

FSC.DEL/25/18  
8 February 2018

ENGLISH  
Original: FRENCH

**STATEMENT BY  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE 876th MEETING OF THE  
OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

7 February 2018

**On the implementation of  
United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, the Preparatory  
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization  
and its contribution to nuclear non-proliferation**

The European Union and its Member States wish a warm welcome to the speakers at this Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) meeting. We appreciate their participation in the Security Dialogue on ways to strengthen the implementation of resolution 1540.

Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery is a grave threat to international peace and security. At a time when several EU Member States have been hit by serious terrorist attacks, we are greatly concerned by the risk that proliferation could put these weapons in the hands of non-State actors.

The North Korean nuclear test on 3 September 2017 highlighted the urgent need for a prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a political imperative, but also as a concrete contribution to international peace and security by prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests and other nuclear explosions. The EU Member States have fulfilled their obligations by ratifying the Treaty some years ago. We call on all States that have not yet signed the Treaty, in particular the States listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the Treaty without preconditions or delay. Promoting the Treaty's universalization and entry into force is an absolute priority for the EU.

The EU and its Member States promote the ratification of the CTBT in the relevant international forums and at meetings with the countries that have not yet signed or ratified it, in order to bring about its prompt entry into force. In this context, we look forward to Thailand's confirmation of its ratification of the Treaty.

Along with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the CTBT is of paramount importance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and has become a solid and effective instrument with a robust verification system. We welcome the reaffirmation of the CTBT's importance by United Nations Security Council resolution 2310.

We recognize and encourage the work of Belgium and Iraq, which were chosen to co-ordinate in 2017–2019 the process under Article XIV of promoting efforts to obtain new signatures and ratifications.

The latest North Korean nuclear test is yet another direct and unacceptable violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its international obligation not to manufacture or test nuclear weapons, as decided by numerous UN Security Council resolutions, and is a serious provocative act and grave threat to regional and international security. The EU resolutely condemns the North Korean regime's nuclear explosions. Once again, we call on the DPRK to renounce its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in order to allow negotiations that would result in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means. In this respect, we welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2397 on 22 December 2017, which imposes new sanctions on North Korea. We also recall the adoption on 16 October of new autonomous EU measures and new designations adopted on 22 January to complement and reinforce resolution 2397 with the aim of increasing the pressure on North Korea so that it respects its obligations.

The recent high-level talks between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK are an encouraging signal. At the same time, the DPRK must respond to international concerns by agreeing to engage in negotiations on its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and by respecting its international obligations, particularly by bringing itself into line with the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system that it establishes. We also call on the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) demonstrated yet again its invaluable role by quickly providing reliable and independent data on the North Korean regime's latest activities, which enabled the international community to make a prompt and appropriate response. The CTBTO has given the international community a global, high-technology system for monitoring nuclear weapons tests, something that no State could do on its own. We welcome the International Monitoring System, which is close to completion, and encourage all signatory States to co-operate with the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to install, certify and use stations. Resolution 2310 underscores the necessity of maintaining the momentum in order to put in place all components of the Treaty's verification regime. We encourage the use of new tools and processes that would raise effectiveness and increase capacity-building for the good of all States Parties, and the investment needed to achieve this. We believe that the availability of reliable data, including from the International Data Centre's (IDC) reports, is essential.

The CTBT's highly sophisticated verification system and its capacity-building activities require substantial financial support. All of us should respect our budget commitments and enable this work to continue. Since 2006, the European Council has adopted six common actions/Council decisions to support the CTBTO's work and strengthen its monitoring and verification capacity. The EU's voluntary financial support for the CTBTO now comes to more than 18.5 million euros.

Our financial support for the CTBTO to promote capacity-building and bring about the Treaty's entry into force will continue. A proposal on new voluntary EU contributions to CTBTO activities is currently being studied. The EU will continue to work actively with the CTBTO and all interested States to encourage the Treaty's prompt entry into force and universalization.

As a platform for dialogue, the FSC has means of its own for supporting the implementation of resolution 1540. Some measures have already been taken, such as the OSCE contact points, which are an integral part of the 1540 Committee network and hold annual meetings. We also commend all the participating States which, acting in a spirit of transparency, publish and update their reports on implementing resolution 1540. The EU believes that the OSCE has the means and the duty to participate in promoting implementation of resolution 1540 and related resolutions. We thank Mr. Pavlov for his work as FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues and welcome Mr. Cuesta, who is taking over this important task. Finally, we wish to thank the Slovak FSC Chairmanship for having devoted this Security Dialogue to the implementation of resolution 1540 and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its contribution to nuclear non-proliferation.

The candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro<sup>1</sup>, Serbia<sup>1</sup> and Albania<sup>1</sup>, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Free Trade Association countries and members of the European Economic Area Iceland and Liechtenstein, as well as Ukraine, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino, align themselves with this statement.

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1 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.