danish Air Force on behalf of the police.

The Danish police falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and consists on an organisational level of the Danish National Police and 12 local police districts as well as the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which each constitute a police district.

The Danish National Police regularly collect and examine data from relevant national and international partners (incl. Frontex). Risk analysis is available to all employees of the police.

At all border crossing points, the police has access to search in relevant databases such as national databases, the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System and Interpol’s databases (SLTD and nominal).

**Travel document security**

*Any specific changes in national legislation or policy, development of a strategy for national identity management*

N/A

*Implementation of relevant international (e.g., ICAO/EU) standards in this field*

Denmark has implemented all relevant EU and ICAO standards regarding Passports/ePassports.

*Changes in institutional arrangements*

No changes have been made in the institutional arrangements since the application process for passports was handed over to the municipal authorities in 2007.

*Introduction of electronic passport (ePassport) and/or national ID card systems*

All Danish passports issued after 1 August 2006 are ePassports. At present, Denmark does not issue national ID cards.

*Participation in the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD)*

At present, Denmark does not participate in the ICAO PKD. Currently, Denmark is working on the
implementation of a solution in the Danish IT-systems that will enable Denmark to exchange passports certificates with other countries. Denmark will make a decision on participation in the ICAO PKD Initiative after the implementation of the abovementioned solution.

*Use of new biometric (face, fingerprint, iris, etc.) technology*
Denmark implemented face biometric in passports in 2006 and fingerprints from 1 January 2012.

*Reporting of lost and stolen travel documents to Interpol’s Database on Lost and Stolen Travel Documents (SLTD)*
When a passport is reported lost or stolen, it is immediately entered into the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and Interpol’s Database on Lost and Stolen Travel Documents (SLTD).

*Awareness raising and dissemination of information to national authorities on detecting forged travel documents*
The Danish National Police has an ongoing dialogue with all relevant national authorities including the municipal authorities who handle the application process for passports.

*Awareness raising with relevant trade bodies (private airports, etc.)*
In Denmark, border control is conducted by Danish police. The National Danish Police has a continuing dialogue with airport and port authorities and others relevant trade bodies.

*International co-operation/technical assistance activities*
The Danish National Police does not participate in ICAO’s technical committee, but follows the ongoing developments.

The Danish National Police participates in the Article 6 Committee on a Uniform Format for Visa under the European Commission.

**Legal co-operation including extradition**
Denmark has ratified the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 and the additional protocols of 15 October 1975 and 17 March 1978.
Denmark has also signed bilateral agreements on extradition with the United States of America and Canada.
Danish legislation contains rules on Law No 117 of 11 February 2020 on extradition to and from Denmark (the Danish Extradition Act).
The Danish Extradition Act lays down the rules on extradition of Danish and foreign nationals for the purpose of criminal prosecution or execution of a judgment in a state outside the European Union. Furthermore, the Danish Extradition Act stipulates rules on surrender of Danish and foreign nationals for the purpose of criminal prosecution or execution of a judgment in a member state of the European Union on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant.

In 2005, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden agreed upon a convention on the surrender in criminal matters between the Nordic countries (the Nordic Arrest Warrant). Rules on the Nordic Arrest Warrant were inserted into the Danish Extradition Act by Act no. 394 of 30 April 2007. The Act stipulates special rules on the surrender of Danish and foreign nationals for the purpose of criminal prosecution or execution of a judgment in Finland, Iceland, Norway or Sweden. The Act entered into force on 16 October 2012, and at the same time, the former Act on Extradition to Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden was repealed. In comparison with the former Act, the rules on the Nordic Arrest Warrant contain an extended obligation to surrender.

Danish law does not contain specific rules on mutual legal assistance. However, as a general principle, Denmark can execute requests for legal assistance from other states in accordance with the rules applicable to national criminal procedures in, inter alia, the Danish Administration of Justice Act.


As member of the European Union, Denmark is also a party to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union of 29 May 2000 and a number of framework decisions regarding specific forms of mutual assistance between the member states of the European Union.

Furthermore, Denmark has signed a mutual agreement with Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on legal assistance in criminal matters and some bilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory

2.1 Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.

Denmark is a party to the Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the Status of their Forces from 1951. It has signed the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces, done at Brussels on 19 June 1995. Denmark ratified on 7 August 1999.

Besides that, Denmark concludes Status of Forces Agreements on an ad hoc basis when the Danish Armed Forces are going to be stationed on territories, where the NATO-SOFA does not apply.

As of April 2020, Denmark has troops deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Estonia in a NATO framework. In the framework of the UN, Denmark contributes to UN missions in Mali and in the Middle East. Lastly, Denmark contributes to the coalition against ISIL with troops and an air surveillance radar in Iraq, as well as to the French-led operation to support the international effort to counter terrorism with a helicopter contribution in the Sahel region.
3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct

3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.

Denmark is state Party to all relevant multilateral arms control-, disarmament- and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, such as:

- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
- Treaty on Open Skies
- All Confidence- and Security Building Measures agreed upon in the OSCE
- Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC)
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
- Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)

Denmark implements these treaties and agreements as well as other international instruments and initiatives in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the UN Security Council
Resolution 1540, the UN Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Furthermore, besides participating in arms control activities within the European Union, Denmark is an active member of the following export control regimes:

- the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
- chair of the Zangger Committee (ZC),
- the Australia Group (AG),
- the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
- the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and
- the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

3.2 **Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence-and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.**

In addition to implementation of the above-mentioned treaties and agreements and active participation in their respective governing bodies, Denmark is engaged nationally and internationally in projects within the framework of arms control. As an example, Denmark each year conducts bilaterally agreed CFE-, Open Skies and/or Vienna Document activities.
Section II: Intra-State elements

1. National planning and decision-making process

1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

The military posture

Denmark has a political tradition for establishing multi-year broad political defence agreements, normally covering several years. The current political defence agreement covers the period 2018-2023. The agreements determine the structure of and funds allocated to the defence and the emergency management agency.

Defence expenditures

The Danish defence budget is approved by the Parliament once a year when the overall Financial Law is passed. The general level of the defence budget is, however, determined by a Defence Agreement as mentioned above. The Defence Agreements ensure a financial long term perspective for the defence planning.

Throughout any current year the Parliament will typically decide on issues as participation in international operations and financial allocations in relation to these specific missions. Also, the standing committee for financial matters will approve major procurement and infrastructure projects.

1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?

Denmark actively seeks to enhance multilateral cooperation, facilitate transnational dialogue and encourage collective solutions to alleviate legitimate security concerns. In this regard, strengthening the international legal order and respect for human rights with transparent legal procedures governing the use of military force is a key priority. In continuation thereof, compliance with and
respect for international conventions and human rights obligations is a cornerstone of Danish foreign and security policy. Denmark’s efforts to enhance multilateral cooperation and the international legal order primarily take place through international institutions and fora, inter alia UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE. To facilitate participation in international operations contributing to international peace, security and stability, the armed forces have transformed into a modern deployable defence force. The 2018-2023 Danish Defence Agreement thus strengthens Danish contributions to NATO’s collective defence, international operations and stabilisation efforts. The agreement emphasises the need for a strong international legal order and effective multilateral cooperation.
2. Existing structures and processes

2.1. What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces and, intelligence services and the police?

The overall defence policy is determined by the Minister of Defence. The minister is accountable to Parliament for all defence matters and issues regarding emergency management. The MOD is subject to the same procedures in relation to Parliament as all ministries, that is, Parliament receives all information required for it to function as legislator and scrutiniser of the central administration, incl. the government.

The Defence Committee is a standing parliamentary committee dealing with defence and emergency management is set up to scrutinise bills and proposals on defence and emergency management issues for parliamentary resolution. The committee encompasses all parties represented in Parliament. The committee also follows the developments within its sphere of competence and ensures that the Minister of Defence implements the laws according to the decisions made by Parliament. Citizens and organisations can make enquiries to the committee. The Minister of Defence is obligated to answer questions asked by the committee or by any Member of Parliament.

According to the Constitutional Act of Denmark, section 19 (3), the government is also obligated to consult with the Foreign Affairs Committee before making any decision of major importance for Danish foreign policy. This includes decisions concerning defence issues related to international affairs. The Foreign Affairs Committee is also appointed among members of Parliament. Besides, Parliament can at any time decide to have an interpellation on a broader theme pertaining to defence and emergency management, the result of which may enjoin the government to follow a specific guidance.
Furthermore, the Danish constitution ensures parliamentary control if use of military force may become necessary. According to section 19(2), the use of military force – save for a few exceptions – is subject to parliamentary approval. Parliamentary approval of military force, according to section 19(2), is not exclusively limited to the use of kinetic force or combat missions.

**Police**

On 11 October 2006, the Ministry of Justice set up a committee tasked with reviewing and evaluating the system for dealing with complaints against the police and processing criminal cases against police officers. The Committee submitted its report in April 2009.

The committee found that the system for dealing with complaints against the police functioned well but that it was important – in the light of the critique of the system – to ensure confidence in the police complaints system, both within the public and among the police force.

Based on this report, the Administration of Justice Act (*retsplejeloven*) was amended on 21 April 2010 introducing as of 1 January 2012 a new independent body – named the Independent Police Complaints Authority (*Den Uafhængige Politiklagemyndighed*). The authority was tasked with handling complaints concerning the conduct of police personnel and investigating criminal offences committed by police personnel while on duty as well as cases concerning the death or injury of persons in police custody.

Prior to the introduction of the Independent Police Complaints Authority, the Regional Public Prosecutors (*Statsadvokaterne*) handled these cases. To ensure that criminal charges against police officers are handled according to the same guidelines as criminal charges against others the decision on whether criminal charges are to be filed against police personnel however still lies with the Regional Public Prosecutors or the Director of Public Prosecutions (*Rigsadvokaten*). The assessment of whether to charge a police officer is therefore handled by an authority that has a broad-based expertise and experience in handling a variety of different criminal cases.

The Independent Police Complaints Authority is headed by a Police Complaints Council (*Politiklagerådet*) that consists of five members, which is comprised of a high court judge as the head of the council, one private practising attorney, one professor of law and two representatives of the general public.
The Administration of Justice Act provides rules for processing complaints against police personnel. Part 93 b and part 93 c of the act govern the processing of complaints regarding the conduct of police personnel and the processing of criminal proceedings against police personnel, while part 11 a govern the organisation of the Independent Police Complaints Authority.

The rules apply to police personnel with police authority, i.e. regular police officers and members of police legal staff. The rules however do not apply to administrative staff and other civilian employees. On 17 may 2017, the Parliament adopted a bill that makes part 93 b and part 93 c of the Administration of Justice Act applicable to military personnel assisting the police in carrying out its duties. These rules entered into force on 1 July 2018.

The provisions apply to offences that have been committed while on duty. The decision on whether an offence has been committed while on duty is based on a case-by-case assessment of the facts of the case.

According to the rules of the Administration of Justice Act, the Independent Police Complaints Authority has to process cases regarding the conduct of the police personnel within a reasonable time. If a decision has not been rendered within 6 months after a complaint has been received, the authority must inform the complainant in writing about the reason for this and about the expected time frame for the processing of the case.

As to cases regarding criminal charges against police officers, the Independent Police Complaints Authority must inform the victim, the police officer in question and other relevant persons if a decision has not been rendered within 12 months.

In both type of cases, the authority must inform the complainant, the victim, the police officer in question etc. again within 6 months if the decision still has not been rendered.

Generally, the Independent Police Complaints Authority handles all aspects of inquiries and investigations, and consequently the police will merely be involved in the processing of these cases to a very limited extent. However, the police may deal with urgent matters concerning inquiries and investigations. In addition, the Independent Police Complaints Authority may request the National Police (Rigspolitiet) to assist the authority in its investigations.
The rules solely concern complaints regarding conduct and criminal proceedings involving police personnel (and from 1 July 2018 military personnel assisting the police). Hence, complaints about substantive decisions and actions taken by the police in connection with their processing of cases do not fall within the scope of the rules. Complaints about police (operational) action outside the scope of criminal justice procedure are handled by the Commissioner of the relevant police district (Politidirektøren) or the National Police. Act No. 444 of 9 June 2004 on police activities (politiloven) deals with the rules on police actions outside the scope of criminal justice. Complaints on police actions involving criminal investigations are handled by the Regional Public Prosecutor.

During a case before the Independent Police Complaints Authority, police personnel have the right to legal representation. The Independent Police Complaints Authority may decide that the cost of legal representation shall be paid by the state.

The Independent Police Complaints Authority initiates investigations based on a complaint or on its own initiative. Moreover, the Independent Police Complaints Authority is required to initiate investigations if a person has died or been seriously injured as a result of police intervention or while the person in question was in police custody.

Both the aggrieved party and others may file a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Authority on the conduct of police personnel and alleged criminal offences committed by the police.

When the Independent Police Complaints Authority has reached a decision based on its investigation in criminal cases involving police personnel, the authority will forward the case to the Regional Public Prosecutor for review of whether or not to press criminal charges.

The Regional Public Prosecutor’s decision may be appealed to the Director of Public Prosecutions by either party of the case or by the Independent Police Complaints Authority.

In 2019, the Independent Police Complaint Authority received a total of 21110 cases which have been assessed under parts 93 b and 93 c of the Administration of Justice Act of the Administration of Justice Act.

In addition to the complaints mechanism described above, the Parliamentary Ombudsman Act (ombudsmandsloven) permits complaints to be lodged with the Ombudsman about final
administrative decisions taken by the authorities, including decisions taken by the police. The Ombudsman decides whether examinations should be commenced on a case-by-case basis. The Ombudsman may also commence examinations on his own initiative.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the Ministry of Justice automatically informs the Ombudsman about the outcome of investigations conducted by the Regional Public Prosecutors in cases concerning deaths while an individual is in the custody of police, i.e. where the individual has been arrested or is held in detention.

During the negotiations of the bill establishing the Independent Police Complaints Authority, it was agreed that the system should be evaluated 3 years after its commencement, i.e. in January 2015. On 7 May 2014, the Police Complaints Authority granted the Faculty of Law at the University of Copenhagen the task of evaluating the Authority. The evaluation was completed and published in April 2017, and the overall conclusion from the evaluation is that the majority of respondents perceive the Police Complaints Authority as an independent authority, and have confidence in the police complaints system.

**The Security and Intelligence Service (PET)**

PET is subject to the same rules of the Administration of Justice Act as the rest of the police including the complaint system. Furthermore, PET is subject to different forms of external control.

For instance, the Ministry of Justice on behalf of the government supervises PET, and PET is subject to instructions of the Ministry of Justice. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the Ministry of Justice must be informed of general and specific circumstances, which are of fundamental importance to the work of PET.

According to consolidation Act no. 937 of 26 August 2014 the Parliamentary Committee on the Security and Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (the Intelligence Services Committee) must also be notified of the general instructions and guidelines that apply to the work of PET and be informed of circumstances regarding security of importance to the work of PET.
The Act also requires the Danish Government – upon request – to provide any information concerning the Security and Intelligence Service, including statistical information, to the Intelligence Services Committee.

Furthermore, the PET Act, which was adopted by the Danish Parliament on 30 May 2013 and entered into force on 1 January 2014, has introduced an independent body to supervise PET. The supervisory body, designated the Intelligence Oversight Board, is charged with monitoring PET’s processing of data. The supervisory body consists of five members. They are appointed by the Minister of Justice upon negotiation with the Minister of Defence. The chairman, who must be a high court judge, is appointed upon recommendation from the Presidents of the Eastern and the Western High Courts. Members are assigned for a period of four years. They may only be reassigned for one further period of four years.

The oversight board carries out its supervisory duties in full independence and it determines its own rules of procedure and can engage any necessary secretariat assistance.

The oversight board monitors PET’s processing of data concerning natural and legal persons in all respects. In that connection, it is empowered to demand all types of information and all material of importance for its own operation. The supervisory body has access to all premises etc. of PET at all times, including IT systems. As part of its activity, the supervisory body may issue opinions to

In addition to the above, it should be mentioned that many investigation measures performed by PET are subject to judicial control. Measures such as searches and tapping of telephone lines etc. can only be performed by PET after obtaining a court order.

**Defence Intelligence Service (FE)**

FE is an agency under the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence supervises FE, and FE is subject to instructions of the Ministry of Defence. The legal safeguards ensuring democratic political and judicial control with FE are to a large extent identical to the ones ensuring control with PET, described above.

Thus The Intelligence Oversight Board oversees that FE’ processing of data is in accordance with the provisions of the Defence Intelligence Service Act. The Intelligence Services Committee under
the Danish Parliament must be notified about the guidelines governing the activities of FE, and substantive security or foreign policy issues affecting the activities of FE.

2.2. How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?

Reference is made to question 2.1.

With reference to section 19(2) and 19(3) of the Danish constitution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the interpretation and application of the provisions.

2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?

The overall roles and tasks of the Danish defence are described in the Danish Defence Act (no. 122 of 27 February 2001, as latest amended by Act no. 625 of 12th June 2013). According to the Act, the primary aims of the Danish Armed Forces are to promote peace and security, to prevent conflicts and war, preserve Danish sovereignty and secure the country’s existence and integrity, and promote a peaceful development in the world with respect to human rights.

The tasks and organisation of the Danish Home Guard are described in the Home Guard Act (no. 198 of 9th February 2007, as latest amended by Act no. 1552 of 13th December 2016). According to the Act, the tasks of Danish Home Guard are as a voluntary military organisation to participate as part of the military defence in the solution of tasks for which the army, the air force and the navy are responsible. The home guard also plays an active and important part in the combined preparedness of society (total defence).

Whenever Danish military forces are requested by the UN, NATO or the OSCE to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian and other operations, the government undertakes a thorough and careful analysis of the specific situation prior to any decision about Danish contributions. Pursuant to section 19 (2) of the Constitutional Act of Denmark, as described above, the consent of Parliament will be obtained prior to any participation in missions, where the use of military force might be necessary.

Denmark has neither paramilitary nor internal security forces.
3. Procedures related to different forces personnel

3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?

The main objective of the Danish Armed Forces’ personnel policy is to provide highly skilled and motivated personnel in order to maintain the quality and efficiency of accomplishing tasks in both national and international environments.

The manning of the armed forces is based on professional soldiers. However, each year approximately 4,620 conscripts, mainly volunteers, are trained to become a part of the total defence forces that are called up in the event of a crisis or a natural disaster. This includes emergency management forces. Until the end of 2023 the number of conscripts will gradually rise to approximately 5,120.

All young men holding a Danish citizenship are examined for liability for military service in the year when reaching the age of 18. If called-up he has the possibility to sign an agreement with the armed forces. The agreement allows a certain influence on where, when and for how long he will do his preliminary compulsory service. It is also possible to volunteer for this service. There is no compulsory national service for women in Denmark. Women can join the armed forces on a voluntary basis and serve on the same conditions as men, but with the option to opt out during their service.

The regulars are recruited from among the conscripts or directly among those who have finished their regular school attendance. Officer Cadets are recruited from either experienced non-commissioned officers with additional military and civilian education or civilians with a bachelor degree. Selection procedures differ slightly between the services and between officers and other ranks. Applicants are required to meet specific literacy and numeracy requirements and to be both medically and physically fit.

The members of the Home Guard take part in the defence and support of the country on a voluntary and unpaid basis. Men and women from the age of 18 can apply for membership. A military background is not necessary. When membership has been granted, members are admitted into one
of the following branches – Army, Naval or Air force Home Guard. Denmark has no paramilitary forces and internal security forces.

3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?

Conscription was stated for the first time in the Constitutional Act of Denmark in 1849 and has been maintained since then.

Section 81 of the Constitutional Act reads: “Every young man capable of bearing arms is to take part in the defence of the country according to national law”. Consequently, the Danish Parliament has passed the Act of Conscription, which was last amended in June 2018. This act lists four possible ways of doing national service:

1. Service within the Danish Armed Forces,
2. Service within the Danish Emergency Management Agency,
3. Service as aid worker in third world countries,
4. Civilian work – service for personnel that reject service within the armed forces.

The last three possibilities of doing national service do not include armed service.

Conscripts have the possibility of volunteering as a conscript, which will allow them some influence on place, time and unit of conscription. In 2019, volunteers accounted for 99.8% of conscripts to the armed forces.

Denmark has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC), which prohibits the conscription into the armed forces of persons below the age of 18.

3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?

Military personnel are subject to the Military Penal Code, the Military Administration of Justice Act and the Military Disciplinary Act.

In peacetime, the Military Penal Code and the Military Disciplinary Act apply to military personnel in active service and discharged personnel regarding military duties imposed on such personnel
after their discharge. During an armed conflict, the Military Penal Code and the Military Disciplinary Act apply to all personnel - whether military or civilian - in the armed forces. Criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction extends to Danish military personnel serving outside Denmark, including participation in Peace Support Operations.

Military criminal cases are tried before the regular (civilian) courts. In general, the Civil Administration of Justice Act apply to all cases concerning violations of the Military Penal Code as well as violations of the Civil Penal Code committed by military personnel when the violation relates to the service or has been committed in or because of the service, within a military area, or in military quarters provided. The Military Administration of Justice Act only contains a few modifications to the Civil Administration of Justice Act. The most important modification is that the Military Prosecution Service is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases under military jurisdiction, exercising authority equivalent to that of the police and public prosecutors in civilian criminal cases. The Military Prosecution Service is an independent body subordinate only to the Minister of Defence. Other military authorities have no specific or independent authority to investigate and prosecute criminal cases.

While the Military Penal Code deal with service offenses of a more severe nature, like for instance disobedience of a lawful command, mutiny, harassment, absence without leave, negligent performance of duty, etc., the Military Disciplinary Act concern misconduct of a less serious nature. These cases of misconduct are not punishable under the Military Penal Code but should, nevertheless be sanctioned in order to ensure and maintain discipline within the armed forces. Only the specific acts of misconduct mentioned in the Military Disciplinary Act can be sanctioned. The disciplinary measures include reprimand, presentation, work or additional exercise in part of the spare time, additional service, and disciplinary fine. The Act provides a detailed description of the procedures concerning disciplinary cases. Disciplinary measures may be imposed by officers who have been granted disciplinary authority.

A person, on whom a disciplinary measure has been imposed by an officer granted disciplinary authority, can choose to bring the decision before the disciplinary chief. The decision by the disciplinary chief can be brought before the disciplinary board consisting of a judge, a representative of the armed forces appointed by the Chief of Defence, and a representative of the personnel group of the person on whom the disciplinary measure have been imposed. The representatives are appointed based on recommendations of the personnel organisations which are
entitled to negotiate. Furthermore, the decision of the disciplinary chief can be brought before a court of law.

4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law

4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g., through military training programmes and regulations?

All Danish military personnel receive instruction in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and other relevant international law governing international military operations. All training in LOAC is based on the Danish Military Manual on international law relevant to Danish armed forces in international operations (2016).

The regulations concerning instruction in LOAC were reviewed in the early 1990's. Today, instruction is governed by a defence command regulation from June 2014. This regulation is currently under revision, subject to the standards of NATO STANAG 2449, 3rd ed. The guiding principle is that everyone shall receive instruction according to his or her level and function. Instruction is also integrated into all military exercises, thus making LOAC an integrated part of military training. Instruction takes place at all levels during basic military training, at NCO-schools and at the officer academies as well as at the Royal Danish Defence College. In addition, personnel who are deployed in international operations receive additional training specific to that operation, including training in LOAC, before deployment. Personnel who have special responsibilities relating to LOAC receive training specific to that area of law.

In 2016, a Danish military manual was published with the aim to further strengthening the Danish Armed Forces’ education and training in, and use of, international humanitarian law and LOAC. The military manual is integrated in the defence command regulation system and it has been in effect as a defence command regulation since February 2017. The Manual was translated by the Danish Ministry of Defence and published in March 2019.

In 1997, a military legal advisory service was established with responsibility for advising military commanders on LOAC issues and other legal questions relating to military operations, in accordance with the requirements laid out in Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions,
article 82. This service is regulated by a defence command regulation from August 1997. The military legal advisory service is currently undergoing revision in order to raise the standard and quality of the service, due to the constant more complex nature of international operations.

Military legal advisors are employed throughout the armed forces’ operational and administrative structure, from the senior commands including defence command down to brigade (army), squadrons (navy) and air stations (air force) level. Military legal advisors advise military commanders in relation to crisis management and international peace support operations as well as in the planning of military operations, nationally and internationally. Military legal advisors have been deployed on operations with Danish and NATO military contingents. Military legal advisors oversee the instruction in LOAC within the armed forces.

4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?

Through the instruction in LOAC as mentioned under Section II (4.1) and in accordance with the Danish military manual the armed forces personnel receive training on the implementation and enforcement of the LOAC rules including individual and command responsibility for violations of inter alia the Danish military criminal code and the rules concerning prosecution of such crimes.

4.3 How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?

According to the Danish Defence Act, section 1 (3), it is one of the purposes of the Danish defence to promote a peaceful development in the world in respect of human rights. Further reference is made to Section II (2.1).

The following additional information on women, peace and security is provided with reference to the interpretative statement FSC.DEC/2/09, 1 April 2009, Attachment 1 and to OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality in accordance with ministerial decision No. 14/04 as well as ministerial decision No. 14/05 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation - aiming at enhancing the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).
In June 2005, the Danish government launched a national action plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The action plan – developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence – provided several suggestions on how to integrate foreign, defence and development policy. The action plan was revised in 2007 by a working group consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the National Commissioner of Police, in cooperation with NGOs and other civil society partners. On 10 June 2014, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark launched Denmark’s third National Action Plan. The third Danish Action Plan represents cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish National Police, representing the Ministry of Justice. It emphasises the full and equal participation of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction in accordance with SCR 1325. The specific focus of the updated National Action Plan (2014 – 2019) is to deliver results on several specific initiatives and indicators for each authority to implement. The Danish Government is currently updating the national action plan for the coming 5-year period.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for strengthening the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in various ways, directly and indirectly, multilaterally and bilaterally, by

- working for inclusion of UNSCR 1325 elements in UN, OSCE and NATO decisions, policies and plans of action,
- promoting inclusion of UNSCR 1325 in emergency humanitarian response and humanitarian policy,
- working for wider incorporation of the various aspects of SCR 1325, including the important aspect of combating gender based violence through humanitarian activities of UN organisations such as OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and UNRWA,
- ensuring inclusion of UNSCR 1325 aspects in humanitarian projects and programmes of Danish relief organisations supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
- working for more women in senior international peace work by contributing female candidates to the rosters within the EU and UN,
- working for increasing the number of women recruited for the Danish International Humanitarian Services,

- promoting partnership of like-minded European countries similar to the UN Friends of 1325 groups,

- supporting capacity building and training on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations,

- giving specific attention to UNSCR perspectives in UN missions, including upholding the zero tolerance of violations of code of conduct.

On the basis of the national action plan, the Danish armed forces have established an action plan for inclusion of UNSCR 1325 in the areas of:

- Leadership and management

- Operations

- Education and training

- Manning and recruitment

- Legislation

4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member’s exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country’s armed forces are politically neutral?

Reference is made to Section II (3.3 and 2.1 respectively).

4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?

Reference is made to Section II (2.1).
Section III: Public access and contact information

Public access

1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?

The public can obtain information on the provisions of the Code of Conduct via the homepage of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.um.dk).

1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?

Danish replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct are made publicly available on OSCE homepage.

1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State’s armed forces?

Information to the public is made available on the official internet home page of the Danish armed forces www.forsvaret.dk and on the homepage of the Danish Ministry of Defence (www.fmn.dk).

Furthermore, information on the armed forces is available at public libraries and by direct contact to:

Defence Command Denmark

Herningvej 30

7470 Karup J, Denmark

Ph: +45 7284 0000

E-Mail: FKO@mil.dk
2 Contact information

2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Office for Security Policy / SP
Asiatisk Plads 2
DK-1448 Copenhagen K
Ph.: +45 3392 0000,
Fax: +45 3354 0533
E-mail: sp@um.dk