



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Conflict Prevention Centre**

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Let me first of all thank you for inviting me. It is a pleasure to visit Japan, which although far away from Vienna, is still very much a part of the OSCE as one of our Asian Partners for Co-operation. This is a very good example of the importance of common efforts to address regional questions.

Today I have been asked to give a presentation on the experiences of the OSCE in issues surrounding violent conflict, terrorism, and extremism. I would like to brief you on the OSCE's responses, through its conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms, with a special emphasis on its institution building, rule of law and human rights activities. I have also been asked to briefly address the issue of non-proliferation.

To pursue these issues, and to promote the commitments and norms they 'feed' on, is one of the more challenging tasks that today's governments, security organisations and individuals face. The mission to make the world a safer and more stable place for all to live is not an easy one, for we face a whole range of outstanding challenges. I could mention terrorism, trafficking of weapons, human beings and drugs, international organised crime as well as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as but some of them. In the OSCE we have worked out a strategy by which possible responses to these, both new and old, challenges have been identified. Since its successful adoption at the Maastricht Ministerial Council 2 weeks ago we now have a road map as the basis for our work in the immediate future. Based on this strategy I would therefore like to present you with a recipe of how the OSCE addresses its regional challenges.

The OSCE is, as you are well aware, a regional security organisation that is recognised as such under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Organization is the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its co-operative and comprehensive approaches to security are a part of the reason why the OSCE

today occupies a unique place in the world of international organisations in general, and in the realm of European security in particular.

The key is to get involved at the earliest possible stage. This is possible, first of all, due to the continuous political consultations among all 55 participating States, that cover the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok - so do note that both North America and the Russian Federation are very much active members. This permanent dialogue among delegations, both in the Permanent Council and in the Forum for Security Co-operation, allows for a continuous exchange of views on all issues of concern to our participating States. The establishment of consensus as the only basis for the decision making process, even though it can sometimes make this process more burdensome and perhaps frustrating, has the benefit of encouraging full participation and a strong sense of ownership of the organisation for all - and especially for the smaller countries.

In addition to this mechanism for consultations, there are other 'tools in the box'. The OSCE has four important Institutions, namely the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM), and its own Parliamentary Assembly (PA). In addition it has 19 field operations deployed to assist some of the participating States that, among much else, are mandated to provide early warning.

OSCE Conflict Prevention is based on the Organization's comprehensive approach of security, which I mentioned earlier. This brings together activities embracing the OSCE's three security 'baskets'. The first dimension is specifically devoted to enhancing security in the politico-military dimension, through a sophisticated network of CSBMs and arms control measures. These are on both a regional and a sub-regional regional scale, and include the requirement for participating States to implement the provisions concerning the Small Arms and Light Weapons document (SALW), and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Matters. These measures are amongst the most advanced in the world. There are as well other initiatives, namely in the economic and environmental dimension (the second basket), as well as in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and the rule of law – this is the third basket. More cross-dimensional activities, such as in respect of policing, trafficking, the fight against terrorism, border management issues, have all become concrete examples of how such a comprehensive approach can be translated into practical activities that engage different institutions at the same time, each of them from their own respective angles, and with their own contribution of expertise. As an example of how such cross dimensional issues are tackled within the OSCE, you should know that as the focus on border management and border security issues has been

intensified, a focal point has been established at the Conflict Prevention Centre to act as a co-ordinator to deal with the increased responses necessary.

In the early 1990s, and not least due to the end of the Cold War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it became clear that the apparatus at the disposal of the then CSCE for preventing and resolving conflicts was in need of adaptation and enhancement. The Budapest Summit in 1994 cast the OSCE as 'a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management' with a 'flexible and dynamic' approach. New mechanisms, procedures and political instruments were established to facilitate this role. The emphasis shifted from mechanisms of early warning and prevention of inter-state conflict, which were mainly based on politico-military instruments, to increased attention to the factors that generate conflicts within, and between, states. This shift in emphasis was intended to give the ability to respond more flexibly to crises and more effectively to conflicts. To this end 'second generation' instruments, such as the HCNM and the missions of long duration were created. These missions/field presences are new forms of international intervention into potential conflict situations. Deployed in all cases with the approval of the host country, these field presences ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of developments in its various areas, and at the same time they facilitate the political processes that are designed to prevent or settle conflicts as necessary, and assist with post-conflict rehabilitation where called for.

The HCNM is a real instrument of early warning and preventive diplomacy. It was set up with the aim to identify - and promote early resolution of – ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or relations between OSCE participating States. Similar activities are provided for in the mandate of the ODIHR, which greatly contributes to early warning and conflict prevention by monitoring the implementation of human dimension commitments. The functions of the Representative on Freedom of the Media are a working example of the concept of co-operative security, for the Representative is authorised to observe media development, including *inter alia* the monitoring of hate speech should it occur, in all participating States, and to advocate and promote full compliance with relevant OSCE principles and commitments. In doing so, the Representative closely co-operates with all OSCE political bodies and other institutions. With regard to early warning, the HCNM has on several occasions raised issues concerning minority rights. When the crisis developed in Kosovo in 1998, it had a severely negative effect on the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had to accept a considerable number of Albanian refugees from Kosovo at the height of the crisis in 1999. This led the High Commissioner, for the first time since this Institution was established, to issue a formal early warning on 12 May 1999 that, unless the international

community significantly increased its efforts to provide more assistance, significant destabilisation of the country could occur.

OSCE missions and field activities – as I mentioned earlier there are some 19 of them now in operation, including the Joint Commissions on Military Pensioners in Estonia and Latvia - are the front line of the OSCE's work. The missions operate in the Balkans (6), in Central and Eastern Europe (5), in the Caucasus (3) as well as in Central Asia (5). They give the Organisation an active presence in countries that require assistance and are the vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action. The mandates, composition and operation of missions and other field activities are increasingly varied, underlining the flexibility of this instrument. The respective mandate may, *inter alia*, include the following responsibilities:

- Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;
- Observing compliance with OSCE commitments, and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;
- Assisting in the organisation and monitoring of elections;
- Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Monitoring, verifying and assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

All Missions are engaged in some activities that have a preventive function. This can be seen from the perspective of two particular issues that are pertinent to conflict prevention, namely the promotion of dialogue and engagement in human dimension issues. Therefore where human dimension issues are included in mandates, or where mention is made of issues pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms, missions will play a role in developing the capacities of that state's institutions and civil society in order to regulate their own dysfunction through democratisation, adherence to the rule of law and other appropriate measures. Second, the promotion of dialogue and understanding between parties features in the mandates of many of the field presences, and is often linked to the task of gathering and /or disseminating information.

This last element is a key premise to understand the role of missions and their intended contribution to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis

management. Indeed, one of the primary tasks of these field missions is to maintain or promote transparency by gathering and disseminating accurate information for the political bodies of the OSCE, for reliable and timely information provides the basis upon which the political bodies and the participating States can act in a given situation. By being located in a country, field presences are able to provide more dedicated information than some individual States might receive from their embassies. Therefore, the key to the operational effectiveness of the Missions is their capacity to establish and maintain good and varied contacts with all parties and groups, and to actively promote this as a basis for better understanding.

Field presences are also able to play instrumental roles in laying the groundwork for negotiation and conflict resolution processes - in other words to play a facilitative and mediation role. In the context of conflict prevention, presences can facilitate relations between the parties by changing parties' perceptions and reducing fears, exploring options for settlement and helping governments to set up legislative and regulatory frameworks.

I wish now to provide examples of how these missions operate on the ground, but before doing so I would like to touch on the role of my own Directorate, the Conflict Prevention Centre, or CPC.

### **Role of Conflict Prevention Centre.**

The CPC plays a key role in supporting the OSCE's activities in the field, for it co-ordinates the activities of the Missions and assists in the implementation of their mandates. It is also a focal point in the Secretariat for the coordination and development of the OSCE's role in the politico-military dimension. In particular, the CPC is responsible for supporting the Organization's Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and the Secretary General in implementing OSCE tasks in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation.

Among the CPC's day-to-day responsibilities are continuous liaison and follow-up with the OSCE missions or other field activities with respect to the execution of OSCE political decisions. In doing so it contributes to a coherent approach to a coordinated range of activities undertaken by the missions themselves, or in conjunction with the various OSCE Institutions.

Additionally, and under the guidance of the Secretary General, the CPC also supports the CiO and all relevant OSCE negotiating and decision-making bodies, such as the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation. More specifically in the politico-military and the broader security

dimension of the Organization's activities, the CPC provides support for the implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), *inter alia* by maintaining databases on information exchanged, as well as maintaining a computer network specially designed to facilitate direct communication between capitals (the OSCE Communications Network). It supports and organizes seminars and workshops, and, at the request of participating States, it assists with the implementation of the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the Vienna Document 1999, the 2000 SALW Document, and other commitments. It also gathers data on relevant developments for the Organization and provides a constant means of contact for the OSCE personnel in the field.

The CPC is organised into a Mission Programme Section, a Project Coordination Cell, and a Forum for Security Co-operation Support Unit. There is also an Operations Planning Unit (OPU), with responsibilities exactly as the name suggests, but this unit is also mandated to provide early warning, operational liaison with our partner organisations, analysis, and to act as a focal point for border issues. Finally, incorporated within the OPU is a Situation/Communication Room. This is staffed 24 hours a day, and as well as being a point of contact for the Organization is one of the main tools for early warning, for it provides a continuous source of information from the OSCE area to the Analyst and Mission Programme Officers within in the CPC

If I can now turn back to the missions, I would like to describe their activities in more depth by using some examples.

### **The Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

My first example is the important role the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje played before, during and after the crisis that affected the country in 2001, when armed rebels from the Albanian ethnic minority rose up against government security forces. As a result of the internationally brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement, the OSCE mission was asked to help the government create the right conditions for the agreement to be implemented. Within a few weeks, the mission grew from just a handful of members to over 400 national and international staff, whose task was to create a stable environment in former rebel-held areas so as to allow the return of the Macedonian security forces. This involved painstaking negotiations often lasting many months, in occasionally volatile circumstances. But with willingness on both sides and ratification of an 'Amnesty Law', routine police patrols were re-established in all areas by June of 2002. The Mission, with a network of initially six field stations

in the former crisis regions, offered confidence building as well as technical assistance in response to the requirements of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Working closely with the Macedonian Ministry of Interior, the Mission has trained a new generation of police officers, whose inclusion in the security forces will help create a more ethnically balanced police force. By the end of July 2003, the number of new police officers trained by the Ministry of Interior and the OSCE reached approximately 1270. Of this total, over 1000 are from minority groups and nearly 15 per cent are female. In addition, the Mission, with a substantial presence of international police advisors and community police trainers in the field, is helping to reform outdated policing methods and develop 'Community Policing'. In the former crisis areas, this is seen as essential in order to re-establish trust between citizens and the security forces. OSCE Confidence Building Monitors were further tasked to monitor security in the former crisis areas, maintaining close links with communities, assisting with the return of internally displaced persons and helping to promote inter-ethnic co-operation. The Mission has now developed an extensive network of citizen's advice groups to foster better links between the security forces and the general public. The Mission also provided technical assistance to municipalities in preparation for a greater degree of self-government in the future.

### **Border monitoring in Georgia**

In Georgia, the OSCE is deeply involved in activities, such as promotion of peaceful settlements of disputes, border monitoring, various projects on small arms and other weapons, and activities to address human, social, economic and environmental impact of security-related developments. The task has become even more challenging with the recent developments and a new interim government in place.

In fact, the work of the OSCE Mission in relation to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict illustrates well the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security. Here the mission promotes resolution of the conflict both by simultaneously addressing issues in all three dimensions, and by enhancing its interaction with the authorities, civil society and the representatives of international organisations. Naturally, the OSCE's involvement in the region started at a political level, and the mission has been facilitating improvements to the existing mechanisms for political negotiation. Promotion of confidence-building measures, including the monitoring of the activities of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, has also been of primary importance. More recently economic issues have come to the forefront of the mission's activities, since reconstruction of the areas affected by the conflict was seen as one of the factors that could assist stimulate a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and human dimension issues are now also becoming increasingly important to create a favourable climate for a peaceful settlement. Another example of activities in this field is the work of the

Border Monitoring Operation of the OSCE Mission to Georgia. This operation monitors and reports on movement across the border between Georgia and the Chechen, Ingush and Dagestan Republics of the Russian Federation. The deployment and subsequent geographical expansions of this operation illustrate the ability of the Organisation to react rapidly to requests from participating States for conflict prevention activity where of negative security developments are identified. Despite some difficult periods over the last three years, this operation has proved to be an important element for contributing to confidence building and promoting stability in the region.

### **Mission in Kosovo**

An example of OSCE post-conflict rehabilitation is the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. The Mission, which was established in the summer of 1999 at the end of the NATO campaign against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, represents for the OSCE a new step in acting in co-operation with other international organisations. For the first time, the OSCE is an integral part of an operation led by the United Nations and forms a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It has taken the lead role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building. It also plays a major role in human rights issues. The present OSCE Mission in Kosovo was preceded by the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was launched at short notice to verify the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions dealing with a cease-fire in Kosovo, as well as to observe the movement of forces. It was withdrawn when the NATO campaign began in March 1999.

As part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, the focus of the Mission in Kosovo's mandate on institution building is a clear sign that post-conflict rehabilitation is of primary importance to the OSCE and is, indeed, one of its strongest elements of its field activities. Despite the focussed nature of the mandate, the mission has had to adjust to realities on the ground in Kosovo since its inception. This ability to remain flexible has been a hallmark of its success to date. To achieve its goal of institution building, the mission conducts a whole range of activities, within the fields of democratisation, rule of law, human rights and police education. But, while the fields in which the mission works have not changed since 1999, the core activities the mission used to carry out in these fields has, and this has been the result of the ever-evolving situation in Kosovo. At the end of the conflict, and the entry of the Mission into Kosovo in 1999, large numbers of refugees were in the process of rapidly returning, the rule of law had yet to be established, human rights violations were occurring with an unfortunate frequency, and no system of local governance existed. In these circumstances, the Mission played a major role in monitoring and reporting on human rights and setting up the Kosovo Police Service School, in



order to train a democratically oriented, indigenous police service from scratch. After some months, the Mission also then began to make preparations for municipal elections, which were held in the Autumn of 2000. These preparations included not only key elections-related activities such as establishing a legal framework for the elections and creating a voter's list, but core democratisation work such as assisting political party development to become true democratic parties. Other activities at this time included the development of a nascent media.

After the 2000 municipal elections, and with a further stabilisation of the situation in Kosovo, the Mission began again to develop its activities to reflect the changing environment. It began the training of the newly elected assemblies, which had more and more responsibilities in issues of local governance. Further establishing the rule of law was also imperative. This was done through the establishment of several institutions, such as an Ombudsman Institution, as well as institutions which focus on judicial and prosecutorial training, which were created by the mission. Other linked activities included the active promotion human rights and providing expertise in this area; this a further proactive step that meant we were no longer simply monitoring and reporting on them as had been the case.

In Autumn 2001, the Mission organised and supervised Kosovo-wide elections, where the people of Kosovo elected for the first time their Assembly, which was inaugurated on 10 December 2001. In February 2002, the formation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-government (PISG) took place. The creation of the PISGs has ushered in a new period of the work of the Mission. While the Mission's work in the areas of police training, which envisions up to 6,500 new Kosovo police service cadets being trained at the OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School, and media development continued apace. Activities in the areas of democratisation and human rights saw a shift toward assisting these nascent institutions to develop and eventual 'institutionalise' democratic standards. Human rights experts, though still assisting their partners in UNMIK, now provide expertise to the PISGs, while the democratisation department provides capacity building to the PISGs and the municipal assemblies as its core function. The Mission has also played a major role in the handover of some of its functions. OSCE created institutions have now become largely independent of OSCE assistance and funding. At the same time, the mission's role in the organisation of elections (of which there will be Kosovo-wide ones scheduled in 2004), has been reduced to only a few key areas, with a locally established authority doing much of the day-to-day operations under the loose guidance of the Mission.

The list of achievements by OMIK goes on, but, in short, we can see that the development of the mission reflected the general developments of the post-conflict society in which it works.

So, how successful has the OSCE been in its activities in the field? It is, of course, not easy to judge one's own work and success from a general point of view, but I am convinced that the OSCE has proved to be a very relevant instrument for promoting stability and security in its region. Our Organization remains actively involved within the framework of conflict settlement, where it aims to either find solutions to the conflicts that occur in many parts of the OSCE area, or to prevent possible crises before they escalate. Many conflicts have not been solved for years, and the parties involved have displayed at times some impatience and criticism, but that said, they have not called for serious changes in the way OSCE is involved in the search for a peaceful settlement of these disputes. And of course finally much depends on the willingness of the parties in dispute to co-operate among themselves, and to respect their respective commitments to the OSCE principles and norms for the peaceful settlement of such problems.

On many issues the OSCE co-operates with other international institutions with the aim of preventing conflict and conduct post-conflict rehabilitation. When considering the present state of this co-operation, I would point out that we have come a long way since the time of our initial experiences, and we have also learnt a lot along the way, both from the set-backs and from the successes. Let me briefly turn to recent examples of the kind of co-operation between OSCE and the UN, as well as with EU and NATO, with a particular focus on peace-operations.

The current format for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with a Board of Principals revolving around the function of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and more empowered local authorities, and the UNMIK 'pillar' structure in Kosovo that I mentioned earlier, are, albeit in my view to a different degree, successful models that one could draw upon in designing mechanisms for co-ordination on the ground in the future.

The BiH model has proved challenging, especially with regard to the division of labour and, at times, due to the lack of a shared vision for the operation, but it has improved over time.

In Kosovo, the pillar structure has proved to be a probably more efficient platform that has functioned fairly well, not least due to the fact that this structure naturally leads to close co-operation, especially on the ground, and so to a clear definition of roles and tasks. However, still more can and should be done in terms of sharing views on the overall IC strategy.

In the Western Balkans, we found our co-operation with NATO, and more recently with the EU, not only extremely useful, but in fact a *conditio sine qua non* for us to be able to discharge effectively our functions in a number of regions. In particular NATO- led forces ensured the benign environment that unarmed international organisations need to operate. Yet this co-operation is reciprocal and always pragmatic. I could cite here a recent example of concrete interaction with the EU in FYROM, where the OSCE extended to the EU logistical support related to its police activities, including support to the EU/Proxima planning team with office space, cars and equipment.

Further east, we find other recent experiences of UN-OSCE co-operation in crisis management related operations, both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In Georgia, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continues to co-operate closely with the OSCE in matters of mutual concern, in particular the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, focusing especially on human rights issues. In Tajikistan, the OSCE has also worked in close co-operation with key international organisations under the umbrella of the UN. This co-operation has proven an important contributing factor in restoring peace to this war-ridden country – this through the finalising of the Tajik General Agreement in 1997.

### **The Importance of Arms Control for Stability in the Politico-Military Dimension: Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM)**

The OSCE experience with CSBMs is rightly regarded as a success story. The politico-military dimension has been an integral part of the OSCE security architecture for almost three decades. The first CSBMs had a profound impact on European security. They were intended to "contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where States lack clear and timely information" These key words reflect the main concerns of that time, and the efforts by participating States to dispel them.

The emphasis was on predictability through increased openness and transparency. These measures opened the door to pan-European negotiations on military issues. Such measures contained in the Vienna Document 99 are militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable. At the same time, negotiations on limitations of conventional arms, and creating a formal aerial observation regime, resulted in the treaties on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Open Skies. This evolution of politically binding commitments into legal obligations in the defence realm was the logical extension of transparency in military activities.

In the Asian regional context, I would like to draw your attention to regional CSBMs. These measures underline the indivisibility of security - the principle that comprehensive, mutually beneficial relations between countries in any region are possible only under conditions of stability and security, which is guaranteed by mutual confidence, openness and predictability. The OSCE experience demonstrates the effectiveness of such measures, applied to both bilateral and sub-regional levels. Some go beyond 'classical', military CSBMs, in that they deal with specific security issues, such as defining borders, humanitarian rescue operations, environmental protection, and combating trans-border crime.

Sub-regional CSBMs exert a positive influence in neighbouring regions, for example in Asia. I recall the Shanghai Agreement between six states on CSBMs in adjacent border areas. Another example is the Initiative on Interaction and CSBMs in Asia of 2002, which 16 states have already joined. I would like to express here our appreciation with regard to the productive development of relations between the OSCE and Japan, South Korea and Thailand, our partners for co-operation.

In spite of some views that CSBM implementation has become somewhat routine, OSCE States strongly feel that the results achieved do not diminish its role. On the contrary, CSBMs have significantly reduced tensions by increasing transparency and improving predictability between states. The considerable improvement of the military security situation in the OSCE area, as a result of the progress achieved in CSBM and arms control implementation, has allowed the Organization to shift its focus to other issues, such as conflict prevention and crisis management. Internal and regional ethnic conflicts have become dangerous challenges to security and stability, which are often difficult to prevent or resolve within the traditional framework of arms control. The OSCE has emphasised the importance of maintaining CSBM implementation at the current high level, while searching for new measures to meet new threats.

#### *Other Measures*

While addressing the politico-military aspects of security in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), participating States have not limited themselves to modernisation of the CSBM regime. They have also paid serious attention to new security challenges in the military field, resulting in adoption of a number of documents, *inter alia*:

- Defence Planning
- Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations
- Global Exchange of Military Information

- Questionnaire on Ottawa Convention on Prohibiting Anti-Personnel Landmines
- Questionnaire on the Status of Ratification of the Chemical Weapon Convention.

Time does not permit me to go into detail, but only to mention them to demonstrate the scope of OSCE activity in the politico-military dimension. I will highlight just a few important additional initiatives as they relate to meeting the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### *Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers*

The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation has encouraged a responsible approach to international armaments transfers, in particular regarding those states accumulating conventional weapons beyond legitimate defence needs, and in regions of tension. This set of adopted principles emphasises States' commitment to exercise due restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and related technology by means of an effective national control mechanism.

#### *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)*

The effort to prevent and combat the illicit trafficking in SALW has become a major part of the OSCE's work. It is considered to be one of the pre-eminent organisations in this sphere. The proliferation of SALW previously took place outside the scope of arms control agreements. Firmly within its pol-mil acquis, the OSCE is in the process of adapting its traditional tools to the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

SALW are now recognised as causing a majority of fatalities and injuries in combat and non-combat situations, among both combatants and civilians. Unlike heavy conventional weapons, SALW are widely available. According to the UN, there are over 500 million in circulation around the world, though the real number may be considerably higher. They are cheap, and easy to conceal and smuggle across borders. In the hands of non-state actors, e.g. terrorist and criminal organisations, their firepower now often outpaces that of the police or military. They are durable, require little logistical support, and are relatively easy to use. The OSCE area is strongly affected, particularly in Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

The multi-faceted nature of the problem led to a comprehensive agreement. The SALW Document goes further than most, and has an impact not just regionally, but globally. Its provisions govern weapons marking and manufacture controls, common export criteria and controls, arms brokering; stockpile management, reduction of surpluses, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; and information exchanges.

Just recently, at the OSCE Ministerial in Maastricht, Netherlands, the Forum for Security Co-operation announced the publication of its SALW Best Practice Guide, which will serve as a useful and practical tool in this effort. In addition, in order to focus on illicit trafficking, the Conflict Prevention Centre has conducted two targeted assistance projects on border control in the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border region. OSCE field missions are also increasingly active in areas such as community policing in the Balkans.

#### *Code Of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*

The fight against terrorism has come to the forefront of OSCE attention after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The Bucharest Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (and I will say more on the subject of terrorism later) referred to the Code of Conduct as one of the most relevant tools for this purpose. The Code calls for national legislation on combating terrorism, as well as information on its implementation. The participating States committed to the prevention and combating of terrorism in all its forms. A significant element of this commitment is their adherence to the co-operative approach, while not tolerating or supporting forces uncontrolled by state authorities.

The Code addresses the issue of transparency regarding democratic control of armed, police, and security forces. Its political significance lies in the fact that OSCE states have undertaken to base the internal control of their armed forces on agreed international guidelines. Its provisions should be considered an integral part of the security policymaking process, in which both governments and parliaments play equally important roles. Transparency and accountability toward parliament require detailed information on the defence budget, force structures, and roles and missions of military and security forces.

The Code is a specific tool of arms control, and thus a modern political instrument for conflict prevention. Its cross-dimensional nature links the politico-military dimension with the human, economic, and environmental aspects of security. It forms an integral part of the OSCE matrix of politically binding norms, with significant potential for responding to new security challenges. The Code can contribute to internal and external stability only to the extent that states comply with its provisions, thereby contributing to democratic developments throughout the OSCE area. It has proven to be a living document, meeting the need for political guidance and providing the OSCE with a new instrument of arms control.

#### *Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA)*

The problem of surplus ammunition and explosives is part of the universal problem of disarmament. Since the reduction in heavy armaments in accordance

with the CFE treaty and the initiation of small arms and light weapons destruction, a huge surplus of munitions and explosives has been laid bare, which is out of proportion to the decreasing number of weapons. The environmental, security, criminal, and terrorist risks posed by these stockpiles is apparent.

The 2003 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition establishes practical procedures for stockpile destruction, and upgrading their security and management practices. The document reflects both a State's primary responsibility for its own stockpiles, as well as identification and reduction of surpluses, with the aim of strengthening its national capacity to deal with such specific problems on its own. At the same time, it calls for transparency in requesting assistance from others, and prescribes appropriate procedures. It is important to note that any participating State may request the assistance of the international community through the OSCE, and that participation is voluntary.

#### *Principles Governing Non-Proliferation*

The issue of non-proliferation has gained increased importance in the course of the last decade as a result of the transition to the post-Cold War order. In addition, recent terrorist events have added a new dimension, with the awareness of an increased risk that terrorist groups may use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addressing a possible role for the OSCE in dealing with non-proliferation, I would propose to take a closer look at the following menu of activities:

- Exchange information on relevant proliferation-related issues in and around the OSCE area, including regarding risks relating to terrorism.
- Explore ways to strengthen individual regimes through additional measures, which could be adopted at the OSCE level.
- Support implementation of non-proliferation regimes by participating States, e.g. through assistance in developing relevant legislation, including on export controls.
- Raise awareness of OSCE field missions and encourage the further development of projects in the political-military dimension to address non-proliferation issues.
- Address environmental issues related to WMD.
- Develop, or further make operational, co-operation with other international and regional organisations, as well as with co-operation partners.

In concluding this section, I have attempted to outline the importance of arms control for stability in the politico-military dimension of Human Security, and some OSCE characteristics in conflict prevention and crisis management. I

hope that these contributions will prove beneficial to the thinking on Asian security, and that you may benefit from the OSCE experience.

### **Terrorism**

Now, let me turn to the last issue that I want to touch upon, namely the fight against terrorism. Preventing and combating terrorism is a critical area of OSCE activity that has been built up following the events of 11 September 2001. On the political level, the main framework of the OSCE's action against terrorism is provided for in the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, and in the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism. These documents have been technically complemented by the Bishkek Programme of Action. With the adoption of these documents, the OSCE participating States instrumentalised their commitment to protect their citizens from new challenges to their security, while safeguarding the rule of law, individual liberties, and the right to equal justice under law. States further committed to enhanced efforts and greater international co-operation to combat these challenges, among participating States themselves, as well as between the OSCE and other international organisations, institutions and sub-regional groups, in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. The OSCE facilitates the implementation of these commitments through the provision of technical assistance in the areas of drafting counter-terrorism legislation, implementing the 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols related to terrorism, suppressing the financing of terrorism, law enforcement activities to detect or counter terrorist activity, border management, improving travel documents security and countering the MANPADS threat to civil aviation security. Two weeks ago the OSCE Ministerial Council provided additional impetus to these areas through decisions on MANPADS and travel document security, as well as on regional counter-terrorism co-operation within a network co-ordinated by the Action Against Terrorism Unit (ATU).

On the working level, the implementation of these political commitments is centrally facilitated by the ATU as a permanent structure to enhance and strengthen OSCE activities aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. Since its inception, the ATU has developed into a regional information resource upon which other organisations and initiatives in the OSCE area, as well as individual States, could draw upon and to provide, as necessary, a co-operative framework. In recognition of the UN's lead role in building an effective global framework against terrorism, the ATU liaises closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. The ATU's efforts are complemented by activities of the Co-ordination of Anti-Terrorism Issues in the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (CATI ODIHR), who focuses on technical assistance drafting



anti-terrorism legislation, as well as on protecting human rights in the fight against terrorism.

In facing the continuing challenges posed in the international security landscape, individual States remain at the forefront. However, many less developed States' national economies are struggling to support government activities, including the provision of security. Economic crises compound the challenge. In this context, counter-terrorism does not run counter to development – indeed, it is a precondition to development: an economy cannot thrive where investments and growth are thwarted by the cancer of terrorism, organised crime and lack of good governance. The same can be applied to post-conflict societies. Through its common and comprehensive security concept the OSCE is concerned with all aspects of security, which is useful since the international fight against terrorism requires also addressing issues related to the general habitat of terrorism at all levels. States must take action to counter terrorism threats while fully respecting human rights, fundamental freedoms and pertinent components of the international humanitarian law. Notably, this also includes addressing the set of political, social and economic factors that engender conditions in which terrorists may recruit and win support.

Finally, and to conclude generally, I have covered a lot of ground, and hope I have managed to give you an idea of how the OSCE goes about its business. The threats that face the OSCE in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century can all embrace violent conflict, terrorism and extremism, but I do believe as an organisation we have reacted swiftly to address them in order to remain fully relevant as a major player on the international arena. I have tried to explain how we attempt to recognise the 'symptoms' that might lead to conflict, and to address them in time before they become violent. And where we are not involved early enough, I hope I have given you an idea of how we deal with the consequences. You will have noted we are very much in the business of human security, how we work in work in the human dimension, and how we also try to promote economic development, all of which are factors which if not addressed are factors that undermine development, contribute to frustration and lead to instability.