



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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Conference Services

Please find attached the Chairman's Report and reports of the Working Group
Co-ordinators of the 1999 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

Conference Services

**1999 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSMENT MEETING**

Vienna, 1-3 March 1999

SUMMARY

CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

REPORTS OF THE WORKING GROUP CO-ORDINATORS

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CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION ON THE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 1-3 March 1999

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

As Chairman of the closing plenary of the ninth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, it is my honor to report to the Forum for Security Co-operation on the proceedings and results of this meeting.

The Chapter 10 of the Vienna Document 1994 set as the main purpose of the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting to assess the record of implementation of the existing CSBMs as well as to discuss matters related to their actual operation and application. The meeting also aims at facilitating, through open and frank debates, the search for ways and means for improving implementation and operation of these measure as well as the initiation of new ones. In addition to the provisions of the Vienna Document '94, operation and application of other FSC agreed measures as well as of measures stemming from regional and sub-regional arrangements provide important topics for debates during the AIAM.

The ninth AIAM took place, in accordance with the relevant decision of the FSC, between 1-3 March 1999. The Mediterranean partners for co-operation as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea attended the opening and the closing plenary meetings. The broad participation of experts from capitals as well as their active and substantial contributions to the debates have also benefited this year's AIAM.

Mr. Chairman,

The proceedings of this year's AIAM were organized in two plenary sessions, chaired by Portugal and Romania, and six working groups, chaired by co-ordinators. Each co-ordinator presented a report on the results of the work in the respective group. With your permission, I would base my ensuing comments on the results of the working groups on the excellent reports delivered by the co-ordinators. These will also be attached to my statement.

The discussions in first working group, on annual exchange of military information, confirmed once again that these provisions form the basis for all other confidence and security building measures. It was underlined that, in general, implementation of AEMI functioned well although some room for improvement was still possible. Some shortcomings in implementation of this mechanism were noted, in particular related with delays in providing information.

An increase in the use of the automated data exchange was noted as a positive development, without undermining the official validity of the traditional hardcopy format. Given its recognized usefulness and efficiency, a more regular use of the automated format for data exchange was strongly encouraged. In this respect, offers for technical assistance were submitted by some delegations.

The working group on defense planning emphasized the uniqueness of the information exchanged under this chapter of the Vienna document and a particular point was made in connection with its value in assessing the changes in the armed forces over time. The value of the defense planning information was stressed as well as its generic use for various purposes and by various international organizations. Regrettably, it was noted, the number of States participating in the defense planning information exchange was still limited to about a half of the nations.

The discussions in working group on military activities focused on the issues of prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, annual calendars and constraining provisions. During the debates it was found that although the number of notifiable military activities was decreasing, the VD provisions on prior notification of certain military activities retain their full validity as valuable CSBMs. The increasing number of cases of voluntary information provided on activities that do not require prior notification under these provisions was mentioned. The notification as well as observation of certain military activities of a multinational nature was also pointed at as a positive development. The failure of some countries to exchange annual calendars was noted and request was made as to the use of the opportunities of the AIAM to explain the reasons.

As in previous years, the main topics for debate in the working group on compliance and verification related to the need for a solution to the long standing problem of the quota regime. In this respect, constructive proposals were forwarded and an agreement was formed that discussion on quotas will be further examined in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the review of the Vienna Document. Other topics that were taken up during the debates included: improvement of reporting, inclusion of interpreters in the definition of auxiliary personnel, stipulating the size of the specified area, the list of permissible auxiliary means, the use of helicopters for inspection purposes and the multinational character of verification teams.

In the working group on contacts, it was found that with the adoption of a 5-years periodicity for air base visits, the intensity of such visits had improved. However, not all states were able to fulfil their obligations in this regard. It was noted that room for improvement exists as regards the full implementation of these measures and that there was a need for better use of the opportunities offered by such visits.

With regard to the provisions on military co-operation, some delegations expressed concern on the limited number of participating States that have fulfilled their commitment under this chapter and the need for fulfilling the obligations in this regard was underlined. It was suggested that synchronizing the periods of implementation for visits and observations can help simplify their application and combine the advantages provided by them.

Failure to comply fully with the provisions on demonstration of new types of major weapons and equipment systems by a number of States was also noted and possible improvements to these provisions were discussed.

The continuing relevance and importance of the provisions related to risk reductions were referred to by delegations participating in the respective working group. However, it was noted that over the last year there have been no instances when the provisions of this chapter were made use of and possible explanations for non-use of this mechanism were explored. It was suggested that this may be due to the good status of the relations among

participating States. Another possible explanation indicated to the lack of a follow-up mechanism that would operationalize the provisions as regards unusual military activities. In this connection, it was noted that the lack of a clearly defined role of the Permanent Council in this mechanism, may make States reluctant to use the potential of risk reduction provisions in conflict prevention and suggestions for improvement were made, to be further considered in the process of review of the Vienna Document.

The main thrust of the discussions in the working group on communications was dedicated to the on-going process of upgrading of the OSCE communications network for the year 2000. In this connection, the best ways were searched as to ensure the viability of the network in the next century as a means of CSBMs information exchange and as an useful tool of communication for OSCE-related purposes.

The problem of not yet having all the participating States connected to the network was also raised. In this context, it was found that the use of Internet may bring some advantages from the point of view of accessibility and cost, though the need for secure communications must be fully regarded.

Finally, the working group on operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures and documents provided for useful discussions on the Global Exchange of Military Information, the Code of Conduct, Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, Principles Governing Non-proliferation as well as on some CSBMs stemming from regional and subregional arrangements.

As concerns the Global Exchange of Military Information, it was noted that in a limited number of cases returns were not submitted and offers for assistance in this respect were made by some delegations.

The importance of the OSCE principles on Conventional Arms Transfers was stressed and their relationship with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as well as their relevance for the work in other international arrangements, in particular the Wassenaar Agreement was also underlined.

The usefulness of the Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations to be considered in regional context was underlined and their use in the context of Dayton Agreement was pointed at.

As concerns the CSBMs stemming from regional and subregional arrangements, reference was made to the useful debate held in the FSC on this topic in 1998 and to the CPC regional database. During the debate on the inclusion of regional issues in the revised Vienna Document the principle of safeguarding the link between regional security and wider OSCE level was emphasized and several specific proposal were made.

Concerning the Code of Conduct, there were reports by some delegations on the record of implementation. A quest was made to prompt returns to the Questionnaire on implementing the Code as a basis for the success of the second follow-up conference which will probably take place later this year.

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

This was meant to be but a short overview on the issues addressed at the 9th AIAM and I am convinced that you will find more details in the reports by the co-ordinators. The structured discussions in the working groups have produced interesting and substantial results. Let me express the hope that many of the points raised there will be further elaborated upon in the Forum for Security Co-operation and its Working Group A.

In the opening plenary of the AIAM, the Chairman of the Forum for Security Co-operation presented a report on the activity conducted in 1998 within the Forum in connection with the implementation issues. In addition, a structured presentation on the implementation of the agreed measures was given by the Conflict Prevention Center. These, together with a special survey prepared by the Center, served as good bases for the work in the AIAM's relevant Working Groups.

The presentation delivered by the co-ordinator of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the review of the Vienna Document on the work of his group, further served as a practical basis for approaching the existing CSBMs in the AIAM from a future-oriented perspective. Many issues were discussed in relationship with the revision of the Vienna Document 1994 and I hope that some of our findings of last week will find a substantial and timely reflection in the on-going negotiations conducted in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

The delegation of Sweden organized one workshop on Defense Planning at the margins of the AIAM. It was suggested by one delegation that this very good experience should be incorporated into the main thrust of the meeting.

Participation from the capitals in this year's AIAM was significant, both in numbers of experts as well as in valuable contributions coming from them. I would like to express my thanks to all the participants for contributing to this meeting, in particular to the co-ordinators for the excellent work done and to the Conflict Prevention Center for their substantial and technical support.

Before concluding, let me inform the FSC on the organization of the next AIAM. One delegation suggested that the format and the agenda of the AIAM needs changes in order to better serve the purpose of this meeting. This issue will be further examined in the context of the negotiations on the review of the VD. Therefore, the precise dates, agenda and modalities of the next AIAM will be settled either by decision of the FSC or according to the respective provisions of the revised VD, that is due to be finalized by Istanbul Summit.

Thank you very much for your attention.

WORKING GROUP I

Monday, 1 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
- (a): annual exchange of military information
-

There was again a general consensus that the annual exchange of military information formed the basis for all other confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). In general, the provisions functioned well, though there was still some room for improvement. The importance of providing the information on time was reaffirmed. Explanations for delays in providing the information were encouraged.

One delegation noted the increase this year in States taking advantage of the automated information exchange. Although the traditional hardcopy data remains the official information, the automated data can provide a useful tool for analysing this information. Therefore, regular use of the automated information exchange was strongly recommended. In that connection, some delegations reiterated their offers to provide technical assistance.

One state queried to what extent increases in personnel strength and notification can be used to indicate a transfer. Explanations were given.

There was a discussion on a possible refinement of the existing measures related to the AEMI. It was noted that some proposals are being discussed in the context of the modernization of the Vienna Document.

WORKING GROUP II

Monday, 1 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
- (b): defence planning
-

In his introduction to the discussion the co-ordinator suggested the following items:

1. Should and could the Vienna Document provisions on Defence Planning be amended, or were problems mainly to be found in the implementation of existing provisions?
2. Could the information on Defence Planning be integrated with other CSBMs and be used, for example, in connection with inspections and evaluation visits?
3. Did delegations have suggestions for improving implementation as regards participation as well as the quality of the information?
4. Should the OSCE Defence Planning Information be disseminated to a wider public?

Several delegations expressed regret that only about half of the nations participated in the information exchange.

Some delegations announced that their Defence Planning information was being distributed and commented on details in the information. One delegation explained why its home authorities had not been able to distribute Defence Planning information the previous year.

Two delegations stressed that Defence Planning information was unique in the sense that changes in the armed forces over time could be indicated and recommended that this kind of information should be given to a greater extent.

One delegation gave examples of how Defence Planning information was used in contacts with several international organizations. Defence Planning information had developed into a kind of generic document used for various purposes, an approach that was recommended.

One delegation elaborated on measures to enhance the dialogue on Defence Planning. Political/military seminars, to be held perhaps every five years, were suggested. The present discussions in AIAM fitted into this dialogue, even if they were often more formal than substantial. Requests for clarification, a measure that had not been made use of, might also enhance a substantial dialogue. The importance of regional and bilateral sharing of Defence Planning information was also stressed.

WORKING GROUP III

Tuesday, 2 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
 Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

(c): military activities

Original: SPANISH

The Working Group held a lively debate on prior notification of military activities and a somewhat less intense discussion on other questions: observation of certain military activities, annual calendars and constraining provisions.

The comments considered most relevant by the Co-ordinator were as follows:

- Although at present there are few military activities which require prior notification – which in fact could be interpreted as an erosion of the Vienna Document 1994 – it is thought very important to maintain these notifications because they imply transparency among States and contribute to the CSBMs.
- There exists a positive tendency for the State on whose territory a military activity is to be carried out to provide information voluntarily on that activity even though it may lie beneath the notification thresholds. This does nothing to increase costs and it is an important contribution to transparency.
- A number of States recalled their proposals in the ad hoc working group to review the Vienna Document 1994, for example the idea of providing notification even when an activity is below the threshold, or that of considering the importance and military significance of activities carried out bilaterally or with neighbouring States.
- The establishment of lower thresholds for military activities carried out with neighbouring States, or in certain specific zones, is something that will require further study because of its implications for third States.
- With regard to the observation of certain military activities, one delegation mentioned that many notifications refer to multinational military activities.
- With regard to annual calendars, several delegations appealed to the States which had not submitted their annual calendars to comply with paragraph 60, which provides that: “If a participating State does not forecast any military activity subject to prior notification, it will so inform all other participating States in the same manner as prescribed for the exchange of annual calendars.” In the same context, paragraph 67 of VD 94 was also recalled.

- Another delegation noted a reluctance on the part of certain States to use the AIAM as an opportunity to explain their reasons for failing to comply with certain provisions of the VD 94 and expressed the hope that the new “reminder mechanism” approved by the FSC last year would improve that situation.
- It was also stated that no restrictions should be applied to military activities connected with peacekeeping missions.
- Another delegation suggested that it would not create obstacles to multinational military activities which constitute a further evolution of these activities.

Conclusion

The Working Group focused on a number of matters involved in fulfilling the provisions on military activities. These were the voluntary nature of many of the current notifications; the implications for VD 94 of the trend towards multinational military activities; the failure to fulfil commitments associated with the submission of annual calendars; and the failure to make use of the AIAM to explain reasons for not satisfying certain provisions of VD 94.

WORKING GROUP III

Tuesday, 2 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
- (d): compliance and verification
-

Original: GERMAN

1. As in previous years, the dominant topics, along with the positive experience gained in the area of verification, were the rapid exhaustion of the quotas, the concentration on the first quarter, and individual instances of early notification for the purpose of reserving a visit.

With a view to improving the situation, constructive proposals were discussed on increasing the quotas, with the costs to be borne by the implementing State, and also regarding better distribution throughout the implementation year, including the prevention of unduly early notification. One proposal was submitted in writing to the Working Group (FSC.AIAM/18/99), and it was announced that a second proposal would be put before the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Adaptation of the Vienna Document. The great majority of the participants expressed the intention to examine the written and oral proposals. Hungary repeated its offer to accept four additional verifications on its quota.

2. The following topics were mentioned as further areas where improvements should be made:

(a) Reporting

It was almost unanimously agreed that there was a need to improve reporting in terms of faster transmission and greater detail. One written proposal for a "Checklist" could contribute to the further examination of this subject.

(b) Definition of auxiliary personnel

The inclusion of interpreters in the definition of auxiliary personnel was regarded as important by a number of participants and the proposal to do so was welcomed.

(c) Size of the specified area

On this point, the figures compiled by the Conflict Prevention Centre were regarded as very useful for the further examination of the question as to whether the actual size of the specified area in kilometers should be stipulated. Of 48 inspections recorded in the statistics, 25 per cent involved an area of more than 18,000 square kilometers, with 44,000 square kilometers representing the largest territorial extension; 75 per cent lay within a range below 18,000 square kilometers.

(d) Permissible auxiliary means

The discussion regarding the adaptation of the lists of permissible auxiliary means produced a general consensus that these means should be brought into line with modern technology and should be used in so far as their employment was not limited by national laws.

(e) Overflights by helicopters

There was no objection to the remark of one delegation to the effect that helicopters are not intended purely as a means of transport but for inspection purposes. Another delegation expressed the belief that it should be possible to fly also into areas bordering on neighboring States and that possible restrictive regulations based on bilateral treaties or national laws should be made subordinate to the Vienna Document.

(f) Multinational character of verification groups

On this point, one delegation discussed and circulated in writing its observations regarding initial experiences drawn from verification measures conducted on an essentially multinational basis. A number of conditions for the trouble-free involvement of guest inspectors were also examined.

3. In summary, it may be stated that there is a particular need for an urgent solution to the unsatisfactory state of affairs as regards the quota regime. The proposals put forward in the Working Group are regarded as providing a good basis for further work in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

WORKING GROUP IV

Tuesday, 2 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
 Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

(e): risk reduction

The working group regarded the various aspects of Chapter II of the Vienna Document 1994 as being of continuing relevance and importance to OSCE participating States. However, no instances in which the provisions of this Chapter had been invoked over the past year were cited. There were no reports of instances when the mechanisms for co-operation in dealing with hazardous incidents of a military nature had been applied, nor had there been any requests for further information. States seemed to be satisfied that the points-of-contact system would operate appropriately and as needed. Neither were there any reports of visits hosted on a voluntary basis to dispel concerns about military activities, or any requests for further information.

It was noted that this might be a reflection of the stable nature of relations among participating States rather than the consequence of any difficulties in implementing the provisions. However, it was also noted that the consultation and co-operation mechanism as regards unusual military activities lacked a strong and effective follow-up procedure to make these provisions more effective. It was pointed out that the role of the Permanent Council in this mechanism was not clearly defined, and needed improvement. For these reasons, in cases where the assistance of the OSCE could be useful in conflict prevention, States might in fact be reluctant to apply the provision on risk reduction. Proposals had been made, particularly in the Ad Hoc Working Group, to develop this mechanism further through an inspection arrangement and to clarify the roles of the various OSCE institutions in its implementation. This would ensure that the mechanism was qualitatively improved in the review process and regarded as more valuable. The mechanism's relationship with the Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations was also noted, with which it was seen as providing a combined tool for response by the OSCE to crisis situations.

WORKING GROUP IV

Tuesday, 2 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
 Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
- (f): contacts
-

The working group first considered the implementation over the past year of the provisions for air base visits. It was noted that, with the adoption of a new five-year period as of January 1997, the intensity of the scheduling of visits had improved. However, a number of States had yet to fulfill their obligations in this regard. Several States expressed their concern that the air base visits that had taken place had in some instances not entirely complied with either the letter or the spirit of these measures. In particular, it was noted that too much importance was being given to demonstrations of infrastructure and not enough time to increasing the understanding of the current routine at the air base. It was also noted that opportunities to meet with the personnel of the air bases had in some cases been inadequate, and that the duration of some visits had not been as specified in the measures. It was also observed that the advance notification of air base visits had proven very useful both to the CPC and to States in planning their activities so as to take full advantage of the opportunities offered. States were encouraged to continue that practice. The CPC indicated that it would shortly be issuing an updated list of air base visits that had been announced. A request was also made for the CPC to produce a document reviewing historically the implementation of the provisions of this Chapter for use as a reference tool by experts from participating States.

There were no reports of specific activities conducted under the provisions on military contacts and co-operation.

With regard to the provisions on military co-operation, discussion participants noted with concern that during the first five-year cycle only 18 States had fulfilled their commitment under the provisions of this Chapter to provide an opportunity to other participating States to visit one military facility. Those participating States that had not as yet done so were strongly urged to recognize and meet their obligation in that regard, since these measures made a significant contribution to transparency and better understanding between OSCE States.

It was proposed that consideration be given to synchronizing the period of implementation of the various measures providing for visits and the observation of military activity so as to make it easier to carry them out and take advantage of opportunities for co-scheduling these activities. It was also proposed that invitations issued by States should indicate clearly whether the event was of an obligatory or voluntary nature. No objections were raised to either of these proposals, which it was urged should be pursued in the appropriate fora.

With regard to the provisions on demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems, concern was expressed that a number of States had not fulfilled their obligation in that regard. It was also noted that in some cases there had been shortcomings in the

nature of these demonstrations; these problems had been raised on a case-by-case basis in other fora. A proposal was also put forward for the improvement of these provisions in terms of their time-frame and scope. It was considered that this proposal contained useful improvements and should be pursued in the appropriate working group.

WORKING GROUP V

Monday, 1 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinators

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the
 Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

(g): communications

The discussion in Working Group V, Communications was introduced by a presentation by the Co-ordinator entitled the "Evolution of the OSCE Communications Network - A Retrospective" (FSC.AIAM/9/99/Add.1, 1 March 1999). Its principal objective was to describe the current status of the communications network and the future plans to upgrade it. A secondary objective was to answer the most frequently asked questions concerning these improvements.

The presentation began with a summary of the early years of the network and drew some important lessons learned during the first seven years of its management and operation. The main focus was on the renewal of the system through the current improvements and the incentive to reduce operating costs as a means of attracting increased participation.

Currently, 41 of the 55 eligible States have active connections. It is unlikely that the level of participation will increase until we tackle two issues, namely, the availability of X.25 connections in some countries and their cost.

In 1998 the Communications Group (CG) endorsed a Configuration Control Board (CCB) recommendation to upgrade the network. In July 1998 the FSC approved a decision to set aside funds to replace the Central Mail Server (CMS) and established a Project Management Team to oversee the improvements that are currently taking place in two Phases. The purpose of Phase I is to replace the hardware and operating systems so as to ensure that they are year-2000-compliant. At the same time, the communications software is being replaced because it is no longer supported. Following open bidding, Cap Gemini was awarded the contract to upgrade the CMS and provide hardware and software to those countries that wished to upgrade their End-User-Station (EUS). The upgrade programme is now under way and is scheduled to be completed by the beginning of July.

In parallel, the CCB is discussing options for Phase II of the upgrade, the objectives of which are quite simple: (1) To increase the level of participation from 41 States to 55; and (2) to reduce the cost of communications borne by participating States. Although these objectives are themselves quite clear, the path to achieving them is littered with obstacles that have to be overcome. While some of these are technical, others are political in nature.

First, we must consider two FSC decisions that dictated the current network architecture and mode of operation. These are the rule that the sender pays and the requirement for 24-hour connectivity. The "sender pays" rule implies that the total cost of transmitting a message from the originator to each intended recipient must be borne by the

originating State. This requires that the CMS establish a connection with each EUS and forward those messages rather than that each EUS make connection with the CMS and collect its messages. The costs of forwarding messages are calculated and passed on to each State by the CPC on an annual basis. Needless to say, this accounting requirement places an additional burden on the CMS staff and relies on each country's paying its bill on time. Last year the network was close to being shut down because of the outstanding debt owed to the Netherlands PTT. Meeting the second requirement for 24-hour connectivity requires that each EUS be ready to receive mail from the CMS at all times, even on weekends when there is almost no message traffic. If the EUS were to collect mail from the CMS, the same virtual connectivity could be provided by making connection at frequent intervals of, say, once an hour.

The primary technical issue is not the means but rather the high cost of long-distance communications. From studies carried out in the United States, we see only one reliable way of reducing this cost. Simply stated, we should eliminate the costly X.25 long-distance charges by using the Internet as the backbone for the network, a solution that has already been adopted by many multinational companies and international organizations. In this case, the cost of sending and receiving mail would be limited to the cost of local calls to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and the annual subscription cost for the ISP.

There is no doubt that if we were to exchange messages over the Internet, we risk their being intercepted and read by unauthorized users. That risk has been examined and can be reduced to the point where it no longer exists. A two-layered approach can provide the required level of security, using commercially available technology.

A Technology Test Bed is being established as an important step in building confidence in the use of the Internet for secure communications between capitals. The Technology Test Bed will be used to determine whether the OSCE can exploit Internet technologies as a more cost-effective means of communication.

In summary, the use of the Internet for e-mail could provide virtual 24-hour connectivity at a significantly reduced cost. This should encourage an increase in the number of States connected to the OSCE Communications Network. Moreover, Internet technologies offer the possibility of deploying applications, such as notification processing systems, that are less expensive to develop, operate and maintain. Finally, the Internet makes it possible to provide restricted, on-line access to official documents, notifications and data - not just to the single EUS in each capital, but to any authorized user who has an Internet connection.

Following the presentation, the following points were raised in discussion. Malta was the only non-connected country that confirmed that it has Internet access. Since the last survey to determine Internet availability was conducted over a year ago, it was suggested that it might be time to update that survey. One representative stated that the possibility for lower cost was in itself a valid reason to pursue the Internet option, irrespective of the likelihood of increased participation. In response to a reiteration of the need for receipt confirmation, it was stated that Microsoft Exchange can be configured to provide confirmation of messages received, both when a message has been opened and when a message was deleted before being opened. The recommended practice associated with the virtual 24-hour connectivity would be that each EUS would be configured for connection to the network automatically at least once an hour. This would ensure that message traffic with critically timed

receipt/response criterion would be satisfactorily handled. The CG Chairman informed the meeting that 23 countries had placed orders for upgraded EUS.

WORKING GROUP VI

Wednesday, 3 March 1999

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 3: Operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:
- Global Exchange of Military Information;
 - Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
 - Principles Governing Non-proliferation;
 - Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations;
 - CSBMs stemming from regional and subregional arrangements;
 - Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security.
-

Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI)

Sweden commented that, although their workshop in the margins of the 1998 AIAM had helped improve implementation, some differences remained. Footnotes in future GEMI reviews explaining any difference in total figures (for example on numbers of personnel) would be helpful. Germany agreed, adding that lack of clarity on conscript numbers was structural shortcoming of GEMI, rather than on implementation problems.

Germany said that, although eighty percent of participating States with armed forces had submitted returns, seven had yet to do so. Those experiencing difficulties in completing returns on GEMI and other documents could request assistance. The United Kingdom, Italy and France echoed this comment on assistance; bilateral requests through verification centres would be treated sympathetically. Malta said such offers were very welcome; Malta itself had much appreciated practical assistance received from Germany. The Czech Republic highlighted the usefulness of cost-saving exercises, for example the CPC's GEMI Workshop and Communication Group meetings, both of which involved the same personnel from participating States and were held back to back.

Principles on Governing Conventional Arms Transfers

Germany and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of OSCE principles in this respect, as well as the principles set out in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

The United States said that the separate FSC Working Group last September had been useful, not least for the input from those dealing with the Wassenaar Agreement, who had more expertise in this field than the FSC. On a practical note, the US suggested that future changes to the questionnaire might highlight those changes within the complete text, making it simpler to identify where those changes had occurred.

Principles Governing Non-proliferation

Ukraine announced its signature on 24 February 1999 of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personal Landmines. Canada said that the Convention had entered into force on 1 March 1999. 134 countries had signed the Convention, of which 65 had ratified it. Fifty percent of OSCE participating States had either ratified or signed the Convention.

Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations

Armenia stressed the usefulness of the measures contained in this document, as a “toolbox” for possible CSBMs in a regional context. Italy mentioned the use of the provisions in the Article II Agreement of Annex 1-B of the Paris/Dayton Accords.

CSBMs Stemming from Regional and Subregional Arrangements

Finland referred to the useful debate in 1998 in the FSC and the CPCs regional database. Debate on Regional Issues within the context of a revised Vienna Document merited close study. This should include clear principles safeguarding the link between regional security and the wider OSCE level. The joint Finnish/Swedish initiative from April 1998 had helped build co-operative security in the Baltic Sea area. The initiative should help pave the way for pragmatic CSBMs in the region and wider.

Ukraine mentioned draft bilateral agreements under discussion with its immediate neighbours and the imminent third round of negotiations on naval CSBMs in the Black Sea. Hungary announced the ratification on 2 March 1999 of its bilateral agreement with Ukraine. The CPC asked if the details of such arrangements could be passed to the CPC to update its database.

The Netherlands welcomed discussion within the context of the review of the Vienna Document. A new chapter within the Document, together with an annex which might contain, for example, the menu of CSBMs, would be welcome. Turkey supported a short chapter in a revised Vienna Document, containing guiding principles, with a separate annex for illustrative provisions.

Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security

Germany and the United Kingdom appealed for prompt returns, before or by the deadline of 15 April, of the questionnaires on implementing the Code. This would facilitate a more informed debate on implementation at the second follow-up conference later this year.

Poland reported on its three separate initiatives since 1995 to publish the Code, as a booklet and as an insert to the Armed Forces magazine. Ukraine reported a series of 15 internal seminars in 1997/98 for its Armed Forces, designed to introduce and explain the application of the Code.

Switzerland reminded participating States of its next workshop on the Code, scheduled for the period 26-30 April 1999.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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243rd Plenary Meeting

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DECISION No. 2/99

**ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING
1-3 March 1999**

I. AGENDA

1. Opening of the Meeting by the Chairman

- Report of the Chairman of the FSC on CSBM implementation issues discussed in the FSC during 1998
- Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- General remarks

2. Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the Vienna Document 1994: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- (a) annual exchange of military information;
- (b) defence planning;
- (c) military activities:
 - prior notification of certain military activities;
 - observation of certain military activities;
 - annual calendars;
 - constraining provisions;
- (d) compliance and verification;
- (e) risk reduction;
- (f) contacts;
- (g) communications.

3. Operation and implementation of other FSC agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and conclusions:

- Global Exchange of Military Information;
- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
- Principles Governing Non-proliferation;
- Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations;
- CSBMs Stemming from Regional and Subregional Arrangements;

- Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security.

4. Closure of the Meeting

- Working Group Summaries and concluding remarks
- Date of the 2000 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting

II. TIMETABLE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES

1. The AIAM will be organized into opening and closing plenary meetings, and Working Group meetings to address different portions of the agenda. The indicative timetable in the Annex provides more detail.

The working hours of the meeting will be 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.

Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided.

2. The Chair for the meeting will be held in rotation among the delegates in French alphabetical order, proceeding from the Chair for the last day of the 1998 AIAM (Poland). On 1 March the Chair will be Portugal; on 3 March the Chair will be Romania.

3. There will be no formal statements in the Working Groups.

All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide experts to participate in these informal meetings. The more experts present from a variety of countries, the more useful and informative the AIAM will be. Working Groups are designed to be very informal sessions with the dual objective of answering questions and exchanging information between participating States.

4. Each Working Group will have a designated Co-ordinator. The Co-ordinator's duties will be to facilitate the discussion and to make an oral report during the closing plenary.

If possible, the Co-ordinator will circulate a list of discussion questions or topics prior to his or her session to help guide the discussion and ensure that all relevant areas are addressed.

During the first part of the closing plenary meeting, the Co-ordinator of each Working Group will provide a short oral report to the delegates on the issues that the Working Group has addressed, including problem areas, improvements achieved, suggestions for further improvement and any other pertinent information. After each oral report, the Co-ordinator will answer questions. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the Co-ordinator's reports.

The Co-ordinator is also strongly encouraged to provide written input to the CPC for inclusion in its survey of suggestions.

Delegations that have volunteers for the role of Working Group Co-ordinator should provide the name of the individual and Working Group number to the Chairman of the FSC as soon as possible, but not later than 19 February. A Working Group may have more than

one Co-ordinator. The Co-ordinator for each Working Group will be made known to all delegations not later than 24 February.

5. Pertinent additional areas relating to CSBMs can be considered for discussion. All delegations are strongly encouraged to propose topics and provide experts from their countries. Delegations that wish to suggest additional areas for discussion in the Working Groups should contact the Chairman of the FSC not later than 19 February.

Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations and concrete examples of their own implementation procedures as appropriate.

6. Within one month of the conclusion of the AIAM, the CPC will provide a written survey of suggestions made during the Meeting aiming at improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.

7. During the first FSC plenary meeting after the conclusion of the AIAM, the Chairman of the closing plenary will submit a report to the FSC on the AIAM.

8. The Mediterranean partners for co-operation and Japan, as well as the Republic of Korea, are invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings of the 1999 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

9. Indicative timetable

Monday, 1 March

9 a.m.	Organizational meeting (for Chairpersons, Co-ordinators, CPC)
10 a.m.	Opening plenary
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Report of the Chairman of the FSC on CSBM implementation issues discussed in the FSC during 1998- Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre- General remarks
1 p.m.	Lunch break
3 p.m. - 4 p.m.	Working Group I - Agenda item 2(a)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- annual exchange of military information
4 p.m. - 5 p.m.	Working Group II - Agenda item 2(b)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- defence planning

5 p.m. - 6 p.m. Working Group V - Agenda item 2(g)

- communications

6 p.m. Meeting adjourns

Tuesday, 2 March

10 a.m. Working Group III - Agenda items 2(c) and 2(d)

10 a.m. - 12 noon - military activities

12 noon - 1 p.m. - compliance and verification

1 p.m. Lunch break

3 p.m. - 4 p.m. - compliance and verification

4 p.m. Working Group IV - Agenda items 2(e) and 2(f)

4 p.m. - 5 p.m. - risk reduction

5 p.m. - 6 p.m. - contacts

6 p.m. Meeting adjourns

Wednesday, 3 March

10 a.m. Working Group VI - Agenda item 3

10 a.m. - 11.30 a.m. - Operation and implementation of other agreed measures/documents

- assessment, clarification and conclusions:

- Global Exchange of Military Information;

- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;

- Principles Governing Non-proliferation;

- Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations;

- CSBMs stemming from regional and subregional arrangements;

11.30 a.m. - 1 p.m. - Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security.

- | | |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 p.m. | Lunch break |
| 3 p.m. | Closing plenary (Agenda items 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Summary of working group meetings- Discussion- Concluding remarks- Date of the 2000 AIAM- Closure |
| 6 p.m. | 1999 AIAM adjourns |