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Session II - Shaping a Security Community: addressing emerging global challenges.  
Developing a new approach to conventional arms control?

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**1. Which are the new global challenges that OSCE is currently facing and how can we effectively deal with them? To what extent and how should the OSCE revitalize conventional arms control?**

My first point is the following: The role of the OSCE and Europe's global role in broader sense will depend on Euro-Atlantic community and on Europeans themselves. For now the OSCE participating States seem preoccupied with mainly themselves. The fiscal crisis and internal domestic issues are taking precedence over matters of—both—“soft” and “hard” security, including military aspects of security.

In short, the OSCE is confronted with a new non-conventional problems. In fact, the Organization was invented with an aim to reconcile two challenges: how to keep the status quo on one hand and promote the process of change on the other. When politicians fail to keep up with the pace of change, informal meetings (like our Security Day in Vienna, the EASI Commission under Carnegie Endowment auspices or Munich Security Conference and—on permanent basis—the European Council on Foreign Relations) grow in significance, bringing together persons who are independent and creative enough to think innovatively.

The new security threats are quite often identified by three notions: instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. They are diverse, complex and come largely from non-traditional sources (such as violent extremism, terrorism, cyber attacks and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).

One of the key issues in this respect is the urgent need to redefine and revitalize arms control and the non-proliferation process. In her recent presentation (29 Feb. 2012) at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Rose Gottemoeller, acting U.S. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, confirmed that strengthening and maintaining European security is “a top U.S. priority”. She gave an overview of three conventional arms control regimes that play a key role in European security: the Open Skies Treaty, The Vienna Document (2011) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). All these three instruments are in fact deeply rooted in the system of bipolarity characterized by confrontation and distrust.

The arms control regime in the past was designed with the intention of preventing a possible, unexpected attack by the Soviet Army and the allied armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization against those Western democracies united within the NATO Alliance. This was achieved to a greater extent by the process of transition which established a set of Military Confidence and Security Building Measures. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the main political goals were achieved through overcoming the partition of Europe, an extension of the North Atlantic Alliance to the East and a decrease in the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war.

Now, the time is right to replace the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction by that of Mutual Assured Stabilization. The United States and Russian Federation still control over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and need to continue working on bilateral nuclear reduction efforts. Having a regime in place with negotiated and verified limits on each other's strategic nuclear forces provides important predictability and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The US-Russian dialogue started already on important ideas relevant to further reductions and transparency. Ongoing is also the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). It gives us an opportunity to take stock of the challenges that the Alliance is likely to face in the future and to determine the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defense forces that NATO will need to deter and defend against threats to the Alliance and to ensure its security.

In other words, the new arms control agenda has to be innovative and creative to correspond with the new security environment.

## **2. What other tools should be developed to address global challenges, and how can the OSCE contribute?**

The world is changing faster than our ability to comprehend the essence of these changes. The United States, China and Russia are all searching for their new place in the world.

In his memorable speech in Berlin in December 1989, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said: "Free men and free governments, are the building blocks of a Europe whole and free." The Europe 2012 correspond only in part to the James Baker project. Not all Europe is united and not all men and women of the OSCE area are free. International security in the Euro-Atlantic region is defined by common institutions, universal values and divergent interests. The alliance-based NATO, the community-based EU, and the loose cooperation of the remaining countries within the OSCE and NATO partnerships and CSTO reflect the reality of the second decade of XXI century.

Not every country in the Euro-Atlantic region shares the values of political pluralism, free market, the rule of law, media freedom and respect for human rights. Even if accepted in theory, they are rejected in political practice. Cold War rhetoric is back: the alleged superiority of "non-interference into the domestic affairs" over the all other principles of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) apparently justifies the concept sovereignty or "sovereign democracy." But if common values—aside from common interests—fail to be respected, the security community will simply be a facade.

The New Strategic Concept of NATO based on the Report prepared by the Group of Experts led by Madeleine Albright defined three essential core tasks of the Alliance: collective

defence; crisis management; and cooperative security. Alliance's new aims and tasks are not only focused on territorial defence of its members—States but they are oriented to protect the community of values as well, and are not limited to the Euro-Atlantic area only since crisis management function is applicable also to the other regions of the world. In other words, within the new 2020 Strategic Concept Partnership with the OSCE is now “different and more intimate than it is with most other international organizations”.

### **3. In the past, new systems were usually agreed upon fairly quickly—after the end of large-scale wars.**

The victors enforced and imposed their will upon the defeated. That is how—after the Napoleonic wars—the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Powers came into being in Europe, their concept designed by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich. Many politicians still regard the system then created as a model for global power relations.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe (November 1990), better than any other document, identified the important new feature of an emerging international system, a feature which boils down to this simple observation: in the 21st century, international security in the global and regional dimension—especially European—is contingent more on the situation within the states than between them.

The nature of conflicts has changed, and it is about time to draw conclusions from this. Discussions about the new system must not ignore the circumstance that over the past twenty years nearly all armed conflicts have broken out within the states, not between them. From a strictly military point of view, these are usually low-intensity conflicts. Increasingly, they are of an asymmetrical nature, where parties include not only states but also non-state actors.

The new international political and military environment differs fundamentally from the situation that was the cause and source of the Cold War between East and West. The new reality is incomparably more complex, and any attempts to steer or ‘manage’ the world in keeping with a political philosophy of rival power centres are tantamount to accepting a kind of polycentric concept of security.

Robert Cooper was right when he wrote that ‘This is a new world, but there is neither a new world order (...) nor is there a new disorder. There is a safe Europe and a safe North America, but there are areas from which threats emanate, not only for individual regions (the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula), but for the world as a whole. There are also areas of chaos, a lack of prospects for development, uncertainty, poverty, famine, and disease (Africa, and many countries of Asia and Latin America).

In the opinion of Henry Kissinger (a classic practitioner of Realpolitik), there are two paths to stability: hegemony or equilibrium. Such thinking about challenges reflects a time that belongs to the past. In the diversified yet interdependent world of the 21st century, it is futile to refer to the simple schemes and logical thought patterns that corresponded to the needs of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. Their application, while failing to address present problems, creates new ones instead.

#### **4. Unconventional problems and situations call for unconventional solutions.**

In practice this means that we need to realize that just as the world is diversified, the methods for neutralizing risks and threats are complex. International security necessitates a holistic approach, not only encompassing the political and military dimension (as was the case in the past), but also taking into account economics, information technology, and civilizational issues, and allowing nations to protect and cultivate their identities.

Two new factors has to be taken under consideration:

- 1) Uncertainty and loss of trust of the governed in the governors: citizens share universal values, but their political systems do not express these values;
- 2) A number of European countries are feeling increasingly nostalgic about the idea of renationalizing security—which means returning to the national niche. The generation which now has both say and power sees the experiences of World War Two and post-war development as but a piece of distant history.

In many parts of OSCE area—outside the Euro-Atlantic institutions—elites would like to see closer ties with the European Union and NATO, but are not willing to implement the kind of domestic reforms that would make these ties possible. Professor Brzeziński claims, however, that a rapprochement will take place within the next 20 years.

There is a need to be innovative and find a response to the question raised after the Cold War: How to manage the change and respect specificity of different cultures and traditions?

#### **5. What does it mean in practice?**

There are different dimensions of security within military security. The principal source of discord between the West and Russia is missile defence. Russia's stance is motivated by the concept of a balance of power and geopolitics. For the West the central point is respect for common universal values. At the Conference organized by the Russian Council for International Affaires (Moscow, 23 March 2012) President Medvedev stated: "The test of how ready the United States and other NATO members are for genuine partnership with Russia is really very simple: to what extent will they take our interests into account, above all regarding the European missile defence issue."

A joint project to break this impasse has been put forward by an EASI Commission of former politicians and military experts. Their report claims that breaking the impasse in negotiations and the "transformation of the very essence of relations" between the U.S. and Russia in the military aspects of security must be given priority status by the two governments. The authors provide principles for Russian-Western cooperation on missile defence. They call for the drafting of a joint programme to prevent the most serious threats, currently posed by medium-range ballistic missiles (max. range 4,500 km). Such cooperation would ensure a more effective response to threats than a strategy implemented independently by one country. Joint action means that NATO and Russia would create joint data and information exchange centres and that both parties would protect their territory whilst enabling the interception of missiles aimed at the partner country.

The reports' conclusions consist of specific postulates, calling on the U.S., EU and Russian authorities to accept, a vision of a Euro-Atlantic security community as the foundation of their political philosophy and to instruct their senior military commanders and defence officials to create "a dynamic confidence-building process to lengthen warning and decision-making time in both of Europe's military spheres—conventional and nuclear."

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The vision of a "Europe whole and free" by continuing the enlargement agenda for NATO—as the Ambassador Nicholas Burns recent report suggests—should include Russia by focusing on pragmatic cooperation in short run while working toward eventually bringing a democratic Russia into the Atlantic family of nations in the long run. Not necessarily within NATO but within the new cooperative security system.

The creation of a genuine security community is feasible. The world as we know it is becoming a thing of the past. The outline of a new global order, which lives up to the challenges of the future, is becoming ever sharper. These challenges include fundamental changes in the role played by individuals and societies in the new cyberspace. The market for political ideas is seeing a rise in demand for imagination and reason.