

WEBINAR
INDEPENDENCE OF PROSECUTORS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

ODIHR WEBINAR REPORT



Warsaw/Online, 20 October 2021

This report should not be interpreted as comprising official OSCE recommendations based on a consensus decision, an opinion of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or of any particular OSCE participating State. The content of this report provides a synopsis of the issues discussed during the meeting, which took place online on 20 October 2021.

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Introduction

OSCE participating States have made commitments to ensure the “impartial operation of the public judicial service”, and to clearly define “powers in relation to prosecution and the measures preceding and accompanying prosecution” ([Copenhagen 1990](#)). In addition, prosecutors should also play a key role in ensuring and protecting the independence of the judiciary. Prosecutors should be individuals of integrity and ability who always maintain the honour and dignity of their profession and respect the rule of law ([Brussels Declaration, 2006](#)).

On 20 October 2021, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Prosecutor’s Office of Estonia co-organized a webinar on the topic of independence of prosecutors in Central Europe, with an emphasis on functional independence of prosecutors.

The event followed the path initiated in February 2020, when ODIHR published a [report](#) providing targeted policy recommendations on how to strengthen the functional independence of prosecutors in Eastern Europe. The report publication was followed by an [event](#) on the independence of prosecutors in Eastern and Central Europe in the autumn of 2020.

The webinar brought together senior prosecutors from participating States in Central Europe and other participating States as well as representatives of international organizations and civil society. The aim of the webinar was to make senior officials within the prosecution services of participating States aware of the importance of independence of prosecutors and familiarize them with some key tools available to enhance independence of prosecutors. During the webinar, two ODIHR experts presented key findings and recommendations from independent research they conducted into the legal frameworks and practice in selected Central European participating States.

This report reflects the presentations and discussions in the webinar and provides a summary of the research. It also identifies recommendations for amelioration of independence of prosecutors, particularly in Central Europe.

Session 1 - Opening remarks

The webinar was opened by **Ms. Kateryna Ryabiko**, First Deputy Director of ODIHR. Ms. Ryabiko welcomed the participants and underlined the pivotal role of independent prosecution services for the rule of law, especially in prosecuting serious crimes. She emphasized ODIHR's engagement in fostering a culture of independence within prosecution offices in participating States. To this end, she recalled previous ODIHR efforts in this field, such as the [2020 ODIHR report](#) dedicated to independence of prosecutors in Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Taavi Pern, Chief State Prosecutor of Estonia also addressed participants with opening remarks, emphasizing from a practitioner's perspective the importance of independence, both external and internal, in the prosecutor's daily work.

Session 2 – Presentation of ODIHR research

Two ODIHR consultants presented the result of their research work on prosecutorial independence in selected participating States.

Ms. Lorena Bachmaier, ODIHR expert, illustrated her research work on Hungary's and Germany's systems, with a comparative approach to other systems in Europe.

She started with some general remarks on the topic of **prosecutorial independence**, saying that the focus of the webinar and of ODIHR's research was mainly on the functional (internal) side of prosecutorial independence, rather than on the institutional (external) one. Functional independence is particularly important when investigating and prosecuting sensitive cases, where external actors such as government authorities, politicians, lobby groups or organized crime groups may have a vested interest in slowing down or hampering prosecutions.

She emphasized the growing importance that the principle of functional independence has been afforded in international law and practice. The Venice Commission's [Report](#) on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System, Part II – the Prosecution Service, noting a “tendency to give more independence to prosecutors”, specifically recommends that to ensure **non-interference** in the prosecutorial decisions, prosecutors should be granted functional immunity. The Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) [Opinion No. 13\(2018\)](#) “On the status of independence of the prosecutors” states that the functional independence of the public prosecutors is crucial for ensuring the proper **functioning of the justice system** and the rule of law.

Ms. Bachmaier also stressed that the Council of Europe (CoE) since 2016 has been reiterating that - despite differences in countries - functional independence must be guaranteed. While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) makes no direct reference to prosecutorial independence, inherently this is **necessary to remedy possible violations** of fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention, including Art. 2 and 3. In addition, prosecutors need to be considered as a “competent legal authority” for the purposes of Art. 5. The [European Court of Human Rights has underlined that](#) the independence and impartiality of public prosecutors, similarly to the courts, is a fundamental guarantee against misuse of power.

The [Recommendation \(2000\)19](#) of the CoE's Committee of Ministers observes that "States should ensure effective measures to ensure that prosecutors are able to fulfill their professional duties"; such measures include provisions on **recruitment, career development, and disciplinary offences** (para. 5). Particularly important is whether prosecutors can be given instructions on how to investigate and prosecute cases: the Committee stressed that any instructions should be put in writing and the prosecutors shall have the right to challenge them (para. 10).

Lastly, the European Court of Justice has been emphasizing the importance of functional independence, including in the landmark 2019 [judgment](#) stating that the German Public Prosecutor's Office does not provide a sufficient guarantee of independence from the executive for the purposes of issuing a European arrest warrant.

The Venice Commission has [repeatedly emphasized](#) that prosecutorial independence must be matched with **accountability**. The biggest problems of accountability (or rather a lack of accountability) arise when the prosecutors decide not to prosecute. Various systems have adopted different ways of holding prosecutors accountable, including through their reporting to the appointing political authority (such as Parliament or Government) and through some form of judicial or citizens' control (such as the possibility for a private prosecutor to bring a defendant to trial where the public prosecutor decided to dismiss the charges).

When it comes to the expert's research on **Hungary**, she noted that the Hungarian Prosecution Service is an independent organisation according to the Constitution. Although prosecutors interviewed by the expert stated that their functional independence is respected in their day-to-day job, and prosecution is mandatory regardless of the nature of the case, she noted that in CoE's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO's) assessment, individual public prosecutors in Hungary are not independent.¹ Prosecution offices are structured hierarchically, granting the superior prosecutor *inter alia* the power to issue instructions to subordinates, assign cases (no automatic case allocation system is in place) and, in case of disagreement on the handling or the termination of a case, take over a case from a lower prosecutor without the need to follow strict criteria. The superior prosecutor also has the power to reallocate cases among subordinates, although such decisions should always be reasoned.²

Civil society representatives interviewed by the expert stated that lower public prosecutors in Hungary do not feel independent to make their own decisions, specifically in sensitive cases: the system, *de facto*, can steer the decisions of lower prosecutors towards the position desired or supported by their superiors.

The expert also highlighted a particularly problematic issue with performance bonuses: although foreseen by Hungarian law, the chief prosecutor has broad margin to decide on the allocation of such bonuses, which may be thus used as a mechanism to reward obedient subordinates.

In Germany, prosecutors are hierarchically organized and must follow the service-related instructions issued by their superiors. The Ministry of Justice has the power to issue directives including on individual cases. The German Constitutional Court regards the prosecution as a part of the executive, despite it clearly being a prime actor within the justice system and having followed the same educational path as judges.

¹ Group of States against Corruption, Fourth evaluation round, Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, Second interim compliance report Hungary GrecoRC4(2020)10, of 25 September 2020, available at: <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a062e9>.

² Ibid.

Interviewed German prosecutors confirmed that they are part of a hierarchical structure, they must follow orders, and in many cases their decisions must be signed by a superior. However, in their experience this has not led to undue interferences, including in high-profile cases; none of them reported ever receiving an indication to close a case against a specific suspect. Subordinates can challenge the superior's instructions and their decisions are subject to the scrutiny of the court and even victims, who may ask to bring the accused to trial as private prosecutors.

Since many public prosecutors serve both as judges and public prosecutors during their career, the principle of judicial independence is deeply accepted, even when they work within a hierarchical structure.

Ms. Sabina Garahan, ODIHR Expert, illustrated the results of her research into prosecutorial independence in Slovenia and Czech Republic.

In **Slovenia**, the Prosecutor's Office is formally part of the executive, although it is considered a separate self-dependent entity within the justice system.

There is a State Prosecutorial Council, an independent state body in charge of self-governance and internal administration with mostly advisory functions and some binding powers e.g. on promotion and transfer of prosecutors. The State Prosecutorial Council also acts as a watchdog, reacting publicly against external interferences, which reportedly included attempts by politicians to influence or criticize prosecutorial decisions in specific cases.

Every five years, the Slovenian Parliament adopts a resolution on criminal policy. Prosecutors receive general policy instructions from their superiors, such as guidelines on case prioritization. Although this does not extend to intervention in individual cases, superiors retain broad supervisory powers. For instance:

- According to the State Prosecutor's Office Act, the head of a prosecutor's office can establish that, for certain categories of crimes, s/he must clear indictments and other prosecutorial decisions before they are submitted. If the head of an office does not agree with the prosecutor's decision, they can reassign the matter to another prosecutor, although this is reportedly used in rare instances each year. Contrary to the Venice Commission's recommendations³, there is no remedy.
- While prosecutors enjoy discretion in determining the requested amount of punishment, if the request is considered too lenient it can become subject to supervision by the Office of the State Prosecutor General.
- Since 2020, decisions to dismiss charges for serious crimes must also be cleared by superiors. Since 2021, in some particularly serious cases, the party that reported the crime has some form of oversight on the prosecutor's intention to dismiss the charges.

Some prosecutors interviewed by the expert noted that these provisions interfere with their independence, since overregulation may create grounds for disciplinary action in case of non-compliance.

Some interviewed prosecutors also reported being afraid that prosecuting sensitive cases may lead to career repercussions.

³ The European Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II The Prosecution Service, para 59, <https://rm.coe.int/1680700a60>.

In the **Czech Republic**, the Constitution regulates the prosecution service in the section regarding the executive. While the Czech Constitutional Court qualifies the Public Prosecution Office as a special authority bordering executive and judicial powers, on multiple occasions politicians reiterated that the prosecution service formally falls within the executive branch, thus creating an appearance of intervention of the executive in the work of the prosecution service that may be as damaging as actual interference. Rules that govern prosecutorial activities and independence seem to confirm this setup.

The Czech prosecutorial system is based on the principle of strict hierarchy: hierarchical superior offices supervise the work of subordinate offices and may issue binding written instructions. If the subordinate office refuses to comply, it must immediately notify in writing the superior office, which can take over the case. The same system applies to relations among individual prosecutors.

There are no clear standards regarding promotion, and prosecutors cannot appeal unsuccessful applications. Interviewed prosecutors reported that despite some attempts to adopt a general evaluation system, the practice is still fragmented.

Prosecutors generally cannot be transferred to a lower instance office without their consent but can be transferred to higher or equally ranked offices.

Disciplinary proceedings may be initiated by any superior and by the Ministry of Justice. Disciplinary decisions cannot be appealed.

The government has the power to remove the Prosecutor General without reasoning its decision.

There is no prosecutorial self-governing body, although there is a Union of Public Prosecutors, which is consulted by the Ministry of Justice on reform proposals and which is active in issuing statements in response to possible criticism of the prosecution service by politicians. Interviewed prosecutors underlined its vital role in safeguarding the independence of prosecutors.

Session 3 - International standards and good practices on the independence of prosecutors

Next, **Ms. Elizabeth Howe and Mr. Antonio Vercher Noguera** addressed the topic of international standards and good practices on independence of prosecutors.

Ms. Elizabeth Howe, Senator of the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP), emphasized the issue of striking a balance between accountability and independence of prosecutors.

General rules and guidelines are needed to ensure consistency. Prosecutors should be protected from persecutory disciplinary proceedings or dismissals but should also be held accountable when acting out of recklessness or outright incompetence.

Ms. Howe highlighted an IAP section on “prosecutors in difficulty” and a world ranking of 139 countries on rule of law.⁴ She also shared several IAP publications.⁵

Mr. Antonio Vercher Noguera, President of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors,⁶ highlighted that in the various European systems prosecutors enjoy a wide range of degrees of independence, from complete subordination to complete independence. In some systems, such as the Italian one, they belong to the same system as judges. In others, the two careers are entirely separate.

Mr. Vercher Noguera recalled CCPE’s Opinion no. 13/2018, “[Independence, accountability and ethics of prosecutors](#)” in which the Council stressed *inter alia* that “The status and independence of prosecutors should be clearly established and guaranteed by law” (para 23) and that “transfer, promotion and discipline of prosecutors be clearly set out in written form and be as close as possible to that of judges” (para 24).

He also underscored that prosecutors need to be accountable for their actions (para. 19). This means, *inter alia*, that they must not act arbitrarily, must base their decisions on the law and need to justify decisions based on the principle of legality or opportunity.

Session 4 – The Estonian Example

Ms. Kairi Kaldoja, Chief Prosecutor of Southern District Prosecutor’s Office in Estonia described the rules and guarantees contained in the Estonian system. She emphasized that Estonia is a multi-layered legal system, foreseeing guarantees for prosecutors in the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, in the 2003 Code of Criminal Procedure and in the 1998 Prosecutor’s Office Act.

The latter is of particular importance, because it establishes the principle that prosecutors are independent in the performance of their functions, and that they shall act only pursuant to the

⁴ The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index is the world’s leading source for original, independent data on the rule of law. Covering 139 countries and jurisdictions, the Index relies on national surveys of more than 138,000 households and 4,200 legal practitioners and experts to measure how the rule of law is experienced and perceived worldwide. See <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021>.

⁵ IAP Standards of Professional Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors ([https://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Resources-Documentation/IAP-Standards-\(1\)/IAP_Standards_Oktober-2018_FINAL_20180210.pdf.aspx](https://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Resources-Documentation/IAP-Standards-(1)/IAP_Standards_Oktober-2018_FINAL_20180210.pdf.aspx)); Seventh Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Resolution 17/2, E/CN.15/2008/22 ([https://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Resources-Documentation/IAP-Standards-\(1\)/UN-Resolution/UN_Resolution_IAP_Standards_draft_as_approved-1.pdf.aspx](https://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Resources-Documentation/IAP-Standards-(1)/UN-Resolution/UN_Resolution_IAP_Standards_draft_as_approved-1.pdf.aspx)); The Status and Role of Prosecutors- a UNODC and IAP guide <https://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Legal-Guidance.-support-and-assistance/Good-Practice-Manuals/UNODC-IAP-guide.pdf.aspx>.

⁶ This body was created by the Council of Europe in 2005. It is composed of high level prosecutors of all member States and it is tasked, *inter alia*, to prepare opinions for the Committee of Ministers on issues related to the prosecution service, to promote the implementation of [Recommendation Rec\(2000\)19](#) and [Recommendation Rec\(2012\)11](#) on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, and to collect information about the functioning of prosecution services in member States. Among its various activities is the annual meeting of chief prosecutors. See also Opinions adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors and The European Guidelines on ethics and conduct for public prosecutors “The Budapest Guidelines” adopted by the 6th session of the Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe on 29-31 May 2005 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccpe/documentation/general-documents>.

law and their conscience. This concept is a cornerstone in professional ethics and accountability of Estonian prosecutors and is often quoted in decisions.

The system also contains formal guarantees of independence, for instance by establishing that prosecutors are selected and appointed by an impartial committee with diverse membership.

Another important guarantee is that prosecutors cannot be transferred to another office without their consent, thus removing the possibility that transfers are used to remove sensitive investigations from a certain prosecutor, to force them to comply with a certain decision, or to retaliate against them.

In Estonia, the head of the prosecution office or in any case a hierarchically superior prosecutor has the power to give directives to lower-ranking or subordinate prosecutors, including to revoke a specific act or decision undertaken by them.

Ms. Kaldoja concluded her presentation by emphasizing the importance of societal background and public perceptions in fostering a culture of independence in a certain legal system. She recognized that Estonia ranks rather high (17th among 180 countries) in Transparency International's corruption perception index, thus showing that citizens' trust in institutions, including judicial and prosecutorial ones, is very high. Prosecutorial independence is therefore seen as a privilege not (only) of prosecutors themselves, but as a guarantee of a rule of law-based, corruption-free society as a whole.

Session 5 – Breakout Sessions

The webinar featured a breakout discussion on two separate topics.

The first group discussed the topic of “**Soft law sources regulation of independence of prosecutors**”, Moderator: Ms. Lorena Bachmaier

Participants discussed three main topics.

First, the need for prosecutors to have instructions from their superiors put in writing. A balance should be struck between transparency and efficiency: the written instructions should necessarily be included in the file, but not all orders should be given in writing, because that would hamper the efficient management of the office). Participants agreed that at least “key” decisions, especially in sensitive cases, should be required to be given in writing, and not only upon request from the lower public prosecutor.

Second, participants discussed the possibility to formally separate public prosecution and the executive branch. While participants in principle did not oppose some form of coordination by the executive in order to attain criminal policy goals, avoid overlaps and maximize results, the prosecution chain of command should be formally separated from the executive. One participant opined that the Italian system shows that strict subordination is not essential to coordination. More institutional independence would also improve the citizens' perception of the prosecution service as an impartial, objective body charged with prosecuting criminal actions, but also upholding citizens' human rights.

Third, participants agreed that functional independence should be enshrined in domestic law at the highest level, possibly in the constitution, similarly to what CoE Recommendation 2010(12) recommends for judges. Laws on individual responsibility of prosecutors for professional negligence or intentional violations (e.g. allowing civil lawsuits against individual

prosecutors for “malicious action”), while contributing to their accountability, may be misused, especially in the absence of clear legal provisions on prosecutorial independence.

The second group discussed the topic of “**Independence as a topic in training of prosecutors**” (Moderator: Ms. Sabina Garahan).

The two main issues discussed in the group were whether independence (a) should be taught as a separate topic or mainstreamed throughout prosecutorial training; and (b) should be among compulsory subjects or among topics of choice.

As an example, the expert stated that in Germany independence is included in basic training curricula for both judges and prosecutors. Training highlights possible challenges to independence, the level of supervision which it is appropriate to accept, what to do if a superior prosecutor interferes with their work in a way which is inappropriate, and related rights and duties. In Hungary, sessions relating to independence are held throughout a prosecutor’s training. In Slovenia, there is no single module focused on independence but independence as a core principle is mainstreamed throughout the training.

An Italian prosecutor stated that training has a pivotal role in strengthening external and functional independence. In Italy, independence is covered as a topic in both induction training and continuous training, both of which are mandatory and assessed through periodic evaluation.

A Dutch prosecutor also stated that it would be important to have dedicated training on independence.

Mr. Ghenadie Barba, ODIHR Chief of Rule of Law Unit, recognized that training should guide prosecutors (especially junior ones, more prone to undue influence by higher-ranking ones) in distinguishing the fine line between undue interference and guidance.

Good practices and recommendations

At the outcome of the webinar, a number of good practices and recommendations emerged.

Participants agreed that there is no uniform model of European public prosecutors, and it has been accepted that the public prosecution follows different structures and principles in different European countries. Nevertheless, the principle of prosecutorial independence should be fostered in all systems.

Some of the good practices identified during the webinar and by the experts’ reports include:

- 1. Common career.** In some legal systems, prosecutors and judges share the same career (as in Italy or Spain) or at least the same course of study (e.g. Germany). A common professional culture may foster self-awareness, and social recognition, of prosecutors as independent justice actors.
- 2. Oversight on procedural decisions.** External oversight mechanisms can also ensure that public prosecutors’ actions are subject to public scrutiny, thus limiting the likelihood of unlawful decisions such as unduly terminating a case against a specific suspect. Such mechanisms include citizens acting as private prosecutors (such as in Hungary or Spain) or judicial control over decisions to terminate cases (as is the case in Lithuania or Italy).
- 3. Superiors’ powers to issue orders.** While the hierarchical structure of most prosecution offices means that superiors can issue directives to ensure consistency within the office and set common priorities, this does not necessarily imply the superiors’ power to interfere with

subordinates' decisions in individual cases (e.g. in Lithuania, a superior prosecutor may not instruct a subordinate prosecutor on what procedural decision to take; in Italy, unity and consistency seem to be sufficiently achieved without resorting to strict hierarchical subordination). In any case, instructions should always be in writing (without the need for the subordinate to request so), be included in the file, and subordinates shall have the right to challenge them in case of disagreement. It is a good practice to include a motivation in written instructions.

4. **Electronic case management.** A good practice identified in Hungary is the possibility to follow the progress of the entire investigation carried out by the public prosecutor in the digital registry. This allows to carry out oversight on reassignment of cases as well as it has a deterrent effect upon potential decisions to close a case despite sufficient evidence.
5. **Mandatory vs. discretionary prosecution.** In systems prescribing mandatory prosecution, prosecutors may be less vulnerable to pressures to terminate proceedings than in systems where prosecutors have broader discretionary powers to drop charges. While practice shows that in both systems prosecutors may be subject to interferences, it is crucial that discretionary powers by the prosecutor (e.g. entering into plea agreements or dismissing charges based on principles of opportunity) are regulated by law and subjected to some form of judicial control.

Some of the recommendations identified during the webinar and by the experts' reports include:

1. **Self-governing bodies.** The existence of such bodies, with career and disciplinary functions, is a safeguard against undue external interferences. In particular, the superior should not have disciplinary powers, except for minor warnings against the subordinate prosecutors in his/her office. Participating states that do not have self-governing bodies should consider creating them.
2. **Limit the powers of the executive.** While the Ministry to which the prosecution service is answering is overall responsible for and should have the power to ensure the optimal functioning of the prosecution service and the implementation of criminal policies, in some participating States such powers include giving instructions to public prosecutors. While such instructions are reportedly never or seldom issued in practice, they may contribute to a perception of a prosecution service which is not independent. It is recommended to consider limiting any powers of the executive to issue instructions in individual cases.
3. **Limit transfers and reassignments to a different office.** A decision to transfer a public prosecutor to another office shall not be done without consent, not even within the same district. In case a re-distribution of the positions is needed because of staffing issues, this should be decided by the self-governing body, upon justified criteria of efficiency and office needs.
4. **Establish rules and criteria for allocation of cases.** Pre-established and transparent rules for case allocation should be in place and be public. Criteria may include automatic assignment on a rotation basis or objective criteria, such as in Estonia where cases are distributed according to the type of criminal offence, offender or other general criteria. Any reallocation of a case should be reflected in the digital case management system.
5. **Reconsider performance bonuses.** While incentives for high performance and for prosecutors who work longer and with better results may stimulate productivity and reward professionalism, in practice its disadvantages in the prosecution offices too often outweigh its advantages, especially when they are granted by the direct superior, because they may contribute to consolidating a culture of subordination. Participating States should reconsider having bonuses for public prosecutors.

ANNEX: Webinar Agenda



20 October 2021

14:00 CET (Bern, Berlin, Bratislava, Budapest, Ljubljana, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw)

15:00 GMT+2 (Bucharest, Sofia, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius)

Zoom Meeting ID 926 9433 7303 Passcode 46221292 <https://osce-org.zoom.us/j/92694337303>

Webinar INDEPENDENCE OF PROSECUTORS IN CENTRAL EUROPE



Prosecutor's Office
of Estonia

13:45 – 14:00	Registration of participants	
14:00 – 14:10	Opening remarks - Ms. Kateryna Ryabiko, First Deputy Director of ODIHR - Mr. Taavi Pärn, Chief State Prosecutor of Estonia -	
14:10 – 14:50	Presentation of ODIHR research - Ms. Lorena Bachmaier, ODIHR Consultant - Ms. Sabina Garahan, ODIHR Consultant -	
14:50 – 15:00	Questions and Answers	
15:00 – 15:30	International standards and good practices on independence of prosecutors - Ms. Elizabeth Howe, Senator of the International Association of Prosecutors - Mr Antonio Vercher Noguera President of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors and Deputy Attorney General of Spain	
15:30 – 15:45	The Estonian example - Regulation, practical application challenges and good practices pertaining to independence of prosecutors - Ms. Kairi Kaldoja, Chief Prosecutor of Southern District Prosecutor's Office	
15:45-16:20	Breakout Sessions	
	Soft law sources regulation of independence of prosecutors Moderator: Ms. Lorena Bachmaier	Independence as a topic in training of prosecutors Moderator: Ms. Sabina Garahan
16:20 – 16:45	Presentation and Discussion in Plenary - Group rapporteurs	
16:45 - 17:00	- Concluding remarks - Mr. Ghenadie Barba, ODIHR Chief of Rule of Law Unit - Mr. Taavi Pärn, Chief State Prosecutor of Estonia	
17:00	- End of webinar	