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**United States Mission
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

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Note Verbale

The Mission of the United States of America to the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe presents its compliments to all of the other Delegations and Permanent Missions to the OSCE, the Forum for Security Cooperation, and the Conflict Prevention Center, and has the honor to submit the United States of America's completed response, valid as of April 15, 2019, to the questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in accordance with Forum for Security Cooperation Decision 2/09.

The Mission of the United States of America to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Delegations and Permanent Missions to the OSCE and the Conflict Prevention Center the assurances of its highest consideration.

U.S. Mission to the OSCE
April 24, 2019

To all Permanent Delegations and Missions to the OSCE
The Conflict Prevention Centre



DIPLOMATIC NOTE

Section I: Inter-state Elements

1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

1.1: *To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional, and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?*

The United States is a party to a number of multilateral instruments currently in force that are related to States' responsibilities for preventing and combating terrorism, including the following:

- Convention on Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife (1928);
- The Charter of the United Nations (1945);
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949)
- Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention, 1963);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention, 1970);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention, 1971);
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973);
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979) and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005). (Once the 2005 Amendment entered into force on May 8, 2016, the convention was renamed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities;
- International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);
- Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification (1991);
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997);
- International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999);
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005);
- Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; and
- Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

The United States is also party to the 1971 Organization of American States (OAS) Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance and the 2002 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

The United States has signed, but not yet ratified, two other multilateral instruments related to counterterrorism (CT):

- Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010); and
- Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (2010).

In addition, the United States supports a broad range of international and national efforts to prevent and combat terrorist activities. These efforts are guided by, *inter alia*, the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly on September 8, 2006; applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs); the U.S. National Security Strategy; and the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, collaborated with partner nations to take military action to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States and took actions to help counter the threat posed by international terrorism, including by deterring States from supporting, harboring, or acting in complicity with transnational terrorist groups.

The United States also actively participates in a number of bilateral and multilateral law-enforcement and CT agreements and arrangements for information sharing and cooperation. In connection with these efforts, coalition partners are also reviewing and improving domestic legislation in support of international conventions.

The United States has engaged in extensive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and partnership activity to support U.S. efforts to counter terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Some of these fora and initiatives include:

- The Global Coalition to Defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): The United States is leading a coalition of 79 nations to defeat ISIS. As part of the U.S. strategy and building on broader diplomatic efforts, there are multiple priorities, including: cut off ISIS's access to financing and funds; expose ISIS's true nature; support military operations, capacity building, and training; and address associated humanitarian relief and stabilization.
 - Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF): The GCERF is a public-private partnership that supports community-level initiatives to strengthen resilience to terrorist radicalization and recruitment. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the GCERF focuses on preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE) by building the capacity of small, local, community-based organizations. In 2018, the GCERF funded hyper-local CVE programs in Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, and Nigeria. Thirteen countries, plus the European Union, have contributed funds to the GCERF, totaling more than \$60 million to date.
 - Strong Cities Network (SCN): The SCN is the first global network of municipal officials and community groups focused on building resilience to, and preventing, terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The SCN continued to expand in 2018, with 125 cities
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around the world now members. The SCN held its third annual global summit in July in Melbourne, Australia, and hosted workshops in Kolkata, India, and Washington, D.C.

- CVE City Exchange: Launched in 2011, the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have collaborated on ten city exchanges between U.S. and Western European cities, with additional exchanges to include cities from East and West Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Western Balkans, and Western Europe. This program enhances our foreign and domestic partners' ability to develop structures, enhance capabilities, and build resilience for communities that are vulnerable to radicalization to violence. As a direct result of a two-way exchange with Columbus (Ohio) in 2014, the number of foreign terrorist fighter departures from Vilvoorde (Belgium) to foreign conflict zones significantly dropped after the city made changes to its community engagement efforts.
 - Hedayah: Launched in late 2012, Hedayah is the Abu Dhabi-based international CVE training, dialogue, and research center. Hedayah has trained hundreds of law enforcement, government officials, and community leaders in community-oriented policing, counter-messaging, education, and other CVE approaches. With U.S. and other donor support, Hedayah supported the creation of two counter terrorist messaging guides in 2018 – one in the Middle East and North Africa and one in East Africa. Hedayah developed the communications strategy of the CVE national action plan for the Republic of Kosovo, held workshops on mapping social media content and developing effective counter-narratives using social media in Morocco, and worked with journalists on CVE efforts in Tunisia. Hedayah contributed to two CVE education workshops, in Uganda and in Malaysia, leveraging funding and technical resources of donor countries in addition to the United States, including the United Kingdom, and of the United Nations, which resulted in the development of an educational training guide for CVE.
 - East Africa CVE Center and Counter-Messaging Hub: Started in 2016, the Center provides a platform for the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development and for its Member States and other organizations to conduct training, research, and counter-messaging for government officials and civil society groups from Kenya, Somalia, and other East African countries.
 - The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF): Since its 30 members launched it in September 2011, the GCTF has developed and promoted civilian, rule of law-based counterterrorism and counter violent extremism doctrine. With its primary focus on countering violent extremism and strengthening civilian criminal justice capacities for countering terrorism, the GCTF aims to diminish terrorist recruitment and increase countries' capacity for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and regions. This includes support for mobilizing and organizing capacity building based upon that doctrine through its three inspired institutions, the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IIJ), the Hedayah Center of Excellence for CVE, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). The GCTF is composed of three thematic and two regional Working Groups: Countering Violent Extremism; Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law; Capacity Building in the East Africa Region; Capacity Building in the West Africa Region; and Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In September 2017, the United States and Jordan became co-chairs of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group for an initial two-year term. The working group formally adopted a work plan at its April 2018 plenary meeting.
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The United Nations (UN) is a close partner of, and participant in, the GCTF and its activities. In 2018, the GCTF Co-Chairs, Morocco and the Netherlands, issued a report on recommendations for the UN and GCTF to increase cooperation and partnership in both GCTF and UN activities. In September 2018, GCTF ministers endorsed a joint GCTF-UN statement marking the enhanced cooperation between the two. The GCTF serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the universally agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, more broadly, to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the UN. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In September 2018, GCTF ministers formally endorsed four new framework documents, including two co-led by the United States:

1. Rabat-Washington Good Practices on the Prevention, Detection, Intervention, and Response to Homegrown Terrorism: Morocco and the United States, in coordination with the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law, developed good practices to help policymakers and practitioners improve domestic efforts to identify and address homegrown terrorism.
2. Good Practices on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Families Initiative, co-led by the Netherlands and the United States, produced a set of good practices for governments to draw on to handle foreign terrorist fighter families upon their return to their country of origin or third country.
3. Abuja Recommendations on the Collection, Use and Sharing of Evidence for Purposes of Criminal Prosecution of Terrorist Suspects: Nigeria and Switzerland, as co-chairs of the GCTF Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group, produced a set of good practices to help investigators and prosecutors build cases, including with evidence collected from the battlefield.
4. The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: The Netherlands led an initiative to discuss the links between terrorism and transnational crime. The resulting good practices raise awareness of the nexus and how to expand and tailor available tools to deal with its manifestations in different regional contexts.

Also, in September 2018, the GCTF launched three new initiatives, including two co-led by the United States:

1. Initiative on Improving Capabilities for Detecting and Interdicting Terrorist Travel Through Enhanced Terrorist Screening and Information Sharing (“Terrorist Travel Initiative”): Co-led by Morocco and the United States, this initiative is raising awareness of the resources States have available to meet the obligations under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2396, including facilitating the development of watchlists. The initiative will result in a set of non-binding good practices to enable countries and
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organizations to build broader and more efficient watchlist and terrorist screening infrastructures.

2. Initiative to Counter Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Threats: Co-led by Germany and the United States, this initiative is developing a set of non-binding good practices to help a variety of stakeholders, including national and local governments, international organizations, and private industry, to address terrorist use of UAS.

3. Memorandum on the Use of Rule of Law-Based Administrative Measures in a Counterterrorism Context: Co-led by the Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group co-chairs, Nigeria and Switzerland, this initiative is addressing the legal basis, scope, procedures, authority and oversight, and other dimensions of the use of administrative counterterrorism measures within a rule of law framework.

The United Nations (UN): Throughout 2018, the UN remained actively engaged in addressing the evolving terrorist threat. The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted several resolutions to address the threat of terrorism to international peace and security, including UNSCR 2419 to address youth, peace, and security.

The United States participated in the June 2018 UN General Assembly's biennial review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and the inaugural High-Level Conference of Heads of Counterterrorism Agencies of Member States. The United States also co-hosted three expert side-events with Member States and UN agencies on the margins of the high-level meetings in June 2018 that focused on disrupting terrorist travel through implementation of Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Advance Passenger Information (API) requirements; lawful access to digital data across borders to investigate and prosecute terrorist offenses and other crimes successfully; and the rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremist offenders. In August 2018, to observe the first International Day of Remembrance of and Tribute to Victims of Terrorism, the United States, together with Afghanistan, Belgium, Iraq, Nigeria, and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, [launched a multimedia exhibit](#) at the UN Headquarters in New York that featured the voices of victims, experts, and civil society leaders who had either been affected by a terrorist attack or have worked with victims of terrorism.

Other U.S. engagement with UN actors on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism included:

- **The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED).** The United States supported CTC and CTED efforts to analyze capacity gaps of UN Member States to implement UNSCRs 1373, 1624, 2178, 2396, and other relevant counterterrorism resolutions, and to facilitate training and other technical assistance to UN Member States. This included participating in the December 2018 review and updating of the Madrid Guiding Principles, which were first adopted in 2015 to assist States in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to conflict zones, as well as the CTC's regular thematic debates on a range of issues including strengthening aviation security and border security measures; preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons; and countering terrorist narratives.
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- **The United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT).** The United States supported the creation of UNOCT in 2017 to: provide leadership on all UN General Assembly counterterrorism mandates; enhance coordination and coherence across the 38 Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (former CTITF) Task Force entities to ensure the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the [UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy](#); strengthen the delivery of UN counterterrorism capacity-building assistance to Member States; and promote and improve visibility, advocacy, and resource mobilization for UN counter-terrorism efforts. In keeping with this mandate, UNOCT developed the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact by which 36 UN entities plus INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization coordinate their work on counterterrorism. UNOCT also concluded a number of memoranda of understanding with both UN and non-UN bodies, including the African Union Commission, the OSCE, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
 - In 2017-2018, the State Department contributed more than \$20 million to fund a range of UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Development Program, and International Office of Migration activities, including:

 - Supporting implementation of UNSCR 2396 obligations to address the challenges of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters in Africa and South and Central Asia;
 - Strengthening the capacity of the judicial antiterrorism unit and specialized antiterrorism chambers in Niger;
 - Development of counterterrorism rule-of-law plans of action in the Sahel;
 - Promoting effective use of alternatives to imprisonment;
 - Supporting Kenyan prisons, courts, and probation services;
 - Work with Mali's Special Judicial Pole;
 - Building the capacity of States to obtain digital evidence for terrorism investigations and prosecutions;
 - Development of a counterterrorism prison database in Bangladesh;
 - Border community engagement in Niger and Senegal;
 - Supporting countering violent extremism efforts in the Balkans; and
 - Strengthening community-police partnerships in high-risk communities.
 - **The UNSC 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee.** The United States worked closely with the UN Sanctions Committee and its Monitoring Team in 2018 by proposing listings and de-listings, providing amendments, engaging the Committee's Ombudsperson regarding petitions for de-listings, and providing input to the Committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures. The United States also assisted the Monitoring Team with information for its research and reports. In 2018, nine individuals and four entities were added to the 1267 Sanctions List, resulting in a total of 265 individuals and 83 entities as of December 31, 2018. The Committee also worked to ensure the integrity of the list by conducting regular reviews and by endeavoring to remove those individuals and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing. In 2018, no individuals or entities were removed from the sanctions
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list. The Committee approved amendments to the existing entries of five individuals and four entities.

- **The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).** The UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) continued to provide assistance to countries seeking to ratify and implement the multilateral legal instruments against terrorism and provided assistance for countering the financing of terrorism in conjunction with the UNODC’s Global Program against Money Laundering. The United States has engaged UNODC/TPB as a counterterrorism assistance implementer, and supported programming focused on strengthening the criminal justice system’s response to terrorism by Member States. In 2018, the United States continued to support UNODC/TPB programs designed to strengthen the legal regime against terrorism within a rule of law framework in Africa, the Middle East, and the Central and South Asia regions.
 - **The UN Development Programme (UNDP).** The UNDP engages countries to mitigate and prevent conflicts by developing national and regional strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism and deepening research on preventing violent extremism (PVE) through its Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) in Norway. In May 2018, the OGC held a two-day meeting entitled “Assessing Progress Made, and the Future of Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism,” in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sessions focused on lessons learned on the role of the media, women, and youth in PVE, as well as effective reintegration of disengaged foreign terrorist fighters. The UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding with UNOCT on the margins of this meeting in order to enhance collaboration and improve cooperation in information-sharing, outreach, and support to the development and implementation of national PVE action plans to requesting Member States. In 2018, the United States continued providing funding to assist UNDP in its efforts to help strengthen community-police partnerships in high-risk communities.
 - **The UN Security Council (UNSC) 1540 Committee.** The Committee monitors and facilitates efforts to implement the obligations and recommendations of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540, addressing the nexus of proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and illicit activities by non-state actors, including terrorist activities. The Committee submitted its annual review on implementation to the UN Security Council in December 2018. The Committee’s Group of Experts also participates as part of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and cooperates with INTERPOL, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the Financial Action Task Force, and other counterterrorism bodies. The United States is one of eight countries, plus the European Union, that have contributed to the UNODA Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Affairs that funds a range of UNSCR 1540 activities, including the establishment of a 1540 regional coordinator position in OAS/CICTE to promote the full implementation of the resolution in the Western Hemisphere. In 2018, the United States agreed to extend the period of performance of the remaining balance of the U.S. funds through September 20, 2019. The U.S. funds will be used to conduct five projects designed to assist African and Asian countries to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by developing national implementation plans.
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- **The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).** In November 2018, ICAO hosted its second aviation security symposium at its headquarters in Montreal. The symposium brought together aviation security professionals from around the world to address the threat posed by terrorists targeting civil aviation, by reinforcing, strengthening, and promoting the international framework of aviation security standards, including the expeditious development of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data as a standard in accordance with UNSCR 2396. ICAO also strengthened its efforts to address international terrorist threats by joining the UN Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact in May 2018 to enhance both agencies' cooperation and information-sharing related to border controls, aviation security, and CT response consistent with a wide range of UN Security Council resolutions. Member States pursued UNSCR 2309 implementation, which calls on all States to prioritize aviation security and ensure that effective, risk-based measures are in place at the airports within their jurisdiction, in accordance with international standards and recommended practices. UNSCR 2309 further calls on all States to strengthen terrorism-related information sharing and requires airlines operating in their territories to provide Advance Passenger Information to appropriate national authorities to track the movement of individuals identified by the UN's counterterrorism committees. It also urges all States to ensure cooperation among their domestic departments, agencies, and other entities on identifying gaps and vulnerabilities in aviation security.
 - **The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).** The United States serves as Co-Chair of GICNT, a voluntary partnership of 88 nations and six international observer organizations committed to strengthening national and global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to the shared threat of nuclear terrorism. In 2018, the GICNT conducted 11 multilateral activities that improved the plans, policies, procedures, and inter-operability of partner nations in technical areas such as nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, national emergency response frameworks, legal frameworks, radioactive source security, and sustainability. In addition to serving as Co-Chair, the United States provides both financial and human resources to support the initiative's multilateral undertakings.
 - **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):** The OSCE focused on building support for a comprehensive approach to addressing terrorism-related challenges, in particular with regard to FTFs, information sharing, and countering radicalization to violence under Italy's 2018 Chairmanship-in-Office. The May 10-11, 2018, OSCE Counterterrorism Conference in Rome focused on the challenges posed by returning and relocating FTFs to the OSCE area and beyond. The conference included interventions and side events on how OSCE countries are addressing border security and information sharing; how to rehabilitate and reintegrate FTFs within and outside the criminal justice system; and challenges of addressing family members of FTFs. The OSCE's Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (LIVE) effort is a train-the-trainer program aimed at mobilizing groups to speak up and address terrorism-related challenges at the community level. In 2018, the OSCE conducted a scenario-based, multi-stakeholder tabletop exercise to develop practical recommendations, promote
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whole-of-society collaboration, and address challenges posed by returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OSCE staff actively participate in a number of global and regional efforts supported by the United States through the IJJ and GCTF North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): NATO's role in the fight against terrorism is an integral part of the Alliance's comprehensive approach to deterrence and defense and projecting stability and includes awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity-building and partnerships, and operations. NATO Allies agreed to a new biometric data policy at the July 2018 Summit that, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions, supports NATO Allies' ability to identify returning FTFs and other threat actors, and to support implementation of UNSCR 2396. NATO is part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh and, at the July 2018 Summit, agreed to enhance its airborne early warning and control and air-to-air refueling support. At the December 2018 Foreign Ministers meeting, NATO Allies endorsed an update to the 2017 NATO Counterterrorism Action Plan. Key tenets of the Plan include expanding information sharing, improving resilience to terrorist attacks within the borders of the Alliance, increasing capabilities to defend against terrorist misuse of technology, and building Partners' capacities to respond to security threats. The Plan also continues support for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, and the establishment of NATO Mission Iraq. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): In 2018, APEC continued to implement and update its comprehensive Consolidated Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy. The Strategy, adopted in 2011, endorsed the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience, and advocated for risk-based approaches to security challenges across supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. The Working Group also focused on furthering the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group Strategic Plan 2018-2022, which set priorities in such areas as the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters, terrorist financing, border and critical infrastructure security, and information sharing. In 2018, the United States hosted a workshop on soft targets in a counterterrorism context in Tokyo, Japan. The workshop produced a set of recommendations that was endorsed by APEC economies in August 2018.

- Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE): OAS/CICTE, which has 34 Member States and 70 observers, made strides in 2018 across its focus areas: cybersecurity; border management; the prevention of the financing of terrorism; the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the prevention of violent extremism; and addressing the FTF phenomenon. Working closely with its Member States, CICTE establishes policies and implements programs to address these issues, and bolsters counterterrorism partnerships, cooperation, and information sharing through promoting counterterrorism policies, training, and capacity-building. OAS/CICTE's 18th Regular Session, May 3-4, 2018, in Washington, D.C, with Argentina as incoming chair, focused on countering violent extremism, foreign terrorist fighters, and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Through interventions and the final declaration (http://www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/session_2018.asp), Member States reiterated their commitments to fulfill obligations from relevant UNSCRs, enhance information sharing, strengthen border controls, and prioritize prevention measures to counter radicalization and violent extremism that can lead to terrorism. In February 2018, under the auspices of CICTE, cyber security policy experts agreed to two inaugural hemispheric confidence-
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building measures in cyberspace to facilitate cyber cooperation and promote international stability in cyberspace.

- The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Since it was launched in 2003, 107 States have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, expressing their commitment to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. Participants work to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop WMD, their delivery systems, and related items. PSI-endorsing countries commit (1) to undertaking effective measures to interdict transfers to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern; (2) to develop procedures to facilitate the exchange of information concerning suspected proliferation activity with other countries; (3) to review and work to strengthen national legal authorities to facilitate their PSI commitments; and (4) to take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts to the extent permitted by national legal authorities and consistent with relevant international obligations and frameworks. (<https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm>).
 - The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is an international partnership of 88 nations and 6 official observers committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism. (www.gicnt.org).
 - The U.S. Export Control and related Border Security (EXBS) Program: The EXBS–Program provides training, donates equipment, and facilitates exchange of best practices to help other governments establish sustainable national capabilities to detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit transfers of WMD, WMD-related items, and conventional arms.
 - Agreements relating to civil nuclear cooperation, pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, include a requirement for the partner country to maintain adequate physical protection with respect to any nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement, and any special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred.
 - The U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) Program assists governments with reducing their stockpiles of excess or at-risk conventional weapons and munitions and securing retained stocks, combating illicit proliferation to terrorists. (<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra>).
 - G8 Action Plan to Enhance Transport Security and Control of MANPADS. (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/82050.htm>).
 - Wassenaar Arrangement initiatives to strengthen controls over MANPADS, resulting in the endorsement of such controls by more than 95 countries from 4 multilateral organizations (the Wassenaar Arrangement, OSCE, APEC, and OAS). (www.wassenaar.org).
 - World Customs Organization SAFE Framework.
 - International Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code.
 - The U.S.-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of MANPADS. (<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/MANPADS/Statefactsheet24feb05.htm>).
 - Numerous training and capacity-building programs including countering cash couriers, breaking terrorist abuse of charities, law enforcement training, border security, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, as well as supporting civil society initiatives to
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empower women's roles in countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism - via regional multilateral bodies such as the OSCE, OAS, APEC, ARF, and NATO.

1.2: What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements?

The United States has enacted domestic legislation to criminalize acts covered by CT-related treaties, to assert U.S. jurisdiction over such acts, and to impose appropriate penalties for the commission of such acts.

Twenty-four bills and Joint Resolutions related to the attack of September 11, 2001, have been enacted into law, including:

- USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) as extended and amended by the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, and three additional provisions approved May 26, 2011;
- Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act;
- Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002;
- Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002;
- Bioterrorism Response Act of 2001;
- Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
- Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002;
- Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; and
- An Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001).

In addition, the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015," or the "USA FREEDOM Act of 2015," was signed into law June 2, 2015. The bill contained implementing legislation for the:

- 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005);
- Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; and
- Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

1.3: What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) 13354 in August 2004, and is responsible for leading U.S. efforts to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing information with partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in January 2003 to protect the nation against threats, including terrorist attacks, to the U.S. homeland. DHS analyzes threats, guards U.S. borders and airports, protects critical infrastructure, and coordinates the national response in emergencies. DHS includes, inter alia, the following major components:

- The Directorate for National Protection and Programs, which works to advance the Department's risk reduction mission;
- The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which is responsible for assessing current and future threats to the United States through the use of multi-source intelligence;
- The Office of Operations Coordination, which is responsible for monitoring the security of the United States on a daily basis and for coordinating activities within DHS and with Governors, Homeland Security Advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical infrastructure operators in all 50 U.S. States;
- The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, which provides standardized, career-long training to law enforcement professionals;
- The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which works to enhance the nuclear detection efforts of Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governments, among others, and to ensure a coordinated response to such threats;
- U.S. Customs and Border Protections (CBP), which is responsible for protecting U.S. borders from the infiltration of terrorists and terrorist weapons while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel;
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is responsible for identifying and shutting down vulnerabilities to U.S. border, economic, transportation, and information security;
- The U.S. Coast Guard, which protects the public, environment, and U.S. interests in U.S. ports and waterways, along the coast and on international waters;
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which prepares the United States for hazards and manages response and recovery efforts following any national incident; and
- The U.S. Secret Service, which protects the President and other high-level officials and investigates counterfeiting and other financial crimes, including computer-based attacks on U.S. financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.

For further information on DHS, please review: <http://www.dhs.gov>.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead U.S. law enforcement agency for investigating acts of domestic and international terrorism. The FBI relies on a vast array of partnerships across the United States and around the world to disrupt and defeat terrorists. For example, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are teams of State and local law enforcement officers, FBI Agents, and other Federal agents and personnel who work shoulder-to-shoulder to investigate and prevent acts of terrorism. The Secretary of Defense may support the Attorney General (usually through the FBI) during an emergency situation involving WMD, including situations involving terrorism. Information on FBI activities can be found at: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism>.

The National Guard, along with the Naval Militia, is part of the organized militia reserved to the states by the Constitution of the United States under Article 1, Section 8. In peacetime, the

National Guard is commanded by the Governor of each respective State or territory. When ordered to active Federal duty or called into Federal service for emergencies, units of the National Guard are under the control of the appropriate Department of Defense (DoD) component. The National Guard supports homeland security and homeland defense at the State and Federal levels through a variety of critical roles. For specific functions and roles of the National Guard in preventing and combating terrorism, please visit: <http://www.nationalguard.mil/Features/2011/Homeland-Defense>.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established on October 1, 2002, to provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities within its assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR). USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and civil support operations to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. USNORTHCOM's geographic AOR for the conduct of normal operations includes the air, land, and sea approaches to North America, the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida; and the Caribbean region inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands. USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few assigned forces. USNORTHCOM is allocated forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President and Secretary of Defense. For more information on USNORTHCOM's role in preventing and combating terrorism, please visit: www.northcom.mil.

1.4: *Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining, inter alia, to:*

-- Countering the financing of terrorism;

The U.S. Government has multiple authorities to counter the financing of terrorism. Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of State has authority to designate an organization meeting certain statutory criteria as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and it is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States knowingly to provide "material support or resources" to or receive military-type training from or on behalf of a designated FTO. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances removable from, the United States. To review the list of currently designated FTOs, please visit: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

The Department of State and the Department of Treasury share authority to designate individuals and entities under E.O. 13224. As a result of a designation under E.O. 13224, all property and interests in property of the designated individual or entity subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the designated individual or entity. The United States implements its obligations under the UNSC 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime primarily through making

designations under E.O. 13224. To review the consolidated list of all Department of State and Department of Treasury designations, please visit: <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx>.

To review the latest “Terrorist Assets Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees,” please, visit: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/terror.aspx>.

Additionally, a country may be designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” (SST) if the Secretary of State determines that “the government of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” SST designations are made pursuant to four laws: Section 1754(c) of the National Defense Reauthorization Act of 2018; Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as continued in effect by Executive Order; Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA); and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As of January 2019, there are four countries (Iran, Syria, North Korean, and Sudan) currently designated as SSTs. A number of restrictions and sanctions result from a SST designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain controls over exports of dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

In addition, Section 40A of the ACEA also prohibits the sale or license for export of defense articles and defense services to countries that the President determines and certifies to the U.S. Congress as not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Unlike SST designations, these determinations are made annually. In May 2018, the President certified to Congress that the following countries were not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts: Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.

The United States has also worked to implement effectively the recommendations set out by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is an inter-governmental, international policy-making body that sets standards and promotes the effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. To review the United States’ 2016 FATF Mutual Evaluation, please visit: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/uz/unitedstates/documents/mer-united-states-2016.html>.

-- Border controls:

The U.S. Department of State works to disrupt terrorist networks through a variety of initiatives that enhance U.S. and our foreign partners’ ability to detect terrorists and secure borders. Bilateral terrorism screening information sharing arrangements negotiated pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) strengthen our screening capabilities, while the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) provides partner countries border security assistance to limit terrorist mobility. In addition, the Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which serves as the U.S. Government’s premier CT capacity-building program for foreign law enforcement agencies in a wide range of areas, helps partner nations to detect and deter terrorist operations across borders and regions. ATA currently has active partnerships with more than 50 countries. The Department of State’s Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) establishes programs to build

regional cooperation for constraining terrorist activities. Because terrorist groups often use porous borders and/or ungoverned areas between countries, bilateral responses to terrorism are insufficient. The Department of State created the RSI to encourage overseas missions to think about CT regionally, rather than solely bilaterally. RSI operates in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat collectively, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations. The Department of State has established eight RSI regions around the world.

In addition, the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program provides assistance to more than 60 countries in developing their export control and border security capabilities designed to prevent WMD proliferation and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons. The EXBS program is active in countries that possess, produce, or supply sensitive items and materials, as well as countries through which such items are likely to transit. Drawing on the expertise of U.S. Government agencies, foreign government experts, the private sector, and academic community, EXBS provides training on detection, inspection, interdiction, and disposal of export-controlled items and donates state-of-the-art detection and inspection equipment to partner governments.

DHS has the primary responsibility for securing the United States from criminal or terrorist exploitation. Within the DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are central to this mission.

CBP is the single, unified border enforcement agency of the United States charged with securing U.S. borders while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP has developed numerous initiatives to meet these twin goals, including the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, the Global Entry program, the Immigration Advisory Program, the Carrier Liaison Group, the Container Security Initiative/Secure Freight Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. A summary of CBP actions and programs can be found at: <http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets>.

ICE is responsible for identifying, investigating, and dismantling vulnerabilities regarding the nation's border, economic, transportation, and infrastructure security. As such, ICE is charged with the investigation and enforcement of more than 400 Federal statutes within the United States, in the interest of protecting the United States and upholding public safety by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal activity. Examples include:

- Travel document security (i.e., passports);
- Container and supply chain security;
- Security of radioactive sources;
- Legal cooperation, including extradition; and
- Eliminating safe havens and shelter for terrorists and terrorist organizations.

For more information on ICE programs, please visit: <http://www.ice.gov/jtff/>.

-- The Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes;

The United States has approved a Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative, a National Strategy for Cyber Security (2018), and a National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Work on other national strategies addressing specific aspects of cyber security, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes or CVE online, is ongoing, including through the 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy. The 2011 “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” (updated in 2016) established a White House-led Interagency Working Group to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in 2012 that has been superseded by other interagency efforts to counter ISIS and other terrorists. An International Strategy for Cyberspace was released in May 2011, and the United States has been engaging international partners in both bilateral and multilateral fora on the issues involved in addressing criminal activity on the Internet while protecting human rights such as freedom of expression, as well as the free flow of information, and an open, secure, reliable, and interoperable Internet.

Under 18 U.S.C. 842(p), Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, the United States can prosecute individuals who distribute bomb-making information (via the Internet or other method) knowing or intending that the information would be used for a Federal crime of violence such as a terrorist attack. U.S. law enforcement does not seek to compel the removal of internet content unless it clearly violates U.S. law (for example, child pornography), and content that promotes an ideology or belief does not typically constitute a violation of U.S. law. The removal of content that does not violate U.S. law is at the discretion of internet, including social media, companies. U.S. efforts to counter terrorists’ propaganda online focus on creative and voluntary partnerships with key stakeholders such as civil society and communities, as well as the private sector, including to build resilience to terrorist narratives by enhancing the capacity of those who may be vulnerable to think critically and by challenging terrorist ideologies. Private companies may choose voluntarily to remove terrorist websites or social media accounts with content that violates their user service agreements and companies have been proactively and aggressively addressing terrorist content on their platforms. In June 2017, Facebook, YouTube/Google, Twitter, and Microsoft established the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) to prevent and counter terrorist exploitation of their platforms, including through sharing technological and other information with smaller companies, such as a hash-sharing database in partnership with the UN-affiliated Tech Against Terrorism initiative. The GIFCT and Tech Against Terrorism have through their collective efforts conducted outreach to smaller companies through workshops to build regional networks around the world. Tech Against Terrorism launched an online Knowledge Sharing Platform focused on resources for smaller and start up companies in November 2017. The United States through a whole-of-government approach, has continued to work to improve information sharing with technology companies, including information on U.S.-designated terrorists and on terrorist trends and tactics. In line with our views that in general alternative viewpoints are often a more effective response to objectionable speech (that does not violate U.S. law) than suppression of that speech, we also counter violent extremists’ propaganda on the Internet by undermining terrorist narratives through alternative messages.

The Global Engagement Center (GEC) is an interagency coordinating body within the Department of State that applies a data-science driven approach to countering foreign State and non-state propaganda and disinformation. The GEC, in coordination with U.S. departments and

agencies, also identifies and cultivates a network of partners whose voices resonate with at-risk populations. The GEC conducts on-the-ground training sessions to enable these partners to develop their own content and disseminate it through their distribution networks. The GEC and its partners inject factual content about terrorist organizations into the information space to counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment. The Department of State established the GEC in 2016, replacing the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which was established in 2011.

2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory

2.1: *Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.*

The United States continues to deploy forces in many locations throughout the world, both bilaterally and within an alliance context. The United States is a party to multilateral and bilateral status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with more than 100 nations.

The United States has continued to play a key role in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Agreement Among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces (the PfP SOFA opened for signature in Brussels June 19, 1995) recognizes status protections and authorizations that enable the forces of countries participating in the PfP program to be stationed on the territories of other participating States, and to join in combined exercises and training. Other agreements to be specially noted include the SOFAs under the Dayton Peace Accords between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which contain provisions prescribing the status of NATO personnel who are supporting the ongoing peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In regard to Kosovo, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established by UNSCR 1244 to provide, inter alia, for the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), created pursuant to Resolution 1244 to provide an interim administration for Kosovo, promulgated UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, prescribing the status and privileges and immunities of KFOR and its personnel.

Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. In its Declaration of Independence, Kosovo reaffirmed “that NATO retains the full capabilities of KFOR in Kosovo.” Kosovo has also committed to respect the responsibilities and authorities of the international military presence pursuant to UNSCR 1244 and the Ahtisaari Plan, including the status, privileges, and immunities currently provided to KFOR under UNMIK Regulation 2000/47.

The United States has entered into a number of additional SOFAs to enable the presence of U.S. forces in many locations and to facilitate their activities in the continuing armed conflict against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces.

SOFAs are critical to the success of all manner of combined activities, including training, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. They commonly address such issues as the right to wear uniforms and bear arms, legal jurisdiction over visiting forces, exemption from customs

and taxes, provision for the use of military camps and training areas, and liability for and payment of claims.

3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct

***3.1:** Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.*

Robust verification, compliance, and implementation are essential to maintaining and strengthening the integrity of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes. In this regard, the Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) leads the Department of State in many matters related to the implementation of certain international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. For nonproliferation treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) treaties and their protocols, and for nonproliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is the Department of State's lead. These two bureaus (i.e., AVC and ISN) share responsibilities that include staffing and managing treaty implementation commissions and review conferences, creating negotiation and implementation policy for agreements and commitments, and developing policy for future arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament arrangements.

AVC also ensures that appropriate verification requirements and capabilities are fully considered and properly integrated throughout the development, negotiation, and implementation of most arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and ensures that other countries' compliance is carefully watched, rigorously assessed, appropriately reported, and resolutely enforced. ISN has similar responsibilities for the NPT, for which much of the compliance is undertaken via our work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and nonproliferation regimes. AVC and ISN are also responsible for preparing and vetting multiple reports to Congress, such as the President's annual report to Congress on "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." AVC is further required to prepare verifiability assessments on proposals and agreements, and to report about these assessments to Congress as required.

DoD policy on arms control is outlined in DoD Directive 2060.1. It is DoD policy that all DoD activities shall be fully compliant with arms control agreements to which the United States is a party. DoD oversees implementation of, and provides guidance through appropriate chains of command for, planning and execution throughout the DoD to ensure that all DoD activities fully comply with arms control agreements. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops and coordinates DoD policies and positions on arms control implementation and/or compliance issues and represents the Secretary of Defense with coordinated DoD views in discussions, negotiations, meetings, and other interactions with representatives of foreign governments on issues concerning DoD implementation of, and compliance with, arms control agreements.

The Department of Justice formally established the National Security Division (NSD) in 2006 under the USA Patriot Act to foster improved coordination among prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community, and to strengthen the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's CT efforts.

3.2: Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.

AVC has responsibility for the negotiation and implementation of existing and prospective arms control agreements and security arrangements concerning conventional arms control agreements in the OSCE area, in particular: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Vienna Document 2011 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), the Treaty on Open Skies, and arms control elements of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Bureau also provides policy direction and administrative support to the Chief Arms Control Delegate in the U.S. Mission to the OSCE; support and personnel to NATO committees, including the NATO High-Level Task Force (HLTF) and the Verification Coordinating Committee; and for the promotion of CSBMs in regions of the world beyond Europe in connection with OSCE efforts to advance wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles, and commitments with Mediterranean and Asian partner States.

Additionally, the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) contributes to implementation of a variety of arms control, disarmament, and confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE area through assistance programs designed to demilitarize surplus, destabilizing, and excess conventional arms and ammunition at the request of OSCE participating States.

DoD makes certain that negotiations take place on the basis of accurate information about U.S. military forces to ensure that agreements are equitable and contain practical measures for enhancing military security in the OSCE area.

Section II: Intra-State elements

1. National planning and decision-making process

1.1: What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

National planning and decision-making in determining military posture begin at the highest level of the U.S. Government. The President signs the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which expresses the President's vision and outlines goals that seek to enhance the security of the United States. The Secretary of Defense then uses the NSS to write the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), which provides guidance on the DoD's goals and strategies for achieving the objectives in the NSS. The National Military Strategy (NMS), signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the NSS, implements the NDS, and provides strategic guidance and military objectives for the Armed Services.

The U.S. Congress has power over the military budget, and it also has the power to enact legislation imposing substantive restrictions on the size and composition of U.S. military forces, consistent with the President's constitutional authorities.

Appropriations for U.S. military forces are determined through the legislative process and by executive branch implementation of U.S. laws. Early each year, the President submits a budget proposal that recommends the amounts of funds to be spent for particular military purposes. Congress then develops legislation that may or may not be consistent with the President's recommendations.

Once defense authorization and appropriations bills are passed by Congress, the President may sign them, allow them to become law without his signature, or veto them. A Presidential veto can be overridden only by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress. Once the defense authorization and appropriations bills become law, the President generally implements them through DoD.

All phases of this process are conducted publicly, except for a very limited class of information related to particular programs that are classified in order to protect national security.

***1.2:** How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?*

The Department of State seeks to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed States that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system. The United States and other States are able to address many security concerns through the negotiation of arms control agreements and other security arrangements. The United States also promotes regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening partners and allies through security assistance programs.

DoD takes into account the security concerns of other States through the implementation of arms control agreements, and other arrangements that reflect the concerns of their States Parties. In addition, DoD reviews the acquisition of new weapons systems to ensure that their acquisition is consistent with U.S. obligations, including under applicable arms control agreements. DoD actively manages its military activities and procurements to make sure that the United States is in full compliance with arms control agreements to which it is a Party.

On September 16, 2009, DoD issued Directive 3000.05 to update and establish DoD policy and to assign responsibilities within DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. Stabilization efforts span the conflict continuum, ranging from preventive efforts in fragile States to deliberate efforts during military operations. Stability operations are an integrated civilian and military process applied in fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the United States to establish civil security, address drivers of instability, and create conditions for sustainable stability – a condition characterized by local political systems that can

peaceably manage conflict and change; effective and accountable institutions that can provide essential services; and societies that respect fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Stabilization efforts vary from place to place, and are frequently partnered with humanitarian assistance. Stabilization efforts often address civil security; rule of law; support to governance and civil society; and economic stabilization and critical infrastructure repair.

DoD coordinates relations with the Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations to enhance U.S. institutional capacity to focus on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities. The core mission of this Bureau is to advance U.S. national security by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority States, setting conditions for long-term peace.

The United States actively contributes to international security through its participation in international peacekeeping operations. Recent U.S. involvement in peacekeeping has included missions in: Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Tunisia, Israel, and South Sudan. The United States also supports UN peacekeeping operations through capacity-building programs with partner nations that contribute to peacekeeping missions.

In cooperation with the military forces of other nations, the U.S. Armed Forces assist nations to build their defense capacity against threats to stability, including transnational threats such as terrorism and the narcotics trade. Current military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of how the U.S. Armed Forces engage in activities across the spectrum from peace to conflict.

2. Existing structures and processes

2.I: What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States provides that "the executive power" is vested in the President. Article II, section 2, further provides, "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." This provision has been interpreted to mean that the President's authority as Commander in Chief extends to all the military forces of the nation, including the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.

Article I, section 1, provides that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Article I, section 8 provides that among the powers of the Congress are the powers to lay and collect taxes, to provide for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.

Although the President appoints senior civilian and military officials (including the promotion of senior military officers), such appointments are generally subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. For example, Section 113 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Secretary of Defense to be “appointed from civilian life” and requires the President’s appointment to be by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Also to be considered is review by the judicial branch. Under Article III, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, “the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” In this regard, the Supreme Court of the United States may hear appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in criminal cases under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Lawsuits can be brought against the U.S. Government and the U.S. military in Federal district courts, subject to certain limitations (e.g., sovereign immunity). Courts may interpret the U.S. Constitution and duly enacted laws, resolve certain controversies over separation of powers, award money damages, and issue injunctions and writs of habeas corpus.

***2.2:** How is the fulfillment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?*

Congress has enacted the UCMJ, which empowers the President and the military chain of command to exercise effective discipline over the armed forces. The President has implemented this legislation in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which provides detailed rules on the conduct of judicial and non-judicial proceedings for all of the Military Departments. The exercise of this disciplinary power is also subject to independent judicial review by a civilian court, subject to ultimate review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In addition, the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) provides criminal penalties for anyone who “except in cases and circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.” As implemented under DoD policy, the Armed Forces of the United States (including active or the reserve components when acting under Federal authority) do not conduct civilian law enforcement activities unless otherwise authorized by law to do so. For example, the U.S. Armed Forces ordinarily cannot be used to enforce civil laws in the United States. This does not include military law enforcement functions related to military personnel and DoD installations.

The basis and rules for the collection of intelligence and conduct of intelligence operations are clearly prescribed publicly by statute and executive orders. The statutory framework for U.S. intelligence is found in the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401-504), as amended, including significant amendments establishing a new Director of National Intelligence, found in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, authorizes DoD to conduct certain intelligence activities, and establishes funding rules, accountability to civilian leadership, and congressional oversight. Among other things, the National Security Act requires that certain congressional committees be kept fully and currently informed of U.S.

intelligence activities. The key Executive Order in this regard is E.O. 12333, dated December 4, 1981, as amended by E.O. 13355, dated August 27, 2004; and E.O. 13470, dated July 30, 2008. There are also numerous legislative provisions that protect privacy and access to information.

2.3: *What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?*

The U.S. Armed Forces are at all times subject to the control and authority of the President, who is an elected official, and the Secretary of Defense, who is appointed from civilian life. Congress also exercises its legislative authority to regulate the Armed Forces. The exact division of authority between the President and the Congress is a matter of frequent debate, but it is clear that the Armed Forces are at all times subject to the collective authority of the elected and appointed officials of the Executive Branch and the elected officials of the Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government.

The members of the National Guard are under the authority of the Governors of their States when not in Federal service. When in Federal service under U.S. law, the members of the National Guard have the same status as members of the regular Armed Forces, for all practical purposes. When called to active duty, members of the reserve forces are subject to the same conditions of service as members of the regular Armed Forces. The importance of the reserves and the National Guard has greatly increased, as they have been regularly called up for duty for military installation security, peacekeeping, and other military operations. This is particularly significant in specialized areas such as civil affairs and military policing where the military personnel with these needed skills are concentrated primarily in reserve and National Guard units.

The Federal Government agencies involved in protection of the internal security of the United States include, inter alia, the FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service within the Department of Justice, and the Secret Service, ICE, and the Coast Guard within DHS (except when the latter is operating as a specialized service under the Navy in time of war or when directed by the President: by statute, the Coast Guard is a military service and branch of the Armed Forces). Each of these agencies is under the authority of the President and cabinet officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Relevant committees of the Congress exercise oversight of these Federal agencies. In cases where these agencies work in concert with active Armed Forces, it is normal to draw up a memorandum of understanding to provide for respective responsibilities and financial arrangements. In some cases, the civilian agencies may request support that the active Armed Forces may provide on a reimbursable basis.

The intelligence services of the United States operate under the direction and oversight of the President and senior officials appointed by the President. They are also subject to congressional intelligence oversight.

State and local police forces are subject to the control of elected executive officials and legislative officials of elected state and local governments, and to the judicial review of the courts.

Many of the specific statutes that apply to DoD are contained in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which prescribes the functions of DoD, its powers, and its key officials. It prescribes the organization and functions of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the reserve components, and their inter-relationships. Special authorities provide for military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (Chapter 15), security cooperation (Chapter 16), humanitarian and other assistance to foreign countries (Chapter 20), DoD intelligence matters (Chapter 21), and the UCMJ (Chapter 47). Title 10 also includes provisions pertaining to training, pay, procurement, and financial accountability. There are statutory positions such as the General Counsel of the DoD, and the General Counsel of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Judge Advocates General of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, who ensure provision of proper legal advice, reviews of programs and operations, and oversight. Also of particular importance is DoD Directive 5500.07, "Standards of Conduct," dated November 29, 2007, and the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) that implements it. These directives apply to all DoD personnel and establish rules to implement the principle of public service as a public trust, and to ensure that U.S. citizens can have complete confidence in the integrity of DoD and its employees. These directives cover the areas of conflicts of interest, political activities, use of benefits, outside employment, financial disclosure, and training. Federal law also has established the Offices of Inspectors General. DoD and the separate Military Departments have independent Inspectors General who conduct inquiries into allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. Further, the Inspectors General review current organizational matters and provide advice to the civilian and military leadership on whether there are better or more efficient ways to obtain the same or better results.

With regard to Standards of Conduct, the United States participates in exchanges with many countries regarding military legal matters. Standards of conduct are part of the discussions during such exchanges. U.S. military personnel continue to meet with military and civilian officials in other countries to discuss military personnel issues and standards of conduct for military and civilian defense personnel. Uniformed legal personnel have visited countries in Eastern Europe, South America, Africa, and Asia to provide lectures and instruction on discrete legal topics.

3. Procedures related to different forces' personnel

3.1: What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?

Procedures for recruitment for the regular Armed Forces and their reserve and National Guard components are established by statute. Although authority for compulsory recruitment ("the draft") still exists, it has not been exercised since 1973. Since that time, all recruitment into the U.S. Armed Forces has been on a voluntary basis. The minimum age for enlistment in the Armed Forces is 18 years, or at age 17 with parental consent. Discrimination in recruiting on grounds of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin is prohibited. U.S. law establishes conditions under which the President has the authority to order members of the reserve and National Guard to active duty.

On May 25, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict that requires States Parties to raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces to an age greater than 15 years and commits States Parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces under age 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities. The Protocol also bars compulsory recruitment below age 18. The United States signed the Optional Protocol on July 5, 2000, and became a party to the Optional Protocol on December 23, 2002. The United States declared at that time that the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into the Armed Forces was 17. The United States also provided the following understanding:

...with respect to Article 1 of the Protocol

(A) the term “feasible measures” means those measures that are practical or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations;

(B) the phrase “direct part in hostilities”-

(i) means immediate and actual action on the battlefield likely to cause harm to the enemy because there is a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy; and (ii) does not mean indirect participation in hostilities, such as gathering and transmitting military information, transporting weapons, munitions, or other supplies, or forward deployment; and

(C) any decision by any military commander, military personnel, or other person responsible for planning, authorizing, or executing military action, including the assignment of military personnel, shall only be judged on the basis of all the relevant circumstances and on the basis of that person's assessment of the information reasonably available to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or executed the action under review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to light after the action under review was taken.

3.2: *What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?*

As indicated above, no individual has been compelled to enter military service since 1973. Existing statutes authorizing compulsory service provide an exemption from service for persons who have conscientious objections to any military service. They also provide for assignment to noncombatant duties for those who do not object to all military service, but who have conscientious objections to performing combatant duties. Individuals whose conscientious objections crystallize after they have entered military service may be honorably discharged administratively.

3.3: *What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces' personnel as well as conscripts?*

The UCMJ provides procedural guarantees for courts-martial that are similar to the rights enjoyed by defendants in the civilian criminal courts, and in some respects exceed civilian

standards (e.g., counsel is provided without cost and without any means testing for both trial and appellate proceedings). Both military judges and defense counsel are assigned to separate commands reporting to the Office of their respective Military Department Judge Advocates General (or for Marine Corps defense counsel to the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps) in Washington, DC, to prevent any inference of command influence on their performance of duty. The court-martial system has an appellate system that allows those convicted of serious offenses to seek review of their cases by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Each judge of the Court, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate from civilian life. In accordance with Federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court may also review convictions by courts-martial to ensure that defendants were not denied any constitutional rights and that the proceedings were not contrary to law.

Administrative proceedings are conducted in accordance with procedures and standards established by Congress and the President, and Federal courts are available to review claims of unfairness or illegality in such proceedings. Federal statutes guarantee the right of military personnel to file complaints with the Inspector General of their Military Department and with the Inspector General of DoD, and to communicate freely with members of Congress. DoD policies permit military personnel to exercise their religion freely, to participate in certain political activities during non-duty time and in their personal capacity, and to vote in elections on the same basis as other citizens.

Also available to military personnel and their families is an extensive legal assistance program that provides legal advice and services in regard to wills and powers of attorney, matrimonial matters, debt issues, and taxes. This support is especially important to military personnel deploying on overseas missions and to the families who remain behind. Military personnel being deployed on overseas missions receive as part of their deployment processing a review of the documents and legal issues that would be important to them while away from their families. There is also a program to ensure that military personnel are aware of their right to vote, and that assistance is given in applying for and mailing absentee ballots.

4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law

4.1: *How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g., through military training programmes and regulations?*

DoD Directive 2311.01E (DoD Law of War Program) provides DoD policies and responsibilities ensuring DoD compliance with the Law of War obligations of the United States. Among other elements, the Directive requires the heads of the DoD components to institute and implement effective programs to prevent violations of the Law of War, including through Law of War training and dissemination. The DoD components have established training and dissemination programs under which (1) all persons entering the U.S. Armed Services receive general training on the Law of War; (2) individuals receive specialized Law of War training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities (e.g., ground combatants, aircrew, naval personnel, military police, religious personnel, and medical personnel); (3) refresher training is provided as appropriate; and (4) Law of War topics are included in exercises and inspections.

Although all of the Military Departments have previously published many respected works on the Law of War, which have served as valuable resources for their personnel, DoD published the DoD Law of War Manual in 2015 and updated it in 2016. The purpose of the manual is to provide information on the Law of War to DoD personnel responsible for implementing the Law of War and executing military operations. The manual was the result of a multi-year effort by military and civilian lawyers from across DoD to develop a department-wide resource on the Law of War for military commanders, legal practitioners, and other military and civilian personnel. The manual has been updated twice since 2015 and will continue to be updated periodically. The manual is publicly available at: <http://ogc.osd.mil/>. In addition to the DoD Law of War Manual, the public may also review other official documents related to U.S. military practice in the law of war on the same website.

4.2: What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?

For military personnel and units assigned to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian, or other operations, for example, units operating with KFOR in Kosovo or with the “Resolute Support Mission” in Afghanistan, special training is provided in the law of armed conflict rules that are particularly applicable to them. Training standards are coordinated within NATO to ensure that all participating nations are aware of relevant rules and standards. Such training is also practiced in multinational training exercises including PfP programs. Rules of engagement and operations plans are regularly reviewed by both national and NATO attorneys to ensure compliance with Member States’ international legal obligations. Also of note is the requirement to provide training on human rights standards to all personnel deploying to countries in South and Central America. In addition, rigorous training programs continue for U.S. forces both in and outside the United States. The U.S. Armed Forces have vigorously applied Law of War training and principles during the current armed conflict against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, including against ISIS. Despite new challenges and changing circumstances, applicable Law of War principles and rules are scrupulously applied.

4.3: How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?

Congress has enacted the UCMJ, which empowers the President and the military chain of command to exercise effective discipline over the Armed Forces. The President has implemented this legislation in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which provides detailed rules on the conduct of judicial and non-judicial proceedings for all of the Military Departments. The exercise of this disciplinary power is also subject to independent judicial review by a civilian court, and subject to the overall supervision of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) provides criminal penalties for anyone who “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute laws.” As implemented under DoD policy, the military forces of the United States (active or the reserve components when acting under Federal authority) do not conduct civilian law enforcement activities unless authorized by law to do so. For example, this means that the U.S.

military ordinarily cannot be used to enforce civil laws in the United States. This does not include military law enforcement functions related to military personnel and DoD installations.

4.4: *What has been done to provide for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country's armed forces are politically neutral?*

DoD Directive 1344.10, dated February 19, 2008, provides that members of the Armed Forces on active duty should not engage in partisan political activity. They are encouraged to vote, but may not be candidates for political positions. Members of the Armed Forces on active duty shall not participate in political fundraising or campaign activities, rallies, or conventions. The requirements of the Directive are derived from appropriate provisions of the United States Code, including provisions that make certain prohibited conduct criminal offenses. Additionally, Title 10 Section 973 of the U.S. Code limits or prohibits active members of the Armed Forces from accepting employment and from holding or exercising the functions of a civil office in the U.S. Government.

4.5: *How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?*

The United States ensures that its defense policy and doctrine are consistent with international law by having draft DoD policies and other issuances reviewed by lawyers prior to their issuance. More generally, trained civilian and military lawyers at every level within DoD, from the DoD Office of General Counsel to the judge advocates who serve in the field with military units, advise policy-makers, commanders, and other decision-makers on military operations and other activities. There are both civilian lawyers in each Military Department and military lawyers serving with commands at every level. Each Military Service -- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- has senior military lawyers responsible for ensuring that service lawyers are trained and qualified to advise commanders and their staffs.

Section III: Public access and contact information

1. Public access

1.1: *How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?*

The Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance's website provides a link to OSCE activities in the politico-military dimension, from which the public may access information about the Code of Conduct: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/index.htm>.

The Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs website also provides a link to the OSCE homepage: <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/osce/index.htm>.

1.2: *What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?*

The Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance's website provides a link to U.S. responses to the Questionnaire and to OSCE activities in the politico-military dimension: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/c43834.htm>.

1.3: *How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State's armed forces?*

Information related to U.S. Armed Forces and defense is available to the public through official government, including the following websites:

- Department of Defense: <http://www.defense.gov>
- Joint Chiefs of Staff: <http://www.jcs.mil>
- U.S. Army: <http://www.army.mil>
- U.S. Marines: <http://www.marines.mil>
- U.S. Navy: <http://www.navy.mil/index.asp>
- U.S. Air Force: <http://www.af.mil>
- U.S. Coast Guard: <http://www.uscg.mil>

2. Contact information

2.1: *Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.*

The U.S. point of contact for implementation of the Code of Conduct is the Office of Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State. For additional information, please visit: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/index.htm>, or email AVC-ESA-DL@state.gov

Annex I: Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security

The United States has long been one of the strongest advocates for the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which was first codified in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and in post-conflict reconstruction and stressing the importance of their participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Supporting women's participation, voice, and empowerment in decision-making about security issues is key to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. policy recognizes that deadly conflicts are mitigated and resolved, and peace sustained over time, when women are fully involved and consulted in efforts to build peace and security. The WPS agenda seeks to close the gap in women's participation and leadership in preventing conflict, promoting security, and addressing terrorism. It also recognizes the differential impact of conflict on women, calling for efforts to address sexual violence and incorporate their experiences into decision-making about peace/security.

The 2017 Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act requires that U.S. diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance encourage other governments to adopt plans to improve the meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes and decision-making institutions. To this end, the Department of State is investing in efforts to help governments develop national WPS policies, which is a key example of U.S. leadership and promoting burden sharing on WPS. In 2004, the UNSC encouraged governments to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS as part of its call for Member States to take action on women's involvement in security. As of March 2019, more than 80 governments have NAPs or similar policies on WPS (see a real-time updated list at peacewomen.org). To spur more governments to enact national-level action and implementation, a Global Focal Point Network composed of 80+ governments was launched in 2016.

Through peacekeeping assistance and bilateral military engagements, the United States has several outlets to promote reform and women's participation objectives with partner militaries. By promoting gender integration in security sector reform (SSR), we help develop effective security institutions that are more legitimate, effective, and accountable to their populations. When women are present in peacekeeping forces, police, and militaries, a clear message sounds out to societies that women have a central role in establishing policy and ensuring security. Research shows that women in uniform are able to broaden reach, helping identify threats and establish relationships within the community. They can better understand what security means to women and help to bridge the gap between cultures and ways of thinking. Countries undergoing SSR present opportunities to build police and military institutions that reflect their populations, promote human rights, and uphold the rule of law.

The United States also recently unveiled its strategy to Support Women and Girls at Risk from Violent Extremism and Conflict, which takes a holistic approach to address the various ways gender factors into preventing and responding to violent extremism. The strategy will accelerate

the incorporation of influential actors, such as women, into broader counterterrorism initiatives, such as community-engagement efforts. It will close gaps in women's safety and empowerment to unlock their capacity in addressing the effects of violent extremism and identify ways to ensure women have the opportunities and resources to mitigate this threat. Further, this strategy will also explore and respond to the role women and girls play as terrorist actors, recognizing the importance of targeted countering violent extremism (CVE) programs to address women's disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of women foreign terrorist fighters.

For additional information, please visit: <https://www.state.gov/s/gwi/programs>.
