



Summary of OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures

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OSCE MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES

This document provides a brief summary of the main mechanisms and procedures available within the OSCE related to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management¹. It attempts to interpret these mechanisms in view of the institutional development of the Organization, including changes in institutions and structures that have occurred over the years; in particular the establishment of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in 1992 and the Permanent Committee in 1993 (renamed in late 1994 to Permanent Council), as well as the abolishment of the Senior Council in 2006. A diagram visualising the institutional development of the Organization is available on page 19. As this summary is not exhaustive and may provide only one possible interpretation of the meaning of certain provisions in light of organizational development, the relevant original documents should be consulted for full details.² These documents, as well as individual documents quoted in reference to activations, are available in electronic format and can be accessed through DELWEB at: “OSCE Archives – Historical Documents”³. The Document Distribution Unit at the Hofburg remains available to Delegations in this regard. The CSCE/OSCE archives in Prague can also provide these documents upon request. Finally, the Operations Service of the Conflict Prevention Centre would like to express its gratitude to the OSCE Prague Office as well as the ODHIR, FSC Support, Legal Services, and Document Management who made a significant contribution to creating this summary.

¹ There are many OSCE documents covering norms and standards related to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. In the interests of brevity these have not been included because, whilst they have an equally important role to play, they do not sit naturally within the context of this Document.

² The compilation of the relevant original texts pertaining to each mechanism is being circulated simultaneously under the title “Compendium of OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures“ .

³ <http://docin.osce.org/docin/lisapi.dll?func=ll&objId=8016568&objAction=browse&sort=name&viewType=1>

Human Dimension

The CSCE/OSCE has established a number of tools to monitor the implementation of commitments that participating States have undertaken within the human dimension. One of these tools, the so-called Human Dimension Mechanisms, can be invoked on an *ad hoc* basis by any individual participating State or group of States to mobilize rapid and concerted action by the OSCE.

The Human Dimension Mechanisms developed gradually from the provisions foreseen in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting adopted in 1989 (*Vienna Mechanism*) – through changes introduced during the Human Dimension Conferences in Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991), which yielded the so-called *Moscow Mechanism*.

1. The Vienna Mechanism

The Vienna Mechanism, adopted at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in 1989⁴, provides for the exchange of information on questions relating to the human dimension. It can be invoked by any participating State. With the adoption of the Mechanism, participating States decided:

1. to exchange information and respond to requests for information and to representations made to them by other participating States relating to the human dimension;⁵
2. to hold bilateral meetings with other participating States that so request with a view to examining and resolving questions relating to the human dimension, including situations and specific cases;⁶
3. that any participating State may bring to the attention of other participating States, situations and cases in the human dimension including those which have been raised in bilateral meetings described in paragraph 2;
4. to provide information on the exchanges of information to the responses to its request for information and to representations and on the result of the bilateral meetings, including information concerning situations and specific cases, at the meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension (now the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting) as well as at CSCE Follow-up Meetings.⁷

⁴ As amended by the Copenhagen Document of 1990, and the Moscow Document of 1991.

⁵ Such communications may be forwarded through diplomatic channels or be addressed to any competent OSCE institution mandated in this sphere. A written response to requests for information is to be provided in the shortest time possible, but not longer than ten days later.

⁶ The date and place of such meetings should be arranged by mutual agreement through diplomatic channels. The bilateral meetings will take place as soon as possible, as a rule within one week of the date of the request. Moreover, participating States have decided to refrain, in the course of a bilateral meeting held under paragraph 2, from raising situations and cases not connected with the subject of the meeting, unless both sides have agreed to do so.

⁷ In 1994, delegations agreed that the review of implementation of all CSCE commitments will be maintained during the “Review meetings”, which were to take place before each Summit and were foreseen to start in Vienna and end at the Summit venue (Budapest Summit Document 1994).

1.1. Activation to date⁸

Based on available information, the activations include:

Between January 1989, when the Mechanism was adopted, up to the adoption of the Copenhagen Document in October 1990, 115 cases reached phase I of the mechanism (request for clarification) and another 17 cases acceded the remaining activation phases. Three additional activations took place between October 1990 to October 1991 when the Moscow Mechanism was adopted. As of then, the Mechanism implied provisions contained in both the Vienna and Moscow Documents, including the option to dispatch expert or rapporteur missions to investigate the situation at stake. In 1999 the Vienna Mechanism was invoked together with the Moscow Mechanism in relation to NATO's military operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁹

2. The Moscow Mechanism

The Moscow Mechanism is formulated in the final document adopted at the third Human Dimension Conference held in Moscow on 4 October 1991.¹⁰ It is a strengthened and expanded version of the Vienna Mechanism and was designed to improve further the implementation of the CSCE commitments in the human dimension. More specifically it provides for the additional possibility for participating States to establish *ad hoc* missions of independent experts to address or contribute to the resolution of questions related to the human dimension. In accordance with the Moscow Document, a resource list, comprising up to six experts appointed by each participating State, for a period of three to six years, is established.¹¹ The Moscow Mechanism was amended during the 1993 Rome Council Meeting.

The Moscow Mechanism may be activated in five ways:

1. A participating State may *voluntarily invite a mission* of up to three experts from the resource list to facilitate resolution of a particular question or problem on its territory relating to the human dimension of the OSCE.¹² The Mission of experts will not include the participating State's own nationals or residents or any of the persons it appointed to the resource list or more than one national or resident of any particular State. Such a mission may gather information that is necessary for carrying out its tasks and, if appropriate, use its good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue and co-operation among interested parties. The State concerned should agree with the mission on the precise terms of reference and may thus assign any further functions, such as, *inter alia*, fact-finding and advisory services in order to suggest ways and means of facilitating the observance of OSCE commitments. Preferably within three weeks after its establishment, the mission should submit its observations to the inviting State. The latter (i.e. the inviting State) is requested to transmit, via the ODHIR, to the participating States the observations of the mission and a description of any action it

⁸ Reference documents will be compiled and uploaded in the DocIn folder "CSCE-OSCE Mechanisms (1989-2008".

⁹ See activation under Moscow Mechanism for more details.

¹⁰ Taking into consideration the relevant provisions foreseen in the Helsinki Document (July 1992) and the Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting 1993 (November 1993).

¹¹ The list is established and managed by the ODHIR (the designated institution) and can be downloaded from the internet at: http://www.osce.org/documents/odhr/2003/09/2004_en.pdf.

¹² In case of the appointment of experts or rapporteurs pursuant to a decision of the PC, the expenses will be covered by the participating States in accordance with the usual scale of distribution of expenses.

has undertaken or intends to take upon it, no later than two weeks after the submission of the observations. The observations and comments submitted by the inviting State may be discussed in the Permanent Council which may consider any possible follow-up action.

2. After a request for information, and/or for a bilateral meeting, under the Vienna Mechanism, the requesting State may suggest that the other State should invite a *mission of experts*.¹³ If the other participating States agrees to invite a mission of experts, for the purpose indicated, the procedure set forth in the previous paragraph will apply.
3. If the State refuses to establish a mission of experts within ten days, or if the requesting State judges that the issue in question has not been resolved as a result of a mission of experts, the requesting State may initiate the establishment of a mission of rapporteurs (up to three, from the resource list) with the support of at least five other participating States.¹⁴ The consent of the requested State is not necessary. The rapporteurs should establish facts, report on them and may give advice on possible solutions to the questions raised. The mission should then submit its report to the participating State or States concerned, no later than two weeks after the last rapporteur has been appointed. The requested State, unless the States concerned agree otherwise, is required to transmit its observations to the ODIHR no later than two weeks after the submission of the report. The participating State or States that have requested the establishment of a mission of experts or rapporteurs have to cover the expenses of that mission. The ODIHR will transmit the report, as well as any observations by the requested State, or any other participating State, to all participating States without delay. The report should be placed on the agenda of the next regular Permanent Council, which may decide on any possible follow-up action.
4. If a participating State considers that a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment of the provisions of the human dimension has arisen in another State, it may, with the support of at least 9 other participating States, establish a mission of rapporteurs.
5. The Permanent Council, upon the request of any participating State, may decide to establish a mission of experts or rapporteurs. In such a case, the Permanent Council will also determine whether to apply the appropriate provisions mentioned above.

2.1. Activation to date

Documented activations since September 1991 are:

1. on 9 June 1992, the mechanism was triggered by the Russian Federation towards Estonia. The latter agreed to invite a mission of experts to study Estonia's citizenship law and language legislation.

¹³ The inviting State will select the person or persons concerned from the resource list. The mission of experts will not include the participating State's own nationals or residents or any of the persons it appointed to the resource list or more than one national or resident of any particular State.

¹⁴ Such a decision should be communicated to the ODIHR, which will notify without delay the State concerned as well as the other participating States.

2. on 23 July 1992, a request to activate the mechanism towards Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was submitted by the UK in a Note Verbale. A mission of rapporteurs was sent to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, concerning reported attacks on civilians.¹⁵
3. in early January 1993, the Republic of Moldova requested the activation of the Human Dimension Mechanism and invited a mission of experts for an investigation of current implementation of legislations related to rights of persons belonging to national minorities and inter-ethnic relations on the territory of Moldova.
4. on 30 June 1993, the mechanism was invoked by the Committee of Senior Officials (22nd Meeting).¹⁶ The decision called for a rapporteur mission to be dispatched to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to investigate the reports of human rights violations. The MFA of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to issue visas to mission members and the rapporteur mission was therefore unable to fulfill its task.
5. on 23 April 1999, the Vienna/Moscow Mechanism was activated by the Russian Federation in relation to NATO's military operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.¹⁷
6. on 20 December 2002, the Mechanism was invoked in relation to Turkmenistan, by 10 OSCE participating States.¹⁸ The focus of the rapporteur mission was to examine concerns arising out of investigations of the reported attack on 25 November 2002 on the President of Turkmenistan¹⁹. Turkmenistan, however, refused to appoint the second rapporteur and to issue a visa to the rapporteur appointed by the ten invoking States. Consequently, no fact-finding mission was launched. However, on March 13, 2003 a report was presented to the OSCE Chairmanship and participating States²⁰.

¹⁵ The request was supported by 12 participating States.

¹⁶ Annex 3 to Journal No.2 of the 22nd Meeting of the CSO, 30 June 1993. The CSO decided that in addition to dispatching a rapporteur mission to Serbia-Montenegro in view of investigating human rights violations in Serbia, (in accordance with paragraph 13, Chapter I of the Document of the Moscow Meeting) the CSO would also send a CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.

¹⁷ In 1999, the Russian Federation activated the Vienna/Moscow Mechanism in relation to NATO's military operation in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In this particular instance, paragraph 1 of the Vienna mechanism was invoked and several references were made to a number of other international instruments (including the Copenhagen Document and Helsinki Final Act). See SEC.DEL/152/99, 23 April 1999. Note Verbale no 20-H by the Russian Federation.

¹⁸ Namely the United States, Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

¹⁹ PC.DEL/20/03 Letter to Ambassador Kadyrov, Head of Delegation of Turkmenistan regarding Moscow Mechanism, by the US delegation on behalf of Germany, Austria, Canada, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden.

²⁰ ODIHR.GAL/15/03 "Rapporteur's Report on Turkmenistan".

Risk Reduction

A number of specific mechanisms and procedures for reducing the risk of conflict arising and/or escalating were adopted after 1989, reflecting a greater willingness of participating States to co-operate. Additionally, the establishment of certain decision making bodies has greatly strengthened the OSCE's capabilities for early warning and conflict prevention. In this respect, meetings of the FSC (which has met on a regular basis since 1992), the Permanent Committee (renamed as the Permanent Council in 1994), and joint meetings of the two (since 1997) are regularly used by participating States to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crises.

Mechanisms for Risk Reduction developed in the course of the negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe, and building on and adding to the CSBMs contained in the Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986, were for the first time set forth in the Vienna Document 1990. All its further gradual modernisations, particularly in 1992 and 1994, resulted in the present version contained in the Vienna Document 1999 (VD 99), Chapter III "Risk Reduction."²¹ They include provisions on:

- the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities;
- Co-operation Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature; and
- Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concern About Military Activities.

3. Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities

The Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities is a special instrument of crisis prevention in the event of a threat posed by the employment of armed forces. For this purpose, the VD 99 stipulates that participating States, whose armed forces are being employed in unusual and unscheduled activities outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant, agree to a consultation and co-operation mechanism. This Mechanism can be triggered by a participating State's request for an explanation of the activity by the other State that is a subject of security concerns. The reply to the request has to be transmitted within 48 hours. The request and the reply should be transmitted to all other participating States without delay.

Thereafter, the requesting State may ask for a meeting with the responding State; each is entitled to ask other interested participating States, in particular those which have also expressed concern or might be involved in the activity, to participate in the meeting. Such a meeting, chaired by the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office (CiO) (or his/her representative), should be convened within not more than 48 hours and be held at a venue to be mutually agreed upon. If there is no agreement, the meeting ought to be held at the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). A report of the meeting should be prepared and transmitted to all participating States by the CiO without delay. One or both of the States directly involved may also ask for a meeting of all participating States. In this case, the CiO (or his/her representative) should, within 48 hours, convene a meeting. The Permanent Council and the FSC jointly would

²¹ VD 99 also includes other mechanisms and procedures, primarily relating to transparency; e.g. annual exchange of military information, defence planning exchange of information, military contacts and visits, and prior notification of certain military activities. Most of these provisions can be found in their original wording in texts adopted by the FSC in 1993 in the framework of the "Programme for Immediate Action" (see FSC Journal No.49).

serve as the forum for such a meeting. The task of these two OSCE bodies would be to jointly assess the situation, and they may recommend to the States involved appropriate measures for stabilising the situation and halting activities that give rise to security concerns.

3.1. Activation to date

1. on 27 June 1991, Austria and Italy requested an explanation from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the deployment of federal army units in Slovenia and near the Italian border. The Yugoslav authorities sent a response to the request, after receipt of which Austria asked to hold a meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre. The meeting was convened the next day, and ended with a Chairman's statement. (VD 90)
2. on 26 August 1991, Hungary requested an explanation from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on over-flights of Hungarian territory as well as troop movements at the Yugoslav-Hungarian border. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sent a response to the request, after receipt of which Hungary requested a bi-lateral meeting. The meeting was convened the next day, and ended one day later upon the request of Hungary. Representatives of Hungary and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed that a joint report would be released, and it was presented by Hungary that same day. (VD 90)
3. on 8 April 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested clarification from Hungary in connection with an alleged attack against Yugoslav army units from the territory of Hungary. Hungary sent a response to the request. (VD 92)
4. on 6 April 1999, Belarus requested clarification from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia regarding NATO's military operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Responses were sent by all but one participating State. Six days after it received the last response, Belarus made a statement during a joint FSC/PC meeting, under 'Any Other Business', to which the United States of America and France responded. (VD 92)
5. on 28 May 2008, Georgia requested information from the Russian Federation regarding a UAV incident over Abkhazia, Georgia. The Russian Federation sent a response to the request, after receipt of which Georgia requested a bi-lateral meeting. After the meeting was held, and following receipt of the Chairmanship's Report of the bi-lateral meeting, the Russian Federation and, then one day later, Georgia requested a joint FSC/PC meeting. This was held one day later, and the Report was subsequently circulated. (VD 99)
6. on 30 May 2008, the Russian Federation requested clarification from Georgia on the latter's use of UAV flights over Abkhazia, Georgia. Georgia sent a response, after receipt of which the Russian Federation requested a bi-lateral meeting. After the meeting, and following receipt of the Chairmanship's Report of the bi-lateral meeting, the Russian Federation requested a joint FSC/PC meeting. This was held two days later, and the Report was subsequently circulated. (VD 99)
7. on 30 May 2008, the Russian Federation requested clarification from Georgia on the latter's alleged repeated violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces. Georgia sent a response, after receipt of which the Russian Federation requested a bi-lateral meeting. After the meeting, and following receipt of the Chairmanship's Report of the bi-lateral meeting, the Russian Federation requested a joint FSC/PC meeting. This was held two days later, and the Report was subsequently circulated. (VD 99)

4. Measures Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature

Since the adoption of VD 90, Co-operative Measures Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature have been an integral part of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures. VD 99 foresees that these particular measures can prevent possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on other participating States in case the incident takes place on the territory of one of the OSCE's participating States. In case of such hazardous incidents, points of contact have been established by each participating State; a list of these should be available at the CPC since 1995. Through them, each participating State should inform other participating States about such an incident and provide explanations in an expeditious manner. Any participating State affected by such an incident may also request clarification as appropriate, and should receive a prompt response. Matters related to such issues may be discussed by participating States in the FSC or at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

4.1. Activation to date

There are no documented activations of this Mechanism.

5. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns about Military Activities

Voluntary Hosting of Visits is another option in order to help dispel concerns about military activities. This Mechanism envisages that a State, which is conducting such a military activity, is encouraged to invite other participating States, especially those which are understood to have concerns, to visit the areas on the territory of the host State where the activity is taking place. At the time such invitations are issued, the host State should communicate to all other participating States its intention to organize the visit, indicating the reasons for the visit, the area to be visited, the States invited and the general arrangements to be adopted. Arrangements for visits are at the discretion of the host State. The VD 99 contains provisions with regard to modalities and programme of such visits. In particular, joint or individual comments on the visit may be circulated to all participating States by the host State and States providing the visiting personnel.

5.1. Activation to date

So far, this Mechanism has never been activated.

6. Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations

In November 1993, the then Special Committee of the FSC adopted a series of documents in the framework of the Programme for Immediate Action²². Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations is one of these documents and it provides a catalogue of stabilizing measures, intended to facilitate decision making in appropriate OSCE bodies, and the search for specific measures for temporary application in support of the political process during localised crisis situations. The stabilizing measures may be applied individually or in various combinations, depending on the circumstances. The measures apply when the appropriate OSCE body decides to activate them and the exact measures to be taken are also decided by the appropriate OSCE body. Whilst the catalogue does not commit any participating State to agree to the adoption of any of the measures contained therein in a given situation, it does indicate the readiness of participating States to explore them in good faith. Furthermore, their

²² See Annex 2 to FSC Journal No.49, dated 24 November – 1 December 1993.

application requires the prior consent and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation.

These measures can include parties which are not States, in which case their identification and subsequent participation in a crisis prevention, management and/or settlement process does not affect their status. The appropriate OSCE body may also identify third parties which, trusted by all the parties involved in a particular crisis, may provide the good offices or a mediating function for implementing some of the measures. Such third parties may be the OSCE, a State or group of States, or organisation(s) not involved in the conflict.

6.1. Activation to date

So far, these measures have not been activated.

7. Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue

Another measure for risk reduction was adopted at the Ministerial Council in Bucharest in 2001. Ministerial Council Decision No 3 (Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue) contains, amongst others, a specific paragraph (para 8) on improving the dialogue of the Organization through further inclusion of the FSC. According to this paragraph, the FSC, as the OSCE body for reviewing the implementation of OSCE commitments in the fields of arms control and CSBMs and for negotiating measures in these fields, should - while retaining its autonomy and decision making capacity - be more closely connected with the overall OSCE work on current security issues.

To this end, it was decided that the FSC would make available its expert advice on issues of a politico military nature, at the request of the PC. An example of this provided in the decision was advice on politico-military issues of OSCE field operations in accordance with their respective mandates. It was also noted that the FSC could advise the PC or the CiO on its own initiative.

7.1. Activation to date²³

1. on 24 April 2008, the Chairmanship tabled a Draft Decision on the Permanent Council's request to the FSC for its expert advice on the politico-military issues with regard to the UAV incident over Abkhazia, Georgia. However, consensus was not reached. On 29 April 2008, Georgia and, on 30 April 2008, the Chairperson of the PC requested the FSC to provide its expert advice with regard to the same incident. The issue was discussed at various FSC and joint FSC/PC meetings.

²³ Technically, this mechanism was also triggered on 18 July 2002, when the Permanent Council requested the FSC to provide its expert advice on the implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Further detail is covered on page 14.

Early Warning and Preventive Action

Most early warning and preventive action mechanisms are based on political dialogue within the structures and institutions of the Organization. The establishment of the FSC and the PC, the latter supported by, inter alia, the Security Committee, has consequently strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning. Participating States can now use these forums to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crisis situations at any given moment.

8. Provisions relating to early warning and preventive action

The provisions related to early warning on situations within the OSCE area, which have the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts, date back to the 1992 Helsinki Document. The Helsinki Decisions set out that the participating States should make use of regular, in-depth consultations, within the structures, institutions and ad hoc steering groups of the OSCE. Furthermore, participating States have the right to draw the attention of the PC (originally the Committee of Senior Officials) to a given situation. This can be done through the CiO, inter alia, by:

- any participating State directly involved in a dispute;
- a group of 11 participating States not directly involved in the dispute;
- the High Commissioner on National Minorities²⁴ in situations he/she deems escalating into a conflict or exceeding the scope of his/her action;
- the FSC (originally the Consultative Committee of the CPC) following the use of the mechanism for consultations and co-operation as regards unusual military activities;
- the use of the Human Dimension Mechanism or the Valletta Mechanism for Dispute Settlement and Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

The 1992 Helsinki Document also includes, amongst others, procedures related to political management of crises and instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management.

9. Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations (“Berlin Mechanism”)

The Permanent Council²⁵ allows OSCE participating States to react to emergency situations practically at any time without formally triggering the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations. The so-called “Berlin Mechanism”²⁶ was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers. The Mechanism outlines measures that can be applied in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability. It foresees that, if any participating State concludes that such an emergency situation is developing, it may seek clarification from the State or the States involved.

The State or States from which clarification has been sought should provide within 48 hours all relevant information in order to clarify the situation. The request and the reply should be

²⁴ See “Challenges of Change”, and the Helsinki Summit Decisions (1992), especially chapter II: CSCE HCNM: Early Warning and Provisions of Early Warning, Early Action and Accountability.

²⁵ According to paragraph 18 of the Decisions of the Budapest Summit document of 1994 “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era” section on Strengthening the CSCE, it is stated that: “The Permanent Council (formerly the Permanent Committee) will be the regular body for political consultation and decision-making. It can also be convened for emergency purposes”.

²⁶ Annex 2 of the Summary of Conclusions of the First CSCE Council of Ministers held in Berlin 19-20 June 1991.

transmitted to all other participating States without delay. Should the situation remain unresolved, either the participating State which initiated the procedure or the State or States from which clarification has been sought may address to the Chairperson of the PC²⁷ a request that an Emergency Meeting of the PC be held. On receipt of such a request, the Chairperson of the PC should immediately inform all participating States and the Secretariat and submit the relevant documentation.

The Chairperson should then enter into contact with the participating State which initiated the procedure and the State or States from which the initiating State sought clarification within a period of 24 hours following receipt of the request. As soon as 12 or more participating States have seconded the request within a maximum period of 48 hours by addressing their support to the Chairperson of the PC, the latter should immediately notify all participating States of the date and time of the meeting, which should be held at the earliest 48 hours and at the latest three days after this notification. The notification should also include the reason for, and the agenda of, the meeting. The meeting should be chaired by the Chairperson of the PC or his/her representative. If the representative of the Chairmanship is a national of the participating State which initiated the procedure or the State or States from which the initiating State sought clarification, the meeting should be chaired by the representative of the next State, in French alphabetical order, which is not involved in the situation.²⁸ The meeting should last no more than two days and consist of a single agenda item. In light of its assessment of the situation, the meeting may agree on recommendations or conclusions to arrive at a solution. It may also decide to convene a meeting at ministerial level.

9.1. Activation to date

Occasions on which the Berlin Mechanism has been used are:

1. on 28 June 1991, Luxemburg requested clarification from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to the conflict in that country. The request for an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials was seconded by the United States of America, Austria, Hungary and the WEU countries.²⁹ The meeting took place on 3 and 4 July 1991 and yielded several texts including an “Offer of a CSCE good offices mission to Yugoslavia”.³⁰ Four additional emergency meetings were held on this agenda item, in July, August, October and November 1991
2. on 4 May 1992, Austria requested that an emergency meeting be held with regard to situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This request was seconded by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, San Marino, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and United States of America. The meeting took place over 6 days in parallel with other regular Committee of Senior Officials and the Follow-up meetings taking place in Helsinki.³¹

²⁷ Originally, the mechanism referred to the Committee of Senior Officials which was later renamed the Senior Council. Nevertheless, many of the political and decision-making options bestowed with the CSO had been passed on to the CSO-Vienna Group, which held 38 meetings in 1993 and in accordance with Chapter VII, point 3, of the Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, its competences were turned over to the Permanent Committee, which was renamed to Permanent Council.

²⁸ It should be noted that the OSCE Rules of Procedure (MC.DOC/1/06) stipulate the PC shall be convened and chaired by the respective Chairperson or his/her representative.

²⁹ CSCE Communication dated 30 June 1991; “Request and reply under the Mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regards to emergency situations”.

³⁰ Journal 1 and 2 of CSO-IEM including Annexes.

³¹ Journal of CSO-IEM—Annex “Declaration on Bosnia-Herzegovina”.

3. on 6 April 1993, Azerbaijan requested an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in regard to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.³² Two weeks later, the Armenian Delegation presented clarifications under point 1 of the mechanism³³, which was met with a renewed request for holding an Emergency Meeting formulated by Azerbaijan.³⁴ The meeting took place 26 April 1993 and was held in accordance with paragraph 2.6 upon the repeated request of Azerbaijan, seconded by Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.³⁵
4. on 25 November 1994, during the Budapest Review Meeting, Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials to be held in relation to the situation prevailing in the region of Bihac. This request was seconded by Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The meeting was held in accordance with paragraph 2.6 of the Berlin Mechanism and took place during 3 consecutive days in parallel with the Budapest Review Meeting.³⁶
5. on 21 April 1999, the Russian Federation invoked the Berlin Mechanism by³⁷ seeking clarification from Germany, the United States of America, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Iceland and Luxemburg with regard to NATO's military operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Two days later the requested countries provided replies.

10. Measures in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was adopted in November 2000 at the 308th Plenary Meeting of the FSC³⁸. The Document sets out the norms, principles and measures to counter, in a comprehensive way, the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms within the Organization's wider efforts in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. Within the Document, participating States commit themselves to ensuring the OSCE addresses concerns related to small arms as part of an overall assessment of the security situation of a particular country, and takes practical measures which will assist in this respect.

Each participating State may raise at the FSC or the PC its concerns about the accumulation or spread of small arms. Furthermore, a participating State can request, in the FSC framework, assistance in addressing problems related to accumulation or spread of SALW and invite other participating States to make available experts in small arms issues. In response to recommendations from these experts, the PC should consider a range of measures

³² CSCE Communication 102, 111 and 112/1993 "Request for information under the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with regard to Emergency Situation" and "Intention of Azerbaijan to request an Emergency Meeting".

³³ CSCE Communication 116/dated 20 April 1993 –Armenia.

³⁴ CSCE Communication 117/dated 20 April 1993 –Azerbaijan.

³⁵ Journal of CSO-3EM.

³⁶ Annex to Journal of CSO-4EM.

³⁷ SEC.DEL/130/99 Note Verbale H-17 (also referred to as H-16).

³⁸ FSC.JOUR/314 dated 24 November 2000.

including: assistance on security and management of stockpiles of SALW; assistance with reduction and disposal of SALW; encouragement and provision of advice or mutual assistance to implement and reinforce border controls to reduce illicit SALW trafficking; assistance with SALW collection and control programmes; expansion of the mandate of an OSCE field mission or presence to cover SALW issues; and, consultation and co-ordination with other international organisations and institutions. In addition to the aforementioned measures, the Document also includes other measures related to small arms.³⁹

At the 374th Plenary Meeting of the FSC, a decision was reached⁴⁰ on providing expert advice, requested under the Bucharest Ministerial Council Decision No 3 (Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue), on the implementation of Section V 'Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation' of the aforementioned OSCE Document on SALW. This sets out the modalities for making Section V operational, including that it is for each participating State to identify and raise, within the FSC or the PC, concerns about destabilising accumulations and uncontrolled spreads of SALW linked to its security situation.

10.1. Activation to date

To date, this measure has been used on many occasions by participating States requiring assistance in destruction and stockpile management of small arms as well as regarding clarifications on SALW transfers.

³⁹ For example, manufacturing, marking & record keeping; common export criteria and control; management of stockpiles, reduction of surpluses and destruction.

⁴⁰ Procedurally, the FSC provided its expert advice (FSC.DEC/15/02 dated 20 November 2002) in response to a request from the Permanent Council (PC.DEC/489 dated 18 July 2002).

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Based on Conciliation and/or Arbitration

The commitment of all participating States to settle disputes by peaceful means is enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, Principle V. Further references to the peaceful settlement of disputes are included in other CSCE/OSCE documents, in particular, the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the 1992 Helsinki Document. More formalised dispute settlement mechanisms based on conciliation and arbitration were created with the establishment of the “Valletta Mechanism,” the Provisions for an OSCE Conciliation Commission and for Directed Conciliation, as well as the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, described below.

11. The “Valletta Mechanism”

Drafted at the Valletta meeting of experts in January-February 1991⁴¹, and endorsed by the Berlin CSCE Council of Ministers in 1991, the so-called Valletta Mechanism was the first formal CSCE procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes whereby a full-fledged conciliation procedure was developed. Section V of the Valletta Provisions was slightly revised at the Stockholm CSCE Council of Ministers in December 1992,⁴² following recommendations made at an expert meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Geneva in October 1992.

The Valletta Provisions refer to the establishment of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism and outline principles as well as a specific dispute settlement procedure. At the Berlin CSCE Council of Ministers in 1991, the Council agreed to designate the Conflict Prevention Centre as the nominating institution of the CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism consists of one or more members, selected by common agreement of the parties to a dispute, from a register of qualified candidates maintained by the CPC.⁴³ When the Mechanism has been established, it will seek appropriate contact with the parties to the dispute, separately or jointly. The Mechanism may use, if the parties so agree, the premises and facilities of the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The establishment of a Mechanism may be requested by any party to the dispute by notifying the other party or parties to the dispute, if the parties are unable to settle the dispute in direct consultation or negotiation or to agree upon an appropriate dispute settlement procedure within a reasonable period of time. The Mechanism is highly flexible, allowing for the adoption of its own work methods. It may offer general or specific comments or advice that

⁴¹ Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta 1991.

⁴² CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council, Stockholm 1992, “Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,” CSCE/3-C/Dec.1 (15 December). Annex 1 of the Decision No. 1.

⁴³ “The register comprises the names of up to four persons nominated by each participating State desiring to do so. No member of a Mechanism may be a national of, or permanently resident in the territory of any State involved in the dispute. By agreement between the parties, a Mechanism may include members whose names are not included in the register. If the parties to the dispute have not reached agreement on the composition of a Mechanism within two months from the initial request, the Director of the CPC should, in consultation with the parties to the dispute, select seven names from the register. Each party to the dispute has the right to reject up to three of the nominees. After one month from the date of informing the parties of the nomination, the CPC should notify the parties of the composition of the Mechanism” (CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council, Stockholm 1992, Annex 1: “Modification to Section V of the Valletta Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”).

will be confidential unless the parties agree otherwise, and that may relate to the inception or resumption of a process of negotiation among the parties to the dispute, or to the adoption of any other dispute settlement procedure.

If, on the basis of the proceedings of the Mechanism and of any comment or advice offered, the parties are nevertheless unable, within a reasonable period of time, in light of all circumstances of the dispute, to settle the dispute or to agree upon an appropriate procedure for its settling, any party to the dispute may so notify the Mechanism and the other party to the dispute. Similarly, any party to the dispute may, within a period of three months from any notification, request the Mechanism to provide general or specific comment or advice on the substance of the dispute, in order to assist the parties in finding a settlement.

A party to the dispute other than that which requested for the Mechanism to be established or for it to provide general or specific comment or advice on the substance of the dispute, may request its discontinuation on several grounds (e.g. disputes concerning territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas). Similarly, the parties to a dispute may at any time by mutual agreement modify the procedure, inter alia, by agreeing to accept any comment or advice of the Mechanism as binding, in part or in full.

11.1 Activation to date

The “Valletta Mechanism” has, so far, never been used.

12. Provisions for an OSCE Conciliation Commission and for Directed Conciliation

In addition to the aforementioned modification of the “Valletta Mechanism,” at the 1992 Stockholm Council Meeting, the participating States adopted Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission as well as Provisions for Directed Conciliation.⁴⁴ The establishment of a Conciliation Commission was intended as a procedure to complement the “Valletta Mechanism.” Under the first set of provisions, the participating States establish a Conciliation Commission: a) before which the parties may bring a dispute if they so agree; b) with respect to which a participating State may at any time declare that it will accept, on condition of reciprocity, conciliation between it and other participating States. In case of a) the procedure is invoked by means of a joint written request by the parties to the Director of the CPC.⁴⁵ In case of b) the procedure may be invoked by a written request by either party to the other and to the Director of the CPC. With regard to a) the parties to the dispute will, within 20 days of the receipt by the Director of the CPC of the written request, appoint one conciliator from the Valletta Register. With regard to b) the invoking party should name its conciliator in its written request.

The Commission may suggest possible terms of settlement and set a time limit within which the parties should inform the Commission whether they accept such recommendations. If both parties have not notified such acceptance, the Director of the CPC will forward a report

⁴⁴ CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council, Stockholm 1992, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 3: Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission; Annex 4: Provisions for Directed Conciliation.

⁴⁵ Section XVII of Annex 3: Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission designates the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre as the Secretary of the Commission.

from the Commission to the PC. The parties may agree to modify the procedure with regard to their particular dispute.

Under the Provisions for Directed Conciliation, the Ministerial Council or the PC (the Committee of Senior Officials in the original text) may direct any two participating States to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute that they have not been able to settle within a reasonable period of time. The Ministerial Council or the PC may direct that the parties to the dispute use the provisions for conciliation on the same basis as if they had made a joint written request to bring the dispute before the Conciliation Commission described above. In disputes involving two parties to the “Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE,” the Ministerial Council or the PC may also direct parties to use the provisions established under the Convention.

12.1. Activation to date

These Provisions have not yet been put into practice.

13. The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE

The 1992 Stockholm Council Meeting adopted the “Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE.” The Convention binds only those participating States that have become parties to it and that also cover the expenses of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which was established under the Convention in order to settle, by means of conciliation and, where appropriate, arbitration, disputes which are submitted to it.

The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is constituted by conciliators and arbitrators selected from a roster.⁴⁶ While conciliation is undertaken by a Conciliation Commission, arbitration is undertaken by an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted, respectively, for each dispute. The seat of the Court is in Geneva, although the possibility is foreseen that it may meet at another location. Any State party to the Convention may submit to a Conciliation Commission any dispute with another State party which has not been settled within a reasonable period of time through negotiation. When the Conciliation Commission considers that all the aspects of the dispute and all the possibilities of finding a solution have been explored, it draws a final report, containing the proposals of the Commission for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. If a party to the dispute does not accept the proposed settlement, the other party or parties are no longer bound by their own acceptance. If within a period of 30 days, the parties to the dispute have not accepted the proposed settlement, the report shall be forwarded to the Ministerial Council through the PC. The Ministerial Council will similarly be notified if a party fails to appear for conciliation or leaves a procedure after it has begun.

A request for arbitration may be made at any time by agreement between two or more States parties or between one or more States parties and one or more participating States. The award of the Arbitral Tribunal is binding, final, and not subject to appeal. Application for revision is possible only under defined circumstances.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Nominated by the parties to the Convention.

⁴⁷ For the Rules of the Court, see “Rules of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE,” 1 February 1997 (<http://www.osce.org/item/4118.html>).

13.1 Activation to date

So far, only 33 of the participating States have signed and ratified/acceded to the Convention⁴⁸ and although it came into force in December 1994, the Convention has so far not been used.

⁴⁸ See list of signatures and ratifications or accessions with respect to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE as of 26 June 2003 at <http://www.osce.org/item/4119.html>.

CSCE/OSCE Forums for Permanent Consultation

The *CSCE Council* was established in 1990 consisting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In 1994 it became the *Ministerial Council*.

The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)

In effect the CSO was the CSCE's regular consultative body from 1990 to 1992.



The Senior Council (SC)

When the CSCE was renamed to the OSCE in 1994 the *Committee of Senior Officials* became the *Senior Council*. In the following years, the role of the *Senior Council* became increasingly limited. In 2006, the *Senior Council* was officially dissolved and most of its functions were transferred to the *Permanent Council (PC)*.

The Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials

When the CSCE became involved in conflict prevention and crisis management in the 1990s the need for a permanent body for consultations on day-to-day operational matters arose. Taking advantage of the permanent presence in Vienna of State representatives involved in arms negotiations, a *Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials* was formed. This *Vienna Group of the CSO* was institutionalized as the *Permanent Committee* in 1993.

When the *Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre* (which was established by the Paris Charter in 1990) was dissolved in 1993 it was decided to transfer its competence to the *Permanent Committee* and the *Forum for Security Co-operation*.



The Permanent Committee

The *Permanent Committee* was formed in 1993. As time went on the *Permanent Committee* increasingly took over the functions of the *Committee of Senior Officials*, to which it was responsible.



The Permanent Council (PC)

The PC was established in 1994 and has in practise been the OSCE's regular body for decision-making since then.



The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC)

The FSC was created in 1992 and remains an autonomous decision-making body of the OSCE. Originally, it consisted of the *Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre* and a *Special Committee*. In 1993, when it was decided to move the CSCE Secretariat to Vienna, the *Consultative Committee* was dissolved and its role was taken over by the *Special Committee*. In 1994 and 1996 the mandate of the FSC was reviewed and expanded.

Reference Documents⁴⁹

HUMAN DIMENSION

1) Vienna Mechanism

- *Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, section on Human Dimension of the CSCE, paragraphs 1- 4, Vienna 1986-1989.*

2) Moscow Mechanism

- *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Second Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen 1990*
- *Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Third Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Chapter 1, paragraphs 1-16, Moscow 1991.*
- *Decisions of the Rome CSCE Council of Ministers, Annex A, Rome 1993.*
- *Summary of Conclusions of the Prague Second Council of Ministers, January 1992.*
- *“Challenges of Change” Helsinki Summit 1992, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3-5.*

RISK REDUCTION

3) Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities

- *Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) – Stockholm 1986*
- *Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (NCSBM) -Vienna Document 1990*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1992*
- *FSC Journal No. 49, Annex 2, Rome, 24 November 1993.*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1994*
- *NCSBM – Vienna Document 1999*

4. Measures Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature

- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1990*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1992*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1994*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1999*

5. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns about Military Activities

- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1992*
- *FSC Journal No. 49, Annex 2, Rome, 24 November 1993*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1994*

⁴⁹ These documents, as well as individual documents quoted in reference to activations, are available in electronic format and can be accessed through DELWEB at: “OSCE Archives – Historical Documents” <http://docin.osce.org/docin/lilisapi.dll?func=ll&objId=8016568&objAction=browse&sort=name&viewType=1>.

- *NCSBM – Vienna Document 1999*

5. Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations

- *FSC Journal No. 49 (1993) DOC.FSC/2/96, 25 November 1993.*
- *Decisions of the Rome CSCE Council of Ministers, Rome 1993.*
- *Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapters III and V.*
- *NCSBM -Vienna Document 1992*

7. Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue

- *Ninth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Bucharest 2001, Ministerial Council MC/9/Decision No 3 - 2001*

EARLY WARNING AND PREVENTIVE ACTION

8. Provisions relating to early warning and preventive action

- *Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter III.*
- *Decisions of the Rome 4th CSCE Council of Ministers, Rome 1993.*

9. Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations (Berlin Mechanism)

- *Summary of Conclusions from the Berlin Council Meeting, Annex 2, Berlin 1991.*

10. Measures foreseen by the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

- *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons; 308th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 24 November 2000 - Journal No. 314*
- *Expert advice on the Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons; 374th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 20 November 2002 - Journal No. 380.*
- *Guide on National Controls over Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons FSC. GAL/43/03/Rev. 3 released 19 September 2003*
- *FSC Decision No. 5/03 on ‘OSCE Handbook on Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons’; 393rd Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 18 June 2003 - Journal No. 399.*
- *FSC Decision No. 3/04 on OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS); 423rd Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 26 May 2004 - Journal No. 429.*
- *FSC Decision No. 5/04 on Standard Elements on End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports); 436th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 17 November 2004 - Journal No. 442.*
- *FSC Decision No. 8/04 on OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons; 437th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 24 November 2004 - Journal No. 443.*

- *FSC Decision No.3/06 Annex C to the best practice guide on national procedures for stockpile management and security of the OSCE handbook of best practices on small arms and light weapons; 479th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 29 March 2006 - Journal No. 485.*
- *FSC Decision No.5/08 Updating the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence; 547th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 26 May 2008 - Journal No. 553.*

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BASED ON CONCILIATION AND/OR ARBITRATION

11. The “Valletta Mechanism”

- *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta, 8 February 1991.*
- *Summary of Conclusions of the First CSCE Berlin Council of Ministers, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, June 1991.*
- *Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Third CSCE Council of Ministers, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 1, Stockholm, 14 December 1992.*

12. Provisions for an OSCE Conciliation Commission and for Directed Conciliation

- *Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Third CSCE Council of Ministers, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 3 and 4, Stockholm, 14 December 1992.*

13. The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE

- *Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Third CSCE Council of Ministers, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, Stockholm, 14 December 1992.*
- *Rules of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, 1 February 1997.*